

Madhyamakavatara — Part 2

Chandrakirti · Chandrakirti

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The Entrance into the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatara)

By Chandrakirti

-- CHAPTER 6 ONLY --

*** see other file for the other chapters, etc. ***

(A commentary on Nagarjuna's root text, explaining the identitylessness of self (using the sevenfold reasoning) and phenomena (using the reasoning of the diamond fragments) and discussing the progressively refined view of emptiness on the ten bhumis (Bodhisattva levels) in relation to the ten paramitas (perfections).)

[Note: the core of this text is taken from Shenpen Osel, Issue 13, Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche's commentary on Chandrakirti's The Entrance Into the Middle Way and from Shenpen Osel, Issue 6, A Commentary on the Twenty Emptinesses, by The Venerable Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche. Some titles of sections, and another version of the verses, have been taken from the book "Ocean of Nectar" by Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, 1995.]

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L8: [3. Emptiness of the inner and the outer]

L8: [4. Emptiness of emptiness]

L8: [5. Emptiness of the great]

L8: [6. Emptiness of the ultimate]

L8: [7. Emptiness of the composite]

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 L4: [2.4 Conclusion by way of expressing the good qualities of the ground]

L3: [The Sixth Mind Generation: The Approach (226 verses) – Wisdom]

☿(i.e. The sixth chapter is the main body of the Guide, and the other chapters are the limbs that support it. It presents the stages of the profound path according to Nagarjuna's Fundamental Wisdom.

☿-- The principal intention is to reveal the profound meaning of emptiness.)

☿(i.e. The definition of the sixth ground is a Superior Bodhisattva's path that has abandoned middling-middling, innate true grasping, its principal object of abandonment, and that has attained a surpassing practice of the perfection of wisdom from within the ten perfections.)

L4: [1. Introduction to the sixth ground]

[Students sing songs beginning

- ~ Know the five skandas are like an illusion;
- ~ All the images conjured up by a magician;
- ~ Like a dream, like an illusion;
- ~ There are two ways of seeing everything . . .
- ~ See page 59.]

To Lama Tashi and to everyone, a very warm tashi delek this morning. May you all manifest the great radiance of the true nature of mind, which is Buddha nature, clear light.

The true nature of mind, Buddha nature, contains within it the seeds of both compassion and wisdom. By first receiving the instructions on how to cultivate compassion, we can cultivate it and cause it to grow and grow, and by receiving teachings of wisdom to which we listen and on which we reflect, we can cause our wisdom also to increase and increase. Therefore, it is Rinpoche's aspiration that we do so, so that we will be able to perform the benefit of

others and at the same time cause the confusion of dualistic appearances that exists in our minds to disappear, thereby accomplishing the two forms of benefit, benefit for self and others, in a spontaneous and natural way. This is Rinpoche's aspiration for us.

The twentieth century has been a century of great material prosperity and of great scientific advancement. Therefore, it is very important for all of us who are dharma practitioners to accumulate the wealth of the wisdom of listening to, reflecting on, and meditating on the teachings of the genuine dharma.

The dharma jewels of the wisdom of listening, reflecting, and meditating cannot be stolen by any thief, and therefore they are the greatest wealth of all. Since they benefit both self and other, they are the greatest wealth of all. Since they are able to wipe away confusion, they are the greatest wealth of all. Since they help us to realize that suffering is not real, they are the greatest wealth of all. Since they enable us to gain inner peace, they are the greatest wealth of all. Since they help us to realize the equality of friends and enemies, they are the best friends we have. Therefore, amass the wealth of the wisdom of listening, reflecting, and meditating.

Today's topic of explanation is a chapter from a text composed by the glorious Chandrakirti. This author Chandrakirti had an incredible life and performed many miracles, such as the one described in the following verse:

- ~ The glorious Chandrakirti milked the painting of a cow,
- ~ Thereby sustaining the sangha,
- ~ And reversing everyone's clinging
- ~ To things as being real. How miraculous!

And another of Chandrakirti's miracles is described in this way:

- ~ The glorious Chandrakirti
- ~ Exhorted two mighty stone lions to roar,
- ~ Causing Duruka's army to flee
- ~ Without killing or wounding a single person— how miraculous!

We are examining Entrance to the Middle Way, a text written by this being who lived such an incredible, miraculous, and wonderful life. Chandrakirti taught this text in the form of ten different chapters, each corresponding to a different one of the ten transcendent perfections and a different bodhisattva ground. On each ground a different transcendent perfection is predominant in the activity of the bodhisattva. We have now reached the sixth.

The outline for this sixth chapter has three main parts.

1. The first is a brief explanation of the one who is realizing emptiness, also called an explanation of the essential nature of this particular bodhisattva ground.
2. The second is an extensive explanation of emptiness as perceived by the bodhisattva on this ground.
3. And the third is a conclusion and summary by means of expressing the qualities of this ground.

L4: [2. Explanation of the sixth ground]

- [2.1 The etymology of this ground and the surpassing perfection of wisdom]
- [2.2 A praise of the perfection of wisdom]

-- [2.3 An explanation of the profound thatness of dependent arising]

-- [2.4 CONCLUSION BY WAY OF EXPRESSING THE GOOD QUALITIES OF THE GROUND]

L5: [2.1 The etymology of this ground and the surpassing perfection of wisdom]

The first verse reads:

\ ###
\ The perfect bodhisattvas whose minds rest in the equipoise of the approach
\ Approach the qualities of Buddhahood.
\ They see the suchness of dependent arising
\ And from abiding in wisdom, they will attain cessation. (1)

\ ///
\ [VI.1]
\ 44.
\ Abiding in a mind of meditative equipoise on Approaching (6),
\ He approaches the state of complete Buddhahood.
\ He sees the thatness of dependent arising,
\ And through abiding in wisdom (6) attains cessation.

¢(i.e. In the scripture emptiness is often called 'thatness' because it is the ultimate nature of phenomena.

¢-- It is important to distinguish the absorption of cessation from the concentration of perfect liberation of cessation, and the absorption without discrimination (letting our mind go blank, without any manifest thoughts or feelings. This is the meditation taught by the Chinese monk Hashang.)

¢-- "The definition of perfection of wisdom is a wisdom maintained by Bodhicitta that realizes the ultimate nature of phenomena.

¢It has two divisions: the transcending perfection of wisdom and the transcendent perfection of wisdom."

¢-- He sees that "everything is empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen". He sees that the Two Truths are not different, not the same. He sees that "Never are any existing things found to originate from themselves, from something else, from both, or from no cause". He sees that everything is not existent, not non-existent, not both existent and non-existent, not neither existent nor non-existent.)

There are two names given this ground. The one first given in this commentary is "The Approach," which indicates that at this point the bodhisattva is getting very close to attaining the qualities of enlightenment. In other texts it is called "The Manifest," because in the bodhisattva's meditative equipoise, they are able to manifest incredible realization of the nature of reality, transcending all conceptual fabrications. The root verse here follows the name, "The Approach," and the commentary states that the bodhisattvas at this point in their development rest their minds in the incredibly wonderful equipoise of the approach of the sixth ground. At this time their minds have completely and directly understood, have completely become expert in the direct meditative realization of the truth—the truth of the way things appear, which is relative or superficial reality, and the truth of how things actually are, which is genuine or ultimate reality. Through the power of having realized these two truths so well, they understand fully in their hearts or in their mind-streams, the dharmata, the true reality of the world, which is that whatever appears is a merely dependent arising, just as whatever reflections arise in a mirror or in water,

arise in dependence on other factors. And since everything [that appears in our minds, in the world, and in our experience of the world] is just dependently arisen, then everything is of the nature of emptiness. This is what sixth-bhumi bodhisattvas perfectly see.

The first five bodhisattva grounds are focused on the truth of the path.* Here on the sixth ground, bodhisattvas approach the attainment or the manifestation of the Buddha's qualities. So here in the commentary we get these two names back to back. In the root text it says "approach," and then in the commentary it also says alternatively you can say "manifestation." Why? Because they approach the attainment of the manifestation of the Buddha's qualities and they see the suchness of everything that appears in this life. They see the suchness of all the phenomena that are comprised of form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and phenomena that appear to the mind. They see the suchness of these phenomena, that they are mere appearances that arise due to the coming together of causes and conditions. The suchness of these dependent arisings is that they are empty of any inherent existence. Having realized that, seeing that, they abide in the supreme transcendent perfection, the supreme paramita of prajna, the paramita of wisdom. And because of that abiding in prajnaparamita, they will attain cessation. This is the cause of their attaining the truth of cessation. Now what is this cessation? The commentary explains. It is not the cessation that the arhats of the shravakayana and the solitary sages, the pratyekaBuddhas, realize. That type of cessation is a mere stopping of the activity of the seven consciounesses, the seven excluding the alaya consciousness. It is not that type of cessation. Rather it is the realization of perfect freedom from all conceptual fabrications, the realization of the simplicity which is free of any extremes, be they the extremes of existence and non-existence, appearance and emptiness, truth and falsity, and so forth. That is what cessation refers to here.**

~ *Editor's note: Here Rinpoche is referring to the fourth of the Four Noble Truths, the truth of the path leading to the cessation of suffering. The first three of the Four Noble Truths are the truth of suffering, the truth of the origin of suffering, and the truth of the cessation of suffering.

~ **Editor's note: From the standpoint of wisdom, the bodhisattva path to Buddhahood is entirely concerned with realizing the wisdom of emptiness, suchness, dharmata, the true nature—all of which are synonyms, more or less, of the same experience, discussed from different perspectives of relative truth. As beginners, we start out practicing ordinary virtues, abandoning the ten unvirtuous actions and adopting the ten virtuous actions, while practicing meditation and mindfulness, and listening to and studying the Buddha's teachings. This is all very path-oriented, consisting of practices understandable and practicable by beginners whose minds are still locked in dualistic perception. However, if the student practices sincerely, diligently, and energetically, then gradually, based on the blessings of the lama, they will begin to have momentary experiences of suchness or emptiness or dharmata, what the Vidyadhara Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche called "glimpses." At this point, these experiences come unexpectedly, are momentary, and cannot be reproduced at will by the student. If the student becomes attached to such experiences, grows proud of them, afraid of them, or becomes fixated on them in any way whatsoever, then these experiences can even become an obstacle to the student's further development. But if the practitioner continues to practice sincerely with one-pointed diligence and exertion, sooner or later, whether in this lifetime or in a future lifetime, they will definitely experience a decisive understanding of emptiness, which is called the "Path of Seeing," and is the experience that establishes one in and marks the beginning of the first bodhisattva ground as described in

this text. At this point the bodhisattva can enter into the meditation on emptiness at will; in fact, according to Khenpo Rinpoche, the bodhisattva's realization of emptiness during meditation is the same as the Buddhas', though not as vast or extensive. Apart from the inconceivable vastness and extensiveness of a Buddha's realization, the principal difference between a Buddha and a bodhisattva lies in the fact that the Buddha's realization or awareness remains the same during post-meditation as it is during samadhi, while the bodhisattva experiences the world like a dream or like an illusion or like one of the other analogies of emptiness. The bodhisattva then continues to practice the same path of abandoning unvirtuous actions and adopting virtuous ones as described in the noble eight-fold path, the ten unvirtuous actions, the ten virtuous actions, and the six or ten paramitas, that we as ordinary practitioners practice, except with increasing freedom from fixation on the three spheres of the one performing the virtue or act, the virtue or act itself, and the one in reference to whom the virtue or act is being performed. By the time the bodhisattva reaches the sixth ground, based on following the path of the first five grounds, the maintenance of this awareness of emptiness in all activities, this awareness of suchness or dharmata, has become the bodhisattva's main practice. Although the wisdom mind realizing emptiness is the profoundest understanding of the path leading to the cessation of suffering and to Buddhahood, it can be seen to be much more cessation-oriented than the path as it has been practiced at earlier stages of development. It is also out of this wisdom mind realizing emptiness or the true nature that all the qualities of the subsequent four bodhisattva grounds—skillful means, aspiration, power, and jnana—and all the qualities of Buddhahood grow. Thus prajna paramita is called the mother of all the Buddhas.

L5: [2.2 A praise of the perfection of wisdom]

To explain how important it is to realize emptiness if one wishes to attain the state of Buddhahood, the next verse is taught:

```
\      ###
\      Just as a person with eyes
\      Can easily lead a whole group of blind people wherever they wish to go,
\      So here, the mind endowed with wisdom
\      Guides the blind qualities to the Victor's ground. (2)

\      ///
\      [VI.2]
\      45
\      Just as one person with sight can easily lead
\      A whole group of blind people to where they want to go,
\      Similarly here, wisdom takes those qualities that lack sight
\      And goes to the state of a Conqueror.
```

¢(i.e. Chandrakirti praises the perfection of wisdom by showing how it leads all the other perfections to the resultant grounds of Buddhahood. ... It alone has the power to lead us to the city of enlightenment by removing the two obstructions

¢ -- Even though you familiarize yourself with renunciation (1)

¢ -- And the mind of enlightenment (2),

¢ -- Without the wisdom realizing emptiness (3),

¢-- You cannot cut the root of existence.

¢ -- Therefore, strive to realize dependent arising.

¢-- From: Tsong Khapa in 'Three Principals of the Path'

¢-- Without wisdom the methods -- other paramitas -- cannot finish the job. Enlightenment is not produced, or caused by all the methods, even though those methods are not useless, meaningless, not efficient. It is only by directly seeing the non-dual real nature of one's own mind without using conceptualization that one directly see the real nature of everything, and is thus free from the grasp of all of those illusions created by the mind. One then directly see the real nature of anything as they arise; the inseparability of appearances and emptiness. All attachments and fears automatically disappear by themselves then; everything is self-liberating. There is no more uncontrolled karma formation, no more production of the causes of suffering. One is totally free. This is Nirvana not different or separate, but still not the same as samsara.)

Given the individual who wishes to attain the state of enlightenment so that they can lead all other beings to the same state, training in the wisdom realizing emptiness is very important, because it is this wisdom realizing emptiness that is able to lead the other transcendent perfections like generosity to the ground of enlightenment, to the ground of the Buddha's realization, just as someone with eyes is able quite easily and without difficulty to lead an entire group of blind people to the place where they really want to go. So if we put this in the form of this kind of reasoning, then the meaning becomes clear and easy to understand.

L5: [2.3 An explanation of the profound thatness of dependent arising]

Next comes in three sections the actual explanation of this emptiness that is so very important to realize.

- 1. First is a description of the way emptiness is explained,
- 2. then a description of the vessel to whom emptiness is explained,
- 3. and finally the dharma itself that is explained.

L6: [2.3.1 A promise to explain the profound meaning]

The description of the way emptiness is explained is in the third verse:

```
\    ###
\    The way the bodhisattvas realize the incredibly profound dharma
\    Was explained [by Nagarjuna] with scripture and reasoning.
\    Therefore, just as the noble Nagarjuna did in his texts,
\    So will I explain things here. (3)

\    ///
\    [VI.3]
\    46
\    I shall explain the very profound Dharma
\    According to the works of Superior Nagarjuna,
\    Where it is presented through scripture and reasoning
\    Just as he realizes it.
```

¢(i.e. The preceding chapters of the 'Guide' present the stages of the vast path principally according to Nagarjuna's 'Precious Garland'; now the sixth chapter presents the stages of the profound path according to Nagarjuna's 'Fundamental Wisdom'.

¢-- He does so to indicate that his principal intention in composing the 'Guide' is to reveal the profound meaning of emptiness.

¢-- See biography and writings of Nagarjuna and his works (pp. 148-...).

¢-- He presented a system of reasoning which, because it steers a flawless course between the two extremes of existence and non-existence, became known as the 'philosophy of the middle way'. or 'Madhyamika'.

¢-- Although Wisdom, and Enlightenment, is not caused by reasoning, or by accumulating knowledge, those intellectual exercises permit to help in letting go of strong intellectual attachments.)

So emptiness will be explained here by taking the very profound intention of the Buddha as expressed in the sutras of the second turning of the wheel of dharma and proving their validity with reasoning. And just as the ten bhumis or the ten bodhisattvas grounds are joined with the ten transcendent perfections in the Dasabhumikasutra, the Sutra of the Tenth Bhumi, so that will be the mode of explanation here.

In the precious sutras of the second turning of the wheel of dharma, the Buddha taught that the basic nature of everything is that everything transcends all of our conceptual fabrications about what it might be. In this way he taught the simplicity or the freedom from all conceptual fabrications that is the essential nature of reality. And furthermore, he taught that the nature of appearances is that all appearances are equally like dreams and illusions. They are just mere appearances. The protector Nagarjuna then took these teachings and established them as flawless and valid through logical reasoning, through proofs. Chandrakirti in his turn follows the protector Nagarjuna's example in this regard. And he also explains the ten transcendent perfections as being successively connected to each of the ten bodhisattva grounds.

L6: [2.3.2 Recognizing a suitable recipient for an explanation of the profound meaning]

Next, in the explanation of the vessel or the student to whom these teachings are explained, there is a section on identifying a student capable of receiving these teachings and a section on the way in which good qualities arise in such a student upon hearing these teachings.

Verse four and the first three lines of verse five describe students capable of receiving these teachings:

\ ###
\ Those who even as ordinary beings, upon hearing of emptiness Again and again
experience great happiness within,
\ Have their eyes fill with the tears of joy,
\ And the hairs on their body stand on end, (4)

\ ###
\ Those are people with the seed of the perfect Buddha's mind.
\ They are vessels for the teachings on suchness.
\ They should be taught the truth of genuine reality. . .(5abc)

\ ///
\ [VI.4]
\ 47
\ Even while an ordinary being, if upon hearing of emptiness
\ Great joy arises within again and again,
\ The eyes moisten with tears of great joy,
\ And the hairs of the body stand on end,

\ ///
 \ [VI.5abc]
 \ 48abc
 \ Such a person has the seed of the mind of a complete Buddha;
 \ He is a vessel for teachings on thatness,
 \ And ultimate truth should be taught to him.
 \ After that, good qualities will grow in him.

¢(i.e. If those who are unsuitable recipients listen to teachings on emptiness there is a danger that they might misunderstand and fall into the extreme of non-existence -- nihilism.)

When there is a person who, even though an ordinary individual, upon hearing the teachings about emptiness feels so happy inside that their eyes well up with tears of joy, that their hair stands on end, that they get goose bumps, then this is a person to whom the teachings on suchness should be given, because this is a person in whom the habitual tendencies of the seed of the perfect Buddha's mind are waking up. Is that not wonderful!

At first one is an ordinary individual who has never before heard about emptiness, but then we are introduced to it by means of the analogies that teach that everything is just like an illusion or a dream and is just empty form and nothing more. After hearing about emptiness in this way, we hear more teachings and we think about these teachings with our intelligence and we begin to appreciate them. So we want to learn more. And as we learn more, our confidence in emptiness grows and our certainty in and our appreciation of these teachings gets greater and greater, and we find that we are increasingly happy to hear them.

In fact, we are incredibly fortunate if we are interested in these teachings, because it is so easy not to be interested. It is so easy to believe that this world exists as it appears to exist, just as it is very easy not to recognize a dream when we dream. It is very easy to think that the happiness and the suffering that we experience in this lifetime are in fact real, as they appear to be. And so if somebody is interested in hearing about how these things do not really exist, then they are incredibly fortunate.

When we dream and do not recognize that we are dreaming, then we do not want to hear that things are not real. We do not like that idea, because we have such strong attachment to things as existing as they appear to exist. We want to believe that they exist. And even if we should know that we are dreaming, still we do not want to think that things are not real. We still want to think that they exist as they appear to exist. So the teachings on emptiness, which teach that things are not real, that they are empty of any reality or any validity, are not popular. People generally do not want to hear them.

As we live our lives, we want things to be good. We like to be happy. We like to be surrounded by friends and good circumstances. So we are happy to think that those things exist. We do not like to suffer. We do not like to come into contact with people that we do not like. Therefore, it is an expression of skillful means to present the teachings on emptiness first by teaching that suffering does not really exist, that our enemies are not truly real. In that way, we can teach emptiness in a way that accords with our likes and dislikes. Our enemies and our suffering do not really exist because they are neither one nor many, because they are mere imputed fabrications of conceptual mind, because they are merely dependently arisen appearances. The best way to begin is by proving that the appearances of this life that we do not like, and would rather did not exist, do not in fact exist.

This is a concise explanation of emptiness. Later Rinpoche will give a more extensive explanation.

L6: [2.3.3 How good qualities arise when it is explained to such a person]

Next comes an explanation in two parts of the way in which good qualities arise as a result of hearing teachings on emptiness.

-- 1. First is the way in which the good qualities of the relative— the means, the method—arise.

-- 2. Second is the way in which the good quality of the genuine, primordial awareness, arises.

The good qualities of the relative are presented in the last line of the fifth verse through the first line of the seventh verse:

```
\    ###
\    And all the good qualities coming from that will arise within them. (5d)

\    ###
\    Their discipline is always perfect,
\    They give generously, rely on compassion,
\    Cultivate patience, and the resulting virtue
\    They thoroughly dedicate to enlightenment in order to liberate beings. (6)

\    ###
\    They respect the perfect bodhisattvas. (7a)

\    ///
\    [VI.5d]
\    48d
\    After that, good qualities will grow in him.

\    ///
\    [VI.6]
\    49
\    He will take up and always maintain pure moral discipline,
\    Practice giving, rely upon compassion,
\    Become acquainted with patience,
\    Fully dedicate all his virtues to enlightenment to liberate living beings,

\    ///
\    [VI.7a]
\    50a
\    And have respect for perfect Bodhisattvas.
```

¢(i.e. Having found it, he will do everything in order to never loose that view of emptiness, thus in order to never taking rebirth in a lower realms.)

Their discipline is always perfect. Why is that the case? First such people hear teachings on emptiness and really like them. As a result they want to hear these teachings again and again, not only in this life, but also in future lives. How are we going to be able to listen to these teachings in future lives? If we want to hear the teachings on emptiness in future lives, we have to get a human body or a god's body. And in order to get those bodies, we need good conduct; we need discipline. Without good conduct, we will be born in the hell

realms or as hungry ghosts or as animals, and then we will not be able to hear the teachings on emptiness. And so their discipline is always good, because they want to get that good support for listening to the teachings on emptiness again.

There are two main aspects to this discipline, to this right conduct that is being described here. One conducts oneself in a way that is not harmful to others, and one conducts oneself in a way that is beneficial to others. We abandon harming others and take up conduct beneficial to others. And while doing that we make aspiration prayers that the result of discipline and good conduct will be a good support for listening to the teachings on emptiness again in future lifetimes. When these three come together, then the result is very good.

They give generously. Why? Because it is possible to attain a human birth or birth as a deity but not have the ability to listen to teachings on emptiness, because one has no clothes or no food, because one is poor. Such poverty can create obstacles to receiving teachings on emptiness. A way to make sure that that does not happen is to give to others in this life. By practicing generosity, we ensure that in the future we will have the material means to listen to the teachings on emptiness. So when we give in this life we should make aspiration prayers that the result of this will be that in the future we have sufficient means to be able to listen to teachings on emptiness and to be able to practice these teachings in future lifetimes. We can also aspire or make aspiration prayers that in the future we will find a very peaceful, secluded place in which to meditate, a place abundantly endowed with everything we need to be able to practice shamatha in a very good way that will further our realization of emptiness. We should make these aspiration prayers too.

They rely on compassion. Why? Because merely meditating on emptiness alone is not enough to reach the ground of Buddhahood. One needs compassion as well. If we just meditate on emptiness, we will end up as intermediate Buddhas, solitary sages, pratyekaBuddhas, and that is not our intention. Our intention is to attain highest Buddhahood, and in order to do that, we need both emptiness and compassion. And they cultivate patience. Why? Because they think, "If I get angry, my mind will become agitated and I will forget about emptiness, which is what I really value. I do not want that to happen, so it is better for me to be patient and not get angry." And so they practice patience.

If we get angry, then this fierce anger causes us to forget the view of emptiness. If after that we hold a grudge against somebody, then holding that grudge harms the view of emptiness. It causes it to decay. And so we practice patience, which frees us from anger and resentment.

And then they dedicate all their virtue to the attainment of enlightenment so that all beings can be liberated from samsara. In order to lead all beings to this same state of enlightenment of the Buddhas, they dedicate all of their activity to that end.

They respect the perfect bodhisattvas. Since they themselves love so much to meditate on emptiness, they develop great respect and devotion towards those who have realized it directly and are able to teach them to do the same.

If one does not really like meditating on emptiness, there is no reason to have respect for the noble beings who have realized it. But if one likes to meditate on emptiness and likes to get teachings on how to do so, then one naturally feels great respect and devotion towards those who have mastered this kind of meditation and are able to teach one how to do the same.

An example of this praise and respect is found in the story of the son of Machig Labdron, whose name was Gyalwa Dondrup. He sang many songs in praise of his mother, one of which was called "The Song in Praise of Machig Because She Has Perfected the Six Paramitas." In one verse of this song he sang, "I praise you, my mother; you have realized emptiness. In emptiness there is no anger. You have perfected the practice of patience." Because she had realized emptiness, she could never get angry, and this is the perfection of the practice of patience. And because her son also really liked to meditate on emptiness and wanted to achieve the same state that she had, he offered her this praise. If he had not wanted to do that, he would have had no reason to praise her for these qualities.

Similarly, when Machig Labdron passed into nirvana, Gyalwa Dondrup sang a different song in praise of her at each of the four doors of her cremation shrine—first at the western door, then at the southern door, then at the eastern door, and then at northern door. At each door, he sang a different song in praise of his noble and exalted mother, who was noble and exalted because she had realized emptiness.

At one of those gates he sang a verse in which he praised Machig Labdron in the following way: "Mother, you are the woman who is the prajnaparamita siddha. You are extremely kind to all of the disciples of your lineage. Please bless me and all of your other students, so that we may realize what you have." And so he praises Machig Labdron as the prajnaparamita siddha. Most all other realized siddhas, men and women alike, attain their realization through vajrayana practices, but Machig Labdron was different. She realized emptiness by reading the twelve volumes of the one hundred thousand-verse Prajnaparamita Sutra every day for a month. She read all twelve volumes every day for a month, and through doing that she realized emptiness. And so Gyalwa Dondrup praises her as the prajna paramita siddha. It was because he also wanted to realize emptiness that he praised her in this way. If he had not, then he would not have cared what his mother had done. It would not have made any difference to him. And so we see that it was because she had realized emptiness and because Gyalwa Dondrup had such respect for her having done so, that he made these praises.

How did she realize emptiness? Over and over again, she read verses from the sutra which say things like, "Form is not white; it is not green; it is not red; it is not rectangular; it is not triangular. There is no form." Why is there no form? Because, what is form? Can you say it is white? No, because that would exclude everything that is red. Can you say it is red? No, for the same reason. You cannot define form as anything.* And therefore there is no such thing as form. It is just a mere appearance.

~ *Editor's note: Because every attempt to do so will exclude something else we think of as having form.

And so this has been an explanation of how the relative qualities of method or skillful means arise as a result of the practitioner's liking to hear about emptiness, having great faith in the teachings on emptiness.

L6: [2.3.4 Exhorting those who are suitable recipients to listen]

Next, in the last three lines of verse seven, comes the description of how the ultimate qualities of wisdom arise from liking to hear about emptiness:

\ ###
\ The individual who is skilled in the profound and vast natures
\ Will gradually progress to the ground of Perfect Joy.

\ Therefore, those who wish to do the same should listen [to the teachings about]
this path. (7bcd)

\ ///

\ [VI.7bcd]

\ 50bcd

\ Since beings who are skilled in the ways of the profound and the vast

\ Gradually attain the ground, Very Joyful (1),

\ Those who seek that should listen to this path.

¢(i.e. Therefore, we should study carefully the following instructions on profound emptiness.)

Here "profound" refers to wisdom and "vast" refers to method. The individual who is skilled in the profound and vast natures which have been described in this way does not separate them out and consider them to be different from each other, existing as independent things, because they are not independent things. The one who is skilled in that will progress along the paths—the first being the path of accumulation, the second the path of juncture, and the third the path of seeing, which is the first bodhisattva ground, the ground of perfect joy. Bodhisattvas and other beings who are appropriate vessels for the teachings on emptiness progress along the paths in that way, and those who want to do the same should listen to the profound teachings, which are about to be described.

The individual who wishes to reach the first noble bodhisattva ground, the ground of Perfect Joy, should listen to, reflect upon, and meditate upon teachings about emptiness, because if they do not listen to teachings about emptiness, they will not even know that emptiness exists. They will not even know there is such a thing as emptiness. If they do not reflect on those teachings, they will never eliminate their doubts. They will never come to certainty. And if they do not come to certainty through reflection, then they will not be able to meditate [properly or skillfully] on anything. Therefore the individual should listen to, reflect on, and meditate on teachings about emptiness.

The only thing that most people in the world know about emptiness is an empty house, an empty cup, or something like that. They would never dream that these superficial appearances have no inherent nature. Most people have never heard about that, and they will not think of it on their own either. That is why these teachings are so rare, precious, and important.

It is the same in dreams. As ordinary beings, when we dream, we only think that the forms and sounds and smells and things we taste and touch that appear in our dreams are real. We never stop to think that they might not be real. The idea never crosses our minds. The only things we think are empty are cups and houses and space and cars and things like that.

Even though it is the case that all the sights and sounds and smells and things we taste and touch in dreams have no inherent existence, we have no power to give rise to the thought that realizes that. The realization has no strength within us, and so the thought that these things might not be real does not enter our minds. This explains how the thoughts which think things are real obscure our realization of the nature of genuine reality. If you want to know how this works, we need only think of the example of the dream.

L6: [2.3.5 The actual explanation of the profound thatness of dependent arising]

L6: [2.3.5.1 How the correct meaning is revealed in the scriptures : the ten equalities]

In the Sutra of the Tenth Bhumi the Buddha says that bodhisattvas move from the fifth ground

to the sixth through the ten types of equality, the ten ways in which everything is basically the same. What are these ten types of equality?

- 1. The first is that everything is basically the same because nothing has any identifiable signs.
- 2. The second is that everything is basically the same because nothing has any distinguishing characteristics.
- 3. The third is that everything in the future is the same because none of it will ever happen.
- 4. The fourth is that everything in the past is the same because none of it ever happened.
- 5. The fifth is that everything is the same because it is all completely free of happening in the present.
- 6. The sixth is that everything is fundamentally the same because everything is, from the beginning, completely pure.
- 7. The seventh is that everything is basically the same because everything is free from all of our ideas about what they are. They are all of the nature of simplicity, of the nature of the freedom from conceptual fabrications.
- 8. The eighth is that everything is basically the same because none of it need be adopted and none of it need be rejected. There is nothing to adopt and nothing to reject.
- 9. The ninth is that everything is basically the same because everything is equally just like an illusion, a dream, an echo, a water moon, a reflection, and an emanation. There is nothing that is not like that, and everything is like that in an equal way.
- 10. And finally, everything is equal or the same because there is absolutely no difference between something's existing and something's not existing. There is no difference between things that exist and things that do not.

¢(i.e. The principal scriptures that reveal Buddha's ultimate view, the correct meaning of emptiness, are the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. including the Heart Sutra.

¢The ten equalities of phenomena:

- ¢-- 1. The equality of all conventional phenomena in lacking signs
- ¢-- 2. The equality of all conventional phenomena in lacking characteristics
- ¢-- 3. The equality of all conventional phenomena in lacking production
- ¢-- 4. The equality of all conventional phenomena in non-production
- ¢-- 5. The equality of all conventional phenomena in separation
- ¢-- 6. The equality of all conventional phenomena in complete purity
- ¢-- 7. The equality of all conventional phenomena in lacking elaboration
- ¢-- 8. The equality of all conventional phenomena in lacking acceptance and rejection
- ¢-- 9. The equality of all conventional phenomena in resembling illusions, dreams, shadows, echoes, the moon in water, reflections, and emanations
- ¢-- 10. The equality of all conventional phenomena in lacking being thing and non-thing
- ¢-- Each of these ten equalities is mere emptiness, lack of inherent existence. If we understand these we understand the meaning that is the object of meditation of the Bodhisattva on the sixth ground.)

The first of these ten types of equality is the equality of everything because there are no identifiable signs of anything. This refers to when we think, "Oh, this is something clean, this is something dirty, this is my friend, this is my enemy." We have a vast variety of different kinds of thoughts in relation to outer signs, which identify these things as being one or the other for us. Things seem to have on the outside certain qualities of being one way or the other. But none of these really exists, and bodhisattvas in meditative equipoise

do not perceive any such distinctions like those between things. How can we understand that? Well, it is helpful to think of the example of the dream. We can dream of some things being very beautiful and clean and of other things being ugly and displeasing. We can dream of friends and enemies, and all of these things appear to have different characteristics, different signs which identify them. But in fact, none of these characteristics or signs really exist. This example is helpful for us, because we cannot really conceive of what the meditative equipoise of noble beings is like. But we can have some understanding of dreams and of how it is that the signs of things, the marks of things that appear to us in dreams, in fact, do not really exist.

In a dream we have many different kinds of thoughts, which cling to the existence of signs and marks that seem to identify things, but, in fact, none of the marks in dreams, none of the identifying signs, exists. And it is the same in waking life. In the waking state we have a great variety of different kinds of thoughts which express a belief in the existence of identifiable signs which these thoughts think they perceive, but in fact none of these signs which identify things to us exists.

Next is the equality of things because there are no distinguishing or defining characteristics. What is this talking about? This refers to a way of analysis that understands that there are two things happening: there is an object that has its own individual characteristics, and then there is the name that we give to that object. For example, in the case of fire, there is the thing that is actually hot and burning, and then there is the name fire, which we give to that thing. Here we are talking about the thing itself, that which is called the basis for imputing the name. In the case of fire, it is that which is actually hot and burning. Many different kinds of these distinguishing characteristics can appear to us in dreams, but none of them really exists. Therefore, all phenomena are equal because there are no distinguishing or defining characteristics. Things do not have their own individual characteristics.

The third is that everything in the future is the same in that it never will arise. Nothing will ever happen. Arising in the future does not happen. None of it will ever come into existence. Why? Because arising itself is just a mere appearance. There is really no such thing as arising. It is just the mere appearance of the coming together of causes and conditions.

The fourth is that everything is the same, of the nature of equality, in that nothing in the past ever happens. Everything is just like appearances in a dream. We could have had a dream last night, and lots of different things could have seemed to have happened. But none of it really did happen. And everything that we experience in the past in our waking state is the same way. None of it has ever really come into being.

The fifth is that everything is the same, of the nature of equality, because everything is completely free. Free of what? Free of happening in the present. So the third is that nothing in the future is going to happen. The fourth is that nothing in the past has happened, and the fifth is that, if there should be any arising in between those two, any process of present happening, that is not really happening or arising either.

Even though a finger snap is something very coarse,* still we can see that, if we line up all the instants of time the length of a finger snap that have occurred in the past, and then line up all the instants of time the length of a finger snap that will occur in the future, we will find that there is no gap between the last past instant of time and the

first future instant of time. That there is nothing there. And so there is no present process of birth or arising or happening.**

~ *Editor's note: By some Buddhist calculations of time, there are 60 moments of time in the duration of one finger snap.

~ **Editor's note: When you try to find the "process" of any activity, you can't find the instant in which it happens, because between all the past instants and all the future ones there isn't any thing there.

We can look at suffering in the same way. If we look at all of the suffering we have had in the past up until this moment, and from this moment, at all of the suffering we are going to experience in the future, then in between these two there is nothing. There is nothing in between these periods of time. And so there is no such thing as present suffering.

It is the same with death. There is all the time before you die and then there is all the time after you die. But in between those two there is nothing. There is no process of death. If death really happens, when does death happen? It does not happen when you are alive, and it does not happen after you are already dead, and there is nothing in between those two states, because you are either alive or dead—there is no third possibility! There is no point of death. This is why people who die never know at what time they die. There is no such point. When you try to find the "process" of any activity, you can't find the instant in which it happens, because between all the past instants and all the future ones there isn't anything there. Thus the lord of yogis, Milarepa, sang, "I've gained confidence that there is no arising. This swept away my taking past and future lives as two, exposed all six realms' appearances as false, and cut right through believing all too much in birth and death."

It is the same with getting angry. In between all of the anger of the past and all of the anger there will be in the future, there is nothing. There is no time there for any present anger to exist in. And so anger is not real.

The sixth is that everything is the same, of the nature of equality, because everything is completely pure, primordially pure. The purity of phenomena was not created by any one. Nobody takes—even Buddhas do not take—impure things and make them pure, because it is the very nature of things to be pure. That is how they naturally are, and that is how they have always been. The way in which they are completely pure is described in the heart sutra where it says, "There are no stains. There is no freedom from stains." This is the way things have been from beginningless time. They have always been free of any flaw. With regard to sentient beings, we have a vast variety of different kinds of thoughts. Some of them are very good, and some of them are vile and base. But whatever type of thought there might be, its essence has always been completely pure.

The seventh type of equality is that all things transcend all conceptual fabrications about what they might be. This means that you cannot say that things exist; you cannot say that they do not exist; you cannot say that there are things; and you cannot say there are no things. The nature of reality is beyond all of these conceptual fabrications.

In dreams there appear to be different types of characteristics and qualities of things, and we think that these characteristics and qualities exist. But, in fact, none of them do. And so the nature of the many different things we perceive in dreams also transcends all conceptual fabrications about what they might be.

The eighth type of equality is that in everything there is equally nothing to adopt and nothing to reject or get rid of. Here this means that there is nothing we need to bring in from the outside. There is nothing outside that we somehow need to get. And similarly, there is nothing inside that we need to get rid of.

In a dream, if we do not know we are dreaming, it can appear as though there is something we need to get from the outside, and it can appear as though there is something inside that we need to get rid of. But in fact, since it is just a dream, these do not really exist. There is nothing that we need to get and there is nothing we need to get rid of. And so this is how it is in the waking state as well. Thinking about the dream example helps us to understand how this is the case.

The ninth way that everything is basically the same is that everything is like an illusion, a dream, an optical illusion, an echo, a water moon, a reflection, or an emanation. These seven examples illustrate through analogies how it is that things are the undifferentiability of appearance and emptiness. These analogies are taught because we need to realize that everything is appearance-emptiness undifferentiable, and what helps us do that are the examples of these empty forms. So we should sing the verse by Nagarjuna on illusion, because in that verse there are three examples given, and the point in each is the same.

- ~ Like a dream, like an illusion,
- ~ Like a city of gandharvas,
- ~ That's how birth, and that's how living,
- ~ That's how dying are taught to be.

When we think about our feelings of happiness or sadness, our feelings of joy or of pain, then the dream example is very helpful, because we experience these feelings in dreams, but then we wake up and know that none of it was real. So, when we experience those types of feelings in the waking state, it is very helpful to think of the dream example. When we are going around in the big city, then the example of a city of gandharvas is very helpful. To think of it as just being a city of these [disembodied, ghost-like, smell-eating] spirits.

And now in these times advanced machines can produce all kinds of different images. The example that is helpful here is the example of an illusion, because if the causes and conditions come together for these things to appear, then they do; and if the causes and conditions do not come together, then they simply do not appear.

The appearance of an illusion requires a great number of causes and conditions to come together. If even one of these is not present, then the illusion will not be able to be seen very clearly at all, if at all. One of these very important causes is the observer of the illusion. If there is no observer then there is no illusion. You have to have eyes to see it.

With movies and email, if all of the causes and conditions come together, then they can be seen. This includes as a necessary cause somebody to look at them. If there is nobody to look at them, then there is nothing really there. There is nothing really happening.

The tenth and last type of equality is the equality of entity and non-entity, or of something and nothing. In all of this we are doing a lot of refuting of existence, of there being something. Therefore, it might seem as though there were nothing. But, in fact, there is neither something nor nothing. It is just like in a dream. There appears to be something,

on the one hand, and nothing, on the other hand, but in fact, neither the something nor the nothing really exists.

If, from among all of these ten types of equality, we can understand how it is that nothing really happens, that nothing really arises, then the rest is easy to understand. Gaining understanding of this key point allows all the other points to be understood very easily. Therefore,

L6: [2.3.5.2 Identifying the negated object]

¢[i.e. not covered in Rinpoche's commentary]

¢(i.e. For the Madhyamika-Prasangikas something would be truly existent if it existed in any way independent of conceptual thought. ... They say that all phenomena without exception are merely imputed by thought, and do not exist from their own side in the least.

¢-- The object of refutation, according to the Madhyamika-Prasangika school, is "inherent existence", or existence from its own side.

¢-- Any mind that apprehends inherent existence phenomena is a true-grasping mind and a wrong awareness.

¢-- The full impact of meditation on emptiness is achieved only when we clearly identify how inherently existent phenomena appear to our minds, and then realize that there are no inherently existent phenomena. The Madhyamika-Prasangika school says that all phenomena without exception are merely imputed by thought, and do not exist from their own side in the least.

¢-- To identify the subtle negated object, inherent existence, we first need to understand how all phenomena are merely imputed by conceptual thought. There are three ways in which we can understand this.

¢---- By means of scriptures: ... All these worlds and all their inhabitants are merely imputed by thought. They have no creator other than conceptual mind. ... No matter how much we search, we shall never find a world that is independent of conceptual imputation. Therefore the world depends entirely upon mind for its existence. ... The entire world arose due to karma, and karma arises from mind; therefore the actual creator of this world is mind (But this doesn't mean that everything is non-existent, or from a real transcendental mind-only as the Yogacara thinks).

¢---- By means of analogies: .. the analogy of the imagined snake on the road ... similarly, sentient beings observing their aggregates in the darkness of their ignorance mistakenly apprehend an inherently existent I. This mind grasping at an inherently existent self is the root of samsara and the source of all fear. To remove the fears of samsara we must remove this mind by realizing that there is no inherently existent I. Even then, there will be a danger of the mind grasping at an inherent I recurring if we continue to grasp at inherently existent aggregates. Therefore, the only way to remove the fears of samsara entirely is first to realize the lack of inherent existence of the I, and then to realize the lack of existence of the aggregates.

¢---- By means of reasoning: Trying to find this I ... within the aggregates or separate from the aggregates. But we cannot find it. This I and the aggregates are not separate or different, but not identical or the same. The I does not exist from its own side but is merely imputed by conceptual thought on a valid basis: the five aggregates. ... the same for all phenomena, for all living beings ... All phenomena are 'merely' imputed by conceptual thought. The word 'merely' excludes any mode of existence other than being imputed by conceptual thought. Phenomena do not exist from their own side in any sense whatsoever.

¢-- 'Inherent existence', 'true existence', and 'natural existence' all mean the same, and

all are objects to be negated.

¢-- The method for realizing lack of inherent existence is the reasoning presented in the sixth chapter of the 'Guide', such as 'the reasoning of vajra fragments' and 'the sevenfold reasoning'. When through relying upon this reasoning we realize that there are no inherently existent phenomena at all, we shall have realized emptiness.

¢-- Whereas inherent existence, or true existence, is the object to be negated, grasping at inherent existence, or true-grasping, is the principal object to be abandoned. The object of Buddhism is not to abandon all conceptual minds, and to allow the mind to go blank. -- Hasang's view P.171

¢-- So the object to be negated is true existence, which is existence in any way independent of conceptual imputation; and the object to be abandoned is true-grasping, which is a conceptual mind that apprehends, or conceives, true existence. Although true existence appears to all conceptual minds, not all conceptual minds apprehends, or conceive, true existence. Only those conceptual minds that conceive true existence are true-grasping minds. Virtuous minds such as love, compassion, and Bodhicitta are conceptual minds, but they are not true-grasping minds, and so they are not objects to be abandoned. Only by understanding such distinctions can we practice both the profound path which is the cause of the truth Body of a Buddha, and the vast path, which is the cause of the form Body of a Buddha, and thereby attain full enlightenment.

¢-- Another point: emptiness is a non-affirming negative. p.172 ...)

L6: [2.3.5.3 Establishing the meaning of the scriptures by reasoning]

-- [2.3.5.3.1 Establishing selflessness of phenomena by reasoning]

-- [2.3.5.3.2 Establishing selflessness of persons by reasoning]

¢(i.e. In the 'Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sutra' Buddha says that we should know all other beings as we know our self, and we should know all phenomena as we know living beings. This means that we should first realize the emptiness of our self, then the emptiness of other persons, and then the emptiness of phenomena other than persons. In other words, we should first realize selflessness of persons, and then selflessness of phenomena.

Chandrakirti, however, presents selflessness of phenomena first. His purpose is to dislodge the strong adherence to inherent existence in the minds of those who propound tenets lower than the Madhyamika-Prasangikas ... because they cannot understand how it is possible for things to be produced from causes if neither cause nor effect exists from its own side. For them, the very fact that causes produce effects proves that causes and effects exist from their own side, and therefore that they are inherently existent. To remove this wrong conception, Chandrakirti begins with a refutation of inherently existent production.)

L6: [2.3.5.3.1 ESTABLISHING SELFLESSNESS OF PHENOMENA BY REASONING -- not fully covered in

Rinpoche's commentary]

[not fully in Rinpoche's commentary]

1. [PHENOMENA-1 Refuting the four extremes of production within both truths]

a. [PHENOMENA-A. There is no inherently existent production]

b. [PHENOMENA-B. Proving this by reasoning]

c. [PHENOMENA-B.1 - SELF : Refuting production from self]

d. [PHENOMENA-B.2 - OTHER : Refuting production from other]

e. [PHENOMENA-B.3 - BOTH: Refuting production from both]

- f. [PHENOMENA-B.4 - CAUSELESS : Refuting production without a cause]
- g. [PHENOMENA-C. CONCLUSION - The meaning established by the refutation of the four extremes of production]
- 2. [PHENOMENA-2 Rejecting arguments against this refutation]
 - a. [Phenomena-2.1 The actual rejection of arguments]
 - b. [Phenomena-2.2 A summary]
- 3. [PHENOMENA-3 How dependently-arising production eliminates wrong conceptions that grasps at extremes]
- 4. [PHENOMENA-4 Identifying the result of logical analysis]

L7: [PHENOMENA-1 Refuting the four extremes of production within both truths]

L8: [PHENOMENA-A. There is no inherently existent production]

Chandrakirti focuses in the sixth chapter of this text on proving that nothing really arises. The basis of that discussion and that proof is entirely contained in the first and second lines of the eighth verse, which therefore underlies the whole sixth chapter:

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\   ###
\   It does not arise from itself;
\   how could it arise from something else?
\   It does not arise from self and other together;
\   how could it arise without a cause? (8ab)

\   ///
\   [VI.8.ab]
\   51ab.
\   It does not arise from itself;
\   how can it come from other?
\   Also it is not from both;
\   how can it be without a cause?

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☿(i.e. The reasoning of vajra fragments is as follow. Things are not inherently produced because they are not produced from self, from other, from both self and other, or without a cause. ... These four extremes exhaust all possibilities of inherently existent production; and since none of them exist there is no inherently existent production.)

We should recite this statement, which is the key thesis of this chapter, three times.

[Students recite.]

This text, Entrance to the Middle Way, is studied by all four traditions of Tibetan Buddhism—Kagyü, Nyingma, Sakya, and Gelug. They all study it, and so it would be good if people from all four traditions could get together to recite it together. The way that they meditate upon it may be different, according to the teachings that they respectively receive. But everybody can recite this text together.

When you meditate, you can meditate according to the rangtong view, the shentong view, the mahamudra view, or the dzogchen view, whatever you like. It is up to you as an individual, and there is no need for any disharmony about these things, because it is every individual's choice.

You can also meditate on the deity arising instantly out of emptiness, dissolving instantly into emptiness.

...

The statement found in the first two lines of the eighth verse, that things do not arise from any of the four extremes, is the thesis of this chapter and so we will begin by explaining this briefly.

[Note: I have eliminated the redundancy between the two sessions on this chapter]

L8: [PHENOMENA-B. Proving this by reasoning]

L8: [PHENOMENA-B.1 - SELF : Refuting production FROM SELF]

[not fully covered in Rinpoche's commentary]

¢(i.e. SAME: "this is self-caused (internal), it is in its essence to become like that, and nothing else can change it"

¢-- Meaning: the cause & the effect are the same, One.

¢-- Sakya: (a) that the cause and effect are identical, -- (like "internal")

¢-- The position that maintains that cause and effect are identical was advocated by the Samkhya system, one of the classical systems of Indian philosophy.

¢-- Take the first alternative, which affirms the identity of cause and effect. The Madhyamaka says that, if in fact cause and effect are identical, then having bought cottonseed with the price one would pay for cloth, one ought to be able to clothe oneself with it. The idea that cause and effect are identical thus leads to absurdity. If cause and effect are identical, then there would be no difference between father and son, and also no difference between food and excrement.

¢-- Winter: the non-Buddhist theories of causation which fall in one of four categories: self-causation, is exemplified by the Vedic tradition of asserting the reality of the immutable Universal Soul, atman. Briefly, this declares all effects to be inherent in their cause, which cause is in every case some form of the eternal atman. A problem with self-causation is that the effect must be inherent in the cause. If so, then nothing new has occurred or come to be.

¢-- Williams: 'From themselves' means from their essential nature, and entities do not arise from their own essential natures because: (i) such an origination would be quite pointless, and (ii) it would lead to an infinite regress. If entities already essentially (inherently) exist there is no need to produce them, and if an already essentially existing entity is produced then it is not possible that it should ever be the case that it is not being produced. Thus origination does not occur from the entities themselves. ¢-- This last point requires a little explanation. In Buddhist thought generally something is a cause because it produces its effect - if the cause is present then it does indeed bring about its result. If x causes itself then, having caused itself, x would be present again. Since x is the cause as well as the effect so, being present again, it produces the effect - itself - again. And so on, ad infinitum.)

¢(i.e. In 'Fundamental Wisdom' Nagarjuna refutes production from self with powerful logical reasoning. later, as a commentary to this, Chandrakirti provided additional reasoning to refute production from self. These two sets of reasoning will now be presented:)

Given entities, they do not arise from themselves, because if they did, arising would be both meaningless and endless.

Arising would be meaningless because if things arose from themselves they would have to be both the producer and the produced, which means they would have to exist before they arose.

If they existed before they arose then their subsequent arising would be meaningless, because if something were to exist before it arose that would be in contradiction with sound reasoning. But if, on the other hand, it were the case that even though it existed, it would need to arise again, as is postulated by this thesis, then arising would know no end, because it would exist but still have to arise. Then it would [still] exist and so [still] have to arise. So arising would be endless.

If it needed to arise, even after existing, then what would bring an end to arising? Nothing. Normally, when things exist, that is when we know they have stopped arising, but here it would be the case that something that existed would need to arise, so the arising would go on forever. Therefore, things do not arise from themselves.

Since things do not exist as the producer before they themselves exist as the produced, then things do not arise from themselves.

[Original sub-sections of the commentary]

[1 Refuting production from self with the reasoning from Chandrakirti's commentary]

[1.1 Refuting the system of the Samkhya school]

[1.1.1 Refuting production from a cause that is the same entity]

[1.1.1-i. It follows that production from a cause that is the same entity is pointless]

[1.1.1-ii. That things are produced from the same nature is contrary to reasoning]

[1.1.1-iii. Refuting a denial of these faults]

[1.1.2 Refuting that cause and effect are the same entity]

[1.1.2-i. It follows that the shape and so forth of the sprout are not different from those of the seed]

[1.1.2-ii. Refuting a denial of this fault]

[1.1.2-iii. It follows that both the seed and the sprout are similar in being either apprehendable or unapprehendable at any one time]

[1.2 Even worldly people whose minds are not affected by tenets do not assert production from self]

[1.3 Conclusion from these refutation]

[2 Refuting production from self with the reasoning from Fundamental Wisdom]

[copied from another file:]

L9: [SELF- PRODUCTION.1 Refuting production from self with the reasoning from Chandrakirti's commentary]

L9: [SELF-PRODUCTION.1.1 Refuting the system of the Samkhya school]

¢(i.e. Production from self is asserted by the Samkhyas school, the oldest of the Brahmaic schools.

¢-- Samkhyas: We assert production from self because effects are produced from causes that are the same entity as themselves. For example, when a barley seed meets with appropriate conditions such as moisture and warmth, a barley sprout is produced. Although the seed is the cause and the sprout is its effect, they are both the same entity, or nature. Since a sprout is produced from a seed that is the same entity as itself, there is production from self.)

L9: [SELF-PRODUCTION.1.1.1 Refuting production from a cause that is the same entity]

L9: [SELF-PRODUCTION.1.1.1-i. It follows that production from a cause that is the same entity is pointless]

\ ///
\ [VI.8.c]
\ 51c.
\ There is no point in it arising from itself.

¢(i.e. There is no point in a barley sprout arising from a seed that is the same entity as itself because the sprout already exists at the time of the seed, and so has no need of production.)

L9: [SELF-PRODUCTION.1.1.1-ii. That things are produced from the same nature is contrary to reasoning]

\ ///
\ [VI.8d]
\ 51d.
\ Moreover, it is not reasonable that what has been produced is produced again.

\ ///
\ [VI.9abc]
\ 52abc
\ If you assert that what is already produced is produced again,
\ Then the production from sprouts and so forth is not found here,
\ And seeds will continue to be produced until the end of time.

¢(i.e. If a sprout is the same entity as its seed, it follows that it has already been produced at the time of the seed; and it is not reasonable to assert that what has already been produced is produced again. If you assert that what is already produced is produced again, then two consequences follow. First, sprouts and so forth will never be produced because the production of a sprout follows the cessation of its seeds, and seeds that are forever being produced never cease. Second, once a seed is produced it is produced again, and having been produced again it must be produced yet again, and so on. Therefore it follows that the production of seeds is endless, and so seeds will continue until the end of time.

¢-- If the effect is self-produced from the cause, meaning that they are the same, then why would it produce itself again.)

L9: [SELF-PRODUCTION.1.1.1-iii. Refuting a denial of these faults]

¢(i.e. Samkhyas: We do not have to accept either of the foregoing consequences because we can see clearly that sprouts are produced and that seeds cease. A sprout is produced when its cause, the seed, meets with conditions such as moisture and warmth; and in being produced it causes the seed to disintegrate.)

\ ///
\ [VI.9d]
\ 52d
\ How can it destroy that?

¢(i.e. If the seed and the sprout are the same entity, how can the sprout destroy the seed ? Can a sprout destroy itself ?

¢-- And how could the effect destroy itself - the cause ?)

L9: [SELF-PRODUCTION.1.1.2 Refuting that cause and effect are the same entity]

L9: [SELF-PRODUCTION.1.1.2-i. It follows that the shape and so forth of the sprout are not different from those of the seed]

\ ///
\ [VI.10ab]
\ 53ab
\ For you, the shape, colour, taste, potentiality, and ripening of a sprout
\ Are not different from those of its cause, the seed.

¢(i.e. If a cause such as a seed, and its effect, the sprout, are the same entity, it follows that the shape, colour, taste, potentiality, and ripening of a sprout are not different from those of its seed. However, even worldly people can see that they are different; therefore a cause and its effect are not the same entity.

¢-- For you the cause & the effect are the same, one, and have the same characteristics. That is not what is observed.)

L9: [SELF-PRODUCTION.1.1.2-ii. Refuting a denial of this fault]

¢(i.e. Samkhyas: We do not incur this fault because when a seed produces a sprout, its previous nature is destroyed and it becomes a different entity.)

\ ///
\ [VI.10]
\ 53cd
\ If its previous nature is destroyed and it becomes an entity other than that,
\ At that time how is it the nature of that?

¢(i.e. If in producing the sprout the seed's previous nature is destroyed and it becomes a different entity, how can the seed be the same nature as the sprout at that time ? Surely it is contradictory to say that a seed and its sprout are the same nature, and yet the seed must change its nature to transform into the sprout.)

L9: [SELF-PRODUCTION.1.1.2-iii. It follows that both the seed and the sprout are similar in being either apprehendable or unapprehendable at any one time]

\ ///
\ [VI.11]
\ 54
\ If, for you, the seed and the sprout are not different here,
\ Then either the sprout is unapprehendable just like the seed,
\ Or, since they are the same, that is also apprehendable just like the sprout.
\ Therefore you should not assert this.

¢(i.e. If two visual objects are the same nature they must be produced simultaneously and disintegrate simultaneously. When one appears to sense awareness the other also appears, and if one does not appear to sense awareness the other also does not appear. You Samkhyas assert that a seed is the same nature as the sprout. If that is so, then at the time of the sprout, wither the sprout does not appear to sense awareness just like the seed, or the seed appears to sense awareness just like the sprout. Since neither is the case, you should not assert that a seed and its sprout are the same nature.)

L9: [SELF-PRODUCTION.1.2 Even worldly people whose minds are not affected by tenets do not assert production from self]

\ ///
 \ [VI.12ab]
 \ 55ab
 \ Because, though a cause has disintegrated, its effect is still seen,
 \ Even the worldly do not assert that they are the same.

¢(i.e. Even people who do not propound tenets know that although a cause such a seed has disintegrated, its effect, the sprout, can still be seen. Therefore, they do not assert that a seed and its sprout are the same nature; and so they do not assert production from self. The idea of production from self never arises naturally, but is a mental fabrication that comes from adhering to mistaken tenets. A mind that holds production from self, therefore, is an intellectually-formed delusion, not an innate delusion.)

L9: [SELF-PRODUCTION.1.3 Conclusion from these refutation]

\ ///
 \ [VI.12cd]
 \ 55cd
 \ Therefore this fabrication that things arise from self
 \ Is unacceptable in thatness and in the world.

¢(i.e. This fabrication of the Samkhyas that things arise from self is unacceptable both ultimately and conventionally.

¢-- It is not the ultimate reality, and not even a valid conventional truth.)

L9: [SELF-PRODUCTION.2 Refuting production from self with the reasoning from Fundamental Wisdom]

\ ///
 \ [VI.13]
 \ 56
 \ If production from self is asserted,
 \ Then product and producer, object and agent, are one.
 \ Since they are not one, production from self should not be asserted
 \ Because of the consequences extensively explained.

¢(i.e. The second reasoning to refute production from self : If production from self is asserted, it follows that a cause and its effect are inherently the same nature and so are identical in all respects. Thus a product, such as a sprout, and its producer, the seed, are inherently one.

¢-- As Nagarjuna says in 'Fundamental Wisdom':

¢-- The oneness of cause and effect

¢-- Is not acceptable at any time.

¢-- If cause and effect are one,

¢-- Then product and producer are one.

¢-- Furthermore it follows that an object and its agent are also inherently one. Again, Nagarjuna says in 'Fundamental Wisdom':

¢-- If wood and fire are one,

¢-- Object and agent are one.

¢-- Since a product and its producer are not one, and an object and its agent are not one, production from self should not be asserted. Those who assert production from self incur all the consequences extensively explained in 'Fundamental Wisdom' and 'Guide to the Middle

Way'.)

L8: [PHENOMENA-B.2 - OTHER : Refuting production from other]

[not fully covered in Rinpoche's commentary]

¢(i.e. DIFFERENT: "the cause of this is that (external), and nothing else can change it"

¢-- Meaning: the cause & the effect are different, separate, Two.

¢-- Sakya: (b) that the cause and effect are different, -- (like "external")

¢-- The position according to which cause and effect are different was propounded by the Hinayana schools of Buddhism, the Vaibhashikas and the Sautrantikas, and by some of the Brahmanical schools.

¢-- In the case of the second alternative --that cause and effect are different-- anything could originate from anything else, because all phenomena are equally different. Hence a stalk of rice might just as easily originate from a piece of coal as from a grain of rice, for there would be no connection between a stalk of rice and a grain of rice, and a piece of coal and a grain of rice would have the same relationship of difference to a stalk of rice. Thus the notion that cause and effect are absolutely different is an intrinsically absurd idea.

¢-- Winter: the non-Buddhist theories of causation which fall in one of four categories: Other- or external-causation declares all change to be produced by some form of a deus ex machina, such as God, fate, or a deterministic self-nature. A problem with other-causation is that if cause and effect are different then the relation is lost, and, for example, fire could be produced from water.

¢-- Williams: Buddhapalita (Prasangika) continues: 'Nor could it occur from another entity, because it would follow quite logically that everything could arise from everything else.' Entities are not produced by inherently existent, independently real, others. If x produced y, and they are inherently distinct entities, then we have no actual explanation of causation, since x is equally inherently distinct from z. If we call y the effect of x, equally z would be the effect of x, since in both cases the putative cause and effect are inherently quite distinct.)

How then could things arise from something other than themselves? If they do not arise from themselves, how could they arise from something other than themselves? Entities do not arise from something different from themselves, because at the time the cause is present, the result is not.

When the cause exists, the result does not exist. When the result exists, the cause does not exist. So these have the relationship of thing and nothing. When one exists, the other does not, and therefore a thing does not arise from something other than itself because there is nothing other than itself there from which it could arise. There is only one at a time. For something to arise from something other than itself, there has to be something else for it to be other to, something else for it to be different from. But since only one exists at a time you cannot posit that things arise from something different from or other than themselves.

For example, if you take a finger snap, then first, all the fingers are getting ready and the thought to snap the fingers is getting ready. So all the causes are assembling. But the result does not exist. But when you snap your fingers, then you have the result present, but all the causes are gone at the time the result occurs. And so, regarding causes and results, you only have one present at a time. And since you only have one present at a time, there is

nothing other there for something to arise from, or to cause something else to arise. There is only one. For there to be an "other," there have to be two present at the same time, and so things do not arise from something other than themselves.

So things that are products are not different from the things that are their causes. The result cannot be something different from that which is its cause, because only one is present at a time. And so things do not arise from things which are other than themselves. If they did, then anything could arise from anything else. And the reason is that they are all equally different from each other, and so you could have anything coming from anything.

So causes and results are not other to each other. They do not exist in a relationship in which one is different from the other. Things which are different from each other have to exist simultaneously, as do your left and right hand, or two fingers on the same hand. So if things were to arise from things different from themselves in this way, then anything would be able to come from anything else. Any two simultaneously existent phenomena could be said to be the cause and the result. And that does not make sense.

These two refutations of arising from self and arising from other refute that kind of belief. Any belief that asserts that things arise from themselves is refuted by that. Both the Buddhist tenets (in the less advanced philosophical systems) and the non-Buddhist tenets that assert that things arise from something other than themselves are equally refuted by this reasoning.

There are slight variations in the reasonings presented in this text, depending upon what the other person is falsely ascertaining, but this one basic reasoning covers them all. And so it is the most important one, which is why we select it among many to present.

What would happen in these debates,* is that those who asserted that things arise from something other [from themselves] would come back with their own counter-reasonings, and then these too would be refuted. The whole process of debate would go on in this way. And then, of course, those who assert that things arise from themselves could and can also come up with some clever reasonings of their own, but these also are refuted.

~ *Editor's note: And presumably in the sections of this chapter that Rinpoche did not teach.

[Original sub-sections of the commentary]

[1 A description of the position asserting production from others]

[2 Refuting this system]

[2.1 A general refutation of production from other]

[2.1.1 The actual refutation of production from other]

[2.1.1.1 Refuting production from other in general]

[2.1.1.1-i Refuting by means of the consequence of excess]

[2.1.1.1-ii Refuting a denial of this fault]

[2.1.1.1-iiia The denial of the fault]

[2.1.1.1-iiib Refuting this denial]

[2.1.1.2 Refuting particular production from other]

[2.1.1.2-i Refuting production from other where a cause precedes its effects]

[2.1.1.2-ia The actual refutation]

[2.1.1.2-ib Rejecting arguments against this refutation]

[2.1.1.2-ii Refuting production from other where a cause is simultaneous with its effect]

[2.1.1.3 Refuting production from other having analyzed effects by way of four alternatives]

- [2.1.2 Denying that worldly people can damage this refutation -- THE TWO TRUTHS]
- [2.1.2.1 Denying damage by worldly people's belief in production from other]
- [2.1.2.1-i The argument that there is damage by worldly people]
- [2.1.2.1-ii Showing that there is no damage by worldly people]
- [2.1.2.1-ii-a A general presentation of the two truths]
- [2.1.2.1-ii-a-i All phenomena have two natures]
- [2.1.2.1-ii-a-ii The divisions of conventional truths with respect to the awareness of worldly people]
- [2.1.2.1-ii-a-iii An explanation of correct and incorrect object-possession with respect to the awareness of worldly people]
- [2.1.2.1-ii-b An explanation of correct and incorrect object with respect to the awareness of worldly people]
- [2.1.2.1-ii-c Mistaken conceived objects do not exist even nominally]
- [2.1.2.1-ii-c Applying this to the present subject]
- [2.1.2.1-ii-c An explanation of the respective natures of the two truths]
- [2.1.2.1-ii-c1 An explanation of conventional truths]
- [2.1.2.1-ii-c2 An explanation of ultimate truth]
- [2.1.2.1-ii-d How the charge of damage by worldly people is itself damaged]
- [2.1.2.1-ii-e How there can be damage worldly people]
- [2.1.2.2 Denying damage by worldly people because there is no production from other for the worldly, even nominally]
- [2.1.3 The good qualities of this refutation]
- [2.1.4 There is no inherently existent production at any time]
- [2.1.4.1 Refuting the assertion of inherent existence]
- [2.1.4.1-i It follows that a Superior being's meditative equipoise causes the destruction of things]
- [2.1.4.1-ii It follows that nominal truths can withstand analysis]
- [2.1.4.1-iii It follows that ultimate production is refutable]
- [2.1.4.2 Rejecting an argument against this refutation]
- [2.1.5 The good qualities of refuting inherently existing production within both truths]
- [2.1.5.1 The good quality of easily avoiding extreme views]
- [2.1.5.2 The good quality of great consistency with cause and effect]
- [2.1.5.2-i Not asserting inherent existence does not entail acceptance of a consciousness-basis-of-all and so forth]
- [2.1.5.2-ii Showing by analogy how an effect arises after an action has ceased]
- [2.1.5.2-iii Rejecting arguments against this]
- [2.1.5.2-iiia Rejecting the argument that the ripening of the effect would be endless]
- [2.1.5.2-iiib Rejecting the argument of contradiction with the scriptures that reveal a consciousness-basis-of-all]
- [2.1.5.2-iiib1 The actual rejection of the argument of contradiction with the scripture]
- [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.5.2-iiib2 An analogy of speech through the power of intention]
- [2.2 A refutation of the Chittamatra system in particular]
- [2.2.1 Refuting an inherently existent consciousness without externals]
- [2.2.1.1 Stating the other system]
- [2.2.1.2 Refuting this system]
- [2.2.1.2-i An extensive presentation of the refutation]
- [2.2.1.2-ia Refuting examples of a truly existent consciousness without external objects]
- [2.2.1.2-ia1 Refuting the example of a dream]
- [2.2.1.2-ia1-i The example of a dream does not prove that consciousness is truly existent]

[2.2.1.2-ia1-ii The example of a dream does not prove that there are no external objects when awake]

[2.2.1.2-ia1-iii The example of a dream proves that all things are false]

[2.2.1.2-ia2 Refuting the example of seeing floating hairs]

[2.2.1.2-ib Refuting a consciousness generated from its potential]

[2.2.1.2-ib1 Refuting that a consciousness to which an external object appears is generated or not generated from the ripening or non-ripening of imprints]

[2.2.1.2-ib1-i Stating the other position]

[2.2.1.2-ib1-ii Refuting this position]

[2.2.1.2-ib1-ia Refuting an inherently existent potential with respect to the present]

[2.2.1.2-ib1-ib Refuting an inherently existent potential with respect to the future]

[2.2.1.2-ib1-ic Refuting an inherently existent potential with respect to the past]

[2.2.1.2-ib2 Again refuting that consciousness exists without external objects]

[2.2.1.2-ib2-i Stating the other system]

[2.2.1.2-ib2-ii Refuting this system]

[2.2.1.2-ib3 The refutation of the Chittamatra system is not damaged by the scriptures]

[2.2.1.2-ic This refutation and meditation on unattractiveness are not contradictory]

[2.2.1.2-ii The conclusion from this refutation]

[2.2.2 Refuting the validity of the reason establishing other-powered phenomena as inherently existent]

[2.2.2.1 Refuting self-cognizers as a proof of other-powered phenomena]

[2.2.2.1-i Upon investigation self-cognizers are unacceptable as a proof of other-powered phenomena]

[2.2.2.1-ii Refuting the other's reply that they are acceptable]

[2.2.2.1-ia The actual refutation of the other system]

[2.2.2.1-ib How, according to our system, memory develops even though self-cognizers do not exist]

[2.2.2.1-iii Self-cognizers are unacceptable by other reasoning too]

[2.2.2.1-iv An inherently existent other-powered phenomena is similar to a child of a barren woman]

[2.2.2.2 The Chittamatra system is deficient in both truths]

[2.2.2.3 Therefore it is advisable to follow only the system of Nagarjuna]

[2.2.2.4 Refuting other-powered phenomena is not the same as refuting worldly nominalities]

[2.2.3 The word 'only' in 'mind only' does not exclude external objects]

[2.2.3.1 Explaining the intention of the statement in Sutra on the Ten Grounds that says that there is only mind]

[2.2.3.1-i The Sutra on the ten grounds proves that the word 'only' does not exclude external objects]

[2.2.3.1-ii This meaning is also established in other Sutras]

[2.2.3.1-iii The word 'only' establishes that mind is principal]

[2.2.3.2 External objects and internal mind are the same in either being existent or being non-existent]

[2.2.3.3 Explaining the intention of the statement in Gone to Lanka Sutra that says that there is only mind]

[2.2.3.3-i The statement that there are no external objects but only mind is of interpretative meaning]

[2.2.3.3-ia Showing by means of the scriptures that it is of interpretative meaning]

[2.2.3.3-ia-i The actual meaning]

[2.2.3.3-ia-ii Other Sutras like this are also of interpretative meaning]

[2.2.3.3-ib Showing by means of reasoning that it is of interpretative meaning]
[2.2.3.3-ii A method for recognizing Sutras of interpretative and definitive meaning]
[copied from another file:]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.1 A description of the position asserting production from others]

¢(i.e. The Vibhashika, Sautrantika, and Chittamatra schools are known as 'proponents of things' because they assert that things are truly existent. Whereas all Buddhist schools refute production from self, production from both self and other, and production without a cause, the proponents of things do not refute production from other. In this context, 'production from other' means production from inherently existent other causes, not simply production from other causes. Conventionally all things are produced from causes that are other than themselves; but nothing is produced from inherently existent other causes.

¢-- The proponents of things believe that if causes were not inherently existent they would not be able to produce their effects. Therefore they assert that things are produced from inherently existent other causes. They support their belief with a quotation from Sutra where Buddha says:

¢-- The cause of things are the four conditions that exist by way of their own characteristics.

¢-- Thus they believe that causes and effects are inherently existent and inherently other. This assertion of production from other is now extensively refuted by the Madhyamika-Prasangikas.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2 Refuting this system]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1 A general refutation of production from other]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.1 The actual refutation of production from other]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.1.1 Refuting production from other in general]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.1.1-i Refuting by means of the consequence of excess]

\ ///
\ [VI.14]
\ 57.
\ If other arises in dependence upon other,
\ Then thick darkness arises even from flames.
\ Indeed everything arises from everything
\ Because all non-producers are similar in also being other.

¢(i.e. If an inherently existent other effect arises in dependence upon an inherently existent other cause, then because cause and effect are inherently existent other, they do not depend upon each other, but are completely unrelated. If effects arise from independent and unrelated cause, then thick darkness arises even from the flames that dispel it, rice sprouts arise from barley seeds, and medicinal plants arise from poisonous seeds. Indeed everything, whether effect or not, arises from everything, whether cause or not, because a non-cause is similar to a cause in that both are inherently existent other than, and completely unrelated to, the effect. The assertion of production from other, therefore, grants too much as a consequence.

¢-- If something can be caused by something else separate, unrelated, then anything can spring from anything else.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.1.1-ii Refuting a denial of this fault]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.1.1-ia The denial of the fault]

\ ///
 \ [VI.15]
 \ 58
 \ 'Something that can be produced is definitely called an effect;
 \ And that which has the ability to produce it, though other, is a cause.
 \ Thus, because it is produced from a producer of the same continuum,
 \ A rice sprout is not from barley, or any other, as they are.'

¶(i.e. Although causes and their effects are inherently existent other, everything does not arise from everything because we can see clearly that particular causes produce particular effects, and particular effects arise from particular causes. Something that has the ability to produce another thing is correctly called the cause of that thing, even though it is inherently existent other than it; but things that do not have the ability to produce it are not its causes, though they too are inherently existent other. Like wise something that can be produced from another thing is correctly called the effect of that thing; but things that cannot be produced from it are not its effects, though they too are inherently existent other. For example a rice seed can produce a rice sprout that is inherently existent other; but a barley seed cannot produce a rice sprout, even though it too is inherently existent other. Similarly, a rice sprout can be produced by a rice seed that is inherently existent other; but a rice sprout cannot be produced by a barley seed even though it too is inherently existent other. Moreover, a rice sprout is produced from a rice seed that is its own previous continuum, and not from a barley seed or any other seed as barley sprouts and so forth are. Therefore even though a cause and its effect are inherently existent other, it does not follow that everything arises from everything, and we do not incur the consequence of excess.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.1.1-iiB Refuting this denial]

\ ///
 \ [VI.16]
 \ 59
 \ If you say this, then just as barley, corollas, kengshuka, and so forth
 \ Are not called producers of a rice sprout, do not possess the ability,
 \ Are not of the same continuum, and are not similar,
 \ So too the rice seed is not any of these because it is other.

¶(i.e. Phenomena that are not related to a rice sprout such as barley, the corollas of lotuses, and kengshuka flowers are not called producers of a rice sprout, do not possess the ability to produce one, are not of the same continuum as a rice sprout, and are not of a similar type to a rice sprout. In just the same way, the rice seed too is not the producer of the rice sprout, lacks the ability to produce the rice sprout, is not of the same continuum as the rice sprout, and is not of a similar type to the rice sprout. Why ? Because the rice seed too is inherently existent other than, and therefore completely unrelated to, the rice sprout.

¶-- Cause & effect cannot be different and have a relation.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.1.2 Refuting particular production from other]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.1.2-i Refuting production from other where a cause precedes its effects]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.1.2-ia The actual refutation]

\ ///
 \ [VI.17]
 \ 60
 \ A sprout does not exist at the time of its seed,
 \ So without otherness how can the seed be other?
 \ Therefore, since production of a sprout from a seed is not established,
 \ Give up this position of so-called 'production from other'.

¢(i.e. If something is inherently existent it must always have been inherently existent. It could not have been non-existent one moment and existent the next. Therefore, if a sprout is inherently existent it must always have been inherently existent, and so it must have existed at the time of its seed. However, even you proponents of things can see that a sprout does not exist at the time of its seed. Therefore it follows that a sprout is not inherently existent.

¢-- If a sprout is not inherently existent, it cannot be inherently other than its seed; and without an inherently existent other sprout, with respect to what can the seed be inherently other ? Therefore there is no production of a sprout from an inherently existent other seed. You proponents of things should give up this position of so-called 'production from other'.

¢-- The cause & the effect cannot be non-simultaneous, separate.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.1.2-ib Rejecting arguments against this refutation]

\ ///
 \ [VI.18]
 \ 61
 \ 'Just as the highness and lowness of the two arms of a balance
 \ Are seen to be simultaneous,
 \ So too are the producing of what is to be produced and the ceasing of the
 producer.'

¢(i.e. Objection: You say that a sprout is not inherently existent because it is not simultaneous with its seed, but this is not strictly true. Consider for example the following analogy. When a balance is tipped, one arm moves up while the other moves down. Because the actions of ascending and descending occurs simultaneously, the highness and lowness of the two arms of a balance are also simultaneous. In just the same way, because the actions of the producing of what is to be produced -- the sprout -- and the ceasing of the producer -- the seed -- occur simultaneously, the two agents -- the seed and the sprout -- must also be simultaneous. Therefore, a seed and its sprout are inherently other, and the fault you have stated does not apply.

¢-- That is a weak analogy. There is no way to explain the transition from a cause to its effect. Cause and effect cannot overlap in time, or be separate in time. And there cannot be an effect without a cause either.)

\ ///
 \ [VI.19]
 \ 62ab
 \ If you say this, even though they are simultaneous, there is no simultaneity
 here; it does not exist.

\ ///
 \ [VI.19]

\ 62cd
 \ Since that being produced is approaching production, it does not exist,
 \ And that ceasing, though existent, is said to be approaching cessation;
 \ ///
 \ So how are they similar to a balance?
 \ This production [of the sprout] without an agent [the sprout itself] is also an unacceptable entity.

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.1.2-ii Refuting production from other where a cause is simultaneous with its effect]

\ ///
 \ [VI.20]
 \ 63
 \ 'An eye consciousness is other than its simultaneous producers,
 \ The eyes and so forth, and the discrimination and so forth that arise with it.'
 \ If this is so, what need is there for an existent to arise?
 \ If you say it does not exist, the faults in that have already been explained.

¢(i.e. The cause & the effect cannot be simultaneous. If the effect is already present, why is there a cause present.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.1.3 Refuting production from other having analyzed effects by way of four alternatives]

\ ///
 \ [VI.21]
 \ 64
 \ If a producer producing a product that is other is a cause,
 \ Then what is produced, an existent, a non-existent, both, or neither?
 \ If it is an existent, what need is there for a producer, and what need is there if it is a non-existent?
 \ What need is there for both, and what need is there for neither?

¢(i.e. And what is it that is supposed to be produced? Tetralemma.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2 Denying that worldly people can damage this refutation -- THE TWO TRUTHS]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1 Denying damage by worldly people's belief in production from other]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-i The argument that there is damage by worldly people]

[copied from another file:]

\ ///
 \ [VI.22]
 \ 65.
 \ 'Since they rely upon their own views and assert the worldly to be valid,
 \ What is the point of stating reasons here?
 \ Worldly people also realize that other arises from other,
 \ So production from other exists; what need for reasons here?'

¢(i.e. About damage by worldly people: Saying that the worldly are seeing that "other arises

from other" and that it must be the ultimate truth, thatness. Or that the fact that there are valid functional truths proves that the refutation of production form other is wrong.
¢-- Meaning that dependent origination would invalidate emptiness.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-ii Showing that there is no damage by worldly people]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiA A general presentation of the two truths]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiA-i All phenomena have two natures]

\ ///
\ [VI.23]
\ 66.
\ All things hold two entities:
\ Those that are found by seeing correctly and by seeing falsely.
\ It is said that the object of seeing correctly is thatness;
\ And that of seeing falsely a conventional truth.

¢(i.e. Clarifying the distinction between The Two Truths: conventional truths like dependent origination and Ultimate Truth / emptiness. We need those two to describe anything; one alone is not enough. In fact, those Two Truths are not different, not the same. This is said to be the inseparability of appearances and emptiness. The worldly go by the conventional truths; they do not see the Ultimate Truth. So we cannot go by what they see to try to prove what is the Ultimate Truth.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiA-ii The divisions of conventional truths with respect to the awareness of worldly people]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiA-iiA An explanation of correct and incorrect object-possessors with respect to the awareness of worldly people]

\ ///
\ [VI.24]
\ 67
\ Furthermore, it is said that seeing falsely is of two types:
\ With clear powers and with faulty powers.
\ Awareness with faulty powers is held to be incorrect
\ When compared with awareness with good powers.

¢(i.e. Valid conventional truths and false or imagined things. Worldly are not wrong all the time; they are just working at the level of conventional truths.

¢-- Meaning that it is not because everything is empty of inherent existence that everything is coming from the mind-only, or that anything can be. Things are empty of inherent existence, but still dependently arisen from causes and conditions.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiA-iiB An explanation of correct and incorrect object with respect to the awareness of worldly people]

\ ///
\ [VI.25]
\ 68
\ Whatever the worldly realize
\ By apprehending through the six powers without faults
\ Is true for the worldly.
\ The remainder are held by the worldly to be incorrect.

¢(i.e. Valid conventional truths and false or imagined things. There are conventional ways to verify the validity of conventional truths by opposition to pure fabrications. But all of this is still not the Ultimate Truth.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiia-iii Mistaken conceived objects do not exist even nominally]

\ ///
\ [VI.26]
\ 69
\ A nature as projected by Tirthikas,
\ Completely under the influence of the sleep of unknowing,
\ And what is projected on illusions, mirages, and so forth -
\ These are non-existent even for the worldly.

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiib Applying this to the present subject]

\ ///
\ [VI.27]
\ 70
\ Just as what is observed by eyes with unclear sight
\ Does not damage awareness without unclear sight,
\ So minds lacking stainless wisdom
\ Do not damage a mind without stains.

¢(i.e. The validity of conventional truths doesn't change the Ultimate Truth. There is no contradiction between what the worldly see as conventional truths and the Ultimate Truth. So saying that they see "other arising from other" doesn't invalidate the Ultimate Truth.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiic An explanation of the respective natures of the two truths]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiic1 An explanation of conventional truths]

\ ///
\ [VI.28]
\ 71
\ Because confusion obstructs nature it is conventional.
\ Whatever is fabricated by it but appears as true
\ Is said by the Able One to be a conventional truth;
\ But fabricated things exist only conventionally.

¢(i.e. But all conventional truths are just that, relative truths, not absolute, not the Ultimate Truth.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiic2 An explanation of ultimate truth]

\ ///
\ [VI.29]
\ 72
\ Whatever wrong entities such as floating hairs
\ May be projected due to unclear sight,
\ That which is the actual entity is seen by clear eyes.
\ You should understand thatness here in the same way.

¢(i.e. All conventional truths are flawed or relative, not absolute, even if relatively functional. They are all just like illusions. The difference between conventional truths and the Ultimate Truth is like the difference between a false conventional truth and a valid conventional truth. A eye without stains can see the distinction, but not a deluded mind.
¢-- Meaning that it is not because worldly sees that "other give rise to other" that it is the Ultimate Truth. Even if it is a valid conventional truth, it is not the ultimate truth.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiid How the charge of damage by worldly people is itself damaged]

\ ///
\ [VI.30]
\ 73
\ If the worldly are valid, then since the worldly see thatness,
\ What need is there for other Superiors,
\ And what need is there for superior paths?
\ That the confused are valid cannot also be correct.

\ ///
\ [VI.31ab]
\ 74ab
\ In all cases the worldly are not valid;
\ Therefore, on the occasion of thatness, there is no damage by the worldly.

¢(i.e. Meaning that if the worldly were seeing the ultimate truth, as being "other giving rise to other", then why would there be a Buddha and a Buddhist Path ? Meaning that it is not because worldly sees that "other give rise to other" that it is the Ultimate truth. Even if it is a valid conventional truth, it is not the ultimate truth.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiie How there can be damage worldly people]

\ ///
\ [VI.31cd]
\ 74cd
\ If objects of the worldly are denied,
\ There is damage from the worldly by worldly renown.

¢(i.e. That doesn't mean that the worldly cannot discriminate between valid and non-valid conventional truths. That doesn't mean that everything is meaningless, chaotic. We cannot deny all of this. But still all of this doesn't damage the refutation of production from other because production from other is not established by worldly renown.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.2 Denying damage by worldly people because there is no production from other for the worldly, even nominally]

\ ///
\ [VI.32]
\ 75
\ From having only sown the seeds
\ The worldly claim 'I produced this child',
\ Or think 'I planted this tree';
\ Therefore there is no production from other, even for the worldly.

¢(i.e. On the contrary: The worldly people do not have the innate idea of production from other. ... Therefore the assertion that effects arise from causes that are inherently existent other entities is damaged by the beliefs of worldly people. ... The mind that apprehends production from other is only an intellectually-formed mind. It never arises in worldly people who do not propound tenets. there is no production from other for worldly people. Therefore it is quite wrong for those who hold this mistaken view to call upon the perceptions of worldly people to support their belief.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.3 The good qualities of this refutation]

\ ///
\ [VI.33]
\ 76
\ Because a sprout is not other than its seed,
\ The seed is not destroyed at the time of the sprout;
\ And because they are not one,
\ We do not say that the seed exists at the time of the sprout.

¢(i.e. Cause & effect: not different or separate or inherently other, not the same or one.

¢Not non-simultaneous, not simultaneous.

¢-- The refutation of production from other avoids the two extremes of existence and non-existence, and leads us to a realization of emptiness.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.4 There is no inherently existent production at any time]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.4.1 Refuting the assertion of inherent existence]

¢(i.e. Madhyamika-Svatantrikas: Even though ultimately things lack true existence, conventionally they are inherently existent. If they were not inherently existent they would not exist at all. Thus although production from inherently existent other does not exist ultimately, it does exist conventionally, or nominally.

¢Madhyamika-Prasangikas: If you say this then three consequences follow:

¢- It follows that a Superior being's meditative equipoise causes the destruction of things

¢- It follows that nominal truths can withstand analysis

¢- It follows that ultimate production is refutable)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.4.1-i It follows that a Superior being's meditative equipoise causes the destruction of things]

\ ///
\ [VI.34]
\ 77
\ If the dependent exist by way of their own characteristics,
\ Then things are destroyed by being negated;
\ Therefore emptiness causes the destruction of things.
\ Since this is not reasonable, things do not exist.

¢(i.e. They cannot exist conventionally and be found empty by the Superior beings.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.4.1-ii It follows that nominal truths can withstand analysis]

\ ///
\ [VI.35]
\ 78

\ Since, if these things are analyzed,
\ No object is found on this side of things,
\ Away from the nature of thatness,
\ Worldly nominal truths should not be analyzed.

¢(i.e. If they were really existing they should be found. But we cannot find them -- see the four ways to analyze things.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.4.1-iii It follows that ultimate production is refutable]

\ ///
\ [VI.36]
\ 79
\ By the reasoning on the occasion of thatness,
\ Production from self and other is inadmissible.
\ Since by that reasoning it is also inadmissible nominally,
\ By what is production established for you?

¢(i.e. Showing a contradiction in the opponent proposition. So things are not inherently produced, either ultimately or conventionally.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.4.2 Rejecting an argument against this refutation]

\ ///
\ [VI.37]
\ 80
\ Empty things such as reflections that depend upon collections
\ Are also not unknown.
\ Just as, there, awareness of their aspects is generated
\ From empty reflections and so forth,

¢(i.e. But that doesn't mean that they are totally non-existent either; they are conventional truths, they are not without any effect.)

\ ///
\ [VI.38ab]
\ 81ab
\ So, although all things are empty,
\ They nevertheless generate from that emptiness.

¢(i.e. The Union of The Two Truths : Empty of inherent existence, but still functional: dependently arisen and having some effect. Empty causes producing empty effects. Everything exist because they lack inherent existence.)

[End of the chapter on the two truths]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.5 The good qualities of refuting inherently existing production within both truths]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.5.1 The good quality of easily avoiding extreme views]

\ ///
\ [VI.38cd]
\ 81cd
\ And since they lack inherent existence in both truths

\ They are neither permanent nor annihilated.

¢(i.e. Staying away from the two extremes: Not existent, not non-existent. Leading to the realization of emptiness.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.5.2 The good quality of great consistency with cause and effect]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.5.2-i Not asserting inherent existence does not entail acceptance of a consciousness-basis-of-all and so forth]

\ ///

\ [VI.39]

\ 82

\ Since it does not inherently cease,

\ It has ability even though there is no basis-of-all.

\ Thus you should know that an appropriate effect will arise

\ Even though, in some cases, a long time elapses after an action has ceased.

¢(i.e. This model doesn't imply the need to postulate a "supra-regulator" or "supra-memory" in order to regulate everything, linking the cause to the effects.

¢-- There is still no cause without any effect; or no effect without any cause.

¢-- Emptiness of inherent existence doesn't deny dependent origination. In fact they imply each other. They are not the same, not different.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.5.2-ii Showing by analogy how an effect arises after an action has ceased]

\ ///

\ [VI.40]

\ 83

\ Having seen the observed object of a dream,

\ A fool will generate attachment even when awake.

\ Likewise, there is still an effect from an action

\ Even though it lacks inherent existence and has ceased.

¢(i.e. No cause without an effect / an empty effect from an empty cause. Even though the causes are empty of inherent existence they are still functional, efficient.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.5.2-iii Rejecting arguments against this]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.5.2-iiia Rejecting the argument that the ripening of the effect would be endless]

\ ///

\ [VI.41]

\ 84

\ Although the objects are similar in not existing,

\ Nevertheless, one with unclear sight sees the appearance of floating hairs

\ But not the appearance of other things.

\ In the same way, you should understand that ripened actions cannot ripen again.

\ ///

\ [VI.42]

\ 85

\ Thus it is seen that non-virtuous ripening is from non-virtuous actions,

\ And virtuous ripening is from virtuous actions.
\ Those who realize that virtue and non-virtue do not exist will be liberated.
\ However, analyzing actions and their effects is discouraged.

¢(i.e. Emptiness doesn't deny the logic of dependent origination.

¢-- Even though causes, effects, and production are empty of inherent existence, this doesn't mean that this is like non-valid truths, having no valid-causal-link at all. There is no absolute link between a cause and an effect, but there is no total absence of link either; there is a relative link. And there is no need for a "supra-memory" to keep track of the karmic seed.

¢-- We need both: dependent origination and emptiness. Emptiness doesn't deny the Wheel of Life. No absolute good and bad doesn't mean that there is no good and bad at all.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.5.2-iiib Rejecting the argument of contradiction with the scriptures that reveal a consciousness-basis-of-all]

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.5.2-iiib1 The actual rejection of the argument of contradiction with the scripture]

\ ///
\ [VI.43]
\ 86
\ 'Basis-of-all exists', 'Person exists',
\ 'These aggregates alone exist' -
\ These teachings are for those
\ Who cannot understand this very profound meaning.

¢(i.e. Introductory skillful means - Hinayana.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.5.2-iiib2 An analogy of speech through the power of intention]

\ ///
\ [VI.44]
\ 87
\ Even though he is free from the view of the transitory collection
\ Buddha reveals 'I' and 'mine'.
\ In the same way, even though things lack inherent existence,
\ 'Existence' is revealed as an interpretative meaning.

¢(i.e. Introductory skillful means - Hinayana. No absolute, only adapted skillful means. Even though the real nature of everything is not expressed by the philosophical positions of Realism, Idealism, Dualism, and Monism, those views could be used as antidotes, adapted skillful means depending on the situation. That is the case for using Realism in Hinayana.)

L9: [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.2 A refutation of the Chittamatra system in particular]

¢(i.e. A specific refutation following the general refutation.

¢-- It is especially important to dwell at length on the interchange between the Chittamatrins and the Madhyamika-Prasangika, and to try to understand how these two apparently opposing views can be united. Many great Yogis, including Je Tsongkhapa, Gyalwa Wnsäpa, and Khädrub Sangye Yeshe, have praised as pre-eminent the union of these two views.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1 Refuting an inherently existent consciousness without externals]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.1 Stating the other system]

[copied from another file:]

\ ///
\ [VI.45]
\ 88.
\ 'An apprehender is not seen without an apprehended.
\ By realizing the three realms as mere consciousness,
\ The Bodhisattva abiding in wisdom
\ Realizes thatness in mere consciousness.

\ ///
\ [VI.46]
\ 89.
\ Just as waves arise from a great ocean
\ When it is stirred by the wind,
\ Likewise, because of its potentials a mere consciousness arises
\ From the seed of all, which is called 'basis-of-all'.

\ ///
\ [VI.47]
\ 90.
\ Therefore whatever is an other-powered entity
\ Is the cause of imputedly existent things.
\ It arises without external objects, exists,
\ And has the nature of not being an object of any elaboration. '

¢(i.e. Everything is from the "mind-only". Like a Big-One, a transcendental cosmic mind.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2 Refuting this system]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-i An extensive presentation of the refutation]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ia Refuting examples of a truly existent consciousness without external objects]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ia1 Refuting the example of a dream]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ia1-i The example of a dream does not prove that consciousness is truly existent]

\ ///
\ [VI.48]
\ 91.
\ Where is there an example of a mind without an external object?
\ If you say it is like a dream then let us consider that.
\ For us mind does not exist even when dreaming;
\ Therefore you do not have an example.

\ ///
\ [VI.49]
\ 92.
\ If mind exists because we remember the dream when awake,
\ Then it is the same with external objects.
\ Just as according to you we remember, thinking 'I saw',
\ So, like that, external objects also exist.

¢(i.e. The example of a real mind dreaming is not valid because we cannot find such a mind. There is no difference between this mind and any other external objects. There is no proof that it has a particular status. So we cannot say: the mind is real and everything else are an illusions.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ia1-ii The example of a dream does not prove that there are no external objects when awake]

\ ///
\ [VI.50]
\ 93.
\ 'Because eye awareness is impossible in sleep, it does not exist;
\ Only mental awareness exists;
\ Yet its aspect is conceived as external.
\ As it is in dreams so it is here.'

\ ///
\ [VI.51]
\ 94
\ If you say this, then just as for you external objects are not produced in
dreams,
\ So mind too is not produced.
\ The eyes, the visual object, and the mind they generate -
\ All three are also false.

\ ///
\ [VI.52a]
\ 95a
\ And those three of the remainder, ears and so forth, are also not produced.

¢(i.e. The mind, the senses, the objects of senses, all have the same nature of being merely imputed by the mind, dependently arisen, dependent on accumulated karma. The mind is not different that the rest. It doesn't have a special status.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ia1-iii The example of a dream proves that all things are false]

\ ///
\ [VI.52bcd]
\ 95bcd
\ Just as when dreaming, so here when awake, things are false.
\ That mind does not exist, objects of enjoyment do not exist,
\ And the sense powers do not exist.

\ ///
\ [VI.53]
\ 96
\ Here, as when awake,
\ So when not awake these three exist;
\ And upon waking all three no longer exist.
\ It is just the same when waking from the sleep of confusion.

¢(i.e. The simple fact that dreams are so apparently real proves that everything is merely imputed by the mind. Dreams are not like replaying a movie with visual exact sense tracks.

In dreams things are "reconstructed" in dependence of accumulated karma, just as in awake state.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ia2 Refuting the example of seeing floating hairs]

\ ///
\ [VI.54]
\ 97
\ A mind of sense powers with unclear sight
\ And the hairs seen due to that unclear sight
\ Are both true with respect to that mind;
\ But both are false with respect to one who sees objects clearly.

\ ///
\ [VI.55]
\ 98
\ If mind exists without an object of knowledge,
\ Then when his eyes focus on the place of those hairs
\ Even one without unclear sight will generate a mind of floating hairs.
\ Since this is not the case, it does not exist.

¢(i.e. There is no independent mind perceiving independent things. Those two are not different, not separate, not the same. There is no impartial pure perception. The illusions and dreams are proofs of that.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ib Refuting a consciousness generated from its potential]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ib1 Refuting that a consciousness to which an external object appears is generated or not generated from the ripening or non-ripening of imprints]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ib1-i Stating the other position]

\ ///
\ [VI.56abc]
\ 99abc
\ 'The observer does not have that mind
\ Because he does not have a ripened potential for it;
\ Not because of the absence of a thing existing as an object of knowledge.'

¢(i.e. Illusions would be caused by real karmic seeds left on a real transcendental mind.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ib1-ii Refuting this position]

\ ///
\ [VI.56d]
\ 99d
\ If you say this, it cannot be proven because that potential does not exist

¢(i.e. But a real cause such as those karmic seeds cannot be proven; they cannot exist. See the above discussion about other-causation.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ib1-ia Refuting an inherently existent potential with respect to the present]

\ ///
\ [VI.57a]

\ 100a
\ A potential for the produced is impossible.

¢(i.e. There is no need for a cause of an already existing effect.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ib1-iib Refuting an inherently existent potential with respect to the future]

\ ///
\ [VI.57bcd]
\ 100bcd
\ And there is also no potential for an unproduced entity.
\ Without characteristics there is no possessor of characteristics;
\ Otherwise it would exist for a child of a barren woman.

\ ///
\ [VI.58]
\ 101
\ If you want to state it in terms of what is to come
\ Then without a potential it will never arise.
\ The holy ones have said
\ That whatever exists in mutual dependence does not exist.

¢(i.e. A cause cannot be a cause of something -- an effect -- that is not yet existing. We call something a cause of something else only after seeing the effect and assuming the relation. But still an effect is not without any cause. The relational link is just not absolute, but merely imputed by the mind.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ib1-iic Refuting an inherently existent potential with respect to the past]

\ ///
\ [VI.59]
\ 102
\ If it comes from the ripened potential of what has ceased
\ Then other arises from the potential of other.
\ For you, possessors of continuums exist in mutual difference;
\ Therefore everything arises from everything.

\ ///
\ [VI.60]
\ 103
\ If you say that there, different possessors of continuums
\ Do not have different continuums, and so there is no fault,
\ This cannot be proven;
\ For there is no possibility of a non-different continuum.

\ ///
\ [VI.61]
\ 104
\ Phenomena dependent upon Maitreya and Upayagupta
\ Are not included in the same continuum because they are other.
\ Thus it is not reasonable that whatever are different by way of their own

characteristics

\ Are included within the same continuum.

¢(i.e. And calling something a cause after seeing the effect is not right either. Because the exact interaction between the cause and the effect cannot be explained. As shown above they cannot be simultaneous or be non-simultaneous. The cause and effect cannot be separate or different, and cannot be the same. So there is no real karmic seed left on a real transcendental mind.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ib2 Again refuting that consciousness exists without external objects]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ib2-i Stating the other system]

\ ///

\ [VI.62]

\ 105

\ 'The production of an eye consciousness

\ Arises entirely from its immediate potential.

\ A potential that is the basis for its consciousness

\ Is called the eye, a sense power possessing form.

\ ///

\ [VI.63]

\ 106

\ Here, when consciousness arises from a sense power,

\ Appearances such as blue arise from their seeds,

\ Without there being external objects.

\ Not realizing this, beings think they are external objects

\ ///

\ [VI.64]

\ 107

\ Just as when dreaming, without there being another form,

\ A mind with an aspect of that arises from the ripening of its potential,

\ Likewise, here, When awakes

\ Mind exists without there being external objects.'

¢(i.e. Assuming that all perception are caused by karmic seeds, from the mind-only.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ib2-ii Refuting this system]

\ ///

\ [VI.65]

\ 108

\ If, as you say, mental consciousness with appearances such as blue

\ Arises in dreams where there are no eyes,

\ Why is it not also generated from the ripening of potentials

\ In blind people here, where there is no eye sense power?

¢(i.e. If everything is from the mind-only then how come we observe dependence on the sense organs.)

\ ///

\ [VI.66]
\ 109
\ If you say a potential for the sixth
\ Ripens in dreams but not when awake,
\ Then just as there is no ripening of a potential for the sixth here,
\ Why not say there is none during dreams?

¢(i.e. Why would the mind be different from all the other senses.)

\ ///
\ [VI.67]
\ 110
\ Just as lack of eyes is not the cause of this,
\ So too in dreams sleep is not the cause.
\ Therefore you should say that in dreams too
\ Things and eyes are the causes of false subjective realizers.

\ ///
\ [VI.68abc]
\ 111abc
\ Since any answer you may give
\ Is seen to be like an assertion,
\ You should abandon these arguments.

¢(i.e. You cannot prove that the mind is different than anything else.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ib3 The refutation of the Chittamatra system is not damaged by the scriptures]

\ ///
\ [VI.68d]
\ 111d
\ Nowhere have Buddhas taught that things exist.

¢(i.e. The Buddha has never taught that the mind is different than anything else, or that everything comes from the mind-only.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ic This refutation and meditation on unattractiveness are not contradictory]

\ ///
\ [VI.69]
\ 112
\ Yogis following the instructions of their Spiritual Guide,
\ Who see the ground covered with skeletons,
\ Also see all three to be lacking, production,
\ Because it is taught to be a false attention.

\ ///
\ [VI.70]
\ 113
\ If, as you say, as it is with objects of sense consciousness
\ So it is with the objects of the mind of unattractiveness,

\ Then if someone else directs their mind to that place
\ They will also see; thus it is not false.

¢(i.e. No absolute, only adapted skillful means. It is not because something is empty of inherent existence that it is completely non-existent, or from the mind-only, or not functional, or cannot be shared as a conventional truth by all. It may have a similar effect on all who experience it; so it is not from the mind-only.)

\ ///
\ [VI.71ab]
\ 114ab
\ As it is with a sense power possessing unclear sight and the like,
\ So it is with a hungry ghost's mind seeing a flowing river as pus.

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.1.2-ii The conclusion from this refutation]

\ ///
\ [VI.71cd]
\ 114cd
\ In short, the meaning you should understand is this:
\ Just as objects of mind do not exist, mind also does not exist.

¢(i.e. Mind itself is just the chief of all the illusions it created. There is no pure absolute mind covered with karmic seeds that is creating everything. The Buddha-nature is also only a dependently arisen skillful means, merely imputed by the mind, a conventional truths. No absolute, only relative truth.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.2 Refuting the validity of the reason establishing other-powered phenomena as inherently existent]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.2.1 Refuting self-cognizers as a proof of other-powered phenomena]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.2.1-i Upon investigation self-cognizers are unacceptable as a proof of other-powered phenomena]

\ ///
\ [VI.72]
\ 115
\ If with no apprehended object and no apprehender,
\ An other-powered thing exists empty of both,
\ By what is its existence known?
\ It is unsuitable to say that it exists without being apprehended.

\ ///
\ [VI.73a]
\ 116a
\ That it is experienced by itself is not proven.

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.2.1-ii Refuting the other's reply that they are acceptable]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.2.1-iiia The actual refutation of the other system]

\ ///
\ [VI.73bcd]
\ 116bcd
\ If you say it is proven by memory at a later time,

\ The unproven that you assert as a proof
\ Does not prove anything.

\ ///
\ [VI.74]
\ 117
\ Even if self-cognizers are admitted,
\ It is impossible for memory to remember
\ Because, being other, it would be as if generated in an unknowing continuum.
\ Such distinctions are also destroyed by this reasoning.

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.2.1-iiib How, according to our system, memory develops even though self-cognizers do not exist]

\ ///
\ [VI.75]
\ 118
\ Because for us this memory is not other than
\ That by which the object was experienced,
\ Memory thinks 'I saw'.
\ This is also the way of worldly convention.

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.2.1-iii Self-cognizers are unacceptable by other reasoning too]

\ ///
\ [VI.76]
\ 119
\ Therefore, if there are no self-cognizers
\ By what is your other-powered phenomenon apprehended?
\ Since agent, object, and action are not identical,
\ It cannot apprehend itself.

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.2.1-iv An inherently existent other-powered phenomena is similar to a child of a barren woman]

\ ///
\ [VI.77]
\ 120
\ If there exists a thing that is an other-powered entity
\ Without production, and with a nature not known,
\ By what would its existence be impossible?
\ Can a child of a barren woman harm others?

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.2.2 The Chittamatra system is deficient in both truths]

\ ///
\ [VI.78]
\ 121
\ Since not even the slightest other-powered phenomenon exists,
\ What is the cause of conventionalities?
\ Out of attachment to a substance in the other's view
\ Even all the objects known to the world are forsaken.

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.2.3 Therefore it is advisable to follow only the system of Nagarjuna]

\ ///
\ [VI.79]
\ 122
\ Those who are outside the path of Master Nagarjuna
\ Have no means of peace.
\ They depart from the truths of convention and thatness,
\ And, because they depart from them, cannot attain liberation.

\ ///
\ [VI.80]
\ 123
\ Nominal truths are the method,
\ And ultimate truth arises from the method.
\ Those who do not know how these two are distinguished
\ Will enter mistaken paths due to wrong conceptions.

¢(i.e. The Two Truths are not different or separate, not the same. We need both method and wisdom. The Union of the Two truths.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.2.4 Refuting other-powered phenomena is not the same as refuting worldly nominalities]

\ ///
\ [VI.81]
\ 124
\ We do not assert any conventionalities
\ The way you assert other-powered things.
\ However, even though they do not exist, for the sake of the result
\ We say to the worldly that they do.

¢(i.e. Emptiness of inherent existence does not deny dependent origination, conventional truths. They are not contrary to each other. One implies the other. They are not different or separate, not the same.)

\ ///
\ [VI.82]
\ 125
\ But if they did not exist as worldly
\ In the way that they are non-existent for Foe Destroyers
\ Who have abandoned their aggregates and entered peace,
\ Then we would not say that they exist even nominally.

¢(i.e. Enlightenment is not gained by rejecting the world, the five aggregates as if non-existent or from the mind-only. We need both method and wisdom.)

\ ///
\ [VI.83]
\ 126
\ If you are not harmed by the worldly,
\ Then refute them in front of the worldly.
\ Thus you and the worldly should debate on this,

\ And afterwards we shall rely upon the stronger.

¢(i.e. If you think everything is from the mind-only, and think that you can reject the world, then go try to say this to the world and see what happen.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3 The word 'only' in 'mind only' does not exclude external objects]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3.1 Explaining the intention of the statement in Sutra on the Ten Grounds that says that there is only mind]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3.1-i The Sutra on the ten grounds proves that the word 'only' does not exclude external objects]

\ ///

\ [VI.84]

\ 127

\ It says that a Bodhisattva on Approaching (6)

\ Realizes the three realms to be only consciousness

\ To realize the refutation of a permanent self as creator.

\ In fact, he realizes that only mind is creator.

¢(i.e. Everything is merely imputed by the mind. Everything is empty of inherent existence. but that doesn't mean that everything is coming from the mind-only, or that there is a "transcendental mind" that is the creator of everything. Even the Buddha-nature is only a skillful means, a conventional truth. No absolute, only adapted skillful means, only relative dependently arisen fabrications. Even the mind is like that.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3.1-ii This meaning is also established in other Sutras]

\ ///

\ [VI.85]

\ 128

\ Therefore, to increase the wisdom of the intelligent,

\ In Gone to Lazzka Sutra the All-Knowing One uttered

\ This vajra in the nature of speech that destroys the high mountains of the Tirthikas

\ To clarify the meaning.

\ ///

\ [VI.86]

\ 129

\ In their own treatises

\ Tirthikas speak of person and so forth;

\ But seeing that these are not the creator,

\ The Conqueror said that only mind is the creator of the world.

¢(i.e. No absolute, only adapted skillful means. Even the Buddha-nature is a mere antidote, a skillful means. It should not be grasped onto either.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3.1-iii The word 'only' establishes that mind is principal]

\ ///

\ [VI.87]

\ 130.

\ Just as 'increase of thatness' is said for 'Buddha',

\ So too, in Sutra, 'only mind' is said for
\ 'Only mind is principal in the world.'
\ The meaning of the Sutra here is not to deny forms.

¢(i.e. This skillful means had no intention of saying that only the mind exist and that everything else is completely non-existent, from the mind-only. The intention of this skillful means was to urge us to turn away from thinking that all the problems and solutions comes from the external things, to turn inward, to seek the very subtle nature of our own mind, and to directly see the real non-dual nature of our own mind, and thus the real non-dual nature of everything, and thus be free from all attachments and fears.

¢-- Forms, and everything else, are not existent, not non-existent, not both existent and non-existent, not neither existent nor non-existent. What they are is beyond any description, beyond any conceptualization, beyond any views, beyond any dualities, beyond causality space time. But they are not non-existent, or from a real transcendental min-only.)

\ ///
\ [VI.88]
\ 131.
\ If the Great One knew that these are only mind,
\ And if he denied forms there,
\ Why did he say again there
\ That mind arises from ignorance and karma?

¢(i.e. If everything was completely non-existent, or from the mind-only, why would the Buddha have taught "dependent origination", the "Wheel of Life", "wholesome and unwholesome" and "karma" ?

¢-- If the mind was the primary cause of everything, then why did the Buddha taught that the mind is dependently arisen ?)

\ ///
\ [VI.89]
\ 132.
\ All the various worldly environments
\ And the living beings, the inhabitants, are created by mind.
\ It is said that all living beings are born from karma;
\ And if there is no mind there is no karma.

\ ///
\ [VI.90]
\ 133.
\ Even though forms exist,
\ They have no creator like mind.
\ Therefore a creator other than mind is rejected.
\ Forms, however, are not denied.

¢(i.e. In the cycle of dependent origination, all the elements are empty of inherent existence, but still they are not non-existent, they are still functional: dependently arisen and having an effect. All causes, effect and causality are empty of inherent existence, but still not non-existent completely. No absolute causality, but still relative causality. One doesn't need to postulate a real mind, real karma, and real rebirths to

accept all of this. There is no need to reject all appearances as if non-existent, from the mind-only.

¢-- No absolute, only adapted skillful means. Everything is empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. Everything is not existent, not non-existent, not both existent and non-existent, not neither existent nor non-existent. Everything is inseparability of appearances and emptiness.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3.2 External objects and internal mind are the same in either being existent or being non-existent]

\ ///
\ [VI.91]
\ 134.
\ For one who remains with the worldly,
\ All five aggregates exist as they are known by the worldly.
\ If a Yogi wishes to manifest the exalted awareness of thatness,
\ Those five will not arise for him.

¢(i.e. The five aggregates are empty of inherent existence: not existent, not non-existent, not both existent and non-existent, not neither existent nor non-existent.)

\ ///
\ [VI.92]
\ 135.
\ If forms do not exist, do not hold to the existence of mind;
\ And if mind exists, do not hold to the non-existence of forms.
\ Buddha rejects them all equally in the Wisdom Sutras,
\ But they are taught in the Abhidharmas.

¢(i.e. It is not because everything is empty of inherent existence that everything is from the mind-only; as if there was a real mind primary cause of everything. And it is not because the mind is not non-existent completely that everything else is non-existent completely. These are not the absolute truth, but they still could be used as skillful means as in the Abhidharma.)

\ ///
\ [VI.93]
\ 136.
\ You have destroyed these stages of the two truths.
\ However your substance does not exist because it has been refuted.
\ Therefore you should know that by these stages from the beginning
\ Things are not produced in thatness, but are produced for the worldly.

¢(i.e. The Two Truths are not contrary: they are not different or separate, not the same. Emptiness doesn't deny dependent origination. One implies the other.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3.3 Explaining the intention of the statement in Gone to Lanka Sutra that says that there is only mind]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3.3-i The statement that there are no external objects but only mind is of interpretative meaning]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3.3-ia Showing by means of the scriptures that it is of interpretative meaning]

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3.3-ia-i The actual meaning]

\ ///
\ [VI.94]
\ 137.
\ In the [Lankavatara] Sutra that says
\ 'External objects do not exist, mind appears as various things',
\ Forms are denied for those with strong attachment to forms;
\ But that is also of interpretative meaning.

\ ///
\ [VI.95ab]
\ 138.
\ The Blessed One says that it is of interpretative meaning;
\ And it is also established by reasoning to be of interpretative meaning.

¢(i.e. Buddha-nature is only an adapted skillful means, not an absolute. We should not think that the absolute truth is that there is a real transcendental mind and that everything else is coming from this mind-only, that everything else is completely non-existent.)

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3.3-ia-ii Other Sutras like this are also of interpretative meaning]

\ ///
\ [VI.95cd]
\ 138
\ This scripture makes it clear that other Sutras of this kind
\ Are also of interpretative meaning.

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3.3-ib Showing by means of reasoning that it is of interpretative meaning]

\ ///
\ [VI.96]
\ 139.
\ The Buddhas have said that if objects of mind do not exist,
\ The absence of mind is easily realized.
\ Since it objects of mind do not exist, the refutation of mind is established,
\ Objects of mind are refuted first.

L9: [CHITTAMATRA.2.2.3.3-ii A method for recognizing Sutras of interpretative and definitive meaning]

\ ///
\ [VI.97]
\ 140.
\ Thus, having understood this explanation of the scriptures,
\ You should realize that any Sutra whose meaning does not explain thatness
\ Is taught as interpretative; and you should interpret it.
\ You should know that those whose meaning is emptiness are of definitive meaning.

L8: [PHENOMENA-B.3 - BOTH: Refuting production from both]

Then we need to look at the first two lines of verse 98:

\ ###
 \ Arising from both self and other is also untenable
 \ Because the faults already explained apply here as well. (98ab)
 \ ///
 \ [VI.98]
 \ 141.
 \ Production from both is also not a suitable entity.
 \ Why? Because all the faults already explained apply.
 \ It does not exist for the worldly, nor is it asserted in thatness,
 \ Because production from either is not established.

¢(i.e. BOTH: "this is self-cause, but, also, this is cause by that; when the two comes together, that is it"

¢-- Sakya: (c) that the cause and effect are both identical and different

¢-- The position according to which phenomena originate from causes that are both identical and different was affirmed by the Jaina philosophers.

¢-- The third alternative -- that cause and effect are both identical and different -- is no more acceptable, and suffers from two faults.

¢-- First, both the argument that refuted the identity of cause and effect and the argument that refuted the difference of cause and effect are applicable to the third alternative as well. The argument refuting the identity of cause and effect is applicable insofar as cause and effect are identical, and the argument refuting their difference is applicable insofar as cause and effect are different. We really have no new proposition in the case of the third alternative.

¢-- Second, the third alternative is faulty because of the law of contradiction: no phenomenon can have contradictory characteristics. An entity cannot be both existent and nonexistent at once, just as one entity cannot be both red and not red at the same time.

¢-- Winter: the non-Buddhist theories of causation which fall in one of four categories: A third type of causal theory advocated by some schools is basically a combination of the self- and other-causation. The problem with this is that both of the above two problems are compounded.

¢-- Williams: Neither could there be origination from both self and other, since this argument would be prone to the faults of both positions. Nor from no cause at all, for then everything would be being produced continually and everywhere, and also it would become quite pointless to commence anything.)

So somebody might think, "Well, okay, so things do not arise from themselves and they do not arise from something different from themselves; maybe then they arise from some combination of these two?" But that proposition is doubly wrong, because all the faults that apply to saying that things arise from themselves, and all the faults that apply to saying that things arise from something other than themselves apply to this third reasoning. So this third reasoning has twice as many faults as the first two.

L8: [PHENOMENA-B.4 - CAUSELESS : Refuting production without a cause]

¢(i.e. NEITHER: "there is no cause at all; things come and go randomly just like that"

¢-- Sakya: (d) that phenomena arise without cause. -- (like neither, no causality)

¢-- The last alternative, which holds that phenomena originate without a cause, was affirmed by the materialists in ancient India.

¢-- Finally, the fourth alternative -- the idea that phenomena originate without cause -- is

rejected by appeal to common experience. For instance, if we set a kettle of water on a lighted stove, the water will boil, but if we set it on a block of ice, it won't.

¢-- Winter: the non-Buddhist theories of causation which fall in one of four categories: The final option is that neither self- nor other-causation operates, which position is in effect an indeterminism that denies all causation. If anything were to emerge ever, anywhere, then everything could emerge at all times, everywhere.

¢-- Williams: Real production from no cause at all has two faults. First, since entities come into existence with no cause so the world would become random - things would arise anywhere and everywhere. Second, since there would be no cause for the production of y there would be no point in commencing something calculated to bring about y.)

Then somebody might say, "Well, okay, then it must be that things happen without any cause whatsoever. They must just come from out of nowhere. That possibility is refuted in verse 99:

\ ###
\ If things arose without any cause at all,
\ Then everything would always exist and anything could arise from anything else.
\ Furthermore, no one would perform all the hundreds of tasks, like planting seeds
and so forth,
\ That people ordinarily do to get results to arise. (99)

\ ///
\ [VI.99]
\ 142.
\ If there is production entirely without causes,
\ Then everything is produced from everything all the time;
\ And so to obtain fruit, the people of this world
\ Do not have to gather seeds and so forth in a hundred ways.

\ ///
\ [VI.100]
\ 143.
\ If living beings are empty of causes they are unapprehendable,
\ Like the fragrance and colour of an upala flower in the sky;
\ But a very colourful world is apprehended.
\ Therefore you should know that, like your mind, the world comes from causes.

\ ///
\ [VI.101]
\ 144.
\ The nature of those elements that are the objects of your mind
\ Is not the nature of this.
\ How could one who has such thick mental darkness here
\ Correctly realize the world beyond?

\ ///
\ [VI.102]
\ 145.
\ You should realize that when you deny the world beyond
\ You are conceptualizing the nature of objects of knowledge with a wrong view

\ Because you have a body that is a basis for developing such a view.
 \ It is the same when you assert the nature of the elements to be existent.
 \ ///
 \ [VI.103]
 \ 146.
 \ How these elements do not exist has already been explained.
 \ How? Because production from self, other, both, and no cause
 \ Have already been refuted in general above.
 \ Therefore these unmentioned elements also do not exist.

The absurd consequence of the belief that things arise without cause can be stated in the following way: Given entities, they would therefore either always exist or never exist, because it would not matter if their causes were present or not. The presence or the absence of the cause would have no affect on whether a thing existed or not.

So, since things as results would have absolutely no relationship, no dependence upon, their causes, they would then either always be there or never come into existence. Also, if things arose without cause, then no one would do anything. No one would work, because what would be the point. You would not be accumulating or creating the cause of anything, so what would be the point of planting a seed and going to all the trouble [of planting, cultivating, harvesting, and so forth], if there were no relationship between cause and result.

Then somebody might say, "Well, of course, to produce a flower you have to plant a seed. Flowers rely on causes, but other things do not. Other things just happen for no reason." This reasoning is refuted by stating, "Then it is up to you to distinguish between why some things need causes and other things do not. What is the difference?"

Then it might be asked, "Well, what about rainbows in the sky and moons on pools of water? Those do not need any causes, do they?" And the answer is, "Yes, they do. They appear due to the coming together of causes and conditions. They are empty forms that are mere appearances appearing due to the coming together of causes and conditions." This was how the protector Nagarjuna taught about these things.

L8: [PHENOMENA-C. CONCLUSION - The meaning established by the refutation of the four extremes of production] [The King of all reasonings]

\ ///
 \ [VI.104]
 \ 147ab.
 \ Since production from self, other, both, or without depending upon a cause do not exist,
 \ Things are free from inherent existence.

¢(i.e. No absolute, only adapted skillful means. Tetralemma: Saying that "Never are any existing things found to originate From themselves, from something else, from both, or from no cause." is the same as saying that "everything is empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen", or saying "everything is not existent, not non-existent, not both existent and non-existent, not neither existent nor non-existent", or saying that "cause and effect are not different or separate, not the same", or saying "we should stay away from the extremes of realism, idealism of nihilism, dualism, and monism". They all mean the same thing.)

And this is why the protector Nagarjuna said in his text, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way,

\ ###

\ "There is not a single thing which is not dependently arisen; therefore, there is not a single thing that is not empty."

It is easy to understand how it is that rainbows in the sky and reflections of the moon on pools of water are mere dependently arisen appearances. Understanding that, we can apply the same reasoning and understanding to everything else and understand that everything is just a mere dependently arisen and, therefore, empty appearance.

Since it is the case that things do not arise from any one of these four possible extremes, [which are the only four possible ways that things could arise,] then things really do not happen. They really never come into being. We can say that things really do not arise. We can say that in actual reality, they do not arise. We can say that there is no arising from their own side. We can say that entities in fact do not arise. We can say it in lots of different ways.

Therefore, in this great expanse of space without center or end, on this planet where there is neither top nor bottom, for all the beings there may be, self and other are equality—body and mind undifferentiable—the great transparency. Since it is all just a mere dependently arisen appearance, it never truly happens.

In accordance with the way we normally think about things, this planet arose in the middle of space, and thereafter all these beings have been and are being born one after another on this planet. But if this planet really came into existence in this space, where did it come into existence? In the middle of space? At the end of space? Where? The fact is that space is directionless. It has no center and it has no end. So, if you are going to say this planet came into existence and you cannot find out where it came into existence, then that is a logical contradiction.

What about the beings being born on this planet? [Can you not say where they are being born in reference to the planet?] Well, no. If beings are being born on this planet, are they being born on the top of the planet or on the bottom? Wherever you go on this planet, you think you are on the top of it. Nobody thinks they are on the bottom, so there is no bottom. But if there is no bottom, there cannot be any top either. So if you say someone was born and you cannot say where they were born, again you have a logical problem.

Another thing you might ask is, "All right, if sentient beings are born, are they born as you or me?" Well, we all think we are me, but everybody else thinks that we are you. So you cannot say whether a person is you or me. So what are they? If they are born, they have to be one or the other, but they are not. And therefore, what are beings? They are just body and mind undifferentiable—the great transparency, and since they are just mere dependently arisen appearances of that nature, then they really never arise, they are never born at all.

[copied from another file:]

L7: [PHENOMENA-2 Rejecting arguments against this refutation]

L8: [Phenomena-2.1 The actual rejection of arguments]

\ ///

\ [VI.104]

\ 147cd.
\ Because worldly beings have thick confusion like a mass of cloud,
\ Objects appear incorrectly to them.

\ ///
\ [VI.105]
\ 148.
\ Just as some, due to unclear sight, wrongly apprehend floating hairs,
\ Two moons, peacocks' feathers, flies, and so forth,
\ So too the unwise through the faults of confusion
\ See various produced phenomena with their minds.

\ ///
\ [VI.106]
\ 149.
\ 'Since actions arise in dependence upon confusion, without confusion they will
not arise.'
\ Certainly only the unwise conceptualize this.
\ The wise, who have completely eliminated thick darkness with the sun of their
excellent minds,
\ Understand emptiness and are liberated.

¢(i.e. All uncontrolled karma formation are based on the assumption of something inherently existing. All actions are powered by intention, powered by ignorance. One has directly seeing the real non-dual nature of his own mind, and thus the real non-dual nature of everything, then all attachments and fears based on the illusions created by the mind are automatically dropped. Then there is no more uncontrolled karma formation. And then there is total freedom.

¢-- The Middle Way: not acting, not non-acting. There is no need for such discrimination. There is nothing wrong with acting or non-acting, conceptualizing or not, discriminating or not, or anything else. Everything is already pure, self-liberating when one can see their real nature as they arise. So there is nothing to accept, nothing to reject.)

\ ///
\ [VI.107]
\ 150.
\ 'If things did not exist in thatness
\ They would not exist even nominally,
\ Like a child of a barren woman;
\ Therefore they must be inherently existent.'

¢(i.e. Opponent: Not existing as in "empty of inherent existence" must mean non-existent completely. Since this is not the case, not what is observed, then emptiness is a wrong concept and things do inherently exist.)

\ ///
\ [VI.108]
\ 151.
\ Whatever are the objects of those with unclear sight and so forth,
\ Such as floating hairs, are not produced.
\ Therefore you should first examine these,

\ And then apply this to the unclear sight of ignorance.

¢(i.e. Seems to imply that to understand the emptiness of inherent existence, one has to meditate first on the emptiness of the production. But it may be just one method to prove the emptiness of anything. Looking for it, trying to define it, could be another.)

\ ///

\ [VI.109]

\ 152.

\ If a dream, a city of smell-eaters, the water of a mirage,

\ Hallucinations, reflections, and so forth are seen without production,

\ Why for you is that unsuitable there,

\ For it is similarly non-existent?

¢(i.e. Using the same reasoning about production that proves that mere illusions are not really existing because not really produced, you should be able to see that everything is like that.)

\ ///

\ [VI.110]

\ 153.

\ Thus, although they are not produced in thatness,

\ They are not objects that are unseen by worldly beings,

\ Like a child of a barren woman.

\ Therefore what you assert is not definite.

¢(i.e. Although they are empty of inherent existence, they are not completely non-existent, or from the mind-only, or not functional.)

L8: [Phenomena-2.2 A summary]

\ ///

\ [VI.111]

\ 154.

\ The production from its own side of a child of a barren woman

\ Does not exist either in thatness or for the worldly.

\ In the same way, all these things

\ Have no production by their own entity either in thatness or for the worldly.

\ ///

\ [VI.112]

\ 155.

\ Thus, with respect to this the Blessed One says

\ That from the beginning all phenomena are pacified, free from production,

\ And by nature completely beyond sorrow.

\ Therefore production is always non-existent.

¢(i.e. Everything is already pure; Nirvana is a matter of perception without ignorance.)

\ ///

\ [VI.113]

\ 156.

\ Just as these pots and so forth do not exist in thatness,

\ And yet exist well-known to the worldly,
\ So it is with all things.

¢(i.e. The Two Truths are not incompatible; they are inseparable. Not different, not the same.)

\ Therefore it does not follow that they are similar to a child of a barren woman.

L7: [PHENOMENA-3 How dependently-arising production eliminates wrong conceptions that grasps at extremes]

\ ///
\ [VI.114]
\ 157.
\ Because things are not produced without a cause,
\ Not from causes such as Ishvara and so forth,
\ And not from self, other, or both,
\ They are produced completely dependently.

¢(i.e. Everything is dependently arisen, thus empty of inherent existence.)

\ ///
\ [VI.115]
\ 158.
\ Because things arise completely dependently,
\ These conceptions [or views] cannot be sustained.
\ Therefore this reasoning of dependent arising
\ Cuts all nets of bad views.

¢(i.e. This eliminates the extreme views of realism, idealism or nihilism, dualism and monism. This Tetralemma eliminates all other views that are dependent on these ones; and there is no other view possible. No absolute, only adapted skillful means.)

\ ///
\ [VI.116]
\ 159.
\ Conceptions arise if things exist;
\ But how things do not exist has already been thoroughly explained.
\ Without things they do not arise,
\ As, for example, without fuel there is no fire.

¢(i.e. Any view is necessary based on some invariant, something that is believed to be inherently existing. But since everything is empty of inherent existence because everything is dependently arisen, then all views are necessarily flawed.)

L7: [PHENOMENA-4 Identifying the result of logical analysis]

\ ///
\ [VI.117]
\ 160.
\ Ordinary beings are bound by conceptions,
\ Whereas Yogis without conceptions are liberated.
\ Therefore the wise say that whenever conceptions are eliminated
\ It is the result of correct analysis.

¢(i.e. The goal of emptiness is to let go of attachments to all concepts, views, passion, obsessions, ... But this cannot be done artificially. It is not a matter of blind faith. It is the automatic consequence of directly seeing the real nature of our own mind, and thus the real nature of everything. And this is done after carefully using both method and wisdom.)

\ ///
\ [VI.118]
\ 161.
\ The analyzes in the treatises were not composed out of attachment to debate;
\ Rather thatness is revealed for the sake of liberation.
\ If in correctly explaining thatness, the works of others are discredited,
\ There is no fault.

¢(i.e. Nagarjuna is not proposing another view subject to debate. One should not think emptiness is an absolute view, and hold to it. All of his teachings are merely skillful means. Nagarjuna's position is a negation without affirming anything. No absolute, only adapted skillful means.)

\ ///
\ [VI.119]
\ 162.
\ Attachment to one's own view,
\ And likewise anger at the views of others, are mere conceptions.
\ Therefore those who eliminate attachment and anger and analyze correctly
\ Swiftly attain liberation.

¢(i.e. But one should not get attached to emptiness; because emptiness is also empty. The goal is to see that there is no absolute, only adapted skillful means.)

L4: [From Chandrakirti's position (rangtong) to "Nagarjuna's In Praise of the Dharmadhatu" (Shentong)]

Therefore, the appearance of beings is just the undifferentiability of body and mind. And this is the great transparency, the nature of which is open and spacious. So there is no need to worry about the fact that beings are not real, that they are simply this great transparency, because the nature of that unreality is openness and spaciousness. So this openness and spaciousness and relaxedness is the basic nature of reality. It is dharmadhatu, the expanse of reality. And within this dharmadhatu there are interdependent appearances of arising which are not real appearances of arising. They are all just of the nature of the great openness and spaciousness and relaxedness.

Shenpen Osel has printed a book of Rinpoche's teachings, In Praise of the Dharmadhatu,* which we all should read again and again, and see that in these teachings the convention emptiness is not used. Rather the convention dharmadhatu is used, which conveys a sense of the expanse, the openness and spaciousness and relaxedness that is the essence of reality.

~ *Editor's note: See Shenpen Osel, Vol. 3, No. 2. (see another Word document on this site: Nagarjuna's In Praise of the Dharmadhatu – Nagarjuna – Dharmadhatu ...doc)

From our own expanse there shine a great variety of dependently arisen appearances. From

one's own expanse come one's own projections, one's own dependently arisen appearances. In this text, Entrance to the Middle Way, Chandrakirti is concerned first with refuting [the notion of an objectively existent] reality, and that is why the convention emptiness is used, the emptiness of reality, [instead of the term dharmadhatu], and it is this emptiness that is taught to be the nature of ultimate truth, the nature of actual reality.

¢(i.e. From Rangtong to Shentong:

¢-- From the shentong point of view - the clear light nature of mind itself is not empty of its own nature. Putting the importance on the fact that emptiness does not mean non-existence.

¢-- The real nature of the mind - the three aspects:

¢ 1. empty (1), (i.e. the intangible nature of mind, the essential emptiness)

¢ 2. clear (2), (i.e. the illuminating potential which it demonstrates)

¢ 3. and unimpeded (3) nature of mind (i.e. the dynamic unimpeded manifestation of awareness

¢-- This fundamental nature of mind (1-3) - those three aspects - is what we term, in the Buddhist tradition,

¢---- tathagatagarbha,

¢---- Buddha nature,

¢---- the seed or essence of enlightenment.

¢---- the seed or potential for enlightenment,

¢---- the original clarity of our minds,

¢---- jnana or transcending awareness, primordial awareness

¢---- original awareness - the dharmadhatu

¢---- the true nature of mind is original wisdom or primordial awareness. He sings,

¢---- "The view is original wisdom, which is empty."

¢---- Original wisdom and primordial awareness in Tibetan are called yeshe, which is the same as the dharmadhatu.

¢---- the true nature of mind is either original wisdom or radiant clarity

¢-- The dharmadhatu, primordial awareness, the clear light nature of mind.

¢-- The true nature of things, the dharmata.)

L5: [About the Two Inseparable Aspects]

-- [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2 Denying that worldly people can damage this refutation -- THE TWO TRUTHS]

-- [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1 Denying damage by worldly people's belief in production from other]

-- [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-i The argument that there is damage by worldly people]

-- [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-ii Showing that there is no damage by worldly people]

-- [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiia A general presentation of the two truths]

-- [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iiia-i All phenomena have two natures]

There are, in fact, two modes of being. One is the way things appear to be, and one is the way things really are. These are differentiated in the twenty-third verse:

\ ###

\ There are two ways of seeing everything:

\ the perfect way and the false way.

\ Therefore, every thing found holds two natures within.

\ The Buddha taught that perfect seeing sees suchness

\ And false seeing sees the relative truth. (23)

\ ///

\ [VI.23]

\ 66.

\ All things hold two entities:

\ Those that are found by seeing correctly and by seeing falsely.

\ It is said that the object of seeing correctly is thatness;

\ And that of seeing falsely a conventional truth.

¢(i.e. Clarifying the distinction between The Two Truths: conventional truths like dependent origination and Ultimate Truth / emptiness. We need those two to describe anything; one alone is not enough. In fact, those Two Truths are not different, not the same. This is said to be the inseparability of appearances and emptiness. The worldly go by the conventional truths; they do not see the Ultimate Truth. So we cannot go by what they see to try to prove what is the Ultimate Truth.)

For every single thing, there are both the way that it actually is and the way that it appears to be. That which sees the way it actually is prajna, and that which sees the way it appears to be is confused mind. Perfect seeing sees equality, which is the abiding nature of things. It also sees that which transcends all conceptual notions about what it might be. It sees the simplicity that is at the heart of reality.

In terms of the way things appear to be, there is no limit to, no end of, the variety of different ways things can appear to different beings. For example, we look at these flowers and see something very beautiful. Animals, when they perceive these flowers, may be more focused on their smell. Insects may see them as a potential home. There is no end to the different perspectives in relative reality.

The point is that no one can ever say, "This, and no other way, is the way things are. That is it." They cannot say that, because everybody has a different perspective. If, for example, you take somebody who is very famous, like the president, then the president's father sees the president as his son; the president's son sees the president as his father; enemies see the president as enemy; friends see the president as friend; some bugs see the president as something nice to eat; other bugs see the president as their home. So what is the president? You cannot say. There is no one being whose view is the exclusively correct view. No one can say, "This is how it is, and every other view must be excluded," because every being has their own different view.

Furthermore, our own views of ourselves are constantly changing. When everything is going well, when we have no mental or bodily suffering, when we are surrounded by friends, then we get pretty pleased with and have a very high opinion of ourselves. But when things are going badly, when we have bodily and mental suffering and are encountering difficulties with others, then we have a low opinion of ourselves.

And since all of these different ways of seeing things are therefore just confused appearances, do not think that any of it is real. So what is it that we need to realize? We need to realize the true nature of reality, which is equality, the freedom from all conceptual fabrications. So let's sing a song, verse 23:

\ ###

\ There are two ways of seeing every thing, the perfect way and the false way.

\ So each and every thing that can ever be found holds two natures within.
 \ And what does perfect seeing see? It sees the suchness of all things.
 \ And false seeing sees the relative truth — This is what the perfect Buddha said.
 \ ///
 \ [VI.23]
 \ 66.
 \ All things hold two entities:
 \ Those that are found by seeing correctly and by seeing falsely.
 \ It is said that the object of seeing correctly is thatness;
 \ And that of seeing falsely a conventional truth.

L5: [About Conventional Truths]

-- [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iic An explanation of the respective natures of the two truths]
 -- [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iic1 An explanation of conventional truths]

Verse 28 reads:

\ ###
 \ Because bewilderment obscures their true nature, they are relative.
 \ Whatever worldly beings fabricate appears to them to be true.
 \ This the Mighty One called the "relative truth."
 \ The noble ones know these fabricated entities to be relative. (28)
 \ ///
 \ [VI.28]
 \ 71.
 \ Because confusion obstructs nature it is conventional.
 \ Whatever is fabricated by it but appears as true
 \ Is said by the Able One to be a conventional truth;
 \ But fabricated things exist only conventionally.

¢(i.e. But all conventional truths are just that, relative truths, not absolute, not the Ultimate Truth.)

This verse gives us the etymology behind the term relative truth, in Tibetan, kunzog denpa. Literally, kunzog could be translated as completely obscured or completely blocked or covered. Why? Because bewilderment obscures the nature of these appearances. Our minds are obscured by ignorance, and this ignorance is like a big screen that comes in front of us and prevents our seeing the nature of these things as they really are. These appearances really are just fabricated; they are just projections, contrivances of beings who are under the influence of this bewilderment. But the unfortunate fact is that beings think that their own projections are true. This is where denpa, the truth, comes in. It is not because these things are validly existent that the word denpa is used; it is because people think they are true. This is where the word truth comes from in this term. So you have relative, coming from the fact that they are just appearances, one's own projections relative to one's own self that have no validity for somebody else; they are just one's own projections. And because we think our own projections are true, then the Mighty One called them relative truth [or relative truths]. And in fact, with regard to any one thing, there is a limitless number of ways of fabricating it, of relating to it, of thinking that it exists in one way or another.

Given the appearances of this life, they are merely relative appearances, because, first, ignorance, bewilderment, blocks us from seeing their actual nature, and, second, because there is a limitless number of ways that one could fabricate the nature of these appearances and cling to those fabrications as being real. Given all these different fabrications, there is a reason for saying they are real; there is a reason for saying they are true; and the reason is that that is what people think. People think the fabrications are real and true, just as when they dream and do not know that they are dreaming. When bewilderment comes between us and our dream and causes us not to realize that the dream is just a dream, prevents our realizing that we are dreaming, then we fabricate all of these different kinds of things and we think they are all real. So let's recite this verse together.

[Students recite verse 28.]

L5: [About The Ultimate truths]

-- [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-ii2 An explanation of ultimate truth]

\ ///
\ [VI.29]
\ 72.
\ Whatever wrong entities such as floating hairs
\ May be projected due to unclear sight,
\ That which is the actual entity is seen by clear eyes.
\ You should understand thatness here in the same way.

¢(i.e. All conventional truths are flawed or relative, not absolute, even if relatively functional. They are all just like illusions. The difference between conventional truths and the Ultimate Truth is like the difference between a false conventional truth and a valid conventional truth. A eye without stains can see the distinction, but not a deluded mind.

¢-- Meaning that it is not because worldly sees that "other give rise to other" that it is the Ultimate Truth. Even if it is a valid conventional truth, it is not the ultimate truth.)

L5: [About Worldly Perception]

-- [OTHER-PRODUCTION.2.1.2.1-iii How the charge of damage by worldly people is itself damaged]

The fact is though, that all of these fabrications are anything but stable; we constantly change our projections.

\ ###
\ If worldly beings perceptions were valid,
\ Since worldly beings would see suchness, what need for the noble ones?
\ What would the noble ones' path accomplish?
\ The perception of fools is not valid cognition. (30)

\ ///
\ [VI.30]
\ 73.
\ If the worldly are valid, then since the worldly see thatness,
\ What need is there for other Superiors,
\ And what need is there for superior paths?
\ That the confused are valid cannot also be correct.

\ ///
\ In all cases the worldly are not valid;
\ Therefore, on the occasion of thatness, there is no damage by the worldly. ...

¢(i.e. Meaning that if the worldly were seeing the ultimate truth, as being "other giving rise to other", then why would there be a Buddha and a Buddhist Path ? Meaning that it is not because worldly sees that "other give rise to other" that it is the Ultimate truth. Even if it is a valid conventional truth, it is not the ultimate truth.)

If ordinary beings' perceptions were valid, there would be no meaning to the path, because beings would already see things the way they really are. So there would be no point in having a path, there would be no noble beings actually, because there would be nothing to distinguish anybody from anybody else. But since it is the fact that our fabrications and projections gradually dissolve, we need the path of the noble ones. The fact is that the perception of fools, of ordinary beings, is not valid at all, because it is a perception that is clouded by ignorance—just like dreaming and not knowing that we are dreaming. If somebody says that this is wrong, if they say that the way that ordinary beings perceive things is valid, and that the reason why it is valid is that it seems to be valid, that we experience it as valid, then these reasons are not enough, because we have these exact same experiences in dreams. Just because we experience the dream to be real does not mean that it is real; it does not prove it.

Look at how our own way of perceiving things has changed from the time we were small children up until the present. We are continuously replacing one way of viewing the world with another. This just shows that none of these modes of perception has any validity. Viewed over time, we do not even have a belief in our own way of viewing things. We do not even trust that. [The truth of this is readily apparent,] because when things are going well, we have all the confidence in the world; we can do everything. But then, when things go badly, we no longer trust that feeling at all. It is completely replaced by a feeling of impatience and incompetence. So we do not even trust our own way of perceiving things, which just shows that it has no validity.

The way that things appear to ordinary beings, the way that they see them and the way that they think about them—none of this is reliable. It is not trustworthy. It is just like the way that we perceive things in dreams.

L4: Now are there any questions?

QUESTION: What does this aspect of relative truth, focusing on the word relative here, really mean?

RINPOCHE: The word kunzop, that we are translating here as relative truth, in Tibetan has two meanings. One is existence only in relation to something else or in dependence on something else. And the other is this notion of obscuring, that we had in the verse. So here we focus on the first definition, which is what you are asking about. The reason why it has that nature is that relative or the kunzop exists only in dependence upon there being genuine reality, and you can only posit genuine reality, or some notion of genuine reality, because you have something else which is not genuine. Right? So these exist only in dependence upon each other, relative to one another. So neither one really exists. So there are only dependently arisen appearances; therefore they are empty; therefore both truths are

appearance-emptiness undifferentiable.

This is the tradition of the middle way consequence school (prasangika madhyamaka), which explains that, whatever it is, it is just a mere dependently arisen appearance, and therefore, it is empty of any inherent reality. Everything in samsara and nirvana is just dependently arisen, mere appearance. Therefore it is all empty. It is of the nature of emptiness. And because it is all of the nature of emptiness, there can be all of these different appearances. So everything is emptiness and appearance undifferentiable.

As the protector Nagarjuna taught, "There is not a single entity that is not dependently arisen, and, therefore, there is not a single thing that is not empty."

QUESTION: How does genuine truth arise from method?

RINPOCHE: In conventional existence there are many methods that we use, many practices, and it is through these practices that we realize the nature of genuine reality. First, we think about the horrible suffering in the lower realms, and we get scared of that suffering, which causes us to want to gain liberation from it. As a consequence, we begin to practice the path, and gradually we start to progress towards an understanding of the nature of genuine reality.

We learn about past and future lives, that we have been born again and again and have existed since beginningless time, an infinite number of times, and will continue to do so unless we do something about it. We can get very tired and exhausted from these thoughts. But then we can realize that, in fact, there is no self being born in all of these different lifetimes. We realize selflessness.

We think about how all samsaric appearances are confused appearances. Thinking it is all confusion is a method that makes us weary of samsara. But then we can ask ourselves who is the one that is confused, anyway? And then we find out that there is no one who is confused, and that confused appearances themselves do not inherently exist. That confused appearances themselves do not inherently exist is the ultimate truth with regard to the emptiness of phenomena.

Then we think about the suffering of sickness and the suffering of death, and that again makes us frightened and weary of samsara. But then we can look at that and ask ourselves, "Who is it that is really sick? And who is it that is really going to die?" And we cannot find anyone who is either sick or going to die.

When we think about the fact that birth and death do not really exist, that is the emptiness of phenomena. When we think about samsara and the suffering of samsara, that is a method that gets us scared. But then we think of how it is that really there is no one going around in samsara, and that is [a method for realizing] the emptiness of self. And when we think about how it is that samsara does not really exist, that is [a method for realizing] the emptiness of phenomena, and that is how we arrive at the ultimate truth.

When we think about our confused thoughts, about how all of our thoughts are just confused, and that makes us tired and weary, then we can think about how it is that really there is no one thinking. That recognition is the recognition of the emptiness of the self of the individual. And we can also think about how the thoughts themselves do not really exist, and that recognition is the recognition of the emptiness of phenomena.

We can go for refuge to the three precious jewels. We can prostrate to them, make offerings

to them, confess our negativities to them. Those are all methods by which we can realize the nature of genuine reality. For example, in doing prostrations, which is one of these methods, after having done a lot of prostrations and gotten tired, we can sit down and relax and ask ourselves, "Who is the one that is prostrating, anyway?" There is no one prostrating. That recognition is the recognition of the emptiness of the self of the individual. Thinking about the objects to whom we are prostrating, we recognize that these do not really exist, and that is the recognition of the emptiness of phenomena.

Or we can do a lot of Varjrasattva practice, confess our negativity, imagine the amrita flowing through our body and purifying us, and then after that we can think, "Was there really any one who committed any negativity anyway?" The recognition that there was no one committing any negativity in the first place is the recognition of the emptiness of the self. That there was no negativity is the emptiness of phenomena.

And we can offer mandalas and then we can realize in fact there is no one making any offerings, there is nothing to offer, and there is no one to whom to offer anything. This recognition is the recognition of the emptiness of the three spheres, and again a way of realizing the nature of genuine reality.

Again we can do guru yoga practice, and then we can get tired of that and take a rest and see that in fact there is no one who is giving blessing, there is no one receiving blessing, and there is no blessing to give or receive. Again, this is the realization of the nature of genuine reality. Or we can do yidam practice, and when we get tired of focusing on the yidam, then we think, "Who really is practicing this [and what is his or her nature]? What is the nature of the yidam we are practicing? What is the nature of the practice? And again we arrive at an understanding of the actual nature of reality. So it is like that.

QUESTION: If things really do not arise because they do not arise from any of the four extremes, then what is dependent arising? What does that mean? How can anything arise, how can anything even appear to arise, if it does not really arise? So how can it say in Verse 37 that "Empty entities, like reflections and so forth, are known to arise due to the coming together of causes and conditions"?

RINPOCHE: It is just like a dream and a water moon. Dream appearances and the reflection of the moon in a pool of water do not arise from any of the four possibilities. They are just mere appearances—mere appearances of the coming together of causes and conditions producing the mere appearance of arising.

Milarepa sang,

\ When you're sure that conduct's work is luminous light,
\ And you're sure that interdependence is emptiness,
\ A doer and deed refined until they're gone:
\ This way of working with conduct, it works quite well.

In this verse, Milarepa is singing of his complete confidence that things which are dependently arisen are empty, and that things which are empty are only dependently arisen, and that these two pervade each other completely.

Think about dreaming: When you know you are dreaming, you know that whatever appears to you did not really arise; it did not come from any of these four possible ways of arising. It is just a mere appearance of arising. This is what dependent arising means.

So let's sing this verse.

[Students sing.]

QUESTION: I could use advice on how to keep from falling into the extreme of nihilism, thinking that nothing exists. Personally, when I feel compassion, it is when I see someone really there and hurting and feel that. When compassion comes from seeing somebody and thinking that they are there and that they are suffering, how is it that the understanding of emptiness and that things do not really exist does not cause our compassion to decrease? And how do we avoid falling into the view of nihilism in general? How, when one states that a nihilistic view is also just like a dream appearance, [is that different from the Buddhist view that everything is just like a dream appearance?]

RINPOCHE: By the very fact that there are relative, mere dependently arisen appearances, then there is no extreme of nihilism. And because these mere appearances do not exist as what they appear to be, there is no extreme of realism. It is for these two reasons that we do not fall into either of the two extremes.

Specifically with regard to compassion, sentient beings do not really exist, but because of their confused appearances they suffer, and so we have compassion for them. In this way, combining these two,* we are free from both the extreme of realism and the extreme of nihilism. And so it is explained that sentient beings really do not exist, but at the same time it is asserted that there are these appearances of confused sentient beings for whom we have compassion.

~ *Editor's note: The recognition of the emptiness of the confused appearances of suffering and of suffering sentient beings, on the one hand; and compassion for the merely apparent sentient beings who, because of their confusion, are suffering, on the other hand.

The nihilist would say that there is no such thing as a sentient being, nor is there even an appearance of a sentient being that is suffering. If you make both of these assertions, then you have a nihilistic view.

Milarepa described the proper view by saying, "I see this life to be like an illusion and a dream, and I have compassion for those who do not." That was his practice of emptiness and compassion together. Since he sees this life to be like an illusion and a dream, he does not fall into the extreme of realism. Since he has compassion for sentient beings who do not realize that life is like an illusion and a dream, he does not fall into the extreme of nihilism.

In fact, both realism and nihilism are just projections of thoughts. We can say that everything is real, or we can take a nihilistic view that there is nothing, but both views are just thoughts, projections of confused mind. Neither of them exists in genuine reality. This is what Nagarjuna taught in his chapter called The Examination of Mistakes. There is really no mistake; because there is no one to make a mistake, there cannot be a mistake. To have a view either of nihilism or of realism without having a self to have such a view is a contradiction.

If in a dream you have a jewel box, and you open it and find a diamond, and then you think, "Wow, I have a diamond, a real diamond," then that is the view of realism. But then you go somewhere else in your dream and you open the box again and there is no diamond, then you have a very strong view of non-existence. There is nothing. But both the view of something and the view of nothing are just part of the confused dream. Since it is the case that there

was never any diamond in the first place, there cannot be any non-existence of the diamond either. So both of these are just confused notions.

And that is why the existence of the diamond and later its non-existence are of the nature of equality. So it is like that.

QUESTION: So if it is the case that there is not a single thing which is not dependently arisen, does that include suchness and enlightenment and the inconceivable nature of reality, clear light? Would Rinpoche like to add that?

RINPOCHE: Yes, all of these [formulations of] ultimate truth— clear light, suchness, etc.—from the perspective of the second turning of the wheel of dharma, are merely dependently arisen. Because if you say clear light, then that exists only in dependence upon a notion of darkness. If you say truth, that exists only in dependence upon a notion of falsity. If you say genuine or ultimate reality, then that can exist only because you have some notion of what is not real, which is relative. For example, long can exist only in dependence upon short. Short can exist only in dependence upon long. Big can exist only in dependence upon small. Small can exist only in dependence upon big. So, since there is not a single thing which does not exist in dependence upon something else for its existence, then everything is empty. First, truth is refuted; reality is refuted. Then emptiness is proven. But in fact emptiness and reality exist only in dependence upon each other. Therefore, neither one of these really exists; they are of the nature of equality. This is what the teaching on the ten types of equality is talking about.

Self exists only in dependence on other. Other exists only in dependence of upon self. And so self and other are of the nature of equality. Happiness exists only in dependence upon unhappiness. Unhappiness exists only in dependence upon happiness. So neither one of these really exists; they are of the nature of equality.

The nature of everything is fundamentally the same ultimately, because everything is ultimately of the nature of simplicity—beyond all conceptual fabrications—and it is all fundamentally the same relatively because every single appearance is only just like a dream, an illusion, a water moon.

Appearance and emptiness are also of the nature of equality. In his song called The Eight Kinds of Mastery, Milarepa sang

\ Not separating appearance and emptiness—
\ This is view as mastered as it can be.
\ Not seeing dreams and day as differing—
\ This is as meditation as it can be.

In a dream, the appearance of a car and the inner emptiness of the car* are the same; there is no difference between them. This is why realizing the equality of appearance and emptiness is very important. When you say emptiness to ordinary people they get the thought that there is nothing, sheer nothingness. But it is not that. Because nothingness does not exist either.

~ *Editor's note: Referring presumably to the space inside the car.

So, in fact, everything is not empty, because if everything were empty, there would be no non-emptiness, and there would be no place or thing in dependence upon which things could be said to be emptiness. So we can only have a notion of emptiness because we have some notion

of non-emptiness. If everything were empty, then there would be no non-emptiness; and since there is no non-emptiness, there cannot be any emptiness either. It is like that.

QUESTION: So in the third turning, did the Buddha teach about suchness which is not dependently arisen?

RINPOCHE: In the third turning the Buddha did, in fact, give a slightly different explanation, teaching about a suchness which transcends dependent arising, but that is not what we are talking about here.

QUESTION: Rinpoche said that you have to listen to teachings on emptiness in order to know about it, and that then you have to reflect on those teachings in order to gain certainty, because, if you have not gained certainty, then you cannot meditate. But what is the purpose of meditation, if the purpose of listening is to find out about emptiness and the purpose of reflecting is to gain certainty? And my second question is, what is the difference between the equality of things having no identifiable signs and the equality of their not having their own individual characteristics?

RINPOCHE: The function of meditation is to lead us to an experience or a manifestation of emptiness.

The way we meditate is to rest within the certainty we have gained through reflecting on the teachings on emptiness. In the Aspiration Prayer of Mahamudra the Third Karmapa summarized it like this:

1. Through listening you free yourself from the obscuration of not knowing.
2. Through reflecting you defeat the darkness of doubt.
3. And through meditation you reveal the nature of reality just as it is.

With respect to the second question, when we refer to identifiable signs, we are not splitting out the name from the basis to which the name is given. For example, we think this object is clean, this object is dirty. But we are still mixing the two—the object and its dirtiness—together. When we refer to characteristics [of objects], we are not. We are just talking about the basis to which we give a name, devoid of any names or descriptions.

The first deals with the way we as worldly beings perceive things. When we say this is clean, this is dirty, we do not think the name is something different from the object. We mix it all together. The second is more from the perspective of analyzing and seeing that in fact there is an object to which we give a name and that these two, the name and the object, are not the same thing.

The individual characteristics of a thing we can see. For example, we can see the fire burning. We do not see the name. When we look at a person, we only see the person; we do not see the name [of the person]. If we saw the name, we would know each other's names just by looking at each other. When we refer to the individual characteristics of an object, we are not referring to any name associated with that object.

QUESTION: So, is the experience of meditating the same as the experience of gaining certainty, only longer in duration?

RINPOCHE: At first they are the same, but resting in the certainty leads to a direct realization of the nature of reality, which transcends conceptuality and at that time all confused thoughts are self-liberated. So it is like that.

QUESTION: The eleventh verse of the Third Mind Generation states that desire and aggression

are completely exhausted on the third ground. But does it not say elsewhere in the teachings that the kleshas are not completely exhausted until the seventh or eighth ground?

RINPOCHE: On the third ground what is exhausted are the passion and aggression that come from not recognizing, for example, that you are dreaming. But it does not refer to the passion and aggression that arise when you know that you are dreaming. So it is that difference. In the mahayana we have to give up anger, because anger is a motivation to harm others. But we do not give up desire; we do not give up passion, because included in passion is compassion, and we do not want to give that up, because compassion is what causes us to be of benefit to others. What we do want to give up is the passion and the attachment that is like passion and attachment that we experience when we do not know that we are dreaming. What we do not need to give up is the passion and attachment that arise when we know that it is just a dream. That is different.

So for example, when we feel compassion for everybody then everybody appears to be very pleasant and makes us happy to be around them. We like them. That liking of them is included in attachment. It is part of passion, but we do not need to give that up.

On the other hand, anger makes people appear unpleasant to us, and causes us to speak to them harshly, want to do them harm, and maybe even want to kill them. That is what we need to abandon.

But in mahamudra, we do not even try to give up anger. Instead, we meditate on the essential nature of anger, and then it dissolves in and of itself, like ice dissolving into water.

L4: [Continuation of ground six teachings]

L6: [2.3.5.3.2 ESTABLISHING SELFLESSNESS OF PERSONS BY REASONING -- not covered here, but copied from other files]

1. [PERSON-1 Those who desire liberation must first negate inherently existent self]
2. [PERSON-2 The way to negate inherently existent self and mine]
3. [PERSON-2.1 Negating inherently existent self]
 - a. [PERSON-2.1.1 DIFFERENT - Negating a self that is a different entity from the aggregates as fabricated by other traditions] Otherwise they would be unrelated; one would be seen without the other; one would not be the base of imputation of the other.
 - b. [PERSON-2.1.2 SAME - Refuting the assertion fabricated within our own tradition that the aggregates are [the same as] the self] Because, there would be no need for two names; subject and complement would be the same; impossible because whole is one and parts are many; one slight modification on the parts would make a new identity for the whole; because the basis of refutation and the object refuted cannot be the same.
 - c. [PERSON-2.1.3 BOTH - Refuting the three positions of dependent, basis, and possession that remain after these two] If they cannot be the same or different, they cannot be both; the three positions of dependent, basis and possessions are equivalent to the other two.
 - d. [PERSON-2.1.4 NEITHER / INDESCRIBABLE - Negating a substantially existent self that is neither identical nor different] An inherently existing (substantial) thing that is neither the same nor different than its base of imputation is impossible ... by definition.
 - e. [PERSON-2.1.5 WHAT IT IS - Explaining with an analogy how the self is merely a dependent imputation]

- f. [PERSON-2.1.5.1 Even though the self does not exist in the seven extremes it is a dependent imputation, like a cart / chariot]
 - g. [PERSON-2.1.5.2 An extensive explanation of the two positions not previously explained]
 - i. [PERSON-2.1.5.2-ia Refuting the assertion that a cart is the mere collection of its parts]
 - ii. [PERSON-2.1.5.2-ib Refuting the assertion that a cart is the mere shape of its parts]
 - h. [PERSON-2.1.6 USEFULNESS - This presentation has the good quality of allowing us easily to abandon conceptions grasping at extremes]
 - 4. [PERSON-2.2 Negating inherently existent mine]
 - 5. [PERSON-3 ALL DHARMAS - The analysis of the self and the cart also applies to other things]
 - a. [PERSON-3.1 THINGS - Applying it to things such as pots and woolen cloth]
 - b. [PERSON-3.2 CAUSALITY - Applying it to cause and effect]
 - c. [PERSON-3.3 Rejecting an argument against this]
- [from Kelsang Gyatso's commentary]

Self, I, person, and being are synonyms. Their lack of inherent existence is selflessness of persons. Normally, we grasp very tightly at our self, or I. This makes our mind unpeaceful, and causes us to develop desirous attachment, hatred, and all the other delusions. If we study the following instructions carefully, we shall gain perfect knowledge that an inherently existent I does not exist. If our mind becomes acquainted with this knowledge, gradually our self-grasping and other delusions will be subdued, and as a result our everyday problems will disappear and we shall experience pure happiness. Eventually we shall attain the permanent peace of liberation or enlightenment.

There now follows an extensive explanation of selflessness of persons.

L7: [PERSON-1 Those who desire liberation must first negate inherently existent self]

\ ///
 \ [VI.120]
 \ 163.
 \ Wisdom sees that all delusions and all faults
 \ Arise from the view of the transitory collection.
 \ Having understood that its object is the self,
 \ Yogis negate the self.

There are two types of self grasping of persons: grasping at one's own self as inherently existent, and grasping at other's self as inherently existent. The first is known as the 'view of the transitory collection'. This is the source of all delusions and all the faults that they produce, such as uncontrolled birth, ageing, sickness, and death. It is the very root of samsara. Therefore, if we wish to escape from samsara and attain complete freedom from suffering we must cut this root by eradicating the view of the transitory collection from our mental continuum.

In Secret of the Superior Tathagatas Sutra Buddha says: If a tree is cut at its root, all its branches, leaves, and twigs dry up. In the same way, if the view of the transitory collection is pacified by wisdom, all the delusions and secondary delusions are pacified.

The definition of view of the transitory collection is a type of self-grasping of persons

that grasps one's own I as being an inherently existent I. The observed object of the view of the transitory collection is the I within one's own continuum, the I that is merely imputed upon one's own aggregates. This I exists. The conceived object of the view of the transitory collection is this conventionally existent I as an inherently existent I. This I does not exist.

In Commentary to Valid Cognition Dharmakirti says:

- ~ Without its object being negated,
- ~ Self-grasping cannot be abandoned.

This means that to abandon the view of the transitory collection we must negate its conceived object, the inherently existent I, by realizing that it does not exist. Therefore, having understood that the conceived object of the view of the transitory collection is the inherently existent I, those who wish to attain liberation should strive to negate this I. Our success in this, however, will depend upon our first correctly identifying the negated object, the inherently existent I, or self, within our own experience.

Inherently existent self, independent self, truly existent self, substantially existent self, self existing from its own side, objectively existing self, naturally existing self, and self existing by way of its own nature are all synonyms. None of them exists, and they are all the negated object of subtle selflessness. We grasp at such a self all the time, even when asleep. All living beings, even tiny ants, have this mind continuously. However, without relying upon qualified instructions it is impossible to recognize this mind, or to identify its conceived object correctly.

We grasp at an inherently existent I in everything that we do. For example, if we go shopping we do not think 'My body wants this', or 'My mind wants this'; we think only 'I want this.' We grasp at an I that is independent of our body, our mind, or any other phenomenon. At that time we are conceiving an inherently existent I within the collection of our own aggregates. The mind that conceives this I is the view of the transitory collection. We have to watch our mind closely over a long period before we can identify clearly how this inherently existent I appears to our mind. We also have to rely upon correct instructions on the view of the transitory collection, and study authentic texts on the middle way. Such time is well spent, however, because without identifying the inherently existent I within our own experience we shall not be able to realize its non-existence, selflessness of persons; and without realizing selflessness of persons we shall not be able to attain liberation from samsara. The reasoning that follows establishes perfectly the non-existence of the inherently existent self; but it will have little impact on our mind if we do not first clearly identify the negated object within our own experience.

It is helpful to understand the etymology of the term 'view of the transitory collection'. According to the Sautrantika school, the view of the transitory collection is a deluded view that observes one's own aggregates and apprehends a self-supporting, substantially existent I. Thus they say that the observed object of this view is one's five aggregates. According to them, it is the aggregates themselves that are the 'transitory collection'. They are transitory because they are impermanent, and a collection because there are several of them. Thus they assert that the view of the transitory collection observes one's own aggregates and mistakenly apprehends a self-supporting, substantially existent I within them.

According to the Madhyamika-Prasangika explanation, the term 'transitory collection' refers not only to our aggregates but also to the I that is imputed upon them. The I is

impermanent, and so it is transitory; and the I is the nature of a collection because it has many parts. The view of the transitory collection, therefore, is a deluded view that observes the I, the impermanent, transitory collection that is merely imputed in dependence upon one's own aggregates, and conceives it to be an inherently existent I.

L7: [PERSON-2 The way to negate inherently existent self and mine]

L8: [PERSON-2.1 Negating inherently existent self]

It is important to distinguish the inherently existent self, which does not exist, from the self merely imputed by conception on the aggregates of body and mind, which does exist. The inherently existent self is to be negated, but the existent self is not. The existent self performs actions, experiences their effects, takes rebirth in samsara, experiences suffering, and experiences happiness. It is the very basis of both samsara and liberation. Among both non-Buddhists and Buddhists there are many different views on the nature of the self, but only the Madhyamika-Prasangikas identify it correctly, because only they identify the negated object of subtle selflessness correctly.

In the next section of the sixth chapter, Chandrakirti establishes the supremacy of the Madhyamika-Prasangika view of the self by refuting the opposing views.

(SECTIONS:

1. Negating a self that is a different entity from the aggregates as fabricated by other traditions.
2. Refuting the assertion fabricated within our own tradition that the aggregates are [the same as] the self.
3. Refuting the three positions of dependent, basis, and possession that remain after these two.
4. Negating a substantially existent self that is neither identical nor different.)

¢(i.e. Note: The other two elements – collection, shape – of the sevenfold reasoning are introduced later with the example of the cart / chariot)

¢(i.e. Note: There seems to be two presentations: the Sevenfold reasoning, and the reasoning establishing that the self is not the same, not different, not both, not neither.)

L8: [PERSON-2.1.1 DIFFERENT - Negating a self that is a different entity from the aggregates as fabricated by other [non-buddhist] traditions] [nobody really think the self is different than the aggregates]

¢(i.e. Here we start with “different”, but in most other texts we start with “the same” -- Not "different" otherwise they would be unrelated, and one would be seen without the other; one would not be the base of imputation of the other -- so the designation of the self would have no valid basis.)

L9: [PERSON-2.1.1.1 Stating the other system]

L9: [PERSON-2.1.1.1-i Stating the system of the Samkhyas]

\ ///
\ [VI.121.ab]
\ 164ab.
\ A self that is an experiencer, a permanent thing, a non-creator,
\ And without qualities or activity is fabricated by the Tirthikas.

The non-Buddhist Samkhya school say that the self is a different entity from the aggregates.

They posit a self that has five characteristics:

- 1) It is an experiencer. It enjoys such things as food and drink and experiences happiness and suffering.
- 2) It is permanent. Although it is temporarily impermanent it never perishes, so it has the nature of being a permanent thing.
- 3) It is a non-creator. The general principle is the creator of all things because it is the nature or cause of all things. The self is not a creator, merely an experiencer.
- 4) It is without qualities. All qualities are qualities of the general principle; the self has no qualities of its own.
- 5) It lacks activity. All actions such as manifesting and absorbing things are performed by the general principle; the self cannot perform actions.

In summary, anything that is a different entity from the aggregates and possesses these five characteristics is held by the Samkhyas to be a self.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.1.1-ii Stating the system of the Vaisesikas and others]

\ ///
\ [VI.121.cd]
\ 164cd.
\ Through finer and finer distinctions,
\ Different traditions of the Tirthikas have evolved.

The view that the self is a different entity from the aggregates gradually developed, and through finer and finer distinctions being made, different traditions of the Tirthikas evolved. Among them is the tradition of the Vaisesikas who attribute a different set of characteristics to the self. For them the self is an experiencer, a permanent thing, a creator, and a possessor of characteristics, and is inactive. Some Vaisesikas however assert that the self can perform some actions such as stretching and contracting. There are other Tirthikas who assert a single self that pervades all worlds and their inhabitants. They say that even though there is only one self, it can take on many forms and appear as many selves. In this respect it is like space, for even though there is only one space it can be enclosed in many different ways, and so there can appear to be many different spaces.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.1.2 Refuting this system]

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.122]
\ 165.
\ Since such a self is not born, it does not exist,
\ Just like a child of a barren [/ sterile] woman;
\ And since it is not even the basis of grasping at I,
\ It cannot be asserted even conventionally.

\ ///
\ [VI.123]
\ 166.
\ All the characteristics attributed to it by the Tirthikas
\ In this treatise and that treatise
\ Are damaged by the reason of its not being born, with which they are familiar;

\ Therefore none of these characteristics exists.

A self that is a different entity from the aggregates is like a child of a barren woman - it can never be born, and so it does not exist. Moreover, such a self cannot be the observed object of the view of the transitory collection grasping at I, because whatever is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection is necessarily a living being, and whatever is a living being is necessarily born. Therefore a self that is a different entity from the aggregates does not exist even conventionally.

A self that is a different entity from the aggregates is refuted by the reason of its not being born, and you Tirthikas must accept this reason because you use it in your own treatises. If the self that you assert does not exist, then all the characteristics you attribute to it in your treatises also do not exist.

The reasoning in these two verses principally refutes the specific arguments presented by the Samkhyas and other Tirthikas in their treatises. The next two verses provide a more general refutation of a self that is a different entity from the aggregates.

\ ///
\ [VI.124]
\ 167.
\ Thus there is no self that is other than the aggregates
\ Because it is not apprehended separate from the aggregates.
\ It cannot even be asserted as the basis of worldly I-grasping minds,
\ Because though they do not cognize it, they have a view of self.

\ ///
\ [VI.125]
\ 168.
\ Even those who have spent many aeons as animals
\ Do not see this unborn permanent;
\ And yet they too are seen to grasp at I.
\ Therefore there is no self that is other than the aggregates.

¢(i.e. Jang-gya: “The subject, a chariot, is not inherently different from its parts because otherwise they would be different entities and whatever are different entities and simultaneous must be unrelated other factuallities; hence, like a horse and an ox, a chariot would have to be observed separately from its parts but it is not.” ... “If the self were established by way of its own character as different from the [mental and physical] aggregates, it would not have the character of the aggregates: production, abiding, and disintegration. For, [the self] would be an other factuality unrelated to the aggregates. It is like, for example, a horse, which, since it is different from an ox, does not have [the specific characteristics of an ox, which are] a hump [on the shoulders] and so forth. If this were the case, [the mental and physical aggregates] would not exist as the basis for the designation of the convention of a self, nor would they exist as an object of a [consciousness] conceiving self. For, the self would be uncompounded, like a sky-flower. Chandrakirti sets this forth in his Clear Words in the form of an other-renowned syllogism. ¢-- Moreover, if the self and the aggregates were inherently different, [the self] would have to be observed as a different factuality from the characteristics of the aggregates, such as being suitable [to be called] form, just as form and consciousness, for example, are observed as different.”)

There is no self that is a different entity from the aggregates because the self cannot be apprehended separately from the aggregates. Whenever the self appears, one or more of the aggregates also appears; and if no aggregates appear, no self appears. A cow, for example, can appear without a horse appearing because a cow and a horse are different entities. The self, however, cannot appear without its aggregates appearing. This clearly indicates that the self is not a different entity from the aggregates. Moreover, if the self and the aggregates were different entities, it would not make sense to say 'I am sick' when the body is sick, or 'I am happy' when the mind is happy.

A self that is a different entity from the aggregates is not the observed object of worldly people's I-grasping minds, because even though they have no concept of such a self and therefore do not cognize it, they nevertheless do have the view of the transitory collection grasping at an inherently existent I. Even living beings who have spent many aeons in the lower realms as animals, hungry ghosts, and hell beings grasp at an inherently existent self, but they have no concept of a permanent, partless, causeless self that is a different entity from the aggregates. Such a self is merely a fabrication of the Tirthikas who rely upon mistaken tenets. There is no innate mind that grasps at a permanent, partless, causeless self.

L8: [PERSON-2.1.2 SAME - Refuting the assertion fabricated within our own tradition that the aggregates are [the same as] the self] [the same of the five aggregates, or the same as only a subset]

¢(i.e. Not "the same" (individually or collectively) because, there would be no need for two names; whole is one and parts are many; subject and complement would be the same; one slight modification on the parts would make a new identity for the whole; the basis of refutation and the object refuted cannot be the same.)

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.1 Showing contradiction in the assertion that the aggregates are [the same as] the self]

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.1-i The actual meaning]

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.1-ia Stating the other system]

\ ///
\ [VI.126]
\ 169.
\ 'Since a self that is other than the aggregates is not established,
\ The observed object of the view of self is only the aggregates.'
\ Some assert all five aggregates as the basis of the view of self,
\ And some assert the mind alone.

Because we are normally satisfied with the mere name of a person, we can meet people, interact with them, and so forth. For example, if we are introduced to someone called Peter we are satisfied with the mere name 'Peter' and relate to him accordingly. We do not ask 'Where is Peter? What is his real self? Is he within his aggregates, or is he separate from his aggregates?' Because we do not search for a Peter other than the mere name 'Peter', we are able to relate to him and respond to his actions. The non-Buddhists such as the Samkhyas, however, are not satisfied with the mere name of a person. They want to find an actual person other than the mere name, and because such a person cannot be found within the aggregates they conclude that a person must exist separately from the aggregates. In this way they are led to fabricate the existence of a permanent, partless, causeless self.

The lower Buddhist schools have a similar problem because they too are not satisfied with the mere name of a person but search for an actual person other than the mere name. They feel that if it were impossible to find a person through searching in this way, the person would not exist. In their case, however, they realize that there is no self that is other than the aggregates, and so they conclude that the existent self that is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection must be found within the aggregates.

Some Vaibhashikas and some Sautrantikas say that the self cannot be any of the individual aggregates because in the Suttas Buddha says that the self exists in dependence upon the collection of the five aggregates. They therefore conclude that the mere collection of all five aggregates is the self and the basis of the view of the transitory collection grasping at self. Among the Vaibhashikas, there are some Samittiyas who refer to a Sutta in which Buddha says:

~ O Monks, any Sramana or Brahmin who views the self correctly, is viewing correctly only these five, appropriated aggregates.

and conclude that each of the five aggregates is the self. Other Vaibhashikas refer to other Suttas that say:

- ~ You protect yourself,
- ~ How could others protect you?
- ~ By controlling themselves
- ~ The wise attain high status.

and

- ~ Why do I speak of controlling the mind?
- ~ Because a controlled mind is excellent.
- ~ A controlled mind leads to happiness.

They understand the first Sutta to say that by controlling your mind you protect yourself, and the second Sutta to say that by controlling your mind you become happy. From this they conclude that the mind alone is the self. The Chittamatrins also feel that from among the five aggregates, consciousness is the most suitable to be the self. However, they do not feel that any of the six consciousnesses or the deluded mentality can be the self, and so they conclude that the consciousness-basis-of-all is the self. Similarly, the Madhyamika-Svatantrikas assert the mental continuum to be the self. In Blaze of Reasoning, for example, Bhavaviveka says that if we search for the self within the five aggregates it is found within the aggregate of consciousness.

From this we can see that none of the non-Buddhist schools, and none of the Buddhist schools below the Madhyamika-Prasangikas, is satisfied with the mere name of a person. They all search for a self other than the mere name, and claim that such a self can be found. This indicates that they do not understand that the self is empty of inherent existence and exists only as mere conceptual imputation. This view is taught only by the Madhyamika-Prasangika school.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.1-ib Refuting this system]

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.127]

\ 170.
 \ If the aggregates are [the same as] the self, then since they are many,
 \ The self is also many.
 \ The self is a substance,
 \ And the view of it is not wrong because it apprehends a substance.

 \ ///
 \ [VI.128]
 \ 171.
 \ The self definitely ceases at the time of a nirvana;
 \ And in the lives prior to a nirvana,
 \ Since an agent who is born and perishes does not exist,
 \ There are no results [i.e. karmic consequences], and one experiences what another
 has accumulated.

¢(i.e. Jang-gya - self : If the self and the aggregates were one, there would be three fallacies:

- ¢-- 1) asserting a self would be senseless;
- ¢-- 2) there would be many selves;
- ¢-- 3) the self would have production and disintegration.
- ¢-- 1) If the self and the aggregates were inherently one, asserting a self would be senseless because "self would merely be a synonym of "aggregates", like "moon" and "rabbit-bearer".
- ¢-- 2) If the self and the aggregates were inherently one, then just as there are many aggregates, so there would be many selves.
- ¢-- 3) If the self and the aggregates were one, it would [absurdly] follow that the self would be subject to production and disintegration. For, the aggregates are subject to production and disintegration.)

¢(i.e. ME 1.4 : The I is not the aggregates because the I would be produced and would disintegrate just as the aggregates are produced and disintegrate. The I is not inherently produced and does not inherently disintegrate because if it did, memory of former births would be impossible. For, the two I's of the different lifetimes would be unrelatedly different because they would be inherently other. The I is not inherently produced and does not inherently disintegrate because then deeds done (karma) would be wasted as there would be no transmission of the potencies accumulated from actions since the I's of the different lifetimes would be unrelated others. The I is not inherently produced and does not inherently disintegrate because the I would meet with the results of actions not done by itself. If, on the other hand, the potencies accumulated from actions were transmitted, an I which was totally different from the I that committed the deeds would undergo the results of those deeds.)

The view that the aggregates are the self is disproved by four consequences:

- 1) It follows that one person has many selves. If the aggregates are the self, then since each person has many aggregates, each person has many selves.
- 2) It follows that the self is substantially existent. If the aggregates are the self, it follows that the self is substantially existent. However, if you assert a substantially existent self you contradict the Sutras that say:

~ O Monks, these five are mere name, mere nominality, mere imputation. What are they?

Past, future, space, nirvana, and person.

and

- ~ Just as 'cart' is designated
- ~ In dependence upon the collection of its parts,
- ~ So conventionally is 'living being'
- ~ In dependence upon the aggregates.

The first Sutra reveals that past, future, space, nirvana, and person are mere conceptual imputations. Therefore they are all imputedly existent, not substantially existent. The second Sutra also reveals that living beings are imputedly existent because they are merely imputed in dependence upon the aggregates. Since you proponents of things and Madhyamika-Svatantrikas accept these Sutras to be of definitive meaning, it follows that you are in contradiction with Buddha's teachings. Furthermore, if the self is substantially existent it follows that the view of the transitory collection is not a wrong conception because its conceived object, a substantially existent self, actually exists. Therefore the view of the transitory collection is not the root of samsara, there is no need to abandon it, and Buddha's teachings on emptiness are pointless.

According to the Madhyamika-Prasangikas, an imputedly existent phenomenon is any phenomenon that is merely imputed by conception. Since all phenomena are merely imputed by conception, it follows that all phenomena are imputedly existent. There are no substantially existent phenomena because to be substantially existent a phenomenon would have to be inherently existent, existing independently of conceptual imputation; and no phenomenon exists in this way. The lower schools have a different explanation. For them, both imputedly existent phenomena and substantially existent phenomena exist.

3) It follows that the continuum of the self ceases when we attain a nirvana. When we attain a nirvana, the continuum of our present aggregates ceases because they are contaminated aggregates. Therefore, if our aggregates are the self, it follows that the continuum of our self also ceases at that time; and once we become a Foe Destroyer we shall have no future rebirths, and so our attainment of liberation will have been pointless. If you believe this you fall into the extreme of non-existence.

4) It follows that it is impossible to remember former lives. If the aggregates are the self, then in each life before attaining nirvana there is no cause for the birth or death of the self because the self is inherently existent. Therefore there is no connection between the present self and the previous self, and so it is impossible to remember former lives. If this is the case, what are we to make of Buddha's Birth Stories in which he recounts from memory the experiences of his former lives?

Moreover, it follows that actions are exhausted without their effects being experienced because former and later selves have no connection. If you say that the later self does experience the effects of a former self's actions, this is like saying that the effects of John's actions are experienced by Peter!

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.1-ii Refuting a denial of the fault]

Lower schools

\ ///
\ [VI.129a]

\ 172a.
\ 'Since there is a continuum in thatness there is no fault;'

Even though former and later selves are inherently existent, nevertheless they are the same continuum. Therefore these faults do not apply.

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.129bc]
\ 172bc.
\ But the faults of a continuum have already been explained in a previous analysis
[verse 104].
\ Therefore neither the aggregates nor the mind is suitable to be the self.

\ [i.e. VI.61 -- 104
\ Phenomena dependent upon Maitreya and Upayagupta
\ Are not included in the same continuum because they are other.
\ Thus it is not reasonable that whatever are different by way of their own
characteristics
\ Are included within the same continuum.]

If former and later selves are inherently existent it is impossible for them to be in the same continuum. We have already explained the faults of a continuum of inherently existent selves when we refuted production from other. Therefore neither the aggregate of form nor the aggregates of mind are suitable to be the self.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.2 Proving that assertion to be untenable]

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.129d]
\ 172d
\ Because the world has no end and so forth.

When some non-Buddhists asked Buddha whether the world had an end, he did not reply; but his intention was that it did not. According to some texts, 'world' in this context refers to self, and Buddha's silence is taken to imply that the self has no end. On the other hand, Buddha clearly states elsewhere that the continuum of the contaminated aggregates has an end. When we become a Foe Destroyer or a Buddha our contaminated aggregates cease. However, the self does not cease; it becomes a pure self. Therefore, since we cannot find an end to the self but we can find an end to these aggregates, the assertion that the aggregates are the self is untenable.

¢(i.e. I think this is not a valid reason because the real nature of everything is beyond permanence and impermanence. The Buddha didn't answer because both answers would have been an extreme. The author is using the technique that he is blaming his opponents to use later (see verse 175): to quote the Buddha using one adapted skillful means in order to support his absolute view: that the self is eternal.)

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.3 Showing other contradictions in the assertion that the aggregates are the self]

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.130ab]
\ 173ab.
\ According to you, when a Yogi sees selflessness,
\ Things are definitely non-existent.

When Yogis realize selflessness they realize that there is no inherently existent self and no inherently existent phenomenon. Since, according to you proponents of things, inherently existent things and existent things are the same, it follows that Yogis see that there are no existent things! Therefore things definitely do not exist because Yogis see their non-existence with their valid cognizers.

Samittiyas These faults do not apply to us because according to our system when a Yogi sees selflessness he sees simply the non-existence of a permanent self. He does not see the non-existence of the aggregates and so forth.

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.130cd]
\ 173cd.
\ If it is a permanent self that is negated, then in that case
\ Neither your mind nor your aggregates is the self.

\ ///
\ [VI.131]
\ 174.
\ According to you, a Yogi seeing selflessness
\ Does not realize the thatness of forms and so forth;
\ And because he observes forms and apprehends,
\ He generates attachment and so forth from not having realized their nature.

¢(i.e. Fault of the Hinayana view: To be able to realize the selflessness of self without the selflessness of phenomena would mean that the self and the aggregates are different; that one can be seen without the other.; that there could be a self without the aggregates. Also, the arhat would still be able to develop attachment to things even after realizing the selflessness of the self, and thus create the consequences for more suffering.)

If it is just a permanent self and nothing else that is negated, then none of the aggregates is the self because when a Yogi sees selflessness he sees only the non-existence of a permanent self, not the non-existence of permanent aggregates. Therefore it follows that it is possible to see the self without seeing any of the aggregates.

Furthermore, according to you, a Yogi seeing selflessness does not realize the lack of inherent existence of forms and so forth because he has only realized the non-existence of a permanent self. Therefore, when he rises from meditative equipoise, he observes forms and apprehends them to be inherently existent. Consequently he generates desirous attachment and other delusions from not having realized the ultimate nature of forms and so forth. In short, if you assert that the aggregates are the self you incur the consequence that Foe Destroyers generate delusions.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4 Explaining the intention of the statement that the aggregates are the self]

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-i Explaining the meaning of the statement that whatever is seen as the self is seen only in the aggregates]

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-ia This teaching is given only from the standpoint of refutation]

Samittiyas All your logical reasoning is to no avail because our belief that the aggregates are the self is based not upon argument but upon reliable scriptures where Buddha says: O Monks, any Sramana or Brahmin who views the self correctly, is viewing correctly only these five, appropriated aggregates.

How could it be stated more clearly that the aggregates are the self?

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.132]
\ 175.
\ If you assert that the aggregates are the self
\ Because the Blessed One says that the aggregates are the self,
\ This is to refute a self other than the aggregates,
\ Because in other Sutras it says that forms are not the self and so forth.

\ ///
\ [VI.133]
\ 176.
\ Since other Sutras say that
\ Forms, feelings, and discriminations are not the self,
\ Nor are compositional factors or consciousness,
\ The teaching in the Sutra does not say that the aggregates are the self.

¢(i.e. The real nature of the self is beyond description, beyond all conceptualization. We can only say what it is not. It is not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither. It is not the same as the aggregates, not different, not both, not neither, etc. So they are not different, but still not the same; they are inseparable, non-dual: not two, not one. The Buddha would use one element or the other of this Tetralemma (the appropriate adapted skillful means) depending on the situation, depending on the presence of one extreme or another in the mind of the patient. So we cannot one skillful means to prove an absolute position. We have to understand the real intention, the meaning.)

If you assert that the aggregates are the self because Buddha says so, this indicates that you do not understand the meaning of the Sutra you have just quoted. This teaching is given only from the standpoint of refutation, to refute a self that is a different entity from the aggregates. It was never Buddha's intention to assert that the aggregates are the self. This is clear from other Sutras that say forms are not the self, feelings are not the self, and so forth. Since other Sutras say that the aggregates of form, feeling, and discrimination are not the self, and nor are the aggregates of compositional factors or consciousness, clearly the meaning of the Sutra you have just quoted is not that the aggregates are the self. The actual meaning here is that the observed object of the view of the transitory collection is the I that is merely imputed in dependence upon the five appropriated aggregates. Thus this Sutra serves two purposes. First it disproves that any phenomenon that is a different entity from the aggregates is the observed object of the view of the

transitory collection, and second it disproves that the aggregates themselves are the observed object of the view of the transitory collection.

This section reveals the supremacy of the Madhyamika-Prasangikas' uncommon explanation of the self, I, or person. If we understand this explanation we shall see how all the other schools are mistaken in their account of the self. Therefore it is worthwhile spending a long time contemplating the real meaning of the Sutra explained here.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-ib Even if it were given from the standpoint of establishment, it still would not reveal that the aggregates are the self] [the mere collection]

Some lower schools

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\    ///  
\    [VI.134ab]  
\    177ab.  
\    'When it says that the aggregates are the self  
\    It means the [mere] collection of the aggregates, not their entities.'
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When this Sutra says that the aggregates are the self it means the collection of the aggregates, not the individual aggregates. For example, when we see a large group of trees we say there is a forest. We do not mean that the individual trees are the forest, but that the whole group of trees is the forest.

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

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\    ///  
\    [VI.134cd]  
\    177cd.  
\    It is not a protector, subduer, or witness;  
\    Since it does not exist, that is not the collection.
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¢(i.e. This seems to say that a mere static collection of aggregates cannot be the self that is suppose to dynamically chose and act according to the virtuous path. The self is said to be able to do these functions; a mere collection cannot. The dynamic aspect is missing. – This is like talking about all the parts while ignoring their properties, their actual speed, acceleration, position, etc ...)

What you say is not correct. As you know, in one Sutra Buddha says:

- ~ You are your own protector,
- ~ You are your own enemy,
- ~ You are your own witness
- ~ When good or evil is done.

and later in the same Sutra he says:

- ~ By controlling themselves
- ~ The wise attain high status.

This Sutra teaches that with sincere practice we can lay the foundation of the Dharma Jewel in our mental continuum, and through these realizations protect ourself from suffering. Therefore, if we practise Dharma sincerely we can become our own protector. On the other hand, if we engage in non-virtuous actions we shall bring suffering upon ourself, in which

case we shall become our own enemy. Either way, whether we are doing good or evil, we know what we are doing, and so we are our own witness. Those who are wise control their mind through the practice of Dharma and thereby attain rebirth as a human or god, and eventually liberation from samsara. All these activities are functions of the self; but they are not functions of a mere collection of aggregates. A collection of aggregates is not a protector, subduer, or witness. Therefore, since a substantially existent collection of aggregates that can perform all these functions of the self does not exist, the self is not the collection of the aggregates.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-ic Rejecting an argument against this] [similar to a cart]

Some lower schools Just as the possessor of the collection of the aggregates is a protector, subduer, and witness, so is the collection itself.

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.135ab]
\ 178ab.
\ In that case, the collection of its parts remaining is a cart,
\ Because self is similar to a cart.

¢(i.e. This seems to say that a mere static collection of parts cannot be the chariot that is suppose to dynamically function like a chariot. The dynamic functionality is missing. – This is like talking about all the parts while ignoring their properties, their actual speed, acceleration, position, etc ...)

If you say that the mere collection of the aggregates is the self, then it follows that if a cart, for example, is dismantled and all its parts are piled up, that collection of parts is a cart. This is because, as you know, in the Sutras Buddha says that the self exists in a similar way to a cart:

~ Just as 'cart' is designated
~ In dependence upon the collection of its parts,
~ So conventionally is 'living being'
~ In dependence upon the aggregates.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-ii Explaining in dependence upon other Sutras that the mere collection of the aggregates is not the self]

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.135cd]
\ 178cd.
\ Sutra says that it is dependent upon the aggregates;
\ Therefore the mere collection of the aggregates is not the self.

¢(i.e. The basis of imputation and the object imputed cannot be the same.)

The Sutra we have just quoted explains that just as a cart is dependent upon the collection of its parts, so the self is dependent upon the collection of the aggregates. Therefore the mere collection of the aggregates is not the self. Precisely speaking, the meaning of this is that just as a cart is merely imputed by conception in dependence upon the collection of

its parts, so the self is merely imputed by conception in dependence upon the collection of the aggregates. Thus the mere collection of the aggregates is the basis for imputing the self, and the self is the object imputed on that basis. Since, with respect to one object, it is impossible for something to be both the basis of imputation and the imputed object, it follows that the mere collection of the parts of the cart cannot be the cart, and the mere collection of the aggregates cannot be the self.

All Buddhist schools quote the Sutra referred to by the Samittiyas as a source for identifying the self, but with the exception of the Madhyamika-Prasangikas they all misinterpret it. The lower schools all feel that there must be more to the self than the mere term, 'self', and so they search for a self within its basis of imputation. Although they all have different explanations of the nature of the self, they all mistakenly assume that the self can be found within its basis of imputation. They make the same mistake with all other conventional objects, such as carts and pots. However, the truth of the matter is that if we are not satisfied with the mere name of an object and search for it within its basis of imputation we shall not find it. This is because all objects are merely imputed by conception in dependence upon their basis of imputation, and so the basis of imputation of an object cannot be the object itself.

Only the Madhyamika-Prasangikas can give a flawless explanation of how to identify conventional objects, whether internal objects such as the self, or external objects such as pots. Therefore we should spend a long time studying and trying to understand the Madhyamika-Prasangika view.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-iii Refuting that the shape of the arrangement of the mere collection of the aggregates is the self]

Other Samittiyas It is not the mere collection of the parts that is the cart, but the shape of the arrangement of those parts. When we see the shape of a cart we say 'There is a cart.' Similarly when we see the shape of a cow we say 'There is a cow.' It is the same with all other living beings; we identify them by their shape. Thus although the mere collection of the aggregates is not the self, the shape of the aggregates is.

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.136]
\ 179.
\ If you say it is the [mere physical] shape, then since that belongs to
form-possessors,
\ They are the self according to you.
\ The collection of mind and so forth are not the self
\ Because they do not have shape.

¢(i.e. Saying that the mere physical shape of the arrangement of the parts (matter) is the self, this would eliminate the immaterial aspects like mind, as well as the possibility of karma ... The shape is one of the aggregates; the cart has a shape, it is not the shape. – So, again, this is an oversimplification of what we could think of a shape or of a collection: it doesn't include all the other properties of the parts and their speed, acceleration, position, functionality, ... This is still far from the Newtonian paradigm where everything, even mind, would be reduced to those parts, properties, position, speed, acceleration, etc. Knowing those one would be able to predict the future of the whole thing.)

If you say the self is the shape of the aggregates, then since only form-possessors such as bodies possess shape, only they can be the self. The other aggregates, the collection of mind and mental factors, are not the self because they do not have shape. If the self is form, then since the form aggregate ceases at the time of death, it follows that the self also ceases, and so there are no future lives.

The shape of a cart is not the cart but a part of the cart, which is why we call it the shape of the cart, and not the cart. It is true that when we see the shape of something such as a car or a watch we say 'There is a car', or 'There is a watch'; but this is because a car, for example, is not a different entity from its shape, not because a car is its shape. If we are not satisfied with the mere shape of a car and search further we shall not find a car because a car is merely imputed in dependence upon its shape. When worldly people see the shape of a car they are perfectly satisfied that there is a car, exchange money for it, and drive it away. Unlike the lower schools they do not search for the car within its basis of imputation. Thus the lower schools contradict the beliefs of worldly people.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-iv Showing another contradiction in the assertion that the self is the mere collection of the aggregates] [subject & complement cannot be different, nor the same]

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.137ab]
\ 180ab.
\ It is impossible for oneself the appropriator and what is appropriated to be identical,
\ Otherwise the agent [subject] and the [object / complement of the] action would be identical.

¢(i.e. The subject and the complement in phrase like “I have a collection of aggregates, or a shape, or feelings, or a mind, ... “ cannot be the same. It would be useless to use two names for the same thing. This is good for “action verbs” or “state verbs” or “possessing verbs”, ... The subject, verb, and complement in any phrase are always: not different, not the same; inseparable; one implying the other; non-dual: not two, not one, not three. As demonstrated again and again in the Karikas.)

There is another fault with the assertion that the mere collection of the aggregates is the self. Since the aggregates are appropriated by the self, the self is the appropriator and the aggregates are the object appropriated. Therefore, it is not possible for the aggregates to be the self. If they were, then the agent of the action and the object of the action would be identical; in which case a potter, for example, would be one with his pot.

In Fundamental Wisdom Nagarjuna says: You should understand appropriation in the same way.

This means that just as the agent and the object of the action (i.e. of an action verb like “to make pot”) are mutually dependent, so too are appropriator and appropriated (i.e. of a possessing verb like “to have”). Since it is impossible for them to be identical, it is impossible for the self to be the aggregates. (i.e. they are not different, not the same)

Other schools In a Sutra, Buddha says: Even though an agent is not seen, both actions and full ripening exist.

This means that because a self that is an agent does not exist as a separate entity from the

aggregates, both the appropriator and the appropriated are to be found within the aggregates. Therefore there is no contradiction in saying that the agent and the object of the action are identical.

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.137cd]
\ 180cd.
\ If you think there is an [object of an] action without an agent,
\ That is not so because there is no action without an agent.

¢(i.e. Hinayanists think that there is no self, but that the aggregates are composed of real elementary dharmas, and that action / karma, its continuation and its consequences / effects are real. So for them the self is either the aggregates, or the continuation of the aggregates. -- This is the theme of the second chapter of the Karikas : “the goer going”, or “mover moving”. Both subject, and verb are empty of inherent existence. There cannot be a goer with or without a going, and no going with or without a goer. They are not different, not the same; inseparable, non-dual: not two, not one. So just affirming the emptiness of the self is not enough; all dharma have to be realized the same.)

If the self is within the aggregates, there is no agent to appropriate the aggregates. If there is no agent, there can be no object of the action, and so there is not even a collection of the aggregates. If you think that the object of an action can exist without the agent, this is not possible because if there is no agent there is no action, and if there is no action there is no object of the action. In other words, if there is no self to appropriate the aggregates, there is no action of appropriating, and so there are no appropriated aggregates.

Other schools Well then, what is the meaning of the Sutra we have just quoted?

Madhyamika-Prasangikas This Sutra teaches that even though there is no inherently existent self who is an agent, nevertheless both actions and their full effects exist. Thus, even though the self and all other phenomena are empty of inherent existence, we still accumulate karma and experience its effects.

¢(i.e. This points to the message that even if everything is empty of inherent existence, this doesn't mean that everything is completely non-existent, non-functional, without causality at all. Emptiness doesn't deny dependent origination, causality, etc. On the contrary, one implies the other. That is the meaning of the inseparability of the Two truths.)

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-v Buddha says that the self is imputed upon the six elements and so forth]

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.138]
\ 181.
\ Since the Able One teaches that the self is dependent upon
\ The six elements - earth, water, fire, wind,
\ Space, and consciousness -

\ And upon the six bases, eye contact and so forth,
 \ ///
 \ [VI.139]
 \ 182.
 \ And since he says that it is dependent upon
 \ The phenomena of minds and mental factors,
 \ It is not them, not any one of them, and not the mere collection;
 \ Therefore the I-grasping mind does not observe them.

ϕ(i.e. The basis of imputation (individually or collectively) and the object imputed cannot be the same. – This could cover even the Newtonian model, or any other model, which is then seen as just another aggregate, another way to see the basis of imputation.)

In Meeting of Father and Son Sutra Buddha teaches that the self is merely imputed in dependence upon the six elements, the six bases, and the phenomena of minds and mental factors. Therefore all these things, individually and collectively, are bases for imputing the self. Since they are bases for imputing the self, they cannot also be the self. The self is not them, not any one of them, and not the mere collection of them. Therefore, the innate I-grasping mind does not observe them, but observes only the self.

The basis of imputation of the self is the mind and body. These consist of the five aggregates, and these in turn consist of the six elements, the six bases, and the phenomena of minds and mental factors. The six elements are earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness. The first five are all included within the aggregate of form, and the last in the aggregate of consciousness. The flesh, bones, nails, teeth, and other solid parts of the body are the earth element; the blood, saliva, regenerative fluids, and other liquids within the body are the water element; the warmth of the body is the fire element; the winds flowing through the channels are the wind element; and the various vacuities within the body are the space element. The six consciousnesses are the eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mental consciousness.

These six consciousnesses are generated in dependence upon the six powers: the eye sense power, ear sense power, nose sense power, tongue sense power, body sense power, and mental power. Each of these has a mental factor contact associated with it. Thus there is a mental factor contact generated in dependence upon its uncommon dominant condition, the eye sense power; a mental factor contact generated in dependence upon its uncommon dominant condition, the ear sense power; a mental factor contact generated in dependence upon its uncommon dominant condition, the nose sense power; a mental factor contact generated in dependence upon its uncommon dominant condition, the tongue sense power; a mental factor contact generated in dependence upon its uncommon dominant condition, the body sense power; and a mental factor contact generated in dependence upon its uncommon dominant condition, the mental power. Each of these contacts acts as the basis for its respective feeling; therefore they are called the six bases. The six feelings are: feeling arisen from contact associated with eye consciousness, feeling arisen from contact associated with ear consciousness, feeling arisen from contact associated with nose consciousness, feeling arisen from contact associated with tongue consciousness, feeling arisen from contact associated with body consciousness, and feeling arisen from contact associated with mental consciousness.

Minds and mental factors consist of the six primary minds, which are the same as the six consciousnesses, and the fifty-one mental factors that accompany them. All these phenomena,

both individually and collectively, are bases for imputing the self; but none of them is the self.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.5 Showing that the other system is incoherent] [they do not have the right object of negation]

According to the Madhyamika-Prasangika school, self-grasping of persons conceives an inherently existent self, and so an inherently existent self is the negated object of selflessness of persons.

Most of the lower schools, however, believe that the negated object of subtle selflessness of persons is a self-supporting, substantially existent self. The Madhyamika-Prasangikas say that this is the negated object of gross selflessness of persons, not of subtle selflessness of persons. Within the lower school of the Vaibhashikas, the Samittiyas believe that the negated object of subtle selflessness of persons is a permanent, partless self that does not depend upon causes.

Samittiyas

\ ///
\ [VI.140a]
\ 183a.
\ 'When selflessness is realized, a permanent self is negated';

When a Superior being directly realizes selflessness of persons, he or she realizes that there is no permanent, partless self that does not depend upon causes.

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.140bcd]
\ 183bcd.
\ But this is not held to be the basis of grasping at I.
\ Therefore it is amazing that you say that the view of self
\ Is eradicated through knowing the non-existence of self!

\ ///
\ [VI.141]
\ 184.
\ It would be like someone who sees a snake in a hole in the wall of his house
\ Having his anxiety quelled, and losing his fear of the snake
\ By someone saying "There is no elephant here!"
\ Alas, he would be the laughing stock of others.

¢(i.e. They are refuting the wrong object, and still claiming liberation.)

A permanent, partless, causeless self is neither the observed object nor the conceived object of the view of the transitory collection grasping at I. That mind observes the self merely imputed in dependence upon the aggregates, and grasps at an inherently existent self, not a permanent self. Therefore it is amazing that you say that the view of the transitory collection is eradicated, and liberation from the fears of samsara attained, simply through realizing the non-existence of a permanent, partless, causeless self. It would be like a man who generates fear at seeing a snake in a hole in the wall of his house having his fear dispelled by someone saying to him "There is no elephant here!" Alas, he would be the

laughing stock of others!

We are trapped in samsara and experience the many fears of samsara because the view of the transitory collection conceives an inherently existent self. We cannot attain liberation from samsara and eradicate these fears simply by realizing that the self is not permanent. Therefore, you should strive to understand the true nature of selflessness.

L8: [PERSON-2.1.3 BOTH - Refuting the three positions of dependent, basis, and possession that remain after these two] [An inherently existing thing that is both the same and different is impossible ... by definition; it is either the same, or different]

L9: [PERSON-2.1.3.1 Refuting the three position of dependent, basis, and possession]

¢(i.e. Not the case that one depends on the other (as if different and dependent); or one is in the other. -- The two kinds of possessions are like oneness and difference that have been refuted above.)

\ ///
\ [VI.142]
\ 185.
\ The self is not within the aggregates,
\ And the aggregates are not within the self.
\ Why not? If they were other, then there would be these conceptualizations;
\ But since they are not other, these are just conceptions.

\ ///
\ [VI.143]
\ 186.
\ The self is not said to possess form because the self does not exist;
\ Therefore there is no relationship with the meaning of possession.
\ Whether other, possessing cows, or not other, possessing form,
\ The self is neither one with nor other than form.

It has already been established that the self is neither inherently other than nor inherently one with the aggregates. Now Chandrakirti refutes three other positions: that the self inherently depends upon the aggregates, that the aggregates inherently depend upon the self, and that the self inherently possesses the aggregates.

The self is not within the aggregates in the sense of being a dependent inherently depending upon the aggregates as its basis; and the self is not the basis upon which the aggregates inherently depend. If the self and the aggregates were inherently other, then there would be these conceptualizations of inherently existent dependent and basis; but since they are not inherently other, these ideas are just wrong conceptions. Therefore the self does not inherently depend upon the aggregates, and the aggregates do not inherently depend upon the self.

Furthermore, the self does not inherently possess the aggregate of form, or any of the other aggregates, because the self and the aggregates depend upon other phenomena such as their causes, and therefore do not inherently exist. Therefore there is no relationship of inherently existent possession between the self and the aggregates. There are two ways we can possess things: we can possess things that are a different entity from ourself, as a man possesses money or a farmer possesses cows; or we can possess things that are the same entity as ourself, as a man possesses his physical form. However, in neither sense does the

self inherently possess the aggregates. For example, if the self inherently possessed the aggregate of form in the first sense, then the self would be inherently other than form, and if it inherently possessed the aggregate of form in the second sense it would be inherently one with form; but since the self is neither inherently other than nor inherently one with the aggregate of form, neither of these relationships obtains. Just as the self does not inherently possess the aggregate of form, so it does not inherently possess the aggregates of feeling, discrimination, compositional factors, or consciousness.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.3.2 A summary of the refutation]

\ ///
\ [VI.144]
\ 187.
\ Form is not the self, the self does not possess form,
\ The self is not within form, and form is not within the self.
\ Thus all the aggregates should be known in these four ways,
\ Said to be the twenty views of the self.

\ ///
\ [VI.145]
\ 188.
\ The vajra realizing selflessness destroys the mountain of views,
\ And these high peaks in the huge mountain range
\ Of the view of the transitory collection
\ Are destroyed along with the self.

So far, Chandrakirti has refuted five positions: that the self is inherently other than the aggregates, that the self is inherently one with the aggregates, that the self is inherently dependent upon the aggregates, that the self is the basis upon which the aggregates inherently depend, and that the self inherently possesses the aggregates. By realizing these refutations we shall realize that the self is empty of inherent existence; and we shall also come to understand the nature of the root and peak views of the transitory collection.

The root view of the transitory collection is the actual view of the transitory collection already explained. It has two types: the view of the transitory collection conceiving I, and the view of the transitory collection conceiving mine. The first observes only the I within our continuum and conceives it to be inherently existent. The second observes both the I and mine within our continuum and conceives mine to be inherently existent. It is important to identify the observed object of the view of the transitory collection conceiving mine. The view of the transitory collection is necessarily a self-grasping of persons that conceives one's own I to be inherently existent; and it necessarily takes the I within one's own continuum as its observed object. The view of the transitory collection conceiving mine, therefore, must observe our own I and conceive it to be inherently existent. When we see the aspect of other things, such as our clothes or our body, we develop a sense of 'mine'. At such times we are observing our I as a possessor, as 'mine', and conceiving it to be inherently existent. Thus 'mine' in this context refers not to the objects that are being held as mine, but to the subject who is being held as the possessor. If 'mine' referred to the objects, such as our clothes or our body, then the observed object would be a phenomenon other than persons, and the mind grasping them to be inherently existent would be a self-grasping of phenomena, not a self-grasping of persons. Even so, it is not incorrect to say that objects such as our clothes or our body are instances of mine.

Both the view of the transitory collection conceiving I and the view of the transitory collection conceiving mine have innate and intellectually-formed types. Every sentient being apart from those about to become Foe Destroyers, Foe Destroyers themselves, and Bodhisattvas on the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds has the innate view of the transitory collection all the time, even when asleep. Take for example a tiny insect such as an ant. If we put a finger in the path of an ant it will either flee in the opposite direction or freeze and pretend to be dead until the danger has passed. This is a perfect sign that it has the view of the transitory collection strongly grasping at I. The ant does not need to investigate through reasoning to generate this mind; it automatically grasps at I through the force of imprints in its mental continuum. This is why this view is called the innate view of the transitory collection.

Even though the innate view of the transitory collection functions in ordinary beings all the time, binding them to samsara and condemning them to perpetual suffering, there are very few people who are even aware of its existence. Without receiving Dharma instructions we shall never understand the nature or function of the view of the transitory collection. Although there are countless living beings, only a few have the opportunity to receive these instructions. Such people are indeed very fortunate; but even they will not be able to escape from samsara if their experience of the view of the transitory collection remains a mere intellectual understanding.

As already explained, to abandon samsara it is necessary to abandon the view of the transitory collection, and to do this we must first identify it clearly within our own experience. We have to watch our mind over a long period until we clearly recognize the view of the transitory collection within our own continuum. Only then shall we be able to abandon it and attain liberation. Therefore, having attained a precious human life, and having met the Dharma that explains the view of the transitory collection, we should now strive to identify this view within our own mind. Not to do so would be a tragic waste of a rare and precious opportunity.

The peak views of the transitory collection are intellectually-formed views. Unlike the innate view, intellectually-formed views of the transitory collection do not arise naturally from imprints in the mental continuum but develop as a result of misguided reasoning. For example, if we investigate the nature of the I and erroneously conclude that it must be inherently existent, we shall have generated an intellectually-formed view of the transitory collection.

Buddha listed twenty different intellectually-formed views of the transitory collection. They are:

- 1) The view holding our aggregate of form to be an inherently existent I
- 2) The view holding our aggregate of form to be possessed by an inherently existent I
- 3) The view holding our aggregate of form to be the basis upon which an inherently existent I depends
- 4) The view holding our aggregate of form to be dependent upon an inherently existent I
- 5) The view holding our aggregate of feeling to be an inherently existent I
- 6) The view holding our aggregate of feeling to be possessed by an inherently existent I
- 7) The view holding our aggregate of feeling to be the basis upon which an inherently existent I depends
- 8) The view holding our aggregate of feeling to be !dependent upon an inherently existent I
- 9) The view holding our aggregate of discrimination to be an inherently existent I

- 10) The view holding our aggregate of discrimination to be possessed by an inherently existent I
- 11) The view holding our aggregate of discrimination to be the basis upon which an inherently existent I depends
- 12) The view holding our aggregate of discrimination to be dependent upon an inherently existent I
- 13) The view holding our aggregate of compositional factors to be an inherently existent I
- 14) The view holding our aggregate of compositional factors to be possessed by an inherently existent I
- 15) The view holding our aggregate of compositional factors to be the basis upon which an inherently existent I depends
- 16) The view holding our aggregate of compositional factors to be dependent upon an inherently existent I
- 17) The view holding our aggregate of consciousness to be an inherently existent I
- 18) The view holding our aggregate of consciousness to be possessed by an inherently existent I
- 19) The view holding our aggregate of consciousness to be the basis upon which an inherently existent I depends
- 20) The view holding our aggregate of consciousness to be dependent upon an inherently existent I

Our aggregate of form is not an inherently existent I, but the first view holds it to be so. An inherently existent I does not possess our aggregate of form, but the second view holds our aggregate of form to be possessed by an inherently existent I. An inherently existent I does not depend upon our aggregate of form, but the third view holds our aggregate of form to be the basis upon which an inherently existent I depends. Our aggregate of form does not depend upon an inherently existent I, but the fourth view holds our aggregate of form to be dependent upon an inherently existent I. The remaining sixteen views can be understood in the same way.

We might wonder why the position of the self being inherently other than the five aggregates is not included in this list, and twenty-five views enumerated. The reason is that these twenty views are misconceptions that observe the aggregates, not entities other than the aggregates. Because they observe the aggregates and not the I, these twenty views are not self-grasping of persons, and so they are not actual views of the transitory collection. They are called views of the transitory collection because they observe the transitory collection of the aggregates. Calling them views of the transitory collection also serves to highlight the fact that the actual view of the transitory collection arises only when one or more of the aggregates appears to the mind. .

These twenty intellectually-formed views arise in dependence upon the actual innate view of the transitory collection. Thus the innate view of the transitory collection is likened to a vast range of mountains standing solidly in the mind, and the twenty intellectually-formed views are likened to the high peaks that stand out from this range. In one Sutra, Buddha says: When the twenty high mountain peaks of the view of the transitory collection have been destroyed by the vajra of exalted awareness, the accomplishment of Stream Enterer will be experienced directly.

This means that when a Hinayana practitioner attains the path of seeing, the vajra of his or her exalted awareness directly realizing selflessness destroys these twenty

intellectually-formed views, and he or she attains the accomplishment of a Stream Enterer.

L8: [PERSON-2.1.4 NEITHER - Negating a substantially existent self that is neither identical nor different] [An inherently existing thing that is neither the same nor different is impossible ... by definition; it is either the same, or different]

L9: [PERSON-2.1.4.1 Stating the other system]

\ ///
\ [VI.146]
\ 189.
\ Some assert a substantially existent person who is indescribable In terms of
sameness, otherness, permanence, impermanence, and so forth.
\ They say it is an object of knowledge of the six consciousnesses,
\ And assert that it is the basis of grasping at I.

¢(i.e. Monism. A Big One transcendental, beyond any description, any discrimination. But that still can be known.)

Samittiyas Because the self performs actions, experiences their effects, abides within samsara, and finally attains liberation, it must be a substantially existent person. Clearly the self is not the same as the aggregates because it does not perish at death like the aggregates; and yet it cannot be separate from the aggregates because if the aggregates do not appear the self does not appear. Therefore in terms of sameness, otherness, permanence, impermanence, and so forth, the self is indescribable. Even so, it is an object of knowledge of the six consciousnesses, and it is the basis of grasping at I.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.4.2 Refuting this system]

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.147]
\ 190.
\ Since you do not assert mind to be indescribable with respect to form,
\ You should not assert existent things to be indescribable.
\ If self exists as a thing,
\ Existent things, like mind, are not indescribable.

\ ///
\ [VI.148]
\ 191.
\ According to you a pot, which is an entity not existing as a thing,
\ Is indescribable with respect to form and so forth.
\ Therefore, you should not assert a self indescribable with respect to its
aggregates
\ Existing by itself.

\ ///
\ [VI.149]
\ 192.
\ You do not assert that consciousness is other than its own nature,
\ But you do assert it to be a thing that is other than form and so forth.
\ Since these two aspects are seen in things,

\ The self does not exist because it lacks the characteristics of things.

¢(i.e. This seems to mean that the concept of “inherent existence” is strongly related to the concepts of “being one vs. different”. So we cannot talk about being “inherently existing” and not being “the same or different”. So an indescribable substantial entity is impossible. An inherently existing thing that is neither the same nor different is impossible ... by definition. This seems to confirm that, in the Sevenfold Reasoning, we can forget about the cases of a self being both the same and different, or the self being neither the same, nor different than its base of imputation, the aggregates. And that the whole reasoning can be reduced to studying the two cases: being the same, or being different.

¢ If mind is not indescribable, why would the self be indescribable – you say both are substantially existent? So the self must be describable as being either the same or different than the aggregates. And since it is not, then it is not inherently existent.

¢ If the pot is indescribable because not substantially existent thus imputedly existent, then a self that is indescribable should also be not substantially existent, but imputedly existent.

¢ If everything is accepted as being one with itself and different from other, why would the self be different? If it is true, then that means the self is not a thing, it doesn't exist.)

According to you, mind is substantially existent, and so you do not assert it to be indescribable as either identical to or different from form. So why do you assert a substantially existent self to be indescribable in these ways? If the self is a substantially existent thing then, like mind, it is not indescribable because it must be either substantially identical with the aggregates or substantially different from them.

On the other hand, you say that a pot is not substantially existent, and so is indescribable with respect to its parts -form and so forth; and for this very reason you say it is imputedly existent. By the same token, if you say that the self is indescribable with respect to its aggregates, you should say that it too is imputedly existent, not substantially existent.

You say that consciousness is not other than its own nature, but that it is other than form and so forth. These two aspects, being one with itself and different from other things, are essential characteristics of all things. However, you say that the self lacks these characteristics. Therefore it follows that the self does not exist.

These three verses refute a substantially existent self and establish an imputedly existent self. The Samittiyas assert the self to be substantially existent, but according to the Madhyamika-Prasangikas this is impossible. Substantially existent means existing without being imputed by conception. The Madhyamika-Prasangikas say that no phenomenon is substantially existent because to be substantially existent is to be inherently existent, and all phenomena lack inherent existence.

L8: [PERSON-2.1.5 WHAT IT IS - Explaining with an analogy how the self is merely a dependent imputation

[the Sevenfold Analysis applied to the chariot]

L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.1 Even though the self does not exist in the seven extremes it is a dependent imputation, like a cart / chariot]

\ ///
 \ [VI.150]
 \ 193.
 \ Therefore the basis of grasping at I is not a thing.
 \ It is not other than the aggregates, and it is not the entity of the aggregates;
 \ It does not depend upon the aggregates, and it does not possess them.
 \ It exists in dependence upon the aggregates.

 \ ///
 \ [VI.151]
 \ 194.
 \ It is like a cart, which is not other than its parts,
 \ Not non-other, and does not possess them.
 \ It is not within its parts, and its parts are not within it.
 \ It is not the mere collection, and it is not the shape.

From the above it is clear that the existent I that is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection grasping at I is not inherently existent. An inherently existent self cannot be other than the aggregates or the same entity as the aggregates. It cannot depend upon the aggregates, and it cannot possess the aggregates. However, the existent I that is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection is not its aggregates, is the same entity as its aggregates, is dependent upon its aggregates, and possesses its aggregates. Therefore the I is not inherently existent, but exists as a mere conceptual imputation in dependence upon the aggregates.

Great skill is required to distinguish the observed object of the view of the transitory collection, which does exist, from the conceived object, which does not. Failure to distinguish them is the source of many mistaken views. Before we realize emptiness, the existent I always appears to us to some extent mixed with an inherently existent I.

Chandrakirti uses the analogy of the cart to show how the I cannot be found, and yet exists. If we are not satisfied with the mere name 'cart' and search further, we shall not find a cart. A cart is not other than its parts, it is not one with its parts, it does not possess its parts, it is not within its parts, its parts are not within it, it is not the mere collection of its parts, and it is not the shape of its parts. Nevertheless a cart does exist merely imputed by conceptual mind in dependence upon the collection of its parts, which is its basis of imputation. In just the same way, even though we cannot find the I upon investigation, nevertheless it exists merely imputed by conceptual mind in dependence upon its basis of imputation, the collection of the aggregates.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2 An extensive explanation of the two positions not previously explained]

L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2-i The actual meaning]

In the analogy of the cart just given, Chandrakirti refutes seven positions, adding two to the previous five. The two remaining positions are: (1) that a cart is the mere collection of its parts and (2) that a cart is the mere shape of its parts.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2-ia Refuting the assertion that a cart is the mere collection of its parts]

¢(i.e. The composite means the pile of aggregates without their arrangement – Not the composite because there is no inherent composite (the composite and its parts are not the

same, not different); because it is just the basis of designation of the whole/self; subject and complement would be the same; one slight modif on the parts would make a new identity for the whole.)

Proponents of things If we are not satisfied with the mere name 'cart' and search further, we do find a cart because it is the mere collection of its parts.

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\ ///
\ [VI.152ab]
\ 195ab.
\ If the mere collection is a cart,
\ Then that cart exists in the pieces that remain.

If a cart is the mere collection of its parts, then if a cart is dismantled and all its parts placed in a heap, that cart exists in those pieces because they are the mere collection of its parts.

Objection You cannot say that when a cart is dismantled the pieces that remain are parts of a cart, because at that time there is no cart.

\ ///
\ [VI.152cd]
\ 195cd.
\ Without a part-possessor there are no parts,
\ Therefore it is impossible for the mere shape to be the cart.

Madhyamika-Prasangikas Do the parts of a cart become non-parts when it is dismantled? If they do, you are wrong to say that the parts are inherently existent, because if parts are inherently existent they must remain parts forever. Therefore you cannot avoid the foregoing consequence.

Furthermore, the collection of the parts of the cart is itself part of the cart because it is a collection of parts of the cart. If we look among a flock of sheep, for example, we see only sheep; we do not see anything that is not sheep. In the same way, if we look among the collection of parts of a cart we see only parts of a cart; we do not see anything that is not parts of a cart. Therefore the collection of the parts of a cart is part of the cart. Since a cart is not part of a cart, it follows that a cart is not the collection of its parts.

The parts of a cart consist of the individual parts and the collection of the parts. Of the two, the latter is more important because if we possess only the individual parts of a cart we do not possess a cart. A cart comes into being only when its parts are assembled in a particular way. Therefore, the main basis for imputing a cart is the collection of its parts. Since it is the basis for imputing the cart, the mere collection of the parts of the cart cannot be the cart.

Since the individual parts and the collection of the parts are parts of a cart, none of them is the part-possessor; and since, according to you, the cart is its parts, it follows that there is no part-possessor. Without a part-possessor there are no parts, and if there are no parts there is no collection of parts. Therefore it is impossible for the mere collection of its parts to be the cart.

The last line of this verse in the root text reads 'Therefore it is impossible for the mere shape to be the cart/ Some texts say that it should be changed to read, Therefore it is impossible for the mere collection to be the cart' since this is the occasion of refuting the collection of the parts to be a cart. However it is possible to interpret the existing words without contradiction; and there is no need to change them.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2-ib Refuting the assertion that a cart is the mere shape of its parts]

L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2-ib1 Refuting the assertion that a cart is the shape of its individual parts]

¢(i.e. The shape means the pile of aggregates with their shape – Not the shape because there is no inherent composite (the composite and its parts are not the same, not different); because it is just the basis of designation of the whole/self; subject and complement would be the same; one slight modif on the shape would make a new identity for the whole.)

Objection A cart is the shape of its individual parts.

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\ ///
\ [VI.153]
\ 196.
\ According to you, the shape of each part is the same
\ When assembled into a cart as it was before.
\ Just as with those that were separate,
\ So too there is no cart even now.

\ ///
\ [VI.154]
\ 197.
\ If the wheels and so forth have different shapes
\ Now at the time of the cart, they must be visible,
\ But they are not;
\ Therefore the mere shape is not the cart.

When you say that the shape of the individual parts is the cart, is the shape of each part the same after the cart has been assembled as it was before, or is it different? If you say that the shape of each part is the same after it is assembled, then just as there was no cart when the individual parts were separate, so there is no cart when the parts are assembled. If the shapes of the individual parts are not the cart before it is assembled, how can they be the cart when they are assembled if they do not change in the process? If you say that at the time of the cart the wheels, axle, and so forth have different shapes from those they had before they were assembled, we should be able to see these different shapes; but we cannot. Therefore a cart is not the mere shape of its individual parts.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2-ib2 Refuting the assertion that a cart is the shape of the collection of its parts]

Objection A cart is the shape of the collection of its parts.

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\ ///
\ [VI.155]

\ 198.
 \ Since for you there is not the slightest collection,
 \ That shape is not of the collection of parts;
 \ And since it does not depend upon anything,
 \ How, in this case, can it be the shape?

If the cart is the shape of the collection of its parts, that shape must be imputed upon the collection, and the collection must be the basis for imputing that shape. According to your system, a basis of imputation must be substantially existent. On the other hand, you say that there is no such thing as a substantially existent collection because a collection is necessarily imputedly existent. Therefore it follows that the collection of the parts of the cart cannot be a basis for imputing the shape of the cart. If the shape is not imputed on the collection of parts it has no basis of imputation upon which to depend; so how can the cart be the shape of the collection of its parts? Moreover, the shape of the cart is not the cart because the cart is the possessor and the shape is the possessed. Possessor and possessed cannot be one.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2-ii Transferring this reason to others]

\ ///
 \ [VI.156]
 \ 199.
 \ You should know that all things are produced
 \ Just as you have asserted here,
 \ With aspects of effects having untrue natures
 \ Arising in dependence upon untrue causes.

 \ ///
 \ [VI.157]
 \ 200.
 \ Because of this, it is also unsuitable to say that a mind of a pot
 \ Observes the forms and so forth that exist like that.
 \ Since there is no production, forms and so forth do not exist;
 \ Therefore it is also unsuitable that their shape does.

In effect, what you have just said is that a shape that is not substantially existent is imputed in dependence upon a collection of parts that is also not substantially existent. You should know that all things are produced just like this, with imputedly existent effects that lack true existence arising in dependence upon imputedly existent causes that also lack true existence.

The reasoning refuting the assertion that a cart is the collection of its parts also applies to all other things such as pots, houses, cars, and clothes. A pot, for example, is composed of eight atomic substances: the four elements - earth element, wind element, fire element, and water element - and the four substances arising from the elements - form, smell, taste, and tactile objects. Because a pot consists of these eight atomic substances, these substances are parts of the pot; but they are not the pot. Therefore it is unsuitable to say that a mind observing a pot observes the eight atomic substances, forms and so forth, that are the collection of its parts. Furthermore, since there is no inherently existent production, the eight atomic substances, form and so forth, that are the basis of imputation do not exist substantially. Therefore it is also unsuitable to assert that the shape that is

imputed upon them is substantially existent.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.3 Rejecting an argument against this explanation]

Lower schools According to you, if we search for a cart in these seven ways we shall never find it, but this is tantamount to saying that the cart does not exist at all.

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\ ///
\ [VI.158]
\ 201.
\ Indeed it is not established by the seven ways,
\ Either in thatness or for the worldly;

\ ///
\ But from the point of view of the worldly without analysis
\ It is imputed here in dependence upon its parts.

Indeed a cart is not established by the seven ways either ultimately or nominally; but from the point of view of worldly designation it exists without analysis merely imputed in dependence upon its parts. Thus a cart exists simply by worldly designation. There is no cart other than the mere term 'cart' that is imputed by worldly people. We are satisfied with the mere term 'cart' and do not feel the need to investigate further. In this respect we are just like normal people, for they too are satisfied with the mere term 'cart' and, without further investigation, use carts to carry things.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.4 Showing that the nominal meaning of other names is also established]

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\ ///
\ [VI.159]
\ 202.
\ It is a part-possessor and a component-possessor.
\ For living beings a cart is called an agent,
\ And for beings it exists as a taker.
\ Do not destroy conventionalities known to the world.

According to our system it is perfectly possible to designate other names to a cart. For example, with respect to its parts a cart is a part-possessor, with respect to its components it is a component-possessor, and because it takes its parts, it can be called an 'agent' or a 'taker'. Such names are established by worldly convention. Therefore, we can give a faultless presentation of objects such as carts entirely according to worldly conventions. You, however, defy worldly conventions and thereby fail to account for anything. In fact the fault that you attribute to us, that we deny the existence of everything, actually applies to you. Take a cart for example. It has been proven that a cart does not exist within its individual parts or within the collection of its parts; and yet you deny the existence of a cart merely imputed in dependence upon its parts. Therefore, according to you there is no cart; and by the same token there is no pot, no car, no house, and so on. We would like to ask you not to destroy these conventionalities that are well known to the world!

L8: [PERSON-2.1.6 USEFULNESS - This presentation has the good quality of allowing us easily

to abandon conceptions grasping at extremes]

If these feelings are greeted with even an intellectual, inferential cognition of the emptiness of inherent existence, the sense of anger and indignation will dissolve right then and there! And should the conception of inherent existence ever come to an end, then feelings and beliefs like these will arise no more. According to the Buddhist Middle Way teachings, this is the end of suffering and the end of one's cyclical existence.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.6.1 The actual meaning]

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\ ///
\ [VI.160]
\ 203.
\ How can it be said that that which is non-existent in the seven ways exists
\ When its existence is not found by Yogis?
\ Since they realize thatness easily,
\ Its existence should be asserted in the same way here.

How can it be said that a cart that is non-existent in the seven ways exists inherently, when its inherent existence is not found even by Yogis? When Yogis analyze a cart, for example, in the seven ways, and fail to find a cart, they easily realize the lack of inherent existence of the cart. Through realizing the emptiness of the cart, they then realize its subtle conventional nature, that it is mere name. In the Madhyamika-Prasangika system we assert the existence of things such as carts in just the same way as they are realized by these Yogis.

If you proponents of lower tenets want to be free from faults and gain a perfect understanding of the two truths, you should abandon your mistaken views and take up the system of the Madhyamika-Prasangikas. In this system we assert that all things such as carts are mere name, and we do not search further. In this way we can give a flawless presentation of the two truths, and avoid falling into the extremes of existence and non-existence.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.6.2 Rejecting an argument against this]

Objection How can you say that the parts of a cart do not exist inherently when everyone can clearly see the wheels and so forth?

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\ ///
\ [VI.161]
\ 204.
\ If a cart does not exist, then in that case
\ Since there is no part-possessor its parts also do not exist.
\ For example, if a cart is burned its parts no longer exist.
\ Likewise when the part-possessor is consumed by the fire of wisdom, so too are the parts.

As already explained, a cart is not inherently existent because it cannot be found by the sevenfold analysis. If a cart does not inherently exist, there is no inherently existent part-possessor, and so the parts also do not inherently exist. For example, if the part-possessor, the cart, is burned by fire, its parts are also burned and no longer exist.

Likewise, when the fuel of the self-grasping mind apprehending an inherently existent part-possessor is consumed by the fire of wisdom realizing emptiness, so too is the self-grasping mind apprehending inherently existent parts. Thus neither the cart nor its parts are inherently existent.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.6.3 Applying the analogy of the cart to the meaning of the nominal self]

\ ///
\ [VI.162]
\ 205.
\ In the same way, the self is held by worldly renown
\ To be an appropriator in dependence upon the aggregates -
\ The elements, and likewise the six sources.
\ The appropriated are the object, and it is the agent.

The analogy of a cart is given to help us understand how the self is not inherently existent but is merely imputed in dependence upon its parts. Of course any other object could have been taken as an analogy, but it is useful when examining an internal object such as the self to take an external object such as a cart as an analogy. Just as a cart cannot be found when analyzed in the seven ways, neither can the self; and just as a cart exists as mere imputation, so too does the self. In just the same way, the self is established by worldly renown as an appropriator merely imputed in dependence upon its parts - the five aggregates, the six elements, and the six sources. All these are the appropriated, the object of the action; and the self is the appropriator, the agent of the action.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.6.4 Showing other good qualities of asserting a self that is dependently imputed]

\ ///
\ [VI.163]
\ 206.
\ Because the thing does not exist, it is not stable and not unstable,
\ It is not born and does not perish,
\ It also has no permanence and so forth,
\ And it is without oneness or otherness.

Once we have realized that the self is not inherently existent but merely imputed upon the aggregates, we shall then realize that it is not inherently stable and not inherently unstable, it is not inherently born and does not inherently perish, it has no inherently existent permanence or impermanence, and it is without inherently existent oneness or otherness. We shall realize all this simply from realizing that the self is empty of inherent existence. Why is this? It is because once we have realized the emptiness of a characterized phenomenon we automatically realize the emptiness of all its characteristics.

From this we can understand that the realization that the self is not inherently existent but dependently imputed enables us to overcome not only the view of the transitory collection but also all other deluded views. The deluded views referred to here, the view that the self is inherently stable and so forth, are all included in extreme view within the five types of deluded view.

L9: [PERSON-2.1.6.5 Recognizing the self that is the basis both of the bondage of delusion and of liberation]

Question If the self does not exist inherently but is merely imputed, what is it that is presently trapped within samsara and that will eventually attain liberation?

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\ ///
\ [VI.164]
\ 207.
\ The self with respect to whom a mind grasping at I
\ Always arises strongly in living beings,
\ And with respect to whose possessions a mind grasping at mine arises,
\ That self exists uninvestigated and well-known to confusion.

It is true that the self that is the basis of both samsara and liberation cannot be found if we search for it; but this does not mean that it does not exist at all, because if we do not search for it it exists by way of worldly renown. This means that it exists by way of being apprehended by the valid cognizers of worldly beings. Because the valid cognizers of worldly people apprehend the I, the I exists. Thus the I is a mere apprehension of the valid minds of worldly people; it is mere imputation, mere name. If we are satisfied with this mere apprehension, this mere name, T, it exists and functions; but if we are not satisfied and search for it we shall not find it.

Since beginningless time, living beings trapped in samsara have habitually generated a strong view of the transitory collection grasping at I and mine. The self that is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection grasping at I, and with respect to whose possessions a mind grasping at mine arises, is the self that is the basis of samsara and liberation. It exists uninvestigated and well-known to the valid minds of worldly people.

In the root text, the valid minds of worldly people are called 'confusion'. This refers to the valid minds of those who have not yet realized emptiness. It does not mean actual confusion because confusion is a wrong awareness, and not a valid mind.

It is important to stress again the need to put great effort into distinguishing the existent self that is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection from the nonexistent self that is its conceived object. To do this we must first realize the lack of inherent existence of the self by analyzing it in seven ways like a cart. Only then shall we be able to realize that the self exists as mere conceptual imputation.

L8: [PERSON-2.2 NO MINE - Negating inherently existent mine]

\ ///
\ [VI.165]
\ 208.
\ Since without an agent there is no [object of the] action,
\ Without a self there is no mine.

\ ///
\ Therefore Yogis who see that self and mine are empty
\ Will attain liberation.

Just as it is unsuitable to assert inherently existent self, so it is unsuitable to assert inherently existent mine. Without an agent there is no object of the action. For example,

without a potter there is no pot. Therefore, without an inherently existent self there is no inherently existent mine. Since the view of the transitory collection grasping at I and mine is the root of samsara, those who realize that self and mine lack inherent existence will attain liberation from samsara.

L7: [PERSON-3 ALL DHARMAS - The analysis of the self and the cart also applies to other things]

L8: [PERSON-3.1 THINGS - Applying it to things such as pots and woolen cloth]

\ ///
\ [VI.166]
\ 209.
\ Such things as pots, woolen cloth, canvas, armies, forests, rosaries, trees,
\ Houses, small carts, guest houses, and so forth
\ Should be realized in just the same way as they are spoken of;
\ Because the Able One would never argue with the worldly.

\ ///
\ [VI.167]
\ 210.
\ Parts and part-possessors, qualities and quality-possessors, attachment and the
attached,
\ Characteristics and bases of characteristics, firewood and fire, and so forth-
\ Objects such as these do not exist in seven ways when analyzed like a cart;
\ But otherwise do exist by way of worldly renown.

The reasoning that establishes that the self and the cart do not exist in seven ways but are merely imputed by conception also applies to other things. Thus things such as pots, woollen cloth, canvas, armies, forests, rosaries, trees, houses, small carts, guest houses, and so forth - in fact anything imputed by worldly people in dependence upon a valid name - should be realized without investigation to be existent in just the same way as they are spoken of by worldly people. Buddha accepted all these things just as worldly people impute them. He would never argue with worldly people about what they realize with their valid cognizers.

Furthermore, objects such as parts and part-possessors, qualities and quality-possessors, attachment and people with attachment, characteristics and bases of characteristics, and firewood and fire, are also not inherently existent because they do not exist in seven ways when analyzed like a cart; but they do exist by way of worldly renown because they are all imputed in dependence upon valid names by worldly people. Thus we should be satisfied with all these things as mere names just as they are imputed by worldly people; then we shall have no difficulty in establishing the two truths of phenomena such as pots and woollen cloth. For example, the lack of inherent existence of a pot is an ultimate truth, and the pot existing as mere imputation by conception is a conventional truth. If we are not satisfied with the mere names of things and search further we shall find it impossible to establish either of the two truths and, like the proponents of things, fall into the two extremes.

L8: [PERSON-3.2 CAUSALITY - Applying it to cause and effect [they cannot be simultaneous, not separated in time; not different, not the same; no causality, no non-causality]

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\ ///
 \ [VI.168]
 \ 211.
 \ If a cause produces a product it is a cause,
 \ And if no effect is produced then, lacking that, it is not a cause;
 \ But if an effect has a cause it is produced.
 \ Therefore tell us what arises from what, and what precedes what?

 \ ///
 \ [VI.169]
 \ 212.
 \ If you say that a cause produces an effect through meeting,
 \ Then if they are the same potential, producer and effect are not different;
 \ And if they are different there is no distinction between cause and non-cause.
 \ Having rejected these two, there is no other possibility.

 \ ///
 \ [VI.170ab]
 \ 213ab.
 \ If you say that causes do not produce effects, then so-called effects do not
 exist;
 \ And without an effect there is no reason for a cause, and they do not exist.

Cause and effect are also not inherently existent. For example, if a cause such as a seed produces a product such as a sprout, it is a cause; but if no effect is produced by that seed, it is not a cause. Therefore causes depend upon their effects. Since we can see clearly that all effects such as sprouts are produced by their causes, effects also depend upon their causes. Since cause and effect are mutually dependent, they lack inherent existence and, like a cart, cannot be found upon investigation.

If you assert that cause and effect are inherently existent, then what arises from what and what precedes what? Do effects arise from causes, or do causes arise from effects? Do causes precede effects, or do effects precede causes? If you say that effects arise from causes you contradict your assertion that effects are inherently existent because something that is inherently existent does not depend upon causes. If you say that causes arise from effects you will only lay yourselves open to ridicule. If you say that causes precede effects, then since causes are inherently existent they never cease, and if causes never cease, effects are never produced because effects arise only upon the cessation of their causes. If you say that effects precede causes, again you will simply lay yourselves open to ridicule.

Furthermore, if you say that cause and effect are inherently existent, do causes meet their effects or not? If you say that a cause produces an effect through meeting, do the cause and effect meet like one person meeting another, or do they meet like water flowing into water? If you say it is like one person meeting another, cause and effect are simultaneous; but this is impossible. If you say that a cause meets its effect like water flowing into water, it follows that cause and effect mingle and become one potential, like a river flowing into a lake. Since they are the same potential they are identical; and so cause and effect are not different, which is absurd. If you assert that a cause produces an effect without meeting it, then since, according to you, cause and effect are inherently different, they are completely unrelated. If effects can arise from causes with which they are completely unrelated there is no distinction between cause and non-cause, which is absurd. When a cause

produces an effect, it must do so either by meeting or by not meeting; there is no third possibility. Since for you neither of these can be established, this is a clear indication that you have no correct reasons for saying that cause and effect are inherently existent. If you say that inherently existent causes do not produce effects, there are no inherently existent effects; and since without its producing an effect there is no reason for calling it a cause, you should also say that causes do not exist inherently.

Proponents of things But these faults also apply to you because cause and effect must either meet or not meet, there is no third possibility.

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\ ///
\ [VI.170cd]
\ 213cd.
\ Since both of these are just like illusions, we are not at fault;
\ And worldly people's things exist.

Since for us, both causes and effects lack inherent existence and therefore are just like illusions or reflections, we do not incur the fault of falling into the extreme of existence; and since, according to our system, all things imputed by worldly people in dependence upon valid names do exist, we do not incur the fault of falling into the extreme of non-existence.

L8: [PERSON-3.3 Rejecting an argument against this]

L9: [PERSON-3.3.1 The arguments that the refutation of inherently existent cause and effect has similar faults]

Proponents of things

\ ///
\ [VI.171]
\ 214.
\ 'Do these faults not apply to you as well,
\ For your refutation would refute what is to be
\ refuted either by meeting it or by not meeting it?
\ When you say this you destroy only your own position;
\ Thus you are not able to refute what you seek to refute.

\ ///
\ [VI.172]
\ 215.
\ And because without any reason you cast aspersions on everything
\ With false consequences that even in your own words turn back on yourselves,
\ You will not be accepted by the Holy Ones;
\ For, because you have no position of your own, you can only dispute by refuting.'

When we said that cause and effect are inherently existent, you criticized us by stating the consequence that a cause must produce its effect either by meeting or by not meeting, and since neither of these is the case and there is no third possibility our position must be invalid. Well, do these faults not apply to you as well? Your so-called refutation would refute our position either by meeting it or by not meeting it. If the first were the case, your reasons and our reasons would merge and become indistinguishable. If the second were

the case, we would be unable to distinguish a refutation from a non-refutation. Since there is no third possibility your position is invalid. Thus, when you say this you destroy only your own position, and you are not able to refute our position, which is what you seek to do.

Because without any reason you cast aspersions on everything with false consequences that fail to refute our position, but which even in your own words turn back on yourselves, you will not be accepted by the Holy Ones. Because you have no position of your own, you have nothing constructive to say, but can only dispute with others by refuting.

L9: [PERSON-3.3.2 Replying that it does not have similar faults]

L9: [PERSON-3.3.2.1 How refutation and proof are accepted within our position]

L9: [PERSON-3.3.2.1-i How refutation of others' position is accepted nominally]

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\ ///
\ [VI.173]
\ 216.
\ The fault that you have stated here, that a refutation refutes what is to be refuted
\ Either by meeting or by not meeting,
\ Definitely applies to those who hold the position;
\ But since we do not hold that position, the consequence does not follow.

The fault that you have stated here, that our refutation should refute your position either by meeting or by not meeting, definitely applies to those who hold the position that things are inherently existent; but since we do not hold this position the consequence of meeting or not meeting does not follow. However our refutation of your system does exist nominally, undamaged by your criticism.

L9: [PERSON-3.3.2.1-ii How proofs within our own position are accepted]

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.174]
\ 217.
\ Just as for you at the time of an eclipse and so forth
\ The characteristics of the orb of the sun are seen even in a reflection,
\ And although the meeting or non-meeting of the sun and the reflection are certainly inappropriate,
\ Nevertheless it arises dependently and merely nominally.

\ ///
\ [VI.175]
\ 218.
\ And although it is untrue, it is used to beautify the face.
\ Just as that exists, so too in the same way here,
\ Our reasons are seen to be effective in cleaning the wisdom face;
\ For although they are not suited, you should know that with them you can realize the object to be established.

Just as our refutations of others' positions exist nominally, so too do proofs within our own tradition. Even though nothing exists inherently, nevertheless causes produce effects, and signs indicate their meanings. For example, if we want to look at the sun at the time of an eclipse, both the orb of the sun and its characteristics can be seen by looking at its reflection in water. The reflection of the sun is not inherently existent, and if we search for it by investigating whether it meets with the sun or not, we shall not find it. Nevertheless, it arises in dependence upon the sun, and exists merely nominally. What is more, it is a reliable sign indicating the characteristics of the sun in the sky. Similarly, a reflection of a face in a mirror is not truly existent because if we investigate to see whether it meets the actual face or not, we shall not find it. Nevertheless, it exists nominally and we can use it to clean or beautify our face. Just as a reflection of a face lacks inherent existence but is effective in helping to clean the face, so within the Madhyamika position our reasons are effective in cleaning the stains of ignorance from the wisdom face of our opponents such as you proponents of things. Although our reasons such as the reasoning of dependent relationship and the sevenfold reasoning are not inherently existent, you should know that with them you can realize the object to be established, lack of inherent existence.

L9: [PERSON-3.3.2.2 An explanation clarifying the reason why the others' consequence is not similar]

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.176]
\ 219.
\ If the reasons that cause the objects they establish to be understood existed as things,
\ And if the object established, that which is actually understood, were an existent entity,
\ You could apply the reasoning of meeting and so forth;
\ But since they do not exist, you can only despair.

If the reasons such as the reasoning of dependent relationship and the sevenfold reasoning were inherently existent, and if the object they establish, the lack of inherent existence of things, were also inherently existent, you could apply the consequence of meeting and so forth, and your criticisms would be valid; but since they are not you can only despair.

L9: [PERSON-3.3.2.3 Lack of inherent existence can be established but others cannot establish its opposite in the same way]

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.177]
\ 220.
\ We can very easily induce the realization
\ That all things lack things,
\ But you cannot easily make others understand inherent existence in the same way;
\ So why confound the world with a net of bad views?

With our valid reasons and analogies we can very easily lead others to realize that all

things lack inherent existence; but because you have no valid reasons or analogies you cannot make others accept inherent existence in the same way. So why do you confound worldly beings with a net of bad views? Worldly beings are already bound to samsara by the innate view of the transitory collection, and as a result they experience relentless suffering. Why do you entrap them further with your net of intellectually-formed views grasping at an inherently existent self? Our task is to help living beings to escape from their suffering by abandoning self-grasping, not to lead them to even more suffering by increasing their self-grasping.

L9: [PERSON-3.3.2.4 How to understand the remaining refutations not explained here]

Madhyamika-Prasangikas

\ ///
\ [VI.178]
\ 221.
\ Having understood the last refutation just taught,
\ You should use it here to answer the position of meeting and so forth.
\ We are not like disputants who only refute.
\ Any remainder from what has been explained should be understood by this position.

To summarize, in the foregoing reasoning we have extensively explained selflessness of phenomena and selflessness of persons; and on both occasions we refuted others' systems and established our own. Again the proponents of things sought to discredit us by returning our consequence of meeting and so forth, and again we refuted their system and established our own. Having understood this last refutation, you should use it here to answer the position of meeting and so forth. Since we have used valid reasons and analogies, and since we have not only refuted others' positions but also established our own, we are not like disputants who only refute. Once you have understood our reasoning you can use it to refute any assertions of the proponents of things that have not been explained above.

The Madhyamika scholars' principal intention in refuting others' positions and establishing their own is to free living beings from wrong views and to lead them to the correct view of profound emptiness. In this way they hope to free all living beings from the sufferings of samsara and lead them to the happiness of liberation. Since they are motivated only by the wish to benefit living beings it is advisable to follow them.

L6: [2.3.5.4 AN EXPLANATION OF THE DIVISIONS OF EMPTINESS – with a commentary from Rinpoche]

¢(i.e. Résumé:

¢-- The tetralemma:

¢-- It is not realism, not nihilism, not dualism, not monism.

¢-- Emptiness of the four extreme positions.

¢-- Emptiness of all dharmas.

¢-- The dharmadhatu is inconceivable, beyond any description, beyond any view, beyond any conceptualisation, beyond any duality, beyond any karma formation.)

L7: [A. The division of emptiness in brief]

\ [VI.179]
 \ #222.
 \ To liberate living beings, the Blessed One said
 \ That this selflessness has two types when divided by way of persons and
 phenomena;
 \ And then again, according to disciples,
 \ He explained many divisions of these.

 \ [VI.180]
 \ #223.
 \ Having extensively explained
 \ Sixteen emptinesses,
 \ He again explained four in brief;
 \ And these are regarded as the Mahayana.

L7: [B. An extensive explanation of the meaning of each division]

L7: [B.1 An extensive explanation of the division of emptiness into sixteen]

L8: [1. Emptiness of the inner]

¢(i.e. of the subject: refers to dharmas belonging to the subject)

\ <<< Since it has no inherent nature,
 \ The eye is empty of being an eye.
 \ The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind are the same way.
 \ They are all described in a similar way.
 \ (Chap. 6., v. 181)

 \ They are not stable nor forever lasting,
 \ Nor do they remain for a short time and decay.
 \ The eye and the rest that are the six inner ones
 \ Are things that have no essential nature at all.
 \ This is what is meant by "emptiness of the inner." (182) >>>

\ [VI.181]
 \ #224.
 \ Eyes are empty of eyes
 \ Because that is their nature.
 \ Ears, nose, tongue, body, and mind
 \ Should be understood in the same way.

\ [VI.182]
 \ #225.
 \ Because they do not remain constant
 \ And do not disintegrate,
 \ The lack of inherent existence
 \ Of the six, eyes and so forth,
 \ Is said to be the emptiness of the inner (1).

These two verses are in accord with the explanation in the third chapter of The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way that the sense faculties are empty of true essence. And they are empty of true essence because they exist neither as one nor as many. So we first gain certainty about that and then we rest the mind in that certainty.

L8: [2. Emptiness of the outer]

¢(i.e. of the object: refers to object- related dharmas)

\ <<< For these reasons, form's nature is emptiness;
\ Therefore form is empty of being form.
\ Sounds, odors, things that are tasted, and what the body feels too,
\ All these phenomena are exactly the same. (183)

\ Form and so forth have no essential nature:
\ This very lack of essence is called "emptiness of the outer." (184) >>>

\ [VI.183]
\ #226.
\ Forms are empty of forms
\ Because that is their nature.
\ Sounds, smells, tastes, tactile objects, and phenomena
\ Are just the same.

\ [VI.184]
\ #227b.
\ The lack of inherent existence of forms and so forth
\ Is said to be the emptiness of the outer (2).

Form "what is smelled, what is tasted, what is touched, what is heard, what is seen" none of these have any inherent nature. They are just like the appearances in dreams. Remembering that, we rest the mind in meditation. This is the same as the view expressed in Chapter 14 of Nagarjuna's Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, which looks at the object that is seen, what sees, and the seer, and shows that none of them have any true existence.

So for example, in a dream the form that is seen, the eye that sees, and the person who is seeing, none of these ever really meet because they do not have any essence. In the Heart Sutra it says, there is no form, no sound, no smell, no taste, no touch, no phenomena. It is the same meaning.

L8: [3. Emptiness of the inner and the outer]

¢(i.e. of the subject and the object: refers to dharmas which are both subject- related and object- related)

\ <<< That both inner and outer lack an essential nature
\ Is what is called "emptiness of the inner and the outer." (184) >>>

\ [VI.184]
\ #227cd.
\ The lack of inherent existence of both
\ Is the emptiness of the inner and outer (3).

\ [VI.185ab]
\ #228ab.
\ The lack of inherent existence of phenomena
\ Is explained as emptiness by the wise.

[There was a gap in the tape here, but, based on the reasonings in other teachings on emptiness, one could surmise that Khenpo Rinpoche reasoned that once the emptiness of the

inner had been demonstrated and the emptiness of the outer had been demonstrated, then it followed logically that the emptiness of their composite, the inner and the outer, had also been demonstrated.]

L8: [4. Emptiness of emptiness]

\ <<< All phenomena lack the essential nature, and
\ The wisest of all call this "emptiness."
\ Furthermore, the Wise One said,
\ This emptiness is empty of being an inherently existent emptiness. (185)

\ The emptiness of what is called "emptiness"
\ Is the "emptiness of emptiness."
\ The Buddha taught it to counteract
\ The mind's tendency to think of emptiness as something truly existent. (186) >>>

\ [VI.185cd]
\ #228cd
\ And that emptiness too is said to be
\ Empty of the entity of emptiness.

\ [VI.186]
\ #229.
\ The emptiness of what is called emptiness
\ Is said to be the emptiness of emptiness (4).
\ It was taught to overcome the mind
\ That apprehends emptiness as a thing.

In order to reverse our tendency to turn emptiness into some kind of object, the Buddha taught the emptiness of emptiness. We might think, "Oh, emptiness is emptiness." To free us from the belief that emptiness is emptiness, the Buddha taught the emptiness of emptiness.

¢(i.e. Emptiness demolishes the five appropriated aggregates. The emptiness of emptiness demolishes [that] emptiness. -- Emptiness demolishes all dharmas so that the only thing which abides is emptiness. After emptiness has already demolished all dharmas, emptiness itself should also be relinquished. It is on account of this that we require this emptiness of emptiness.)

L8: [5. Emptiness of the great]

¢(i.e. the great emptiness: the ten directions are devoid of the characteristics of the ten directions and that this represents "great emptiness.")

\ <<< The "great" is what the ten directions encompass:
\ All sentient beings and the entire universe.
\ The "immeasurables" prove the directions' infiniteness:
\ They pervade the limitless directions, so they cannot be measured in extent.
(187)

\ That all ten directions in their whole vast extent
\ Are empty of essence is the "emptiness of the great."
\ The Buddha taught about its emptiness
\ To reverse our conception of the vast as being real. (188) >>>

\ [VI.187]
 \ #230.
 \ Because they pervade all environments
 \ And their beings,
 \ And because they are without end like the immeasurables,
 \ The directions are great.

\ [VI.188]
 \ #231.
 \ That which is the emptiness
 \ Of all these ten directions
 \ Is the emptiness of the great (5).
 \ It was taught to overcome grasping at the great.

The directions are truly great, and the reason why is that they pervade all sentient beings in all of the worlds and places in the universe. So, in order to reverse our conception of the directions as being something real Buddha taught the emptiness of the great, because until we realize that the directions are not real we will not be able to realize that everything in the directions is not real.

¢(i.e. This "directionality" is a dharma which is not the product of causes and conditions, nor is it a dharma [characterized by] creation. Because it is a subtle dharma which is difficult to demolish, [the emptiness which refutes its ultimacy] is referred to as "great emptiness.")

L8: [6. Emptiness of the ultimate]

¢(i.e. the emptiness of the supreme meaning: Nirvana)

\ <<< Because it is wanderer's supreme of all needs,
 \ Nirvana's cessation is the ultimate here.
 \ Nirvana, the Truth Body, is empty of itself,
 \ And this is what the emptiness of the ultimate is. (189)
 \ The Knower of the Ultimate
 \ Taught the "emptiness of the ultimate"
 \ To counteract the mind's tendency
 \ To think that nirvana is a thing. (190) >>>

\ [VI.189]
 \ #232.
 \ Because it is the supreme purpose,
 \ The ultimate is nirvana.
 \ That which is its emptiness
 \ Is the emptiness of the ultimate (6).

\ [VI.190]
 \ #233.
 \ The Knower of the ultimate
 \ Taught the emptiness of the ultimate
 \ To overcome the mind
 \ That apprehends nirvana as a thing.

¢(i.e. The supreme meaning refers to the true character (bhuutalak.sa.na) of all dharmas. which constituted their real nature. Because the Buddha wished to cut off these doubts, he simply set forth a clear explanation in which he declared that the five aggregates, the suchness nature of dharmas and the ultimate reality (shr - ji) are all also empty. This is what is meant by "the emptiness of a nature."

¢-- Moreover, that which is conditioned possesses three characteristics: arising, abiding and perishing. That which is unconditioned also possesses three characteristics: nonarising, nonabiding, and nonperishing. If even the nature of that which is conditioned is empty, how much the more so is this the case for conditioned dharmas. If even the nature of that which is unconditioned is empty how much the more so is this the case for unconditioned dharmas. It is on account of all kinds of causes and conditions such as these that a nature cannot be gotten at. This is what is meant by "the emptiness of a nature.")

L8: [7. Emptiness of the composite]

¢(i.e. i.e of the conditioned)

\ <<< Because they arise from conditions
\ The three realms are "composite," it is taught.
\ They are empty of themselves,
\ And this, the Buddha taught, is the "emptiness of the composite." (191) >>>

\ [VI.191]
\ #234.
\ Because they arise from conditions,
\ The three realms are definitely explained as produced.
\ That which is their emptiness
\ Is said to be the emptiness of the produced (7).

Anything that is arisen from causes and conditions is called a composite phenomena. And these composite phenomena are beyond being one or many. (See note on page 62.) They have no true essence at all. That is why the Buddha taught the emptiness of the composite.

Understanding the emptiness of the composite helps to free us from our beliefs that the phenomena that we see [and experience] that arise from causes and conditions are truly existent. In short, this meditation on the true nature of the composite is a meditation on the true nature of samsara. Let's recite this again.

L8: [8. Emptiness of the uncomposite]

¢(i.e. of the unconditioned)

\ <<< When arising, cessation, and impermanence are not among its characteristics,
\ A phenomenon is known as being "uncomposite."
\ They are empty of themselves.
\ This is the "emptiness of the uncomposite." (192) >>>

\ [VI.192]
\ #235.
\ Whatever lacks production, abiding, and impermanence
\ Is unproduced.
\ That which is its emptiness
\ Is the emptiness of the unproduced (8).

A phenomenon that neither arises, nor ceases, nor has the quality of impermanence, is something that is uncomposite. There are three examples, three things which fit into this category. One is space. The other two fall into the category of cessation. One is the cessation of the afflictions that happens when there is wisdom realizing selflessness. That cessation is something that is by nature non-existence. The second type of cessation is ordinary cessation. For example, in this room there is no ox, no elephant, there is no snake. So that non-existence, in all three cases, is something that does not arise, that does not cease. It is not something impermanent. So these are uncomposite phenomena, and these, too, are empty of essence, they are empty of themselves. Let us recite this twice.

L8: [9. Emptiness of that which is beyond extremes]

☿(i.e. the absolute emptiness: emptiness of the Two Truths, transcendence.)

\ <<< That to which extremes do not apply
\ Is expressed as being beyond extremes.
\ Its emptiness of its very self
\ Is explained as the "emptiness of that which is beyond extremes." (193) >>>

\ [VI.193]
\ #236.
\ Whatever is without extremes
\ Is described as beyond extremes.
\ The mere emptiness of that
\ Is explained as the emptiness of beyond extremes (9).

That which is "beyond extremes" there are three.

-- First is emptiness. Emptiness is beyond extremes.
-- Second is dependent arising. Dependent arising is beyond the extremes.
-- The third is the middle way path. That, too, is beyond extremes.

For example, Rinpoche has been teaching that the true nature of reality is the complete freedom from all conceptual elaborations about it. But if we take that to be something real, then that is also a problem. So we are taught that that, too, is empty. So let us recite this twice.

☿(i.e. It means that those Ultimate Truths are also conventional truths.

☿-- Another way to see this. Dependent origination (all conventional truths, based on some causality), and emptiness (the negation of inherent existence of all conventional truths) form a duality. The Middle Way says that none is the absolute truth, that they are interdependent, that we should transcend the duality. But all of this, the Two Truths, the Tetralemma, the need to transcend the dualities, are also conventional truths. They point toward an inconceivable truth but cannot describe it.

☿-- This inconceivable absolute truth, the dharmadhatu, is called The Union of The Two truths, the inseparability of appearance and emptiness, the twin dimensions of genuine [enlightenment], the perfect transcendence, the realization of both dependent origination and emptiness, the realization of the Middle Way. But it is beyond all description, beyond all conceptualization, beyond all views, beyond all dualities, beyond all karma formation..)

L8: [10. Emptiness of that which has neither beginning nor end]

☿(i.e. the emptiness of beginninglessness: samsara, being, ignorance)

\ <<< That which has no point from which it begins

\ Nor boundary where it ends is the cycle of existence.
 \ Since it is free from coming and going,
 \ It is just mere appearance, like a dream. (194) >>>

 \ Existence is void of any existence:
 \ This is the emptiness of
 \ That which neither begins nor ends.
 \ It was definitively taught in the commentaries. (195) >>>

 \ [VI.194]
 \ #237.
 \ Because samsara lacks both
 \ A first beginning and a final end,
 \ It is described as beginningless and endless.
 \ Because it is free from coming and going, it is like a dream.

 \ [VI.195]
 \ #238.
 \ In the scriptures it clearly says that
 \ That which is the isolation of this samsara
 \ Is called the emptiness
 \ Of the beginningless and endless (10).

What is traditionally taught as being without beginning or end is the cycle of existence.
 Since the cycle of existence is without beginning or end, then sentient beings are without beginning or end.

Ignorance is also without beginning or end. But this is not to say that they are without beginning or end in any permanent way; this is not to say in any way that they are permanent. It is like what is without beginning or end in a dream. That which appears in a dream is without any real truly existent beginning, and it is without any real truly existent end. It is the same thing. The cycle of existence, just like dreams, is without any truly existent beginning or any truly existent end.

So, in order to reverse our clinging to that which is without beginning or end as being truly existent, the Buddha taught the emptiness of that which is without beginning or end. If we think about samsara as something that does not come from anywhere and does not go anywhere, then we will understand this too. And that is something that is also taught in the text, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way.

L8: [11. Emptiness of what should not be discarded]

¢(i.e. the emptiness of dispersion: emptiness of the dharma, the path)

\ <<< To "discard" something means
 \ To throw it away or to abandon it.
 \ What should not be discarded is
 \ What one should never cast away from oneself "the great vehicle". (196)

 \ What should not be discarded
 \ Is empty of itself.
 \ Since this emptiness is its very nature,
 \ It is spoken of as the "emptiness of what should not be discarded." (197) >>>

 \ [VI.196]

\ #239.
\ Rejected is clearly explained as
\ Cast aside or forsaken.
\ Not rejected, or not given up,
\ Is that which should not be rejected at any time.

\ [VI.197]
\ #240.
\ That which is the emptiness
\ Of the not rejected
\ Is therefore called
\ The emptiness of the not rejected (11).

That which should not be discarded is the dharma of the great vehicle, the mahayana. It says we should not discard it, we should not throw it away, we should not abandon it. They all mean the same thing. But at the same time we should understand that this dharma of the great vehicle has no essence. So it is empty also. Two more times.

If we take the great vehicle's teachings to be something truly existent, then we think that the vehicle of the hearers, the first turning of the wheel of dharma, is something unimportant and has flaws in it. We should meditate on this.

L8: [12. Emptiness of the true nature]

¢(i.e. the emptiness of a nature; the true nature of being emptiness)

\ <<< The true essence of composite and all other phenomena is pure being,
\ Therefore, neither the students, the solitary realizers,
\ The bodhisattvas, nor the Buddhas
\ Created this essence anew. (198)

\ Therefore, this essence of the composite and so forth
\ Is said to be the very nature of phenomena.
\ It itself is empty of itself.
\ This is the emptiness of the true nature. (199) >>>

\ [VI.198]
\ #241.
\ Because the very entity
\ Of the produced and so forth
\ Was not made by Hearers, Solitary Realizers,
\ Conquerors' Sons, or Tathagatas,

\ [VI.199]
\ #242.
\ So the very entity of the produced and so forth
\ Is explained as their very nature.
\ That which is the emptiness of that
\ Is the emptiness of nature (12).

All composite and all other phenomena have no truly existent essence. Their true nature is emptiness, but this true nature which is emptiness also does not truly exist. The true nature is also empty of being any kind of true nature. This is the emptiness of the true nature. If you think that all phenomena are empty and the nature of all phenomena is

emptiness, and you cling to that as being something real, then you should meditate on the emptiness of that, too.

Two more times.

L8: [13. Emptiness of all phenomena]

¢(i.e. the emptiness of all dharmas)

\ <<< The eighteen potentials, the six types of contact,
\ And from those six, the six types of feeling,
\ Furthermore, all that is form and all that is not,
\ The composite and the uncomposite "this comprises all phenomena". (200)

\ All of these phenomena are free of being themselves.
\ This emptiness is the "emptiness of all phenomena." (201) >>>

\ [VI.200]
\ #243.
\ The eighteen elements, the six contacts,
\ The six feelings that arise from them,
\ Likewise those possessing form and those not possessing form,
\ And produced and unproduced phenomena;

\ [VI.201ab]
\ #244ab.
\ That which is the isolation of all of these
\ Is the emptiness of all phenomena (13).

There are an incredible number of divisions and distinctions that we make between all different kinds of relative phenomena, all of the different kinds of phenomena that appear to us. If we take all of these divisions and distinctions to be real, then we need to meditate on the emptiness of all phenomena and all of the distinctions that go along with them. To every different appearance that appears we give a name.

And we say this is this, and that is that, and all of these different kinds of things. What we need to realize is that there really is no basis for giving any of these names. All of these things that we see are just imputed by thoughts. They do not truly exist.

Sometimes when we are studying we are buried under all the different distinctions that are made by the books that we are reading, or whatever it is that we are studying, and we get very tired. We get a headache from all of these different things that we have to learn. At that time it is good to meditate on the emptiness of it all.

L8: [14. Emptiness of defining characteristics]

¢(i.e. the emptiness of individual characteristics)

¢(i.e. Note verses 201 to 214 were not included in Rinpoche's commentary. They were copied from another file.)

L9: [-- a brief explanation]

\ [VI.201cd]
\ #244cd.
\ [That which is the non-thing of suitable to be form and so forth

\ Is the emptiness of definitions (14).

L9: [-- an extensive explanation]

L9: [-- The definitions of the phenomena of the base]

\ [VI.202]

\ #245.

\ Form has the definition, suitable to be form,
\ Feeling has the nature of experience,
\ Discrimination is apprehending signs,
\ And compositional factors are produced phenomena.

\ [VI.203]

\ #246.

\ The definition of consciousness
\ Is cognizing aspects of individual objects.
\ The definition of aggregate is suffering.
\ The nature of the elements is said to be a poisonous snake.

\ [VI.204]

\ #247.

\ The sources are said by Buddha
\ To be the doors for generation.
\ Within dependent relationship, that which arises
\ Is defined as coming together.

L9: [-- The definitions of the phenomena of the path]

\ [VI.205]

\ #248.

\ The perfection of giving is giving away.
\ Moral discipline is defined as without torment.
\ Patience is defined as without anger.
\ Effort is defined as without non-virtue.

\ [VI.206]

\ #249.

\ Mental stabilization is defined as gathering.
\ Wisdom is defined as without attachment.
\ These are given as the definitions
\ Of the six perfections.

\ [VI.207]

\ #250.

\ The mental stabilizations, the immeasurables,
\ And likewise others that are formless
\ Are said by the Perfect Knower
\ To have the definition unperturbed.

\ [VI.208]

\ #251.

\ The thirty-seven realizations conducive to enlightenment
\ Are defined as causing definite emergence.

\ The definition of emptiness
\ Is complete isolation through not observing.

\ [VI.209]
\ #252.
\ Signlessness is pacification;
\ The definition of the third is the absence of suffering and confusion.
\ The [concentrations of] perfect liberation
\ Are defined as perfectly liberating.

L9: [-- The definitions of the phenomena of the result]

\ [VI.210]
\ #253.
\ The forces are said to be the nature of
\ Utterly perfect decisiveness.
\ The fearlessnesses of the Protector
\ Are the nature of utter firmness.

\ [VI.211]
\ #254.
\ The correct, specific cognizers
\ Have the definition inexhaustible confidence and so on.
\ Accomplishing the benefit of living beings
\ Is called great love.

\ [VI.212]
\ #255.
\ Completely protecting those who suffer
\ Is great compassion.
\ Joy is defined as supreme joy,
\ And equanimity should be known by the definition unmixed.

\ [VI.213]
\ #256.
\ Whatever are asserted to be
\ The eighteen unshared qualities of a Buddha
\ Are defined as unsurpassed
\ Because the Blessed One is never surpassed by them.

\ [VI.214]
\ #257.
\ The exalted awareness knowing all aspects
\ Is said to have the definition direct perceiver
\ Others, being limited,
\ Are not called direct perceivers

L9: [-- a summary]

\ [VI.215]
\ #258.
\ Whether they are definitions of produced phenomena
\ Or definitions of unproduced phenomena,

\ Their mere emptiness
 \ Is the emptiness of definitions (14).
 \ <<< All composite and uncomposite phenomena
 \ Have their own individual defining characteristics.
 \ These are empty of being themselves.
 \ This is the "emptiness of defining characteristics." (215) >>>

This verse is one of a pair with the thirteenth emptiness because it is talking about the emptiness of the characteristics of phenomena. For example, if you have fire, then "fire" is the name, and the characteristics are the basis, that basis which is actually hot and actually does the burning.

So the emptiness of all phenomena is talking about the emptiness of all of these names and divisions. The emptiness of characteristics is talking about the fact that the bases for these names and divisions are also empty of any inherent existence.

According to the Sautrantika (sutra) school the names and the thoughts about phenomena do not really exist, but the phenomena, the bases themselves, do truly exist. So if we have thoughts like that, that these bases are things which truly exist, then we need to meditate on the emptiness of defining characteristics.

In the song, To Speak Truly of the Middle Way by Milarepa, when Milarepa says that therefore not even the name samsara exists, what he is saying is that not only do the bases of imputation not exist, but also even the name "samsara," even the names which we give to these bases do not exist

L8: #15. Emptiness of the imperceptible

¢(i.e. the emptiness of the unattainable)

\ <<< The present does not remain;
 \ The past and future do not exist.
 \ Wherever you look, you cannot see them,
 \ So the three times are called, "imperceptible." (216)
 \ The imperceptible is in essence empty of itself.
 \ It is neither permanent and stable
 \ Nor impermanent and fleeting.
 \ This is the "emptiness of the imperceptible." (217) >>>
 \ [VI.216]
 \ #259.
 \ The present does not remain,
 \ And past and future do not exist;
 \ Because they are not observed anywhere,
 \ They are explained as unobservable. [the three times]
 \ [VI.217]
 \ #260.
 \ That which is the very isolation
 \ Of the entities of these unobservable
 \ Because they neither remain constant nor disintegrate,

\ Is the emptiness of the unobservable (15).

If we have thoughts that the three times really exist, then it is important for us to meditate on the emptiness of the three times, the emptiness of the imperceptible. We think a lot about the past. We think a lot about the future. We think a lot about the present. And based on those thoughts all different sorts of suffering arise. So at those times we should think about how it is that the three times really do not exist and meditate on that. We should think about the proofs which are found in The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, like the one in the examination of time, where it says, if the present and the future were dependent on the past, the present and the future would exist in time past. So let us say this three times.

The past and the future do not exist now, and the present does not even remain for an instant. So where is time? Since the past does not exist then there is no suffering from the past. Since the future does not exist, there is no suffering from the future.

And since the present is something that is fleeting and does not even remain for a moment there is no suffering in the present either. Since we think of the past, present, and future as existing in some continuum, where there is a connection between them, then we suffer as a result of that. We suffer because we confuse them all and we take all of them to be present somehow at the same time.

L8: #16. Emptiness that is the absence of entities

ϕ(i.e. the emptiness of non-existent dharmas)

\ <<< Since an entity arises from causes and conditions,
\ It lacks the nature of being a composite.
\ This emptiness of there being anything that is a composite
\ Is the "emptiness that is the absence of entities." (218) >>>

\ [VI.218]
\ #261.
\ Because they arise from conditions,
\ Things lack the entity of assembling. [lacks the nature of being a composite]
\ The emptiness of assembling
\ Is the emptiness of no thing (16).

Because they arise from causes and conditions, phenomena are said to be composite or are said to be a combination. But as we have seen, there really is no such thing as a combination, there really is no such thing as an entity formed by a combination. That entity is really a non-entity. And the emptiness of this non-entity is also the emptiness that is the absence of entities. So if we see that all entities really have no essence, that there really is no entity there when there is a combination, we might cling to that as being true. So that is why the sixteenth emptiness is taught. If we realize that all entities have no essence really and that there really are no entities at all, and then that makes us depressed because there is nothing, then we should meditate on the emptiness of that nothingness.

L7: [B.2 An extensive explanation of the division of emptiness into four]

ϕ(i.e. The Tetralemma: It is not realism, not nihilism, not dualism, not monism. Emptiness

of the four extreme positions.)

The sixteen emptinesses are condensed into four emptinesses that follow.

-- These four emptinesses are a summary of the previous sixteen.

The reason why they are presented is that there are so many things that are empty in these sixteen that it is easy to forget. So when that happens and you get to the end and you have forgotten what was at the beginning, then these four sum it all up very nicely.

-- The first two talk about the relative, the world of apparent reality " basically

---- entities (i.e. against realism)

---- and non-entities (i.e. against nihilism), and nothing else.

-- The second two talk about the ultimate truth. In the ultimate truth there are no divisions really, but from the perspective of thinking about the ultimate truth we can come up with lots of divisions. Basically here though there are two:

---- There is the nature of all phenomena (i.e. against monism), i.e., the emptiness of entities,

---- and also the ultimate truth is called the entity which is other (i.e. against dualism).

This means, basically, that which is different from relative truth.

L8: #1. Emptiness of entities / things (i.e. Not realism)

¢(i.e. Not realism.)

\ <<< In short, "entities" are
\ Everything included in the five aggregates.
\ Entities are empty of being entities,
\ And this is the "emptiness of entities." (219) >>>

\ [VI.219]
\ #262.
\ The term 'thing'
\ Indicates the five aggregates when condensed.
\ That which is their emptiness
\ Is explained as the emptiness of things (17 / A).

There are limitless numbers of entities that we can think of. But basically they are included in the five aggregates: the aggregates of form, feeling, mental discriminations, mental formations, consciousness. If we take those all into one, then we have "entities," and those are all empty. So that is a helpful way to think about it. So this first one teaches the emptiness of all of that. Let us say this twice.

L8: #2. Emptiness of non-entities / non-things (i.e. Not idealism / nihilism)

¢(i.e. Not idealism / nihilism. The emptiness of non-composite dharmas)

\ <<< In short, "non-entities" are
\ All uncomposite phenomena.
\ Non-entities are empty of being non-entities,
\ And this is the "emptiness of non-entities." (220) >>>

\ [VI.220]
\ #263.
\ 'Non-thing'
\ Indicates unproduced phenomena when condensed.

\ That which is the emptiness of non-things
\ Is the emptiness of non-things (18 / B).

The non-entities are again these three non-composite phenomena: space; the cessation of the afflictions that happens when there is wisdom realizing selflessness - that cessation is something that is by nature non-existence; and the ordinary cessation, for example, there is no ox, no elephant, there is no snake in this room. These three are uncomposite phenomena, non-entities, technically called. And non-entities are also empty of themselves, they are empty of being non-entities, and this is the emptiness of non-entities. Two times.

L8: #3. Emptiness of the nature (i.e. Not monism)

¢(i.e. Not monism. The is no real Oneness. Emptiness of the true nature of being empty.)

\ <<< The nature of phenomena is that they have no essence.
\ It is called their "nature" because no one created it.
\ The nature is empty of itself,
\ And this is the "emptiness of the nature." (221) >>>

\ [VI.221]
\ #264.
\ Nature's lack of entityness
\ Is called the emptiness of nature (19/ C).
\ Thus, it is explained that because nature is not created
\ It is called nature.

This emptiness has the exact same meaning as the twelfth emptiness which is the emptiness of the nature. If we have attachment to emptiness as emptiness, as being the true nature of phenomena, we need to meditate on the emptiness of the nature, too.

L8: #4. Emptiness of the entity that is other (i.e. Not dualism)

¢(i.e. Not dualism.)

\ <<< Whether or not Buddhas appear in the world,
\ The natural emptiness of all entities
\ Is proclaimed to be
\ The "entity that is other." (222)

\ Other names for this are the "genuine limit" and "suchness."
\ They are empty of themselves and this is the "emptiness of the entity that is other."

\ In the sutras of The Great Mother, The
\ Transcendent Perfection of Wisdom,
\ These twenty emptinesses are explained in great detail. (223) >>>

\ [VI.222]
\ #265.
\ Whether Buddhas actually appear
\ Or do not appear,
\ The emptiness of all things
\ Is explained as the other entity.

\ [VI.223]

- \ #266.
- \ The perfect end and thatness
- \ Are the emptiness of other entities (20 / D).
- \ These explanations have been given
- \ According to Perfection of Wisdom.

There are two reasons why the true nature of reality is the entity that is other.

-- The first is that it is different from apparent reality, that is, the false appearance that appears to all of us.

-- And second, it is the object of primordial awareness, the object of our inherent awareness, pristine awareness. And on the other hand the cycle of existence is the object of our ordinary consciousness. So for that reason it is other.

If we get attached to the idea that emptiness is really something different from this cycle of existence on the one hand, and on the other hand, that it is the object of primordial inherent awareness, and that samsara is only the object of our ordinary consciousness, and if we cling to these things as being real, then we need to meditate on this emptiness of the entity that is other.

It is true that ultimate reality is just the object of our inherent awareness and not of our consciousness, but this ultimate reality is empty of essence, it has no true existence to it. And neither does this inherent awareness have any inherent essence to it. So in that way the entity that is other is empty of essence.

When these four emptinesses, which are the summary of the sixteen, are explained, then we get twenty. There are these twenty divisions and these twenty different types of emptiness talked about, but from the perspective of emptiness itself, there are no divisions. These divisions do not really exist.

Then if you think that this non-existence of any divisions is something real, then you should know that the true nature is beyond there being either divisions or no divisions.

This way of teaching the twenty emptinesses is in accordance with the way that Machig Labdron, the great yogini of Tibet, attained her realization. She read the entire hundred-thousand line, twelve-volume Prajnaparamita Sutra once a day for a month. Then at the end of that month she had direct realization of emptiness, and she became a siddha. She taught her students sixteen different types of meditation based on the sixteen types of emptiness. So there are sixteen different verses based on the sixteen different emptinesses, and then there are four more based on the four emptinesses, which are the condensed version. So we end up with twenty different verses which we can recite.

It would be very good if in the future you made a course like this one, where you would get together and make four sessions in a weekend, and had four different emptinesses for every session.

Recite a verse and then meditate, recite another and meditate, like that. If you do four each session then you can do all sixteen in one weekend. If you do all sixteen together, as we did now, then that is called analytical meditation. That gets you to be an expert in both the meaning and the words.

Because Machig Labdron could read the whole twelve volumes of the Prajnaparamita Sutra in one day, she became incredibly renowned for her wisdom, for her learnedness. When Machig Labdron passed into nirvana, then they built a cremation box for her, and as her body was

being cremated, her son, Gyalwa Döndrup, sang a praise to her at each of the four doors of her cremation shrine. And in one of those praises he said, "Mother, Prajnaparamita Siddha," which means that he was saying she was a really great siddha, an extraordinary siddha, because she attained her siddhahood not through the vajrayana like other siddhas, but through the prajnaparamita.

Machig Labdron's son, Gyalwa Döndrup, when he was young was kind of a bum. He stole, he was a thief, and he was not really any good at all. But then based on the blessing of Machig Labdron, he listened to her instructions and turned it around and became a great siddha himself. One time he and his friends got together and they stole an ox, and they killed it. When the ox died it made a very loud and weird noise. When they ate the meat they all got really sick. So Gyalwa Döndrup went running to his mother's house and finally started listening to her teachings, and then he became a great siddha. That shows how it is that doing bad things can lead to good results, because there are many siddhas like that who first engaged in all sorts of negative action and hurt people and animals, and that led to their feeling regret, and then they practiced the dharma and attained great siddhahood. In that way bad actions become your friends on the path, because, based on bad actions, you practice the dharma.

Others became great siddhas because they experienced great suffering. There is the example of Gampopa, Dakpo Rinpoche. First his son died, then his daughter died, then his wife died. He had intense suffering, but as a result, he became a great siddha. In that way suffering is a friend of our dharma practice.

Also anger is a friend of our dharma practice.

There is the example of Marpa the translator who, when he was a child, had a ferocious temper and got into fights with every single kid in his village.

So his parents said, "If you don't practice the dharma, if you don't go that way, then life is going to be really tough for you because you have a really bad temper." So he practiced the dharma and became a great siddha. An example again of how negative actions can be a friend of our dharma practice is the example of Milarepa, who committed intensely bad deeds and felt intense regret as a result of them, and then devoted himself to the practice of dharma with intense diligence and became a great siddha.

Then there is the example of how sickness is a friend of our dharma practice, and that is Götsangpa, who when he was up meditating in the caves got really sick all of the time, and meditated on the essence of his illness. By meditating on the essence of his illness, he attained realization.

Rinpoche's departing aspiration prayer for us is that, based on the merit we have accumulated from his explaining and our listening to his explanation of Nagarjuna's Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, of Milarepa's To Speak Truly of the Middle Way, and Chandrakirti's Entrance to the Middle Way, may all of our bad circumstances arise as our friends on the path. May all bad circumstances actually bring us benefit. May we realize emptiness, the complete freedom from all elaborations. And as a result of fulfilling these aspirations may we bring great benefit to all sentient beings.

A Note on the Logic That Arrives at Emptiness

Much of what Rinpoche is talking about in this teaching is based on the following logic: Whatever the phenomenon is, if it is one, it must have one essence, one essential quality, or one intrinsic nature. So, for example, if we posit the existence of a human body, then under thorough analysis we must be able to find one unitary thing which is the body; it must logically be indivisible. What we find when we analyze the body is simply a collection of parts, and no unitary phenomenon called a body. In turn each and every part of which the body is made up "the torso, the thumb, the leg, etc." when examined in the same way also fails to have any singular, unitary essential quality, essence, or intrinsic nature.

If, on the other hand we say that a phenomenon is many, that it is made of smaller units or particles, then there must logically be a smallest unit of which said phenomenon is compounded, which exists intrinsically and has a singular, unitary essential quality. But if we take again the phenomenon of the human body, regardless of how small a unit of matter that one designates as existing intrinsically and having a singular, unitary essential quality, you will find nothing. Because, no matter how small the unit of matter, no matter how small the particle, you must logically still be able to touch the left side of one against the right side of the other, which means that each particle must have a right and a left side, as well as a top and a bottom side, as well as a fore and an aft side. And if each particle has even two of these dimensions, it is still divisible into smaller particles of matter. Since this logic can be repeated ad infinitum with ever smaller particles of matter, it cannot be said that there is any such thing as a smallest unit of matter. And if there is no smallest unit of matter, then matter cannot be said to exist inherently.

Therefore, material phenomena cannot be said to exist as many, and in fact must exist in some other way than as inherently existent entities. Therefore, our posited human body cannot be said to exist as many.

The same logic can be applied to mind. In the words of Thrangu Rinpoche, "As for the nature of the mind, we all tend to feel that we have a mind which we experience and with which we recognize things, and so on. But if we examine the experience of mind, we see that there is not a single thing which is the mind we are said to have. Consciousness has many different components "awareness of visual objects (forms, shapes and colors), awareness of sounds, tactile consciousness, and mental consciousness" which are all separate ways of knowing. Each type of consciousness recognizes a particular field of experience in its own terms. Thus each of these six consciousnesses functions in its own terms. Thus each of these six consciousnesses functions in its own frame of reference and is at least somewhat independent of the others.

"So mind too is not a single, unitary thing, but a compound, just as external objects are [not single, unitary things]. If we examine in turn visual consciousness, we see that it has the potential to perceive various objects, with various forms and various colors, all arising in succession, with prior appearances disappearing at the moment that succeeding appearances occur. Thus visual consciousness is multiple and successive, has many different potential objects, and so cannot be a single unitary thing."

Then again, in the words of Thrangu Rinpoche, "Examining the successive manner in which consciousness cognizes its objects, we might be led to believe that each 'flash' of awareness, each moment of consciousness, is a fundamental unit of time, comparable to supposedly indivisible particles. However, if we could ever isolate such a particular unit of time, we would see that it could only occur within a framework of on-going consciousness "for awareness is never static " and hence would have to relate to a previous moment and future moment. That is, such a moment would not be a partless whole. Rather it would consist

of three parts, that part relating to a previous moment being past relative to a postulated present, and that 'present' being past in relation to the future moment."

So there is no unitary essential quality, no single identifiable reality, in either the world that appears in an objective frame of reference or the subjective mind.

This same type of analysis can be applied to all phenomena, and in every case we find that there is no unitary essential quality, no single identifiable reality. And so we discover that no phenomenon exists as one, and since no phenomenon exists as one, no phenomenon can possibly exist as many, since many is simply a composite of many "ones," which we have seen do not exist with a singular, unitary nature. Therefore all phenomena are empty. For further presentation of the meaning of emptiness, see the three teachings of Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso in Volume 2, Number 2 of Shenpen Ösel, and The Empty Door to Emptiness, by Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche.

L4: [2.4 Conclusion by way of expressing the good qualities of the ground]

To sum up the teachings of the sixth chapter, the last verse reads:

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\    ###
\    With his broad white wings of the relative and suchness,
\    The king of swans soars ahead to lead the flock.
\    By the power of virtue's wind
\    He crosses to the far shore of the ocean of the Victor's supreme qualities. (226)

\    ///
\    [VI.224]
\    267.
\    Thus, with the rays of his wisdom he attains a clear appearance
\    Just like an olive resting in the palm of his hand;
\    And realizing that, from the beginning, all these three worlds have been without
production,
\    He enters into cessation through the power of nominal truth.

\    ///
\    [VI.225]
\    268.
\    Even though his thought is constantly directed towards cessation,
\    He still generates compassion for protectorless living beings.
\    After this, through his wisdom, he will also defeat
\    All those born from the Sugata's speech and all Middling Buddhas.

\    ///
\    [VI.226]
\    269.
\    This king of the geese, spreading his broad, white wings of convention and
thatness,
\    Comes to the fore of the geese of living beings
\    And then, through the force of his powerful winds of virtue,
\    Goes to the supreme - the ocean of the Conquerors' qualities.
```

So the two truths in union are like the two great white wings of the swan that allow the swan to fly to Enlightenment. If you only have one of the two truths, then you cannot go very far. Just as when a swan has two wings that [seems to finish abruptly here (see page 90 of the original)]

[End]

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