

Part-A

Jamyang Shepa · Tsong Khapa

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Jam-yang-shay-ba's (1648-1721)

Great Exposition of Tenets

PARTS 1, 2, 3 of 6 parts

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[About: the five reasonings establishing the two selflessnesses in the context of the five stages of meditation leading to the union of calm abiding and insight; the inseparability of the two truths; and the refutation of all the various Buddhist and non-buddhist systems]

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o. Introduction / Technical Note / List of Abbreviations / Acknowledgements

[FIRST, A PRESENTATION OF THE FIVE REASONINGS ESTABLISHING THE TWO SELFLESSNESSES]

PART ONE – MEDITATION [Two selflessnesses, five reasonings, five stages, five paths]

1. Purpose and Motivation [We need to realize both selflessnesses: person and phenomena]

2. Self: The Opposite of Selfness [The Middle Way between the two extremes: empty, but still not completely non-existent]

3. Meditation: Identifying Self [ex. Meditation of the selflessness of person]

[RÉSUMÉ OF THE FIVE REASONINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIVE STAGES OF MEDITATION:]

First stage of meditation on emptiness: How a beginner develops experience with respect to the view of emptiness

Identifying the object negated in the theory of selflessness

4. Meditative Investigation [ex. Using the sevenfold reasoning (#2) to establish the selflessness of person]

5. [ex. Using the reasoning of] Dependent-Arising [to establish the selflessness of person]

5b. [ex. Using the reasoning of Dependent-Arising (#3) to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

5c. [ex. Using the sevenfold reasoning to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

6. [ex. Using the reasoning of the] diamond slivers (#1) [to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

7. Realization [of three more types of reasoning to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

7a. The refutation of the four extreme types of production (#4) [product is not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither]

7b. The refutation of the four alternative of production (#5) [one or many causes ? one or many effects]

7c. The reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many (the two first of reasoning #2)

[Conclusion about the first stage of meditation: non-duality of subject vs. object / emptiness of emptiness]

8. Calm Abiding [Prerequisites, the object of calm abiding, faults & antidotes, nine states, five paths]

Second stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding

9. Special Insight [the path of preparation]

Third stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate actual special insight based on actual calm abiding

Fourth stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate direct cognition of emptiness [the paths of seeing & meditation, ten bhumis]

10. Tantra

Fifth stage of meditation on emptiness: How to meditate on emptiness during the second stage of Highest Yoga Tantra

11. Buddhahood [the resulting ground; the Buddha kayas]

[SECOND, A PRESENTATION OF THE TWO TRUTHS: EMPTINESS AND THE CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS]

PART TWO — REASONING INTO REALITY [Details about the Five Reasonings implying Emptiness]

0. Introduction [The two selflessnesses and the two sets of reasonings]

1. The Diamond Slivers (#1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity in change)

The ten samenesses (It is easy to realize the other nine samenesses after having realized the sameness of production)

Statement of the reasons

1. Non-production from self (cause&effect cannot be the same/one; the cause cannot be inside; Vaibhashika ?? & Samkhyas)

2. Non-production from other (cause&effect cannot be inherently different/two/unrelated otherwise anything would produce anything else; the cause cannot be outside; the junction is unexplainable: cause&effect cannot be simultaneous or separate in time; there is no continuity, no discontinuity; but conventional production from other must be accepted as conventionally valid because the other three are much less logical/practical)

3. Non-production from both self and other (the causes cannot be both the same&different, inside&outside; Nirgranthas(Jainas) & theistic Samkhyas)

4. Non-production causelessly (the effect cannot be causeless; Charvakas / nihilists)

Conclusion

2. The Four Extremes (#4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // also: because cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)

3. The Four Alternatives (#5 : refuting that one or many causes can inherently produce one or many effects)

4. Dependent-Arising (#3 : the King of reasoning: refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)

5. Refuting a Self of Persons (#2 : the sevenfold reasoning: refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)

The mine (refuting the “mine”)

[Particularities of Prasangikas: the existent person is not any or all of the mental and physical aggregates]

PART THREE – THE BUDDHIST WORLD [Enumerating some useful conventional truths]

o. Introduction [all empty of inherent existence, but still dependently arisen, functional, and useful conventional truths]

The fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class

The fifty-five phenomena of the pure class

1. The Selfless

Classifications of phenomena (the selfless) in terms of non-existents and existents

(permanent, things (forms, consciousness (mind, mental factors ...))

Classifications of phenomena (the selfless) in terms of the five aggregates

2. Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence

Details about the 12 members of the Wheel of Life, and their interpretation across three lives

3. The Four Noble Truths

Details about the Four Noble Truths

Details about the coarse and subtle selfless – that realizing only the selflessness of the person is not enough

PART FOUR – PRESENTATION AND REFUTATION OF SPECIFIC SYSTEMS / VIEWS (one at a time)

REFUTING NON-BUDDHISTS VIEWS:

1. Refutation of various views about the Self

? The assertion of self (various non-buddhist reasonings to be refuted: like inherent existence or complete non-existence of a self)

? Buddhist refutation of self (résumé of the refutations of those non-buddhist positions) : but “the fact that a substantially existent agent cannot be found does not mean that person or agent do not exist at all; they exist imputedly and effectively”.

2. Non-Buddhist Systems: (oscillating between the two extremes of permanence and annihilation)

Samkhyas / Enumerators / Proponent of the nature of the cause / Kapilas

? Samkhyas production from self, (the Samkhya’s permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, production from itself (non-theistic) or from both self and others together (theistic), that the world was part of the creator's being -- to be refuted)

? Buddhist refutation of Samkhya (résumé of the refutations of the Samkhya’s positions: permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, ...)

Charvakas / Hedonists / Nihilists

? Charvakas (Hedonists, Proponent of Annihilation, Nihilists) (the Charvaka’s position on the production from no cause -- to be refuted)

? Buddhist refutation of nihilism (résumé of the refutations of the Nihilists’s positions: production from no cause, a mind that is emerging from matter, annihilation at death, no rebirth, no karma ...)

REFUTING HINAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS:

3. Hinayana (the two schools of the Vehicle of the Hearers)

(1st school) Vaibhashika (18 subschools) [production from self, the Abhidharmists rejecting the authority of the sutras, asserting no self-consciousness but real dharmas (partless particles and partless moments of consciousness) and simultaneous cause & effect -- to be refuted] [résumé of the refutations of the Vaibhashika View]

(2nd school) Sautrantika [Followers of scripture or Reasoning, not accepting the Abhidharma, asserting a real self-consciousness and real dharmas, everything is momentary, accept absolute perception and inference -- to be refuted] [Refutation of the Sautantrika View]

REFUTING MAHAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS:

4. History of the Mahayana (a cosmology of many Buddhas, a 500 years old Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, ...)
5. (3rd school) Chittamatra [Mind-Only tradition, Followers of scripture or Reasoning, asserting true consciousness, that all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind, eight consciousnesses, ... -- to be refuted] [Refutation of the Chittamatra's positions]
6. (4th school) Madhyamika [Prasangika vs. Svatantrika, (to be refuted – for this refutation see Part 5 below)]

? The Middle Way // The Two Truths // Definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation

PART FIVE – PRASANGIKA-MADHYAMIKA [Details about the refutation of the Svatantrika system]

1. The Prasangika School
2. Debate [Prasangika (Buddhapalita + Chandrakirti) vs. Svatantrika (Bhavaviveka)]
3. Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita
4. Chandrakirti's Defense of Buddhapalita 5. Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
6. Prasangika in Tibet (mostly Prasangikas)
7. Validation of Phenomena (why talking about valid cognition?)
8. Meditative Reasoning (not accepting, not rejecting conceptualization)

PART SIX – The root text: "Emptiness in the prasangika system" by Jam-yang-shay-ba (1648-1721)

0. Introduction

? About the author // About the editions of the text used // Jam-yang-shay-ba's sources // Collaborators for the translation

1. Background

? Definition and etymology of 'Prasangika' // Synonyms of Prasangika // Divisions of Prasangika

? Literature on which the Prasangikas rely [Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, Buddhapalita, Atisha, Maitreya, Asanga, Tsong Khapa]

2. Interpretation of Scripture

3. The Object of Negation

THE FIVE REASONINGS REFUTING INHERENT EXISTENCE OF ALL DHARMA

4. Refuting Inherently Existent Production

REASONINGS REFUTING A SELF OF PHENOMENA

? Diamond Slivers (reasoning #1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity in change)

5. Other types of production

? Simultaneous refutation of production of the four extremes and of the existent, non-existent, both, and neither (reasoning #4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // also: because cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)

? Refutation of production of the four alternatives (reasoning #5 : refuting that one or many causes can inherently produce one or many effects)

6. Dependent-Arising

? Actual exposition of dependent-arising (reasoning #3 : the King of reasoning; refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)

? Elimination of error concerning dependent-arising

REASONINGS REFUTING A SELF OF PERSONS

7. Refuting A Self Of Persons

? Actual exposition of the reasoning refuting a self of persons (reasoning #2 : the sevenfold reasoning; refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)

? Elimination of error concerning the refutation of a self of persons

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[Ignore this section – it is the same as above]

N2: [FIRST, A PRESENTATION OF THE FIVE REASONINGS ESTABLISHING THE TWO SELFLESSNESSES] :N2

N3: [PART ONE – MEDITATION [Two selflessnesses, five reasonings, five stages, five paths] :N3

-- Chapter 1. Purpose and Motivation [We need to realize both selflessnesses: person and phenomena]

-- Chapter 2. Self: The Opposite of Selflessness [The Middle Way between the two extremes: empty, but still not completely non-existent]

-- Chapter 3. Meditation: Identifying Self [ex. Meditation of the selflessness of person]

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N5: [First stage of meditation on emptiness: How a beginner develops experience with respect to the view of emptiness] :N5

-- Identifying THE OBJECT NEGATED in the theory of selflessness

-- Chapter 4. Meditative Investigation [ex. Using the sevenfold reasoning (#2) to establish THE SELFLESSNESS OF PERSON]

-- Chapter 5. [ex. Using the reasoning of] Dependent-Arising [to establish the selflessness of person]

-- 5b. [ex. Using the reasoning of Dependent-Arising (#3) to establish THE SELFLESSNESS OF PHENOMENA]

-- 5c. [ex. Using the sevenfold reasoning to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

-- Chapter 6. [ex. Using the reasoning of the] diamond slivers (#1) [to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

-- Chapter 7. Realization [of three more types of reasoning to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

-- 7a. The refutation of the four extreme types of production (#4) [product is not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither]

-- 7b. The refutation of the four alternative of production (#5) [one or many causes ? one or many effects]

-- 7c. The reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many (the two first of reasoning #2)

-- [Conclusion about the first stage of meditation: non-duality of subject vs. object / emptiness of emptiness]

-- Chapter 8. CALM ABIDING [Prerequisites, the object of calm abiding, faults & antidotes, nine states, five paths]

N5: [Second stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding] :N5

-- Chapter 9. Special Insight [the path of preparation]

N5: [Third stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate actual special insight based on actual calm abiding] :N5

N5: [Fourth stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate direct cognition of emptiness [the paths of seeing & meditation, ten bhumis] :N5

-- Chapter 10. Tantra

N5: [Fifth stage of meditation on emptiness: How to meditate on emptiness during the second stage of Highest Yoga Tantra] :N5

-- Chapter 11. Buddhahood [the resulting ground; the Buddha kayas]

N2: [SECOND, A PRESENTATION OF THE TWO TRUTHS: EMPTINESS AND THE CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS] :N2

N3: [PART TWO — REASONING INTO REALITY [Details about the Five Reasonings implying Emptiness] :N3

N5: [Chapter 0. Introduction [The two selflessnesses and the two sets of reasonings]] :N5

N5: [Chapter 1. The Diamond Slivers] :N5

(#1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity in change)

-- THE TEN SAMENESSES (It is easy to realize the other nine samenesses after having realized the sameness of production)

Statement of the reasons

-- 1. NON-PRODUCTION FROM SELF (cause&effect cannot be the same/one; the cause cannot be inside; Vaibhashika ?? & Samkhyas)

-- 2. NON-PRODUCTION FROM OTHER (cause&effect cannot be inherently different/two/unrelated otherwise anything would produce anything else; the cause cannot be outside; the junction is unexplainable: cause&effect cannot be simultaneous or separate in time; there is no continuity, no discontinuity; but conventional production from other must be accepted as conventionally valid because the other three are much less logical/practical)

-- 3. NON-PRODUCTION FROM BOTH SELF AND OTHER (the causes cannot be both the same&different, inside&outside; Nirgranthas(Jainas) & theistic Samkhyas)

-- 4. NON-PRODUCTION CAUSELESSLY (the effect cannot be causeless; Charvakas / nihilists)

-- CONCLUSION

N5: [Chapter 2. The Four Extremes] :N5

(#4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // also: because cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)

N5: [Chapter 3. The Four Alternatives] :N5

(#5 : refuting that ONE OR MANY causes can inherently produce one or many effects)

N5: [Chapter 4. Dependent-Arising] :N5

(#3 : THE KING OF REASONING: refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)

N5: [Chapter 5. Refuting a Self of Persons] :N5

(#2 : THE SEVENFOLD REASONING: refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)

-- The mine (refuting the “mine”)

-- [Particularities of Prasangikas: the existent person is not any or all of the mental and physical aggregates]

N3: [PART THREE – THE BUDDHIST WORLD [Enumerating some useful conventional truths] :N3

N5: [Chapter 0. Introduction] :N5

[all empty of inherent existence, but still dependently arisen, functional, and useful conventional truths]

-- The fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class

-- The fifty-five phenomena of the pure class

N5: [Chapter 1. The Selfless] :N5

-- Classifications of phenomena (the selfless) in terms of non-existents and existents (permanent, things (forms, consciousness (mind, mental factors ...))

-- Classifications of phenomena (the selfless) in terms of the five aggregates

N5: [Chapter 2. Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence] :N5

-- Details about the 12 members of the Wheel of Life, and their interpretation across three lives

N5: [Chapter 3. The Four Noble Truths] :N5

-- Details about the Four Noble Truths

-- Details about the coarse and subtle selfless – that realizing only the selflessness of the person is not enough

N3: [PART FOUR – PRESENTATION AND REFUTATION OF SPECIFIC SYSTEMS / VIEWS (one at a time)]

:N3

N4: [REFUTING NON-BUDDHISTS VIEWS] :N4

N5: [Chapter 1. Refutation of various views about the Self] :N5

-- The assertion of self (various non-buddhist reasonings to be refuted: like inherent existence or complete non-existence of a self)

-- Buddhist refutation of self (résumé of the refutations of those non-buddhist positions) : but “the fact that a substantially existent agent cannot be found does not mean that person or agent do not exist at all; they exist imputedly and effectively”.

N5: [Chapter 2. Non-Buddhist Systems] :N5

(oscillating between the two extremes of permanence and annihilation)

N6: [Samkhyas / Enumerators / Proponent of the nature of the cause / Kapilas

-- Samkhyas production from self, (the Samkhya's permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, production from itself (non-theistic) or from both self and others together (theistic), that the world was part of the creator's being -- to be refuted)

-- Buddhist refutation of Samkhya (résumé of the refutations of the Samkhya's positions: permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, ...)

N6: [Charvakas / Hedonists / Nihilists

-- Charvakas (Hedonists, Proponent of Annihilation, Nihilists) (the Charvaka's position on the production from no cause -- to be refuted)

-- Buddhist refutation of nihilism (résumé of the refutations of the Nihilists's positions: production from no cause, a mind that is emerging from matter, annihilation at death, no rebirth, no karma ...)

N4: [REFUTING HINAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS] :N4

N5: [Chapter 3. Hinayana (the two schools of the Vehicle of the Hearers)] :N5

N6: [(1st school) Vaibhashika (18 subschools)

[production from self, the Abhidharmists rejecting the authority of the sutras, asserting no self-consciousness but real dharmas (partless particles and partless moments of consciousness) and simultaneous cause & effect -- to be refuted] [résumé of the refutations of the Vaibhashika View]

N6: [(2nd school) Sautrantika

[Followers of scripture or Reasoning, not accepting the Abhidharma, asserting a real self-consciousness and real dharmas, everything is momentary, accept absolute perception and inference -- to be refuted] [Refutation of the Sautantrika View]

N4: [REFUTING MAHAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS] :N4

N5: [Chapter 4. History of the Mahayana] :N5

(a cosmology of many Buddhas, a 500 years old Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, ...)

N5: [Chapter 5. (3rd school) Chittamatra] :N5

[Mind-Only tradition, Followers of scripture or Reasoning, asserting true consciousness, that all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind, eight consciousnesses, ... -- to be refuted] [Refutation of the Chittamatra's positions]

N5: [Chapter 6. (4th school) Madhyamika] :N5

[Prasangika vs. Svatantrika, (to be refuted – for this refutation see Part 5 below)]

-- The Middle Way // The Two Truths // Definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation

N3: [PART FIVE – PRASANGIKA-MADHYAMIKA [Details about the refutation of the Svatantrika system] :N3

N5: [Chapter 1. The Prasangika School] :N5

N5: [Chapter 2. Debate [Prasangika (Buddhapalita + Chandrakirti) vs. Svatantrika (Bhavaviveka)]] :N5

N5: [Chapter 3. Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita] :N5

N5: [Chapter 4. Chandrakirti 's Defense of Buddhapalita] :N5

N5: [Chapter 5. Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka] :N5

N5: [Chapter Chapter Chapter 6. Prasangika in Tibet (mostly Prasangikas)] :N5

N5: [Chapter 7. Validation of Phenomena (why talking about valid cognition?)] :N5

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N3: [PART SIX – The root text: “Emptiness in the prasangika system” by Jam-yang-shay-ba (1648-1721)] :N3

N5: [Chapter 0. Introduction] :N5

-- About the author // About the editions of the text used // Jam-yang-shay-ba's sources // Collaborators for the translation

N5: [Chapter 1. Background] :N5

-- Definition and etymology of 'Prasangika' // Synonyms of Prasangika' // Divisions of Prasangika

-- Literature on which the Prasangikas rely [Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, Buddhapalita, Atisha, Maitreya, Asanga, Tsong Khapa]

N5: [Chapter 2. Interpretation of Scripture] :N5

N5: [Chapter 3. The Object of Negation] :N5

N4: [THE FIVE REASONINGS REFUTING INHERENT EXISTENCE OF ALL DHARMA] :N4

N5: [Chapter 4. Refuting Inherently Existent Production] :N5

N4: [REASONINGS REFUTING A SELF OF PHENOMENA] :N4

-- DIAMOND SLIVERS (reasoning #1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity in change)

N5: [Chapter 5. Other types of production] :N5

-- Simultaneous refutation of production of THE FOUR EXTREMES and of the existent, non-existent, both, and neither (reasoning #4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // also: because cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)

-- Refutation of production of THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES (reasoning #5 : refuting that one or many causes can inherently produce one or many effects)

N5: [Chapter 6. Dependent-Arising] :N5

-- ACTUAL EXPOSITION OF DEPENDENT-ARISING (reasoning #3 : the King of reasoning; refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)

-- Elimination of error concerning dependent-arising

N4: [REASONINGS REFUTING A SELF OF PERSONS] :N4

N5: [Chapter 7. Refuting A Self Of Persons] :N5

-- ACTUAL EXPOSITION OF THE REASONING REFUTING A SELF OF PERSONS (reasoning #2 : the

sevenfold reasoning; refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)

-- Elimination of error concerning the refutation of a self of persons

L1: [Introduction] :L1

:: Homage to Manjushri.

Emptiness is the very heart of Buddhist practice in Tibet. In tantra even the visualized gods, goddesses, channels, suns, moons, and so forth are qualified by emptiness. Without an understanding of emptiness the practice of Buddhism, be it sutra or tantra, cannot be complete.

Emptiness is explained in different ways by the four Buddhist schools of tenets: Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Madhyamika. The Madhyamika view and, within the division of Madhyamika into Svatantrika and Prasangika, the Prasangika view form the basis for the transformational psychology of tantra. Thus, this book on Prasangika-Madhyamika is written with the intent of presenting not only what emptiness is but also how emptiness is realized in meditation, so that emptiness may become more than a concept of abstract philosophy.

Phenomena are empty of a certain mode of being called 'INHERENT EXISTENCE', 'objective existence', or 'natural existence'. This 'inherent existence' is not a concept superimposed by philosophical systems but refers to our ordinary sense of the way that things exist—as if they concretely exist in and of themselves, covering their parts. Phenomena are the things which are empty of inherent existence, and inherent existence is that of which phenomena are empty. EMPTINESS or, more properly, an emptiness is a phenomenon's lack of inherent existence; an emptiness is a negative or utter absence of this concrete mode of being with which we are so familiar.

REASONING is the method used to establish that emptiness, or a lack of substantiality, is the mode of being of objects, and it also constitutes a yogi's approach to direct realization of emptiness. Having precisely identified this sense of the massiveness or concreteness of objects, a yogi reflects on the impossibility of such through thoroughly familiarizing himself with one of the sets of reasonings that show this lack of natural existence to be the mode of being of an object. He gains an inferential understanding of the emptiness of one object and extends this understanding to all objects. Then gradually, through the force of greater and greater familiarity, he passes to a simultaneous, direct cognition of the emptiness of all phenomena in all world systems. He thereby begins to cleanse his mind of its tendencies to misconceive the nature of phenomena; his cognition of emptiness is like medicine for eradicating his assent to the false appearance of things as inherently existent. Finally, he eradicates even the false appearance of inherent existence to his senses, thereby removing all obstacles to knowledge of everything, and becomes omniscient. He does not eradicate existence; he eradicates only the false sense of inherent existence.

Whether this book is merely abstract philosophy or whether it becomes relevant to everyday experience depends on gaining a sense of what inherent existence would be and then seeing

that everything one perceives appears this way. The pivot of the practice of emptiness and of the generation of the wisdom that realizes emptiness is the identification that objects appear as if they exist in and of themselves. Then, an attempt is made to try to find these objects which so boldly appear to be self-existent; the mind becomes totally absorbed in attempting to find an object—among its parts, as the composite of its parts, as something separate from the parts, and so forth. If the search is done with keen interest, the significance of not being able to find the object will be earth-shaking. A yogi will then gain firsthand experience of the falling to extremes against which Buddha so frequently warned. Previously, the yogi took the independent existence of things as the very basis of his life; now that he cannot find anything to call an object, he falls to the opposite extreme of utter nihilism. THE MIDDLE WAY, which is not a blending of these extremes but AN UTTER REFUTATION OF BOTH INHERENT EXISTENCE AND TOTAL NON-EXISTENCE, becomes relevant and

comprehensible for the first time. The two extremes are identified in experience, and it is possible to realize a sense of valid, nominal existence through gaining the understanding that emptiness is an elimination only of inherent existence. Emptiness becomes the context within which a yogi purifies his perception, imagining the world to be the habitation of a deity and himself to be a deity—all within the continuous understanding of unfindability.

EMPTINESS IS THE SAME IN BOTH SUTRA AND TANTRA; the difference between the two systems with

regard to emptiness is in the description of the consciousness that cognizes it. In Highest Yoga Tantra there are special subtle minds, normally of no help to an individual, which become aids on the path to Buddhahood when they are generated in meditation for the purpose of realizing emptiness. An understanding of emptiness is a prerequisite for such realization, and this book attempts to present emptiness as it is taught in that system considered in Tibet to be the acme of philosophical systems, the Prasangika-Madhyamika. The system is based on the teachings of the Indian sage, Nagarjuna, who founded Madhyamika through his definitive presentation of the explicit meaning of Buddha's Perfection of Wisdom Sutras (Prajnaparamita). Nagarjuna's thought was further clarified as being Prasangika-Madhyamika by Chandrakirti, and in the domain of emptiness Chandrakirti's system has held almost complete sway in the various Tibetan orders.

The sources for this explication of emptiness are almost entirely from the Gelugpa order of Tibetan Buddhism, which stems from the teachings of Tsong Khapa (Tsong-kha-pa, 1357-1419).

JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA'S (Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, 1648-1721) GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS, a Gelugpa

presentation of the Prasangika-Madhyamika emptiness and a textbook for the Gomang College of Drebung Monastery in Hla-sa, Tibet, forms the basis for this book.

I first encountered the Great Exposition of Tenets in 1963 when I began studying with Geshe Wangyal, a Kalmuk-Mongolian scholar and adept from Astrakhan, who spent thirty-five years studying in Tibet in the Gomang College of Drebung Monastery. At that time the Great Exposition of Tenets seemed to be hopelessly complicated. Nevertheless, Geshe Wangyal's teaching was inspiring, and near the time of my departure from his monastery in Freewood Acres, New Jersey, in 1968, he advised me to read all of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets. I put this in mind and while acting as a resource assistant at Haverford College in 1968 began to read a little from a condensation of the Great Exposition of Tenets done by Jam-yang-shay-ba's next incarnation, Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo (dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, 1728-91). Upon going to the University of Wisconsin I was

able to study and translate this short text with Geshe Lhundup Sopa, a scholar of Sera Monastery who was first among the First Rank of the geshays receiving degrees in 1962 and who came to Madison from Geshe Wangyal's monastery. His excellent answers to my questions made it possible to put together an outline map of Buddhist philosophy as viewed by the Gelugpa order of Tibetan Buddhism.

All this prepared me for my first encounter with a former Abbot of the Tantric College of Lower Hla-sa, Kensur Lekden, another Gomang scholar who came to Geshe Wangyal's monastery in the fall of 1968 just after I left. I had returned there during a vacation and was captivated from the very start by his lucid, compact, free-flowing presentation of almost any aspect of Buddhist philosophy. I returned to the monastery in the summer of 1969 and, following Geshe Wangyal's advice, began listening to Kensur Rinbochay's (Precious Former Abbot Lekden's) commentary on the Great Exposition of Tenets and on the Mongolian scholar Nga-wang-bel-den's (Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, born 1797) Annotations, an explanation of the difficult points of the Great Exposition of Tenets. I tape-recorded his teachings and translated most of Jam-yang-shay-ba's exposition of the non-Buddhist systems as described in Buddhist literature. Toward the end of the summer we skipped over the lower Buddhist systems and read the presentation of Prasangika tenets in the twelfth chapter.

Returning to Madison, I began translating the chapter on Prasangika, and in January of 1969 when Professor Richard Robinson, the co-founder of the Buddhist Studies program in Madison, and I founded Tibet House in Cambridge, Wisconsin, we invited Kensur Rinbochay to teach us. Kensur Rinbochay gave two series of fourteen lectures on the three principal aspects of the path to enlightenment and on Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Madhyamakavatara), which I translated at Tibet House. (These have been published as the first part of Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism.) Professor Robinson also invited Kensur to give a seminar at the University of Wisconsin on Prasangika philosophy which we conducted after Professor Robinson's untimely death in the summer of 1970.

At Tibet House, Kensur Rinbochay taught me the rest of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets (approximately three hundred folios), Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations (four hundred sixteen folios), and almost all of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (four hundred twenty-four out of five hundred folios), the Gomang textbook for Madhyamika studies. I thereby was able to cover most of the Madhyamika reading which a monk in the Gomang College of Drebung Monastery would traditionally do. Kensur Rinbochay was famous for his abilities as a lecturer, and he, indeed, could weave a fascinating and often moving story of philosophical and spiritual ideas. His kindness in explaining again and again the important points of Buddhist philosophy was a lesson in compassion and a demonstration of how Buddhist philosophy was for him a vivid, living phenomenon.

Kensur Rinbochay left Tibet House in August of 1971 by which time I had finished translating Jam-yang-shay-ba's presentation of emptiness in his Great Exposition of Tenets. My intention was to present a book on the meditation on emptiness, and to that end had obtained a Fulbright-Hays fellowship for a year's study in Germany and India. Four days after I left for Germany in November of 1971, Kensur Rinbochay died of congestive heart failure. In Germany at the University of Hamburg, I studied for three months with Geshe Gedun Lodro, a Gomang scholar of a later generation than that of Geshe Wangyal and Kensur Rinbochay. A special feature of the Gomang scholars, probably stemming from Geshe Jinba around the turn of the century, is an unusual ability to explain philosophy, not just react to it, as sometimes happens when debate is a principal mode of instruction, and Geshe Gedun Lodro soon showed himself to be a scholar of scholars. When he received his geshay degree in India in

1961, he not only was first among those of the First Rank but was also first among three who in an extraordinary year had been given the honor of being first among those of the First Rank. Geshe Gedun Lodro's knowledge was invaluable; he knew not only how to answer questions but also how to lead to the heart of conceptual problems so that the entire context of a question would come to life. Possessing an extraordinary ability both to answer and lecture on minute questions about Buddhist philosophy, he was the ideal person to smooth out the last remaining questions on the translation.

Proceeding on to India, I went to Dharmasala in the north where the Dalai Lama has his headquarters. I arrived just in time for sixteen four-hour public lectures by His Holiness on Tsong Khapa's Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path and was fascinated to find that this reincarnated Lama was not only highly educated but also extremely practical. I had no intention of staying in Dharmasala, but the single figure of the Dalai Lama kept me there, coming back to his audience room again and again to ask my most difficult questions on the philosophy and practice of emptiness. His answers were illuminating to say the least, and after six months he had answered my questions to the point where I had no more to ask—a state which I frankly had had no hope of achieving. I had the good fortune to attend lectures by

His Holiness on Nagarjuna's Six Collections of Reasonings during which he gave the oral transmission and explanation. His Holiness commissioned me to translate Nagarjuna's Precious Garland (Ratnavali) along with a short poem by the Seventh Dalai Lama, The Song of the Four Mindfulnesses, and his own short treatise on emptiness, Key to the Middle Way, as well as his The Buddhism of Tibet. (These have been published as the first two volumes of the Wisdom of Tibet Series.) I had many interviews with the Dalai Lama about the translations, and the discovery that he was to my sight utterly worthy of being the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet defied my cynical sense of world order.

While in Dharmasala, I also studied a Nyingmapa presentation of tenets as found in the first part of the Precious Treasury of the Supreme Vehicle (Theg pa'i mchog rin po che mdzod) by Longchenpa (kLong-chen-rab-'byams, 1308-63) with the Nyingmapa lama Khetsun Sangpo. In addition, later when Khetsun Sangpo visited the University of Virginia in 1974, we read Long-chen-ba's presentation of the sutra schools in his Treasury of Tenets (Grub pa'i mtha' rin po che'i mdzod). Khetsun Sangpo also had acquired a photographic reprint of the Sagyapa Daktsang's (sTag-tshang, born 1405) Understanding All Tenets, which in 1972 was otherwise unavailable. A reading of it revealed how much Jam-yang-shay-ba relied on the very text that he was primarily refuting and showed the continuity of tradition between Sagya and Geluk.

Contact with a Gagyupa presentation of Madhyamika was gained through reading parts of a commentary on Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' by Mi-gyo-dor-jay (Mi-bskyod-rdo-rje, 1507-54), the eighth Karmapa. Acquaintance gained in this way with Nyingma, Sagya, and Gagyupa interpretations was crucial to understanding Jam-yang-shay-ba's presentation in that it provided the historical background of many positions.

Though those texts contributed greatly to my understanding, this book primarily presents a particular interpretation within the Gelugpa order with an aim of imparting a sense of a living system that affects the outlook, meditation, and goals of its scholar-yogi adherents. Thus, this book is not framed as an argument; still, through the stylistic choice of points of emphasis there is an implicit argument against accepting many modern views on Madhyamika as applying to all interpretations of that system.

ALMOST ALL CONTEMPORARY RENDERINGS OF MADHYAMIKA RUN CONTRARY TO GELUGPA AUTHORS SUCH AS JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA ON MANY CENTRAL POINTS. It should be clear by the end of this book that the

traditional interpretation given here does not agree with, and in fact refutes, all of the following positions with respect to Prasangika-Madhyamika:

- Their outlook is nihilistic, agnostic, or skeptic.
- They are anti-reason.
- The uncommon view of the system is that words are inadequate to evoke an experience of objects like that of direct perception.
- They have no system, no views on cause and effect or rebirth, no positive theses, and no negative theses.
- They are merely debaters.
- Wisdom is emptiness.
- Wisdom is contentless.
- Emptiness is the Absolute.
- The two truths are two ways of viewing the same object.
- That objects possess a definite nature is the object of negation in the view of emptiness.
- Their system is a turning away from philosophical analysis to the vulgar views of the world.
- All views are bad.
- Withdrawal from thought is the best meditation. Or, words are enemies. Or, the source of all suffering is words.
- Reasoning is used only to refute other systems.
- What is seen in direct sense perception is the truth; what the senses reveal cannot be denied in any way; one must appreciate the uncommon thingness of each phenomenon as its suchness.
- Direct perception of suchness requires a leap.
- There is no I at all.
- The selflessness of persons denies the existence of persons.
- Conventional truths are established only by ignorance.
- Conceptuality is ignorance.
- Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way must be viewed in isolation.
- Emptiness does not exist.
- Form is one with emptiness.
- Nagarjuna did not set forth the path.
- Teachings about the path are for those of low intelligence.
- Dependent-arising and emptiness are one.
- Emptiness and dependent-arising are a paradox.
- None of the Hinayana categories are accepted.
- Analysis is not meditation.
- Meditation is just stabilization.
- Phenomena are whatever one thinks they are.
- Conventional truths are negated by ultimate truths.

The dependent-arising of this presentation of meditation on emptiness is itself a demonstration of Buddha's focal teaching, of his 'slogan', as the Dalai Lama put it, of dependent-arising. My aim is not to present original reflections on emptiness but to portray

as well as I can how emptiness is a practical force within the Gelugpa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism.

THE MATERIAL IS LARGELY DRAWN FROM THE ORAL EXPLANATIONS WHICH I HAVE RECEIVED AND FROM JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA'S GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS AND GREAT EXPOSITION OF THE MIDDLE WAY AS WELL AS JANG-GYA'S (ICang-skya, 1717-86) PRESENTATION OF TENETS (Grub mtha'i rnam gzhaḡ).

The flavor of the oral tradition is presented with a view to capturing how the doctrine of emptiness figures in the lives of the practitioners who embody it.

L1: [Technical Note] :L1

Renderings of the Tibetan alphabet in roman letters are almost as numerous as the scholars who have worked with Tibetan. However, Turrell Wylie, after careful analysis, has set forth in a reasoned presentation ('A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription', HJAS, Vol. 22, pp.261-7, 1959) a simple system capable of representing the letters of the Tibetan alphabet. Therefore, his system is followed here (except in that the first pronounced letter is capitalized in names).

As he says, his is only a system of transliteration, not aimed at facilitating pronunciation and, therefore, is restricted in this book to parenthetical citation, glossary, and bibliography. Tibetan names must be rendered in a pronounceable form if Tibetan Buddhist studies are to rise out of the arcane, and thus it is necessary to devise a system specifically for that purpose, not seeking a form reconstructable into Tibetan (which has many unpronounced letters). Again, practically everyone who has worked with Tibetan has attempted this, though some have either given up or not even tried, opting instead for the unpronounceable transliteration form. This writer has long thought that if Tibetan names could be written in a simple pronounceable form, people unfamiliar with the language could remember them, as a consequence of which Tibetan Buddhism would not seem so distant. The one obstacle has been that several names are already known in a misleading form. For instance, the capital of Tibet is Hla-sa, pronounced with the 'h' first, though it has almost always been spelled Lhasa. Indeed, this is like the English word 'where' in which 'h' is pronounced first, but it seems unlikely that anyone would think to do this for 'Lhasa'.

Also, due to the fact that most transliteration systems treat the first, fifth, ninth, thirteenth, and seventeenth letters of the Tibetan alphabet as ka, ca, ta, pa, and tsa, respectively, most writers have used these in the 'phonetic' form. Thinking that this might be due to a difference in dialect, this writer has been hesitant to interfere with this policy; however, it has been found that these letters are not pronounced this way in any Tibetan dialect. Rather, they are pronounced more like ga, ja, da, ba, and dza, the mark above the consonant indicating that the tone is 'high', meaning that the sound is pronounced not deep in the throat but higher or more forward and tending to be sharp and short.

The third, seventh, eleventh, fifteenth, and nineteenth letters (when they are in the root position with a head or a prefix) are pronounced ga, ja, da, ba, and dza in a low tone (which need not be indicated by a line underneath since these letters are usually pronounced that way in English). In a simple, easily pronounceable system of 'phonetics' for use in books and essays, but not for real phonetic spelling in the sense of including all minor

variations, these English letters can indicate the Tibetan despite changes due to prefixed and headed letters.

Most writers have used kha, cha, tha, pha, and tsha for the second, sixth, tenth, fourteenth, and eighteenth letters, the 'h' indicating that these letters are aspirated (spoken with breath such that one can even feel it on the hand close to the mouth). However, it seems to this writer that ka, ta, pa, and tsa are aspirated in English anyway, or at least semi-aspirated, whereas kha etc. are both unfamiliar and confusing, frequently leading to mispronunciation—tha and pha being associated with those letters in English words such as 'thin' and 'phone'. Thus, it seems appropriate to delete 'h' from these letters.

This yields a table of conversion from transliteration to 'essay phonetics' as follows: (In each pair, the transliteration form is on the left and the 'essay phonetic' form on the right.)

-- ka = ga kha = ka ga = ga nga = nga
-- ca = ja cha = cha ja = ja nya = nya
-- ta = da tha = ta da = da na = na
-- pa = ba pha = pa ba = ba ma = ma
-- tsa = dza tsha = tsa dza = dza wa = wa
-- zha = sha za = sa 'a = a ya = ya
-- ra = ra la = la sha = sha sa = sa
-- ha = ha a = a

In this book, the 'essay phonetic' forms are used with the following refinements to reflect actual pronunciation: k and p are substituted for g and b in suffix position; nga, nya, na, ma, and la are used when these letters appear after a prefix or under another letter, as their pronunciation becomes high at that time; also, dbyang is rendered as yang and dbang as wang for the same reason.

For vowels, 'a' indicates the vowel sound of 'opt'; 'i', of 'it' or 'eat'; 'u', of 'soon'; 'ay', of 'bake'; 'e', of 'bet'; 'o', of 'boat'; and 'ö' indicates the vowel sound of 'er' (minus the 'r').

The names, of Tibetans and Mongolians who live in or have published in the West are spelled as they spell them. Aside from these, all other Tibetan names have been rendered in the system given above in order to bring their pronunciation more in accord with actual spoken Tibetan in the central dialect; the transliterated form of each name is given in the index.

The hyphens between syllables are retained in the 'essay phonetic' form so that the beginning and end of syllables can be easily distinguished.

Throughout the book 'cognize' and 'realize' are used synonymously to translate one Tibetan word, nogs pa. Similarly, 'impute' and 'designate' both translate 'dogs pa, and thereby 'basis of imputation' and 'basis of designation' are interchangeably used for gdags gzhi. Also, nine Sanskrit words are treated as English words, resulting in the dropping of their diacritics. These are Bodhisattva (hero with respect to contemplating enlightenment), Buddha (one who has awakened from the sleep of ignorance and spread his intelligence to all objects of knowledge), karma (action, and often also the predisposition established by an action), mandala (a divine circle—a deity's body or the habitat of a deity), nirvana (passage beyond sorrow), sutra (abridged expression of profound meaning—the word of Buddha except for tantra), tantra (continuum, referring here to the continuum of words that express the topics

of a base, path, or fruit continuum), vajra (best of stones, diamond, symbolizing an immutability or indivisibility of method and wisdom), and yogi (a meditator who has joined or yoked mental stability and insight). A glossary of key terms giving the Sanskrit and Tibetan equivalents is given at the end of the book.

The transliteration scheme for Sanskrit names and titles is aimed at easy pronunciation, using sh, sh, ch and chh rather than s, s, c and ch. With the first occurrence of each Indian title, the Sanskrit is given, if available. The full Sanskrit and Tibetan titles are to be found in the bibliography which is arranged alphabetically according to the English titles of sutras and according to the authors of other works.

L1: [List of Abbreviations] :L1

(For the full entries of the Tibetan texts see the Bibliography.)

- Alaya: Tsong Khapa's Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of the 'Afflicted Mind and Basis-of-All'
- Ann: Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets'
- Concentrations: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses
- Dak: Daktsang's Revelation of All Tenets
- Den-dar: Den-dar-hla-ram-ba's Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many
- Göñ: Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets
- GM: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
- GT: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
- Jang: Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
- Kaydrup: Kaydrup's General Presentation of the Tantra Sets, as found in Lessing and Wayman's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras (The Hague: Mouton, 1968)
- Lectures: Pabongka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path
- MHTL: Dr. Lokesh Chandra's Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1963)
- P: Tibetan Tripitaka (Tokyo-Kyoto:TibetanTripitaka Research Foundation, 1956)
- Pa: The Ashtadhyayi of Panini, ed. and trans, by Srisa Chandra Vasu (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962)
- Toh: A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons, ed. by Prof. Hukuji Ui, and A Catalogue of the Tohoku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism., ed. by Prof. Yensho Kanakura (Sendai, Japan: 1934 and 1953)
- Tu-gen: Tu-gen Lo-sang-cho-gyi-nyi-ma's Mirror of the Good Explanations

L1: [Acknowledgements] :L1

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L1: [Part I – Meditation] :L1

L2: [1. Purpose and Motivation [We need to realize both selflessness: person and phenomena] :L2

Sources:

- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets

The Perfection of Wisdom Sutras set forth emptiness as the final mode of existence of all phenomena.¹ Nagarjuna explained the approaches to that emptiness, and Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti lucidly commented on Nagarjuna's explanations in exact accordance with his thought. It is necessary to rely on the perfection of wisdom as these masters explain it, not only to attain omniscience, but even to attain liberation from cyclic existence. One who wishes to become a Hearer Superior, Solitary Realizer Superior, or Bodhisattva Superior must rely on this perfection of wisdom.

The Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (Ashtasahasrikaprajnaparamita)² says:

~ Subhuti, one who wishes to realize the enlightenment of a Hearer is to learn just this perfection of wisdom. Subhuti, one who wishes to realize the enlightenment of a Solitary Realizer is to learn just this perfection of wisdom.

~ The Bodhisattva, the Great Being who wishes to realize the supreme perfect complete enlightenment, is also to learn just this perfection of wisdom.

Nagarjuna's works teach that realization of THE SUBTLE EMPTINESS OF ALL PHENOMENA IS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE PATH OF LIBERATION FROM CYCLIC EXISTENCE.

His Precious Garland (35ab) says:

- :: As long as the aggregates are [mis]conceived,
- :: So long is there [mis]conception of an I.

ONE CANNOT FREE ONESELF FROM CYCLIC EXISTENCE MERELY THROUGH COGNITION OF THE COARSE

SELFLESSNESS OF THE PERSON. One must realize the final subtle suchness of the person and of the mental and physical aggregates.

One must eradicate the innate non-analytical intellect that misconceives the nature of the person and other phenomena. IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT MERELY TO WITHDRAW THE MIND FROM CONCEIVING

A SELF OF PERSONS AND OF PHENOMENA, OR MERELY TO STOP THE MIND'S WANDERING TO OBJECTS, for

these do not constitute realization of emptiness. If they did, then deep sleep and fainting would absurdly involve realization of emptiness.

Aryadeva says:

- :: When selflessness is seen in objects,
- :: The seeds of cyclic existence are destroyed.

Chandrakirti says in his Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (VI.116):3

- :: [Extreme] conceptions arise with [the conception of inherently existent] phenomena.
- :: It has been thoroughly analyzed how phenomena do not [inherently] exist;
- :: When [the conception of an inherently existent] phenomenon does not exist,
- :: These [extreme conceptions] do not arise, just as there is no fire when there is no fuel.

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\ [VI.116]
\ 159.
\ Conceptions arise if things exist;
\ But how things do not exist has already been thoroughly explained.
\ Without things they do not arise,
\ As, for example, without fuel there is no fire.

Bhavaviveka says:

- :: With the mind in meditative equipoise,
- :: Wisdom analyzes in this way
- :: The entities of these phenomena
- :: Apprehended conventionally.

Shantideva says:

- :: When one has searched [for these] as realities,
- :: Who desires and what is desired?

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\ [97 ?]
\ Thus, when there is no (truly existing) contact, how can (resulting) feeling arise? What is the reason for this exertion? Who could be harmed by what?

Dharmakirti says:

- :: Without disbelieving the object of this [misconception]
- :: It is impossible to abandon [misconceiving it].

With one voice all the Mahayana masters proclaim that analysis of objects, and NOT MERE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MIND FROM THEM, is the path to liberation.

ONE MUST ANALYZE WELL WHETHER THE INHERENT EXISTENCE OF PHENOMENA, AS IT IS CONCEIVED BY THE INNATE NON-ANALYTICAL INTELLECT, EXISTS OR NOT. THROUGH REASONING AND SCRIPTURAL CITATION ONE MUST ASCERTAIN THAT OBJECTS DO NOT EXIST AS CONCEIVED AND PENETRATINGLY UNDERSTAND THE FALSENESS OF INHERENT EXISTENCE. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO ANALYZE AGAIN AND AGAIN WITH DISCRIMINATING WISDOM.

The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (Samadhiraja) says:

:: If the selflessness of phenomena is analyzed
:: And if this analysis is cultivated,
:: It causes the effect of attaining nirvana.
:: Through no other cause does one come to peace.

The Cloud of Jewels Sutra (Ratnamegha) says,

~ 'Analyzing through special insight and realizing the lack of inherent existence constitute understanding of the signless.'

The Questions of Brahma Sutra (Brahmapariprichha) says,

~ 'The intelligent are those who correctly analyze phenomena individually.'

The great Mahayana masters taught many forms of reasoning, directed toward the ascertainment of suchness, in order to illuminate the path of liberation for the fortunate and not for the sake of mere disputation.

Tsong Khapa says,

~ 'All of the analytical reasonings set forth in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakashastra) are only for the sake of sentient beings' attaining liberation.'

The wish to attain liberation from cyclic existence is the motivation for entering into analysis of phenomena and attaining realization of emptiness. Among Buddhist practitioners, -- those of lesser capacity enter into religious practice for the sake of attaining a happy migration in a future life.⁴ They have seen the sufferings of bad migrations and seek to avoid pain through endeavor at virtue. One cannot make effort at religious practice merely for the sake of improving the present lifetime and be considered a practitioner of Buddhism; at least, a Buddhist's motivation is aimed at attaining a happy migration as a human or a god in a future life.

-- Others, who have greater capacity, seek to leave cyclic existence completely. They see that the attainment of a happy migration in the next life is not sufficient because they must still grow old, become sick, die, and be reborn again in accordance with their former deeds. Their motivation for practice is the wish to attain liberation from cyclic existence for themselves.

-- Still others, who have even higher capacity, realize the extent of their own suffering, infer the suffering of others, and practice so that they may become free from cyclic existence and attain Buddhahood in order to help all sentient beings to do the same.

Thus, it is very important that a motivation be stated verbally and explicitly before meditation:

~ I am meditating on emptiness and analyzing phenomena in order to attain liberation from cyclic existence and omniscience so that I may help all sentient beings to do the same.

The other possible motivation is:

~ I am meditating on emptiness and analyzing phenomena in order to attain liberation from cyclic existence.

The former is far more powerful because, through it, the meditation is related to all sentient beings. The force of the meditation increases as many times as the beings with whom it is related.

EMPTINESS ITSELF IS A VERY POWERFUL OBJECT OF MEDITATION.

Aryadeva says:⁵

:: Those of little merit would not even
:: Have doubts about this doctrine [of emptiness].
:: Even suspicion [that objects are empty]
:: Wrecks [the seeds of] cyclic existence.

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\ 180.
\ Those with little merit
\ Do not even doubt this teaching.

Even a suspicion that emptiness—the lack of inherent existence —is the mode of being of phenomena disturbs the very causes that produce the rounds of powerless suffering. For, when one has such suspicion, the actual mode of being of objects acts for the slightest bit as an object of one's mind.

Tsong Khapa says:

:: Aspirational prayers should be made for the ability to listen to the treatises on the profound [emptiness], to memorize them, to think about their meaning, to meditate on them, and over the continuum of lives to have faith in them, all without harming ascertainment of the dependent-arising of cause and effect.

Jam-yang-shay-ba warns that though the transmission of the Buddhist teaching to Tibet was prophesied in sutra, it was also prophesied that there would be few who would take the perfection of wisdom all the way through to the process of meditation.⁶ He says there are many who memorize the words and many who propound the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras but few who actually achieve the perfection of wisdom. He adds that there are uncountable numbers who through the force of the five ruinings do not want to meditate on emptiness but still claim to meditate on the 'natural mind' or something other than emptiness that lacks the elaborations of duality. Since 'natural mind', 'freedom from the elaborations of duality', and so forth are none other than emptiness itself, and since it is meditation on emptiness that puts an end to the elaborations of misconception, it is mistaken to think that there is another final object of meditation. The various teachings that Buddha does not even abide in the middle way, or that Buddha ultimately does not even teach emptiness must be understood as referring to his not abiding in, or his not teaching, an inherently existent middle way, or inherently existent emptiness.

Those who actually do not meditate on emptiness but claim to do so mistakenly think that

merely by withdrawing the mind from objects and by ceasing thought they can realize the suchness of phenomena. Rather, analysis is the very foundation of meditation on emptiness.

L2: [2. Self: The Opposite of Selflessness [The Middle Way between the two extremes: empty of inherent existence, but still not completely non-existent] :L2

Sources:

- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.625-36

Emptiness in all four Buddhist schools is a 'self-emptiness', but this does not mean that objects are empty of themselves.⁷ If objects were empty of themselves, then no object, not even an emptiness, would exist. Rather, 'SELF-EMPTINESS' IN THE PRASANGIKA SYSTEM SPECIFICALLY REFERS TO AN OBJECT'S LACK OF ITS OWN INHERENT EXISTENCE.

The term 'self-emptiness' distinguishes the Buddhist emptiness from systems such as Samkhya, which assert that the person is empty of being the various other objects of the world. Such an emptiness is an 'OTHER-EMPTINESS', and realization of it is attained through distinguishing one thing from another, as in the case of distinguishing the person (purusha) from the nature (prakrti) that gives rise to all appearances according to the Samkhya system. Realization of a 'self-emptiness', on the other hand, involves distinguishing the absence of a false predicate of an object, for example, THE ABSENCE OF ITS OWN INHERENT EXISTENCE, and does not involve distinguishing one entity from another entity. Still, when emptiness is cognized directly, the objects that are the bases of the quality of emptiness do not appear to the mind. Based on this, some, including the Jo-nang-bas of Tibet, misinterpreted the Buddhist emptiness as an 'other-emptiness'. THAT WHICH IS NEGATED IN THE PRASANGIKAS' SUBTLE THEORY OF SELFLESSNESS IS SELF, DEFINED AS INHERENT EXISTENCE.

THE HYPOTHETICAL SYNONYMS of 'self in the Prasangika system are:⁸

- true establishment (satya-siddhi/bhava, bden par grub pa/ dngos po)
- true existence (satya-sat, bden par yod pa)
- ultimate existence (paramartha-siddhi, don dam par grub pa)
- existence as [its own] suchness (tattva-siddhi, de kho na nyid du grub pa)
- existence as [its own] reality (samyak-siddhi, yang dag par grub pa)
- natural existence or existence by way of its own character (svalakshana-siddhi, rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa)
- substantial existence (dravya-sat, rdzas yod)
- existence able to establish itself (tshugs thub tu grub pa)
- existence from the object's side [rather than being imputed from the subject's side] (svarupa-siddhi, rang ngos nas grub pa)
- objective existence (vishaya-siddhi, yul gyi steng nas grub pa)
- existence through its own power (svairi-siddhi, rang dbang du grub pa)
- existence in the object that receives designation (prajnapti-vishaya-siddhi, btags yul gyi steng nas grub pa)
- existence right in the basis of designation (gdags gzhi'i steng nas grub pa)

- inherent existence (svabhava-siddhi, rang bzhin gyis grub pa)
- existence through its own entitiness (svabhavata-siddhi, ngo bo nyid gyis grub pa)
- existence in the manner of covering its basis of designation (gdags gzhi'i go sa gnon pa 'i tshul du yod pa)
- existence from the side of the basis of designation (gdags gzhi'i ngos nas grub pa).

The members of this list are only 'hypothetical' synonyms because in Buddhist logic 'synonym' (ekārtha) means 'one object', and thus all synonyms necessarily exist. Since these terms for 'self refer to non-existents, they can only be 'hypothetical' synonyms.

The subtle self that is negated in the Prasāṅgika view of selflessness implies an independent entity; thus, all these terms are opposites of dependent-arising. Each illuminates a little more the meaning of non-dependence.⁹ For instance, 'existing from the side of the basis of designation' means that if one searched to find the object designated, one would find it either among the bases of designation, or as their composite, or as the composite of their former and later moments. 'Substantially existent' means not existing through the force of expressions but existing through the object's own power. 'Existing able to establish itself means not established through the force of terms and expressions but existing in the object's basis of designation by way of the object's own entity. 'Existing through its own power' means existing through the object's own particular mode of being.

THE PRASANGIKAS' UNIQUE MEANING OF 'DEPENDENCE' IS 'ESTABLISHMENT THROUGH THE POWER OF A

DESIGNATING CONSCIOUSNESS'. Phenomena depend on thought in the sense that only if the thought that designates an object exists, can that object be posited as existing (conventionally), and if the thought that designates an object does not exist, the (conventional) existence of that object cannot be posited. Since this applies to all objects, nothing exists inherently.

It is similar to the imputation of a snake to a rope. If a speckled and coiled rope is not seen clearly, the thought can arise, 'This is a snake'. At that time, the composite of the parts of the rope and the parts themselves cannot at all be posited as a snake; the snake is only imputed by thought. In the same way, when in dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates the thought 'I' arises, the composite of the former and later moments of the continuum of the aggregates, or the composite of the aggregates at one time, or the individual aggregates themselves cannot in the least be posited as the I. Also, there is nothing that is a separate entity from the aggregates or their composite which can be apprehended as I. Therefore, the I is only established by thought in dependence on the aggregates and does not exist inherently, as it appears to do.

The same type of analysis can be applied to a person and his/ her relationship to the six constituents that are his/her bases of imputation or designation—earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness. A person is not a collection of these, nor any of them individually, nor anything separate from them. A person is thereby shown not to exist inherently.

Prasāṅgika is the only school that accepts all the above mentioned terms as synonyms; the non-Prasāṅgika schools do not attach the same significance to these terms and thus organize them differently (see Chart 1). For instance, the Chittamatrins certainly would not say that dependent phenomena (paratantra) are independent just because they inherently exist; for them 'inherent existence' merely means that objects have their own mode of being. The

Prasangikas, however, answer that the very words, 'inherent existence' or 'own mode of being', imply independence.

Also, the non-Prasangikas say that if phenomena were only designated in the sense of being unfindable among their bases of designation, they would not exist at all because the unfindable could not possibly be functional. However, for the Prasangikas the other schools have missed the meaning of 'only designated' or 'only imputed' (prajnapti-matra, btags pa tsam); Prasangikas say that although this term means that the object designated is not its basis of designation, it does not imply non-functionality. It is a central but difficult point of the Prasangika-Madhyamika system that what is merely designated can be functional, just as a girl created by a magician can attract an unwitting audience.

It is said that often when a yogi thinks he is progressing in understanding the presentation of emptiness, he loses ground in understanding the presentation of conventional objects and that often when he thinks he is progressing in understanding the presentation of conventional objects, he loses ground in understanding the presentation of emptiness.¹⁰ It must be borne in mind that for one who has found the Prasangika view, progress in the presentation of emptiness aids in the presentation of conventional objects and progress in the presentation of conventional objects aids in the presentation of emptiness.

Through refuting only inherent existence and not refuting mere existence, the Prasangikas avoid the extreme of annihilation. Through affirming only nominal existence and not affirming inherent existence they avoid the extreme of permanence. In other words, they describe precisely how things do and do not exist. The lack of even nominal or designated existence would be an extreme of annihilation—an extreme of non-existence—because objects do exist imputedly. Inherent existence would be an extreme of permanence—an extreme of existence—because objects do not inherently exist.

The extremes are no nominal existence, which would mean no existence whatsoever, and inherent existence—the first being 'finer' and the second being 'coarser' than the correct presentation. The main extreme conceptions, therefore, are the conception that things do not designatedly exist and the conception that things exist inherently. The extremes do not exist, but their conceptions do and can be destroyed.

Many think that the Prasangikas have fallen to an extreme of NIHILISM, being no different from the Nihilists who deny the existence of rebirth, and so forth." The Prasangikas themselves refuse any similarity; they say that one cannot ascertain the emptiness of former and later births through just the non-perception of former and later births. One must first identify what former and later births are and identify their existence. Then, through reasonings such as the present birth's becoming a past birth when the future birth becomes the present birth, one identifies that past, present, and future births are mutually dependent and thus do not exist inherently. Identifying that former and later births do not exist inherently, one ascertains the emptiness of births. Such identification both of the positive subject (births) and the negative predicate (non-inherent existence) is essential, for one cannot ascertain an emptiness just by seeing nothing.

The Nihilists referred to here are the Dialectician Nihilists and not the Meditating Nihilists, for some of the latter attain meditative clairvoyance and thereby realize a limited number of former and future births. The Dialectician Nihilists assert that future lives do not exist because no one is seen to come here to this life from a former life and no one is seen to go from this life to a future life. The Madhyamikas, on the other hand,

assert that future lives do not exist inherently because they are dependent-arisings or, in other words, because they are designated by terms and thoughts. However, they do not deny the existence of former and future lives. Both the theses and the reasons of the Nihilists and the Madhyamikas are very different.

// CHART 1: Modes of Existence

I	II	III	IV
ultimate existence	true establishment	natural existence	inherent existence
paramartha-siddhi	satya-siddhi	svalakshana-siddhi	svabhdva-siddhi
don dam par grub pa	bden par grub pa	rang gi mtshan nyid	rang bzhin gyis grub pa
existence as [its own]		kyis grub pa	
existence from its own			
suchness			
(the object's) side			
tattva-siddhi			
svarupa-siddhi			
de kho na nyid du			
rang ngos nas grub pa			
grub pa			
existence as [its own]			
reality			
samyak-siddhi			
yang dag par grub pa			
true existence			
satya-sat			
bden par yod pa			

-- The Prasangikas view all four columns as equally non-existent, ultimately and conventionally.

-- The Svatantrikas find columns one and two the same, denying these of all phenomena both ultimately and conventionally; they find columns three and four the same, affirming these conventionally for all phenomena, but not ultimately.

-- The Chittamatrins affirm all four columns for emptiness and impermanent phenomena and deny the first three columns, but not the fourth, for imputed existents such as space.

-- The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning affirm all four columns for impermanent phenomena and deny the first three, but not the fourth, for permanent phenomena.

-- The Vaibhashikas affirm all four columns for ultimate truths, such as partless particles and partless moments of consciousness; however, they affirm only the second, third, and fourth columns for conventional truths, such as tables and houses.

L2: [3. Meditation: Identifying Self [ex. Meditation of the selflessness of person] :L2

Sources:

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets

- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
- The Fifth Dalai Lama's Sacred Word of Manjushri
- Kaydrup's Manual of Instructions on the View
- Ling Rinbochay's oral teachings
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.684-5

Jam-yang-shay-ba delineates five stages in meditation on emptiness.¹² These outline the progress of one newly developing the powers of meditation

L3: [FIVE STAGES OF MEDITATION:] :L3

- how a beginner develops experience with respect to the view of emptiness
- how to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding
- how to cultivate actual special insight based on actual calm abiding
- how to cultivate direct cognition of emptiness
- how to meditate on emptiness during the second stage of Highest Yoga Tantra.

L3: [First stage of meditation on emptiness: How a beginner develops experience with respect to the view of emptiness] :L3

During the first stage a yogi gains an initial familiarity with the meaning of emptiness through one of several reasonings.

He proceeds through THREE BASIC ESSENTIALS IN MEDITATION:

- identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness,
- ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason,
- and establishing the reason's presence in the subject.

The initial object of meditation is THE SELFLESSNESS OF THE PERSON; the reasoning used is the sevenfold reasoning as set forth by Chandrakirti.

L4: [1. IDENTIFYING THE OBJECT NEGATED in the theory of selflessness] :L4

First, one concentrates and clears one's mind.¹³ Sitting quietly, one waits for the I to appear. If it does not, an appearance of it is created by thinking 'I', and with a subtle type of consciousness one watches the appearance.

If the consciousness that watches the appearance is too strong, one will not see the I, or it will appear and quickly disappear. Therefore, one should allow the consciousness conceiving I to be generated continuously, and through watching this I as if from a corner, one will gain a firm sense of it.

One could also imagine that one is being accused, even falsely, and watch the sense of I. One could remember an incident of false accusation, during which one thought, 'I did not do this, I am being wrongly accused.' By watching the I who is accused, a firm sense of the way that the non-analytical intellect apprehends I can be ascertained.

If the memory of such an accusation is not strong, a yogi cultivates it until the sense of I as misconceived by the innate non-analytical intellect is obvious. This innate mind does not analyze whether the I is the same as or different from mind and body. Without any reasoning

and through the force of habituation, it conceives of an I that is as if self-sufficient, able to establish itself, naturally or inherently existent from the very start and fused with the appearance of mind and body.¹⁴

Though such an I does not in reality exist, an image or concept of it does exist and will appear. It is initially difficult to identify the appearance of a concrete I, but in time it becomes obvious. Sometimes the I appears to be the breath, and sometimes the stomach as when one has an upset stomach and says, 'I am sick.'¹⁵ Sometimes the I appears to be the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mental consciousness. In sum, the I appears at times to be physical and at times mental. The Fifth Dalai Lama says that in the end the appearance of the I and the appearance of the mind and body are as if mixed like water and milk, undifferentiable, but so clear as to seem graspable with the hand.

Tsong Khapa's disciple Kaydrup says in his Manual of Instructions on the View:¹⁶

:: If the mind thinking 'I' is not generated, you should fabricate the thought 'I' and immediately thereafter analyze its mode of appearance. You will thereby come to know its mode of appearance without mixing it with any other object... If you look gently from a corner without losing the consciousness thinking 'I', there is a separate mode of appearance of I to the consciousness which thinks 'I', and this appearance is not any of the mental and physical aggregates. The I does not appear to be just a nominal designation, but appears as if self-established. Through holding that the I exists the way it appears, you are bound in cyclic existence.

Can the I appear to be self-established if its appearance is undifferentiatedly mixed with that of mind and body? It would seem logically impossible for it to be self-established and yet mixed, but the innate intellect apprehending I does not analyze its object logically before, during, or after its apprehension. The appearance of a self-established I is mixed with the appearance of factors of mind and body but is not exactly the same. The present Dalai Lama's Senior Tutor, Ling Rinbochay, said that if someone sticks a pin in your finger, you feel that the pin has been stuck in you and not just in your finger. You have a distinct sense of the I that is hurt.

In order to ascertain this appearance, it is extremely important to prolong subtle examination of it without letting it immediately disappear. Some teachers advise watching the I for a week or even months before proceeding to the second step.

It is interesting to note that the jiva or 'limited individual being' in Vedanta is often said to be the size of the thumb and located in the 'heart'. In Vedanta the jiva is to be merged with the infinite self, Brahman, and in Buddhism the appearance of a concrete I is analyzed, found to be non-existent, and overcome, resulting eventually in a direct realization of emptiness in which the subject, the wisdom consciousness, is merged with its object, emptiness, like fresh water poured into fresh water.

L2: [4. Meditative Investigation [ex. Using THE SEVENFOLD REASONING (#2) to establish the selflessness of person] :L2

Sources:

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets

- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.687-94
- [See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

L4: [2. Ascertaining that SELFLESSNESS FOLLOWS FROM THE REASON [realizing that to inherently

exist, it would have to be either the same or different than its parts, that there is no third possibility] :L4

The second of the three basic steps in meditation on the personal selflessness is the ascertainment that if the I exists the way it is conceived, then it must be EITHER THE SAME ENTITY as the mental and physical aggregates OR A DIFFERENT ENTITY from those aggregates.¹⁷

If the I inherently exists, it must be either inherently the same entity as the aggregates or inherently a different entity from the aggregates. Sameness and difference of entity are mutually exclusive; if two things exist, they must be either the same or different. IF THE I IS FOUND TO BE NEITHER INHERENTLY THE SAME ENTITY AS THE MIND AND BODY NOR A DIFFERENT ENTITY FROM THEM, THEN THE I DOES NOT INHERENTLY EXIST.

THROUGH THE SEVEN-FOLD REASONING, one attempts to infer that the I does not inherently exist

as it appears to do. Such an inference cannot be generated if one has not ascertained that non-inherent existence pervades, or occurs with, every instance of not being inherently the same as or different from the aggregates. In other words, a yogi must realize that whatever is inherently neither the same entity as nor a different entity from its basis of designation does not inherently exist. ONE MUST COME TO A FIRM CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS NO

THIRD POSSIBILITY OF CONCRETE EXISTENCE. When one does, one begins to doubt the existence of the self in much the same way as one starts to doubt an old friend.¹⁸

L4: [3. Establishing the presence of the reasons in the subject [PROVING THAT IT IS INDEED NOT THE SAME OR DIFFERENT] :L4

THE SEVEN-FOLD REASONING in brief is:

- 'I do not inherently exist because of
- not being the [same as the] aggregates,
- not being an entity other than the aggregates,
- not being the base of the aggregates (the aggregate depends on the self),
- not inherently being based on the aggregates (the self depends on the aggregates),
- not inherently possessing the aggregates,
- not being just the composite of the aggregates (mere collection), and
- not being the (mere) shape of the aggregates.

The third step in meditation on emptiness—after identifying the inherently existent I and ascertaining that it must be either the same as or different from mind and body—is the establishment of the first reason as a quality of the I —proving that the I is not mind and body.

Many reasons are suggested here, and each should be considered thoroughly until one is found which disturbs the notion that the I is mind and body.¹⁹

(The reasonings are explained in detail in Part Two.)

L5: [i. Establishing that the I is NOT [THE SAME AS] mind and body] :L5

- The I is not the mental and physical aggregates because then the assertion of an I would be senseless. 'I' would be just another name for the aggregates.
- The I is not the aggregates because just as the aggregates are many, so the selves would be many, or just as the I is one, so the aggregates would be one.
- The I is not the aggregates because the I would be produced and would disintegrate just as the aggregates are produced and disintegrate. The I is not inherently produced and does not inherently disintegrate because if it did, memory of former births would be impossible. For, the two I's of the different lifetimes would be unrelatedly different because they would be inherently other.
- The I is not inherently produced and does not inherently disintegrate because then deeds done (karma) would be wasted as there would be no transmission of the potencies accumulated from actions since the I's of the different lifetimes would be unrelated others.
- The I is not inherently produced and does not inherently disintegrate because the I would meet with the results of actions not done by itself. If, on the other hand, the potencies accumulated from actions were transmitted, an I which was totally different from the I that committed the deeds would undergo the results of those deeds.

L5: [ii. Establishing that the I is NOT DIFFERENT from mind and body] :L5

- The I is not an entity other than mind and body because if it were, the I would not have the character of the aggregates, such as production, disintegration, abiding, form, experiencing, and realizing objects.
- The I is not a separate entity from the mental and physical aggregates because if it were, there would be no basis for the designation I. The I would be a non-product, and non-products are changeless whereas the I obviously changes.
- The I is not a separate entity from the aggregates because if it were, there would be no object to be apprehended as I. The I would be a non-product like nirvana or a non-existent like a flower in the sky.
- The I is not a separate entity from the aggregates because if it were, the I would be apprehendable apart from the aggregates just as the character of form is apprehendable separate from the character of consciousness. But it is not.

L5: [iii. Establishing that the I is not the base of mind and body [a variant of "different"] :L5

- The I is not inherently the base of the mental and physical aggregates like a bowl for yogurt or like snow that exists throughout and surrounds a forest of trees because if it were, the I and the aggregates would be different entities. This has already been refuted in the second reasoning.

L5: [iv. Establishing that mind and body are not the base of I [a variant of "different"] :L5

- The I is not inherently based on the aggregates like a person living in a tent or like a lion living in a forest because if it were, the I and the aggregates would be different entities. This has already been refuted in the second reasoning.

L5: [v. Establishing that the I does not inherently possess mind and body [a variant of "different" or "the same"] :L5

-- The I does not inherently possess the aggregates in the way that a person possesses a cow because if it did, the I and the aggregates would be different entities. The I does not inherently possess the aggregates in the way that a person possesses his body or a tree its core because then the I and the aggregates would inherently be the same entity. These positions have already been refuted in the second and first reasonings.

L5: [vi. Establishing that the I is not the composite of mind and body [a variant of “the same”] :L5

-- The I is not just the composite of the aggregates because the aggregates are the basis of the designation I and an object designated is not its basis of designation. The I is not the composite of the aggregates because the composite of the aggregates does not inherently exist; if the composite of the aggregates were inherently one with the aggregates, the composites would be many like the aggregates, or the aggregates would be one like the composite. Also, if the composite of the aggregates were a different entity from the aggregates, it would be apprehendable apart from the aggregates and would not have the character of the aggregates. But this is not so.

L5: [vii. Establishing that the I is not the shape of the body [a variant of “the same”] :L5

-- The I is not the shape of the body because shape is physical and if the I were merely physical, it would not be conscious. Also, the shape of the body does not inherently exist because it is a composite of the shapes of the limbs of the body.

L4: [CONCLUSION: it is not inherently existing because it is not the same or different.] :L4

WITHOUT ANY FURTHER COGITATION, ONE REALIZES THAT THE I DOES NOT INHERENTLY EXIST. One has

already ascertained that non-inherent existence follows if a phenomenon is in none of these seven relationships with its bases of designation, and now one has seen that the I and body and mind can have none of these seven relationships. Therefore, the I does not exist as a concrete entity as it is perceived.

For beginners it is necessary to become acquainted with the reasoning over a long period of time before an understanding of emptiness can be generated. However, reasons do not require endless establishment because if every reason had to be established by another reason, one would never realize the main thesis.²⁰ THE REASONS ARE ESTABLISHED TO A POINT WHERE EXPERIENCE MANIFESTLY ESTABLISHES THEM. ²¹ If a person lacks this experience, it is necessary to seek other means, such as examples, to gain the necessary experience that establishes the reasons.

~ HHDL in “The Key to the Middle Way” : “With respect to a non-conceptual wisdom that apprehends a profound emptiness, one first cultivates a conceptual consciousness that apprehends an emptiness, and when a clear perception of the object of meditation arises, this becomes a non-conceptual wisdom. Moreover, the initial generation of that conceptual consciousness must depend solely on a correct reasoning. Fundamentally, therefore, this process traces back solely to a reasoning, which itself must fundamentally trace back to valid experiences common to ourselves and others. Thus, it is the thought of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, the kings of reasoning, that fundamentally a reasoning derives from an obvious experience.”

L2: [5. [ex. Using THE REASONING OF] DEPENDENT-ARISING (#3) [to establish the selflessness of person] :L2

Sources:

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Corresponding sections of the translation pp.673-6

If a yogi is directed by his guru to meditate on the non-inherent existence of the I through THE REASONING OF DEPENDENT-ARISING, he would meditate on the thought:

:: I do not inherently exist
:: because of being a dependent-arising.

The meditation has three steps:

L4: [1. IDENTIFYING THE OBJECT NEGATED in the view of selflessness] :L4

This step is the same as that described in chapter three for the sevenfold reasoning. The yogi identifies the appearance of an I as if it covers its bases of designation and identifies how the mind assents to this appearance.

L4: [2. Ascertaining that SELFLESSNESS FOLLOWS FROM THE REASON [realizing that to inherently exist, the self would have to be independent] :L4

One ascertains that whatever is a dependent-arising does not inherently exist because inherent or independent existence is the opposite of dependent-arising.

L4: [3. Establishing the presence of the reason in the subject [proving that it is indeed dependent] :L4

The I is a dependent-arising because of being produced by contaminated actions and afflictions since the life of a being in cyclic existence is created by predispositions established by an action motivated by ignorance. (Even the virtuous deeds that give rise to happy migrations and the non-moving deeds that give rise to lives in the form and formless realms are motivated by ignorance with respect to the nature of the person.) The I is a dependent-arising because of achieving its entity in dependence on its parts—its former and later moments, mind and body, and so forth. The I is a dependent-arising because of being imputed in dependence on a consciousness that designates, 'I'.

L4: [CONCLUSION: the self is not inherently existing because it is not the independent.] :L4

WITHOUT ANY FURTHER COGITATION ONE COGNIZES THAT THE I DOES NOT INHERENTLY EXIST BECAUSE ONE HAS PREVIOUSLY ASCERTAINED THAT WHATEVER IS A DEPENDENT-ARISING DOES NOT INHERENTLY EXIST AND HAS NOW ESTABLISHED THE PRESENCE OF THE REASON—BEING A DEPENDENT-ARISING—IN THE SUBJECT

I. The brevity of the reasoning of dependent-arising illustrates why yogis initially use the sevenfold reasoning, which reveals in detail how the I cannot be found under analysis. The sign of dependent-arising is sufficient to show that the subject cannot be found under

analysis; however, repeated investigation of dependent-arising is required before it is seen that analytical unfindability or non-inherent existence is concomitant with being a dependent-arising.

L2: [5b. [ex. Using the reasoning of Dependent-Arising (#3) to establish the selflessness of phenomena] :L2

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

The reasoning of dependent-arising is also used for phenomena other than persons, such as the body:

:: The body does not inherently exist because of being a dependent-arising.

L4: [1. IDENTIFYING THE OBJECT NEGATED in the view of selflessness] :L4

One identifies an appearance of body wherein it seems as if inherently existent and self-established within the context of being undifferentiably mixed with the appearance of the five limbs and trunk. It is an appearance of body as if it covers the five limbs and trunk.

L4: [2. Ascertaining that SELFLESSNESS FOLLOWS FROM THE REASON [realizing that to inherently exist, the body would have to be independent] :L4

Whatever is a dependent-arising does not inherently exist because inherent existence means that which exists in and of itself, independent of others.

L4: [3. Establishing the presence of the reason in the subject [PROVING THAT IT IS INDEED DEPENDENT] :L4

The body is a dependent-arising because of being produced by the blood of the mother and the semen of the father. The body is a dependent-arising because of attaining its own entity in dependence on its parts—arms, legs, head, trunk, and so forth. The body is a dependent-arising because of being imputed in dependence on arms, legs, head, trunk, and so forth.

L4: [CONCLUSION: the body is not inherently existing because it is not the independent.] :L4

Without any further cogitation one realizes that the body does not inherently exist.

L2: [5c. [ex. Using the sevenfold reasoning (#2) to establish the selflessness of phenomena] :L2

Again, the brevity of the reasoning may not be sufficient for a beginner in which case one could turn to

THE SEVENFOLD REASONING:

:: The body does not inherently exist because of
 :: (1) not being the arms, legs, etc.,
 :: (2) not being a separate entity from the arms, legs, etc.,
 :: (3) not being the base of the arms, legs, etc.,
 :: (4) not inherently depending on the arms, legs, etc.,
 :: (5) not inherently possessing the arms, legs, etc.,
 :: (6) not being the composite of the arms, legs, etc., and
 :: (7) not being the shape of the arms, legs, etc.

L2: [6. [ex. Using the reasoning of THE] DIAMOND SLIVERS (#1) [to establish the selflessness of phenomena] :L2

Sources:

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.639-50
- [See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

¢(#1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity – nothing exist and change)

If the diamond slivers are used as the mode of analysis, the meditation has six steps based on the thought:

:: The body is not inherently produced because of not being produced from self, from inherently existent others, from both, or causelessly.

L4: [1. IDENTIFYING THE OBJECT NEGATED in the view of selflessness] :L4

This step is the same as in the last two meditations. The appearance of a body covering the limbs and trunk is mixed with the appearance of the limbs and trunk and yet appears to exist in itself, to exist concretely.

L4: [2. Ascertaining that SELFLESSNESS FOLLOWS FROM THE REASON [realizing that to inherently exist, the phenomena would have to be produced either from self, other, both or neither; there is no other possibility] :L4

Whatever is not produced from self, from inherently existent others, from both, or causelessly is not inherently produced because inherent production is limited to these four possibilities.

Production is either caused or uncaused; and, if caused, the only possibilities are that the causes are the same entity as the effect, or a different entity from the effect, or both. (i.e That is the theory to be refuted, or shown absurd.)

L4: [3. Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject [proving that it is indeed not produced FROM SELF] :L4

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

The body is not produced from self (from what is the same entity as itself) (a) because, if it were, its production would be senseless and endless, (b) because what already exists in something is not produced from that something, (c) because it would contradict what the world manifestly sees, and (d) because the producer and the produced would be one.

L4: [4. Establishing the presence of the second reason in the subject [proving that it is indeed not produced FROM INHERENT OTHER] :L4

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

The body is not produced from causes which are inherently existent others because if it were, the body could be produced from anything that was other than it. For, inherently existent others are non-related others since otherness is their nature.

The body is not produced from causes which are inherently existent others because the body and its causes are not inherently existent others since the body does not exist simultaneously with its causes. For instance, the body at age ten does not exist simultaneously with the body at age five which is a cause of it. However, if cause and effect were inherently other, the body that is approaching production would have to exist at the time of the activity of its approaching production because this activity depends on it.

Also, for causes, such as the parents or the body of an earlier age, to be causes of the present body which are inherently other than it, the causes would still have to exist because it is in relation to the causes that the body is other. How can a thing be inherently other than a thing that does not exist?

L4: [5. Establishing the presence of the third reason in the subject [proving that it is indeed not produced from BOTH SELF AND OTHER] :L4

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

The body is not produced from both itself and others because all the fallacies of production from self and from other descend on such a theory.

L4: [6. Establishing the presence of the fourth reason in the subject [proving that it is indeed not produced FROM NO-CAUSE AT ALL] :L4

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

The body is not produced causelessly because then the copulation of the parents for the sake of conceiving a child would be senseless. The mother's care of the child in the womb and later after birth would be senseless. Taking effort to nourish the body for the sake of future health would be senseless. For, the body would arise causelessly.

The body is not produced causelessly because if it were, a body could be produced even from a chair or a door, because everything would arise from everything.

L4: [CONCLUSION: the phenomena is not inherently existing because it is not produced either from self, other, both or neither.] :L4

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this conclusion]

The yogi first identified the body as a product and then saw that what is inherently produced must be produced according to one of four possibilities. Thus, upon the

establishment of the four reasons as qualities of the body, he realizes without further cogitation that the body is not inherently produced. He then draws out the implications of this realization to include the cognition that the body does not inherently exist. For, if the body is a product and it is not inherently produced, it does not inherently exist.

L2: [7. Realization [of three more types of reasoning (#4, #5, #2b) to establish the selflessness of phenomena] :L2

Sources:

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.651-8

In the Prasangika system, the sevenfold reasoning, dependent-arising, and the diamond slivers are the three main forms of reasoning for establishing selflessness.

Three other forms are the refutation of

- the four extreme types of production (#4),
- the refutation of the four alternative types of production (#5),
- and the reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many (the first two items of reasoning #2 – the sevenfold reasoning).

L2: [7a. THE REFUTATION OF THE FOUR EXTREME TYPES OF PRODUCTION (#4) [Reasoning #4
:

Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent,
non-existent, both, neither // cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time]

:L2

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

[See also “Emptiness Yoga”, Chapter 13 – Other reasonings]

In the refutation of the four extreme types of production a yogi would most likely take a phenomenon included within the personal continuum such as body or mind, but he might also take as his subject an external phenomenon, such as an apple:

- An apple is not inherently produced because
- (1) an existent is not inherently produced,
- (2) a non-existent is not inherently produced,
- (3) what is both existent and non-existent is not produced, and
- (4) that which is neither existent nor non-existent is not produced.

L4: [1. IDENTIFYING THE OBJECT NEGATED in the view of selflessness] :L4

The yogi identifies the appearance of an apple wherein the apple seems as if it exists there from its own side without being designated by the subject. The very appearance of an apple toward the subject is the appearance of an inherently existing apple.

L4: [2. Ascertaining that SELFLESSNESS FOLLOWS FROM THE REASON [realizing that the product is either existent, non-existent, both or neither; there is no other possibility] :L4

Whatever product is not ultimately produced as an existent, a non-existent, what is both existent and non-existent, or what is neither is not inherently produced. For, the possibilities of the nature of an effect are limited to these four. (i.e That is the theory to be refuted, or shown absurd.)

L4: [3. Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject [proving that the product is indeed NOT EXISTENT] :L4

An inherently existent apple is not produced because what inherently exists must always exist and thus there would be no need for it to be produced. Or, an apple which is in all ways existent at the time of its causes is not produced because causes and conditions cannot create anything that already exists.

L4: [4. Establishing the presence of the second reason in the subject [proving that the product is indeed NOT NON-EXISTENT] :L4

A non-existent apple is not produced because if it were, the horns of a rabbit or the hairs of a turtle could also be produced. Or, an apple is not newly inherently produced because of not existing at the time of its causes, as is the case with a lotus in the sky. For, whatever is inherently produced must always exist because if it did not exist at some time, it would always be inherently non-existent.

Also, an apple would have to exist at the time of its causes because the action of the apple's approaching production exists simultaneously with the action of its causes' approaching cessation. Since the apple is the base of the action of its approaching production, it must exist together with its action if the two are findable. Thus, the apple would have to exist at the time of the seed of the tree that produces it, but this is not the case.

L4: [5. Establishing the presence of the third reason in the subject [proving that the product is indeed NOT BOTH EXISTENT AND NON-EXISTENT] :L4

An apple that is both existent and non-existent is not produced because there is no such thing, since existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive.

L4: [6. Establishing the presence of the fourth reason in the subject [proving that the product is indeed NOT NEITHER EXISTENT NOR NON-EXISTENT] :L4

An apple that is neither existent nor non-existent is not produced because there is no such thing.

L4: [CONCLUSION: there is no inherent product because there cannot be a production of anything existent, non-existent, both, or neither] :L4

The yogi then realizes without further cogitation that an apple does not inherently exist; in other words, he knows that a concrete apple such as earlier appeared to his mind does not exist. A vacuity that is the negative of such an apple appears to his mind, and he remembers the meaning of this vacuity much as a man, who searched thoroughly for his prize bull in his four pastures and did not find it, would not forget the loss of his bull when he returned home.²²

L2: [7b. The refutation of THE FOUR ALTERNATIVE OF PRODUCTION (#5) [one or many causes -- > one or many effects] :L2

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

[See also “Emptiness Yoga”, Chapter 13 – Other reasonings]

In the refutation of the four alternative types of production the subject meditated upon might be an eye consciousness:

An eye consciousness is not inherently produced because of not being a case

- (1) of one inherently producing one,
- (2) of many inherently producing one,
- (3) of one inherently producing many, or
- (4) of many inherently producing many.

L4: [1. IDENTIFYING THE OBJECT NEGATED in the view of selflessness] :L4

The yogi identifies the appearance of an eye consciousness as if it exists in its own right without dependence on designation by thought or terms, as if it exists covering the moments of consciousness which are its basis of imputation.

L4: [2. Ascertaining that SELFLESSNESS FOLLOWS FROM THE REASON [realizing that there are only four possibilities: one or many causes -- > one or many effects] :L4

Whatever product is not a case of one producing one, many producing one, one producing many, or many producing many is not inherently produced because the possibilities of inherently existent production are limited to these four.

L4: [3. Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject [proving that it is indeed ONE CAUSE CANNOT PRODUCE ONE EFFECT] :L4

An eye consciousness is not a case of one cause inherently producing one effect because if it were, two of the three aspects of an eye consciousness (being a conscious entity, having power with respect to colors and shapes, and being generated in the image of its object) would be uncaused.

L4: [4. Establishing the presence of the second reason in the subject [proving that it is indeed MANY CAUSES CANNOT PRODUCE ONE EFFECT] :L4

An eye consciousness is not a case of many causes inherently producing one effect because if it were, only one of the three aspects of an eye consciousness would be produced.

L4: [5. Establishing the presence of the third reason in the subject [proving that it is indeed ONE CAUSE CANNOT PRODUCE MANY EFFECTS] :L4

An eye consciousness is not a case of one cause producing many effects because if it were, the three aspects of an eye consciousness would not have individual causes.

L4: [6. Establishing the presence of the fourth reason in the subject [proving that it is indeed MANY CAUSES CANNOT PRODUCE MANY EFFECTS] :L4

An eye consciousness is not a case of many causes producing many effects because if it were, the one general eye consciousness would be uncaused and its three aspects caused.

L4: [CONCLUSION: the product is not inherently existing because none of the four

possibilities of production is possible] :L4

Thereby, the yogi without further cogitation realizes that an eye consciousness is not inherently produced and thus does not inherently exist. He absorbs the import of this realization, and if it becomes weaker, he performs the analysis again until the cognition of unfindability returns in force. He tries to become accustomed to this unfindability so that he will never think the opposite again.

L2: [7c. THE REASONING ESTABLISHING THE LACK OF BEING ONE OR MANY (the first two items of reasoning #2)] :L2

[This reasoning is not detailed in Part II & Part IV because it is part of reasoning #2 – the Sevenfold Reasoning]

¢[From Emptiness Yoga, chapter 13:

¢-- Now Jang-gya indicates that he will not give a separate explanation of the reasoning of the lack of being one or many — singular or plural — because an explanation of it is contained in the following, lengthy explanation of the sevenfold reasoning.

¢-- “One can understand [the reasoning of] the lack of being one or many through the explanation of the sevenfold reasoning”.]

The reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many has already been illustrated in the sevenfold reasoning in the sense that the I does not inherently exist because of not inherently being one with or different from the aggregates. However, another form of the reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many is illustrated here in the example of a house:

A house does not inherently exist because of not inherently being one and not inherently being many.

L4: [1. IDENTIFYING THE OBJECT NEGATED in the view of selflessness] :L4

The yogi calls to mind a house and identifies the appearance of the house as a whole existing in its own right. The inherently existent house is what he might point to when pointing a house out to someone else. Findability is portability,²³ and the yogi works for a long time to catch a sense of just what is being pointed out, knowing that it is important to stay with an appearance of inherent existence both so that it becomes well known and so that the ramifications of its absence can be felt.

L4: [2. Ascertaining that SELFLESSNESS FOLLOWS FROM THE REASON [realizing that to inherently exist, the phenomena would have to be either one or many] :L4

Whatever is neither inherently one nor inherently many does not inherently exist because these two positions exhaust all possibilities of inherently existent things. The yogi accustoms himself to this fact by considering hundreds of objects, such as house, boards, group, members, glass, mind, and so forth and seeing that from a specific point of view they are each either one or many. For instance, a group is definitely one from the point of view of the entity, group, and the members of a group are definitely many when considering the

constituents of the group.

L4: [3. Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject [proving that it is indeed NOT ONE BECAUSE IT HAS PARTS] :L4

A house is not inherently one because of having parts. Whatever has parts cannot have an inherent nature of oneness because then a plurality of parts would be impossible.

L4: [4. Establishing the presence of the second reason in the subject [proving that it is not MANY BECAUSE THE PARTS ARE NOT ONES] :L4

A house is not inherently many because there is no inherently existent oneness. When a part of a composite is refuted, the composite which is composed of those parts is also refuted. Since the many is composed of ones, refuting inherently existent oneness refutes inherently existent manyness.

L4: [CONCLUSION: the phenomena is not inherently existing because it is not one or many.] :L4

Through having ascertained the pervasion and having established the reasons as qualities of the subject, the yogi realizes without any further cogitation that a house does not inherently exist. He knows then that there is nothing he can actually point to when identifying a house. He knows that there is no house which covers its parts. He remains in the force of this realization as long as he can, not allowing the vacuity which is a negative of a pointable house to become a mere nothingness.

L3: [Conclusion about the first stage of meditation: non-duality of subject vs. object / emptiness of emptiness] :L3

The main object of meditation during the first stage of meditation on emptiness is the I..24 Through the sevenfold reasoning the yogi comes to realize that a self-established I, covering its bases of designation, does not exist at all anywhere at any time. He perceives an utter vacuity that is the absence of such an I, and he ascertains the mere elimination of the I that is negated in the view of selflessness with nothing positive in its place. He sustains this space-like realization, which is so called because just as space is the mere absence of obstructive contact, so the selflessness that he sees is the mere absence of such a self. When his CERTITUDE of the non-existence of an inherently existent I weakens, he again reflects a little on the reasoning and renews the strength of the view of the emptiness of a self-established I.

The yogi during this stage of meditation has generated an INFERRING CONSCIOUSNESS THAT REALIZES THE EMPTINESS OF THE PERSON, and this consciousness has no ascertainment of knower

and the object known. All the elaborations of subject and object are said to disappear in the sense that a consciousness that infers emptiness does not ascertain subject and object; however, subject and object still appear at this time. Though appearing, they are not determined, for a consciousness inferring emptiness does not identify the object, emptiness, and the subject, the cognizing wisdom. The only phenomenon that is ascertained is the mere absence of a self-established I such as usually appears to the mind. It is not even thought, 'This is emptiness.' 25

In an inferential realization of emptiness, an emptiness is cognized conceptually or through

the medium of an image. Despite the profound nature of such inferential intuition, direct realization is yet to be attained.

L2: [8. Calm Abiding] :L2

Sources:

- Pabongka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
- Lati Rinbochay's oral teachings
- Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings

L3: [Second stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding] :L3

The second stage of meditation on emptiness is the mode of cultivating a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding.²⁶ During it, the yogi achieves calm abiding, defined as a stabilization arisen from meditation and conjoined with special pliancy. Etymologically, calm abiding (shamatha, zhi gnas) is explained as the mind's abiding (stha, gnas) on an internal object of observation upon the calming (shama, zhi) of distraction to the outside.

L4: [SIX PREREQUISITES for achieving calm abiding] :L4

The causal collections or [six] prerequisites for achieving calm abiding are six:²⁷

L5: [1. Staying in an agreeable place] :L5

This has five features:

- GOOD ACQUISITIONS. One needs easily obtainable sustenance not involving wrong livelihood or offerings from sinful persons.
- SALUTARY LOCATION. Staying in an area blessed by the presence of former holy persons affords blessings, but if such is not available, one should at least not stay where those who have lost their vows dwell, where the spiritual community has undergone disturbance, or where there are fierce animals, robbers, non-human evil spirits, and so forth.
- SALUTARY PLACE. The place should not generate hot or cold diseases, and the area and water should be agreeable.
- SALUTARY FRIENDS. It is harmful for beginners to stay alone without friends, and thus one should have at least three companions whose views and behavior are concordant and whose presence promotes conscientiousness. Also, since sound is the thorn of concentration, one needs to be free of the sound of humans during the day and of dogs and water, etc., at night.
- POSSESSION OF THE PLEASANT 'ARTICLES' OF YOGA. Through hearing and thinking one should eliminate false ideas with respect to the object of meditation and become skilled in the essentials of practice.

L5: [2. Few desires] :L5

One should not have desire for food, clothing, and so forth, either of good quality or in great quantity.

L5: [3. Knowing satisfaction] :L5

One should be satisfied with gaining only mediocre food and clothing, for if one is not and instead is attached to them, one will be distracted to the purposes of accumulating and keeping wealth, and meditative stabilization will not be generated.

L5: [4. Pure ethics] :L5

The pacification of subtle internal distraction depends on abandoning coarse external distractions; hence, ill behavior of body and speech should be restrained and pacified through proper ethics, for if one is dominated by coarse discursiveness, one's mind will not abide in a natural state.

L5: [5. Forsaking commotion] :L5

If commotion is not abandoned, time will be passed in senseless activities and conversation, etc. Thus, for the sake of generating concentration, one needs few purposes and few activities—this coming of its own accord if a meditator has few desires and knows satisfaction. For one-pointed practice, astrology, medical practice, prophecy, performing rites, and so forth must be forsaken. Also making effort at something of small purpose, such as a minor topic of scholarship, does not achieve the essential purpose, much like being attached to sugar-cane but not taking the sugar.

L5: [6. Thoroughly abandoning thoughts of desire and so forth] :L5

One must turn the mind away from these through contemplating their faults and reflecting on impermanence.

Pabongka states that if all these prerequisites are complete and one practices with effort, the achievement of calm abiding will not take more than six months.

L4: [THE OBJECT OF CALM ABIDING [chose a proper object of meditation to start with (depending on the personality), and stick with it until calm abiding is reached] :L4

Calm abiding must be achieved with respect to an internal or imagined object, and thus even when non-Buddhists use a pebble or stick as the object, these are only bases of later imagination by the mental consciousness; one cannot achieve calm abiding with the eye consciousness.²⁸ The Buddhist scholar-yogi Nagabodhi, being unable to achieve progress with other objects, imagined that the horn of a buffalo had grown from his own head, since he was familiar with it; however, in general for a Buddhist not just any object is suitable.

Rather, the object itself should aid in the process of eliminating the chief faults obstructing meditative stabilization, laxity and excitement. To aid in eliminating laxity, it should be easier, upon observing the object, to generate faith and enthusiasm, and to aid in eliminating excitement, it should be easier to hold the mind to that object and generate sobriety.

The object with respect to which calm abiding is achieved should possess a special purpose.²⁹ OBSERVATION OF EMPTINESS, as here in the second stage of meditation on emptiness, has the special feature of facilitating generation of special insight, but emptiness—due to

its profundity—is a difficult object for beginners. Unless memory of the realization of emptiness during the first stage remains firm, since one must temporarily forsake analysis and remain only in stabilizing meditation in order to achieve calm abiding, the ascertainment of emptiness can weaken to the point where one is no longer meditating on emptiness but on nothingness. Such meditation would only increase ignorance, and thus many choose a different object.

-- It is said that the desirous should concentrate on ugliness, reflecting on (1) the ugliness of pain, (2) the relative ugliness of the beautiful in dependence on something more beautiful, (3) the ugliness of the afflictions, (4) the ugliness of rapid disintegration, or (5) the ugliness of filthy substances.³⁰

-- The hateful should concentrate on love, wishing help and happiness for friends, enemies, and neutral persons.

-- The ignorant should concentrate on the dependent-arising of cyclic existence (see pp.275-83).

-- The proud should concentrate on the six constituents in their own continuum—earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness (see p.627)—thereby overcoming the conception of the body as an amorphous whole and attaining a discrimination of ugliness by seeing the parts, such as fat; by this means pride is deflated.

-- Those with too much discursiveness should concentrate on the inhalation and exhalation of breath.

These five types of objects are called objects of observation for purifying behavior and have the special feature of facilitating the conquest of desire and so forth and thus aid in the generation of meditative stabilization.

Those in whom either desire, hatred, obscuration, pride or discursiveness predominate should choose an object as outlined above because without overcoming the vibrancy of the afflictions by way of those objects of observation, firm meditative stabilization cannot be attained." Hence, the desirous temporarily should not use joy, love, or the like as the object of observation. Similarly, the hateful should not concentrate on suffering, and those with predominate discursiveness should not use bright objects, etc. A particular object of observation, however, is not specified for those whose afflictions are small or of equal strength; they may use any of these.

It is said that observation of the body of a Buddha is better than all others because it not only has the special feature of facilitating the achievement of meditative stabilization through its blessings but also has the special feature of completing the collections of merit as well as enhancing later cultivation of deity yoga in tantra.³² At the point when the object of observation—a Buddha body—becomes firm, ordinary appearances are replaced by pure appearances, and one sees a Buddha night and day; through this, one becomes a suitable vessel for Secret Mantra. Also, through a Buddha's always appearing to the mind, one accumulates the merit of seeing a limitless number of Buddhas, whereby innumerable benefits, such as not being overcome by pain even in dire circumstances, arise.

Thus, in order to aid in the development of calm abiding, the yogi might not take emptiness as his object of observation.

However, once the object is chosen, he would not switch from it to another until a fully qualified calm abiding has been achieved, much as one would not change the place of friction when trying to ignite a fire by rubbing two sticks together.³³ During this period, continuous effort without, for instance, resting for a day or two, is required.

L4: [FIVE FAULTS AND EIGHT ANTIDOTES in developing calm abiding] :L4

In the process of developing calm abiding a yogi overcomes FIVE FAULTS through EIGHT ANTIDOTES (see Chart 2).³⁴

L5: [1. Laziness] :L5

The first fault, laziness, involves either not wishing to engage in cultivating meditative stabilization or the inability to continue the practice once begun.

LAZINESS IS OF THREE TYPES:

- indolence through attachment to sleep and so forth;
- adhering to non-virtuous activities of desire and so forth;
- and a sense of inadequacy, thinking, 'I cannot do this'.

Thus, laziness is not just sluggishness but also the factor of enthusiasm for afflictions, as well as a false sense of inadequacy. The three types of laziness cause procrastination and are overcome through faith, aspiration, exertion, and pliancy.

-- FAITH is mainly conviction in the qualities of meditative stabilization and its fruits, but also includes both the faith of clarity, which is a captivation with those qualities, and the faith that is the wish to attain those qualities. In order to attain faith in meditative stabilization, it is necessary to contemplate the disadvantages of not having stabilization—such as losing the value of virtuous practice through distraction—and the advantages of having it such as steadiness of mind whereby feats, clairvoyance, magical emanation, and so forth can be achieved. Also, with stabilization sleep turns into meditative stabilization, afflictions lessen, and spiritual paths are easily generated in the mental continuum. The faith that sees these qualities induces aspiration, which involves a seeking of meditative stabilization.

-- ASPIRATION, in turn, induces effort, which here is an enthusiasm for meditative stabilization, leading to EXERTION, which acts as the antidote to the three types of laziness.

-- As will be explained later, exertion eventually generates a mental and physical PLIANCY or serviceability that is the final antidote to laziness.

// CHART 2: Faults of Meditative Stabilization and their Antidotes

FIVE FAULTS	EIGHT ANTIDOTES
Laziness _____ (kausidya, le lo)	faith (shraddha, dad pa) aspiration (chhandā, 'dun pa) exertion (vyayama, rtsol ba) pliancy (prasambdhi, shin tu sbyangs pa)
forgetting the advice _____ (avavdda-sammōsha, gdams ngag brjed pa)	mindfulness (smṛti, dran pa)
[non-identification of] _____ laxity and excitement (laya, auddhatya; hying ba, rgod pa)	introspection (samprajanya, shes bzhin)
non-application _____	application (abhisamskāra,

(anabhisamskara, 'du mi 'dubyedpa)
byed pa)
[over-]application _____ equanimity (upekshd, btang
(abhisamskara, 'du byed pa) snyoms)

L5: [2. Forgetting the advice] :L5

The second fault, forgetting the advice from one's lama on the object of meditation, means to lose the object of observation, the pole to which the elephant of the mind is being tied with the rope of mindfulness in order to be brought under control by the hook of introspection. Forgetfulness here is an afflicted mindfulness— taking to mind a non-virtuous object through the power of excitement, laxity, and so forth. IT IS OVERCOME THROUGH MINDFULNESS which is defined as having the function of non-forgetfulness with respect to a familiar phenomenon.

This non-afflicted mindfulness has THREE FEATURES:

- OBJECTIVE FEATURE: a familiar object. If emptiness is the object of observation, familiarity with it was gained during the first stage of meditation on emptiness; there, with realization of non-inherent existence, one 'found' the object. If, on the other hand, the body of a Buddha is the object of observation, familiarity is gained through repeated viewing of a picture or image and then causing it to appear to the mind.
- SUBJECTIVE FEATURE: non-forgetfulness within observation of that object. With mindfulness, the aspects of the object appear continuously without forgetfulness, as in being mindful of food when hungry.
- FUNCTIONAL FEATURE: causing the mind not to scatter to other objects of observation.

One must hold to the object of observation with a tight mode of apprehension without distraction; only that object should appear to the mind.

L5: [3. Non-identification of laxity and excitement] :L5

Then, when mindfulness is able to hold the mind to the object of observation, the third fault, non-identification of laxity and excitement, arises. LAXITY is defined as the mental factor of declination in the mind's mode of apprehension when cultivating virtue; it is an internal distraction, a depression in the intensity of the mind's clarity. In a coarse neutral form of laxity the object is not seen, as if one had entered into darkness. This is a time of suddenly losing the intensity of the factor of clarity, losing the object, and being unable to move the mind to any object; in this state, the mind abides in a subjective clarity, but without intensity, and is unable to remain on the object of observation. Another form of coarse laxity occurs when the mind has stability in the sense of abiding on its virtuous object of observation but lacks clarity; this is a virtuous form of laxity due to the mind's abiding on a virtuous object. Subtle laxity occurs when one has the stability of not losing the mode of apprehension of the object as well as clarity, but lacks an intensity of clarity due to having loosened the strength of the mode of apprehension.

Since both subtle laxity and actual meditative stabilization have stability and clarity, it is difficult to distinguish between the two. The factor distinguishing meditative stabilization, however, is an intensity of clarity. An absence of intensity refers to a looseness of mind and can occur within the stability of being able to stay on the object; firming of the factor of stability within this looseness acts as a cause of subtle laxity. Having an intensity of clarity, on the other hand, means that the mind dwells tightly on the object of observation. Having or not having this intensity is compared to loosely or tightly

holding a bowl, or the difference between usual faith in a lama and the particularly strong faith that is occasionally generated when a tightening in the mode of apprehension occurs.

Since in a state of subtle laxity the movement of the breath in the nostrils can stop, resulting in a firm mind for even an entire day, some have mistaken this for meditative stabilization and have even advised loosening the mode of apprehension of the object. They have confused this with a similar occurrence in the stage of completion of Highest Yoga Tantra upon the entering, remaining, and dissolving of the winds in the central channel; in the latter, however, the movement of the abdomen also stops and profound states are induced. From mis-identifying subtle laxity as meditation, not only can the four concentrations and four formless absorptions not be achieved, but also in this lifetime itself forgetfulness will increase and wisdom diminish, resulting in cultivating—as if intentionally—the means of achieving rebirth as an animal.

Though lethargy and drowsiness can lead to laxity, laxity is neither of them. Lethargy is a heaviness of body and mind, included within obscuration and accompanying all root and secondary afflictions (see p.265), whereas laxity is a factor of withdrawal inside and thus cannot accompany the afflictions of desire, hatred, and so forth, which are distractions outside. Lethargy darkens and obscures the mind whereas laxity does not. However, the mention of laxity here as a fault in meditative stabilization implicitly includes lethargy, sleep, and so forth. Within laxity itself, two types are to be distinguished, one which is an over-withdrawal of the mind inside and another which is a mere diminishment of the mind's mode of apprehension.

EXCITEMENT is a disquiet of the mind and scattering to an object of desire—mindfulness of a pleasant object, such as remembering at night a dance seen during the day. Since excitement is a secondary affliction included within the factor of desire, not all scatterings are instances of excitement, as when the mind scatters to an object of anger or even to another virtuous object. Although all scattering harms meditative stabilization and is implicitly included in the mention of excitement, it is not stated explicitly because those newly cultivating meditative stabilization are of the Desire Realm. They must mainly cease attachment to pleasant forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects whereas scattering to virtuous or hated objects is less frequent and for shorter periods. However, when cultivating calm abiding, scattering to pleasant or unpleasant objects or to virtuous ones, such as becoming mindful of making donations, interrupts the stabilizing of the mind and, therefore, must be stopped.

Coarse excitement is a case of losing the object of observation in forgetfulness, whereas in subtle excitement the object is not lost but a corner of the mind is involved in fast-moving thought such that a pleasant object is about to appear to the mind. The state of subtle excitement is compared to water moving about under ice on a frozen river.

THE ANTIDOTE TO NON-IDENTIFICATION OF LAXITY AND EXCITEMENT IS INTROSPECTION THAT QUICKLY

RECOGNIZES THEM. Like a spy, introspection investigates and determines whether or not laxity and excitement have arisen. Constant cultivation of introspection would prevent stability; yet, if introspection were not cultivated at all, one would not know the faults that had already occurred, like allowing a thief to enter and carry off the wealth; therefore, one must prepare mindfulness beforehand and then occasionally initiate inspection of whether laxity and excitement have arrived or not. As in the example of (1) holding a cup of tea with the hand, (2) holding it firmly, and (3) investigating with the eye to see if it is

tilted, (1) mindfulness holds to the object of observation, (2) the mode of apprehension is tightened, and (3) introspection analyzes whether laxity and excitement have arisen or not.

L5: [4. Non-application] :L5

When either laxity or excitement have arisen, non-application of their antidotes is a fault.

APPLICATION—THE MENTAL FACTOR OF INTENTION WHICH HERE IS AN ENGAGEMENT IN A VIRTUOUS

OBJECT—IS NECESSARY AS ITS ANTIDOTE.

ANTIDOTES TO LAXITY. Since subtle laxity is a case of having both the stability of being able to remain on the object and subjective clarity but of lacking intensity, it is not necessary to leave the meditative session or switch to another object when it arises. Rather, it is sufficient merely to tighten the mode of apprehension; however, if it is tightened too much, excitement will be generated, and thus a moderation of tightness and looseness is necessary, as is the case with the strings of a violin for achieving a pleasant sound. If one suspects that excitement is about to be generated, one should loosen the mode of apprehension a little, whereas if one suspects that laxity is about to be generated, one should tighten a little. The mid-point between these is known only through experience. However, just as there is greater danger from an enemy within one's own circle because of the difficulty of identification, so there is greater danger of mistaking laxity for meditative stabilization, and thus tightness should be emphasized.

If, having tried to tighten the mind, one is unable to remove the fault of subtle laxity and experiences a lack of clarity in the mode of apprehension, coarse laxity has arrived. This is the fault of over-withdrawing the mind inside; to counter it, one should 'extend' the object a little, increasing it in brilliance or noticing its details. If this still does not remove laxity, one should leave the object of observation and invigorate this depressed mind by cultivating joy—reflecting on the difficulty of finding the meaningful life of leisure and fortune as a human, on the auspicious attributes of the Three Jewels, on the advantages of relying on a spiritual guide, or on the benefits of the altruistic intention to become enlightened. One can also take to mind a luminous object or imagine great acts of charity. If the mind heightens through such techniques and awakens, one should again apprehend the original object of observation. For those who are not used to these techniques, it is difficult for them to help immediately; however, for one who is familiar with them, contemplating, for instance, the difficulty of finding this meaningful life of leisure and fortune is like throwing cold water on the face.

However, if laxity is still not removed, one can use the forceful method of imagining one's own mind as a drop of white light at the heart and with the sound 'phat' causing it to exit from the crown of the head, ascend high in the sphere of the sky, and mix undifferentiably with the sky.

If laxity is still not removed, one should leave the session and remove the causes that generate it—lethargy, sleep, darkened mind, and so forth—by staying in a cool area, going to a high place with a vast view, walking about, washing the face with cold water, and so forth. When, having done this, the mind has awakened, one should, as before, apprehend the object of observation.

ANTIDOTES TO EXCITEMENT. Subtle excitement is a case of distraction within not losing the object; its arising is due to the fault of having tightened the mind too much, and thus one should loosen the mode of apprehension a little. If that does not help and one is still

distracted, then coarser excitement has been generated. Since this is caused by a happy mind, one should not be too happy, for progress will be impeded, as was the case with Buddha's father who did not achieve the state of Stream Enterer due to being too happy at his son's success. At this point, it is not necessary to leave the session; rather, one should contemplate sources of sobriety, such as death, impermanence, cyclic existence, and the sufferings of bad migrations.

If excitement is still not removed, one can use a forceful method of eliminating it, such as observing the inhalation and exhalation of the breath when dominated by discursiveness; exhaling, one should think, 'Going there', and when inhaling, 'Coming here'. Or, one can mentally count the breaths, counting in rounds up to ten, back to one, up to ten, back to one, and so forth.³⁵ If, though this is done, excitement is not eliminated, one should temporarily leave the session.

Since beginners can only remain in contact with the object of observation for short periods, initially one should meditate in brief sessions even eighteen times a day; in due course stability will be achieved of its own accord, at which time the session can be lengthened. It is important not to try at first to meditate for long periods; otherwise, upon sight of the meditation cushion, one will feel nausea and laziness. The session should be left while it is going well, when one still feels that it would go well if continued.

L5: [5. Over-application] :L5

When laxity and excitement have been eliminated, application of their antidotes is a fault preventing stability of mind; AS ITS ANTIDOTE ONE USES EQUANIMITY, THAT IS, ONE DESISTS FROM APPLYING THE TECHNIQUES FOR PACIFYING LAXITY AND EXCITEMENT, SUCH AS INVIGORATING THE MIND, WITHDRAWING IT INSIDE, AND SO FORTH. This is a loosening of, or leaving off, the exertion involved in those antidotes—an equanimity that causes the mind to abide naturally on the object of observation accompanied by intense clarity. This occurs on the ninth state of mind (to be explained below) when one loosens the exertion of the introspection investigating whether laxity and excitement have arisen without, however, loosening either mindfulness or the intensity of the mode of apprehension of the object.

L5: [Conclusion about overcoming the five faults using the eight antidotes] :L5

As Pabongka concludes:³⁶

~ Having completed the prerequisites for calm abiding in a place having the five qualifications and so forth, one sits on a comfortable cushion [in a posture] having THE SEVEN FEATURES OF VAIROCHANA. A Shakyamuni, only a finger-length high, separates from the lama on one's head and is set in space [about six feet] in front of one's navel [or at eye level]. Initially, the object of observation will not be clear and one does not need to make it so. For if mere generalities of the parts—head, arms, legs and so forth—and a mere sense of flashing gold appear and if mindfulness keeps the mind undistractedly [on the object] without forgetfulness and with a tight mode of apprehension, this mode of sustaining [meditation] through such mindfulness alone contains all the ways of eliminating laxity and excitement. This is an unparalleled quintessential instruction to be held in the heart by great meditators, for the tight mode of apprehension eliminates laxity and non-distraction eliminates excitement.

~ If, when meditating this way, stability arises, then because one has come closer to laxity, one should be wary of it, [increasing] clarity and tightening the mode of apprehension. However, if clarity arises, one is closer to excitement and thus should be wary of excitement and seek stability.

~ One should not pretend to be achieving meditative stabilization while not knowing what is needed to possess it; rather, one should definitely achieve a meditative stabilization possessing the two features of (1) stability in general but mainly (2) clarity with a tight mode of apprehension. As explained above in detail, mindfulness holds the object of observation without losing it, and at that time whether coarse or subtle laxity or excitement are about to arise, introspection immediately recognizes them, and they are stopped through directly relying on their specific antidotes. Then, when laxity and excitement are eliminated, one should not make the exertion of the antidotes but abide one-pointedly on the object of observation, sustaining it with great clarity that possesses intensity.

L4: [NINE STATES IN DEVELOPING CALM ABIDING] :L4

There are NINE STATES OR LEVELS IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING CALM ABIDING (see Chart 3), of which

- the first two occur during the first stage of meditation on emptiness;
- the remaining seven occur during the second.

Although actual meditative stabilization (Samadhi) is associated with calm abiding, each of the preliminary nine states is called a meditative stabilization due to being an instance of the development of the mental factor with that name (see p.247).³⁷

// CHART 3: States and Factors in Achieving Calm Abiding (read from bottom to top)

SIX POWERS NINE STATES OF MIND FOUR MENTAL ENGAGEMENTS

familiarity	9 setting in equipoise	spontaneously engaging
effort	8 making one-pointed	uninterruptedly engaging
	7 thorough pacifying	interruptedly engaging
introspection	6 pacifying	
	5 disciplining	
mindfulness	4 close setting	
	3 re-setting	
thinking	2 continuous setting	forcibly engaging
hearing	1 setting the mind	

L5: [1. Setting the mind] :L5

The first state is a meditative stabilization that, following the hearing of advice for meditation, withdraws the mind from all external objects of observation and aims it at an internal object. It is ACHIEVED THROUGH THE POWER OF HEARING advice from a lama about an object of observation because initially one merely sets the mind on the object based on that advice, not from a natural familiarity gained by thinking on it again and again. Aside from only occasional placement on the object, the mind mostly cannot remain on it, and thus a continuum of setting cannot be established.

Through the force of engaging in investigating and analyzing what the mind is doing, one recognizes the mind's becoming lost due to scattering and excitement and consequently has

the sense that thoughts are increasing. However, thought has not actually become more manifold; it is just being identified.

If the emptiness of the I is used as the object, the wrong view of the inherent existence of the person predominates due to previous familiarity such that the correct view is actually only an occasional interruption in the stream of distraction.³⁸

L5: [2. Continuous setting] :L5

The second state is a meditative stabilization that involves an ability to lengthen a little the continuum of observing an object without distraction. It is **ACHIEVED THROUGH THE POWER OF THOUGHT** because, due to sustaining the continuum of tying the mind to the object of observation through repeated thought, one is for the first time able to extend that continuum a little. One can remain undistracted for the period that it would take to recite one hundred om mani padme hum. Still, distraction during this phase exceeds abiding on the object.

The first two states arise in the manner of **FORCIBLE ENGAGEMENT** since it is necessary to force or tighten the mind with striving. Despite this, laxity and excitement frequently and continuously arise, the one being generated after the other like a waterfall, such that the mind cannot be set in meditative stabilization.

During the second state one has the sense that thought is resting because it sometimes quiets and sometimes is generated. The difference between the first two states is that during the second the mind remains longer on the object of observation, be it the non-inherent existence of the person or the body of a Buddha, etc.

L5: [3. Re-setting or withdrawal and setting] :L5

The third state is a meditative stabilization that, due to slight familiarity with the object of observation, returns or re-ties the mind to it through mindfulness's immediate realization of distraction. Like putting a patch on cloth, the mind is returned to the continuum of observation through immediate recognition of distraction, which, therefore, is less frequent than in the previous state. This is **THE TIME WHEN POWERFUL MINDFULNESS IS GENERATED**, and thus the third state is said to be achieved through its power. The difference between the second and third states is that the third involves a shorter continuum of distraction, and thus here 'meditation'—from the trilogy of hearing, thinking, and meditating—begins, although in a looser sense one was meditating earlier.³⁹ In the same vein, 'analytical meditation' is technically possible now even though analysis occurred earlier. However, since analysis at this point would obstruct attainment of calm abiding, the yogi does not analyze but instead attempts to remain one-pointedly on, as in the two examples, the emptiness realized analytically during the first stage of meditation or the body of a Buddha.

L5: [4. Close setting] :L5

The fourth state is a meditative stabilization that involves an improved stability of mind, its having been withdrawn from the vast array of objects by the power of mindfulness. During the previous state distraction was abandoned through recognizing it, and thus the mind is now, with effort, set just on its object. From having generated strong mindfulness, losing the object no longer occurs; thus, the fault of forgetting the lama's advice on the object no longer arises. This ability to remain on the object without losing it is the great difference between the third and fourth states.

The fourth state is ACHIEVED THROUGH THE POWER OF MINDFULNESS because strong mindfulness is able to tie the mind closer and closer to its object of observation. With this state, like an adult, mindfulness has matured, or, in other words, its power has been completed. Although the object is never lost and thus coarse excitement has ceased, powerful laxity and excitement still occur; hence it is necessary to rely on their antidotes.

L5: [5. Disciplining] :L5

The fifth state is a meditative stabilization that involves a liking for meditative stabilization through having seen with experience its advantages. With the fulfillment of powerful mindfulness in the last state, introspection also becomes powerful, whereby it recognizes the faults of scattering to objects of discursiveness as well as secondary afflictions and does not allow such scattering. Thus, this state and the next are said to be ACHIEVED BY THE POWER OF INTROSPECTION.

Since during the fourth state the mind was strongly withdrawn inside, the danger of subtle laxity on the fifth is great. One must with powerful introspection distinguish subtle laxity and, through contemplating the advantages of meditative stabilization, revivify the mind. The withdrawal of the mind practiced over the first three stages culminates in the fourth with the ability to stay on the object, but this withdrawal itself proceeds too far, and now it is necessary to apply the antidotes to subtle laxity. Through contemplating the auspicious qualities of meditative stabilization, such as the resultant clairvoyances and the ability to penetrate the meaning of difficult topics such as emptiness, one takes joy in meditative stabilization. The difference between this and the former state is that now coarse laxity does not arise.

L5: [6. Pacifying] :L5

The sixth state is a meditative stabilization that stops distraction, knowing its faults through experience in dependence on introspection. Due to the mind's becoming overly invigorated during the fifth state, here on the sixth the danger of generating subtle excitement is great. Powerful introspection recognizes it, whereupon even subtle excitement is viewed as a fault and stopped. Thus, the difference between this and the former state is that now there is no great danger that subtle laxity will arise and the arising of subtle excitement is less frequent. During the sixth state the power of introspection becomes fully developed.

L5: [7. Thorough pacifying] :L5

The seventh state is a meditative stabilization that involves enthusiasm for abandoning with exertion desirous attitudes, mental discomfort, lethargy, sleep, and so forth. Since the powers of mindfulness and introspection were fulfilled on earlier levels, it is difficult for laxity and excitement to arise; however, one must generate effort, view even subtle laxity and excitement as faults, and abandon them as much as possible. The difference between this and the former state is that here one does not need great qualms about the danger of coming under the influence of subtle laxity and excitement.

Whereas during the fifth and sixth states one has qualms that laxity and excitement could damage one's concentration, during the seventh, effort is able to stop them such that they cannot greatly interrupt the process. Thus, the seventh and eighth states are ACHIEVED BY THE POWER OF EFFORT IN THE SENSE THAT THROUGH EXERTION EVEN SUBTLE

DISCURSIVENESS AND

SECONDARY AFFLICTIONS ARE ABANDONED, whereby laxity and excitement cannot interrupt meditative stabilization.

Although during the third through seventh states one can remain for a considerable time in a continuum of meditative stabilization without generating laxity and excitement, laxity and excitement do interrupt again and again at least in a minor way, and thus THESE STATES ARE CHARACTERIZED BY INTERRUPTED ENGAGEMENT. During the first two states the mind is more out of meditative stabilization than in it, and thus the designation 'interrupted engagement'—meaning an interruption of meditative stabilization—is not used with respect to them. Forcible engagement is specified for the first two states even though it occurs in the first seven, because the third through seventh also involve interrupted engagement.⁴⁰

L5: [8. Making one-pointed, or making continuous] :L5

The eighth state is a meditative stabilization that INVOLVES THE ABILITY OF CONTINUOUS PLACEMENT IN MEDITATIVE STABILIZATION FOR AN ENTIRE SESSION WITHOUT INTERRUPTION by laxity and excitement due to the exertion of applying their antidotes. At the beginning of the session one relies on a little exertion directed at maintaining mindfulness with respect to the antidotes to laxity and excitement whereby one is able to sustain the session without even subtle laxity or excitement during that period.

The eighth state is ACHIEVED THROUGH THE POWER OF THIS SMALL EFFORT, and because not even subtle laxity and excitement arise, the state is CHARACTERIZED BY UNINTERRUPTED ENGAGEMENT.

During the earlier states, the enemies—laxity and excitement—were powerful, then decreased in strength, and now have completely degenerated; therefore, it is no longer necessary to rely on the exertion of introspection analyzing whether laxity or excitement have or are about to arise. The difference between the seventh and eighth states is this absence of laxity and excitement.

L5: [9. Setting in equipoise] :L5

The ninth state is a meditative stabilization devoid of the activity of thought due to the fact that MEDITATIVE STABILIZATION SHINES FORTH OF ITS OWN ACCORD FROM FAMILIARITY, without depending on the striving and exertion of maintaining mindfulness of antidotes. It is achieved through the power of familiarity with one-pointedness during the eighth state such that one engages wholly in meditative stabilization spontaneously, without exertion. Thus, the ninth state is characterized by SPONTANEOUS ENGAGEMENT, like recitation by one trained in it.

The difference between the eighth and ninth states is that the latter does not depend on striving and exertion. A similitude of calm abiding—a one-pointed mind included within the Desire Realm—is achieved.

L4: [CALM ABIDING] :L4

Calm abiding is attained when the ninth state is conjoined with a fully qualified pliancy—a serviceability of body and mind.⁴¹ During the ninth state one can effortlessly abide in

meditative stabilization free from even subtle laxity and excitement, but this is only a similitude of calm abiding. To attain actual calm abiding, special joy and bliss of physical and mental pliancy must be developed through again and again familiarizing with meditative stabilization.

THE SLIGHT FORM OF PLIANCY THAT IS GENERATED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NINTH STATE INCREASES

TO THE POINT WHERE MENTAL PLIANCY IS GENERATED. This means that winds or currents of energy

involved in unsalutary physical states are first calmed and leave the body through the top of the head,⁴² where a sense of bliss is generated, like the touch of a hot hand after shaving the head. Immediately thereafter, a MENTAL PLIANCY, which is a pacification of the unsalutary states that make the mind heavy and prevent its usage in virtue at will, is generated, affording a serviceability of mind. Through its power, a wind of serviceability that induces PHYSICAL PLIANCY moves throughout the body, causing separation from unsalutary physical states of roughness and heaviness and affording an ability to use the body at will in virtuous actions without any sense of hardship. In this way, a physical pliancy of smoothness and lightness in which the body is light like cotton and seems as if filled with this wind of physical pliancy is generated.

In dependence on this, a BLISS OF PHYSICAL PLIANCY that has a nature of very pleasant smoothness and lightness is generated. Then, continued meditative equipoise generates a BLISS OF MENTAL PLIANCY, in which one's body seems to dissolve into the object of observation and no other phenomena appear, whereupon the mind is so buoyantly joyous that it is as if unable to remain on its object. When this buoyant joy is purified a little and the sense of bliss diminishes slightly, one attains an immovable pliancy concordant with meditative stabilization in the sense that the mind remains stably on the object of observation. SIMULTANEOUS WITH THIS, ACTUAL CALM ABIDING IS ATTAINED.

With calm abiding, one attains a mind included within the Form Realm as well as a preparation (samantaka) for the first concentration which is called 'not unable' (anagamyā) because this mind can serve as the mental basis for the path consciousnesses that are the antidotes to all afflictions of the three realms — Desire, Form, and Formless. Thus, calm abiding is achieved when the mind is conjoined with physical and mental pliancy and is also in control in the sense of one's being able to direct it to whatever object of observation one wishes.

When calm abiding is achieved, there are MANY SIGNS OF PROGRESS:

- the mind has the capacity to purify afflictions
- when in meditative equipoise, pliancy is quickly generated
- even subsequent to meditative equipoise, features of pliancy are generated
- with pliancy and meditative stabilization mutually increasing each other, sleep and meditative stabilization become mixed, and many pure appearances are seen in dreams
- during meditative equipoise all coarse appearances disappear, and the mind seems to have mixed with space
- when arising from the session, one has the sense of adventitiously gaining a body
- fewer afflictions are generated, and those that arise are weak and are immediately extinguished of their own accord
- the five obstructions (1) aspiration to objects of the Desire Realm, (2) harmful intent, (3) lethargy and sleep, (4) excitement and contrition, and (5) doubt—mostly do not arise
- the mind's factor of stability is firm like a mountain and the factor of clarity is such

that it seems one could count the particles in a wall.

Though such calm abiding is a prerequisite for cognizing emptiness directly, its attainment alone does not cause one to achieve any of the five Buddhist paths - accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation, or no more learning. Non-Buddhists proceed to generate the four concentrations and four formless absorptions, but since calm abiding alone can serve as the mental basis of path consciousnesses that overcome the afflictions from the root, it is not necessary for a Buddhist to do so (though all eventually do).

The Buddhist turns to the cultivation of special insight.

L5: [Identifying the second stage of meditation on emptiness] :L5

IF THE YOGI USES EMPTINESS AS THE OBJECT OF OBSERVATION during cultivation of calm abiding,

the experience with emptiness which he gained during the first of the five stages of meditation on emptiness becomes firmer during the second stage.⁴³ One who is newly achieving calm abiding temporarily forsakes analysis during this second stage. Since during the first he developed a conceptual understanding of emptiness through inference by means of extensive analysis, during the second he concentrates on this image or concept of emptiness, desisting from further analysis while in the formal meditative session as it would interrupt his progress toward calm abiding. Between sessions, however, he might resort to analysis to renew his understanding of the absence of inherent existence; then, during the formal session, he merely sets his mind on emptiness with continuous mindfulness and so forth as explained above.

When he finally achieves calm abiding with respect to emptiness, he returns to analysis, but this time with a highly developed mind in that it is stable, clear, intense, and serviceable. Still, too much analysis tends to disturb the factor of stability; so, he alternates between analytical and stabilizing meditation, using the same modes of analysis as in the first stage and then setting the mind on the content understood. If analysis is not done, the ascertainment of emptiness lessens, and if after analyzing, the mind is not set on the content thus ascertained, clarity is not attained.

WHEN AN OBJECT OTHER THAN EMPTINESS—SUCH AS THE BODY OF A BUDDHA—IS USED AS THE OBJECT OF

OBSERVATION in developing calm abiding, the second stage of meditation on emptiness occurs after having attained calm abiding, at which point the yogi renews analytical investigation of emptiness. In either case, he must first achieve calm abiding and then strive to conjoin this stabilized mind with analysis of emptiness. The activity of analysis causes the mind of calm abiding to become slightly non-manifest, requiring the yogi to pass again through the nine states, but the second stage of meditation on emptiness is mainly the eighth state, making one-pointed.

IN SUMMARY, whether one uses emptiness or another object as the object of observation in the development of calm abiding, one must achieve calm abiding first and then conjoin that mind with analytical investigation, cultivating a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding. Even though one formerly attained actual calm abiding, one is not, on the second stage, able to retain a fully qualified calm abiding while analyzing. Analysis and stabilization are alternated for the sake of inducing calm abiding again, but this time with the difference of being induced by analytical meditation on emptiness, which during the second stage induces the eighth state of one-pointedness or even the ninth state

of equipoise, but not actual calm abiding. When analytical meditation itself induces the eighth state, a yogi attains a similitude of calm abiding and a similitude of meditative equipoise (Samahita, mnyam bzhag).

L2: [9. Special Insight [the path of preparation] :L2

Sources:

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Presentation of the Grounds and Paths
- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
- His Holiness the Dalai Lama's oral teachings

L3: [Third stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate actual special insight based on actual calm abiding] :L3

The third stage consists of the mode of cultivating actual special insight based on actual calm abiding.⁴⁴ DURING THE INITIAL PART OF THIS PHASE, STABILIZING MEDITATION AND ANALYTICAL MEDITATION ARE HARMONIZED BY ALTERNATING FROM THE ONE TO THE OTHER, for too much analysis would promote excitement and reduce the factor of stability whereas too much firmness would cause one not to want to analyze.

As explained in the previous chapter, one who previously used the body of a Buddha as the object of observation in cultivating calm abiding has switched to emptiness, analyzing the final nature of the I. Since he must pass through all four mental engagements—forcibly, interruptedly, non-interruptedly, and spontaneously engaging⁴⁵—with respect to the emptiness of the I, he must again with tight mindfulness keep on the object, investigating its nature in the manner set forth for the first stage of meditation on emptiness, without straying to other objects or modes of analysis. When, through introspection, the meditator sees that excitement is about to arise, he alternates to stabilizing meditation, concentrating just on the meaning found through analysis. At this point, calm abiding is again induced with emptiness as the object of observation;⁴⁶ however, this is still not special insight, which arises only when analytical meditation itself induces stability and thereby mental and physical pliancy.

Through this process of repeated alternation between analytical and stabilizing meditation, special insight—defined as a wisdom of thorough discrimination of phenomena conjoined with special pliancy induced by the power of analysis⁴⁷—is generated. Its causal prerequisites are to have relied on an excellent being, to have sought much hearing of the doctrine, and to have contemplated properly the meaning heard.⁴⁸ Etymologically, special insight (vipashyana, lhag mthong) means sight (pashya, mthong) exceeding (vi, lhag) that of calm abiding because a clarity is afforded through analysis, different from the non-analysis during calm abiding.⁴⁹ The arising of clarity upon repeated thought and analysis with regard

to either a true or false object is a fact of dependent-arising. For, if rather than just remaining in stabilizing meditation after achieving calm abiding, one performs analytical meditation, one is able to induce a very firm meditative stabilization and powerful wisdom consciousnesses that act as powerful antidotes overcoming afflictions, and one is able easily to make previously non-manifest objects, such as emptiness, manifest.

Since both pliancy and the calm abiding of a one-pointed mind are induced by the power of analysis, the special insight which is a thorough discrimination of phenomena and the calm abiding which is a one-pointedness of mind operate in parallel at the same time and with equal power.⁵⁰ Hence THIS IS A UNION OF SPECIAL INSIGHT AND CALM ABIDING; WITHIN STABILIZATION ONE IS CAPABLE OF STRONG ANALYSIS, WHICH IN TURN INDUCES EVEN GREATER

STABILIZATION. Previously, analytical meditation was cultivated so that the mind would become of the entity of special insight, but at that time one did not have actual special insight which must be conjoined with calm abiding induced by analytical meditation; calm abiding and analysis were like the two ends of a scale, the one becoming slightly non-manifest when the other became manifest. Now, however, one has wisdom that is arisen from meditation, as contrasted to the wisdom arisen from thinking which was the ascertainment of emptiness by inferential valid cognition attained during the first stage and the wisdom arisen from hearing which was attained when the structure of the verbal teaching was determined. For beginners, that which differentiates a state arisen from meditation is the attainment of pliancy, and thus calm abiding marks the beginning of such states; however, with the attainment of special insight one has a wisdom arisen from meditation, pliancy having been induced by analysis. Unlike states arisen from hearing and thinking during which the object—emptiness—and the subject—the wisdom consciousness—appear to be unrelayedly distant and cut off, ONE NOW HAS THE EXPERIENCE OF PIERCING THE OBJECT OF

OBSERVATION, without the sense of subject and object as distant and cut off. Even though some dualistic appearance remains, the very coarse dualistic appearance of subject and object at the times of hearing and thinking has disappeared. One has the sense of approaching the state in which the wisdom consciousness and emptiness are like water put in water. It is for the sake of achieving such steady meditation that desisting from applying the antidotes to laxity and excitement is cultivated during the ninth state of equipoise. UPON THE ATTAINMENT OF A UNION OF CALM ABIDING AND SPECIAL INSIGHT WITH EMPTINESS AS THE OBJECT, THE PATH OF PREPARATION IS ATTAINED.⁵¹

¶(Geshe Rabten : There are five successive paths on which a bodhisattva develops:

- ¶-- The path of accumulation (sambharamarga)
- ¶-- The path of training or preparation (prayogamarga)
- ¶-- The path of seeing (darshanamarga)
- ¶-- The path of intense contemplation (bhavanamarga)
- ¶-- The path of liberation or no more training(vimuktimarga))

L4: [The paths of accumulation & preparation] :L4

The path of preparation—which cannot be attained if one's object is something other than emptiness, such as the four noble truths or the coarse personal selflessness—is the second of the five paths, accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation, and no more learning.

THE MAHAYANA PATH OF ACCUMULATION, which is so named because it marks the beginning of

amassing the collections of merit and wisdom for the sake of enlightenment, was attained earlier when, after long training, one spontaneously generated the wish to attain highest enlightenment in order to establish all sentient beings in final happiness. THE PATH OF PREPARATION is so named because the attainment of a union of calm abiding and special insight with emptiness as the object PREPARES A YOGI FOR HIS INITIAL DIRECT COGNITION OF EMPTINESS.

On the path of preparation the conceptual aspect of the realization of suchness is gradually removed in FOUR PERIODS:52

L5: [1. Heat] :L5

The heat period of the path of preparation is a sign that the fire of the non-conceptual wisdom of the path of seeing will soon be generated. One newly attains a meditative stabilization that has clear conceptual perception of suchness.

L5: [2. Peak] :L5

Prior to the peak period of the path of preparation, roots of virtue could be annihilated through the force of anger and so forth, but now one has reached the peak, or end, of the instability of virtuous roots. One newly attains a 'nirvana' that is a passing beyond the sorrow of the annihilation of roots of virtue and newly attains a meditative stabilization that is a heightening of conceptual perception of suchness.

L5: [3. Forbearance] :L5

During the forbearance period of the path of preparation one newly attains an endurance, or lack of fear, with respect to the profound emptiness. One also attains a 'nirvana' that is a passing beyond the sorrow of bad migrations because one will no longer be born as a hell-being, hungry ghost, or animal through the force of contaminated actions and afflictions (though one might choose to be born there to be of service to such beings). One thoroughly attains conceptual, clear perception of suchness and newly attains a meditative stabilization wherein an appearance of the object meditated—emptiness—is no longer ascertained in contradistinction to the subject—the mind of special insight.

L5: [4. Supreme mundane qualities] :L5

This period of the path of preparation is the supreme of worldly qualities. One newly attains a meditative stabilization that immediately precedes a speedy generation of the path of seeing.

During the first two periods of the path of preparation, heat and peak, subject and object appear during meditative equipoise, and the meditator can ascertain both. A mere vacuity of the object negated, inherent existence, appears; the yogi can delineate this appearance or concept of emptiness as the object and himself as the subject. Even if the emptiness being conceptually cognized is the emptiness of oneself, one nevertheless has a sense of object and subject, emptiness on the one hand and a consciousness realizing it on the other, though not in the coarse way that these appear prior to attaining special insight. One is abiding in the space-like meditative equipoise, and the phenomenon which was investigated to determine whether it inherently exists or not and which is qualified by this emptiness no longer appears at all.

During the periods of heat and peak the capacity to forsake the conception of inherent existence with respect to objects increases, and due to this, the coarser potencies of

manifest innate conceptions of inherent existence diminish. Thus, at the time of forbearance the yogi can no longer ascertain the appearance of the object meditated, emptiness. However, this does not mean that he ceases to ascertain emptiness; rather, the conceptual aspect of the ascertainment disappears to the point where, even though there still is an appearance or image of emptiness, he can no longer recognize it as such. Then, at the time of supreme mundane qualities the cognizing subject also cannot be ascertained. The sense of the object disappears first because it is more difficult to forsake adherence to the inherent existence of the subject.

L3: [Fourth stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate direct cognition of emptiness [the paths of seeing & meditation] :L3

The fourth stage of meditation on emptiness occurs in direct realization of emptiness. During the period of supreme mundane qualities at the end of the path of preparation, one can no longer ascertain the factors of an object meditated and a subject meditating; however, subtle forms of both still appear. Subsequently, —through continuous meditation, all appearances of subject and object are extinguished in suchness—emptiness and subject and object become like water poured into water, undifferentiable. **EMPTINESS IS THEN REALIZED DIRECTLY WITHOUT THE MEDIUM OF AN IMAGE, AND THE PATH OF SEEING, THE INITIAL DIRECT COGNITION OF THE TRUTH, IS ATTAINED.**

L4: [The path of seeing] :L4

Through the path of seeing a yogi removes artificial conceptions of inherent existence, those acquired not from beginningless conditioning but from contact with false systems of teaching. False teachings fortify the innate misconception of the inherent existence of persons and other phenomena, which is acquired from beginningless misconception of the nature of things and is overcome on the path of meditation through continuous conditioning to the truth.

The meditative equipoise of the path of seeing is divided into two parts, an 'uninterrupted path' that abandons the artificial afflictions and a 'path of release' that is the state of having abandoned those artificial afflictions. An uninterrupted path is so named because without interruption or interval a yogi will pass on to a path of release that is a condition of having been released from these afflictions. The uninterrupted path of a path of seeing corresponds to the 'EIGHT FORBEARANCES', and the path of release corresponds to the 'EIGHT KNOWLEDGES' (see Chart 4).⁵³

// CHART 4: Path of Seeing

true paths	subject	subsequent knowledge*
		subsequent forbearance1
	object	knowledge
		forbearance1
true cessations	subject	subsequent knowledge*
		subsequent forbearance1
	object	knowledge*
		forbearance1
true origins	subject	subsequent knowledge*

		subsequent forbearance ¹
object		knowledge*
		forbearance ¹
true sufferings	subject	subsequent knowledge*
		subsequent forbearance ¹
	object	knowledge*
		forbearance ¹

* path of release

¹ uninterrupted path

(The eight forbearances occur simultaneously as one uninterrupted path, and the eight knowledges occur simultaneously as one path of release).

During THE EIGHT FORBEARANCES the realization of the lack of inherent existence is applied to objects and subjects—to the four noble truths and the subjects that realize the absence of inherent existence with respect to them. Through direct realization of the emptinesses that qualify these objects, artificial conceptions of inherent existence with respect to the four noble truths are simultaneously abandoned. In other words, the initial direct realization of emptiness causes the artificial conception of inherent existence to be abandoned simultaneously with respect to true sufferings (such as an afflicted being wandering in cyclic existence), true origins (such as a conception of true existence itself), true cessations (such as the absence of an affliction brought about by cultivation of its antidote), and true paths (such as a realization of emptiness). The emptiness of the wisdom consciousness cognizing these is also realized at the same time; this realization is nevertheless called 'subsequent' because in the lower systems of tenets there is a step by step procedure, even though in this system an actual temporal sequence does not occur.

THE EIGHT KNOWLEDGES, the knowledge that those artificial conceptions of inherent existence have been abandoned, are the path of release. The presentation of eight parts to the uninterrupted path and eight parts to the path of release details phenomena, qualified by emptiness, which a yogi might take as objects of meditation on the paths of accumulation and preparation, and the simultaneous functioning of the eight indicates the great power of direct realization of emptiness. For the Hinayana schools, it is possible to ascend these sixteen steps one by one; the Vaibhashikas propound such a gradual ascent as the only mode of the path of seeing whereas the Sautrantikas assert that sharper beings cover the sixteen in two steps. The Prasangikas, on the other hand, assert that the path of seeing is necessarily limited to this two step simultaneous procedure because a consciousness directly cognizing emptiness necessarily realizes the emptiness of all objects of knowledge, and thus it is not necessary to pass from one to the other among the various phenomena qualified by emptiness.

For a Hearer or Solitary Realizer, the uninterrupted path of a path of seeing marks the commencement of being a Superior (Aryan, 'Phags pa) and of being an Approacher to the level of a Stream Enterer. The path of release of the path of seeing marks the attainment of the level of an Abider in the fruit of a Stream Enterer. For a Bodhisattva, the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing marks the commencement of being a Superior and of attaining the first of the ten Bodhisattva grounds (bhumi, sa).

In one meditative sitting a yogi passes from the fourth and last level of the path of preparation, called 'supreme mundane qualities', through the uninterrupted path and path of release of the path of seeing.⁵⁴ When he rises from meditative equipoise, he has a

consciousness called 'subsequent attainment' that is influenced by the previous direct realization of emptiness. ALTHOUGH PHENOMENA APPEAR TO BE INHERENTLY EXISTENT, HE, LIKE A

MAGICIAN VIEWING HIS OWN CREATIONS, KNOWS THAT ALL PHENOMENA ARE EMPTY OF INHERENT

EXISTENCE. Later, when he forgets his direct realization, he has a 'distracted subsequent attainment'. His other meditative consciousnesses, such as those of compassion and of the realization of impermanence, are paths of seeing because they are in his continuum, but they are neither paths of seeing as meditative equipoise nor paths of seeing as subsequent attainment; they are a third category which is neither.

Though all artificial conceptions of inherent existence are removed on the first Bodhisattva ground and though during meditative equipoise the innate conception of inherent existence is dormant, a conception of inherent existence can arise again outside of direct contemplation of emptiness. The grosser, or artificial, stains were removed on the path of seeing, and now ON THE PATH OF MEDITATION the subtler stains, the innate sense of inherent, true, natural, or objective existence are removed, not just temporarily, but forever—never to arise again.

L4: [The path of meditation, & the ten bhumis / paramitas] :L4

A path of meditation is a continuous familiarizing with the emptiness that was initially and directly cognized on the path of seeing. In meditative equipoise a Bodhisattva, Hearer, or Solitary Realizer again and again enters into direct realization of emptiness, and in subsequent attainment practices the deeds appropriate to his motivation.

A Bodhisattva, ground by ground focuses on a different perfection (added the names of the ten levels of arya-bodhisattva):55

-- first ground:	giving	The joyous (pramudita)
-- second ground:	ethics	The stainless (vimala)
-- third ground:	patience	The light-maker (prabhakari)
-- fourth ground:	effort	The radiant (arcishmati)
-- fifth ground:	concentration	The very hard to conquer (sudurjaya)
-- sixth ground:	wisdom	The turning-toward (abhimukhi)
-- seventh ground:	method	The far-going (durangama)
-- eighth ground:	wishes	The unshakable (acala)
-- ninth ground:	power	The good mind (sadhumi)
-- tenth ground:	exalted wisdom.	The cloud of dharma (dharmamegha)

All ten perfections are practiced on each ground, but a different one is brought to fulfillment on each. A perfection brought to fulfillment remains thus, and another is brought to its level. Finally, on the tenth ground, all ten perfections are in a state of complete development.

ON THE FIRST GROUND, a Bodhisattva, after rising from meditative equipoise, can in one instant:16

- see a hundred Buddhas
- receive the blessings of a hundred Buddhas
- go to a hundred Buddha Lands
- illuminate a hundred lands
- vibrate a hundred worldly realms
- live for a hundred eons

- see with true wisdom the past and future for a hundred eons
- enter into and rise from a hundred meditative stabilizations
- open a hundred different doors of doctrine
- ripen a hundred sentient beings
- emanate a hundred of his own body
- cause each of the hundred bodies to be surrounded by a hundred Bodhisattvas.

ON THE SECOND GROUND, these twelve qualities are a thousand; on the third, a hundred thousand; on the fourth, a hundred ten million; on the fifth, a thousand ten million; on the sixth, a hundred thousand ten million; on the seventh, a hundred thousand ten trillion; on the eighth, a number equal to the particles of a billion worlds; on the ninth, a number equal to the particles of ten million billions of worlds; on the tenth, a number equal to the particles of an inexpressible number of an inexpressible number of Buddha Lands.

AS HE ASCENDS THE GROUNDS, a Bodhisattva gains the capacity to be born as a being of greater and greater influence. As his virtues increase, he is able to outshine, or suppress, greater numbers of beings and more powerful beings, not for the sake of exercising power but for the sake of helping them.

As Nagarjuna says in the fifth chapter of his Precious Garland:57

:: [1' Just as there are eight grounds of Hearers, so there are ten Bodhisattva grounds 440]

:: 440.

:: Just as the eight levels of Hearers
 :: Are explained in their vehicle,
 :: So are the ten Bodhisattva
 :: Grounds in the Mahayana.

:: [2' Entities and good qualities of the ten grounds 441-60]

:: 441.

:: The first of these is the Very Joyful
 :: Since the Bodhisattva is rejoicing.
 :: He forsakes the three entwinements and is born
 :: Into the lineage of the Tathagatas.

:: Through the maturation of these qualities
 :: The perfection of giving becomes supreme.
 :: He vibrates a hundred worlds
 :: And becomes a great lord of the world.

:: The second is called the Stainless
 :: Because the ten [virtuous] actions
 :: Of body, speech, and mind are stainless
 :: And he naturally abides in them.

:: Through the maturation of these qualities
 :: The perfection of ethics becomes supreme,
 :: He becomes a Universal Monarch helping beings,
 :: Master of the glorious [four continents]
 :: And of the seven precious substances.

:: The third ground is called the Luminous because
 :: The pacifying light of wisdom arises.
 :: The concentrations and clairvoyances are generated,
 :: While desire and hatred are extinguished completely.

:: Through the maturation of these qualities
 :: He practices supremely the deeds of patience
 :: And putting an end to desire completely
 :: Becomes a great wise king of the gods.

:: The fourth is called the Radiant
 :: Because the light of true wisdom arises
 :: In which he cultivates supremely
 :: The harmonies of enlightenment.

:: Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes
 :: A king of the gods in [the Land]
 :: Without Combat. [effort]
 :: He is skilled in quelling the arising of the view
 :: That the transitory collection [is a real self].

:: The fifth is called the Very Difficult to Overcome
 :: Since all demons find it extremely hard to conquer him.
 :: He becomes skilled in knowing the subtle
 :: Meanings of the noble truths and so forth.

:: Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes
 :: A king of the gods abiding in the Joyous Land, [concentration]
 :: He overcomes the sources of afflictions
 :: And of the views of all Forders (Tirthika).

:: The sixth is called the Approaching because he is
 :: Approaching the qualities of a Buddha;
 :: Through familiarity with calm abiding and special insight
 :: He attains cessation and is thus advanced [in wisdom].

:: Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes
 :: A king of the gods [in the Land] of Liking Emanation. [wisdom]
 :: Hearers cannot surpass him, he pacifies
 :: Those with the pride of superiority.

:: The seventh is the Gone Afar because
 :: The number [of his qualities] has increased,
 :: Moment by moment he can enter
 :: The equipoise of cessation.

:: Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes a master
 :: Of the gods [in the Land] of Control over Others' Emanations. [means]
 :: He becomes a great leader of teachers for he knows
 :: Direct realization of the [four] noble truths.

:: The eighth is the Immovable, the youthful stage.
 :: Through non-conceptuality he is immovable

:: And the spheres of his body, speech, and mind's
 :: Activities are inconceivable.

 :: Through the maturation of these qualities
 :: He becomes a Brahma, master of a thousand worlds. [prayers]
 :: Foe Destroyers and Solitary Realizers and so forth
 :: Cannot surpass him in establishing the meaning [of the doctrines].

 :: The ninth ground is called Good Intelligence.
 :: Like a regent he has attained correct individual
 :: Realization and therefore has good intelligence.

 :: Through the maturation of these qualities
 :: He becomes a Brahma who is master of a million worlds. [forces]
 :: Foe Destroyers and so forth cannot surpass him
 :: In responding to questions in the thoughts of sentient beings.

 :: The tenth is the Cloud of Doctrine because
 :: The rain of excellent doctrine falls.
 :: The Bodhisattva is consecrated
 :: With light by the Buddhas.

 :: 460.
 :: Through the maturation of these qualities
 :: He becomes a master of the gods of Pure Abode. [awareness]
 :: He is a supreme great lord, master
 :: Of the sphere of infinite wisdom.

 \ ###
 \ 461.ab Thus those ten grounds are renowned
 \ As the ten Bodhisattva grounds.

A yogi who has attained direct realization of emptiness cannot remain in that realization while perceiving the phenomena qualified by emptiness and also cannot perceive phenomena while directly realizing emptiness.⁵⁸ He loses the direct cognition of emptiness when he rises from meditative equipoise, for the appearance of conventional phenomena rules out a direct cognition of emptiness and a direct cognition of emptiness rules out the appearance of conventional phenomena. In terms of how emptiness and other phenomena appear to him, the two truths are as if contradictory; such are the obstructions to omniscience —the simultaneous realization by one consciousness of all phenomena, both the phenomena qualified by emptiness and the emptinesses themselves. A Bodhisattva has a great wish to rid himself of this obstruction because it prevents him from knowing those things that make attempts to help other beings fruitful. Although he does not actually begin to abandon the obstructions to omniscience until the eighth Bodhisattva ground, the wish to do so is his basic motivation during the seven preceding grounds as he is ridding himself forever of the various degrees of the conception of inherent existence, the root of the obstructions to liberation.

ON EACH GROUND A BODHISATTVA ABANDONS VARYING DEGREES OF THE INNATE CONCEPTION OF INHERENT EXISTENCE AND THE POISONS IT INDUCES ALONG WITH THEIR SEEDS.⁵⁹ These objects of abandonment

are arranged in relation to the three realms and the nine levels.

THE THREE REALMS are

- the Desire,
- Form, and
- Formless Realms;

of the Nine Levels,

- the first corresponds to the Desire Realm,
- the next four to the four divisions of the Form Realm, called the Four Concentrations (jnanas),
- and the last four to the four divisions of the Formless Realm, called the Four Formless Absorptions.

The Four Concentrations and Four Formless Absorptions are places of rebirth where beings have particularly strong concentrative powers; these powers can be achieved within a lifetime in the Desire Realm, and thus the three realms outline the possible states of consciousness in terms of concentrative ability within a human lifetime in the Desire Realm and also present in condensed form all the possible states of rebirth within cyclic existence.

The conception of inherent existence and its attendant afflictions are divided into EIGHTY-ONE STEPS, nine each with respect to the nine levels, so that each level has a series of nine obstacles that are to be abandoned:

- big big, middle big, and small big;
- big middle, middle middle, and small middle;
- big small, middle small, and small small (see Chart 5).

// CHART 5: Innate Afflictions Forsaken on the Path of Meditation in Terms of the Three Realms and Nine Levels

	Peak of Cyclic Existence (ninth level)	73-81
afflictions regarding Formless Realm	Nothingness (eighth level)	64-72
	Infinite Consciousness (seventh level)	55-63
	Infinite Space (sixth level)	46-54
	Fourth Concentration (fifth level)	37-45
afflictions regarding Form Realm	Third Concentration (fourth level)	28-36
	Second Concentration (third level)	19-27
	First Concentration (second level)	10-18

	small small	9
small	middling small	8
	big small	7

afflictions			
regarding	small middling	6	
Desire Realm (first level)	middling middling	5	
	big middling	4	
	small big	3	
big	middling big	2	
	big big	1	

The Prasangikas assert that no one proceeds through THESE EIGHTY-ONE STEPS one by one; rather, the nine big big innate afflictions are simultaneously abandoned; the nine middling big are simultaneously abandoned, and so forth through the small small. One proceeds in nine steps with each step having an uninterrupted path, which is a path of direct cognition of emptiness actively forsaking a corresponding affliction, and a path of release, which is a consciousness directly cognizing emptiness within the condition of having abandoned that affliction. The 'active forsaking' of an affliction does not mean that the path and the affliction combat each other; rather, simultaneously with the production of an uninterrupted path the corresponding affliction ceases.

To destroy the big big afflictions only a small small path is needed, much the same as when initially cleaning a garment the grosser stains are easily cleaned with a little washing. To destroy the small small afflictions a big big path is needed, and the same is to be respectively applied to the intermediate degrees.

On each of the second through eighth Bodhisattva grounds a portion of the innate afflictions is forsaken:

- second ground: the nine big big
- third ground: the nine middling big
- fourth ground: the nine small big
- fifth ground: the nine big middling
- sixth ground: the nine middling middling
- seventh ground: the nine small middling
- eighth ground: the nine big small, the nine middling small,
- and the nine small small simultaneously.

The grounds are not enumerated for Hearers and Solitary Realizers even though they abandon the same afflictions as do Bodhisattvas. As Hearers and Solitary Realizers abandon the various degrees of afflictions, they are classified into the 'eight levels of approaching and abiding' with respect to their attainment of the fruits of a Stream Enterer, Once Returner, Never Returner, or Foe Destroyer (see Chart 6).

// CHART 6: Eight Levels of Approaching and Abiding

(read from bottom to top; afflictions refer to those in Chart 5 on p. 105)

	afflictions	afflictions	path
	being	already	
	forsaken	forsaken	
Abider in the			
fruit of a Foe	1-81	no more learning	
Destroyer			
Approacher to the			
fruit of a Foe	10-81	1-9	meditation

Destroyer			
Abider in the			
fruit of a	1-9	meditation	
Never Returner			
Approacher to the			
fruit of a	7-9	1-6	meditation
Never Returner			
Abider in the			
fruit of a		1-6	meditation
Once Returner			
Approacher to the			
fruit of a	1-6		meditation
Once Returner			
Abider in the.			
fruit of a		seeing-path of	
stream Enterer		release	
Approacher to the		seeing—	
fruit of a		uninterrupted	
Stream Enterer		path	

With the attainment of the path of release of the path of seeing, a Hearer or Solitary Realizer is an Abider in the fruit of a Stream Enterer. While making effort to overcome the first six of the nine degrees of innate afflictions pertaining to the Desire Realm, he is an Approacher to the level of Once Returner, and once these six are overcome, he becomes an Abider in the fruit of Once Returner. He will return to the Desire Realm by the power of afflictions only once more, at which time he will strive to overcome the remaining three degrees of innate afflictions pertaining to the Desire Realm, becoming an Approacher to the level of a Never Returner. With success in overcoming all afflictions pertaining to the Desire Realm, he becomes an Abider in the fruit of a Never Returner, never again returning to the Desire Realm due to the afflictions although he might return to the Form and Formless

Realms within cyclic existence many times. When he makes effort to overcome the remaining seventy-two degrees of innate afflictions pertaining to the Form and Formless Realms, he becomes an Approacher to the level of Foe Destroyer, and when all innate afflictions have been overcome, he is an Abider in the fruit of a Foe Destroyer.

When, as in the Prasangika system, the afflictions are forsaken simultaneously rather than serially, a yogi first abandons simultaneously the first, tenth, nineteenth, twenty-eighth, thirty-seventh, forty-sixth, fifty-fifth, sixty-fourth, and seventy-third degrees of the afflictions. Thus, it is said that while abandoning this first of the nine rounds, he already is an Approacher to the fruit of a Foe Destroyer.

When a Hearer or a Solitary Realizer has abandoned all nine rounds of the innate afflictions, he is a Foe Destroyer and has attained the path of no more learning of his vehicle. However, he has not ceased learning in general; he is urged by Buddhas to enter the Mahayana both in order to help other beings and to perfect his own aims. Though he has eliminated the innate afflictions and thereby removed the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence, he has not even begun to remove the non-afflicted ignorance that constitutes the obstructions to omniscience—the appearance of inherent existence and the stains of viewing the two truths as separate entities.

Upon their generation of a spontaneous, strong wish to attain highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings, Hearer and Solitary Realizer For Destroyers enter the Mahayana path of accumulation. They proceed through the paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, and meditation and ascend the Bodhisattva grounds, eliminating not the innate afflictions, because these have already been destroyed through the Hinayana path, but the obstructions to attainment of the many special qualities of Bodhisattvas. They must spend one period of countless eons on the paths of accumulation and preparation and another period of countless eons on the first eight grounds doing this.

On the eighth ground all Bodhisattvas—those who proceed only on the Mahayana path and those who first completed the Hinayana path—finally begin to eliminate what they have sought to overcome since their entry into the Mahayana, the obstructions to omniscience. They spend one period of countless eons proceeding from the second part of the eighth ground to Buddhahood, forsaking by degrees the stains that prevent them from full effectiveness in their efforts to help other beings. The obstructions to omniscience (literally, obstructions to objects of knowledge: jneyavarana) plague all sentient beings, not just eighth ground Bodhisattvas, for the appearance of inherently existent objects to the sense and mental consciousness lends a false support to the innate conception of inherent existence, the assent to this false appearance. However, only eighth ground Bodhisattvas have the capacity to begin to counteract the appearance of inherent existence. The long endeavor in amassing the collections of merit and wisdom has been for the purpose of so empowering the mind that it is possible to counteract these most subtle obstructions.

The obstructions to omniscience are divided into four degrees that are to be eliminated on the last three grounds, called 'pure' because eighth through tenth ground Bodhisattvas are purified of the innate afflictions:

second part of eighth ground:	big obstructions to omniscience
ninth ground:	middling obstructions to omniscience
first part of tenth ground:	coarse small obstructions to omniscience
last part of tenth ground:	subtle small obstructions to omniscience.

The final uninterrupted path in the continuum of a sentient being eliminates the subtlest obstructions to Buddhahood, and the corresponding path of release is Buddhahood itself.

In order to generate this final uninterrupted path, however, it is necessary to enter the path of tantra. Even though the Buddhahoods described in sutra and in tantra are the same, the paths of sutra alone can carry a yogi only to the tenth Bodhisattva ground. To achieve Buddhahood, it is necessary to supplement these paths with the paths of Secret Mantra.

L2: [10. Tantra] :L2

Sources:

- His Holiness the Dalai Lama's oral teachings
- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets

- Nga-wang-bel-den's Illumination of the Tantric Texts

A Bodhisattva spends at least three countless eons on the paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, and meditation and reaches the last part of the tenth ground, but in order to remove the subtle small obstructions to omniscience he still must enter the Secret Mantra Vehicle.⁶⁰ His path has been very long; if he were fully qualified and had entered the tantric vehicle from the beginning, he would have been able to attain Buddhahood in just one lifetime. Tantra is the quick path for those who are fit receptacles, but not for those who cannot bear the difficulties of the long path.⁶¹ To practice tantra requires even greater compassion and greater intelligence than are required on the sutra path; thus, though many persons in the degenerate era are interested in tantra, tantra is not for degenerate persons.

Tantra is limited to persons whose compassion is so great that they cannot bear to spend unnecessary time in attaining Buddhahood, as they want to be a supreme source of help and happiness for others quickly.⁶² The most qualified of tantric practitioners complete the path in one lifetime, and it is said that those who are less qualified but maintain their vows will attain the supreme achievement in either seven or sixteen lifetimes.

In order to enter the tantric path it is necessary to have good understanding of the three principal aspects of the path to full enlightenment: the thought to leave cyclic existence, the aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings, and the correct view of emptiness."Therefore, it is impossible to enter the Mantra Vehicle before the first of the five stages of meditation on emptiness; however, it could be entered anytime after the yogi had gained an acquaintance with emptiness, the first of these five stages, provided he had the other qualifications of compassion and so forth.

There is an exoteric explanation that once a Bodhisattva has attained a non-tantric path of seeing he must wait until he reaches the tenth ground to enter the tantric path.⁶⁴ However, according to an oral transmission, a Bodhisattva can enter the Mantra Vehicle at any time; his great compassion and sharpness of mind as well as his ability to create manifestations which visit Buddhas in different lands insures that he would know of the tantric path and seek it. Thus, the second, third, and fourth of the five stages of meditation on emptiness could be replaced by similar stages within the practice of tantra, beginning at any point within these three. It is not obligatory to pass through the ten Bodhisattva grounds to enter the practice of tantra, nor is it obligatory to pass through the three lower tantras to enter Highest Yoga Tantra.

L4: [CALM ABIDING AND SPECIAL INSIGHT IN TANTRA] :L4

Tantra in general is divided into four types which in ascending order are: Action (Kriya), Performance (Charya), Yoga (Yoga), and Highest Yoga (Anuttarayoga). The mode of developing a union of calm abiding and special insight with emptiness as the object is similar in the first three tantra sets to that in the sutra teachings in the sense that, after attaining calm abiding, analytical meditation and stabilizing meditation are alternated in order to prevent respectively laxity and excitement, or lack of penetrating ascertainment and lack of stability.⁶⁵ However, unlike the sutra system, all four tantras emphasize a union of manifestation and emptiness—the vivid appearance of oneself as a deity in conjunction with conceptual cognition of emptiness.

In other words, it is accepted in the tantric systems that a phenomenon which is qualified by emptiness can continue to appear to an inferential consciousness that realizes its

emptiness. Both the vivid appearance of a deity and realization of the deity's non-inherent existence are practiced by one consciousness. In most interpretations of the sutra systems, however, a phenomenon qualified by emptiness does not appear to an inferential consciousness cognizing its emptiness; just its emptiness appears. Thus, in the sutra systems the union of wisdom and method refers merely to cognition of emptiness as supplementing the Bodhisattva deeds, or the Bodhisattva deeds as supplementing cognition of emptiness. IN TANTRA, ON THE OTHER HAND, ONE CONSCIOUSNESS IS SUFFICIENT TO CONTAIN THE PRACTICE OF THE PROFOUND— THE WISDOM REALIZING NON-INHERENT EXISTENCE—AND THE PRACTICE OF THE VAST—THE APPEARANCE OF ONESELF AS A DEITY. Furthermore, because from the beginning a yogi imagines himself as having the body, enjoyments, abode, and activities of a Buddha, he amasses far more quickly the merit necessary to produce a Buddha's Form Body, and in this sense tantra is the quick path.

In the yoga of union of the profound and the manifest, a meditator reflects on emptiness through any of the reasonings outlined in the first stage of meditation on emptiness. According to the three lower tantras, he achieves calm abiding and then alternates between analytical meditation and stabilizing meditation, within continuous realization of emptiness and within vivid appearance of himself as a deity. However, in Highest Yoga Tantra it is not necessary either to achieve calm abiding first or to perform such alternation.⁶⁶ Highest Yoga Tantra is divided into stages of generation and completion, during both of which the yoga of the union of manifestation and emptiness is performed, but with a difference. IN THE STAGE OF GENERATION, due to the force of holding the mind fully to a subtle object in a special place within the body, such as a tiny drop or letter at the heart, and due to the type of object being meditated, the winds gradually abide inside, whereby excitement can be quickly stopped. Thus, the yogi can perform strong analytical meditation without concern that he will lose the factor of stability. When the eighth state preliminary to calm abiding is achieved, a type of analytical meditation involving the emanation and withdrawal of, for instance, vajras, easily stops coarse conceptuality and induces the simultaneous achievement of calm abiding and special insight. Attainment of the union of calm abiding and special insight is thus very fast in Highest Yoga Tantra—provided that the meditator is qualified.

L3: [Fifth stage of meditation on emptiness: How to meditate on emptiness during the second stage of Highest Yoga Tantra] :L3

In the second and final stage of Highest Yoga Tantra, that of COMPLETION, there are a series of techniques, suited to the meditator's physical constitution and mental temperament, that cause the winds (prana) to enter, remain, and dissolve in the central channel.⁶⁷ The purpose is to manifest a series of four subtle minds and, in turn, to use the subtlest, the mind of clear light, to cognize emptiness. When the winds have fully entered, remained, and dissolved in the indestructible drop in the center of the heart, emptiness is directly cognized by the very subtle mind of clear light. At this point in just one period of the path of seeing, the yogi forsakes not only the artificial but also the innate afflictions. The emptiness that is cognized is exactly the same emptiness that is taught in sutra; however, the bliss consciousness that cognizes emptiness is far subtler than the corresponding consciousness presented in the sutra systems.

Since even some Hearers are said to forsake the innate afflictions in as little as three

lives, the extraordinary speed of Highest Yoga Tantra is not just the instantaneous abandoning of the artificial and innate afflictions on the path of seeing; it also refers to the swift abandonment of the obstructions to omniscience. Rising from the path of seeing, a yogi's very subtle mind and the very subtle wind that is its mount serve as the causes of an illusory body which is pure in the sense that the afflictions have been abandoned and is actual in the sense that it is not just imagined. With this special mind and body, the obstructions to omniscience are quickly eliminated, and Buddhahood is realized.

During the stage of completion in Highest Yoga Tantra the emphasis is not on meditation analyzing emptiness by way of reasoning but on stabilizing meditation for the sake of gathering the winds in order to manifest a subtle consciousness cognizing emptiness. HOWEVER, THESE STABILIZING CONCENTRATIONS CANNOT BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS THEY ARE BUILT ON FIRM

ASCERTAINMENT OF EMPTINESS ATTAINED THROUGH ANALYTICAL REASONING, UNDERTAKEN DURING THE

STAGE OF GENERATION AND BEFORE.⁶⁸ It is within the context of an ascertainment of emptiness that a yogi concentrates on the physical and psychic centers although during the actual session itself he desists from applying his mind to analytical reasoning. Still, analytical meditation of a different type is required in order to generate a sharpness and brightness of concentration,⁶⁹ in dependence on which the winds are gathered, thereby generating through meditation the same subtle minds that are actualized powerlessly and without benefit at death. The deepest and subtlest of these minds and the wind that is its mount are the actual substances that develop into a Buddha's mind and body.⁷⁰ Though it may be possible without the view of emptiness to actualize some of these subtle consciousnesses, it is impossible without the view of emptiness to actualize the most subtle.⁷¹

As the tutor of the Eighth Dalai Lama, Ye-shay-gyel-tsen (Ye-shesrgyal-mtshan) reports:⁷²

~ It is said that this profound view of the middle way is the life of both the sutra and tantra paths. Also, it is said that particularly with respect to Highest Secret Mantra there is no chance of having an actual path of Mantra without this view.

L2: [11. Buddhahood [the Buddha kayas] :L2

Sources:

- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings

On the path Bodhisattvas familiarize themselves in innumerable ways with the six perfections.⁷³ They develop limitless wishes and dedications, and they experience in myriad forms the joys of the wisdom that cognizes the profound suchness of all phenomena in the manner of a fusion of subject and object. Whether following the sutra or tantra path, the Bodhisattva's base is the same: the aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings. The deeds are, in general, also the same: the six perfections. In the sutra systems a limitless variety of these deeds is prescribed whereas in tantra an additional method, yoga of the union of the profound and the manifest, is used to empower the mind to combat the obstructions to omniscience. The effect of these paths is the attainment of a

Buddha's Form Body and Truth Body which are the fulfilment of the aims of both oneself and others.

The uninterrupted path at the end of the tenth ground is called the end of the continuum as a sentient being because although a Buddha is sentient, he does not have a mind that has obstructions yet to be eliminated. The uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum of a sentient being is the antidote to the very subtle obstructions to omniscience; it cognizes the suchness of all phenomena in the manner of being of one taste with suchness. Like fresh water poured into fresh water, there is no distinction experienced between the wisdom consciousness and emptiness. Still, it has the potentialities that will make possible, immediately afterwards, the instantaneous appearance of the inconceivable qualities of a Buddha.

WHILE THE YOGI IS IN DEEP CONTEMPLATION ON EMPTINESS ONLY, HE PASSES INTO A CONDITION

WHEREIN, SIMULTANEOUS WITH CONTINUOUS DIRECT COGNITION OF EMPTINESS, ALL THE PHENOMENA THAT

ARE QUALIFIED BY EMPTINESS APPEAR TO HIM. He passes to the final path of release, and while in a meditative equipoise in which there is not the slightest interference of duality, this same consciousness directly cognizes all the many varieties of objects of knowledge as clearly as one sees an olive in the palm of one's hand. Since the potencies of mistaken dualistic appearance have been eradicated, the yogi attains the divine eye that has no impediments with respect to objects of knowledge and is not impeded from seeing one object by seeing another. He has exhaustively eliminated the obstructions to omniscience, has actualized the limit of reality, has actualized the Truth Body, and has become thoroughly and completely enlightened with respect to all phenomena.

THE BODIES OF A BUDDHA are variously enumerated as one, two, three, four, or five.⁷⁴ These are more extensive or condensed forms of each other and thus do not indicate a difference of meaning.

-- One: Truth Body

-- Two: Truth Body and Form Body

-- Three: Truth Body, Enjoyment Body, and Emanation Body (the last two being included within Form Body above)

-- Four: Nature Body, Wisdom Body, Enjoyment Body, and Emanation Body (the first two being included within Truth Body above)

-- Five: Nature Body, Wisdom Body, Actual Enjoyment Body, Imputed Enjoyment Body (such as the body of a tenth ground Bodhisattva), and Emanation Body (the middle two being included within Enjoyment Body above).

When the wisdom of meditative equipoise at the end of a yogi's continuum as a sentient being (that is, his uninterrupted path consciousness directly cognizing emptiness) becomes the final path of release, this wisdom of meditative equipoise itself becomes the Wisdom Body, a composite in one entity of both meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment. This means that all phenomena, emptinesses and conventionalities, are directly cognized all of the time. The emptiness of this final uninterrupted path becomes the Nature Body, the absence of all obstructions in the continuum of a Buddha.

The Truth Body is so called because its two parts, the Nature Body and the Wisdom Body, are respectively the ultimate true cessation and the ultimate true path.⁷⁵ A Nature Body is of two types, a naturally pure Nature Body which is the absence from beginningless time of

inherent existence in the pure sphere of Buddhahood, and an adventitiously pure Nature Body which is the absence in the pure sphere of Buddhahood of the adventitious stains—the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience—through the application of their antidotes. Both are non-products and mere absences, but only the first is called a non-product because it lacks production, duration, and disintegration and lacks a beginning, middle, and end. The second type of Nature Body is called 'spontaneous' because the aspect of having utterly eliminated the subtle motivational effort that initiates deeds of body and speech allows for the spontaneity of the Enjoyment and Emanation Bodies.

Both aspects of the Nature Body are emptinesses which are the absence of inherent existence of a Buddha's omniscient mind; the naturally pure Nature Body is an emptiness from the point of view that the mind is always naturally free of inherent existence. The adventitiously pure Nature Body is this emptiness from the viewpoint of its being a quality of a mind that has been cleansed of all contaminations. Thus, both Nature Bodies are emptinesses and ultimate truths.

The Nature Body is said to have five qualities:

- non-production, because of having no production, duration, or disintegration and no beginning, middle, or end
- non-difference, because of being undifferentiable from the final nature of phenomena in terms of not being a different entity from phenomena
- non-perversity, because it has not fallen to the two extremes of reification of what does not exist and denial of what does exist
- purity, because of being free of the afflictive obstructions, the obstructions to omniscience, and the obstructions to meditative absorption
- clear light, because the stains do not inherently exist, because it is not fully cognizable by the intellect, and because it is an object of perception by yogis in individual meditative equipoise.

The Nature Body is vast because it is not knowable as being limited to any measure. It is innumerable because it surpasses the number of sands of the Ganges. It is unthinkable because it cannot be conceived as any of the four alternatives. It is unequal because one who has actualized it is unequal with all who have not. It is completely pure because the defects of the afflictions and their predispositions have been completely abandoned.

The Wisdom Body is the final, perfect wisdom. It is called the wisdom cognizing the mode of existence of phenomena in the sense that it perceives all emptinesses. It is called the wisdom cognizing the varieties of phenomena in the sense that it also perceives all conventionalities. In brief, the Wisdom Body is a Buddha's omniscient consciousness; his eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses are each omniscient. Thus, a single moment of any consciousness cognizes all phenomena; his eye consciousness perceives not just colors and shapes, but also sounds, odors, and so forth, including the emptiness of each phenomenon perceived. A Wisdom Body is everywhere because a Buddha's wisdom consciousness cognizes the emptiness of everything non-dualistically.

When a Bodhisattva arrives at the end of the continuum of being a sentient being, his body ornamented with a similitude of the major and minor marks of a Buddha becomes a Buddha's Enjoyment Body. Through the power of former wishes and without any intellection, various Emanation Bodies are issued from the Enjoyment Body, appearing simultaneously in countless lands throughout the ten directions and aiding sentient beings in accordance with their interests, dispositions, and beliefs. One does not first become a Buddha and then think

about what needs to be done; one responds immediately and without thought or effort to the needs of all sentient beings. The Enjoyment Body and Emanation Bodies are achieved simultaneously because (1) both are fruits of training in the equality of cyclic existence and peace; (2) both are fruits of training to produce pure lands for Enjoyment and Emanation Bodies in order to provide bases for sentient beings to gain enlightenment; and (3) both are fruits of training in wisdom and method such that at the time of highest enlightenment there are no obstructions with respect to the perfection of all qualities.

An Enjoyment Body abides in a Highest Pure Land (Akanishta). Highest Pure Lands are above the seventeen types of lands in the Form Realm and thus are called 'Highest' (literally, 'not below'). Each Buddha has his own Highest Pure Land produced by his limitless collections of merit and wisdom and as vast as space; it is achieved from a portion of his wisdom and is not composed of particles of matter.

An Enjoyment Body is said to have five qualities:

- An Enjoyment Body is impermanent, but it continuously displays the same type of body ornamented with the major and minor marks of a Buddha; therefore, it is immortal.
- An Enjoyment Body continuously speaks the same type of doctrine, the Mahayana, and thus is a Body that enjoys or uses the Mahayana doctrine as opposed to the Emanation Bodies which abide in Pure Lands and preach both Hinayana and Mahayana.
- An Enjoyment Body continuously displays the activities that arise from wisdom and compassion.
- These activities of body, speech, and mind are performed without effort.
- Though an Enjoyment Body does not exist as many different personal continuums, it displays many Emanation Bodies.

It is said that even though the displayer of Emanation Bodies is an Enjoyment Body, Emanation Bodies are not Enjoyment Bodies but are of the same continuum as an Enjoyment Body.

Through the force of compassion and wishes over countless eons the ultimate wisdom itself appears in the aspect of a body. Each of the parts of the body directly cognizes all phenomena and proclaims inconceivable intonations of doctrine; mind and body are no longer separate phenomena. Not only is the Enjoyment Body an appearance of the wisdom consciousness itself, but also the pure numberless phenomena that a Buddha cognizes from his own point of view are the entity of this wisdom itself. In dependence on others, a Buddha also perceives impure phenomena which have as their final cause afflicted ignorance (the conception that phenomena inherently exist) and non-afflicted ignorance (the appearance of these phenomena as if inherently existent).

Based on the accumulation of inconceivable merit for untellable eons and based on repeated, inconceivable, powerful wishes while a Bodhisattva, an Enjoyment Body continuously displays countless Emanation Bodies that appear in accordance with the dispositions of beings and act for the sake of furthering their aims of attaining high status as humans and as gods and attaining the definite goodness of liberation and omniscience. Spontaneously and without thought a Buddha, like a wish-granting jewel, achieves the aims of beings but does not stir for an instant from the sphere of the final nature of phenomena.

There are three main types of Emanation Bodies:

- artisans, such as a guitarist, goldsmith, or scribe
- constructions, such as a tree or a deer

-- supreme beings, who display the twelve activities of a Bodhisattva who becomes a Buddha.

Responding to sentient beings' needs throughout time and space, Emanation Bodies appear, perform their task without effort, and are withdrawn. A sentient being's noticing or not noticing them as such depends on his fortune which is formed through the potencies established on the mind by his virtuous and non-virtuous deeds. As long as space exists, the various activities of a Buddha, arising from great compassion, come into existence spontaneously and continuously.

L1: [PRESENTATION OF THE TWO TRUTHS: EMPTINESS (part 2) AND THE CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS (part 3)] :L1

L1: [PART II — REASONING INTO REALITY -- Details about the Five Reasonings proving the Emptiness of all dharmas] :L1

L2: [o. Introduction [The two selflessnesses & the two sets of reasonings] :L2

Sources:

- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
- Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.636-8

Phenomena are divided into persons and phenomena, with the latter 'phenomena' meaning 'phenomena other than persons'.⁷⁶ Objects are so divided because adherence to the inherent existence of persons and adherence to the inherent existence of other internal phenomena, such as the body, are the two principal binders of beings in cyclic existence. Persons are enjoyers or users, and other phenomena are the enjoyed or the used.

The non-inherent existence of persons is the personal selflessness (pudgalanairatmya), and the non-inherent existence of other phenomena, such as mind, body, hand, house, and mountain, is the selflessness of other phenomena (dharmanairatmya). THE TWO SELFLESSNESSES—of persons and of other phenomena are not divided by way of different objects of negation—different interpretations of 'self—but by way of classes of objects that are the bases of the quality of non-inherent existence.

The Mahayana schools other than Prasangika do not divide the two selflessnesses this way. FOR THE CHITTAMATRINS AND SVATANTRIKAS, the selflessness of phenomena (non-difference of entity of object and subject for the Chittamatrins and non-true existence for the Svatantrikas) applies to all phenomena including persons. For them, the selflessness of phenomena is subtler than the selflessness of persons, and thus the personal selflessness can be realized without realizing the subtler selflessness of phenomena. They assert a difference of intelligence between Hearers, who meditate mainly on the personal selflessness, and Bodhisattvas, who meditate on the subtler selflessness of phenomena.

FOR THE PRASANGIKAS, the two selflessnesses are equally subtle and an inferential realization of one yields an ability to realize the other. Furthermore, when emptiness is

directly cognized, all emptinesses are directly cognized, and, therefore, even Hearers and Solitary Realizers on the path of seeing cognize the subtle emptiness of all phenomena directly.⁷⁷ Still, Bodhisattvas are said to be more intelligent than Hearers in the sense that they approach emptiness from many and various points of view, as in the twenty-seven chapters of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way, instead of through only one or two.⁷⁸

There is a question as to whether the selflessness of persons in the Chittamatra and Svatantrika systems applies only to persons or to all phenomena.⁷⁹ This selflessness is the non-existence of a self-sufficient person, and some say that to speak of a 'person' with respect to a phenomenon such as a house is absurd. They say that the personal selflessness of phenomena other than persons refers to their not being objects of use of a self-sufficient person. Others say that phenomena other than persons do not have a self-sufficient entity separate from their parts and that this is their personal selflessness. Still others say that a meditator realizes the non-existence of a self-sufficient person with respect to the mental and physical aggregates, and then by extension realizes that other external phenomena are not a self-sufficient person. In any case, for the Chittamatrins and Svatantrikas, meditation on the personal selflessness is mainly based on the person but can be extended to a person's relationship with external phenomena. Meditation on external objects as not being objects of use of a self-sufficient person is said to be very helpful in breaking the web of relationships that support and nourish the conception of a self-sufficient person.

In the Chittamatra and Svatantrika systems the two selflessnesses differ in degree of subtlety; therefore, these systems have separate sets of reasonings to prove the different types of selflessness. The two selflessnesses in the Prasangika system do not differ in subtlety, but the Prasangikas still use separate sets of reasonings. The self of phenomena is refuted by the diamond slivers, refutation of production of the four extremes, and refutation of production of the four alternatives. The reasoning of dependent-arising refutes the self of both persons and other phenomena. The self of persons is refuted by the five-cornered and seven-cornered sets of reasonings.

THE TWO SETS OF REASONINGS ARE DIVIDED NOT BECAUSE THEY EXCLUSIVELY PROVE EITHER PERSONS OR OTHER PHENOMENA TO BE SELFLESS BUT BECAUSE THE VARIOUS MADHYAMIKA MASTERS HAVE MAINLY USED THEM THIS WAY.⁸⁰ A student is advised to apply the five-cornered and seven-cornered reasonings to all phenomena, and the three sets of reasonings that examine production can also be applied to persons.

L2: [1. THE DIAMOND SLIVERS (reasoning #1 : Analysing where the effect / product come from; refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity – nothing exist and change)] :L2

Sources:

- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings
- Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations and Illumination of the Thought
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.639-50
- [See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]
- [See also "Emptiness Yoga", Chapter 10-12 on the Diamond fragments]

Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way begins with an analysis of production that mainly refutes the inherent existence of products other than persons.⁸¹ In the Treatise and in Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' the diamond slivers are the main means for approaching the absence of true production.

It is said that through understanding this absence of true production it is easy to understand the other nine of the ten samenesses of phenomena. Realization of the ten samenesses is explained in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhūmika) as the means by which a fifth ground Bodhisattva proceeds to the sixth ground.

THE TEN SAMENESSES ARE:

- sameness of all phenomena as signless, or the sameness of all phenomena in the absence of signs such as white, red, and so on for a consciousness in meditative equipoise on the nature of phenomena
- sameness of all phenomena as natureless, or as free from being established by way of their own nature
- sameness of all phenomena as productionless, or as free from naturally existent production in the future
- sameness of all phenomena as non-produced, or the sameness of all past and present phenomena as free from naturally existent production and cessation
- sameness of all phenomena as vacuous, or the sameness of things yet to be produced and things already produced as void or empty of natural existence
- sameness of all phenomena as pure from the start, or as purified of natural existence, not through scripture and reasoning, but from the start
- sameness of all phenomena as free from the elaborations of thought, or as free from the elaborations of dualistic perception for a consciousness in meditative equipoise on the nature of phenomena
- sameness of all phenomena in being ultimately non-adopted and non-discarded (as in the case of adopting virtues and discarding non-virtues)
- sameness of all phenomena in being like a magician's illusions, dreams, shadows, echoes, moons in the water, reflections, and emanations, or in being empty of inherent existence as illustrated by these seven examples
- sameness of all phenomena in not having the duality of things (bhava) and non-things (abhava), or the sameness of products in not inherently being things and of non-products in not inherently being non-things.

The seventh is an attribute of the first; the third, fourth, and fifth are attributes of the second; and the rest are attributes of both the first and the second.

Nagarjuna chose to explain the sameness of non-production because through it the other samenesses are easily understood.

The main means that he chose to establish non-true production is the diamond slivers.

L3: [Statement of the reasons] :L3

¢[From Part I.: The object of negation: This step is the same as in the last two meditations. The appearance of a body covering the limbs and trunk is mixed with the appearance of the limbs and trunk and yet appears to exist in itself, to exist concretely.
¢-- Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason : Whatever is not produced from self, from inherently existent others, from both, or causelessly is not inherently produced because inherent production is limited to these four possibilities.
¢-- Production is either caused or uncaused; and, if caused, the only possibilities are that the causes are the same entity as the effect, or a different entity from the effect, or both.]

The diamond slivers are so called because each is a powerful means of destroying the conception of inherent existence.⁸²

The reasoning is composed of a thesis:

:: The subjects, things, are not inherently produced.

And a four-cornered proof:

:: Because of not being produced from themselves, from
:: naturally existent others, from both, or causelessly.

These four reasons are themselves each theses which are NON-AFFIRMING NEGATIVES. They do not imply anything positive in their place, such as the existence of no production from self.

STILL, THEY DO IMPLY ANOTHER NON-AFFIRMING NEGATIVE—THAT THINGS ARE NOT INHERENTLY

PRODUCED—because although non-affirming negatives lack positive implications, they can imply other non-affirming negatives of the same type. The reasoning which proves that things are not inherently produced does not establish that things are nominally or conventionally produced. The diamond slivers are non-affirming negatives, and just the absence of inherently existent production, not the presence of nominal production, is realized when inferring or directly cognizing the emptiness of production. THE FOUR NEGATIVE THESES DO SERVE AS PROOFS OF ANOTHER THESIS—THAT THINGS ARE NOT INHERENTLY PRODUCED—and thus their

import can be stated syllogistically, as above. The reason why no more than four negative theses are needed to prove that things are not inherently produced is that the four are refutations of all possibilities of true production. Production is either caused or uncaused. If caused, the cause and the effect are either the same entity, different entities, or both the same and different. Thus, the possibilities for inherently existent production, or production that can be found under analysis, are ONLY FOUR: production of an effect that is of the same entity as the cause, production of an effect that is a different entity from the cause, production of an effect that is both the same entity and a different entity from the cause, and causeless production. Because the possibilities of inherently existent production can be limited, when all possibilities have been refuted, inherently existent production has been perforce refuted, and the thesis of no inherently existent production can be realized. If the possibilities could not be limited, one would be forever waiting in a state of doubt for new possibilities, and the thesis could never be realized. Therefore, it is an important step in meditation to investigate and decide firmly, based on

the above reasoning, that the possibilities have been limited to those stated and that if those can be refuted, the thesis will be proved.

¶[Jang-ya says: The reason why, if there were inherently existent production, it would necessarily be one of the four extreme types of production, is that it is certain that production is either caused or causeless, and if it is caused, it is limited to three types — production of an effect (1) that is the same entity as the causes, (2) that is a different entity from the causes, and (3) that is a composite of being the same entity as and a different entity from the causes. The Foremost Omniscient [Tsong Khapa's] saying this in both of his Great Explanations — of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way and Chandrakirti's Supplement — is a very important, good explanation of the great texts from his experience. However, it seems that most of those who write on the Middle Way School put this in a category of minor importance. In any case, they discuss it very briefly.]

Since production from imputedly existent others is the only existent type of production, when production from other is refuted under analysis, this alone establishes that things lack inherent existence. Still, it is necessary to examine the problem of production from the viewpoints of other philosophical systems, all of which can be included into these four modes. If three of these modes of production do not stand a chance conventionally, they could not possibly withstand ultimate analysis; however, persons and systems must be approached on their own grounds, and, therefore, all four positions are attacked.

A MEDITATOR SEEKS TO GENERATE A CONSCIOUSNESS REALIZING THAT THERE IS NO INHERENTLY EXISTENT

PRODUCTION, and, thus, refutations are not stated aimlessly. The generation of an inferential cognizer (anumanapramana, rjes dpag tshad ma) depends on the establishment of the reasons and the fact that the predicate of the thesis, the absence of inherently existent production, FOLLOWS FROM THESE REASONS.

Still, the presence of THE REASONS (NON-PRODUCTION FROM SELF AND SO FORTH) in the subject

(things), the pervasion of the reasons by the predicate of the thesis (not being inherently produced), and the counter-pervasion do not have to be proved in the manner of the logicians through syllogisms.

The Prasangikas' main means for generating an inferential consciousness is to state unwanted consequences of the four possibilities and thereby generate in an intelligent person a consciousness inferring the thesis that there is no inherently existent production.

The Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Svatantrikas say that one must first state unwanted consequences in order to break the pointedness or vibrance of the opponent's adherence to his own view but that the consequences must be followed by a syllogistic statement. (The Vaibhashikas are omitted here because of lack of information regarding their positions.)

Although the Prasangikas do not accept the need for this, Jam-yang-shay-ba does use the syllogistic mode to present the thesis and the four reasons for the sake of ease in explanation (see p.640 – Section VI on this reasoning).

:: [Because production from self,
:: Other, both, or causelessly
:: Does not exist, inherently
:: Existent production does not exist.]

~ [The subjects, things which have production, have no inherently existent production because there is no production of them from themselves, from [inherently existent] others, from both, or causelessly—as in the case of a mirror image.]

He takes as his subject 'things which have production', a seemingly redundant phrase because, in the strict use of the word, 'things' (bhava) mean products.⁸³ The reason he qualifies 'things' with 'which have production' is that the Vaibhashikas say that permanent phenomena are 'things'. As his annotator, Nga-wang-bel-den, says, he wants to make sure that when he proves that things are not naturally produced, the Vaibhashikas will not say, 'You are proving the already proved because we agree that permanent things are not produced.' The Prasangikas are proving to the non-Buddhist schools and the other Buddhist schools that impermanent things are not inherently produced. Since the Svatantrikas assert that conventionally things are inherently produced, they are included in the opposition.

The thesis of no production from other is qualified as no production from naturally existent others because conventionally things are produced from causes that are other than themselves but do not naturally exist. (The remaining three possibilities do not require qualification because, unlike production from what is merely other, they do not exist even conventionally.) If the qualification were not given for production from other, then there would be no production at all, and this would deny the cause and effect of actions and result in an utter nihilism.

Still, some non-Gelugpa interpreters say that the qualification is unnecessary either because phenomena are unpredicable dependent-arising or because there is no need to present production in Madhyamika itself because the Madhyamikas have no system.

Tsong Khapa's position⁸⁴ is that the Madhyamikas obviously have a system; he explains that when Chandrakirti says that production from other does not exist either ultimately or conventionally, he means that production which can be found under analysis does not exist even conventionally. The meaning of 'naturally existent production' implies 'production which can be found under analysis', and thus the qualification is necessary in order to eliminate the mistake that mere production from causes that are other is being refuted. Chandrakirti in his Clear Words (Prasannapada) often predicates his refutations with 'under such analysis' lending credence to Tsong Khapa's view.⁸⁵

At issue is the best means of leading students—whom all accept as not knowing the difference between naturally existent production and production—to THE MADHYAMIKA REALIZATION OF NO

PRODUCTION WITHOUT UTTERLY DESTROYING THE POSSIBILITY OF ILLUSORY-LIKE PRODUCTION. The

criticism of Tsong Khapa seems mainly based on the feeling that the qualification of production from other with 'naturally existent' would keep students from realizing the startling import of the Madhyamika sense of no production. Many non-Gelugpas seem to feel that the brilliant philosophical subtlety of Tsong Khapa's view is beyond comprehension and thus obscures the path. However, Tsong Khapa himself says⁸⁶ that beings who have not entered the Madhyamika view cannot discriminate between conventional existence and inherent existence; thus, his affirmation of the valid establishment of conventional existence should not be taken as confirming the common ignorant misconceptions of the nature of existence. The meaning of conventional or imputed existence must be sought as something new; otherwise, the very reason for Tsong Khapa's subtle presentation of cause and effect and so forth in the Madhyamika system will be lost. He calls his followers to realize that even

conventionally the validly established phenomena of the world are not their bases of designation. (i.e. See Part V – Chapter 7 “Validation of phenomena” for more on this Gelugpa’s adapted skillful means.)

L3: [Non-production FROM SELF [cause & effect CANNOT BE THE SAME] :L3

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

[See also “Emptiness Yoga”, Chapter 10 – Can something give birth to itself?]

¢(i.e. From other texts & résumés: Production from self means: the essence of the effect is in (inside) the cause; there is continuity in change; the cause and the effect are the same / one; this is self-caused (internal causation), it is in its essence to become like that, and nothing else can change it;

¢-- that the cause and effect are identical, -- (i.e. like "internal")

¢-- Self-causation, is exemplified by the Vedic tradition of asserting the reality of the immutable Universal Soul, atman. Briefly, this declares all effects to be inherent in their cause, which cause is in every case some form of the eternal atman. A problem with self-causation is that the effect must be inherent in the cause. If so, then nothing new has occurred or come to be.

¢-- 'From themselves' means from their essential nature, and entities do not arise from their own essential natures because: (i) such an origination would be quite pointless, and (ii) it would lead to an infinite regress. If entities already essentially (inherently) exist there is no need to produce them, and if an already essentially existing entity is produced then it is not possible that it should ever be the case that it is not being produced. Thus origination does not occur from the entities themselves. -- This last point requires a little explanation. In Buddhist thought generally something is a cause because it produces its effect - if the cause is present then it does indeed bring about its result. If x causes itself then, having caused itself, x would be present again. Since x is the cause as well as the effect so, being present again, it produces the effect - itself - again. And so on, ad infinitum.

¢-- The position that maintains that cause and effect are identical was advocated by the Sankhya system, one of the classical systems of Indian philosophy.

¢-- The Madhyamaka refutes these four explanations of origination by means of a very typical Madhyamaka method that has drawn the attention of many scholars both in the East and the West. This method is called the method of *reductio ad absurdum*, and it is a kind of negative dialectic that exposes the inherent contradictions and absurdities in the opponent's position. Let us try to illustrate how this method of argumentation works. Take the first alternative, which affirms the identity of cause and effect. The Madhyamaka says that, if in fact cause and effect are identical, then having bought cottonseed with the price one would pay for cloth, one ought to be able to clothe oneself with it. The idea that cause and effect are identical thus leads to absurdity. If cause and effect are identical, then there would be no difference between father and son, and also no difference between food and excrement.)

¢[From Part I: Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject :

¢-- The body is not produced from self (from what is the same entity as itself)

¢-- (a) because, if it were, its production would be senseless and endless,

¢-- (b) because what already exists in something is not produced from that something,

¢-- (c) because it would contradict what the world manifestly sees, and

¢-- (d) because the producer and the produced would be one.]

The refutation of production of something from self, or from its own entity, is done through
DEMONSTRATING THE CONSEQUENT ABSURDITY OF SENSELESS PRODUCTION:87

~ The production again of a sprout is senseless because of having already achieved its own entity. Since the production of a thing means the attainment of its own entity, then if once having achieved its own entity, it is produced again, its re-production is purposeless.

The opponent answers:

~ Having already attained its own entity and needing production are not contradictory.

His thought is that a sprout, for instance, has attained its own entity in its unmanifest state (in its causes) but still requires production in the sense of manifestation.

This is refuted by THE ABSURDITY OF ENDLESS PRODUCTION:

~ If so, then sprouts, and so forth would be produced again and again because though they have achieved their own entity, they must be produced.

The opponent might answer:

~ That which exists non-manifestly as a potential entity must be produced manifestly, but once it has been manifested, it need not be produced. Therefore, both the former and latter consequences do not follow from the reasons given.

The Samkhyas cannot extricate themselves from error this way, for if a manifestation exists from the start, it need not be produced. Also, if a manifestation were reproduced, then its production would be endless. Thus, the fallacies remain. If a manifestation did not exist from the start, one has let fall the position that only what exists formerly in the cause is produced.

Since the already produced—that which has already achieved its own entity—must be produced again, there would be no opportunity for the production of effects, such as sprouts, because the causes, seeds, would be produced endlessly. There is no point in something's being produced from itself.

A Samkhya might respond:

~ The natures of both the seed and the sprout are a partless one, but the transformations as seed and sprout are different. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the transformations, the seed disintegrates and the sprout is produced. It is not asserted that a sprout is produced from a sprout. So, there is no fallacy.

A Madhyamika answers:

~ It follows that a sprout would not cause its seed to disintegrate because the natures of the seed and the sprout are one. For example, a sprout cannot cause a sprout to disintegrate.

Though the Samkhya himself does not assert that a sprout is produced from a sprout, his position that the natures of both the seed and the sprout are a partless one forces him to accept THE ABSURDITY THAT THE APPEARANCE OF A SPROUT COULD NOT CAUSE THE DISINTEGRATION OF ITS SEED BECAUSE THEY ARE A PARTLESS ONE.

Furthermore, there is a refutation of the oneness of the natures of the seed and the sprout:

~ It follows that a seed and its sprout would not have different shape, color, taste, powers, and fruition because the natures of the seed and its sprout are one in all respects.

A Samkhya might respond:

~ The natures of the seed and its sprout are one, but their states are different; therefore, the state of the seed is abandoned when the state of the sprout is assumed.

Answer:

~ It follows that the nature of a seed is not the nature of its sprout because when the phenomenon of the state of the seed is done away with, there is the phenomenon of the state of a sprout. It so follows because the phenomenon of the state of the seed is the phenomenon of the seed and there is no phenomenon of the seed other than the entity of the seed.

Further, there is AN UNWANTED CONSEQUENCE OF THE MUTUALITY OF APPREHENSION OF BOTH SEED AND SPROUT IN EACH STATE:

~ Just as during the state of the sprout the seed is not apprehendable by a sense consciousness, so it follows that the sprout would be non-apprehendable.

Further:

~ Just as during the state of the sprout the sprout is apprehendable by a sense consciousness, so it follows that the seed would also be apprehendable. For, the entity of the seed and the entity of the sprout are one in all respects.

BECAUSE THESE CONSEQUENCES CANNOT BE ACCEPTED, ONE SHOULD NOT ASSERT THAT THE NATURES OF THE SEED AND THE SPROUT ARE ONE.

All Buddhist schools except VAIBHASHIKA (i.e. one of the two Hinayana schools – the Abhidharmists – see Part IV – Chapter 3) accept that in general an existent is produced and that what is non-existent prior to its production is produced or attains an existent entity.⁸⁸ Vaibhashika is omitted because this school asserts that at the time of the seed the future of the sprout exists and that at the time of the sprout the past of the seed exists and, for them, the future of the sprout is a sprout and the past of the seed is a seed. Their view is that things cannot be produced from what does not exist earlier because of the unwanted consequence that production would be adventitious and causeless. Therefore, they assert that an effect exists at the time of its future, which occurs previous to the aggregation of its causes and conditions. The aggregation of its causes and conditions produces the sprout at the time of its present. Thereby, the entity abides before and after its production.

All other Buddhist schools—Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Madhyamika—consider Vaibhashika to be almost like SAMKHYA (i.e. one of the non-buddhist schools – the Enumerators – see Part IV – Chapter 2) on this point. All Buddhist schools except Vaibhashika say that at the time of the seed the sprout is the seed; at that time, the sprout is not a sprout; the sprout does not then exist.⁸⁹ The horns of a rabbit⁹⁰ (an example of an utter non-existent) also do not exist at that time, but the difference between the horns of a rabbit and a sprout is that at the time of its seed a sprout abides as the entity of a seed even though it is non-existent.

If the sprout were existent, it could not abide as the entity of its seed because it would be a sprout. The Samkhya view is that only the existent can be produced; thus, the Buddhist sense that effects abide as the entity of causes but are non-existent at the time of their causes differs greatly. Just as the yogurt in a bowl is not produced from the bowl, so that which already exists in something is not produced from that something.

L3: [Non-production FROM OTHER [cause & effect CANNOT BE DIFFERENT / UNRELATED; nor simultaneous or separate in time; no continuity, no discontinuity] :L3

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

[See also "Emptiness Yoga", Chapter 11 – Does a plant grow?]

¢(i.e. Production from other means: the essence of the effect comes from outside of the cause; there is discontinuity in change; the cause and the effect are different / two; this is other-caused (external causation), things become something else through the power of something external / other;

¢-- that the cause and effect are different, -- (i.e. like "external")

¢-- Other- or external-causation declares all change to be produced by some form of a deus ex machina, such as God, fate, or a deterministic self-nature. A problem with other-causation is that if cause and effect are different then the relation is lost, and, for example, fire could be produced from water.

¢-- Buddhapalita continues: 'Nor could it occur from another entity, because it would follow quite logically that everything could arise from everything else.' Entities are not produced by inherently existent, independently real, others. If x produced y, and they are inherently distinct entities, then we have no actual explanation of causation, since x is equally inherently distinct from z. If we call y the effect of x, equally z would be the effect of x, since in both cases the putative cause and effect are inherently quite distinct.

¢-- The position according to which cause and effect are different was propounded by the Hinayana schools of Buddhism, the Vaibhashikas and the Sautrantikas, and by some of the Brahmanical schools.

¢-- In the case of the second alternative -- that cause and effect are different -- anything could originate from anything else, because all phenomena are equally different. Hence a stalk of rice might just as easily originate from a piece of coal as from a grain of rice, for there would be no connection between a stalk of rice and a grain of rice, and a piece of coal and a grain of rice would have the same relationship of difference to a stalk of rice. Thus the notion that cause and effect are absolutely different is an intrinsically absurd idea)

¢[From Part I: Establishing the presence of the second reason in the subject : The body is not produced from causes which are inherently existent others because if it were, the body could be produced from anything that was other than it. For, inherently existent others are non-related others since otherness is their nature.

¢-- The body is not produced from causes which are inherently existent others because the body and its causes are not inherently existent others since the body does not exist simultaneously with its causes. For instance, the body at age ten does not exist simultaneously with the body at age five which is a cause of it. However, if cause and effect were inherently other, the body that is approaching production would have to exist at the time of the activity of its approaching production because this activity depends on it.

¢-- Also, for causes, such as the parents or the body of an earlier age, to be causes of the

present body which are inherently other than it, the causes would still have to exist because it is in relation to the causes that the body is other. How can a thing be inherently other than a thing that does not exist?]

L5: [Three ways of refuting production from other] :L5

There are three ways of refuting production of effects from causes that are inherently other than those effects:⁹¹

- refuting both inherently existent otherness and inherently existent production
- refuting inherently existent production
- refuting inherently existent otherness.

L6: [i] Refuting both inherently existent otherness and inherently existent production [cause & effect cannot be different / unrelated otherwise anything would produce anything else] :L6

It follows that thick darkness arises from a tongue of flame and that any effect arises from what are commonly considered to be its causes or non-causes because inherently other effects arise in dependence on inherently other causes.

If causes and effects were inherently existent others, then they would not be dependently existent others but would be non-related others. If an effect were produced from a cause that is an unrelated other, IT IS THE SAME AS ALLOWING THAT IT COULD BE PRODUCED FROM EVERYTHING THAT IS CONVENTIONALLY CONSIDERED NOT TO BE ITS CAUSES BECAUSE THEY ARE EQUALLY OTHER THAN THE EFFECT. In the same way, if a cause produced an effect that is an unrelated other, it is the same as allowing that a cause could also produce any entity, such as a lamp's producing darkness.

A proponent of production from other might object:

~ This consequence does not apply; though cause and effect are inherently other, an effect which a cause is able to produce is the effect of that cause, and a cause which is able to produce that effect is the cause of that effect. A sprout of rice is not produced from a barley seed and is not produced from its non-producers, such as the future moments of its own continuum. A sprout of rice is produced from that which is included in its same continuum and from producers that are prior to it. Therefore, everything is not produced from everything.

Answer:

~ This is not correct; once cause and effect are inherently other, this otherness must be their mode of being. Once otherness is their mode of being, they must be utterly non-related. Thus, it is not possible for a rice seed and a barley seed to be different with respect to whether they can produce a shoot of rice or not because they both are inherently other than a rice shoot.

Further:

~ A seed is not inherently other than a sprout because a seed has no inherently existent otherness. It so follows because if a seed were inherently other than its sprout, then it could not be a dependent existent or nominal other. It would necessarily have a separate entity of otherness such as is mistakenly propounded by the Vaisesikas.

Further:

~ A seed and its sprout are not inherently other because a sprout does not exist simultaneously with its seed. It so follows because if they existed inherently, they would neither depend on nor be affected by anything. They would never disappear, and thus the sprout would have to exist even at the time of the seed. However, they do not exist simultaneously because without a transformation of the seed there is no production of a sprout. Thus, a seed and its sprout are not inherently other, and production of a sprout from a seed does not exist inherently. For this reason, one should forsake the thesis that things are produced from inherently existent others.

L6: [ii) Refuting inherently existent production [the junction is unexplainable: cause & effect cannot be simultaneous or separate in time] :L6

If the entities of the phenomena that are effects, such as sprouts, do not exist in their causes either collectively or individually or as things other than their causes, then the entities of the effects to be produced do not exist prior to their production. If so, how could production from other exist?

An effect would have to exist prior to its production if production existed inherently. Once production is accepted, the cause's approaching cessation and the effect's approaching production are simultaneous, as it is even in the Prasangika's own presentation of conventionally existent production.⁹² The activity of approaching production depends on the effect because it is the effect that is approaching production. If production were findable under analysis, then, whenever the activity of approaching production existed, the base of this activity, the sprout, would have to exist. For, the two are in a relation of supported and supporter, and since this is their nature, it cannot change.

The activity of approaching production exists at the time of the cause's approaching cessation, and since the effect must exist along with its activity, the seed and the sprout would have to exist simultaneously. This is impossible because simultaneity would rule out that the one produced the other. If the sprout were already existent, what could a seed do to produce it?

Still, if a seed produces something, this something that is growing forth must exist, but if it already exists, how can it be said that the seed produces it?

If they do not exist simultaneously, how can it be said that production exists inherently? For, the activity of approaching production and that thing which is approaching production would have to exist simultaneously if production were findable. How could there be growing without the thing that is growing?

Someone might object:

~ It is seen that one end of a scale moves downward at the same time that the other end moves upward. Just as these activities exist simultaneously, the activities of approaching cessation and of approaching production exist simultaneously. Thereby, it is shown that seed and sprout exist simultaneously.

Answer:

~ Even if the activities of the rising and lowering of the two ends of a scale exist simultaneously, a seed and a sprout are not similar because they do not exist simultaneously, and, thus, their activities do not exist simultaneously. A sprout's state of

presently being produced is its approaching production; therefore, it does not exist at that time. A seed's present ceasing is its approaching cessation; even though the seed is existent, in the next moment it will not exist. Therefore, a sprout and its seed do not exist simultaneously and are not similar to the two ends of a scale.

Buddha used the example of the scale in the Rice Seedling Sutra (Shadlistamba) to show that these two actions exist simultaneously as dependent-arising, when there is no analysis, like a magician's illusions.

L6: [iii] Refuting inherently existent otherness [there is no continuity, no discontinuity]
:L6

If the effect's own entity does not exist at the time of the cause, then there is no referent in relation to which the causes could become 'other'. Thus, there is no phenomenon of otherness in seeds and so forth, and so no production from other.

Someone might try to avoid this fallacy by stating:

~ Though there is no inherently existent otherness in what does not exist simultaneously, since cause and effect . exist simultaneously and are other, there is production from other.

Answer:

~ What already exists has no need for production.

L5: [Errors concerning the refutation of production from other [but conventional production from other is valid because the other three are much less practical] :L5

Many interpreters of Madhyamika think that since two things that are other must exist simultaneously in order to be other and since cause and effect necessarily exist at different times, the production of an effect from a cause other than it is impossible.⁹³

Tsong Khapa rejects this interpretation of the Prasangika refutation of production from other because the very faults that are ascribed to others by the Prasangikas would apply to themselves. In other words, since the Prasangikas assert cause and effect conventionally, they must also assert that conventionally cause and effect exist at different times and that cause and effect are other. If the Prasangikas refuted all otherness in what do not exist simultaneously, it would be impossible for them to present cause and effect.

Therefore, the refutation of production from other refers not to other in general but to 'inherently existent other'. When this is refuted, mere analytically unfindable, conventional otherness of cause and effect is not refuted, and cause and effect can be presented without fault.

If analytically findable production from other existed, then an effect would have to exist at the time of its causes in order for its causes to be other than it, and since cause and effect are necessarily serial, analytically findable otherness cannot obtain between them. Thus, Tsong Khapa objects to other interpreters' failure to delineate inherently existent otherness as the object of refutation.

It is necessary to present the reasoning that refutes inherently existent production in such a way that it does not harm one's own presentation of conventional phenomena. For instance, it is said that the action of approaching production can exist conventionally without the

existence of the sprout that is approaching production, much the same as a seed and a sprout do not exist simultaneously even though they are related.⁹⁴ Conventionally, a seed is the source or object related to and its sprout is the relater; however, both do not have to exist simultaneously within the context of analytically unfindable nominalities. It is necessary to distinguish between what constitutes ultimate analysis and what constitutes conventional analysis. Making complicated distinctions does not necessarily constitute ultimate analysis. Here, ultimate analysis is a searching for an otherness that can bear analysis, such as investigating whether the something in relation to which a thing is called 'other' is present or not.

Seeing all analysis as ultimate analysis, many interpreters of Prasangika say that the Madhyamikas themselves have no presentation of cause and effect; thus, they think that it is not necessary to qualify production from other with 'inherently existent'. For Tsong Khapa, production exists conventionally and validly, and production from the merely other must be accepted because the remaining three possibilities—self, both, and causelessly— are absurd. Therefore, the refutation of production from other must be qualified as 'PRODUCTION FROM INHERENTLY EXISTENT OTHER'. From his viewpoint many Madhyamika interpreters have overextended the scope of Nagarjuna's refutations.

L7: [More about the Gelug's validation of conventional production from other] :L7

It is a cardinal point in the systems of interpreters of Prasangika who do not accept valid establishment that Prasangikas assert nothing themselves but use only the inner contradictions of others' assertions to refute them. Thus, some Tibetan scholars say that Prasangikas hold that a reason is not validly established for both parties in a debate because the stater would not know what was validly established for his opponent since he would not know the other's mind either through direct perception or inference. They add that he himself would not know what was validly established because even when one has 'decided' that something is validly established, error is possible.

Tsong Khapa answers that if such an interpretation of Prasangika were true, then Prasangikas could not refute others from the point of view of others' own assertions because they would not know what the others actually asserted since they would not know others' minds. They could not state refutations of others because even though they had 'decided' that something is a refutation, it is possible to be mistaken.

These same interpreters of Prasangika say that pervasion of a reason by a predicate cannot be validly established because through direct perception one only realizes, for instance, that the existence of fire pervades the existence of smoke in a specific place, such as a kitchen. One does not realize that the existence of fire pervades the instances of smoke in all places and at all times. They say that an inferring consciousness cannot realize the pervasion because it would have to cognize all phenomena in order to certify that all instances of smoke in all places and all times are pervaded by the existence of fire. Therefore, they say that there is no valid establishment of the pervasion of a reason (presence of smoke) by a predicate (presence of fire); they say that there is only pervasion that accords with the conventions of the world.

Tsong Khapa answers that this is extremely wrong. When one inferentially realizes that on a mountain pass there is fire because of the presence of smoke, as in a kitchen, the pervasion is not of a particular instance of smoke by a particular instance of fire. Rather, the generality 'fire' is realized as pervading the generality 'smoke'. If it were taken that the

pervasion referred to fire on a pass pervading smoke on a pass, then, when this pervasion is realized, the thesis would already be realized. In other words, when it is determined that fire on a pass pervades smoke on a pass, one would already have realized the thesis—'On the pass there is fire.'

Furthermore, examples are given in order to facilitate realization of the same predicate, and, therefore, the predicate of the thesis which is implied in the example ('as in a kitchen') must be the same as in the main thesis, 'there is fire'. If the predicate of the example were specified as kitchen-fire, then the main thesis would absurdly have to read, 'on the pass there is kitchen-fire'. Rather, Tsong Khapa says that the subject ('on the pass') is the base with respect to which one realizes the presence of fire because of the presence of smoke and that this base should not be confused with the predicate of the thesis ('there is fire') through making it into 'there is pass-fire'.

According to Tsong Khapa, scholars who reject valid inference on the basis of the requirement of having to realize the pervasion of a specific reason by a specific predicate do not understand the Buddhist position on the subject. Rather than using good reasoning, they use a mass of coercives that are exactly alike in their lack of force. He says that they are similar to those who have fallen into a river and are trying to save themselves by grasping at floating grass. Though a specific smoke is seen on the pass, the pervasion based on which one realizes the specific thesis is a general pervasion.

THE SAGYA SCHOLAR DAKTSANG (s Tag-tshang) refuted Tsong Khapa saying that it is contradictory to accept that seed and sprout are different substantial entities (dravya) and then not accept 'production from other'.⁹⁵ Jam-yang-shay-ba turns the same reasoning back on Daktsang, saying that Daktsang then must accept production from other because the latter implies that he accepts that the 'other' of 'production from other' means just an otherness of entity and not 'inherently existent others'.

Tsong Khapa's assertion is that seed and sprout are other entities and that a sprout is produced from its seed. However, this does not constitute an assertion of 'production from other' because the 'other' of 'production from other' means 'inherently existent other'. Daktsang himself does not accept that seed and sprout are even 'other', but Jam-yang-shay-ba thinks that Daktsang is 'forced' to assert this because the term 'substantial entity' is a part of common analysis. Since cause and effect must be accepted conventionally and since they must be accepted as other substantial entities, Daktsang must accept production from other if he says that 'other' means just 'other substantial entities' rather than 'inherently existent others'.

Daktsang then would contradict the many dictums of the Prasangika system which say that both ultimately and conventionally production from other is not asserted. Daktsang, however, is quite aware that production from other cannot be accepted even conventionally. For him, it is Tsong Khapa who breaks the dictum by applying analysis and then accepting that cause and effect are different entities.

Tsong Khapa's answer probably is that once dependently arisen production is accepted, it must be asked whether cause and effect are the same entity or different entities. If it is unsuitable to ask about sameness of entity or difference of entity, or mere self and other, it would be tantamount to saying that any analysis of the terms 'self and 'other' would immediately involve ultimate analysis, even in cases of looking into whether something done several years ago was done by oneself or another.

Once valid establishment of conventional production is accepted, production must be explained as involving causes and effects which are either the same or different. If it cannot be said that cause and effect are merely other, the whole presentation of reasoning and valid establishment falls to the ground. Tsong Khapa's followers cogently say that analysis into whether an apple seed and the tree that will grow from it are merely different is just conventional analysis.⁹⁶ Any further investigation into whether they are totally unrelated and so forth would constitute ultimate analysis and would exceed the sphere of the conventional. Thus, the 'other' of 'production from other' refers to others that can be found under analysis. Conventionally existent inherent otherness is also refuted, but mere conventionally existent otherness is not.

Still, when a mother says, 'I gave birth to a boy,' this is not accepted as a case of production from self. Although from the mother's viewpoint her son is produced from herself, conventionally she and her son are other. The world's merely saying something does not make it conventionally existent; reasoned, systematic analysis is not forbidden.

L3: [Non-production from BOTH SELF AND OTHER [as taught by the theistic Samkhyas and Jainas] :L3

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

[See also "Emptiness Yoga", Chapter 11 – Does a plant grow?]

¢(i.e. Production from both self and other means: part of the essence of the effect is in (inside) a primary cause, but it needs something external to activate the transformation; there is both continuity and discontinuity in change; the cause and the effect are both the same and different/ one and two; this is a combination of self-caused (internal causation) and other-caused (external causation), it is in its essence to become like that, but things become something else through the power of something external / other.

¢-- that the cause and effect are both identical and different

¢-- A third type of causal theory advocated by some schools is basically a combination of the self- and other-causation. The problem with this is that both of the above two problems are compounded.

¢-- Neither could there be origination from both self and other, since this argument would be prone to the faults of both positions. Nor from no cause at all, for then everything would be being produced continually and everywhere, and also it would become quite pointless to commence anything.

¢-- The position according to which phenomena originate from causes that are both identical and different was affirmed by the Jaina philosophers.)

¢-- The third alternative -- that cause and effect are both identical and different -- is no more acceptable, and suffers from two faults. First, both the argument that refuted the identity of cause and effect and the argument that refuted the difference of cause and effect are applicable to the third alternative as well. The argument refuting the identity of cause and effect is applicable insofar as cause and effect are identical, and the argument refuting their difference is applicable insofar as cause and effect are different. We really have no new proposition in the case of the third alternative. Second, the third alternative is faulty because of the law of contradiction: no phenomenon can have contradictory characteristics. An entity cannot be both existent and nonexistent at once, just as one entity cannot be both red and not red at the same time.)

¢[From Part I: Establishing the presence of the third reason in the subject : The body is not produced from both itself and others because all the fallacies of production from self and from other descend on such a theory.]

THE THEISTIC SAMKHYAS (i.e. one of the non-buddhist schools – the Enumerators – see Part IV – Chapter 2) assert that all transformations are produced from the nature (prakṛti) which is the same entity as its transformations, as well as from the god Ishvara, who is other than the transformations.⁹⁷ Therefore, all transformations are produced from both self and other.

THE JAINAS (i.e. one of the non-buddhist schools – the Nirgranthas – see Part IV – Chapter 2) assert that, for example, a man named Maitreya who already existed as a living being (jīva) in a former life took rebirth, and thus, Maitreya is produced from himself since Maitreya and his living being are not other.⁹⁸ Also, Maitreya is produced from that which is other than himself—parents, virtue, non-virtue, contaminations, and so forth—therefore, he is also produced from the other. In the same way, a pot is the same entity as the clay but a different entity from the potter's activities.

These assertions might seem to combine the advantages of production from self and production from other; however, they also accrue the fallacies of both. Each part of the dual assertion is refuted by the respective refutations of production from self and production from other already given.

L3: [Non-production CAUSELESSLY (as taught by the Charvakas / nihilists)] :L3

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

[See also “Emptiness Yoga”, Chapter 11 – Does a plant grow?]

¢(i.e. Production from neither self nor other means: the effect doesn't need a cause, neither the same (internal), not different (external). The cause and effect are neither the same / one, not different / two. This is total chaos. It is a rejection of all causation, all possible karmic consequences, control or path.

¢-- that phenomena arise without cause. -- (i.e. like neither, no causality)

¢-- The final option is that neither self- nor other-causation operates, which position is in effect an indeterminism that denies all causation. If anything were to emerge ever, anywhere, then everything could emerge at all times, everywhere.

¢-- Real production from no cause at all has two faults. First, since entities come into existence with no cause so the world would become random - things would arise anywhere and everywhere. Second, since there would be no cause for the production of y there would be no point in commencing something calculated to bring about y.

¢-- The last alternative, which holds that phenomena originate without a cause, was affirmed by the materialists in ancient India.

¢-- Finally, the fourth alternative -- the idea that phenomena originate without cause -- is rejected by appeal to common experience. For instance, if we set a kettle of water on a lighted stove, the water will boil, but if we set it on a block of ice, it won't.)

¢[From Part I: Establishing the presence of the fourth reason in the subject : The body is not produced causelessly because then the copulation of the parents for the sake of conceiving a child would be senseless. The mother's care of the child in the womb and later after birth would be senseless. Taking effort to nourish the body for the sake of future health would be senseless. For, the body would arise causelessly.]

¢-- The body is not produced causelessly because if it were, a body could be produced even from a chair or a door, because everything would arise from everything.]

THE NIHILISTS (i.e. one of the non-buddhist schools – the Charvakas – see Part IV – Chapter 2) do not assert that there is utterly no caused production because causation that can be observed, such as the making of a pot, does exist. However, the sharpness of thorns, the plunging downward of water-falls, the colors of flowers, and so forth are said to be causeless, arising just by the nature of the entity.⁹⁹ They draw the conclusion that making effort at ethics is a waste of precious time because no moral carry-over from one lifetime to another is seen. Not being seen, such causation does not exist.

The Buddhists say that the sharpness of thorns is produced from the same seeds that produce the thorns.¹⁰⁰ The ascertainment that the sharpness of thorns arises sometimes in some places is a proof that they are produced in dependence on other entities, and these entities upon which they depend are called causes.

If things were uncaused, the planting of fields and the like would be senseless because things would arise themselves. Anything could arise from anything. If the production of things were adventitious, then just as a bread-fruit tree, for instance, would not be the cause of its own fruit, so because all things, such as lemon and mango trees, are also not causes of bread-fruit, bread-fruit would be produced from them because they are equally non-causes in relation to bread-fruit.¹⁰¹

L3: [Conclusion] :L3

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this conclusion]

[See also “Emptiness Yoga”, Chapter 12 – Inducing realization]

¢[From Part I: The yogi first identified the body as a product and then saw that what is inherently produced must be produced according to one of four possibilities. Thus, upon the establishment of the four reasons as qualities of the body, he realizes without further cogitation that the body is not inherently produced. He then draws out the implications of this realization to include the cognition that the body does not inherently exist. For, if the body is a product and it is not inherently produced, it does not inherently exist.]

The four possibilities of inherently existent production are thereby proved to be non-existent.¹⁰² IT IS THUS ESTABLISHED THAT THINGS ARE NOT INHERENTLY PRODUCED. (i.e. The only thing established so far, is the inadequacy of our actual concepts and theories, that our actual concept of production is flawed if pushed to its limits.) This, in turn, establishes that products do not exist inherently because for products to exist inherently they would have to be inherently produced. Realization of the absence of inherently existent production of a product is a realization of its emptiness.

Refutations of the views of philosophical systems on the four possibilities of inherently existent production are not just refutations of rival systems but should be taken as a branch of the process of overcoming one's own innate sense that things are inherently produced.¹⁰³ The innate non-analytical intellect does not conceive cause and effect to be either the same, or inherently different, or both, or neither; however, if the objects that the intellect misconceives as inherently existent did in fact inherently exist, they would necessarily exist in one of these four ways. Thus, through eliminating these four

possibilities, the inherently existent products that are the objects of this innate ignorance are shown to be non-existent. By attacking in this way the falsely conceived object, the falsely conceiving subject is gradually overcome. The false subject is removed by overcoming belief in the false object.

Actual realization of an emptiness of inherent production transforms a person's view of the world and frees him or her from the chains of attachment toward products. Ultimately, direct cognition of emptiness in a totally non-dual manner elevates one to the level of a Superior, and through continuous cultivation of this cognition cyclic existence—the beginningless round of birth, aging, sickness, and death—is terminated.

L5: [Other conclusions: this reasoning is showing that things do not exist the way they appear] :L5

¢[i.e. Beginning of extracts taken from “Emptiness Yoga”, Chapter 12

¢-- ... Almost everything with which we come into contact is compounded, produced. We have a very firm sense that all these products are there in and of themselves. If we want to find out if these products are really there in the way that they appear, one technique is to examine how they are produced. For, if we can refute their substantially established production, we can negate this very solid, bold, and forthright appearance as if they are right there in their own right.

¢-- First, decide whether these appearances are permanent or not. This can be done easily. These are impermanent and hence must be products. Once they are products, we have only four choices. Production has to be either caused or causeless; if it is caused, then there are three choices — the effect has to be produced from a cause that is either the same as itself, different, or both same and different.

¢-- In order to succeed, you have to tie the reasoning to these very forceful appearances. What we usually do is to take the things appearing here as data, as facts, and then try to figure out an intellectual system that will accord with them. What is needed here is quite different. We have to figure out some way to extricate our minds from these wrong appearances so that we will quit assenting to them; then we have to destroy the wrong appearances themselves so that things will appear correctly. This Buddhist system is opposite to what we are accustomed to.

¢-- Many people talk about quieting the mind down, about ceasing the frozen overlay we put on things and experiencing them more the way they are. Perhaps this is a way of getting closer to the innate mind; artificial conceptions are being quieted, and the mind is being withdrawn from intellectually acquired ideas. There is no question that if we can do this, we will perceive the world differently. However, even if you could completely keep the mind away from even the innate conceptions, the appearance of phenomena would still be wrong. By sinking down into appearances, you are getting deeper into your problem and, in a sense, identifying it more, but your realization is getting no deeper. As mentioned before, it is insufficient merely to withdraw the mind from things. Although attempting to put people more into the present moment, these systems do not have any means of actually opposing our wrong conceptions and wrong appearances. Their method of opposing is merely to push them out of the way.

¢-- The system here, however, is to provide a weapon explicitly countering wrong conceptions. We have to get to the point where, when we look at our object of meditation, we will understand that one of its qualities is that it is not produced from self, other, both, or without causes. These four points have to move your mind deeply; they have to be able to show you that **THINGS DO NOT EXIST IN THE WAY THAT THEY APPEAR**. The non-production of

things

in these four ways contradicts how things appear. Thus, with this, the very appearance of phenomena will begin to change. The refutation of production of the four extreme types is like a diamond weapon.

¢-- Whether this reasoning works for you or whether you will have to find some other reasoning is something to be discovered by playing with these reasonings and getting into them, learning how they work. The four positions of production from self, other, both, or causelessly ARE THE ONLY POSSIBILITIES OF INHERENTLY EXISTENT PRODUCTION.

¢-- We get upset because it looks as if the Buddhists are forcing people like the Samkhyas and Nihilists into positions they would not themselves accept. We may even feel to support the side being refuted. However, when you meditate, you have to throw yourself to the Buddhists' side; play the Buddhists' game for a while and get into it. This will work itself down into your mind and cause your natural resistance to come out. Then you really have to start looking at it, from inside.

¢-- Since these phenomena are not permanent, they must be products. If they are produced and this production is findable — as being from self, other, both, or causelessly (i.e. that is the opponent theory that is shown absurd here) — then this appearance of things as findable is correct. If their production cannot be found, then what is appearing is not right. We have a very important matter to decide here; it will apply to all phenomena. THROW YOUR MIND COMPLETELY INTO THIS, PUT ALL YOUR ENERGY BEHIND IT. There is a lot at stake: if there is no

findable production, then we are wrong in our usual way of living. These meditations change the appearance of things. Normally, when things appear and we assent to the way they appear, the appearance becomes even more encrusted. Then, we make up systems and freeze this appearance of inherent existence all the more. Reasonings such as these that refute inherently existent production do just the opposite; they change the way things appear, making it easier not to assent to that appearance. Meditation on emptiness is a real antidote.

¢-- ...

¢-- This will show you that its current solid appearance is incorrect and that you should not assent to this appearance.

¢-- ...

¢-- THE DIRECT COGNITION OF EMPTINESS IS SUCH THAT IT WILL BRING ABOUT A TRUE CESSATION OF A

CERTAIN LEVEL OF THE AFFLICTIONS. Although meditative suppression can yield a sense of bliss, clarity, non-conceptuality, and even greater intellectual power, if you want utterly and forever to get rid of desire, hatred, and ignorance, merely suppressing them is not enough. You have to destroy them by means of their antidote, direct cognition of emptiness.

How can you arrive at this direct cognition of emptiness? Through inference. The meaning of the vacuity that appears to an inferential cognition is that these concrete events and objects to which we are accustomed do not exist as they appear. This vacuity has to keep meaning this for you because otherwise, it will become a vacuity of nothingness.

¢-- At the level of direct cognition, you do not have to worry about sustaining the meaning of the cognition, you do not have to think about whether the force of the intent of your cognition is still there or not, you do not have to keep reminding yourself what you are looking for and not finding. Your mind is at a level where all these are there. However, with our kind of conceptual cognition or, even more so, with its precursor, correct assumption, we have to sustain the intention of our cognition.

¢-- End of extracts taken from “Emptiness Yoga”, Chapter 12]

L2: [2. THE FOUR EXTREMES (Reasoning #4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)] :L2

Sources:

- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Chandrakirti's Commentary on the 'Supplement'
- Corresponding sections of the translation pp.651-3
- [See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]
- [See also "Emptiness Yoga", Chapter 13 – Other reasonings]

DOES A CAUSE PRODUCE AN EFFECT WHICH IS EXISTENT, NON-EXISTENT, BOTH, OR NEITHER?¹⁰⁴

This analysis is a refutation of the four extremes but can also be called a refutation of the four alternatives. (The diamond slivers can also be called a refutation of the four extremes and a refutation of the four alternatives simply because there are four extremes or four alternatives considered.)¹⁰⁵ As above, the possibilities for inherently existent production are limited to four, and when these four are eliminated, the absence of inherently existent production is established.

The reasoning in brief is:¹⁰⁶

- :: AN EXISTENT EFFECT is not ultimately produced because whatever exists ultimately must always exist, and thus there would be no need for producers, that is, causes.
- :: A NON-EXISTENT EFFECT is not ultimately produced because if a non-existent effect were produced, the horns of a rabbit could also be produced.
- :: AN EFFECT WHICH IS BOTH EXISTENT AND NON-EXISTENT is not produced because there is no such thing as an existent and non-existent effect; no one thing possesses contradictory natures.
- :: AN EFFECT WHICH IS NEITHER EXISTENT NOR NON-EXISTENT is not produced because there is no such thing.

Or, in another way:

- :: A sprout which is in all ways existent at the time of its causes is not produced by causes and conditions because causes and conditions cannot create anything that already exists.
- :: A sprout is not ultimately produced newly because of not existing at the time of its causes, just as a lotus in the sky, which is utterly non-existent, does not exist at the time of its causes and is not newly produced.

An effect, if ultimately existent, must exist at the time of its causes because whatever is ultimately produced must always exist since if at any time it did not exist, it would ultimately be non-existent forever. The ultimately existent is not fit to depend on causes and conditions; hence, there could be no difference between production when the causes and conditions are complete and non-production when the causes and conditions are non-complete.

Also, an effect would have to exist at the time of its causes because the action of the

growing forth of an effect such as a sprout must depend on the sprout. Thus, at the time when the sprout is approaching production (which is the same time that its seed is approaching cessation), the sprout which is the base of the activity of growing forth must exist. Since the cause has not yet ceased at that time, both would exist at the same time.

Chandrakirti says in his Commentary on the 'Supplement':¹⁰⁷

~ Now, there is no time when a cause, from among cause and effect, depends on an effect [and thus could achieve otherness with respect to an effect].

~ In order to show this, it is said [in the Supplement, VI.21],

:: 'If producers are causes producing products other [than themselves], it is to be considered whether they produce an existent, non-existent, that which is both, or that which is neither.

:: If it exists, of what use are producers?

:: What could these producers do for the non-existent?

:: What could they do for that which is neither?'

\ #####

\ [VI.21]

\ If a producer producing a product that is other is a cause,

\ Then what is produced, an existent, a non-existent, both, or neither?

\ If it is an existent, what need is there for a producer, and what need is there if it is a non-existent?

\ What need is there for both, and what need is there for neither?

Causes, that is, producers, are not producers of an existent product because of the fallacies already set forth, such as,

:: 'It is just not reasonable that what has already been produced be produced again.'¹⁰⁸

:: Thus, there is no need at all of causes [for what already exists].

:: Also, what could these producers do for a non-existent product?¹⁰⁹

:: It would be non-existent like the horns of an ass.

\ #####

\ [VI.8.c]

\ 51cd.

\ There is no point in it arising from itself.

\ Moreover, it is not reasonable that what has been produced is produced again.

\ #####

\ 52.

\ If you assert that what is already produced is produced again,

\ Then the production from sprouts and so forth is not found here,

\ And seeds will continue to be produced until the end of time.

\ #####

\ How can it destroy that?

\ #####

\ For you, the shape, colour, taste, potentiality, and ripening of a sprout

\ Are not different from those of its cause, the seed.

\ #####
\ If its previous nature is destroyed and it becomes an entity other than that,
\ At that time how is it the nature of that?

\ #####
\ If, for you, the seed and the sprout are not different here,
\ Then either the sprout is unapprehendable just like the seed,
\ Or, since they are the same, that is also apprehendable just like the sprout.
\ Therefore you should not assert this.

\ #####
\ Because, though a cause has disintegrated, its effect is still seen,
\ Even the worldly do not assert that they are the same.

\ #####
\ Therefore this fabrication that things arise from self
\ Is unacceptable in thatness and in the world.

\ #####
\ If production from self is asserted,
\ Then product and producer, object and agent, are one.
\ Since they are not one, production from self should not be asserted
\ Because of the consequences extensively explained.

It is said,

:: 'For whoever asserts that the effect is existent and for whoever asserts that the effect is non-existent, it would be senseless to set pillars and so forth for a house.'

Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way [XX.21-22] also says:

:: If the entity of the effect exists,
:: What will a cause produce?
:: If the entity of the effect does not exist,
:: What will a cause produce?

:: If it is not producing,
:: A cause is not possible.
:: If causes are not existent,
:: Of what would there be an effect?

\ #####
\ 20:21.
\ Can a cause produce a product which is essentially existing in itself (svabhava) ?
\ Can a cause produce a product which is not essentially existing in itself
(svabhava) ?

\ #####
\ 20:22.
\ It is not possible to have "what is by its nature a cause" (hetutva) of "that
which is not producing."
\ If "what is by its nature a cause" is not possible, whose product will exist?

Even if an effect were both existent and non-existent, what could causes do for it? For, the

fallacies previously set forth would follow. 'Bothness' [here] is a thing that is both, or that which exists as both [existent and non-existent]. Possession of the entities of existence and non-existence does not occur in one thing at one time. Therefore, a thing that has such a nature does not exist. Because it is just not existent, what could causes which are producers do for it?

The Treatise [XXV. 14] says:

- :: How could nirvana
- :: Be both a thing and a non-thing?
- :: These two do not exist in one,
- :: Like light and darkness.

- \ #####
- \ 25:14.
- \ How can nirvana exist as both an existent and a non-existent thing?
- \ There is no existence of both at one and the same place, as in the case of both darkness and light.

Just so [VIII.7]:

- :: An existent and non-existent doer
- :: Does not do an existent and non-existent [doing].
- :: How could one [entity] have existence and non-existence
- :: Which are mutually exclusive?

- \ #####
- \ 8:7.
- \ And a real-nonreal producer does not produce in a real-nonreal manner.
- \ For, indeed, how can "real" and "non-real," which are mutually contradictory, occur in one place?

Also, what could causes do for an effect which is neither existent nor non-existent? For, an effect that has forsaken the entities of existence and non-existence does not exist. If the existent and non-existent do not occur, that which is both not existent and not non-existent, being the negative of these, would not be any different. When these two are not established, that which is both not existent and not non-existent just does not occur.

The Treatise [XXV. 15] says:

- :: The teaching of nirvana
- :: As [both] not a thing and not a non-thing
- :: Would be established
- :: If things and non-things were established.

- \ #####
- \ 25:15.
- \ The assertion: "Nirvana is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing"
- \ Is proved if [the assertion]: "It is an existent thing and a non-existent thing" were proved.

Chandrakirti applies this refutation of the four extremes to various types of production from other, and Nagarjuna and Atisha extend its import to include a refutation of inherently existent abiding and ceasing. For, once there is no inherently existent production, how

could there be inherently existent abiding or ceasing?

¢[From Emptiness Yoga, chapter 13:

¢-- This reasoning investigates an effect. What kind of effect is produced? Is it existent, non-existent, both existent and non-existent, or neither existent nor non-existent? The reasoning can be framed in two ways. In one way, you are CONSIDERING AN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF ITS CAUSES. Is an effect produced that is existent at the time of its causes, non-existent at the time of the causes, both, or neither? Or, you can CONSIDER THE EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE EFFECT. Is an inherently existent effect produced, a non-existent effect, both, or neither?

¢-- [Cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, or separate in time]

¢-- IN THE FIRST WAY, YOU CONSIDER A PRODUCT AT THE TIME OF ITS CAUSES — whether that

product was existent at that time, non-existent, both, or neither. Apart from these four, there are no other choices. A huge amount of production occurs — cars, buildings, buses, smells, sky, people; everything is a product. If these things exist, they must be products. We have already done away with uncaused products in the earlier reasoning; here we are considering caused products. How many choices do you have? The effect is either there at the time of its causes or it is not — that is about it. You can go on to consider that it is both there and not there, but that is silly. Or you can say that it is neither there nor not there, but that is also absurd. So it is either existent at the time of its causes or non-existent at the time of its causes. The only point in stretching the possibilities to four is that there are philosophical systems that assert such; still, the only sensible options to consider are existence and non-existence, because these are a dichotomy.

¢-- Do causes produce an existent effect? If the effect is existent at the time of its causes, there would be no point in its production, for production would be a senseless reproduction. On the other hand, if the effect is non-existent at the time of its causes, how could it be produced? How could causes produce that effect? We say "produce that effect", but there is no effect there to produce. In general, the Gelugpa Consequentialists say that conventionally a formerly non-existent effect is newly produced and that an existent effect is produced. Thus, a foot-high sprout which has a root system exists as the entity of the seed, but it is non-existent at the time of the seed. The seed exists, its effect does not; the sprout exists as the entity of the seed. This is how conventional production is asserted.

¢-- I am writing a book, Emptiness Yoga. If it were existent, it would be crazy for me to write it. If it were non-existent, how could I write it? It is as if there is a small child shouting in your ear, wanting to know how things are — it is almost unbearable. Yet this is the very perspective into which we are to sink our minds. We have to become convinced that despite the ever so solid appearance of production, there is no analytically findable production. This has to affect you, to impress you.

¢-- "Causes do not produce inherently existent effects, for the inherently existent has no need for causes."

¢-- Above, we investigated the possibility of an effect existing at the time of its causes. The analysis is ALSO APPLICABLE AT THE TIME OF THE EFFECT. If an effect were inherently existent, what would be the use of causes to produce it? We live in a world where things appear to be inherently existent; since if they did inherently exist, they would not be caused, we have to struggle to superimpose the idea that these inherently existing effects have causes. We have to keep learning and reminding ourselves about cause and effect. Why? Because cause and effect contradict the way in which things appear to us. Even if you can

intellectually decide that an absence of cause and effect would be absurd, the fact still remains that the world appears to us to exist from its own side, and we assent to that appearance. Thus, if an effect inherently exists, what use are causes at any time? If this effect inherently exists at the time of the effect, it must exist at all times. If we are to accept the way things appear to us, we should give up cause and effect, but since cause and effect cannot be sensibly eliminated, we should give up believing in the concrete appearance of things as if they exist from their own side.

¢-- “Non-existent effects also are not produced, because causes could not do anything for the non-existent.”

¢-- Once you have exhausted those two options — inherently existent and non-existent effects — it can be decided that there is no production that exists in its own right, but the reasoning continues for the sake of generating a sense of thoroughness.

¢-- “Effects that are both existent and non-existent also are not produced, because a composite of these two does not occur.”

¢-- Nothing is both existent and non-existent from the same point of view.

¢-- “Also, causes do not produce effects that are neither existent nor non-existent, for something that is neither of these two does not occur.”

¢-- Something that is both existent and non-existent or is neither existent nor non-existent is impossible even conventionally.

¢-- “This [reasoning] is explained in the basic text and commentary of Chandrakirti's Supplement, in Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, and also in Atisha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment.”]

L2: [3. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES (reasoning #5 : refuting that one or many causes can inherently produce one or many effects)] :L2

Sources: Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations

- Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.653-8
- [See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]
- [See also “Emptiness Yoga”, Chapter 13 – Other reasonings]

The principal Indian source for the refutation of the four alternatives is the Svatantrika Jnanagarbha's Discrimination of the Two Truths (Satyadvayavibhanga) and his own commentary.¹¹⁰ Not finding any Prasangika sources, many scholars, including Jang-gya, do not accept this reasoning as Prasangika.¹¹¹ It is not that the import of the refutation of the four alternatives cannot be considered Prasangika but a question of whether this reasoning is emphasized sufficiently among Indian Prasangikas to be considered an integral part of their system. Jam-yang-shay-ba, however, lists it as one of the Prasangikas' means of refuting the inherent existence of phenomena, saying that the reasoning refuting the four alternatives is so attractive that it literally captivates the mind of the intelligent (see p.654 – Part IV on this reasoning).

It is:¹¹²

- :: A product such as an eye consciousness is not ultimately produced because
- :: ultimately only one effect is not produced from only one cause,

- :: ultimately many effects are not produced from only one cause,
- :: ultimately only one effect is not produced from many causes,
- :: and ultimately many effects are not produced from many causes.

The very meaning of production mitigates against ultimate existence because 'ultimately existing' means 'existing through its own power'. If an entity's existence depends on production, the entity does not exist through its own power. Still, one's mind will not be captivated by this interesting reasoning unless one probes the refutation further. The establishment of the four-cornered reason must be investigated thoroughly in order to gain its import.

AN EYE CONSCIOUSNESS IS CHOSEN AS THE EXAMPLE because the THREE CAUSES OF THE PRODUCTION OF

AN EYE CONSCIOUSNESS are well known in Buddhist literature. An eye consciousness is caused by three factors: a visible form, an eye sense power, and a former moment of consciousness. A visible object—color and shape causes an eye consciousness to be produced in the image of that object. An eye sense power causes an eye consciousness to have the ability to apprehend colors and shapes and not sounds, odors, and so forth. A former moment of consciousness causes an eye consciousness to be a conscious entity. In other words, the ability of an eye consciousness to apprehend visible objects is derived from its respective sense; its being generated in the image of a particular object is caused by a particular visible form; its being conscious is caused by a previous moment of consciousness.

THE REFUTATION OF THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE, that ultimately only one effect is produced from only one cause, is based on the fact that an eye sense power not only produces an eye consciousness but also produces its own next moment.

If it were said that the single effect produced by an eye sense power is only its own second moment, it would absurdly follow that all beings would be blind because the production of an eye consciousness from an eye sense power would not occur.

If it were said that an eye sense power produces only an eye consciousness, it would absurdly follow that all beings would be blind because there would be no continuous production of two moments of an eye sense.

The first moment of the eye sense would generate an eye consciousness, but because there would be no second moment of the eye sense, a second moment of eye consciousness would be non-existent, and an ordinary being cannot realize anything in just one moment.

THE REFUTATION OF THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE, that ultimately many effects are produced from only one cause, is accomplished through three absurd consequences:

It would absurdly follow that:

- ~ 1 the experiential aspect of an eye consciousness would not be the imprint or effect of an immediately preceding moment of consciousness
- ~ 2 the aspect which is the image's generation in the consciousness would not be the effect of the visible form
- ~ 3 the aspect of an eye consciousness which is its ability to apprehend a particular type of object would not be the effect of an eye sense power, its special empowering cause.

The reason is that ultimately only one cause would produce many effects, and only one cause would be assigned for these three effects.

THE REFUTATION OF THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE, that ultimately only one effect is produced from many causes, is:

~ It absurdly follows that only one of the three attributes of an eye consciousness is produced by the three causes of an eye consciousness. Therefore, it absurdly follows that the other two attributes either do not exist or are produced causelessly.

The fourth alternative, that ultimately many effects are produced from many causes, is the most likely alternative, and its refutation is many-sided:

~ It might be said that a composite of the three causes ultimately produces the three attributes and that the three attributes are not ultimately different but only appear to the mind to be different. Then, because they would actually exist one way but appear another way, they would be false and thus could not be truly existent. Further, if the three attributes are not different and do not appear to be different to any mind, the three attributes would be one, and it could not be said that many causes produce many effects.

If the three attributes are ultimately different, it would follow that an eye consciousness and the three attributes of an eye consciousness would be ultimately different. Then, since the composite of the three causes produces the three attributes, one would have to find a cause for the consciousness which is different from them. Furthermore, an eye consciousness and its three attributes are not ultimately different because if they were, the wisdom realizing suchness would have to perceive them as different since difference would be their mode of being, but it does not.

Moreover, an eye consciousness would be produced by a visible form because its being generated in the image of the object is produced by the form. Also, an eye consciousness would not be produced by a visible form because its being a conscious entity is not produced from a visible form. An eye consciousness is not a different entity from its attribute of being produced in the image of its object and also it is not a different entity from its attribute of being a conscious entity. Therefore, it would be both produced from a visible form and not produced from a visible form.

The pivot around which these consequences turn is that if an eye consciousness were ultimately the same entity as its attributes, it would be one with its attributes in all respects. Such are the conditions that an object findable under analysis must fulfill; if the sameness of an eye consciousness with its attributes is its inherent nature, how could it also be different from these attributes?

In the same vein:

~ A visible form absurdly would be both a producer and a non-producer of an eye consciousness. It would produce an eye consciousness because it generates the consciousness in its image, and it would not produce an eye consciousness because it does not generate its quality of being conscious.

If the three attributes are produced from the composite of the three causes, then the causes individually would not be producers. If the three causes are individually the producers, then the effect, the eye consciousness, would be uncaused because only the three attributes of an eye consciousness would be caused. If it is asserted that the three causal factors

produce an eye consciousness, then the eye consciousness which is not different from its three different attributes would be uncaused. For, the three attributes would be uncaused, and the eye consciousness is not different from them.

It is said that not finding things such as cause and effect under analysis is somewhat like searching a room from top to bottom for a big, obvious thing such as a good-sized box.¹¹³ One is not able to find it, and the search generates utter conviction that it cannot be found. This analytical consciousness which does not find objects is a wisdom consciousness. Through cultivating it, realization dawns, revealing how objects are utterly unfindable when analyzed in such a manner but are imputedly existent, effective, and validly established.

¢[From Emptiness Yoga, chapter 13:

¢-- This reasoning investigates both causes and effects. It is an analysis of whether or not ultimately one cause produces one effect, one cause produces many effects, many causes produce one effect, or many causes produce many effects.

¢-- Jang-gya does not go into it here; so we will not go into it either.

¢-- “[Some of] our own recent scholars apply the reasonings explained in the basic text and commentary of [the Middle Way Autonomist] Jnanagarbha's Discrimination of the Two Truths here [in the Middle Way Consequence School. However] most texts concerning the Consequence School describe just the reasons of the diamond fragments as a refutation of the four alternatives. Except for this, it does not appear that what Jnanagarbha explains in the Discrimination of the Two Truths is set forth with much emphasis in the Consequence School.”

¢-- In the texts of the Consequence School, the diamond fragments (which Jang-gya also called a "refutation of production of the four extreme types") are also called a "refutation of production of the four alternatives". For, production from self, from other, from both, and without cause are, from the point of view of causes, four alternative types of production. Thus, when the four alternatives are discussed, they usually do not refer to JNANAGARBHA'S ANALYSIS OF SINGLE OR MULTIPLE EFFECTS FROM SINGLE OR MULTIPLE CAUSES.

¢-- All teachers have a reasoning that is their own diamond instrument for attacking the false appearance of objects, but it seems that none of the Indian masters of the Consequence School had particular interest in this reasoning explained by Jnanagarbha, an Autonomist. Ashvaghosha, in his Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment, uses the diamond fragments. Chandrakirti's favorites are the diamond fragments and the sevenfold reasoning. Aryadeva, in a work called Length of a Forearm, teaches meditation on emptiness through an analysis of whole and parts, which is also said to be a favorite reasoning of the Autonomists, though Consequentialists also use it.

¢-- Still, it should not be felt that just because the analysis of whole and parts, for example, was a favorite of Shantarakshita, it is unsuitable to use it in the context of the Consequence School. Aryadeva used it, and he is, in the end, a Consequentialist, at least according to the Consequentialists. Not only that, but also such a reasoning is very appropriate to the Consequentialist system, as is the reasoning that refutes production of single and multiple effects from single and multiple causes. Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets explains this reasoning in the context of the Consequence School; he is among those whom Jang-gya implicitly criticizes for bringing it over to the Consequence School.

L3: [Elimination of error] :L3

Because these four types of production do exist conventionally, it is necessary that the qualification 'ultimately', 'inherently', or 'naturally' be affixed to the refutations. Otherwise, the scope of the refutation would be over-extended. In the Prasangika system there is nominal production of one from one, many from one, one from many, and many from many.

The best source for showing that one producing one and so forth exist conventionally is in sutra where it is taught that (1) one action can produce one life, (2) one action can produce many lives, (3) many actions can produce one life, and (4) many actions can produce many lives (see p.657). It could be asked whether a single life is only one effect, but such investigations into whether a series can rightly be considered a unit or not is a mode of ultimate analysis. When the continuum of a lifetime is sought in the individual moments of the continuum, it cannot be found. The continuum is not the individual moments nor their composite; if a continuum were a composite of the moments, either each moment would be a continuum or there would be no separate moments.

Conventionally, or nominally, cause and effect are preserved. It is said that just as external cause and effect can differ greatly in size, as in the case of an apple seed's producing an apple tree, even more so does the force and endurance differ between cause and effect in the internal sphere.¹¹⁴ The mind's power is such that a little non-virtue can cause tremendous havoc and a little virtue can cause tremendous advancement. Just so, one complete action with strong motivation to attain Buddhahood for the sake of living beings can act as the basis not just for one lifetime but for many. The marvels of cause and effect are not lost in the devastating import of no inherent existence. An understanding of emptiness enhances an understanding of cause and effect.

L2: [4. Dependent-Arising (reasoning #3 : the King of reasoning: refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)] :L2

Sources:

- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.659-76
- [See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

In the Madhyamika system all phenomena, both impermanent and permanent, are dependent-arising (pratityasamutpada).

THROUGH THE REASON OF THEIR BEING DEPENDENT-ARISINGS, THEIR EMPTINESS IS ESTABLISHED. ¹¹⁵

The Questions of Sagaramati Sutra (Sagaramatipariprchhha) says:

- :: Those which arise dependently
- :: Are free of inherent existence.

The Questions of the King of Nagas, Anavatapta, Sutra (Anavataptandgarajapariprchhha) says:

- :: Those which are produced from causes are not produced.
- :: They do not have an inherent nature of production.
- :: Those which depend on causes are said to be

:: Empty; those who know emptiness are aware.

In this quote, the reason which establishes an emptiness of products is indicated by 'produced from causes'. The meaning of not being produced is clarified by the next line, 'They do not have an inherent nature of production'; it is not mere production but inherently existent production that is eliminated. Also, Buddha himself clarified his teaching of no production in the Descent into Lanka Sutra (Lankavatara),

~ 'O Mahamati, thinking of no inherently existent production, I said that all phenomena are not produced.'

In the quote from the Questions of Anavatapta Sutra the words 'those which' indicate the phenomena that are subjects being shown to lack inherently existent production; they are outer phenomena, such as sprouts, and inner phenomena, such as actions. The third line, 'Those which depend on causes are said to be empty', indicates that reliance and dependence on causes is the meaning of being empty of inherent existence. An emptiness of inherent existence is the meaning of dependent-arising; emptiness does not mean the negation of mere production or an absence in phenomena of an ability to perform a function.

The reasoning is:

:: Sprouts and so forth are not inherently produced because of being dependent-arisings.

The predicate of the thesis ('are not inherently produced') eliminates the extreme of permanence; the reason ('being dependent-arisings') eliminates the extreme of annihilation. Seeing that the reasoning of dependent-arising refutes all extremes and that this teaching is a quality elevating Buddha above all other teachers, Nagarjuna praised Buddha in the opening verses of his Treatise on the Middle Way:

:: I bow down to the perfect Buddha,
:: The best of propounders, who taught
:: That what dependently arises
:: Has no cessation, no production,
:: No annihilation, no permanence, no coming,
:: No going, no difference, no sameness,
:: Is free of the elaborations [of inherent
:: Existence and of duality] and is at peace.

\ #####
\ I salute him, the fully-enlightened, the best of speakers,
\ who preached the non-ceasing and the non-arising,
\ the non-annihilation and the non-permanence,
\ the non-identity and the non-difference,
\ the non-appearance and the non-disappearance,
\ the dependent arising,
\ the appeasement of obsessions and the auspicious.

L4: [The word 'dependent-arising' in Sanskrit is pratityasamutpada.] :L4

It has two parts: pratitya, a continuative meaning 'having depended', and samutpada, an action noun meaning 'arising'. The formation of pratitya is:

~ in - n + prati + su - su + ktva which changes to lyap -1 - p -i-tuk (between i and

ya)-k-u + su-su = pratitya.

In other words, the verbal root in, meaning 'going', loses its indicative letter n, leaving i. To this, prati is affixed, and the nominative case ending su is affixed to prati but immediately erased because prati is an indeclinable. The continuative ending ktva is added to i in the form of lyap, of which the accent letter / and the p that indicates the addition of the augment tuk are dropped. This leaves prati i ya. Tuk is added between i and ya, and the indicative k and pronunciation letter u are dropped. The / of prati and the i of the verbal root are combined, making pratitya. The nominative case ending su is added but is immediately dropped because the continuative pratitya is an indeclinable. The formation of samutpada is:

~ pada +ut (before pada) + sam (before utpada) + su (after ut) + su (after sam) - su - su + ghan (which is a vrddhiing of a) + su - u (with the s changing to) ru - u (with the r changing to) h = samutpadah.

In other words, the prefixes ut and sam are added to pada which means 'going'. The nominative case ending is added to these two and then is immediately dropped because they are indeclinables, making samutpada. The vowel of pad is strengthened for the sake of denoting an action noun, making samutpada. The nominative case ending su is added; the u is erased; the i changes into ru; the u is erased, and the r changes into visarga, making samutpadah.

Pratitya is thus shown to be a continuative meaning 'having depended' and not a secondary derivative noun as many Madhyamikas and non-Madhyamikas wrongly claim. For them, the t of itya is added because the root i is being used to form an action noun. Ya is then an affix used to form a secondary derivative noun.

Thus, for them itya means 'that which goes', and 'prati' means 'multiple', or 'diverse', or 'this and that'. In this mistaken interpretation pratitya means 'that which goes or disintegrates diversely'. Pratitya being viewed not as a continuative but as a noun, it is wrongly asserted that in the compound pratityasamutpada a genitive plural case ending has been erased and should be added when taken out of compound, making pratityanam which means 'of those which go, depart, or disintegrate diversely'. The etymological meaning of pratityasamutpada is thereby wrongly taken to mean 'the composition and arising of effects which disintegrate in each diverse moment and which have definite, diverse causes and conditions'.

Chandrakirti does not say that this meaning is wholly wrong, but that it is a bad etymology because though it would apply to a use of pratityasamutpada in a general sense, it would not apply when pratityasamutpada refers to a specific arising of a single effect from a single cause. However, taken as 'having depended, arising' or 'dependent-arising', it applies to both general and specific references.

The Prasangikas say that samutpada does not just mean 'arising' (lit., 'going out'), in the sense of arising from causes and conditions in the way that a sprout arises from a seed. It also means 'establishment' (siddha, grub pa) and 'existence' (sat, yodpa), (two words that are often used interchangeably in Buddhist terminology). The term pratityasamutpada thereby refers not just to products, or things which arise from causes, but also to non-products since their existence is relative. All phenomena are dependent-arisings.

The term 'dependent-arising' not only refers to a process of production and of coming into

existence but also to these things which are produced and come into existence.¹¹⁶ Phenomena themselves are dependent-arising; a pot is a dependent-arising; a consciousness is a dependent-arising; an emptiness is a dependent-arising, and so forth.

The non-Buddhist Grammarians object to the term and its meaning, saying that since pratitya is a continuative, the act of depending must precede the act of arising. If that which depends or meets its causes exists before its arising, then it would contradict the Buddhists' own dictum that an effect does not exist at the time of the cause. Therefore, the Grammarians reject both the grammatical correctness of the term and the philosophical correctness of its meaning. However, according to Buddhists an effect does not have to exist at the time of its causes for it to depend on those causes; the mere production of an effect by causes is the meaning of 'dependence'.

Bhavaviveka, in effect, refuses to etymologize the term in detail, thereby suggesting that pratityasamutpada attains its meaning through conventional usage and is not bound to an etymological meaning. Chandrakirti speculates that Bhavaviveka compares it to the compound aranyetilaka which literally means 'sesame in the forest' but is used to indicate anything that does not answer to one's expectations. Just as wild sesame yields no oil, so events that do not yield one's expectations are called 'sesame in the forest'. The etymology, though connected to the meaning, is much narrower than the meaning which is gained through common convention. Chandrakirti speculates that for Bhavaviveka the etymology of the term pratityasamutpada likewise does not bear close scrutiny; by common convention, however, it just means 'conditionality', that is, 'when this is, that arises'.

Chandrakirti disagrees, making reference to a verse in Nagarjuna's own Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktishashtika) where the master himself obviously etymologizes pratityasamutpada:

:: Tat tatprapyayadutpannam notpannam tat svabhavatah
:: 'That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions] is not inherently produced.'

\ #####

\ 19.

\ Whatever arises depending on this and that has not arisen substantially. That which has not arisen substantially: How can it literally be called 'arisen'?

The word substituted for pratitya is another continuative, prapya,¹¹⁷ which means 'having attained' (or 'having met' according to the Tibetan translation in this context for prapya, phrad nas). The stanza thereby refutes Bhavaviveka's contention that Buddhapalita erred in taking prapya as the meaning of pratitya. Bhavaviveka's contention, as is made clear by his commentator Avalokitavrata,¹¹⁸ is like that of the Grammarians. His point is that if an eye consciousness, for example, were existent, it could meet with the eye sense and form which are its causes. However, if it were existent at the time of its causes, it would be senseless for the causes to produce it. According to Avalokitavrata, Bhavaviveka's objection is based on the principle that phenomena which meet must be simultaneously existent, but Bhavaviveka himself does not make clear the reasons for his objection. Chandrakirti surmises that perhaps Bhavaviveka means that only physical things can meet; Avalokitavrata's interpretation is broader, but the requirement of simultaneous existence is present for a physical meeting also. Chandrakirti's answer to Bhavaviveka's objection is two-fold:

~ First, Buddha made statements such as, 'This monk has met with (that is, attained)

the fruit'. Second, Nagarjuna himself used the word prapya as a substitute for pratitya.

His answer is indeed to the point because Bhavaviveka would not want to quarrel with Nagarjuna.

Interestingly, in Nagarjuna's verse etymology, prati seems to be etymologized as 'this and that' (tat tat); this would affirm the view that prati is to be taken as meaning 'multiplicity', or 'diverse', or 'this and that', contradicting Chandrakirti's contention on this point. Chandrakirti might answer, however, that Nagarjuna is giving an example of things relied upon, not an etymology of prati. for, prati itself means prapti, 'meeting' or 'attainment', and it modifies i, which usually means 'go', to cause it to mean prapti.¹¹⁹ prapti means apeksha, 'reliance', and thus the compound pratityasamutpada means 'arising in reliance' and 'arising in dependence', or, more cogently, 'dependent-arising'. It means the arising of things in dependence on causes and conditions, a very sign of their non-inherent existence.

prapyasamutpada, apekshyasamutpada, and pratityasamutpada are synonyms; however, they are sometimes explained with individual meanings. prapyasamutpada, 'arising through meeting', is taken as referring to the dependent-arising which is the production of things by their causes. This is the meaning that the Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, and Chittamatrins give to 'dependent-arising'; for them, however, dependent-arising is a sign of things' true existence, not a sign of their non-true existence. 'Meeting' can even be taken literally in the sense of indicating that a cause's approaching cessation and its effect's approaching production are simultaneous.

Apekshyasamutpada, 'existing in reliance' or 'relative existence', is taken as referring to the dependent-arising which is the attainment by products and non-products of their own entities in reliance on their parts. This meaning of dependent-arising is a distinguishing feature of the Madhyamika system and is said to be the Svatantrika-Madhyamikas' favored means of proving no true existence, but it is also shared with such Prasangika masters as Aryadeva.¹²⁰ Things undeniably appear to the mind to be separate from their parts as when it is thought, 'This house has ten rooms'. The house appears to be one thing and the ten rooms appear to be another.

L4: [Dependent on its basis of imputation, or better : on the thought that designates them – that includes conceptual interdependence] :L4

Pratityasamutpada, 'dependent-existence', is taken as referring to the dependent-arising which is the designation of all phenomena in DEPENDENCE ON THE THOUGHT THAT DESIGNATES THEM.

Without thought to designate the existence of phenomena, the arising of phenomena does not occur. However, phenomena undeniably appear to common beings as if they exist in and of themselves, appearing from the object's side toward the subject rather than appearing to be imputed by the subject toward the object. 'EXISTING IN DEPENDENCE ON A DESIGNATING CONSCIOUSNESS' is the special meaning of dependent-arising in the Prasangika system. The other two meanings are also wholeheartedly accepted by the Prasangikas, but their own special interpretation is to take pratityasamutpada as referring to the designation of phenomena DEPENDENT NOT JUST ON THEIR PARTS OR BASES OF DESIGNATION BUT ALSO ON THE THOUGHT THAT DESIGNATES THEM.

When Chandrakirti says that dependent-arising is the arising of things dependent on causes

and conditions, the words 'causes and conditions' do not refer just to usual causes and conditions such as seeds or ignorance. 'Causes and conditions' also refer to the parts of an object—an object's basis of designation—and to the thought that designates the existence of an object. The word 'arising' means not just 'production' but also 'existence' and 'establishment'; all phenomena are dependent existents or relative existents.

Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (VIII. 12) says:

:: A doer arises dependent on a doing,
:: And a doing exists dependent on a doer.
:: Except for that, we do not see
:: Another cause for their establishment.

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\ 8:12.

\ The producer proceeds being dependent on the product, and the product proceeds being dependent on the producer.

\ The cause for realization (i.e. Nirvana) is seen in nothing else.

It is clear that Nagarjuna does not mean that these two cause each other with each one arising after the other one; such would be impossible. Doer and doing are mutually dependent in terms of the attainment of their entities through designation by thought.

L4: [Dependent-arising is the king of reasonings because it can, without residue, overcome both extremes.] :L4

The reasoning is:

:: All phenomena do not inherently exist because of being dependent-arisings.

Or, in its most powerful form:

:: All phenomena do not inherently exist because of being dependently imputed.

Here, 'all phenomena' means 'each and every phenomenon'. Through ascertaining the reason—that all phenomena are dependent-arisings—the extreme of annihilation is avoided, and realization of the dependent-arising of causes and effects is gained. Through ascertaining the thesis—that all phenomena do not inherently exist—the extreme of permanence is avoided, and realization of the emptiness of all phenomena is gained.

Furthermore, through ascertaining the reason—that all phenomena are dependent-arisings—the extreme of permanence is also avoided because it is realized that phenomena are just interdependently existent, not inherently existent. Through ascertaining the thesis—that all phenomena do not inherently exist—the extreme of annihilation is also avoided because it is realized that only inherent existence is negated, not existence in general. As a yogi progresses in understanding dependent-arising, realization of how the reason and the thesis each avoid the two extremes becomes subtler and subtler.

L4: [All other reasonings that prove no inherent existence derive from this king of reasons, dependent-arising.] :L4

In the Prasangika system the main reasonings proving no inherent existence are the refutation of the four extreme types of production, called the diamond slivers, and the sevenfold analysis of the relationship of the person and the mind-body complex, to be

explained in the next chapter.

Ultimately, the diamond slivers meets back to dependent-arising as Chandrakirti says in his Supplement (VI. 114):

```
::    Because things are not produced causelessly,  
::    Or from Ishvara and so forth,  
::    Or from other, from self, or both,  
::    They are dependently produced.  
  
\    ####  
\    157.  
\    Because things are not produced without a cause,  
\    Not from causes such as Ishvara and so forth,  
\    And not from self, other, or both,  
\    They are produced completely dependently.
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The very fact that external phenomena, such as sprouts, and internal phenomena, such as actions, arise dependent on their causes (seeds and ignorance) establishes that their production is empty of natural existence and eliminates that they are produced from self, other, both, or causelessly. This is mainly based on the reasoning of dependent-production, and in this sense the diamond slivers derives from dependent-arising.

The diamond slivers also derives from dependent-designation, which is more difficult to realize than dependent-production. When a yogi searches to find the object that is being imputed in the expression, 'A sprout is growing,' he gains ascertainment that it does not grow from self, other, both, or causelessly. Through the force of this realization he develops ascertainment that the production of sprouts and so forth is just a conventional designation and through this develops ascertainment that if the object imputed in the expression 'production' is sought, it cannot be found. This is how the reasoning which refutes production of the four extreme types derives from dependent-arising, or dependent-designation.

Ultimately, the sevenfold reasoning refuting an inherently existent person also derives from dependent-arising.

As Chandrakirti says (Supplement VI. 158):

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::    [The person] is not established in fact  
::    Or in the world in the seven ways,  
::    But without analysis, here in the world  
::    Is imputed in dependence on its parts.  
  
\    ####  
\    [VI.158]  
\    201.  
\    Indeed it is not established by the seven ways,  
\    Either in thatness or for the worldly;  
  
\    ####  
\    But from the point of view of the worldly without analysis  
\    It is imputed here in dependence upon its parts.
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The non-finding of a person as either the same as mind and body, or as different from them,

or as their base, or as based on them, or as possessing them, or as their shape, or as their composite induces the ascertainment that a person is just imputed to the mental and physical aggregates. Similarly, a realization that a person is just imputed in dependence upon the aggregates induces the ascertainment that a person is not findable in these seven ways. Thus, the sevenfold analysis can be seen as contained in an investigation of dependent-designation, the subtlest meaning of dependent-arising.

L4: [Dependent origination are not different, but still not the same – the inseparability of the Two Truths] :L4

It is even said that emptiness and dependent-arising are synonyms, but this is not in the sense that 'pot' and its definition 'that which is bulbous and able to hold water' are synonyms. Also, the synonymy of emptiness and dependent-arising does not mean that a consciousness which ascertains that effects arise dependent on causes and conditions also ascertains the meaning of their being empty of inherently existent production. Furthermore, the meaning of the term 'dependent-arising' is not asserted to be the meaning of emptiness. An explicit ascertainment of a dependent-arising does not even carry with it an implicit ascertainment of emptiness. Rather, emptiness is synonymous with dependent-arising for Madhyamikas who through valid cognition have refuted inherent existence.

Not just anyone who realizes dependent-arising can realize its synonymy with emptiness since many even see dependent-arising as a reason for asserting inherent existence. However, when a Madhyamika ascertains that external and internal things are dependent-arising, he realizes, based on the force of this very understanding, that being empty of inherent existence is the meaning of being a dependent-arising. For, he has realized that what inherently exists does not rely on anything, and he has realized that inherent existence and dependent-arising are contradictory.

Since through dependent-arising itself he has found realization of the emptiness that negates inherent existence, when he sees, hears, or is mindful that sprouts and so forth depend on causes and conditions, he is drawn to thinking of the manner in which these sprouts do not inherently exist. His mind has been thoroughly trained to consider the unfindability of phenomena through merely perceiving that they arise dependent on causes and conditions. He is so conditioned to think of emptiness as soon as he notices causal conditionally that in a future life, even though emptiness is not taught to him, the mere hearing of the doctrine of cause and effect revivifies his former understanding. His probing of the unfindability of phenomena is renewed, and his progress on the path toward direct cognition of emptiness is enhanced. He overcomes the bonds of forgetfulness that accompany the passage from one lifetime to another due to the difficulties of birth and the accustoming to a new body. Since cause and effect are taught practically everywhere, the yogi can 'outwit' the contrary forces that would take him away from continuing penetration of emptiness by taking the doctrine of cause and effect and using it as his means to penetrate emptiness.

Through realizing how the other types of reasoning meet back to dependent-arising, it is seen how working properly on any one of them could involve understanding the meaning of all the others. Through seeing dependent-arising, it is said that a yogi sees Buddha in the sense that Buddha as a Truth Body is not different from the nature of dependent-arising.¹²¹

L3: [Elimination of error] :L3

Because all phenomena, including emptinesses, are dependent-arising and thus do not truly exist, Jam-yang-shay-ba (see p.676) criticizes Daktsang for claiming that 'ultimate' (paramartha, don dam), 'validly established' (pramanasiddha, tshad mas grub pa), and 'able to set itself up' (Tib: tshugs thub tu grub pa) are synonyms. Daktsang refuses to accept that conventional phenomena are validly established because for him 'validly established' means that an object is able to establish itself independently.¹²² Jam-yang-shay-ba points out that there is no system of tenets, even within Hinayana, which asserts that what is validly established must also be 'able to set itself up'. For, in the Sautrantika system 'generally characterized phenomena' (samanyalakshana, spyi mtshan) or permanent phenomena are validly established but are not able to establish themselves because they depend on thought.

Still, it does seem that the Vaibhashikas assert that all phenomena are self-established because they assert that every phenomenon has its own self-sufficient entity.¹²³ The Vaibhashikas maintain that all existents are 'substantially established' (dravyasiddha, rdzas grub) though they reserve 'substantially existent' (dravyasat, rdzas yod) merely for those phenomena that can bear analysis. For the Vaibhashikas, ultimate truths are not emptinesses, as the Madhyamikas and Chittamatrins assert, but objects such as forms and consciousnesses which, even if analyzed down to their smallest particles or moments, are still instances of form or consciousness. Objects such as tables and chairs, however, disappear from the mind if one considers their individual particles and asks if those are tables; thus, they are conventional truths. However, each particle is still an instance of form; therefore, the Vaibhashikas assert that partless particles, partless moments of consciousness, and permanent phenomena can bear ultimate analysis. For them forms, consciousnesses, spaces, and so forth are ultimate truths. All composite objects, such as chairs and pots, are conventional truths, and Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be implying that though conventional truths are for them 'substantially established', they are not 'able to set themselves up'.

In any case, the Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Madhyamikas agree that what is validly established need not be self-established. Jam-yang-shay-ba says that if one insists that in the Prasangika system an ultimate, that is, an emptiness, must be both validly established and able to set itself up, one misses the distinctive feature of Madhyamika and the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, this being the dependent existence of everything. However, Daktsang does not accept the valid establishment of anything and says further that whatever is 'validly established' must be also 'self-established'. He, therefore, does not himself accept that emptinesses are 'self-established', but Jam-yang-shay-ba forces on him the conclusion that emptinesses are 'self-established' or truly existent because for Jam-yang-shay-ba an emptiness must be validly established just because it exists.

Since an analytical consciousness discovers or finds the unfindability of an object, this unfindability (emptiness) might seem to be inherently existent.¹²⁴ It is true that when an analytical consciousness searches to find whether an object inherently exists or not, it does find an emptiness of the object; however, when this very analytical consciousness searches to find the emptiness of the object, it 'finds' or cognizes an emptiness of the emptiness of the object. Thus, though an emptiness is an ultimate truth, it does not ultimately exist. This does not diminish the fact that when conjoined with practice of the Bodhisattva deeds, cognition of and thorough acquaintance with emptiness grant the highest of boons, liberation from cyclic existence and, finally, omniscience.

L2: [5. Refuting a Self of Persons (reasoning #2 : THE SEVENFOLD REASONING: refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)] :L2

Sources:

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings
- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.677-97
- [See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

¢[From Emptiness Yoga, chapter 13:

¢-- Now Jang-gya indicates that he will not give a separate explanation of the reasoning of the lack of being one or many — singular or plural — because an explanation of it is contained in the following, lengthy explanation of the sevenfold reasoning.

¢-- “One can understand [the reasoning of] the lack of being one or many through the explanation of the sevenfold reasoning”.]

L3: [The origin of the Sevenfold Reasoning] :L3

In general 'self (atman, bdag), 'person' (pudgala, gang zag) and 'I' (aham, nga) are synonyms along with 'creature' or 'being' (purusha, skyes bu), which has also been translated here as 'person'.¹²⁵ However, when Prasangikas speak specifically of a self of persons (pudgalatman, gang zag gi bdag), this 'self does not refer to the conventionally existent person which is imputed in dependence on the aggregates of mind and body. In the term 'self of persons', 'self means 'inherent existence', and the word 'persons' means 'nominally exist persons'. Hence, the term 'selflessness of persons' means the non-inherent existence of nominally existent persons. 'Inherent existence' means 'independent existence', 'objective existence', 'natural existence', or 'existence under its own power', etc. The meaning of inherent existence is best seen when one progresses toward realizing the imputed nature of the person.¹²⁶

Yogis who long to be freed from the round of birth, aging, sickness, and death do not initially meditate on the emptiness of pillars, pots and sprouts but on the emptiness, or selflessness, of persons.¹²⁷ Having gained an understanding of the emptiness of persons, a yogi turns to meditation on the emptiness of the other phenomena which are included within the continuum of a person, such as body and mind, and finally to meditation on the emptiness of phenomena not included within the personal continuum, such as pillars and houses. He might use the king of reasons, dependent-arising, in his meditation on the emptiness of the person, but the fivefold and sevenfold reasonings are renowned among the Prasangikas as the easiest means for gaining a quick and penetrating understanding of emptiness.

THE FIVEFOLD REASONING is based on a description in sutra of twenty false views of a real self:¹²⁸

- :: viewing forms, i.e., body, as a self
- :: viewing the self as inherently possessing forms
- :: viewing the self as inherently existing in forms
- :: viewing forms as inherently existing in the self
- :: viewing feelings as a self
- :: viewing the self as inherently possessing feelings
- :: viewing the self as inherently existing in feelings
- :: viewing feelings as inherently existing in the self
- :: viewing discriminations as a self
- :: viewing the self as inherently possessing discriminations
- :: viewing the self as inherently existing in discriminations
- :: viewing discriminations as inherently existing in the self
- :: viewing compositional factors as a self
- :: viewing the self as inherently possessing compositional factors
- :: viewing the self as inherently existing in compositional factors
- :: viewing compositional factors as inherently existing in the self
- :: viewing consciousness as a self
- :: viewing the self as inherently possessing consciousness
- :: viewing the self as inherently existing in consciousness
- :: viewing consciousness as inherently existing in the self.

These are five sets of four positions; Nagarjuna's fivefold analysis is based on these four positions with THE ADDITION OF A FIFTH: viewing the self as a different entity from forms and so forth. Five modes are not mentioned in sutra because Buddha had already taught that without apprehending the aggregates, it is impossible for the innate false view of a self to conceive of a real self. For this reason, a false view of the self as a totally different entity from the aggregates is not innate but artificial, learned through the mistaken teachings of the non-Buddhist Forders. Also, because the innate false view of a real self does not conceive the person and the aggregates to be either one or different, all twenty false views of a self are only artificial. However, if the self existed as conceived by the innate view of a real self, it would be either one with the aggregates or a different entity from the aggregates. Therefore, the self as conceived by the innate misconception of inherent existence is analyzed in the same way as the self that is misconceived through artificial teachings.

The object of observation of an innate false view of an inherently existent person is the nominally existent self or person and not the mental and physical aggregates. However, among the twenty false views of a self the object of observation is often the aggregates. Still, the aggregates are phenomena related to the self which is the object observed by a false view of a self, and, therefore, even these are named 'false views of a real self. For instance, if forms are viewed as an inherently existent self, the base of the view or the object of observation is a form, and, therefore, such a misconception is a conception of a self of phenomena and not of a self of persons. When, on the other hand, the person is viewed as inherently possessing form, the object of observation is the person, and, therefore, such a misconception is a conception of a self of persons. If the person is viewed as inherently existing in forms, the base of the view or the object of observation is a form, and, therefore, such a misconception is a conception of a self of phenomena and not of a self of persons. If it is viewed that forms inherently exist in the person, the person is the base of the view or the object of observation, and such a misconception is a conception of a self of persons.

The same distinctions can be extended to the other sixteen views. Thus, some of the so-called 'false views of a real self are actually misconceptions of a self of phenomena other than persons. Since Nagarjuna's fivefold reasoning is based on the modes of the false view of a real self, both the fivefold and the sevenfold reasonings can be said to involve refutation of a self of phenomena other than persons in order to establish the selflessness of the person. Due to the fact that the base or object of observation of the false view of a real self must be the person and not the aggregates, it might be necessary to say that not all twenty false views of a real self are actual false views of a real self but are only named so.

THE FIVEFOLD REASONING as stated in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way is:

:: The self does not inherently exist because of
:: (1) not being [the same as] the aggregates,
:: (2) not being other than the aggregates,
:: (3) not being the base of the aggregates,
:: (4) not depending on the aggregates, and
:: (5) not possessing the aggregates.
:: An example is a chariot.

\ ####
\ 22:1.
\ That one [who is "fully-completed"] is not the "groups of universal elements"
(skandha),
\ nor something other than the "groups";
\ the "groups" are not in him, nor is he in them;
\ The "fully completed" does not possess the "groups."
\ What, then, is the "fully completed"?

The reason is fivefold, and thus it is called the fivefold reasoning.

CHANDRAKIRTI ADDED TWO MORE 'CORNERS' TO THE REASON:

:: (6) not being the shape of the aggregates, and
:: (7) not being the composite of the aggregates.

In a slightly longer form THE SEVENFOLD REASONING is:129

Except for only being imputed in dependence upon the aggregates which are its basis of imputation, there is no self-subsistent self, for:

-- the aggregates which are the basis of the imputation are not [the same as] the person
-- the person is not an entity other than the aggregates which are the basis of its imputation
-- the person is not the support of the aggregates which are its basis of imputation
-- the person ultimately does not depend on the aggregates which are its basis of imputation
-- the person ultimately does not possess the aggregates
-- the person is not the shape of the aggregates which are its basis of imputation
-- the person is not the composite of the aggregates which are the basis of its imputation.

For example, if a chariot is sought analytically, there is no self-subsistent chariot to be found.

L3: [The three basic essential in meditation] :L3

In the sevenfold reasoning, in order to realize the thesis that the I does not inherently exist,

-- [first, identifying THE OBJECT OF REFUTATION]

-- [then :] it is necessary FIRST TO REALIZE THE PERVASION of the sevenfold reason by the predicate of the thesis. In other words, one must first realize that whatever does not exist in these seven ways does not inherently exist.

-- After that, one establishes THE PRESENCE OF THE SEVEN REASONS IN THE SUBJECT, I.

By the force of realizing the pervasion of these seven reasons by the predicate of non-inherent existence and by the force of establishing the presence of these seven reasons in the subject, I, THE I CAN BE REALIZED AS NOT INHERENTLY EXISTENT.

L3: [The example of the chariot] :L3

FIRST, the predicate of the thesis ('does not inherently exist') is to be applied to an EXAMPLE ('CHARIOT') which is familiar in the world, since an example is easier to understand than the actual thesis. It is not that the emptiness of a chariot is to be realized before realizing the emptiness of a person, but it is important first to see how the mode of analysis works through an example which is easier than the actual subject.

Applied to a chariot the reasoning is:130

:: A chariot does not inherently exist because of not being its parts, not being other than its parts, not being in its parts, not being that in which its parts exist, not possessing its parts, not being the composite of its parts, and not being the shape of its parts.

THESE SEVEN REASONS MUST BE ESTABLISHED AS QUALITIES OF THE SUBJECT, A CHARIOT.

-- A chariot is NOT INHERENTLY THE SAME entity as its own parts (axles, wheels, etc.) because if it were one with them, just as its parts are many, so the chariot would also be many. Or, just as the chariot is one, its parts also would be one. Furthermore, the agent—the chariot as the whole which conveys its parts when it moves—and the object—the conveyed parts—would absurdly be one. (i.e. Not "the same" (individually or collectively) because, there would be no need for two names; whole is one and parts are many; subject and complement would be the same; one slight modification on the parts would make a new identity for the whole.)

-- A chariot is NOT INHERENTLY OTHER than its own parts because if it were other, it would be a different entity from its parts. Things which are different entities and which exist at the same time must be unrelatly other; therefore, just as a horse and a cow are unrelatly other and apprehendable separately, so a chariot would have to be apprehendable separately from its own parts. However, it is not so apprehended. Therefore, a chariot is not inherently other than its parts. (i.e. Not "different" otherwise they would be unrelatly, and one would be seen without the other; one would not be the base of imputation of the other -- so the designation of the self would have no valid basis)

-- A chariot's parts DO NOT INHERENTLY DEPEND on the chariot because if they did, the parts and the chariot would have to be inherently other. The impossibility of this has already

been explained. (i.e. Not the case that one depends on the other (as if different and dependent); or one is in the other.)

-- Also, a chariot DOES NOT INHERENTLY DEPEND ON its parts because if it did, the chariot and its parts would have to be inherently other. The impossibility of this has already been explained. (i.e. Not the case that one depends on the other (as if different and dependent); or one is in the other.)

-- A chariot does not inherently POSSESS its parts either in the manner that a man possesses a cow or in the manner that a man possesses his body. For, the former mode of possession is that of different entities, and the latter mode of possession is that of the same entity. Thus, the chariot and its parts would have to be either different entities or the same entity. Both of these have already been refuted. (i.e. The two kinds of possessions are like oneness and difference that have been refuted above.)

-- A chariot is also NOT JUST THE COMPOSITE of its parts because the shapes of the individual parts cannot be a chariot nor can the shape of the composite of the parts be a chariot since it is impossible for the shapes before or after arrangement to be a chariot. If it were said that the shapes of the parts which are not different from their shapes before arrangement are a chariot, then since there is no difference in shape before and after arrangement, just as the shapes are not a chariot before arrangement, so they would not be a chariot after arrangement. If it were said that the shapes of the parts which are different from the shape that they had before arrangement are the chariot, then since there would be different shapes to the axles, wheels, and so forth, after arrangement, these different shapes would have to be apprehendable. However, they are not. (i.e. The composite means the pile of aggregates without their arrangement – Not the composite because there is no inherent composite (the composite and its parts are not the same, not different); because it is just the basis of designation of the whole/self; subject and complement would be the same; one slight modif on the parts would make a new identity for the whole.)

-- Also, THE SHAPE of the composite of the parts is not a chariot because the composite of the parts does not inherently exist. There is no composite of the parts of a chariot separate from the parts of a chariot because if there were, the composite could be apprehended without apprehending the parts. Nor is the composite of the parts one with the parts themselves because if it were, either the composite would be many like the many parts or the parts would be one like the one composite.¹³¹ Therefore, the shape of the composite of the parts only imputedly exists and is not suitable to be a substantially existent chariot. For the Prasangikas, the shape of the composite of the parts is a basis of the imputation of a chariot, but not even conventionally can it be considered a chariot. (i.e. The shape means the pile of aggregates with their shape – Not the shape because there is no inherent composite (the composite and its parts are not the same, not different); because it is just the basis of designation of the whole/self; subject and complement would be the same; one slight modif on the shape would make a new identity for the whole.)

WHEN A CHARIOT IS SOUGHT IN THESE SEVEN WAYS, IT IS NOT FOUND, BUT A CHARIOT DOES NOT

THEREBY BECOME NON-EXISTENT. Still, the non-finding of a chariot in these seven ways is true both ultimately and conventionally. Even as a conventional truth a chariot is unfindable in these seven ways; however, a chariot conventionally exists because the assertion of a chariot is not made from the point of view of its being established by the reasoning that analyzes whether it inherently exists or not. A chariot is established as existing when

there is no analysis to find the object imputed; it is established only by a non-defective, conventional, worldly consciousness. Thus, a chariot is presented as only imputedly existent in the sense that it is imputed in dependence on its parts (the axles, wheels, etc.) and is not any of them.

THE SVATANTRIKAS, CHITTAMATRINS, SAUTRANTIKAS, AND VAIBHASHIKAS all say that if the composite of the parts, or the shape, etc., could not be assigned as the whole, the chariot (or whole) would be non-existent. For there is no whole which is a separate entity from its parts. Therefore, in all these schools chariots and so forth are assigned as some phenomenon from among their bases of designation: either their composite, their shape, or one of the bases of imputation. These schools do not accept that chariots and so forth are just nominally imputed in the sense of being unfindable among their bases of designation. For them, things have their own natural existence. In these schools, to be merely nominally imputed only means that a phenomenon is not something separate from its bases of designation. For instance, though a person appears to be the boss of his aggregates of mind and body, he is shown to be one of the aggregates—either the mental consciousness, or a mind-basis-of-all (alayavijnana, kun gzhi mam shes), or the continuum of the aggregates, or the continuum of the mental consciousness, and so forth.

IN THE EXTRAORDINARY PRASANGIKA SYSTEM, neither the composite of the parts nor the individual parts are taken to be the whole. Still, the Prasangikas are able to present well all the objects and agents of cyclic existence and of nirvana within the context of just nominally imputed wholes, parts, qualities, qualificands, and so forth. Tsong Khapa urgently advises that this method of analysis be studied and practiced because it is a profound means of quickly finding the view of emptiness.

As Chandrakirti says in the Commentary to the 'Supplement',

:: 'These worldly conventionalities do not exist when analyzed in this way, but exist through non-analytical renown. Therefore, when yogis analyze these through this series [of reasons], they penetrate very quickly to the depth of suchness.'

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\ [VI.160]
\ 203.
\ How can it be said that that which is non-existent in the seven ways exists
\ When its existence is not found by Yogis?
\ Since they realize thatness easily,
\ Its existence should be asserted in the same way here.

L3: [Then, turning to the main subject : the 'self'] :L3

Through the example of a chariot one gains familiarity with the modes of the sevenfold reasoning.¹³² However, unlike the other Buddhist schools, the Prasangikas do not say that for the example of the chariot to be correct the meditator must first realize the predicate of the thesis, 'does not inherently exist', as a quality of the chariot and then proceed to the subject of the original syllogism, the person. If one first had to realize the emptiness of a chariot before realizing the emptiness of a person, then the emptiness of a person would not be the initial object of meditation for those who seek liberation. Furthermore, it would be pointless to state many reasons to prove the selflessness of a person because one

would realize the emptiness of a person through merely turning one's mind to this subject. For, the emptiness of a chariot would already have been validly cognized, and a realization of the emptiness of one thing is sufficient preparation for the realization of the emptiness of anything else that the mind turns to while still remembering the first realization. In the Prasangika system, examples which are merely more familiar in the world than the subject of the main thesis are often given. This is why mirror images and magician's illusions are so often used as examples; just as a mirror image of a face is empty of being a face, so objects are empty of being inherently existent. However, realization that a mirror image of a face is not a face is not a cognition of the emptiness of a mirror image. It is a conventional analog of the extraordinary and unfamiliar cognition of emptiness.

Thus, a yogi's aim in analyzing a chariot is not to gain a thorough realization of a chariot's emptiness but to gain familiarity with the mode of reasoning so that he can apply it to the person, for it is misconception of the nature of the person that causes transmigration and the repeated rounds of the suffering of birth, aging, sickness, and death.

THE SEVEN-CORNERED REASON MUST BE ESTABLISHED AS A QUALITY OF THE PERSON: 133

(1) THE SELF AND THE AGGREGATES ARE NOT INHERENTLY ONE

- because the assertion of a self would then be senseless. For, 'self' would only be a synonym of the aggregates, just as 'rabbit-bearer' (that which has the figure of a rabbit in it) is a synonym of 'moon'.
- Also, just as the aggregates are many, so the selves would be many.
- Or, just as the self is one, so the aggregates would only be one.
- Also, because the aggregates are entities which are produced and which disintegrate, the self also would be produced and would disintegrate.

If it is accepted that the self is nominally produced and nominally disintegrates, there is no fault. However, if the production and disintegration of the self naturally existed (i.e. if there is discontinuity), then there would be three faults:

- memory of former births would be impossible,
- deeds done would be wasted,
- and one would meet with the results of actions not done by oneself.

¢(i.e. Not "the same" (individually or collectively) because, there would be no need for two names; whole is one and parts are many; subject and complement would be the same; one slight modification on the parts would make a new identity for the whole.)

These three faults arise because the selves of former and later births would be naturally individual and thus would be unrelatedly other. Moreover, it is impossible for those which are naturally other to belong to one continuum, just as the being named Maitreya and the being named Upagupta who are other and are contemporaries are not one continuum.

For, Chandrakirti says (Supplement VI.61):

- :: The phenomena which are based on Maitreya and Upagupta
- :: Are different and thus not included within one continuum.
- :: Whatever are naturally separate are not
- :: Fit to be included within one continuum.

\ #####
\ [VI.61]

- \ Phenomena dependent upon Maitreya and Upayagupta
- \ Are not included in the same continuum because they are other.
- \ Thus it is not reasonable that whatever are different by way of their own characteristics
- \ Are included within the same continuum.

If two lives were naturally or inherently other, this otherness would be their nature; a sameness of continuum could not obtain between them.

If the self were inherently produced and inherently disintegrated, Buddha could not have remembered that in the past he was such and such a person because the two persons would be naturally separate. For instance, when someone named Devadatta remembers his past lives, he does not remember that he was Yajna who is his own contemporary. The fallacy of there being no memory of former lives is similar to the consequence that if cause and effect were naturally existent others, then darkness would arise from a tongue of flame. In other words, once the elements of a continuum are naturally existent or analytically findable as others, then a continuity cannot obtain between them, and there can be no continuum.

Deeds done would be wasted because the self which performed the deeds would have utterly ceased by the time the effects are experienced in another lifetime. For, the aggregates would inherently disintegrate at the end of a lifetime, and the self would be one with them. If the person did experience the results of former deeds, since those deeds would not have been done by him, he would be undergoing the effects of deeds done by another since each lifetime would be inherently separate from all other lifetimes.

The same faults do not accrue to the Prasangikas' own presentation of the self and of the relationship between deeds done in one lifetime and the effects that are experienced in another lifetime. For the Prasangikas, the 'mere I' gives rise to the thought 'I', and the various selves in the different lifetimes are instances of the 'mere I'.¹³⁴ The 'mere I' exists from one lifetime to another just because the expression 'I' is common to former and later lifetimes. Conventionally or nominally, the generality I exists from one lifetime to another, even though the particular beings which are its instances do not live from one lifetime to another. It is said to be much the same as the fact that a gold pot and a bronze pot are pots but a gold pot is not a bronze pot and a bronze pot is not a gold pot. Just so, the particular I of one lifetime is not the particular I of another lifetime, but they are both I. Still, this does not mean that there is a generality which is a separate entity from its individual instances. Just the reasoning that the particular I of each lifetime is an I is sufficient to establish that the 'mere I' exists nominally from one lifetime to another. Any further analysis into the nature of the general and particular I would constitute ultimate analysis in the face of which nothing is found.

(2) THE SELF AND THE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL AGGREGATES ARE NOT DIFFERENT entities because if they were,

- the self would not have the character of the aggregates such as production, disintegration, abiding, form, experiencing objects, and so forth.¹³⁵
- In that case, there would be no basis for the designation 'self,
- and there would be no object to apprehend as a self because the person would be a non-product.

¢(i.e. Not "different" otherwise they would be unrelated, and one would be seen without the

other; one would not be the base of imputation of the other -- so the designation of the self would have no valid basis)

All products are included within the five aggregates; thus, if the person did not have the character of the aggregates, it could not be a product. If the person were a non-product, it would have to be either a permanent existent, like nirvana, or a non-existent, like a flower in the sky. Such a phenomenon could not be a basis of the designation 'self' and could not serve as an object to be apprehended as a self. For, the self would then be changeless, and a changeless self could not take rebirth, die, cognize objects, and so forth.

Also, if the self were a different entity from the aggregates, then just as the character of consciousness can be apprehended separately from the character of form, so a self without the character of mind and body would have to be apprehendable.

However, since the self is not apprehendable separately from the aggregates of mind and body, the self is not a separate entity from the aggregates.

The non-Buddhist Forders assert that the self has a different character from the aggregates when they say that it is beyond mind and body. However, Tsong Khapa says that the Forders fail to realize that the self is only a name, that the self only nominally exists. Since the Forders see that it is impossible for the self to be the aggregates of mind and body, they fabricate a view of a permanent self, separate from mind and body.¹³⁶ Chandrakirti says that the Forders fall from conventional truths through not realizing the character of the self as a designation dependent on the aggregates and fall from ultimate truths through not realizing the lack of inherent existence of the self.¹³⁷

One of the most incisive reasonings refuting a self separate from the aggregates is that it would be useless to call such an unchangeable phenomenon 'self'. Without the experiencing of objects or the taking of rebirth the word 'self' loses any meaning. The Vedantins use the term 'self', however, to refer to the non-dual and final nature of the universe. They refer to cognition of the all pervasive Brahman which is the self of the universe as well as one's own actual self. The finitude and diseased nature of the ordinary self is cancelled in its identification with Brahman, and the distance of Brahman as the ultimate reality is cancelled in its identification with the self. The immediacy of the self remains and is extended through identification to Brahman, and the ultimacy or absolute nature of Brahman remains and is extended through identification to the self. The finite living being (jiva) becomes the infinite Brahman in vivid realization. The transmutation of the living being into Brahman requires a complete destruction of egocentricity. Still, the essence of reality is called 'self'.

In Buddhism, also, when emptiness is directly cognized, the object—emptiness—and the subject—a wisdom consciousness become like water poured into water, totally undifferentiable. However, the Prasangikas seem to be questioning the value of calling the highest reality 'self' just because such a designation would increase egocentricity. The usage of the word 'self' is not required to preserve a sense of immediacy, for immediacy is the very mode of direct perception as is witnessed every day, and when it is said that reality is perceived directly, a sense of the immediacy of reality is conveyed without reliance on the word 'self'. Also, the teaching of one all-pervasive entity would only block the way to destroying the sense that each individual thing is a truly existent one. The very chains of cyclic existence are forged with the conception of true existence that does not analyze oneness and manyness. Beings are bound in cyclic existence by their failure to

investigate whether phenomena, which they habitually conceive to exist inherently, are truly one or truly many. To conceive reality as a truly existent one pervading the many might further the habitual non-analytical intellect that causes the powerless wandering in cyclic existence. If the manifold universe could be subsumed under a truly existent Brahman, it might seem that the many parts of a table, for instance, could be subsumed under a truly existent table.

Still, it is not to be thought that meditations on the all-pervasive are absent in Buddhism. The formless meditative absorptions in which space, consciousness, nothingness, or something subtler than even nothingness are seen as all-pervasive are common to both Hinayana and Mahayana and the non-Buddhist systems as well. In tantric practice a meditator often views himself and his environment as one entity; the world is visualized as a mandala and is reduced to the size of a drop. Also, the metaphor of water poured into water as a description of the mode of the direct cognition of emptiness intentionally indicates a fusion of subject and object. Technically, everything true of the subject is not true of the object and vice versa, but the experience must be something like that. No ordinary being has ever experienced such a complete oneness, for a oneness is always a composite of parts, and each part is not one with every other part in terms of function, position, and so forth. It is questionable whether the word 'one' can convey any of the sense of such a state. Still, some Tibetan orders do refer to the one mind, or the one sphere of the nature of phenomena, whereas the Gelugpas restrict themselves to a metaphor, the undifferentiability of fresh water poured into fresh water.

The question here is not whether there are practices common to Hinduism and Buddhism that are aimed at developing a sense of pervasion but whether these practices are the primary means of cognizing reality. For the Buddhists such practices are means to enhance the concentrative power of the mind in order to further analytical penetration into the nature of things. This analysis revolves around developing an understanding that oneness and manyness do not naturally inhere in objects. An unsuccessful attempt to find the self under specific types of analysis is seen as a prerequisite for progress toward liberation from cyclic existence. In both sutra and tantra teachings such analysis is a necessity because it is this which breaks the bonds of misconception, and misconception of the nature of things is the ignorance that causes the powerless rounds of birth, aging, sickness, and death. For instance, Buddhists accept that non-Buddhist yogis have attained the marvelous experience of the entry, abiding, and dissolving of the winds into the central channel. However, the Buddhist form of the practice is still considered to be basically different because the non-Buddhists' practice is not preceded by this type of analysis of phenomena.¹³⁸ Thus, it is said that without the view of emptiness a yogi cannot cause the winds to dissolve into the indestructible mid-point of the heart center.

What the Prasangika analysis is refuting in the sevenfold reasoning must be clearly defined; the self is not being reduced to miniscule size nor is it being expanded to pervade the universe. The self is realized as an imputation dependent on the mental and physical aggregates. The meditator is told again and again that when he realizes the unfindability of the self, what appears is an utter vacuity which is the mere absence of an inherently existent self.¹³⁹ He is told again and again that at the time of direct cognition subject and object become like fresh water poured into fresh water and that the emptinesses of all phenomena are directly cognized without the slightest appearance of those phenomena themselves.

Conventionally, the self and the aggregates are the same entity and different opposites of

negatives because even conventionally the self is not the aggregates nor is it a separate entity from the aggregates. A person (or self) is none of the aggregates which are its basis of designation but is an instance of the fourth aggregate, samskaraskandha, or pile of compositional factors. Being impermanent, the self must be an aggregate, and the self is designated as a member of the fourth aggregate because it has the character of all the aggregates. Since the self has the character of all the aggregates, it cannot be designated as a form aggregate, feeling aggregate, discrimination aggregate, or consciousness aggregate. It is, therefore, called a 'compositional factor' aggregate because this aggregate is the repository for all impermanent things which are not included among the other aggregates.

It has been established in the first two 'corners' of the sevenfold reasoning that the self is neither inherently the same as nor different from the aggregates. The remaining five reasons are included in these two positions because sameness and difference of entity are a dichotomy. If the self and the aggregates inherently exist, they must be either one entity or different entities. When these two positions are refuted, the inherent existence of the self is refuted. Thus, even though all possible positions have already been refuted, the other five positions are refuted for the sake of attacking the various modes of the habitual misconception of a self.

(3) THE SELF DOES NOT ACT AS THE BASE OF THE AGGREGATES like a bowl for yogurt or like snow

that exists throughout and surrounds a forest of trees. 140 For, in that case the self and the aggregates would be different, and this position has already been refuted.

The examples provide clues for glimpsing and eventually identifying ways in which the non-analytical intellect tends to conceive the self.

¢(i.e. Not the case that one depends on the other (as if different and dependent); or one is in the other.)

(4) THE SELF DOES NOT INHERENTLY EXIST IN OR DEPEND ON THE AGGREGATES like Devadatta living

in a tent or a lion living in a forest. For, in that case the self and the aggregates would be different, and this position has already been refuted.

¢(i.e. Not the case that one depends on the other (as if different and dependent); or one is in the other.)

(5) THE SELF DOES NOT POSSESS THE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL AGGREGATES either as a DIFFERENT

entity, as in the case of a man possessing a cow, or as THE SAME entity, as in the case of a man possessing his body or a tree possessing its core. For, in the first case the self and the aggregates would be different entities, and in the second case they would be the same entity. Refutations of these positions have already been stated.

The meaning of the word 'have' or 'possess' is being analyzed here. It seems most likely that a self would possess its aggregates in the manner of sameness of entity, but once a sameness of entity is asserted to be findable under analysis, then the possessor and the possessed become one. The concept of 'my body' or 'my mind' cannot bear such analysis.

¢(i.e. The two kinds of possessions are like oneness and difference that have been refuted above.)

(6) THE SELF IS NOT JUST THE COMPOSITE OF THE AGGREGATES OF MIND AND BODY because the composite is the basis of the designation 'self' and, therefore, cannot be the self.

It is said¹⁴¹ that a Buddha does not confuse or mix the basis of the designation of a phenomenon with the phenomenon that is designated. Jang-gya says that this difficult point is based on a sutra that teaches that just as 'chariot' is imputed to the parts of a chariot, so the person is imputed conventionally in dependence on the aggregates.¹⁴² The Prasangikas view this as meaning that the person is not the aggregates and that this non-identity is clearly perceived by a Buddha.

Furthermore, the composite of the mental and physical aggregates does not inherently exist because the composite is unfindable as either inherently one with or different from the aggregates.

If the composite of the aggregates were one with the aggregates, the composite would be as many as the aggregates, or the aggregates would be one just as the composite is only one. If the composite were inherently different from the aggregates, then it would be apprehended separately from the aggregates and would not have the character of the aggregates, but this is not so.¹⁴³

The reasoning that the object imputed cannot be the basis of the imputation also refutes the view that the self is the continuum of the aggregates because then object imputed and basis of imputation would be one.

Also, if the self were the composite of the aggregates, then the self as the agent of the appropriation, or assumption, of the aggregates would be one with the aggregates which are its appropriation.

The five aggregates are accepted as that which is appropriated by a self as when it is said that such and such a person takes rebirth or assumes a new body and mind. The composite of the five aggregates is thus also accepted as the appropriation. If the self were the composite, the appropriator and the appropriated would be one.

If the composite of a person's various consciousnesses—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousness—is asserted to be the person, then the absurdity of the plurality of the composites and the persons would follow. Similarly, if it is said that only the mental consciousness is the person, each moment of the mental consciousness would absurdly be a different person because each moment of the mental consciousness is different.

¶(i.e. The composite means the pile of aggregates without their arrangement – Not the composite because there is no inherent composite (the composite and its parts are not the same, not different); because it is just the basis of designation of the whole/self; subject and complement would be the same; one slight modification on the parts would make a new identity for the whole.)

(7) THE SELF IS NOT THE SHAPE OF THE AGGREGATES because shape is physical, and if a self were merely shape, then the mind, etc., would not be posited as the self. If it were said that both the physical shape and the mind are the self, then either the self would be two, or shape and consciousness would be one.

In most cases, beings are identified by their shape; the difference between a cow and a human is commonly determined by their different shapes.¹⁴⁴ It is being taught here that

common beings confuse the basis of the designation, which is not the person, with the person that is designated. (All animals—cows, horses, and so forth—are accepted as persons.) It is commonly said, for instance, that a dog is black whereas it is meant that the color of its hair is black. The color of a dog is a basis of the designation 'dog', but it itself is not a dog.

¢(i.e. The shape means the pile of aggregates with their shape – Not the shape because there is no inherent composite (the composite and its parts are not the same, not different); because it is just the basis of designation of the whole/self; subject and complement would be the same; one slight modif on the shape would make a new identity for the whole.)

THE NON-FINDING OF THE PERSON IN ANY OF THESE SEVEN MODES IS THE MEANING OF THE NON-INHERENT

EXISTENCE OF THE PERSON. Since even as a conventional truth a person is not findable in these seven ways, even conventionally a person does not naturally exist. However, when there is no analysis to find the object imputed, a person undeniably is validly established as able to perform functions; therefore, the self does nominally exist. Furthermore, when a consciousness thinking, 'I', is generated, it is generated based on the five aggregates. Hence, it is said that a person is only imputed or designated in dependence on the five aggregates.

As Chandrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred' (Bodhisattvayogacharyachatuhsatakātika) says,¹⁴⁵

:: 'Therefore, when analyzed in this manner, an inherent existence of things is not established.

:: Thus, [only] an illusory nature remains individually for things.'

Chandrakirti thereby indicates that an illusory object does remain.

The Madhyamika view is the complete negation without residue of inherent existence, which is refuted through analytical reasoning. After the negation, there must also remain a flawless presentation of all the objects and agents of the dependent-arising of cause and effect which are like the creations of a magician, appearing to be inherently existent but actually not inherently existent. Thus, the Madhyamika view is a composite of (1) a non-affirming negative of inherent existence and (2) a presentation of agents and objects which are like illusions. Jang-gya says there are practically none who understand the Madhyamika view, emphasizing that it is extremely difficult to find the correct view. One is exhorted to make great effort to understand this view without allowing the pure teaching to be distorted by one's own tendencies toward nihilism or eternalism.

L3: [The mine] :L3

When reasoning investigates whether the self inherently exists, it does not find the self in any of the seven ways.¹⁴⁶ This having been done, an inherent existence of the mine is easily refuted. It is not that the very same consciousness that realizes the non-inherent existence of the I realizes that the mine does not inherently exist. Rather, if the yogi merely turns his attention to the mine, its emptiness is easily realized in dependence only on the consciousness that realized the emptiness of the I. Since further reasoning is not required, Madhyamika treatises do not offer a separate reasoning to aid in realizing the non-inherent existence of the mine.

When an emptiness has been realized indirectly and inferentially through the medium of a concept, this realization is sufficient to clear the way for the immediate but subsequent realization of the emptinesses of other phenomena.¹⁴⁷ Separate reasoning is not required even though the realization of one emptiness is not itself a realization of all emptinesses. However, when the emptiness of one thing is cognized directly, the emptiness of all phenomena is cognized directly. It is not that the emptiness of one thing is the emptiness of everything; rather, the extraordinary mode of the direct cognition of emptiness—in which the object, emptiness, and the subject, the wisdom consciousness, are undifferentiable -like fresh water poured into fresh water—allows for cognition of the emptiness of all objects.

Having inferentially realized the emptiness of the I, one can readily realize the non-inherent existence of the mine both as the possessor of mind, body, and so forth and as the phenomena included within the continuum and possessed by the person. Then, passing outside of the sphere of the false view of a transitory collection as a real I and mine, one meditates on the emptiness of phenomena which are mine but not included within the continuum, such as a house, and then meditates on other phenomena which are not mine, such as a city. The same sevenfold reasoning is used to analyze the relationship between the phenomena designated and the bases of designation, as in the example of a chariot. These phenomena cannot be found under analysis and thus do not inherently exist; however, they are still accepted as validly established conventionally when there is no analysis. This acceptance is congruous with Buddha's statement that he does not debate with the world about the existence or non-existence of objects.¹⁴⁸

THE SEVENFOLD REASONING DOES NOT REFUTE NOMINAL EXISTENCE, ONLY OBJECTIVELY ESTABLISHED EXISTENCE.

L3: [Particularities of the Gelugpa's teaching: affirming valid establishment as a skillful means against the danger of nihilism] :L3

The mere apprehension of I and mine are not erroneous; the error is the further misconception of the nominally existent I and mine as objectively existent. Even Buddhas have valid cognizers that perceive I and mine, but they do not confuse the basis of designation with the phenomenon designated. Some say that this teaching is so subtle and difficult to penetrate that it is not only useless but also injurious.¹⁴⁹ They say that those who cannot discriminate between nominal existence and 'objective' existence would be led into affirming their misconceptions of I and mine as real because Tsong Khapa asserts that the mere apprehension of I and mine is valid. Still, this most unusual and penetrating of Tsong Khapa's teachings is a call to eradicating misconceptions and should not be taken as affirming one's accustomed conception of oneself. It is undeniable that ordinary beings see the bases of designations as the phenomena designated, and Tsong Khapa's teaching is clear that even conventionally nothing is its basis of designation. Tsong Khapa is able, through the subtlety of affirming the apprehension of I and mine as valid, to present all the objects and agents of cyclic existence and of nirvana under the rubric of valid establishment and thereby block one gate of the road to nihilism. This subtlety does not in any way affirm an ordinary being's consent to the appearance of objects as objectively existent; eternalism, or the reification of what exists, is not a concomitant of affirming valid existence. As Jam-yang-shay-ba says, to think that the valid establishment of objects implies their objective existence does not pass beyond the thought of non-Madhyamikas.

L3: [Particularities of the Prasangikas] :L3

The cardinal difference between the Prasangikas and the non-Prasangikas, as defined by Tsong Khapa, Jam-yang-shay-ba, and so forth, is THE PRASANGIKAS' UNCOMMON NOTION THAT THE EXISTENT

PERSON IS NOT ANY OR ALL OF THE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL AGGREGATES. The other Buddhist schools

accept either the composite of the aggregates, or the continuum of the aggregates, or the mental consciousness, or the continuum of the mental consciousness as the self. For them, actions could have no cause or effect if the self were merely imputed in the sense of being totally Unfindable among the bases of designation of the self. The Prasangikas answer that if objects were analytically findable as the concrete entities they seem to be, cause and effect would be impossible.

L3: [The need to realize both selflessness] :L3

According to the Prasangikas, even Hearers and Solitary Realizers cognize the same emptiness as Bodhisattvas; all Superiors realize that persons and other phenomena do not inherently exist.¹⁵⁰ It is necessary to be freed from the afflictions to achieve nirvana, which is the passage beyond the afflictions, and the chief of afflictions is the conception that persons and other phenomena inherently exist. **THUS, WITHOUT DESTROYING THIS CONCEPTION, LIBERATION**

FROM CYCLIC EXISTENCE IS IMPOSSIBLE. Chandrakirti clearly states that the emptiness of both the person and other phenomena must be cognized in order to achieve liberation.¹⁵¹ **THE REASON IS THAT THE CONCEPTION OF A SELF OF PHENOMENA CAUSES THE CONCEPTION OF A SELF OF**

PERSONS. For Chandrakirti, to be liberated from cyclic existence means to have destroyed the conception that persons and other phenomena inherently exist.

When a yogi has penetrated the selflessness of the person, he applies the same reasoning to the mind and body and all other phenomena since the principle of a lack of sameness or difference of a phenomenon designated and its basis of designation can be applied to all phenomena. In other words, the emptiness understood with respect to the person is easily applied to each and every phenomenon. If one gains a penetrating understanding of the imputed nature of the person, it is impossible still to hold the view that the aggregates of mind and body are not merely imputedly existent.

The power of inferential realization of the emptiness of one phenomenon is such that a yogi is caused thereby to drop any tenets asserting the inherent existence of any phenomenon whatsoever. This conveys some sense of the esteem in which an inference of emptiness is held and of how difficult it is to develop. A yogi must proceed through the stage of correct doubt during which he suspects that phenomena are not inherently existent. In time, through long meditation, he develops a reasoned assumption that phenomena do not inherently exist. Eventually, an inference of such is generated, and through becoming familiar with this inference, he directly perceives emptiness in an utterly non-dual cognition.

L1: [Part Three – The Buddhist World [Details about the useful conventional truths] :L1

L2: [Introduction [all empty of inherent existence, but still dependently arisen, functional, and useful conventional truths] :L2

Sources:

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
- Long-dops One Hundred and Eight Bases of Explanation
- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Gyel-tsap's Commentary on (Maitreya's) 'Sublime Continuum'
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.625-6

Before meditating on emptiness it is necessary to know what exists; otherwise, a yogi will not know what is to be meditated upon as empty of inherent existence.¹⁵² Without identifying what exists, one would think that an emptiness means an utter non-existence and not just an absence of inherent existence as a predicate of a conventionally existent object. A

Il the excellent masters asserted that it is incorrect to teach emptiness from the very beginning because, as Jam-yang-shay-ba says,

~ 'If emptiness were taught to the stupid from the beginning, their ignorance would increase, and they would be harmed.'

Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says:

- :: Initially for one seeking suchness
- :: It is taught that everything exists.

Chandrakirti echoes this in his commentary, saying:

- :: If emptiness were taught in the very beginning to those who have not developed their intellect, very great ignorance would be produced; therefore, the Superiors do not teach emptiness in the very beginning.

Also, a great many tantric texts make it clear that no matter how gifted a student is he must practice tantra in stages.

Some commentators, however, have mistakenly taken advanced teachings on the final stage of tantra, such as not being allowed to touch images and books made from clay, stone, or wood, and have applied them to sharp beginners. Particularly, many have misapplied the teaching in the Highest Yoga Tantras that analysis is not suitable in the meditative equipoise of the stage of completion, mistakenly claiming that sharp beginners should not analyze but set their minds in utter vacuity. Their view is based on the misconception that all conventional objects are like the horns of a rabbit and the falling hairs seen by a person with cataracts, that is, non-existent. They proclaim that all conventional objects do not exist and that the meaning of conventional existence is 'what exists for a mistaken mind'. They declare that the 'gradual' teachings are for the dull, misapplying teachings pertaining to the final stages of tantra to sharp beginners. They are wrong because even the intelligent must analyze to discover suchness, be it through sutra or tantra practice. A NON-CONCEPTUAL AND TOTALLY NON-DUALISTIC COGNITION OF EMPTINESS MUST BE PRECEDED BY AN INFERENCE OF

EMPTINESS.¹⁵³ Inference, in general, is the cognition of a hidden meaning through having perceived a sign (reason) and having realized the concomitance of a predicate with this sign. EMPTINESS IS COGNIZED IN DEPENDENCE ON A REALIZATION OF, FOR INSTANCE, DEPENDENT-ARISING. PROPER THOUGHT IS INDISPENSIBLE.

If the emptiness of something is to be realized, this 'something' must be identified; an emptiness is not a vacuity which is merely the non-perception of an object. If the aggregates (skandha, phung po) constituents (dhatu, khams), sources (ayatana, skye niched), and so forth do not appear to the mind, an explanation of emptiness will be applied 'as if to a midnight sky', and a vacuousness of ignorance will only be increased.

THEREFORE, ONE MUST COMPREHEND THE PRASANGIKAS' PRESENTATION OF PHENOMENA.

Jam-yang-shay-ba (see p.626) refers to (in paraphrase) 'the phenomena that are renowned and well known in the world' which are so called because they are established as existing by an innate non-analytical awareness. This is not the mistaken innate intellect that apprehends phenomena as inherently existent, but the valid innate mind. A consciousness that analyzes whether an object can be found among or separate from its bases of imputation does not find objects; therefore, it is not in the face of an analytical consciousness that objects are said to exist. They exist in the face of a valid, innate, non-analytical awareness which every being has, from a hell-being to a Buddha. The objects that are established as existing conventionally by such a consciousness are never refuted; an analytical consciousness refutes merely their ultimate or objective existence.

Phenomena are divided into two classes:

- an afflicted class consisting of fifty-three phenomena
- and a pure class consisting of fifty-five phenomena.¹⁵⁴

These one hundred and eight phenomena are the bases of the explanations of emptiness in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras and are called 'the one hundred and eight bases of commentary'. The classification into afflicted and pure classes does not imply that all members of each class are afflictions or pure phenomena; the groupings are merely rough divisions.

L4: [The fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class] :L4

L6: [The five aggregates which are the bases for the further division of most of the other phenomena:] :L6

- 1 forms
- 2 feelings
- 3 discriminations
- 4 compositional factors
- 5 consciousnesses

L6: [The six senses which are the supports of their respective consciousnesses:] :L6

- 6 eye sense powers
- 7 ear sense powers
- 8 nose sense powers
- 9 tongue sense powers
- 10 body sense powers
- 11 mental sense powers

L6: [The six consciousnesses which depend on these senses:] :L6

- 12 eye consciousnesses
- 13 ear consciousnesses
- 14 nose consciousnesses
- 15 tongue consciousnesses
- 16 body consciousnesses
- 17 mental consciousnesses

L6: [The objects of those consciousnesses:] :L6

- 18 visible forms
- 19 sounds
- 20 odors
- 21 tastes
- 22 tangible objects
- 23 phenomena

L6: [The six contacts (distinguishing objects as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral) which arise upon the aggregations of a sense, an object, and a consciousness:] :L6

- 24 contacts upon the aggregation of an eye sense, a visible form, and an eye consciousness
- 25 contacts upon the aggregation of an ear sense, a sound, and an ear consciousness
- 26 contacts upon the aggregation of a nose sense, an odor, and a nose consciousness
- 27 contacts upon the aggregation of a tongue sense, a taste, and a tongue consciousness
- 28 contacts upon the aggregation of a body sense, a tangible object, and a body consciousness
- 29 contacts upon the aggregation of a mental sense, a phenomenon, and a mental consciousness

L6: [The six feelings which are the experiences arising from contacts:] :L6

- 30 feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of an eye sense, a visible form, and an eye consciousness
- 31 feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of an ear sense, a sound, and an ear consciousness
- 32 feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a nose sense, an odor, and a nose consciousness
- 33 feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a tongue sense, a taste, and a tongue consciousness
- 34 feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a body sense, a tangible object, and a body consciousness
- 35 feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a mental sense, a phenomenon, and a mental consciousness

L6: [The six elements which are the bases of production:] :L6

- 36 earth
- 37 water
- 38 fire
- 39 wind
- 40 space

-- 41 consciousness

L6: [The twelve branches of dependent-arising, which are to be seen as disadvantageous:] :L6

-- 42 ignorance

-- 43 action

-- 44 consciousness

-- 45 name and form

-- 46 six sources

-- 47 contact

-- 48 feeling

-- 49 attachment

-- 50 grasping

-- 51 existence

-- 52 birth

-- 53 aging and death

L4: [The fifty-five phenomena of the pure class] :L4

L6: [The six perfections which are the paths of practice:] :L6

-- 1 giving

-- 2 ethics

-- 3 patience

-- 4 effort

-- 5 concentration

-- 6 wisdom

L6: [The eighteen emptinesses which are the paths of the view:] :L6

-- 7 emptiness of the internal, that is, of the five senses (adhyatmashunyata)¹⁵⁵

-- 8 emptiness of the external, that is, of the six types of objects which are the objects of the five senses and of the mental consciousness (bahirdhashunyata)

-- 9 emptiness of the internal and external, that is, of the loci of the senses, the gross orbs of the eyes, etc. (adhyatmabahirdhashunyata)

-- 10 emptiness of emptiness, that is, of the emptiness that is the nature of phenomena (this eliminates the qualms of those who might think that emptiness truly exists because it is established by a consciousness which analyzes suchness) (s h Unya tash unya ta]

-- 11 emptiness of the great, that is, of the ten directions (mahashunyata)

-- 12 emptiness of the ultimate, that is, of nirvana (paramarthashunyata)

-- 13 emptiness of products (samskrtashunyata)

-- 14 emptiness of non-products (asamskrtashunyata)

-- 15 emptiness of what has passed beyond the extremes, that is, of what is free of the extremes of permanence and annihilation (atyantashunyata)

-- 16 emptiness of what is beginningless and endless, that is, of cyclic existence (anavaragrashunyata)

-- 17 emptiness of the indestructible, that is, of the indestructible Mahayana (anavakdrashunyata)

-- 18 emptiness of nature, that is, of the emptinesses which are the nature of phenomena (this eliminates the qualms of those who might think that an emptiness truly exists because a final nature exists without being produced by anyone) (praktishunyata)

-- 19 emptiness of all phenomena, that is, of the eighteen constituents, etc.

(sarvadharmashunyata)

-- 20 emptiness of definitions, that is, of the definitions of all phenomena from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses (lakshanashunyata)

-- 21 emptiness of the unapprehendable, that is, of the past, present, and future which are unapprehendable as the cessation of phenomena, their presence, and their non-production (anupalambhashunyata)

-- 22 emptiness of the inherent existence of non-things, that is, of inherently existent non-products (abhavasvabhavashunyata)

-- 23 emptiness of things, that is, of the five aggregates (bhavashunyata)

-- 24 emptiness of non-things, that is, of non-products (abhavashunyata)

L6: [The thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment which are the yogic paths, divided into seven sections:156] :L6

-- 25 four establishments in mindfulness—of body, feelings, thoughts, and phenomena—attained with the lesser path of accumulation. These are meditations on the impermanence, misery, emptiness, and selflessness of one's own body, feelings, thoughts, and other internal phenomena. Bodhisattvas would extend the field of meditation to include all sentient beings' bodies, feelings, and so forth.

-- 26 four thorough abandonings—the abandoning of afflictions already generated, the non-generation of afflictions not yet generated, the increasing of pure phenomena already generated, and the generation of pure phenomena not yet generated—attained with the middling path of accumulation. These are called 'thorough' abandonings because the mode of practice is suitable, when supplemented by the aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings, to lead one to Buddhahood. Without changing the type of object or mode of cognition, these paths lead to final enlightenment whereas the non-Buddhist 'abandonings' have to be altered in form to lead to the final aim. Even the accomplishments of virtues are 'abandonings' because their respective opposites must be forsaken.

-- 27 four legs of manifestation - aspiration, effort, thought, and analysis. These are called 'legs' because they are prerequisites for magical manifestation. The four exist simultaneously when a manifestation is actually being made, and they are serial when one is practicing magical manifestation, first generating an aspiration to create a manifestation, and so forth. They are attained on the great path of accumulation

-- 28 five powers—faith, effort, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom—attained on the levels of heat and peak of the path of preparation

-- 29 five forces—faith, effort, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom—attained on the levels of forbearance and supreme mundane qualities of the path of preparation

-- 30 seven branches of enlightenment—mindfulness, discrimination of phenomena, effort, joy, pliancy, meditative stabilization, and equanimity—attained with the path of seeing

-- 31 eight-fold path—correct views, correct realization, correct speech, correct aims of actions, correct livelihood, correct effort, correct mindfulness, and correct meditative stabilization—attained with the path of meditation. When the state of Foe Destroyer is actualized, all thirty-seven harmonies of enlightenment have been attained.

L6: [The paths of calming:] :L6

-- 32 four noble truths—true sufferings, true origins of suffering, true cessations of suffering, and true paths out of suffering

-- 33 four concentrations—first, second, third, and fourth concentrations

-- 34 four immeasurables—equanimity, love, compassion, and joy

-- 35 four formless absorptions—infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, and

peak of cyclic existence

-- 36 eight liberations: these eight are called 'liberations' not because they liberate beings from cyclic existence but because they free beings from the manifest activity of specific afflictions. They are to be distinguished from complete cessations of afflictions which involve the conquest of both the manifest appearance and the potencies of the afflictions.

---- the embodied looking at a form: a yogi considers himself to be a being with a body and cultivates any of the four concentrations which are included in the Form Realm

---- the formless looking at a form: a yogi considers himself to be a being without a body and cultivates any of the four concentrations which are included in the Form Realm

---- beautiful form: a yogi considers himself to have an attractive body and cultivates any of the four concentrations which are included in the Form Realm. (The above three are considered prerequisites for making physical manifestations and are called the three paths of manifestation.)

---- infinite space: a yogi concentrates on space and imagines it is infinite with just space as his object of observation

---- infinite consciousness: a yogi concentrates on consciousness and imagines it is infinite with just consciousness as his object of observation

---- nothingness: a yogi imagines that there is nothing to be apprehended and no apprehender

---- peak of cyclic existence: a yogi imagines that there are no coarse objects to be apprehended but that there are subtle objects of apprehension

---- equipoise of cessation: a yogi enters a state of meditative equipoise which is the absence of the manifest activity of the six consciousnesses

-- 37 nine serial absorptions—first concentration, second concentration, third concentration, fourth concentration, infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, peak of cyclic existence, and absorption of cessation

-- 38 paths of insight—meditative stabilization on the three doors of liberation: wishlessness, signlessness, and emptiness. Wishlessness is the emptiness of a phenomenon from the point of view of its not inherently producing effects.¹⁵⁷ Signlessness is the emptiness of a phenomenon from the point of view of its not having been inherently produced from causes. Emptiness is the emptiness of the entity of a phenomenon itself.

L6: [The paths of special qualities:] :L6

-- 39 five clairvoyances—divine eye, divine ear, knowledge of others' minds, memory of former lives, and knowledge of the extinction of contaminations

-- 40 four meditative stabilizations—'going as a hero', 'sky treasury', 'stainless', and 'loftily looking lion'

-- 41 four doors of retention—the retention of patience (for the sake of fearlessness with respect to emptiness), the retention of secret speech (for the ability to make spells to pacify the injurious), the retention of words (for not forgetting names, thoughts, and meanings), the retention of meaning (for not forgetting the individual and general characteristics of phenomena)

L6: [The paths of effect:] :L6

-- 42 ten powers:¹⁵⁸

---- knowledge of sources and non-sources. This is direct knowledge of cause and effect within cyclic existence, such as the arising of pleasure from virtues and of pain from

non-virtues, and direct knowledge of causes and effects included within the class of pure phenomena, such as the paths and their fruits. This first power is achieved through steadiness with respect to ascertaining the relation of cause and effect and with respect to the two forms of the mind of enlightenment—the aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all beings as well as its consequent practices and the wisdom directly cognizing emptiness.

---- knowledge of the fruition of actions. This is direct knowledge of the definiteness of actions (such as the fact that non-virtues never cause pleasure and virtues never cause pain), the increase of the potencies established by actions, the non-wasting of deeds done, and the non-meeting with the effects of actions not done by oneself. It is achieved through conviction in the relationship of actions and their effects.

---- knowledge of those who are superior and those who are inferior, or those who have faith and those having heavy afflictions and so forth. It is achieved through teaching doctrines in accordance with the faculties of trainees.

---- knowledge of the varieties of dispositions. This is the knowledge of the many different lineages in the mental continuums of trainees. It is achieved through teaching doctrines in accordance with the dispositions of trainees.

---- knowledge of the varieties of trainees' interests in the various great and small vehicles. It is achieved through teaching doctrines in accordance with the interests of trainees.

---- knowledge of the paths proceeding to cyclic existences and of the paths to the three enlightenments of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas. It is achieved through practicing the various vehicles and paths.

---- knowledge of the concentrations (dhyana), liberations (vimoksha), meditative stabilizations (Samadhi), and meditative absorptions (Samapatti), and knowledge of others' afflictions and others' non-contamination. It is achieved through completing the practice of meditative stabilization.

---- knowledge mindful of former states. This is direct knowledge of all former lives of oneself and others. It is achieved through not having spoiled the roots of virtue during the paths of learning.

---- knowledge of one's own and others' deaths and births. This is included within the clairvoyance of the divine eye and is achieved through formerly giving lamps and supramundane paths to sentient beings.

---- knowledge of the extinction of all contaminations. This is achieved through formerly teaching doctrines for the sake of extinguishing contaminations and through one's own actualization of such meaning.

-- The six knowledges of (1) sources and non-sources, (2) fruition of actions, (3) the superior and inferior, (4) varieties of dispositions, (5) varieties of interests, and (6) paths are similar to a diamond instrument piercing the armor of the obstructions to omniscience. The three knowledges of (7) the concentrations and so forth, (8) former states, and (9) death and birth are similar to a diamond instrument destroying the wall of the obstructions to meditative absorption. The knowledge of (10) extinction of all contaminations is similar to a diamond instrument cutting the trees of the afflictive obstructions.

-- 43 four fearlessnesses:159

---- fearlessness with respect to the assertion, 'I am completely and perfectly enlightened with respect to all phenomena.' For, one will not encounter even the name of an opponent who could correctly say that one does not know such and such a phenomenon. It is achieved

through lacking any stinginess with respect to the doctrine.

---- fearlessness with respect to teaching that the afflictive obstructions are obstacles to liberation and that the obstructions to omniscience are obstacles to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena, and that, therefore, these are to be ceased. For, one will not encounter even the name of an opponent who could correctly say that reliance on desire and so forth would not obstruct a being from liberation. It is achieved through not falling under the influence of an obstructive doctrine.

---- fearlessness with respect to teaching the paths of deliverance. For, there is no opponent who could say correctly that these paths are not paths leading to liberation. It is achieved through practicing the paths to liberation.

---- fearlessness with respect to asserting that the contaminations have been extinguished. For, one will not see even the name of an opponent who could correctly dispute the assertion that one has attained the cessation of all afflictions and their potencies. It is achieved through formerly abandoning pride.

-- 44 four sciences—knowledge of doctrines, of the general and specific characters of phenomena, of the many languages so that appropriate definitions can be given, and of the varieties of entities, aspects, relationships, and differences of phenomena in the sense of having the bravery to make these distinctions

-- 45 great love

-- 46 great compassion

-- 47 eighteen unshared attributes of Buddhas: 160

---- being non-mistaken physically, such as not going on the wrong road

---- being non-mistaken verbally

---- not decreasing in mindfulness

---- not ever not being in meditative equipoise

---- not having the various discriminations of one-pointedly apprehending cyclic existence as to be forsaken and nirvana as to be attained, or, in other words, not discriminating cyclic existence and nirvana, or phenomena and their emptiness, as different entities

---- not being disinterested

---- aspiration

---- effort

---- mindfulness

---- wisdom

---- non-degeneration of liberation, that is, non-degeneration from the abandonment of obstructions

---- non-degeneration of the wisdom realizing liberation

---- 14, 15 governing by wisdom the activities of body, speech, and mind

---- 16, 17, 18 non-obstructed wisdom with respect to all objects of knowledge in the past, present, and future due to the absence of any impeding obstructions

L6: [The five beings who actualize the paths:] :L6

-- 48 Stream Enterers

-- 49 Once Returners

-- 50 Never Returners

-- 51 Foe Destroyers

-- 52 Solitary Realizers

L6: [The three final fruits:] :L6

- 53 knowers of the bases, or Hearers' cognizers of emptiness
- 54 knowers of the paths, or Bodhisattvas' cognizers of emptiness
- 55 omniscient consciousnesses, or Buddhas' cognizers of all phenomena simultaneously.

L2: [1. The Selfless] :L2

Sources:

- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets

Traditionally, a master begins a student's instruction with a presentation of the Buddhist world.¹⁶¹ He starts with the selfless as a basis and divides the selfless into the existent and the non-existent:

// CHART 7: Divisions of the Selfless

	non-existent
	asat
selfless	med pa
nairatmya	
bdag med	existent
	sat
	yod pa

In the Prasangika system 'the selfless' means that which does not inherently exist. The first category of the Buddhist world is the non-inherently existent because both existents and non-existents do not inherently exist. Since nothing inherently exists, this is the broadest possible category.

L5: [Non-existents] :L5

Some of the more famous examples of non-existents are the horns of a rabbit, the hairs of a turtle, a garment made of turtle hairs, the diadem of a frog, a blue snow mountain (a snowy mountain appearing to be blue), a double moon, a self-sufficient person, and inherently existent phenomena. The horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist because they do not exist at all. The mere realization of their non-existence reveals that the horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist; therefore, the non-inherent existence of the horns of a rabbit is not an emptiness. An emptiness is not understood through realizing the mere non-existence of an object; it is known through comprehending in an existent object the absence of the quality of inherent or objective existence.

It is said that the horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist, are not inherently existent, and are non-inherently existent. In Buddhist logic none of these statements is necessarily an affirming negation; the fact that the horns of a rabbit are non-inherently existent does not imply that they have some other type of existence. The statement indicates a non-affirming negation.

A synonym of 'non-existent' is 'non-phenomenal non-product'. Non-existents are non-products

because they are not produced from an aggregation of causes and conditions; they are also non-phenomena because they do not exist, unlike phenomenal non-products, such as the permanent phenomenon space, which do exist.

L5: [Existents] :L5

An existent is selfless, or non-inherently existent; its non-inherent existence is an emptiness. Synonyms of 'existent' (sat, yod pa) are 'phenomenon' (dharma, chos), 'object' (vishaya, yul), 'object of knowledge' (jnaya, shes bya), and 'established base' (vastu, gzhi grub). Thus, everything that exists is a phenomenon (dharma), so translated because all dharmas are objects of knowledge and can appear to the mind, even permanent phenomena such as emptiness and space. All existents are phenomena, and there is no noumenon which is a separate entity from the category of phenomena because nothing independently exists. The word 'noumenon' is not used in this translation scheme though it might be used for words indicating the nature of phenomena, such as dharmata, as long as it is understood that all noumena are phenomena.

All existents are objects because whether they are subjects or objects they can be objects of a consciousness. All existents are objects of knowledge, or more literally objects of knowing, because all objects are continually known by some consciousness. Without even considering the penetrating clairvoyances of Buddhas and yogis, the various hungry ghosts and unusual types of beings which exist everywhere insure that even particles in the centers of huge rocks are cognized by some being.

All existents are existent bases or established bases because they are established as existing by valid cognizers. Valid cognizers are consciousnesses that are either direct perceivers, which cognize their objects without the medium of images and concepts, or inferring consciousnesses, which cognize their referent objects through images and concepts (see pp.346-7).

L4: [EXISTENTS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO TYPES:] :L4

// CHART 8: Divisions of Existents

existent	permanent phenomenon
	nitya
	rtag pa
	thing
	bhava
	dngos po

L5: [EXISTENT: PERMANENT PHENOMENA] :L5

Permanent phenomena are defined as phenomena that do not disintegrate, disintegrating phenomena being those which cease every instant due to causes and conditions. The permanent are specified as non-disintegrating phenomena because the non-existent or non-phenomenal are also non-disintegrating. Because of the inclusion of the word 'phenomena' in the definition of the permanent, non-existents are not permanent, even though they do not disintegrate. A synonym of permanent phenomenon is 'uncompounded phenomenon' (asamskrtadharma, 'dus ma byas kyī chos).

There are two types of permanent phenomena: the occasional permanent and the non-occasional permanent. Though in common parlance 'permanent' means 'always existent', the philosophers of the Sautrantika school and above have limited its meaning to 'non-disintegrating existent'. Therefore, phenomena that come into existence and go out of existence but do not disintegrate momentarily due to causes and conditions are 'occasional permanents'. For instance, the emptiness of a cup comes into existence when the cup is made and goes out of existence when the cup is destroyed; however, because the emptiness of a cup does not disintegrate moment by moment and does not change momentarily from one thing into another through the action of causes and conditions, it is non-disintegrating. Thus, because the emptiness of a cup is both a phenomenon and non-disintegrating but does not exist forever, it is an 'occasional permanent'. However, emptiness in general, though not existing as a separate entity from its specific instances, is always existent because there never is a moment when there is no instance of emptiness. There are always minds, space, the potential elements, and so forth, and these are all empty of inherent existence.

There is some debate about whether such a presentation makes emptiness an impermanent phenomenon. Since the coming into and going out of existence of an emptiness depend on a phenomenon that is produced and ceased by causes and conditions, it begins to look as if an emptiness is produced and ceased. However, it is said that the coming into existence of an emptiness, which is merely the non-inherent existence of an object, is unlike the production of an object by causes and conditions, and thus no one speaks of the production and disintegration of emptinesses.

Permanent phenomena are divided, but not exclusively (there are other phenomena which are technically permanent, such as the double reverse of pot which only appears to thought through the mental exclusion of non-pot or, more accurately, non-one with pot) into four types:

// CHART 9: Divisions of Permanent Phenomena

permanent phenomenon	space
	akasha
	nam mkha'
	analytical cessation
	pratisamkhyanirodha
	so sor brtas 'gog
	non-analytical cessation
	apratisamkhyanirodha
	so sor brtags min gyi 'gog pa
	suchness
	tathata
	de bzhin nyid

L6: [Existent: Permanent Phenomena : Space] :L6

A space is a mere absence of obstructive contact. Space is all pervading because there is an absence of obstructive contact everywhere, even where solid objects exist, for without an absence of obstructive contact an obstructive object could not be there in the first place.

Because a space is a mere absence of obstructive contact, it is a non-affirming negative—there is no positive thing implied in its place—and it is in this sense that an

emptiness, which is a non-affirming negative of inherent existence, is said to be similar to a space. Also, space, like emptiness, has parts because each physical object has a lack of obstructive contact, just as each object has a lack of inherent existence. The space of an object refers not to the area of the object but to the absence of obstructive contact associated with it.

L6: [Existent: Permanent Phenomena : Analytical cessations] :L6

Analytical cessations are final states of cessation of obstructions upon analysis of the nature of phenomena, which are such that those obstructions will never return. They are enumerated as true cessations, the third of the four noble truths, in terms of the individual obstructions being abandoned on the levels of the paths. 'Cessation' here means the absence of an affliction following abandonment and does not refer to the process of cessation. Analytical cessations are compared to the state of a locked door after a robber has been thrown out of a house in that the obstructions that have been abandoned will never return. Analytical cessations come into existence even though they are not produced; thus, although they never go out of existence, individually they are occasional permanents.

A nirvana is an analytical cessation that comes into existence upon the abandonment of the last affliction. It is not the act of cessation or the act of passing beyond sorrow but a phenomenon possessed in the continuum of a yogi that is the mere absence of the ceased afflictions.

L6: [Existent: Permanent Phenomena : Non-analytical cessations] :L6

Non-analytical cessations are compared to the state of having thrown out a robber but having failed to lock the door. They are temporary absences of afflictions and so forth due to the incompleteness of necessary conditions, upon the aggregation of which the afflictions will return. For instance, when a person pays intense attention to what he is seeing, he does not desire food. The desire for food has not disappeared from his mental continuum forever, but has temporarily disappeared. Non-analytical cessations come into existence and go out of existence and so are, in terms of specific instances, occasional permanents.

L6: [Existent: Permanent Phenomena : Suchness] :L6

'Suchness' refers to 'emptiness' because whether Buddhas appear or not the nature of phenomena remains as such.¹⁶² A suchness is also a 'natural nirvana' (prakrtiparinirvana, rang bzhin myang 'das) which does not refer to an actual passage beyond sorrow, that is, an overcoming of the afflictions, but to an emptiness itself that naturally is passed beyond inherent existence. The teaching that cyclic existence and nirvana are not different means that the phenomena of cyclic existence are the same entities as their natural nirvanas, or emptinesses, and not separate entities. It does not mean there is no difference between being afflicted with the conception of inherent existence and not being so afflicted.

L5: [EXISTENT: THINGS] :L5

The other division of existents is comprised of things or actualities. The definition of thing is: that which is able to perform a function (particularly the function of producing an effect). Therefore, according to all schools except Vaibhashika, permanent phenomena are not things. The Vaibhashikas say that permanent phenomena are things because, for instance, a space performs the function of allowing an object to be moved. The other systems of tenets, including Prasangika, say that the presence or absence of another obstructive object is what allows or does not allow an object to be moved, not space itself which is just a

non-affirming negative of obstructive contact. Still, even the Prasangikas call emptiness—a non-affirming negative of inherent existence—a 'cause' of Buddhahood because without it the transformation of the mind into wisdom would not be possible. However, it is not said that space causes the possibility of movement, just as emptiness does not actually cause Buddhahood.

Things are impermanent (anitya, mi nag pa) because of being phenomena that disintegrate moment by moment. Though impermanent things are momentary, they are not just one moment; if they were, it could not be said that beings without yogic direct perception ever perceive things because they are not capable of realizing a single isolated instant. The impermanent things that these beings cognize are series of moments; the phenomena are imputed to a series of moments and are unfindable among the various moments or as the series itself. Still, the imputed nature of things does not prevent their performing functions; rather, being merely imputed is a prerequisite for the performance of a function. If things were frozen in a world of inherent existence, unaffected by causes and conditions and unable to affect anything else, there could not be any cause and effect. Non-inherent existence is the very basis of cause and effect, and the presence of cause and effect is a sign of non-inherent existence.

Things are also products, or caused phenomena, or compounded phenomena (samskrta, dus byas) because they are made (krta, byas) in dependence on the aggregation (sam, 'dus) of causes and conditions. The term 'thing' (bhava, dngospo), when used strictly as it is here in the table of phenomena, applies only to products; however when it is used loosely as it often is in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, it refers to both products and non-products as when Buddha says that all things do not ultimately exist.

Things, or products, are divided into three:

// CHART 10: Divisions of Things

	form
	rupa
	gzugs
	consciousness
thing	jnana
	shes pa
	non-associated compositional factor
	viprayukta-samskara
	Idan min 'du byed

L6: [Existent: Things : Forms] :L6

Source:

Cha-har Ge-shay's Identification of Elements, Elemental Evolutes,
And So Forth

Etymologically, a form is so called because it is suitable to become an object of a sense consciousness upon the aggregation of other causes, such as the presence of an eye sense.¹⁶³ However, because there are forms that are perceived only by the mental consciousness, this explanation is merely an etymology and not a definition. Forms are divided into eleven types—the five physical sense powers, the five objects of the senses, and forms which are objects only of the mental consciousness:

// CHART 11: Divisions of Forms

	eye sense
	chakshurindriya, mig gi dbang po
	ear sense
	shrotrendriya, rna ba'i dbang po
	nose sense
	ghranendriya, sna'i dbang po
	tongue sense
	jihvendriya, Ice'i dbang po
	body sense
	kdyendriya, lus kyi dbang po
form	visible form
	rupa, gzugs
	sound
	shabda, sgra
	odor
	gandha, dri
	taste
	rasa, ro
	tangible object
	sprashtavya, reg bya
	form for the mental consciousness
	dharmdyatana
	chos kyi skye mched pa 'i gzugs

L7: [Existent: Things : Forms: Sense powers] :L7

The five sense powers are neither the coarse organs, which are the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and body, nor are they consciousness. They are clear matter located in the coarse organs which cannot be seen with the eye but can be seen by certain clairvoyants. They give their respective consciousnesses dominance or power with respect to certain objects and are thus called 'powers' (indriya, dbang po). An eye sense has power with respect to visible forms, that is, colors and shapes, but not with respect to sounds, odors, tastes, or tangible objects. An ear sense has power with respect to sounds but not visible forms, and so forth. Sense powers give their respective consciousnesses the ability to apprehend and to be generated in the aspect of their respective objects.

Eye (chakshuh, ntig), eye sense power (chakshurindriya, mig gi dbang po), eye-constituent (chakshurdhatu, mig gi khams), and eye-source (chakshurdyatana, mig gi skye niched) are synonyms. An eye sense power is called an eye-constituent because of being the cause giving rise to the continuation of its own similar type, that is, later moments of itself. It is also called an eye-source because of being a door, cause, condition, or source producing and increasing an eye consciousness. The same terminology is also used for the ear, nose, tongue, and body sense powers.

The particles of each sense power are arranged in a specific shape: eye sense, like that of a bud of a zar-ma flower; ear sense, like the knot of a birch tree; nose sense, like two fine hollow needles at the root of the nostrils; tongue sense, like half moons having the area of only the point of a hair throughout the center of the tongue; body sense, like skin or hide throughout the body. As types of the body sense, the particles of the female organ

are arranged like the inside of a drum, and those of the male organ are arranged like a thumb.

The sense power of the mental consciousness is not physical and thus has no shape; a former moment of any of the six consciousnesses acts as the sense power of a mental consciousness.

For instance, when one pays attention to a color, an eye consciousness acts like a sense power in that it gives the mental consciousness the ability to perceive a visible object.

A sense power is an uncommon empowering condition (asddharana-adhipatipratyaya, thun mong ma yin pa'i bdag rkyen) of a consciousness because it gives it power with respect to its own special type of object. Also, a former moment of consciousness causes it to be an entity capable of experiencing objects. Thus, a mental consciousness has two consciousnesses as its causes: any of the six consciousnesses which is its empowering condition and a former moment of consciousness which is its 'immediately preceding condition' (samanantarapratyaya, de ma dag rkyen).

A consciousness is also caused, or affected, by an object in the sense that an object causes a consciousness to be generated in its image, much as objects cause a mirror to reflect their image. These objects are called 'observed-object-conditions' (dlambanapratyaya, dmigs rkyen). However, the world which is being seen is not just a mental image; the co-ordination of an image in consciousness with an object certifies that the object is being perceived properly, but the object seen is an external object, not an internal image. The Buddhist theory is not that everything being perceived exists inside either the eye or the brain.

L7: [Existent: Things : Forms: Visible forms] :L7

Visible forms (rupa, gzugs) are defined as objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness and are to be distinguished from the general term 'form' which is the basis of the division into eleven types of forms. A visible form is called a form-constituent (rupadhatu) because of being a cause giving rise to the continuation of its own similar type, that is, later moments of visible form, and is called a form-source (rupa-dyatana) because of being a form that is a door, cause, condition, or source of an eye consciousness. Visible forms are of two types:

// CHART 12: Divisions of Visible Forms

	Color
	varna
	kha dog
visible form	
	shape
	samsthana
	dbyibs

Colors. There are twelve colors, four primary and eight secondary (see Chart 13). The four primary colors are the colors of the four elements. Wind is blue; earth, yellow; water, white; and fire, red.

// CHART 13: Divisions of Colors

blue
nila, sngon po
yellow

primary color	pita, serpo
	white
	avaddta, dkar po
	red
	lohita, dmar po

color	cloud
	abhra, sprin
	smoke
	dhuma, du ba
	dust
	rajah, brdul
	mist
	mahika, khug sna
secondary color	illumination
	dloka, snang ba
	darkness
	andhakdra, mun pa
	shadow
	chhdyd, grib ma
	sunlight
	dtapa, nyi ma 'i 'od ser

It is not that clouds and so forth are secondary colors but that their colors are secondary colors. However, some scholars do say that illumination, darkness, sunlight, and shadow themselves are secondary colors. Illumination refers to the light of the moon, stars, fire, medicine, and jewels. Darkness refers to a form that obscures other forms and causes one to see gloom and blackness. Darkness obscures other forms such that they cannot be seen, whereas shadow makes other forms a little unclear but still perceivable; thus, darkness and shadow have a difference of density. Sunlight refers to the illumination of other forms when the sun appears.

The eight secondary colors do not include the secondary colors that are mixes of primary colors, such as green which is a mix of blue and yellow, and thus the category is not all-inclusive.

An eye consciousness actually apprehends only colors and shapes. Although pots, pillars, and so forth appear to an eye consciousness and although it is said that an eye consciousness sees them, pots, pillars, and so forth are not objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness. Rather, the color and shape of pots, pillars, and so forth—that is, their visible form—are objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness and thus are also form-constituents and form-sources. Although pots and pillars are matter and are forms, they are not visible forms, form-constituents or form-sources, but tangible objects, tangible-object-constituents, and tangible-object-sources. Similarly, when one sees the visible form of a human or horse, one sees their shape and color but does not, in a sense, see a human or horse. Also, seeing earth and water is a case of seeing their color, for earth and water are tangible objects, and, therefore, the eye does not see the capacity of hardness or of moistening. Furthermore, when the visible form of a pot is seen, an eye consciousness does not conceive, 'This is a pot'; a mental consciousness is the identifier and designator of names.

Shapes. Shapes are of eight types only (see Chart 14). Long refers to the form of a long board, a long rope, a long (deep) spring, and so forth. Short arises in relation to those. High and low refer to, for instance, a high mountain and a low valley. A square, or perhaps polygon, is technically a shape of equal sides, such as dice, or a pentagon, hexagon, and so forth; however, the shapes of a 'rectangular box or a board are also included. Round refers to

// CHART 14: Divisions of Shapes

	long
	dirgha, ring ba
	short
	hrasva, thung ba
	high
	unnata, mtho ba
shape	low
	avanata, dma' ba
	square
	vrta, lham pa
	round
	parimandala, zlum po
	level
	shata, phya le ba
	non-level
	vishata, phya le ba ma yin pa

either the globular, like an egg, or the flat, like a mandala. Level refers to any shape having an even surface, whereas non-level refers to a shape with, for instance, bumps and depressions.

L7: [Existent: Things : Forms: Sounds] :L7

Sounds, which are defined as objects of hearing by an ear consciousness, are of only eight types (see Chart 15). Sound, soundconstituent, and sound-source are synonyms. Although sounds are entities constructed from particles, they are not formsources, that is to say, visible forms.

// CHART 15: Divisions of Sounds

Sound

- Sound caused by elements conjoined with consciousness
 - Articulate sound
 - Pleasant sound, e.g. words of doctrine
 - Unpleasant sound, e.g., harsh words
 - Inarticulate sound
 - Pleasant sound, e.g. sound of finger snapping
 - Unpleasant sound, e.g., sound of a fist on impact
- Sound caused by elements not conjoined with consciousness
 - Articulate sound
 - Pleasant sound, e.g. words of doctrine taught by trees susled by a Buddha's extraordinary powers
 - Unpleasant sound, e.g., words of scolding from a tree rustled by a Buddha's

extraordinary powers

---- Inarticulate sound

----- Pleasant sound, e.g. sound of a drum

----- Unpleasant sound, e.g., sound of crashing stones

L7: [Existent: Things : Forms: Odors] :L7

Odors, which are defined as objects of smelling by a nose consciousness, are of only four types (see Chart 16). An equal odor, such as the odor of sesame, does not infuse other objects, whereas the opposite is true of an unequal odor such as the odor of garlic. Odor, odor-constituent, and odor-source are synonyms.

// CHART 16: Divisions of Odors

odor	fragrant odor sugandha dri zhim pa	equal fragrant odor samāsugandha zhim pa'i dri mnyam pa
		unequal fragrant odor visāmāsugandha zhim pa 'i dri mi mnyam pa

	unfragrant odor durgandha dri mi zhim pa	equal unfragrant odor samādurgandha mi zhim pa'i dri mnyam pa
		unequal unfragrant odor visamādurgandha mi zhim pa 'i dri mi mnyam pa

L7: [Existent: Things : Forms: Tastes.] :L7

Tastes, which are defined as objects of taste by a tongue consciousness, are of only six types:

// CHART 17: Divisions of Tastes

taste	sweet, e.g., taste of molasses madhura, mngar ba
	sour, e.g., taste of lemon amla, skyur ba
	salty, e.g., taste of ocean salt lavana, Ian tshva ba
	pungent, e.g. taste of ginger katuka, tsha ba
	bitter, e.g., taste of gentiana chiretta tikta, kha ba
	astringent, e.g., taste of the myrobalan fruit kashaya, bska ba

Sweetness arises from a predominance of earth and water; sourness, from a predominance of fire and earth; saltiness, from a predominance of water and fire; pungency, from a predominance of fire and wind; bitterness, from a predominance of water and wind; and

astringency, from a predominance of earth and wind.

L7: [Existent: Things : Forms: Tangible objects.] :L7

Tangible objects, which are defined as objects of touch by a body consciousness, are of only eleven types—the four elements and seven tangible objects that are arisen from the elements:

// CHART 18: Divisions of Tangible Objects

tangible object	element	earth
	bhuta, 'byung ba	prthivi, sa
		water
		ap, chu
	tangible object arisen from elements bhautika. 'byung, 'gyur	fire
		tejas, me
		wind
		vayu, rlung

		smoothness
		shlakshnatva, 'jam pa
		roughness
		karkashatva, rtsub pa
		heaviness
		gurutva, lei ba
		lightness
		laghutva, yang ba
		cold
		shita, grang ba
		hunger
		bubhuksha, bkres pa
		thirst
		pipdsd, skom pa

The definition of earth is the hard and obstructive; its entity is hardness, and its function is the obstruction of other physical objects. The definition of water is the damp and moistening. The definition of fire is the hot and burning. The definition of wind is the light and moving.

The particles that serve as the bases for the construction of physical objects are aggregates of the eight substances: earth, water, fire, wind, visible form, odor, taste, and tangible object arisen from elements. (Sound is not included because it does not have a continuum of similar type.) Thus, wherever one of the elements exists, the other three also exist, but there is a difference of strength and, thus, dominance. (Some say that the others dwell in the manner of seeds, that is, in potency.)

The fact that stone, wood, and so forth hold together indicates the presence of the water element in the earth element; that stones and trees move indicates the presence of the wind element in the earth element; that sparks are produced when two stones meet indicates the presence of the fire element. Similarly, that the water element can serve as a support for boats, leaves, and so forth indicates that the earth element is present in the water

element; that leaves and roots rot in water and that there are warm springs indicate the presence of the fire element in water; that water flows downward and moves about indicates the presence of the wind element. Similarly, that leaves and grass are held up in the wind indicates the presence of the earth element in the wind element; that there are warm winds and that damp objects dry when spread out to the wind indicates the presence of the fire element in the wind element; that currents of wind are held together in a twister indicates the presence of the water element. Similarly, that one tongue of fire grasps another and that a tongue of fire can support leaves, grass, and so forth indicates the presence of the earth element in the fire element; that tongues of fire do not split apart but burn together indicates the presence of the water element; that tongues of flame move about indicates the presence of the wind element.

The seven tangible objects that are evolutes of the elements arise from the four elements. Smoothness arises from a preponderance of water and fire. Roughness arises from a preponderance of earth and wind. Heaviness arises from a preponderance of earth and water. Lightness arises from a preponderance of fire and wind. Cold arises from a preponderance of water and wind. Hunger arises from a preponderance of wind. Thirst arises from a preponderance of fire.

The colors of particles depend upon the element that is predominant. If the earth element is predominant, the color is yellow; if water, white; if fire, red; and if wind, blue. The shapes of particle clusters are determined by the arrangement of color particles and are not separate particles themselves. The particles of color/shape are different from the particles of odor, taste, or touch and thus are classed separately from the four elements as visible objects.

Visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects are all 'atomic' in that they are masses of particles, but these are not necessarily single particles.¹⁶⁴ Otherwise, the only sense objects would be single particles, and there would be no gross objects. Though visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects are 'atomic', many say that these are not 'established atomically' (rdul du grub pa) because the word 'established' carries with it the force of 'truly established' (satyasiddha, bden grub) or its synonym 'truly existent' (satyasat, bden par yod pa). Since 'established atomically' is the definition of matter (kantha, bempo), it can be said that the Prasangikas do not accept 'matter'. This, however, does not mean that particles or gross objects constructed from particles are not accepted in the Prasangika system. Indeed, the word 'matter' seems to refer to the atomically constructed and nothing more; however, the difficulty is not merely in translation. For, in a similar way the Chittamatrins accept forms and particles which are of the same entity as a perceiving consciousness, but they do not accept 'matter' because for them the term itself implies an external object. To say in Tibetan that there are particles and objects constructed from particles but no *bem po* is as forceful as saying in English that there are particles and objects constructed from particles but no matter. The word 'matter' carries with it a connotation of findability under analysis, or true existence. That there are particles and masses of particles is accepted conventionally, but matter, because of the implications of the word, is not accepted even conventionally (according to Jam-yang-shay-ba).

Since visible forms and so forth are atomically constructed, it may be wondered why the four elements which are necessarily present in every particle are classified under tangible objects. The reason is that without touch, the function of earth, hardness and obstructiveness, cannot be experienced. Similarly, without touch, the function of water,

dampness and moistening, cannot be experienced; without touch, the function of fire, heat and burning, cannot be experienced; without touch, the function of wind, lightness and moving, cannot be experienced. Therefore, the four elements are classed as tangible objects. Visible forms, odors, tastes, and the other tangible objects are evolutes of the elements.

The five sense powers and the five objects are called the ten obstructive physical objects. Among these, colors and shapes that can be shown to an eye consciousness are called demonstrable obstructive forms; thus, demonstrable form and object of apprehension by an eye consciousness are synonyms. The five sense powers and the four remaining objects—sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects—are undemonstrable obstructive forms.

L7: [Existent: Things : Forms: Forms for the mental consciousness] :L7

The final category of forms is comprised of forms for the mental consciousness, which are undemonstrable and non-obstructive. They are defined as form aggregates which are objects only of the mental consciousness and thus are classed not as formsources (rupayatana, gzugs kyi skye mched) but as phenomenasources (dharmayatana, chos kyi skye mched)¹⁶⁵ (see Chart 19)

Forms arising from aggregation. A single particle does not appear to an ordinary being's sense consciousness, but when the mental consciousness analyzes a gross form into parts, a single particle does appear, and thus it is classed as a form for a mental consciousness.

// CHART 19: Divisions of Form for the Mental Consciousness

	form arising from aggregation (of the eight substances), e.g., a single particle
	abhisamkshepika
	bsdu ba las gyur ba
	space-form, e.g., appearance of clear space only to a mental consciousness
	abhyavakashika
	mngon par skabs yod pa
	form arising from promises, e.g., a vow or an absence of a vow
	Samaddnika
form for the mental consciousness	yang dag par blangs pa las gyur ba
	imaginary form, e.g., a horse, elephant, or house in a dream, or a non-actual meditative object such as an area filled with corpses
	parikalpita
	kun btags pa
	form for one with meditative power, e.g., earth or water appearing to one in isolated meditative stabilization on earth or water
	vaibhuvika
	dbang 'byor ba

The shape of a single particle is necessarily round, but its colors are various as described above for the four elements. Since single particles appear only to the mental consciousness,

all shapes and colors are not included in the category of visible forms seen by an eye consciousness.

Space-forms. Space appears both to an eye consciousness and a mental consciousness and thus the bluish space that appears to an eye consciousness is a visible form whereas the space that appears to a mental consciousness is a form for a mental consciousness.

Both are impermanent whereas uncaused space, which is a non-affirming negative of obstructive contact, appears only to an inferential mental consciousness and is permanent. Like emptiness, it is a mere absence of a negated factor—for emptiness, inherent existence, and for space, obstructive contact.

Forms arising from promises. When one takes a vow of individual liberation, a form arises in dependence on the shape of the body, as in crouching, and in dependence on the sounds of speech, as in declaring that one will turn away from killing. This subtle physical entity is said to arise at the moment of first taking the vow and remains with the person until losing the vow or death. Similarly, a form arises from non-restraint as, for instance, in dependence on a butcher's physical and verbal actions in killing animals and selling their flesh. A middling variety of such is a form that arises from physical or verbal virtue. Forms arising from promises are continuations of virtue or sin and arise from revelatory actions of body or speech or arise from cultivating meditative stabilization. Since the motivations of these actions are not knowable by others, they are called 'non-revelatory forms' (avijnaptirupa, rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'i gzugs).

Imaginary forms. Dream objects, such as elephants, and non-actual objects of meditation, such as corpses filling the world, appear as if they were actual forms but are not; thus, they are classed as imaginary forms. The Prasangikas say that a dream consciousness is solely a mental consciousness appearing in the aspects of the five sense consciousnesses. A dream object is an external object affecting a mental consciousness just as a reflection in a mirror is an external object affecting an eye consciousness. The non-Buddhist Mīmāṃsakas say that the light of the eye hits the mirror, and through returning to the eye an image is seen. The Buddhist Vaibhashikas say that a clear type of form arises in the mirror. The Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins and Yogachara-Svatantrikas say that a mirror image is a false appearance to the mind and is not a different entity from the mind. The Prasangikas, however, say that reflections, the falling hairs seen by one with cataracts, and mirages are visible forms just as echoes are sounds. A consciousness perceiving these is nevertheless mistaken because, for example, a mirror image of a face appears to be a face and not just a mirror image.

Forms for one with meditative power. Forms that appear to one who has attained mastery in meditation are objects of meditation that exist in fact. Mere earth or mere water as a meditative manifestation of one who has attained mastery in meditation is actual and is not an imaginary form. Included in this category are objects of meditative manifestation that can be shown to another being's eye consciousness, but this does not make the object as it appears to the master a visible form; for him it still is a form for the mental consciousness. This is compared to the varieties of externally existent objects seen by different types of beings, as in the case of a god's seeing a bowl of fluid as ambrosia and a hungry ghost's seeing pus and blood in the same place.

L6: [Existent: Things : Consciousness] :L6

Sources:

- Ye-shay-gyel-tsen's Clear Exposition of the Modes of Minds and Mental Factors
- Lati Rinbochay's oral teachings

The second division of things, or impermanent phenomena, is consciousness, defined as the clear and knowing.¹⁶⁶ Consciousness is of two types:

// CHART 20: Divisions of Consciousness

consciousness	Mind
	chitta
	sems
	mental factor
	chaitta
	sems byung

L7: [Existent: Things : Consciousness: Minds] :L7

A mind is a knower of the mere entity of an object, whereas a mental factor is a knower which, on the basis of observing that object, engages in the object from the point of view of other features, such as function and so forth. Minds and mental factors are different within being the same entity; they possess five similarities which, as described in Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge (Abhidharmakosha) are:

- Sameness of base. A mind and its accompanying mental factors depend on the same sense power, as in the case of an eye consciousness and its mental factors which both depend on the physical eye sense power.
- Sameness of object of observation. A mind and its mental factors observe the same object. For instance, when the main eye consciousness apprehends blue, so does the mental factor of feeling that accompanies it.
- Sameness of aspect. For instance, if the main eye consciousness is generated in the aspect (or image) of blue, so is the mental factor of discrimination that accompanies it.
- Sameness of time. A mind and its mental factors are produced, abide, and cease simultaneously.
- Sameness of substantial entity. Just as at any one time the substantial entity of a particular mind is single and there are not many minds of the same type, such as several eye consciousnesses, so the substantial entity of, for instance, the mental factor of intention that accompanies the eye consciousness is also single.

Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge (Abhidharmasamuchchaya) combines the sameness of object of observation and sameness of aspect and adds another, sameness of realm and level. This refers to the fact that if, for instance, the main mind is of the Desire Realm, only mental factors of the Desire Realm will accompany it, and not mental factors of the Form or Formless Realms.

Minds are of only six types (see Chart 21). An eye consciousness is an individual knower depending on the eye and observing visible form. An ear consciousness is an individual knower depending on the ear and observing sound. A nose consciousness is an individual knower depending on the nose and observing odor. A tongue consciousness is an individual knower depending on the tongue and observing taste. A body consciousness is an individual knower depending on the body and observing tangible objects. A mental consciousness is an individual knower depending on the mind sense (which is a former moment of consciousness and thus non-physical) and observing phenomena.

// CHART 21: Divisions of Minds

	eye consciousness
	chakshuruijnana
	mig gi rnam par shes pa
	ear consciousness
	shrotravijnana
	rna ba 'i rnam par shes pa
	nose consciousness
	ghrdnavijnana
	sna'i rnam par shes pa
mind	tongue consciousness
	jihvdvijnana
	Ice'i rnam par shes pa
	body consciousness
	kdyavijnana
	lus kyi rnam par shes pa
	mental consciousness
	manovijnana
	yid kyi rnam par shes pa

The mind cognizing emptiness, either inferentially or directly, is a mental consciousness, not an eye, ear, nose, tongue, or body consciousness, except in the case of a Buddha whose consciousnesses are cross-functional. The mental consciousness has the capacity to penetrate, first conceptually and then non-conceptually, the nature of phenomena, which not only is beyond the realm of a non-Buddha's sense perception but also is obscured by a false overlay that until Buddhahood accompanies sense perception. In dependence on reasoning, the mental consciousness first realizes an emptiness of a particular object conceptually—by way of the image of a vacuity which is a negative of inherent existence; then through familiarity with that knowledge, the imagistic element is removed, whereupon the mental consciousness becomes a Superior's wisdom directly cognizing emptiness.

L7: [Existent: Things : Consciousness: Mental factors] :L7

There are fifty-one mental factors which are classed in six groups:

// CHART 22: Divisions of Mental Factors

	omnipresent factor (5)
	sarvatraga
	kun 'gro
	determining factor (5)
	viniyata
	yul nges
	virtuous factor (11)
	kushula
	dge ba
mental factor	root affliction (6)
	mulaklesha
	rtsa nyon
	secondary affliction (20)

upaklesha
 nye nyon
 changeable factor (4)
 aniyata
 gzhan 'gyur

L8: [Existent: Things : Consciousness: Mental factors: Omnipresent mental factors.] :L8

The omnipresent mental factors are so named because they necessarily accompany all minds, even the wisdom cognizing emptiness. The five omnipresent mental factors are:

// CHART 23: Divisions of Omnipresent Mental Factors

	feeling
	vedana
	tshor ba
	discrimination
	samjna
	'du shes
	intention
omnipresent	chetana
mental factor	sems pa
	contact
	sparsha
	regpa
	mental engagement
	manaskara
	yid la byed pa

Feeling. Feeling is an entity of experience individually experiencing the fruitions of virtuous and non-virtuous actions. Its objects are pleasure, pain, and neutrality. Pleasure is that with which, when it ceases, one wants to meet again; pain is that from which, when it arises, one wants to separate; and neutrality, being neither pleasure nor pain, is that with respect to which, when it arises, neither the wish to meet nor the wish to separate occurs. Pleasure, pain, and neutrality are called 'fruitions' in order to emphasize that all generations of pleasure, pain, and neutral feeling are results of former actions.

All pleasures, even that arising from a cool breeze in a hell, arise from virtuous actions (karma, las) accumulated in the past. Similarly, all pains, even a headache in the continuum of a Foe Destroyer, arise from non-virtuous actions accumulated in the past. In other words, pleasure and pain do not arise causelessly, or from a discordant cause, such as the nature (prakrti, rang bzhin) asserted by the Samkhyas or the lord Ishvara as asserted by the Aishvaras. Rather, general pleasure and pain, such as being born as a human or as a hell-being, arise from general virtuous and non-virtuous actions, such as an ethical deed or the sin of murder. Similarly, the varieties of particular pleasures and pains arise from the varieties of particular virtuous and non-virtuous actions. The development of certainty as to this definite and undeceived relationship of action and effect—of pleasure to virtue and pain to non-virtue—is praised as the basis of all auspicious doctrines and called the correct view of all Buddhists.

Pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha), and neutrality (aduhkasukha) can each be divided into physical (kayiki) and mental (chaitasiki) feeling, making six types of feeling. Physical

feeling refers to that accompanying any of the five sense consciousnesses, not just that accompanying the body consciousness. It is called physical because the five sense powers are composed of clear matter and because the body sense power pervades the sense powers of eye, ear, nose, and tongue. Mental feeling is that accompanying the mental consciousness.

From the viewpoint of their base or sense power, feelings are of six types:

- feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness (chakshusamsparshaja vedana)
- feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness (shrotrasamsparshaja vedana)
- feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness (ghranasamsparshajavedana)
- feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness (jihvasamsparshaja vedana)
- feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness (kayasamsparshaja vedana)
- feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness (manahsamsparshaja vedana).

Taking into account pleasure, pain, and neutrality, these six are further divided into eighteen types of feeling.

When divided from the viewpoint of object of abandonment and antidote, there are two types:

- feeling as the base of attachment (gredhashritavedana), which is feeling accompanying attachment to attributes of the Desire Realm
- feeling as the base of deliverance (naishkamyashritavedana), which is feeling accompanying a mental consciousness that has turned away from desire for attributes of the Desire Realm and is included within an actual concentration.

This division into two is made in order to make known how attachment is induced by the power of feeling and how one separates from attachment to feeling in dependence on the concentrations.

There is also a division of feeling into materialistic (samishavedana) and non-materialistic (niramishavedana). The former is feeling accompanying attachment to contaminated mental and physical aggregates, whereas the latter is feeling accompanying a wisdom consciousness directly cognizing selflessness.

Discrimination. Discrimination apprehends, upon the aggregation of an object, sense power, and a consciousness, the uncommon signs of an object. There are two types:

- non-conceptual apprehension of signs: apprehension of the uncommon signs of an object appearing to a non-conceptual mind
- conceptual apprehension of signs: apprehension of the uncommon signs of an object appearing to thought.

These two types of discrimination operate on (1) perceptions, involving the designation of expressions to objects manifestly perceived, (2) hearing, involving the designation of expressions in dependence on hearing believable words, (3) differentiations, involving the designation of expressions to objects ascertained in dependence on signs (such as in determining that an article is good due to possessing the signs of superior quality), and (4) knowledge, involving the designation of expressions to objects ascertained directly. There is also a division of discrimination into two types:

- discrimination apprehending signs in objects: apprehension individually differentiating the features of an object, such as blue, yellow, and so forth
- discrimination apprehending signs in expressions: apprehension individually differentiating the features of expressions, such as in, 'This is a man; that is a woman.'

From the viewpoint of its base, discrimination is of six types:

- discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness (chakshusamsparshajd samjna)
- discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness (shrotrasamsparshaja samjna)
- discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness (ghrdnasamsparshaa samjna)
- discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness (jihvdsamsparshaja samjna)
- discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness (kdyasamsparshaja samjna)
- discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness (manahsamsparshajd samjna).

From the viewpoint of object of observation, it is also of six types:

- reasoned discrimination (sanimittasamjnd): (a) discrimination skilled in the relationship of names and meanings, (b) discrimination observing products as impermanent and so forth, and (c) discrimination having a clear subjective aspect and object of observation
- unreasoned discrimination (animittasamjna): (a) discrimination unskilled in the relationship of names and meanings, (b) discrimination observing products as permanent and so forth, and (c) discrimination lacking clear subjective aspect and object of observation
- discrimination of the small (pariitd samjna): (a) discriminations in the continuum of an ordinary being in the Desire Realm who has not attained an actual concentration and (b) discriminations observing attributes of the Desire Realm
- discrimination of the vast (mahadgatd samjna): (a) discriminations observing the Form Realm and (b) discriminations in the continuums of beings of the Form Realm
- discrimination of the limitless (apramdnasamjnd): (a) discriminations observing limitless space or limitless consciousness
- discrimination of nothingness (akinchinsamjnd): discriminations observing nothingness (a state beyond coarse feeling and discrimination).

In general, discrimination involves the differentiation and identification of objects; as a mental factor accompanying a non-conceptual mind such as an eye consciousness, it implies a non-confusion of the details of the object without which a later identification could not be made.¹⁶⁷ Discrimination is the heart of identifying the object of negation in the view of selflessness and then reflecting on a reasoning proving non-inherent existence; thus, far from being a hindrance to the path, correct discrimination is to be enhanced.

Intention. Intention (or attention) is the mental factor that moves and directs the mind that accompanies it to its object; it has the function of engaging the mind in the virtuous (kushala, dge ba), non-virtuous (akushala, midge ba), and neutral (avydkrta, lungdu ma bstanpa). Intention is the most important of all mental factors because through its power minds and mental factors engage in objects, like pieces of iron powerlessly moved by a magnet.

From the viewpoint of its base, intention is of six types:

- intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness (chakshuhsamsparsahjd chetand)
- intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness (shrotrasamsparsahjd chetand)
- intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness (ghrdnasamsparsahjd chetand)
- intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness (jihvdsamsparsahjd chetand)
- intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness (kdyasamsparsahjd chetand)
- intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness (manahsamsparsahja chetand).

Intention is mental action (manaskarma, yid kyi las) from among the two types of action (karma, las), actions of intention (mental actions) and intended actions (physical and verbal actions).

Contact. Contact distinguishes its object—upon the aggregation of object, sense power, and mind—as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral in accordance with subsequent feelings of pleasure, pain, or neutrality; thus, it has the function of serving as a basis for feeling. Since contact distinguishes its object as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, it serves as a cause for the feelings of pleasure, pain, or neutrality which in turn serve as causes for desire, hatred, and ignorance.

From the viewpoint of its base, contact is of six types:

- contact upon the aggregation of a visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness
- contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness
- contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness
- contact upon the aggregation of a taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness
- contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness
- contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness.

Mental engagement. Mental engagement directs the mind accompanying it to a specific object of observation (dlambana, dmigspa). The difference between intention and mental engagement is that intention moves the mind to objects in general whereas mental engagement directs the mind to a specific object.

Without the five omnipresent factors, the experience of an object would not be complete. Without feeling, there would be no experience of pleasure, pain, or neutrality. Without discrimination, the uncommon signs of the object would not be apprehended. Without intention, the mind would not approach its object. Without contact, there would be no basis for feeling. Without mental engagement, the mind would not be directed to a specific object of observation. Thus, all five are needed to experience an object.

L8: [Existent: Things : Consciousness: Mental factors: Determining mental factors.] :L8

The five determining mental factors are shown in Chart 24.

// CHART 24: Divisions of Determining Mental Factors

aspiration
chhanda
'dun pa

	belief
	adhimoksha
	mos pa
	mindfulness
determining	smrti
mental factor	dran pa
	stabilization
	Samadhi
	ting nge 'dzin
	knowledge
	prajna
	shes rob

Aspiration. Aspiration observes a contemplated phenomenon and seeks it. Aspiration serves as a base for the initiation of effort in the sense that, for instance, through perceiving the advantages of meditative stabilization, a captivating faith in meditative stabilization is produced, and in dependence on this, a strong continuous aspiration seeking meditative stabilization is generated such that one is able to generate continuous effort. Effort in meditative stabilization, in turn, generates a pliancy of mind and body that bestows an ability to remain in the practice of virtue night and day, thereby overcoming the laziness which is a non-delight in cultivating meditative stabilization and liking for what is discordant with meditative stabilization. Thus, faith, aspiration, effort, and pliancy are the antidotes to laziness.

Aspiration is divided into three types: aspiration wishing to meet, aspiration wishing not to separate, and aspiration that seeks. The last is again divided into aspiration seeking desires, aspiration seeking views, and so forth.

Belief. Belief holds an ascertained object to be just as it was ascertained; it has the function of keeping the mind from being captivated by another view. For instance, when one considers Buddha and other teachers and analyzes to discover which is an undeceiving refuge, one ascertains that only Buddha is the teacher of an undeceiving refuge. Then, when the doctrine taught by him and the spiritual community properly achieving his doctrine are ascertained by valid cognition as undeceiving, a firm belief in them as final refuges is gained. Thereupon, Forders and so forth cannot lead one away from this position. One has then entered among the number of Buddhists, and based on this, all auspicious qualities increase.

Mindfulness. Mindfulness is non-forgetfulness with respect to a familiar phenomenon; it has the function of causing non-distraction. Mindfulness has three features:

- objective feature: a familiar object. Mindfulness cannot be generated toward an unfamiliar object.
- subjective feature: non-forgetfulness within observation of that object. Even though one might have become familiar with an object previously, if it does not presently appear as an object of mind, mindfulness cannot occur.
- functional feature: causing non-distraction. Since the stability of the mind increases in dependence on mindfulness, non-distraction is specified as the function of mindfulness.

Mindfulness that possesses these three features is extremely important for both sutra and tantra practice, as all auspicious qualities of the grounds and paths increase in dependence on mindfulness and introspection. In particular, all achievements of meditative

stabilization in sutra and tantra are attained through the power of mindfulness.

Stabilization. Stabilization is a one-pointedness of mind with respect to an imputed object; it has the function of serving as the base of knowledge, that is, special insight. The object of stabilization is specified as 'imputed' because when meditative stabilization is cultivated, the mind is held to a mentally imputed or imagined object of observation. This indicates that meditative stabilization is not generated by a sense consciousness, such as by an eye consciousness staring at an object, but by the mental consciousness observing an internal object. Through continuous cultivation of meditative stabilization, the object of observation—whether true or untrue—will be perceived clearly and non-conceptually.

In dependence on the meditative stabilization of calm abiding, which is a setting of the mind internally in equipoise, special insight is achieved through the force of analytical wisdom. Therefore, the function of stabilization is specified as serving as the base of knowledge. Stabilization, in turn, depends on ethics.

Knowledge. Knowledge (or wisdom) individually differentiates the faults and virtues of objects of analysis; it has the function of overcoming doubt. When one analyzes with reasoning and gains ascertainment, doubt is overcome; thus, the function of knowledge is specified as overcoming doubt.

L8: [Existent: Things : Consciousness: Mental factors: Virtuous mental factors.] :L8

The eleven virtuous mental factors are:

// CHART 25: Divisions of Virtuous Mental Factors

	faith
	shraddha, dad pa
	shame
	hri, ngo tsha shes pa
	embarrassment
	apatrdpya, khrel yod pa
	non-attachment
	alobha, ma chags pa
	non-hatred
	advesha, zhe sdang med pa
virtuous mental	non-ignorance
factor	amoha, gti mug med pa
	effort
	virya, brtson 'grus
	pliancy
	prasrabdhi, shin tu sbyangs pa
	conscientiousness
	apramdda, bag yod pa
	equanimity
	upekshd, btang snyoms
	non-harmfulness
	avihimsa, rnam par mi 'tshe ba

Faith. Faith has the aspect of clarity (prasdda, dang ba), conviction (abhisampratyaya, yid ches), or a wish to attain (abhilasha, 'thob 'dod) with respect to the existent (such as

actions and their effects), the possession of qualities (such as by the Three Jewels), or powers (such as the powers of the path to actualize cessation). It has the function of serving as a basis for aspiration. The faith of clarity, or clarifying faith, is, for instance, the clarity of mind that comes through perceiving the qualities of the Three Jewels; it is called 'clarifying' because just as when a waterclarifying jewel is put in water, the dirtiness in the water is immediately cleansed, so when this type of faith is generated in the continuum, mental troubles are cleared away, whereupon the qualities of realization are suitable to be generated.

The faith of conviction is, for instance, the gaining of conviction in dependent-arising or in actions and their effects through contemplating these doctrines as set forth by the Conqueror. The faith which is a wish to attain is, for instance, the faith thinking, 'I will definitely attain the cessation of suffering', upon contemplating the four noble truths, ascertaining true sufferings and true sources as objects of abandonment and true cessations and true paths as objects of attainment, and realizing that through striving in the proper way these can be attained.

Although the world equates faith (dad pa) and liking (dga' ba), they are not the same. Liking one's child or spouse and liking beer are cases of liking but not of faith. Also, the faith which is a concern and conviction from one's depths with respect to the faults of cyclic existence is faith but not liking. The faith which is a conviction and liking from the depths through contemplating the qualities of a spiritual guide or the benefits of wholesome actions and their effects is both faith and liking.

Furthermore, faith and respect (gus pa) are not the same though they are considered to be so in the world. For instance, liking a spiritual guide is faith, but respecting a spiritual guide involves contemplating his kindness, knowing shame, and valuing him highly; thus, faith and respect are different mental factors.

As explained earlier, effort is the cause of all auspicious qualities, and in order to generate effort, aspiration seeking those qualities is necessary. In order to generate aspiration, one must perceive those qualities and have the faith of conviction in them. Thus, faith is frequently praised in the scriptures and their commentaries as the basis of all auspicious attainments.

Shame and embarrassment. Shame is an avoidance of misconduct due to one's own disapproval whereas embarrassment is an avoidance of misconduct due to others' disapproval. These mental factors both have the function of serving as a basis for restraining misconduct. In the case of shame, when one is about to engage in misconduct, one avoids it by thinking, 'This is not something I should do,' whereas in the case of embarrassment, one avoids it by thinking, 'Since others will despise me, this is not suitable.' This latter involves concern for the displeasure of a lama, teacher, or the like.

Shame and embarrassment serve as a basis for restraining misconduct in the sense that to restrain physical, verbal, and mental misconduct, one must definitely have shame and embarrassment; for if one does not have either concern from one's own point of view over the fruition of an action or concern for the discomfort of a lama or teacher, there is no way to cease misconduct.

Non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance. Non-attachment is an emergence from and non-desire for cyclic existence and the articles of cyclic existence. Non-hatred is a factor that, in observing either harmful sentient beings, sufferings, or sources of suffering,

conquers the generation of hatred; it is an absence of the intent to harm. Non-ignorance is a knowledge of individual analysis that can serve as an antidote to ignorance; it is either attained from birth through the fruition of actions in an earlier lifetime without depending on contributing causes in this lifetime or arises through application by way of hearing, thinking, or meditating.

Non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance have the function of serving as bases for non-engagement in misconduct, being roots of all virtuous practices, methods for ceasing all misconduct, and the essence of all paths. Since all grounds and paths are for the sake of abandoning the three poisons of desire, hatred, and ignorance and since these three mental factors cause one to emerge from the three poisons that cause all misconduct, their function is specified as serving as bases for restraining misconduct.

A being of small capacity generates non-attachment to this life and, turning away from this life, seeks his own welfare in future lives. A being of middling capacity generates non-attachment toward all the marvels of cyclic existence and, having reversed his grasping from the depths, seeks release from all cyclic existence. A being of great capacity generates non-attachment to both cyclic existence and a state of solitary peace and seeks the non-abiding nirvana of a Buddha wherein he can remain in meditative equipoise on emptiness while at the same time manifesting countless forms in order to help migrators in cyclic existence. In this way, all paths can be related to non-attachment as well as to non-hatred and non-ignorance.

Effort. Effort is a mental delight in virtue; it has the function of fulfilling and accomplishing virtues. Although in the world everything that involves striving is called effort, toil only for the sake of the affairs of this lifetime is not effort but is laziness that is an attachment to bad activities; it is discordant with effort.

There are five types of effort:

- effort of armoring—this is the thought prior to engaging in virtue that is the mind's taking delight in that activity. It is like putting on great armor in that it affords a willingness to engage in extended activity.
- effort of application—a mental delight while engaging in practice
- effort of non-inferiority—a delight generated such that one will not be discouraged, thinking, 'How could one such as I do this?'
- effort of irreversibility—a fullness of mental delight such that circumstances cannot divert one from engaging in virtuous activity
- effort of non-satisfaction—a striving for higher qualities without being satisfied with achieving small virtues.

All auspicious qualities depend on effort.

Pliancy. Pliancy is a serviceability of mind and body such that the mind can be set on a virtuous object of observation as long as one likes; it has the function of removing all obstructions. It is of two types:

- physical pliancy—through the power of meditative stabilization physical unserviceability is purified, whereupon the body is light like a ball of cotton and capable of being used in virtuous activity according to one's wish
- mental pliancy—through the power of meditative stabilization the mind becomes free of unserviceability, whereupon it has the facility to engage in a virtuous aim without impediment.

The function of pliancy is specified as removing all obstructions because through its power all unfavorable conditions of mind and body are purified. Once pliancy is attained, meditative stabilization is increased from within; through this the bliss of pliancy increases, whereupon meditative stabilization again increases. Through this, in turn, the mind becomes empowered, when conjoined with special insight, to overcome obstructions.

Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness keeps the mind from contaminations and causes the achievement of virtue while abiding in effort. It keeps the mind from coming under the influence of the afflictions and has the function of serving as a basis for the achievement of all mundane and supramundane marvels. Conscientiousness is of five types:

- conscientiousness with respect to the former—a remedying of past faults in accordance with the doctrine
- conscientiousness with respect to the later—an earnest intention to remedy future faults
- conscientiousness with respect to the middle—remedying faults without forgetfulness in the present
- conscientiousness prior to activity—a tightening of the mind, thinking, 'How nice it would be if I could behave and abide in such a way that faults do not arise!'
- conscientiousness of concordant behavior—abiding and behaving in such a way that faults do not arise.

Conscientiousness is very important as a root of all grounds and paths.

Equanimity. Equanimity is an evenness of mind, a dwelling in a natural state, and a spontaneous abiding discordant with the afflictions. It is associated with non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance and has the function of not allowing an opportunity for the afflictions.

In dependence on techniques for setting the mind onepointedly, the nine states of mind (see pp.80-86) are gradually achieved. When the ninth is attained, the exertion of using the antidotes to laxity and excitement is no longer needed. At that point one attains a spontaneous abiding of the mind on its object, and with this state an equanimity that involves non-application of the antidotes to laxity and excitement is attained. Thus, equanimity here is an equanimity of application, not an equanimity of feeling nor the immeasurable equanimity of wishing that all sentient beings abide in an equanimity free of desire and hatred, intimacy and alienness.

The function of equanimity is specified as not allowing an opportunity for the afflictions because when the ninth state of mind is attained, it is easy to overcome the afflictions of the Desire Realm and also at the time of meditative equipoise laxity and excitement do not arise.

Non-harmfulness. Non-harmfulness is a compassionate attitude, included as part of non-hatred, which is patience devoid of intention to injure. It observes suffering sentient beings and thinks, 'May they be free of such suffering!' The function of non-harmfulness, not injuring sentient beings, is said to be the essence of Buddha's teachings.

These eleven virtuous mental factors are called 'natural virtues' because they are virtuous entities in themselves, without depending on consideration of other factors such as motivation and so forth. Though these eleven are the principal virtues, there are four other types:

- virtue through relation—the minds and mental factors that accompany any of the eleven virtues

- virtue through subsequent relation—virtuous predispositions established by virtuous minds and mental factors
- virtue through motivation—physical and verbal actions motivated by faith and so forth
- virtue through ultimacy—suchness, or emptiness, is designated a virtue because when one observes and meditates on it, all obstructions are purified; however, it is not an actual virtue.

From the viewpoint of state or situation, virtues are divided into eight types:

- virtue by way of attainment at birth—such as faith that arises through the force of predispositions established in former lifetimes without depending on familiarization in this lifetime
- virtue by way of application—such as the faith of wishing to attain Buddhahood that arises in dependence on relying on a virtuous spiritual guide, listening to the excellent doctrine, properly taking such to mind, and achieving doctrines that are conducive to attaining nirvana
- virtue by way of an activity in front—imagining, for instance, a field of assembly of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and so forth in front of oneself, and then bowing down and making offerings
- virtue by way of helping—actions such as ripening sentient beings by way of the four means of gathering students (giving articles, teaching the means for attaining high status in cyclic existence and definite goodness, causing others to practice what is beneficial, and behaving that way oneself)
- virtue by way of bearing—such as wholesome actions that serve as the means for attaining high status and definite goodness
- virtue by way of acting as an antidote—such as actions that possess the special power of directly overcoming objects of abandonment and the unfavorable
- virtue by way of pacification—such as true cessations
- virtue by way of concordant cause—such as the five clairvoyances and ten powers that arise through the force of attaining true cessations.

A similar presentation of seven types is made with respect to non-virtues:

- non-virtue by way of attainment at birth—such as spontaneously engaging in murder due to predispositions from a former lifetime
- non-virtue by way of application—such as misconduct of body, speech, and mind that arises in dependence on relying on a non-virtuous friend, listening to specious doctrine, improperly taking such to mind, and so forth
- non-virtue by way of an activity in front—such as offering a blood sacrifice to an image
- non-virtue by way of harming—such as actions of body, speech, and mind that injure sentient beings
- non-virtue by way of bearing—such as actions impelling future lifetimes and actions completing the character of a future lifetime that yield only suffering as their fruit
- non-virtue by way of non-conduciveness—such as bad views that prevent generation of non-contaminated paths
- non-virtue by way of interruption—such as bad views that interfere with virtuous activity.

L8: [Existent: Things : Consciousness: Mental factors: Root afflictions.] :L8

Afflictions, in general, are defined as knowers that, when generated, cause the mental

continuum to be very unpeaceful. The six root afflictions, which are so called because they are the sources of all other afflictions, are shown in Chart 26.

// CHART 26: Divisions of Root Afflictions

	desire
	rdga
	'dod chags
	anger
	pratigha
	khong khro
	pride
	mdna
	nga rgyal
root affliction	ignorance
	avidya
	ma rig pa
	doubt
	vichikitsa
	the tshom
	afflicted view
	drshti
	Ita ba nyon mongs can

Desire. Desire perceives an internal or external contaminated phenomenon to be pleasant from the point of view of its own entity and thereupon seeks it. It has the function of generating suffering. Like oil that has set in cloth, desire adheres to its object of observation and thus is difficult to separate from it.

Desire is divided into three types: desire of the Desire Realm, desire of the Form Realm, and desire of the Formless Realm. The reason for stating that the function of desire is the generation of suffering is that the root of all suffering is birth, and the main cause of birth in cyclic existence is desire, or attachment.

Anger. Anger is an intention to harm sentient beings, to harm sufferings in one's own continuum, or to harm phenomena that are sources of suffering (such as thorns). It has the function of causing oneself not to remain in contact with happiness and serves as a basis for misconduct. Through anger, one does not abide in happiness in this lifetime, and immeasurable suffering is induced in the future.

Pride. Pride depends on the view of the transitory collection as a real I and has the aspect of a puffing up of the mind upon observing one's own wealth, qualities, youth, and so forth. It has the function of serving as a basis for the arising of disrespect and suffering.

There are seven types of pride:

- pride—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is superior to lower persons
- excessive pride—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is superior to equal persons
- pride beyond pride—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is greatly superior even to persons who are superior to others
- pride of thinking I—a puffing up of the mind, observing the appropriated aggregates of mind and body and thinking, 'I'
- pride of conceit—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one has attained what has not

been attained, such as clairvoyance or meditative stabilization
 -- pride of slight inferiority—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is just a little lower than others who are actually greatly superior
 -- wrongful pride—a puffing up the mind, thinking that one has attained auspicious qualities when one has actually deviated from the path, such as claiming high attainments when one has actually been carried away by a spirit.

Because pride causes disrespect for high qualities and for those who possess high qualities, it serves to obstruct the new attainment of doctrines of verbalization and realization, to cause rebirth in bad migrations, and, even when reborn as a human, to cause birth in a low class, such as a servant. Thus, it produces the unwanted in both this and later lives.

Ignorance. Ignorance is an absence of knowledge that involves obscuration with respect to the status of phenomena. It has the function of serving as a basis for the arising of false ascertainment, doubt, and afflictions. Its principal antidote is the wisdom cognizing selflessness.

Ignorance is of two types: obscuration with respect to actions and their effects and obscuration with respect to suchness. The latter serves as the causal motivation for all rebirth in cyclic existence, but in terms of operational motivation at the time of actions, obscuration with respect to actions and their effects is specified as the cause of accumulating actions that result in birth in bad migrations whereas obscuration with respect to suchness is specified as the cause of accumulating actions that result in birth in happy migrations.

In dependence on ignorance, the other afflictions arise, and in dependence on them contaminated actions are accumulated. From those, all sufferings in cyclic existence are produced. Therefore, all afflictions and faults arise in dependence on ignorance.

Doubt. Doubt is a two-pointedness of mind with respect to the four noble truths, actions and their effects, and so forth. It has the function of serving as a basis for non-engagement in virtues. Doubt obstructs all virtuous activities and especially interferes with seeing the truth.

Afflicted views. There are five afflicted views: (see Chart 27).

// CHART 27: Divisions of Afflicted Views

	view of the transitory collection (as real
	I and mine)
	satkayadrshṭi
	'jig tshogs la Ita ba
	view holding to an extreme
	antagrahadrshṭi
	mthar 'dzin pa'i Ita ba
	conception of a (bad) view as supreme
afflicted view	drshṭiparamarsha
	Ita ba mchog 'dzin
	conception of (bad) ethics and modes of
	conduct as supreme
	shilavrataparamarsha
	tshul khrims dang brtul zhugs mchog 'dzin

perverse view
mithyadrshiti
log ha

View of the transitory collection. A view of the transitory collection observes the appropriated mental and physical aggregates and conceives them to be a real I and mine. It is an endurance in the sense of not fearing the mistakenness of inherently existent I and mine; a desire in the sense of seeking a mistaken object; an intelligence in the sense of thoroughly discriminating its object; a conception in the sense of adhering strongly to its object; and a view in the sense of observing its object. A view of the transitory has the function of serving as a basis for all bad views.

It is called the view of the transitory collection because the mental and physical aggregates, which are the base of the view, are impermanent, and thus transitory, and are a composite of the plural, and thus a collection. The name itself indicates that there is no permanent and partless person. (See p. 176 for its divisions.) A view of the transitory collection conceives of an inherently existent I and exaggerates the distinction between self and other. Thereupon, desire for one's own side and hatred for others arises.¹⁶⁸ Through viewing the self, pride is generated, a view of the self as eternal or as annihilated at death arises, and the conception of one's own bad behavior as superior is generated. Similarly, teachers of selflessness and their teachings of cause and effect, the four noble truths, the Three Jewels, and so forth are conceived to be non-existent or become objects of doubt. In this way, the view of the transitory collection acts as the basis of all afflictions. Although usually identified as ignorance, in this context its relation to ignorance is like the relation of a mind conceiving the presence of a snake to the dimness surrounding a rope in a dark area.

View holding to an extreme. A view holding to an extreme observes the self as apprehended by the view of the transitory collection and conceives it to be either permanent in the sense of unchanging or annihilated in the sense of not transmigrating to another lifetime. Since it causes descent to the extremes of permanence and annihilation, it has the function of obstructing progress on the middle way free from the two extremes. As above, it is an endurance, desire, intelligence, conception, and view.

Conception of a (bad) view as supreme. A conception of a (bad) view to be supreme observes a view of the transitory collection, a view holding to an extreme, a perverse view, or the mental and physical aggregates in dependence on which these views arise and conceives such (1) to be supreme in the sense of claiming it to be perfect, (2) to be chief in the sense of holding that there is nothing greater, (3) to be superior, or (4) to be ultimate in the sense of holding that it has no equal. A conception of a (bad) view to be supreme has the function of serving as a basis for adhering strongly to bad views in that it establishes predispositions for not separating from them in this and future lives. As above, it is an endurance, desire, intelligence, conception, and view.

Conception of (bad) ethics and modes of conduct as supreme. A conception of (bad) ethics and modes of conduct to be supreme takes as its object (1) a faulty system of ethics that is intended to abandon faulty ethics, (2) a faulty mode of conduct that prescribes dress, behavior and physical and verbal activities, or (3) the mental and physical aggregates in dependence on which these are performed. It considers these to purify sins, liberate from afflictions, and release from cyclic existence. It has the function of serving as a basis for fruitless fatigue. As above, it is an endurance, desire, intelligence, conception, and

view.

Perverse view. A perverse view is a denial of cause, effect, functionality, and existent phenomena and can involve holding that Ishvara and so forth are the cause of beings migrating in cyclic existence. Denial of cause is a view that good and bad behavior and so forth do not exist. Denial of effect is a view that fruitions of virtuous and sinful actions do not exist. Denial of functionality is a view that former and later lives and so forth do not exist. Denial of existent phenomena is a view that, for example, attainment of the state of a Foe Destroyer does not exist.

Perverse views have the function of severing virtuous roots, causing tight adherence to non-virtuous roots, serving as a basis for engaging in non-virtue, and causing non-engagement in virtue. Since denial of cause, effect, and rebirth sever all virtuous roots, these are the worst among all perverse views.

L8: [Existent: Things : Consciousness: Mental factors: Secondary afflictions.] :L8

The twenty secondary afflictions, which are so called because they are close to or portions of the root afflictions, are shown in Chart 28.

// CHART 28: Divisions of Secondary Afflictions

secondary affliction	belligerence, krodha, khro ba
	resentment, upandha, 'khon 'dzin
	concealment, mraksha, 'chab pa
	spite, pradasha, 'tshigpa
	jealousy, irshya, phrag dog
	miserliness, matsarya, ser sna
	deceit, maya, sgyu
	dissimulation, shathya, g.yo
	haughtiness, mada, rgyags pa
	harmfulness, vihimsa, rnam par 'tshe ba
	non-shame ahrikyā, ngo tsha med pa
	non-embarrassment, anapatrdpya, khrel med pa
	lethargy, sty ana, rmugs pa
	excitement, auddhatya, rgod pa
	non-faith, ashraaddhya, ma dad pa
	laziness, kausidya, le lo
	non-conscientiousness, pramada, bag med pa
	forgetfulness, mushitasmrtita, brjed nges pa
	non-introspection, asamprajanya, shes bzhin ma yin pa
	distraction, vikshepa, rnam par g.yeng ba

Belligerence. Belligerence is an intention to harm another through striking and so forth when one is in any of the nine situations of harmful intent, thinking:

- 'This person has harmed me.'
- 'This person is harming me.'
- 'This person will harm me.'
- 'This person has harmed my friend.'
- 'This person is harming my friend.'
- 'This person will harm my friend.'
- 'This person has helped my enemy.'

-- 'This person is helping my enemy.'

-- 'This person will help my enemy.'

Belligerence has the function of serving as a basis for bearing weapons, punishing, and preparing to injure others. It differs from the root affliction anger in that anger is an impatience and intent to harm that arises when a harmful sentient being, or one's own suffering, or sources of suffering appear to the mind. Belligerence is an extremely disturbed state of mind which, upon a great increase of anger, is a wish to inflict harm on another such as by physically striking that person when he is in one's presence.

Resentment. Resentment is a wish to harm or to answer harm, involving non-release of a continuum of anger. It has the function of serving as a basis for impatience.

Concealment. Concealment is a wish, through the force of ignorance, to hide a fault when another person, such as a spiritual guide, points out that fault. It has the function of increasing faults, of serving as a basis for contrition and not abiding in contact with happiness, and of impelling rebirth in bad migrations.

Spite. Spite is a wish, through the force of belligerence and resentment, to speak harsh words out of ill-will to another who has pointed out a fault. It has the function of causing one not to abide in happiness in this lifetime by causing engagement in many faulty actions, such as speaking harsh words, and by generating many non-meritorious actions. Spite also generates unpleasant fruitions in future lives.

Jealousy. Jealousy is a disturbance of the mind from the depths that involves an inability to bear another's fortune due to being attached to goods and services. It involves hatred and has the function of causing discomfort of mind and not abiding in contact with happiness.

Miserliness. Miserliness is a tight holding onto articles without letting them go through the power of attachment to goods and services. It has the function of serving as a basis for the non-diminishment of possessions, and it generates the unwanted in this and later lives.

Deceit. Deceit is a pretension of having good qualities, whereas one does not, through the force of strong attachment to goods and services. As in the case of the hypocrisy of pretending to have a disciplined mind in order to deceive others, deceit can involve ignorance and desire and has the function of serving as a basis for wrong livelihood. 'Wrong livelihood' refers to deceitfully gaining goods (1) through hypocrisy, (2) through speaking soft words in accordance with another's thought, (3) through praising others' possessions, (4) through speaking on the faults of miserliness and so forth, and (5) through praising another's act of giving and so forth.

Dissimulation. Dissimulation is a wish to hide one's faults from others through the force of desire for goods and services. Both dissimulation and deceit have the function of preventing the attainment of true preceptual instruction and cause one in this and future lifetimes not to meet with a Mahayana spiritual guide.

Haughtiness. Haughtiness is a puffing up of the mind through taking joy and comfort in observing one's own good health, youth, beauty, power, signs of long life, prosperity, and so forth. It has the function of serving as a basis for all afflictions and secondary afflictions and acts as a root of non-conscientiousness.

Harmfulness. Harmfulness is an unmerciful wish to harm other sentient beings. Involving

anger, it is a lack of compassion as in wanting to harm or to cause others to harm, or in taking delight when seeing or hearing of harm to sentient beings. It has the function of injuring others.

Non-shame. Non-shame is a non-avoidance of faults from the viewpoint of one's own disapproval or of religious prohibition. It can involve desire, hatred, and ignorance and has the function of assisting all root afflictions and secondary afflictions. For example, if a monk, when encountering an intoxicant, did not avoid drinking it, thinking, 'This is something I should not do,' he would have the mental factor of non-shame.

Non-embarrassment. Non-embarrassment is non-avoidance of faults from the viewpoint of another's disapproval. It can involve desire, hatred, and ignorance and has the function of assisting all root afflictions and secondary afflictions. If one does not avoid faults thinking that the Teacher Buddha and clairvoyant gods would be disturbed and others would criticize oneself, one would have non-embarrassment. It and non-shame assist all afflictions and act as causes of all faults, for without a wish to avoid faults, one cannot keep from them. Thus, these two mental factors are said to accompany all non-virtuous minds.

Lethargy. Lethargy is a heaviness and unserviceability of body and mind. It involves ignorance and has the function of assisting all root and secondary afflictions, for in dependence on lethargy these increase.

Excitement. Excitement is a scattering of the mind to attributes of the Desire Realm experienced previously and an engagement in them with attachment. Excitement is a non-peacefulness of mind that involves desirous engagement in the pleasant; it has the function of preventing calm abiding. Thus, all scatterings of the mind are not instances of excitement since excitement is a portion of desire whereas the mind is frequently distracted to objects by way of afflictions other than desire and even scatters to virtuous objects of observation. Scattering involving desire is both scattering and excitement whereas other instances are just scattering.

Non-faith. Non-faith is non-conviction, non-delight, and non-wishing with respect to virtuous phenomena. It involves ignorance and has the function of serving as a basis for laziness. non-faith is the opposite of the three types of faith; it is non-conviction in actions and their effects, etc., non-delight and dislike of the possessors of auspicious qualities such as the Three Jewels, and non-wishing or non-seeking of liberation and so forth.

Laziness. Laziness is a non-delight in virtue due to attachment to lying down and so forth. It involves ignorance and has the function of preventing application in virtue. (See p.71.)

Non-conscientiousness. Non-conscientiousness causes a looseness of mind, not keeping it from afflictions and faults and resulting in non-cultivation of virtuous phenomena. It can involve an abiding in desire, hatred, and ignorance as well as laziness and has the function of serving as a basis for the increase of non-virtues and decrease of virtues.

Forgetfulness. Forgetfulness is an unclarity of mind and a forgetting of virtuous objects through mindfulness of objects of the afflictions. It has the function of serving as a basis for distraction in that, based on afflicted mindfulness, the mind is distracted to the objects of observation of the afflictions.

Non-introspection. Non-introspection is an unknowing engagement in physical, verbal, and mental deeds. It has the function of serving as a basis for the infractions of codes of

ethics.

Distraction. Distraction is a scattering of the mind from its object of observation. It can involve desire, hatred, and ignorance and has the function of preventing separation from desire. Excitement is a scattering of the mind to pleasant objects whereas distraction is a scattering to any object.

L8: [Existent: Things : Consciousness: Mental factors: Changeable mental factors.] :L8

The four changeable mental factors are so called because they become virtuous, non-virtuous, or neutral by the power of the motivation and the minds accompanying them. They are shown in Chart 29.

// CHART 29: Divisions of Changeable Mental Factors

	sleep
	middha
	gnyid
	contrition
changeable	kaukrtya
mental factor	gyod pa
	investigation
	vitarka
	nog pa
	analysis
	vichara
	dpyod pa

Contrition. Contrition is remorse or regret for a deed done by oneself in accordance with one's own thought or upon pressure by someone else which one subsequently comes to dislike. It involves ignorance and has the function of interrupting the stability of the mind.

Contrition is of three types:

- virtuous—remorse for sins done previously
- non-virtuous—remorse for meritorious actions done previously, such as making donations and then feeling sorry for having depleted one's wealth
- neutral—remorse for activities that neither helped nor harmed others, such as making a mistake sewing.

Sleep. Sleep is a powerless withdrawal inside of the engagement by sense consciousnesses in objects. It depends on causes such as heaviness of body, weakness, fatigue, taking the figure of darkness to mind, and so forth. Sleep involves ignorance and has the function of serving as a basis for losing virtuous activities. The proper time for sleep is the middle watch of the night, not the first or last watches nor during the day. During the middle watch of the night one should sleep with a wish to practice virtue, and not motivated by afflictions. Thus, there are two types of sleep, virtuous and non-virtuous, the latter having the function of degenerating virtuous activities.

Contrition for sins is suitable when their fruition has not yet occurred and they can still be affected by confession and so forth. When the fruition of a sin has already occurred, such as in having been born blind, contrition can no longer overcome the effect of the deed.

Investigation and analysis. Investigation is an inquiry into the rough entities of objects as well as their names whereas analysis is a fine discrimination of these. In dependence on

their objects, investigation and analysis are of three types, virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral. The virtuous, such as analyzing selflessness with an intention to emerge from cyclic existence, has the function of serving as a basis for abiding in contact with happiness in that it generates pleasant effects. Non-virtuous investigation and analysis, such as inquiring into pleasant and unpleasant objects motivated by desire and hatred, has the function of serving as a basis for not abiding in happiness in that it generates unpleasant effects. Investigation and analysis into crafts, styles, and so forth without a virtuous or non-virtuous attitude are neutral. (For another way of presenting consciousness see Appendix 1.)

L6: [Existent: Things : Non-associated compositional factors] :L6

Source:

- Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may's Beginnings of Annotations on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Essence of the Good Explanations'

The final division of impermanent phenomena is comprised of compositional factors which are neither form nor consciousness .169 They are called compositional factors because of being factors that allow for the aggregation of causes and conditions and for the production, abiding, and cessation of products. They are called 'non-associated' because, unlike minds, they are not associated with minds or mental factors. Non-associated compositional factors are divided into two types:

// CHART 30: Divisions of Non-Associated Compositional Factors

	person
non-associated	pudgala, gang zag
compositional	
factor	non-person compositional factor
	apudgalaviprayuktasamskara
	gang zag ma yin pa'i Idan min 'du byed

A person is a non-associated compositional factor because of being designated in dependence upon a collection of form and consciousness. Since a person is neither form nor consciousness but impermanent, it can be only an instance of the remaining category of impermanent phenomena, a non-associated compositional factor.

Non-person non-associated compositional factors are of twenty-three types (see Chart 31). These twenty-three are called 'designations to states'. 'Acquisition' is designated to a state of the increase and decrease of virtues and so forth, of which there are two types: 'finding acquisition' which is a new attainment of such increase or decrease and 'possessive acquisition' which is the retention of it.

// CHART 31: Divisions of Non-Person Non-Associated Compositional Factors

acquisition; prapti, 'thob pa
 absorption without discrimination;
 asamjñiSamapatti, 'du shes med pa'i snyoms 'jug
 absorption of cessation;
 nirodhaSamapatti, 'gog pa'i snyoms 'jug
 one having no discrimination; asamjñika,
 'du shes med pa pa
 life faculty; jivitendriya, srog gi dbang po

	similarity of type; nikayasabhagata, rigs 'thun pa
	birth; jdti, skye ba
	aging; jar a, rga ba
	duration; sthiti, gnas pa
non-person	impermanence; anityata, mi nag pa
non-associated	group of stems; namakaya, ming gi tshogs
compositional	group of words; padakaya, tshig gi tshogs
factor	group of letters; vyanjanakaya, yi ge'i tshogs
	state of an ordinary being; prthagjanatva,
	so so skye bo nyid
	continuity; pravrtti, 'jug pa
	distinction; pratiniyama, so sor nges pa
	relatedness; yoga, 'byor 'grel
	rapidity; Java, 'gyogs pa
	order; anukrama, go rim
	time; kala, dus
	area; desha, yul
	number; samkhya, grangs
	collection; samagri, tshogs pa

'Absorption without discrimination' is designated to a state involving a lack of the coarse feelings and discriminations associated with the third concentration and below. It is produced in dependence on the fourth concentration by common beings only. 'Absorption of cessation' is designated to a state achieved only by Superiors in which there is a lack of the coarse feelings and discriminations associated with the peak of cyclic existence (the highest formless level) and below. 'One having no discrimination' is designated to the state of a person born among the gods in the condition of being without coarse feelings and discriminations.

'Life faculty' or 'life' is designated to the state of living; it is the base of consciousness and warmth. 'Similarity of type' is designated to the state or condition of likeness. 'Birth' (or 'production'), 'aging', 'duration', and 'impermanence' are designated to states of the characteristics of things. 'Group of stems', 'group of words', and 'group of letters' are designated to various states of verbal conventions. Stems are bare names without case endings, etc., whereas words are stems with case endings, etc.

'State of an ordinary being' is designated to one who has not attained the qualities of Superiors. (The Vaibhashikas substitute non-acquisition for this category and do not assert the remaining nine, limiting their presentation of non-associated compositional factors to fourteen.) 'Continuity' is designated to the non-interrupted state of a continuum of causes and effects. 'Distinction' is of three types: distinction of the particular. and the general, distinction of virtues and sins and pleasures and pains, and distinction of causes and effects. 'Relatedness' is of three types: 'means' which is the collection of, for instance, an artisan's tools, 'aggregation' which is a collection of causes but specifically their reliance on each other within the collection, and 'suitability' which is each thing's having its own function.

'Rapidity' is designated to a condition of the arising of effects immediately after their causes and to the speed caused by persons, magical emanations, and so forth. 'Order' is designated to a serial state of former and later, high and low, and so forth. 'Time' is designated to states of the past, present, and future. 'Area' is designated to the composite

of a place and the persons therein. 'Number' is designated to a condition of measure. 'Collection' is designated to the state of a complete collection of causes, and specifically to that completeness.

L4: [AGGREGATES, CONSTITUENTS, AND SOURCES] :L4

Sources:

- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets

Another way of dividing all impermanent things is into the five aggregates, or, more literally, 'heaps' or 'piles' (skandha, phung po).¹⁷⁰

These five are:

// CHART 32: The Five Aggregates

	forms (rupa, gzugs)
	feelings (vedana, tshor ba)
thing	discriminations (samjna, 'du shes)
	compositional factors (samskara, 'du byed)
	consciousnesses (vijnana, rnam shes)

The heaps are so called because when Buddha taught them he heaped up various grains—rice and so forth—into five piles, to represent the categories of impermanent phenomena. These heaps are defined as aggregates of phenomena, and, therefore, 'aggregate' is often used here as the translation equivalent.

The eleven types of forms and all their instances constitute the first aggregate, 'forms'. The three types of the mental factor 'feeling'—pleasure, pain, and neutrality—and all their instances constitute the second aggregate, 'feelings'. The mental factor of discrimination and all its instances constitute the third heap, 'discriminations'. Non-associated compositional factors and the remaining forty-nine mental factors as well as all their instances constitute the fourth aggregate, 'compositional factors'. The six main minds and all their instances constitute the fifth aggregate, 'consciousnesses'. The person is imputed in dependence upon these aggregates of impermanent phenomena and is unfindable either separate from or among them.

All impermanent phenomena not only of the personal continuum but also of the external world are included in these five. However, the emptiness of the mind, a permanent phenomenon included within the personal continuum, is not counted among the five aggregates because the five aggregates are exclusively impermanent. Thus, all phenomena of the personal continuum are not included in the five aggregates, only the impermanent.

The last four aggregates are mental phenomena and the first is physical; thus, the five are the 'mental and physical aggregates'. Each instance of the five is also called an 'aggregate' because, for instance, a table itself is an aggregate of particles and a consciousness is a continuum of moments. A single particle and a single moment of consciousness are also called a form aggregate and a consciousness aggregate not because they are aggregates of particles or moments but merely from the point of view of designating a part—for example, an instance of a form aggregate—with the name of the whole—'form aggregate'.¹⁷¹ This mode of appellation in which every instance of an aggregate is itself called an aggregate accords with the relationship between a generality and its instances. If

the generality is 'form aggregate', each of its instances must be a form aggregate. To be an instance of a generality (such as pot), a phenomenon (such as a gold pot) must be the same entity as the generality, the phenomenon must be it (a pot), and there must be other instances.

All phenomena, both permanent and impermanent, can be divided into the eighteen constituents (dhatu, khams), which are so called because they give rise to phenomena of similar type.¹⁷²

These are the six objects, the six sense powers, and the six consciousnesses, every instance of which is called a constituent:

// CHART 33: The Eighteen Constituents

object	sense power	consciousness
form	eye sense power	eye consciousness
sound	ear sense power	ear consciousness
odor	nose sense power	nose consciousness
taste	tongue sense power	tongue consciousness
tangible object	body sense power	body consciousness
phenomenon	mind sense power	mental consciousness

'Phenomenon', the sixth category of objects, refers to other phenomena, those that are not sense objects but are objects only of the mental consciousness, such as impermanence and emptiness. Since sense objects are also objects of a mental consciousness, the category 'phenomena' does not include all objects of a mental consciousness—just its exclusive objects among which mental factors and permanent phenomena, such as space, are included.

Since each of a Buddha's six consciousnesses cognizes all phenomena, this list does not apply to Buddhas. However, the ability of a Buddha to cognize all objects with any consciousness does not imply that there is only one mind which is merely designated with the names of the six consciousnesses when it arrives at the various organs and experiences their respective objects. The cross-functionality of a Buddha's consciousnesses is an extraordinary quality and does not affect the presentation of the consciousnesses and objects of non-Buddhas.

The eighteen constituents include all phenomena, both permanent and impermanent, due to the inclusion of all permanent phenomena in the category 'phenomenon'. These eighteen can be reduced to the twelve sources (ayatana, skye mched) through eliminating the six consciousnesses, yet still contain all phenomena because the six consciousnesses are still included in the category 'mind sense power'. The mind sense power is a previous moment of any of the six consciousnesses which acts as the base of a mental consciousness much as a physical sense power acts as the base of a sense consciousness.

The twelve sources are so called because they open the way for the production of the six consciousnesses.¹⁷³ They are the six objects and the six sense powers:

// CHART 34: The Twelve Sources

object	sense power
form	eye sense power
sound	ear sense power
odor	nose sense power
taste	tongue sense power

tangible object body sense power
phenomenon mind sense power

Teachers repeatedly enumerate the twelve sources or the eighteen constituents in order to emphasize a sense of the multiplicity of phenomena that are the bases of imputing or designating a person. The tables are memorized, with students not only repeating the names but causing the phenomena to appear to their minds. This practice helps greatly to crowd out the sense of self and prepare the way for a recognition of the imputed nature of the person. Then, one can proceed to investigate the imputed nature of these phenomena themselves.

L2: [2. Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence] :L2

Sources:

- Tsong Khapa's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path
- Geshe Lhundup Sopa's oral teachings
- Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba's General Meaning of (Maitreya 's) 'Ornament for Clear Realization'
- Den-ba-dar-gyay's Analysis of Dependent-Arising

The last twelve of the fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class are THE TWELVE MEMBERS OF THE DEPENDENT-ARISING OF CYCLIC EXISTENCE.¹⁷⁴ These twelve are to be viewed as faulty because they obstruct the path to liberation.

They are:

- ignorance (avidya, ma rig pa)
- action (samskarakarma, 'du byed kyi las)
- consciousness (vijñana, rnam shes)
- cause consciousness
- effect consciousness
- name and form (namarupa, ming gzugs)
- six sources (shadayatana, skye mched drug)
- contact (sparsha, reg pa)
- feeling (vedana, tshor ba)
- attachment (trshna, sred pa)
- grasping (upadana, len pa)
- existence (bhava, srid pa)
- birth (jati, skye ba)
- aging and death (jaramarana, rga shi).

IGNORANCE does not just mean non-knowledge; it is also a consciousness that conceives the opposite of correct knowledge. Ignorance here is a misconception of oneself as inherently existent and of phenomena included in one's own continuum as being objects controlled by an inherently existent I. Ignorance views the nominally existent I, which is merely designated in dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates, as an inherently existent self and views the aggregates themselves as under the control of this self. Thus, its principal antidote is knowledge of the true nature of the I as empty of inherent existence. Ignorance can also refer to obscurations with respect to the coarse relationships of actions and their effects, as in the case of ignorantly making sacrifices in order to gain liberation, but as

the first of the twelve members of dependent-arising, it is necessarily a conception of a self of persons that gives rise to the later members.

In a particular round of dependent-arising, the first member applies only to the period of obscuration or misconception which in a previous life served as the motivator of one particular action. This single complete action, the second member of the twelve, is called a path of action because it serves as a path to rebirth in a bad migration (hell-being, hungry ghost, or animal) or a happy migration (human, demi-god, or god). For an action to be a complete path of action it must have its necessary members: an intention (such as the wish to kill someone), thought which identifies the object properly, preparation for the accomplishment of the action, successful conclusion, and non-reversal of intention before the action is completed.¹⁷⁵ This complete action establishes a potency on the 'cause consciousness' or the consciousness at the time of the action, the first half of the third member.

ACTION as the second member usually refers only to one meritorious or non-meritorious contaminated action in a former life, either in the life immediately preceding this life or in any other former life. Based on ignorance with respect to the nature of the person, a path of action leading to a happy migration is accumulated. Based also on ignorance with respect to actions and their effects, a path of action leading to a bad migration is accumulated. The former is a meritorious action projecting or impelling rebirth as a human or god of the Desire Realm, and the latter is a non-meritorious action projecting rebirth in a bad migration as an animal, hungry ghost, or hell-being. Based on ignorance with respect to the nature of the person, an action of meditative stabilization projects, or provides the power for, a happy migration in a Form or Formless Realm; it is a meritorious action which is called 'unmoving' because its effect can reach fruition only in the type of life and level for which it was projected, this corresponding to the type of meditative stabilization. An example of an unmoving action is a deed of meditative absorption in the first concentration that projects an effect included within the first level of the Form Realm and which will only ripen in the first level of the Form Realm. An example of a moving action is a deed such as murder that projects an effect included within a bad migration but which might not actually ripen in a bad migration, reaching fruition in a human life as a form of human suffering. Thus, meritorious and non-meritorious actions are 'moving' actions because their projected effects and actualized effects are not necessarily of the same type of life and level even though they may be the same.

Dependent on the motivational ignorance that precedes and gives rise to them, virtuous actions and actions of meditative absorption lead to rebirth in cyclic existence, albeit in a favorable situation. Pabongka's commentary on Tsong Khapa's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path says,¹⁷⁶ 'The second member, action, is the performance of an activity, motivated by ignorance, which produces the mental and physical aggregates of a rebirth. It is like doing work.' The first half of the third member, 'cause consciousness', refers only to the moment when the potency of the action 'stains' the consciousness which exists at the time the action is completed.

The first two and a half members, ignorance, action, and cause CONSCIOUSNESS, are causes projecting a future birth (see Chart 35); they are, therefore, called a 'future dependent-arising'. What they project are the next four and a half members, effect consciousness, name and form, sources, contact, and feeling. The first of these, 'effect consciousness', refers only to the moment of the mental consciousness just after bridging the gap from the previous life to the new life, which in womb-birth is the first moment in

the womb. Then, with the next moment, name and form apply. 'Name' refers to the four non-form aggregates—feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses—and 'form' refers to the aggregate of forms.

// CHART 35: Buddha's Explicit Teaching in the 'Rice Seedling Sutra' of One Round of a Twelve-Membered Dependent-Arising

life A	1 ignorance	projecting causes
	2 action	
	3 consciousness	
	a. cause consciousness	
life B	b. effect consciousness	projected effects
	4 name and form	
	5 sources	
	6 contact	
	7 feeling	
	8 attachment	actualizing causes
	9 grasping	
	10 existence	
life C	11 birth	actualized effects
	12 aging and death	

Life A precedes life B at any time,
and life B precedes life C with no interval.

A being in the intermediate state between lives has all six consciousnesses as well as at least the five omnipresent mental factors, including feeling and discrimination. Together with the mind are potencies, established by countless actions, in a dormant state; these are instances of compositional factors, and thus all four non-form aggregates are present during the intermediate state. Also, a being in the intermediate state has a subtle physical body which is called an 'unobstructed body' because it can pass through walls, mountains, and so forth; thus, the form aggregate is also present during transmigration.

NAME AND FORM, as the fourth member of dependent-arising, refer to the five aggregates of the new life immediately after conception. At that point there are mental and body consciousnesses. 'Form' refers to the roundish shape (embryo), oblong shape (the lengthening embryo), and so forth. (In the Formless Realm 'form' refers only to the dormant seeds of form, which are neither form nor consciousness.)

THE SIX SOURCES are the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental sense powers. Through the development of the form aggregate which at that time is the embryo (the semen of the father and the blood of the mother penetrated by the consciousness) and the four 'name' aggregates (feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses) the remaining four of the six sources—eye, ear, nose, and tongue sense powers—come into being. (The body and mental sense powers exist from the first moment of the embryo.) If the birth is spontaneous as in a hell or heaven, the sense powers all come into being with the inception of the new life, unlike the serial development as in birth from a womb, from an egg, or from heat and moisture.

The term 'sources' as the fifth member of dependent-arising refers to a specific five moments in the development of a life in cyclic existence; the first is the achievement of the sense powers of mind and body, and the second through fifth occur at the production of

the other four sense powers which depend on the gradual development of name and form. Therefore, 'sources' are identified as only the six sense powers, excluding the six objects (see p.274). The six objects or external sources are ever present and need not be produced in dependence on name and form because the embryo has color and shape, sound (for example, if hit), odor, taste, softness and so forth as tangible objects, and impermanence.

The sixth member, CONTACT, arises from the aggregation of object, sense power, and consciousness and has the function of distinguishing objects as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. 'Aggregation' refers not to a simultaneous collection, but to the production of a consciousness by a sense power and an object. The seventh member, FEELING, is comprised of feelings of pleasure, pain, or neutrality in accordance with the discrimination by contact. Since feeling is divided into six types from the viewpoint of the six types of contact produced by the six sources, it involves a serial production in accordance with the production of each source. However, 'feeling' refers not just to the first moment of each of the six types of feeling but also to moments of feeling throughout the life that serve as the objects of the next member, ATTACHMENT.

In sum, effect consciousness, name and form, sources, contact, and feeling are effects projected by ignorance, action, and cause consciousness in the sense that the latter make them suitable for actualization. An action that depends on ignorance projects these through staining a potency on the cause consciousness. This potency of a particular type of life is similar to the outline of a picture, the details of which are provided by other deeds, called completing actions.

The potency is actualized by attachment, grasping, and existence. The eighth member, attachment, is desire not to separate from a feeling of pleasure, to separate from a feeling of pain, and for a non-diminishment of neutral feeling. The ninth member, GRASPING, an increase of attachment, is of four types:

- desirous grasping—desire involving strong attachment to the Desire Realm attributes of pleasant forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects
- grasping for views—desire involving aspiration to bad views, not including the view of the transitory collection of mind and body as real I and mine
- grasping for ethics and modes of conduct—desire involving strong attachment to bad ethics and bad modes of conduct which are associated with bad views
- grasping for a self—desire involving strong attachment to the pride of selfhood and the view of the mental and physical aggregates which have the nature of transitoriness and of an aggregation as real I and mine.

Attachment and grasping nourish or actualize the particular potency that is the projecting cause of the next life and thus can occur at any time during the life. However, since such moments of attachment and grasping are most efficacious near the time of death, attachment and grasping here for the most part refer to instances near the time of death.

The tenth member, EXISTENCE, is a case of giving the name of the effect to the cause. For it is the potency established by the second member, action, when it has been thoroughly nourished by attachment and grasping and has become empowered to develop into the next life. Since 'existence' occurs at the moment just preceding the new existence or life which is its effect, calling the tenth member 'existence' is a designation of it with the name of its effect.

Attachment, grasping, and existence are causes that actualize the potency projected by

ignorance, action, and cause consciousness. The actualizer is grasping, which is caused by attachment, and birth and aging and death are what are actualized. Through grasping, the potency previously established in the consciousness by an action is fully empowered, this state being called 'existence'.

Among the twelve members, ignorance, action, and cause consciousness take place in a former life. Effect consciousness, name and form, sources, contact, feeling, attachment, grasping, and existence occur in the present life. Birth and aging and death occur in the future life. For the production of this life only ignorance, action and cause consciousness are explicitly presented; for the production of the future life only attachment, grasping, and existence are explicitly presented. However, each birth has both the three projecting causes and the three actualizing causes. Particular causes are emphasized for each of the two births for the sake of pointing out the existence of all of them for all births.

The actualized effects are BIRTH, that is, the five mental and physical aggregates just after transmigrating to the new life, and aging and death. AGING refers to the process of change beginning from the second moment of the new life and applying through to death. DEATH is the cessation of the continuum of a similar type of mental and physical aggregates. Aging and death are put as one member because there are cases of death immediately after rebirth, without aging.

In this way one round of the twelve members of dependent-arising is completed in three lifetimes. The effect consciousness, name and form, sources, contact, feeling, attachment, grasping, and existence of this lifetime are not in the same round of dependent-arising as the birth and aging and death of this lifetime. The birth and aging and death of this lifetime are the result of the actualizing members of the last lifetime. In this way, two rounds of dependent-arising are occurring simultaneously. Similarly, actions motivated by ignorance in this lifetime are each beginning other new rounds of dependent-arising. (For other presentations, see Appendix 2.)

A benefit of contemplating dependent-arising is the creation of a sense of distress. Through understanding that a life is created by nourishment—through attachment and grasping—of a potency established by an action that is motivated by ignorance, one can thereby infer the existence of past and future lives. Through this, one sees that innumerable potencies have been established in the mind and are ready for actualization. The impermanence and precariousness of this life is obvious, and the conditions for empowering another potency to create a new life that might be very miserable are ever-present. Similar to a person who knows that calamity is about to befall him, one will, upon understanding one's position, seek with great effort to extricate oneself from such a situation. The afflictions that give rise to the rounds of dependent-arising will be identified as enemies, and one will seek the means of overcoming them.

After a practitioner identifies the misery in his own continuum, he knows through inferential extension that other sentient beings are suffering the same miseries. Just as he wishes to free himself from misery, so he develops the wish to free all sentient beings due to their closeness over the continuum of lives. In this way compassion is generated, and with it as a motivation, one will seek with great vigor to vanquish ignorance, attachment, and grasping which are now identified as the enemies of all sentient beings. The benefit of the study and realization of dependent-arising is eventually the attainment of Buddhahood.

L2: [3. The Four Noble Truths] :L2

Sources:

- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
- Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings
- Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may's Presentation of the Four Truths
- Pan-chen-So-nam-drak-ba's General Meaning of (Maitreya's) 'Ornament for Clear Realization'
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way

Like the two truths, the four noble truths—true sufferings, origins of suffering, cessations, and paths—are objects and riot concepts of truth, beauty, and so forth.¹⁷⁷ Unlike the two truths, however, the four noble truths do not include all objects; absent are permanent phenomena, such as spaces and non-analytical cessations, as well as impermanent phenomena such as a Buddha's Enjoyment and Form Bodies or an ordinary being's body in a pure land.

THE FIRST TRUTH IS TRUE SUFFERINGS, which are the mental and physical aggregates produced by contaminated actions and afflictions. They include all instances of mind and body of ordinary beings except those generated by pure wishes, meditation, and so forth. Even the environments shared by beings in the various cyclic existences are true sufferings because they are created from potencies established by contaminated actions and afflictions. However, the body of an ordinary being born in a pure land is not a true suffering because it is not created by contaminated actions and afflictions but by pure wishes for rebirth in a pure land. A common being's consciousness inferentially realizing impermanence or emptiness is also not a true suffering because it arises from cultivation of the path and is born from meditation, not from the afflictions. Still, a common being's inferential cognizer of emptiness is said to be 'contaminated' (sasrava, zag bcas) because it is polluted with dualistic perception in the sense that its object, emptiness, appears to be inherently existent though it is not being conceived as inherently existent.

Of the two types of true sufferings, internal and external, internal true sufferings are 'cyclic existences' (samsara, 'khor ba) and are included within the three types of suffering. The first is the suffering of misery, or all feelings of physical and mental pain. The second is the suffering of change, or all feelings of pleasure which are contaminated with the misconception of inherent existence. For example, just as the warmth of the sun is pleasant on a cool day but is a source of pain if one stays too long in it, all the pleasures of cyclic existence, if over-extended, become sources of suffering. Furthermore, even if one enjoys the pleasures of cyclic existence in measure, these still are sufferings of change because they are suitable to create suffering if overused. If such were inherently pleasurable, long-term usage would increase the pleasure; however, suffering is eventually induced. Thus, the need for moderation is a sign of their not naturally being pleasurable.

Discouragement with the suffering of misery and of change is not sufficient to induce a fully qualified aspiration for liberation. The third type of suffering, that of composition, is the root and pervader of the other two, and discouragement with it must be sought with

particular emphasis. The suffering of composition means simply to be under the outside influence of contaminated actions and afflictions such that one is ready to suffer pain upon the aggregation of minor causes. The main conditions are always present—when one is in cyclic existence—to undergo considerable suffering upon the sudden aggregation of the remaining causes, such as a change in the environment. Thus, even though one might not have manifest feelings of pain, one is still subject to suffering upon meeting with minor causes. This type of suffering is called 'pervasive' because no matter how one searches among the ordinary body and mind, every instance of it is miserable, either manifestly painful or capable of inducing suffering. It is called 'compositional' because it induces suffering in the future.

As Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may says:178

~ Though a prisoner certain to be executed is not punished physically, there is no opportunity for pleasure in his inner mind which realizes the daily approach of death. Similarly, a person carrying a burden, even when resting, does not take much pleasure until reaching the destination.

In this way, a yogi develops discrimination of the phenomena of cyclic existence as unfavorable, like executioners raising swords, and the wish to leave cyclic existence arises. Thereupon, by inferring the plight of others based on one's own, compassion wishing to protect others arises without difficulty. This is the special purpose of Buddha's setting forth true sufferings first.

THE SECOND OF THE FOUR TRUTHS IS TRUE ORIGINS, THE SOURCES OF SUFFERING—the afflictions and actions contaminated with the afflictions. Here 'afflictions' specifically are the first member of dependent-arising—ignorance—and the other afflictions that are produced based on ignorance, the remaining five root afflictions and the twenty secondary afflictions (see p.255-66). Actions, as the other source of suffering, refer to the second member of dependent-arising—the meritorious, non-meritorious, and non-moving actions motivated by ignorance that impel rebirth respectively in happy migrations as humans or gods, in bad migrations as hell-beings, hungry ghosts, or animals, or in the Form and Formless Realms. Afflictions and actions are the causes of suffering even though in general they themselves are true sufferings because they are what give rise to true sufferings. Like illnesses, true sufferings are to be identified, and like the causes of illness, true origins are to be abandoned.

THE THIRD OF THE FOUR TRUTHS IS TRUE CESSATIONS, the extinguishment of true sufferings and origins. These are the individually enumerated cessations that are states of having abandoned obstructions and correspond to the uninterrupted paths causing their attainment. By stages one attains complete deliverance from the various levels of afflictions such that they will never return, culminating in the attainment of nirvana, the emptiness of the mind in the continuum of one who has abandoned all afflictions whatsoever.

The chief affliction is ignorance, and its chief type is the conception of inherent existence. Therefore, anyone who has attained nirvana, even if he has not attained Buddhahood, has completely destroyed the conception of inherent existence. Foe Destroyers (Arhan, dGra beam pa) are those who have destroyed (han, beam) their enemy (ari, dgra), the afflictions. All Foe Destroyers— whether Hearers, Solitary Realizers, or Buddhas—have

attained a nirvana that is an utter cessation of the afflictions.

Even though true cessations, the ultimate of which are nirvanas, are attained in dependence on a path that eradicates the afflictions, they are said to be permanent phenomena in the sense that since they do not change moment by moment, they are non-disintegrating. However, the true cessations in the continuum of a yogi come into being upon his attainment of the various levels of the paths; thus, there are debates about whether or not true cessations and nirvanas are impermanent phenomena. The answer given is that a true cessation is not an act of cessation but an emptiness of the mind in the continuum of one who has utterly and forever removed at least some portion of the afflictions. All true cessations are emptinesses and thus permanent, but all emptinesses are not true cessations as is the case with the emptiness of inherent existence of the body. Emptinesses, except for those of the mind in the continuum of persons who have overcome afflictions, are not any of the four noble truths.

THE FOURTH NOBLE TRUTH IS TRUE PATHS, which are the means of attaining true cessations. Just

as a state of health is to be attained by the sick and the medicines to attain that state are to be relied upon, so true cessations are to be realized and true paths are to be relied upon. Except for vows which are non-revelatory forms, all true paths are consciousnesses, called paths because they are factors which, through being generated in the mental continuum, take one to liberation from cyclic existence.

Here, there are EIGHT PATHS:¹⁷⁹

- correct view—the opposite of the view of the transitory collection of mind and body as real I and mine, the opposite of the permanent and annihilistic views of the self and the aggregates, the opposite of perverse views such as asserting the absence of cause and effect, the opposite of views conceiving bad ethics and bad disciplines to be superior, and so forth. Thus, a correct view is not necessarily just a consciousness cognizing emptiness though such is included in the term.
- correct realization—especially the consciousnesses which subtly analyze emptiness
- correct speech—the vows and so forth which are the contraries of wrong livelihood and so forth
- correct aims of actions—the actions of body and speech in dependence on vows
- correct livelihood—the abandonment of wrong modes of livelihood, such as butchering animals
- correct effort—the mental factor of effort that causes gradual progress on the path
- correct mindfulness—constant attentiveness to objects of awareness and to modes of perception of those objects necessary for ascending the paths
- correct meditative stabilization—the meditative ability to remain one-pointedly on the objects of the paths.

The four noble truths are called 'noble' (drya) because they are taught by Nobles or Superiors (Aryan, 'Phags pa) or because they are ennobling.¹⁸⁰ They are called truths (satya, bden pa) because through meditation on them one unmistakably enters into the paths of liberation and omniscience. Because the teachings that sufferings and their origins are to be abandoned and that cessations and the paths that actualize them are to be adopted are true and thus do not deceive disciples into cultivating false paths, they are truths. However, unlike ultimate truths they do not necessarily exist the way they appear, because except for true cessations, they are falsities in the sense that true sufferings, for instance, appear in direct perception to exist inherently but do not. Therefore, the four

noble truths are not just truths for Nobles or Superiors because, if they were, they would have to be truths for the special cognizers of Superiors—their direct perceivers of suchness—whereas when emptiness is directly perceived, conventional truths such as true sufferings do not in any way appear to the mind. Thus, the Prasangikas say that the four noble truths are truths for conventional valid cognizers. For the Vaibhashikas, however, they are truths just for Nobles (Superiors) because they are perceived directly by a Superior's wisdom of meditative equipoise.

Buddha set forth the four noble truths—true sufferings, origins, cessations, and paths—in the order not of their causation but of their realization. In causal order, true origins—afflictions and actions contaminated with the afflictions—give rise to true sufferings—the phenomena included within the scope of the contaminated mental and physical aggregates—while true paths, such as the realization of emptiness, cause the attainment of true cessations—the state of being freed forever from a certain portion of the afflictions and their consequent sufferings. However, in his presentation of the four noble truths Buddha put the effects before the causes to indicate their application in practical realization.

When one recognizes sufferings as like an illness, one understands that one must become free from them. Then, seeing that abandoning sufferings depends on overcoming their origins, one generates a wish to abandon these. Having identified the origins of suffering as the afflictions, the chief of which is the ignorance conceiving inherent existence, one realizes that since the conception of inherent existence is baseless, the causes of suffering can be abandoned whereby a wish to actualize cessation is generated. Having seen that sufferings and their origins must and can be abandoned, one engages in the means for abandoning them, true paths. This is said to be the general procedure of intelligent persons and an unparalleled quintessential instruction not just for initial realization but also for initially training the mind.

As Gonchok-den-bay-dron-may says:¹⁸¹

~ When we analyze our own mental continuum carefully, we see that beyond a mere verbal image of it, it is extremely difficult to develop an aspiration to liberation from the depths of the heart; rather, we are naturally involved in the causes of suffering—contaminated actions and afflictions. This is because beginninglessly we have mistaken a mind which is under the influence of the afflictions, and thus actually a suffering, to be happiness. For example, when certain types of hidden heat disorders are mistaken to be cold disorders, the antidotes to heat disorders are not taken and one intentionally seeks the diet, behavior, and so forth increasing the heat disorder. Just as to overcome the heat disorder, it is absolutely essential to identify it, so if one does not recognize that which has a nature of suffering as suffering and turn away from it from the depths, there is no way to be led upward through annihilating the root of suffering. In this condition, though one pretended to seek liberation, one would proceed only to error, conceiving some low contaminated state to be it; thus, an actual wish for liberation would not occur.

As Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:

:: How could one who is not discouraged
:: About this aspire to its pacification?

L4: [MEDITATION ON THE FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS] :L4

The four noble truths are objects of extensive meditation, with each truth having four attributes, making a total of sixteen attributes.

L5: [1. True sufferings] :L5

L6: [i. Impermanence. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: The contaminated mental and physical aggregates are impermanent because of being produced occasionally (not existing forever).

The impermanence of true sufferings is their momentary disintegration, which is a fault arising from the afflictions and actions contaminated with the afflictions. However, the impermanence of a Buddha's omniscient consciousness is an advantage of this consciousness and arises from the force of the completion of the accumulations of wisdom and merit. Unlike a Buddha's omniscient consciousness which, though impermanent, continuously remains of the same type, true sufferings change in the process of disintegration, gradually leading one to lower rebirths. Meditation on the impermanence of true sufferings overcomes viewing them as permanent.

L6: [ii. Misery. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: The contaminated mental and physical aggregates are miserable because of being under the outside influence of contaminated actions and afflictions.

True sufferings are miserable because they are not independent phenomena but under the outside influence of former afflictions and actions contaminated with the afflictions. The experience of ordinary beings confirms the misery of birth, aging, sickness, and death whereas realization of the suffering of being under an outside influence requires long analysis. Meditation on the misery of true sufferings counters viewing them as pure and pleasurable.

L6: [iii. Emptiness. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: The contaminated mental and physical aggregates are empty because of being devoid of a supervisory self that is a different entity from them.

True sufferings are empty of being a permanent, single, independent self. The permanent is the non-disintegrating; the single is the partless; and the independent is what does not depend on others for its existence. That true sufferings are empty of being a permanent, single, independent self or of being objects of use of such a self is their emptiness. Meditation on the emptiness of true sufferings overcomes viewing them as a self.

L6: [iv. Selflessness. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: The contaminated mental and physical aggregates are selfless because of not existing as an independent self, but being under the influence of many other impermanent factors.

True sufferings are empty of being a self-sufficient person. A self-sufficient person would be a controller of the mental and physical aggregates, like a master over his servants. That true sufferings are empty of being such a self-sufficient person or objects of its use is their selflessness. Meditation on this counters the view of true sufferings as a self-sufficient person or as the objects of use of such a person.

L5: [2. True origins] :L5

L6: [i. Cause. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: Contaminated actions and attachment are causes because of being the roots of suffering.

Meditation on these as causes counters the notion that suffering is causeless, as is asserted by the Hedonists (Charvaka, Tshu rol mdzes pa).

L6: [ii. Origin. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: Contaminated actions and attachment are origins because they again and again produce suffering in all its forms.

Meditation on these as origins counters the notion that suffering is caused by just one cause, such as permanent time as is asserted by the Dfpakas.

L6: [iii. Strong production. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: Contaminated actions and attachment are strong producers because they produce suffering with great force.

Meditation on true origins as strong producers counters the notion that the nature of things is permanent but their states changeable, as is asserted by the Vaidakas and the Samkhyas.

L6: [iv. Condition. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

Contaminated actions and attachment are conditions because attachment to cyclic existence acts as a cooperative condition for suffering.

Meditation on true origins as conditions counters the notion that suffering is created under the supervision of a deity, as is asserted by the Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas.

L5: [3. True cessations] :L5

L6: [i. Cessation. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: A separation which is a total extinguishment of a suffering by its antidote is a cessation because of being a state of having abandoned that suffering.

Meditation on true cessations as cessations counters the view that there is no liberation from cyclic existence, as is asserted by the Hedonists.

L6: [ii. Pacification. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: A separation which is a total extinguishment of a suffering by its antidote is a pacification because of being a state of having abandoned an affliction.

Meditation on true cessations as pacifications of contaminations counters notions conceiving contaminated states to be liberation as is the case with the Jaina assertion of a place of liberation on top of the worlds that is like an upside-down white umbrella.

L6: [iii. Auspicious highness. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: A separation which is a total extinguishment of a suffering by its antidote is auspiciously high because of being a liberation other than which there is no superior source of help and happiness.

Meditation on true cessations as auspiciously high counters the notion that there is a

liberation superior to the cessation of suffering, as is the case with the Samkhya assertion of the liberated self as high liberation.

L6: [iv Definite emergence. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: A separation which is a total extinguishment of a suffering by its antidote is a definite emergence because of being a liberation from that suffering such that it will never return.

Meditation on true cessations as definite emergences from suffering counters the notion that liberation, once attained, is reversible.

L5: [4. True paths] :L5

L6: [i. Path. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: The wisdom directly cognizing selflessness is a path because it causes one to proceed to liberation.

Meditation on this as a path counters the notion that there are no paths of liberation from cyclic existence.

L6: [ii. Suitability. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: The wisdom directly cognizing selflessness is suitable because of being the antidote to ignorance.

Meditation on the wisdom realizing selflessness as suitable counters the notion that it is not a path of liberation.

L6: [iii. Achievement. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: The wisdom directly cognizing selflessness is an achiever because it realizes the nature of the mind unmistakably.

Meditation on this wisdom as an achiever counters the notion that such paths as worldly concentrations, receiving initiation in a mandala of Ishvara, or undergoing the asceticism of the five fires (one each on the four sides and the sun above as in Jainism) are paths of liberation.

L6: [iv. Deliverance. The meditation centers on the thought:] :L6

:: The wisdom directly cognizing selflessness is a deliverer because it unquestionably causes one to pass to a state of irreversible liberation, extinguishing sufferings and afflictions completely.

Meditation on wisdom as a deliverer counters the notion that there is no total eradicator of suffering.

L4: [COARSE AND SUBTLE SELFLESSNESS] :L4

The Vaibhashika sub-schools, except for the five schools advocating a self, say that through direct cognition of the four noble truths and their sixteen attributes Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas reach their respective paths of seeing. Through continuously meditating on them during the path of meditation, they also reach their goals, the states of Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Buddha. Dharmakirti says that the purpose of the first two attributes of true sufferings is to help in the realization of the last two

attributes, emptiness and selflessness.¹⁸² Thus, the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning say that paths of seeing and the state of Foe Destroyer are attained through direct cognition of the mental and physical aggregates that lack being a self-sufficient person or lack being the objects of use of self-sufficient persons.

Among the Mahayana schools, the Chittamatrins and Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas say that Hearers and Solitary Realizers take the emptiness that is a person's lack of being self-sufficient as their main object of meditation (see Chart 36).¹⁸³ The Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas say that only Hearers take the emptiness of a self-sufficient person as their main object of meditation; Solitary Realizers take the emptiness that is the non-existence of subject and object as different entities as their main object of meditation.

The non-Prasangika schools agree that the conception of the person as a self-sufficient entity and the poisons that arise from it are the afflictive obstructions. They are the afflictions obstructing one from liberation from cyclic existence (kleshavarana, nyon sgrib). All these schools agree that through eradication of the afflictive obstructions, Hearers attain the state of Foe Destroyer. Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Sautrantika-Svatantrika add that Solitary Realizers have the same principal object of meditation, with Vaibhashika and Sautrantika also saying that it is the same for Bodhisattvas.

The Chittamatrins say that Bodhisattvas principally meditate on a non-difference in entity of subject and object, whereas the Svatantrikas say that Bodhisattvas principally meditate on an absence of true existence. These two schools thereby propound that Bodhisattvas rid themselves of subtler obstructions than do Hearers and Solitary Realizers. They remove the obstructions to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena (jneyavarana, shes bya'i sgrib pa). For Chittamatrins and Svatantrikas, though Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not meditate on the final nature of things, their meditation, despite its coarseness, is still capable of destroying the bonds to cyclic existence.

The Prasangikas disagree; they say that THE CONCEPTION OF A SELF-SUFFICIENT PERSON IS ONLY A COARSE AFFLICTIVE OBSTRUCTION AND THAT NO ONE CAN ATTAIN LIBERATION FROM CYCLIC EXISTENCE THROUGH ERADICATING IT. However, meditation on the emptiness of a self-sufficient person is indeed helpful for eventual abandonment of the subtle afflictive obstruction, the conception that phenomena truly exist (see Charts 37, 38, and 39). The Prasangikas do not separate out one type from among the coarse and subtle emptinesses as the main object of meditation for Hearers and Solitary Realizers and another for Bodhisattvas. For Prasangika, BEINGS ON ALL THREE TYPES OF PATHS REALIZE THE SAME EMPTINESS, THE LACK OF INHERENT EXISTENCE OF ALL PHENOMENA. The conception that phenomena inherently exist obstructs beings from liberation from cyclic existence; without realizing that all phenomena—both persons and other phenomena—do not inherently, truly, or objectively exist, conquest of cyclic existence is impossible.

CHART 36: PRINCIPAL OBJECTS OF MEDITATION

HEARERS	SOLITARY REALIZERS
BODHISATTVAS	

Vaibhashika	non-existence of	non-existence of
non-existence of		
and Sautrantika	a self-sufficient person	a self-sufficient person
a self-sufficient person		
Chittamatra	non-existence of	non-existence of
non-existence of		
	a self-sufficient person	a self-sufficient person
subjects and objects as		
	different entities	
Yogachara-	non-existence of	non-existence of
non-existence of		
Svatantrika	a self-sufficient person	subjects and objects as
truly existent phenomena		
	different entities	
Sautrantika-	non-existence of	non-existence of
non-existence of		
Svatantrika	a self-sufficient person	a self-sufficient person
truly existent phenomena		
Prasangika	non-existence of	non-existence of
non-existence of		
	inherently existent	inherently existent
inherently existent		
	phenomena	phenomena
phenomena		

CHART 37: SELF

	COARSE SELF	SUBTLE SELF	COARSE SELF
SUBTLE SELF			
	OF PERSONS	OF PERSONS	OF PHENOMENA
OF PHENOMENA			
Vaibhashika	a permanent, single,	a self-sufficient	none
none			
and Sautrantika	independent person	person	
Chittamatra	a permanent, single,	a self-sufficient	none
phenomena as naturally			
	independent person	person	
bases of names; object			
	and subject as different		
	entities		
Yogachara-	a permanent, single,	a self-sufficient	object
and subject	truly existent phenomena		
Svatantrika	independent person	person	as
different entities			
Sautrantika-	a permanent, single,	a self-sufficient	none
truly existent phenomena			
Svatantrika	independent person	person	
Prasangika	a self-sufficient	an inherently	
none	inherently existent		
	person	existent person	

phenomena other than

persons

CHART 38: OBSTRUCTIONS

	COARSE AFFLICTIVE SUBTLE OBSTRUCTIONS TO TO OMNISCIENCE	SUBTLE AFFLICTIVE OBSTRUCTIONS TO OMNISCIENCE	COARSE OBSTRUCTIONS TO OMNISCIENCE
Vaibhashika	conception of a	conception of a	
none	none		
and	permanent, single,	self-sufficient	
Sautrantika	independent person	person	
Chittamatra	conception of a	conception of a	
none	conception of phenomena		
	permanent, single,	self-sufficient	
as naturally bases of			
	independent person	person	
names; conception of			
		object and subject	
as			
		different entities	
Yogachara-	conception of a	conception of a	
conception of object	conception of phenomena		
Svatantrika	permanent, single,	self-sufficient	
and subject as	as truly existent		
	independent person	person	
different entities			
Sautrantika-	conception of a	conception of a	
none	conception of phenomena		
Svatantrika	permanent, single,	self-sufficient	
as truly existent			
	independent person	person	
Prasangika	conception of a	conception of	
none	appearance of inherent		
	self-sufficient person	persons and other	
existence; stains of			
		phenomena as	
conceiving the two truths			
		inherently existent	
as different entities			

CHART 39: SELFLESSNESS

	COARSE SELFLESSNESS SELFLESSNESS OF OF PHENOMENA	SUBTLE SELFLESSNESS SUBTLE SELFLESSNESS OF OF PERSONS	COARSE SELFLESSNESS OF PHENOMENA
Vaibhashika	non-existence of a	non-existence of a	
none	none		
and	permanent, single,	self-sufficient person	

Sautrantika	independent person	
Chittamatra	non-existence of a	non-existence of a
none	non-existence of phenomena	
	permanent, single,	self-sufficient person
as naturally bases of names;	independent person	
non-existence of object and		
subject as different entities		
Yogachara-	non-existence of a	non-existence of a
non-existence of	non-existence of truly	
Svatantrika	permanent, single,	self-sufficient person
subject and object as	existent phenomena	
	independent person	
different entities		
Sautrantika-	non-existence of a	non-existence of a
none	non-existence of truly	
Svatantrika	permanent, single,	self-sufficient person
existent phenomena		
	independent person	
Prasangika	non-existence of a	non-existence of an
none	non-existence of inherently	
	self-sufficient person	inherently existent
existent phenomena other		
	person	
than persons		

The destruction of the afflictive obstructions is simultaneous with the attainment of the state of Foe Destroyer for both Hearers and Solitary Realizers and is simultaneous with the attainment of the eighth ground for Bodhisattvas. On the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds Bodhisattvas proceed to destroy the obstructions that prevent simultaneous cognition of all phenomena. Being eighth-grounders or above, they have destroyed the conception that phenomena inherently exist, but due to previous conditioning phenomena still appear as if inherently existent; nevertheless, they know that these appearances are false just as a magician knows that his creations are false, no matter how vividly the illusion may appear. Finally, through the eradication of the appearance of inherent existence, an omniscient consciousness of Buddhahood is attained, and one is able for the first time to perceive objects through the senses with no trace of false appearance. One is then able to cognize simultaneously and directly the emptinesses of all phenomena and all phenomena themselves.

A selflessness is an emptiness, to be viewed as a predicate or quality of existent persons and phenomena. These predicates vary from the coarse—or easier to realize—to the subtle—or more difficult to realize. It is said that the non-existence of a permanent, single, independent person is easy to realize through such reasons as the impossibility of a permanent being's taking rebirth since the permanent can never change.

In the Prasangika system the emptiness of a self-sufficient person is not the final mode of existence of the person, and thus one cannot be liberated from cyclic existence through realization of and meditation on it. Cognition of the person as empty of such a self will not even cause one to ascend to the path of preparation of a Hearer. For, Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas all attain special insight into the emptiness of inherent

existence simultaneously with their attainment of the path of preparation. Still, the realization of the emptiness of a self-sufficient person is a stepping-stone to realization of the emptiness of inherent existence. If one is incapable of understanding the coarse emptiness, one will certainly not be capable of cognizing the subtle; therefore, it is important that the coarse selflessness be identified as well.

A 'self-sufficient' (Tib. rang rkya ba) person is a 'substantially existent' (dravyasat, rdzas yod) person.¹⁸⁴ In general, both terms refer to an object that can appear to the mind without depending on the appearance of other objects; thus, the opposite of 'substantially existent' is 'imputedly existent' (prajnaptisat, btags yod). Here in the coarse selflessness, 'imputedly existent' is identified as eliminating the possibility that the person is an entity independent of the aggregates of mind and body. All Buddhist schools, except Prasangika and the Vaibhashika sub-schools that advocate a self, say that a person is 'imputedly existent' in the sense of not being a separate entity from the mental and physical aggregates. However, these schools propound that the person is either the composite of these aggregates, or one of them, or their continuum, or the continuum of one of them. For Prasangika, however, this is incorrect; a person is neither separate from the mental and physical aggregates, nor the mental and physical aggregates themselves; rather, a person is merely imputed in dependence upon the aggregates. The imputedly existent person of the other schools is considered by the Prasangikas to be substantially existent because the latter say that the meaning of 'substantially existent' is to be findable separate from or among the bases of imputation of the object.

Here in the four noble truths in the realization that a person is not self-sufficient, the meaning of 'only imputed' is not so subtle; the term merely indicates that a person depends on his mental and physical aggregates. Opposite to this, many mistaken systems teach that a person has a character separate from that of his aggregates; they view a person as like a herder or a lord and the mental and physical aggregates as his herd or subjects.¹⁸⁵ For the non-Prasangika schools of Buddhist tenets, this view of a self-sufficient person exists innately in ordinary beings, but for Prasangika it is only a product of false teachings. The Prasangikas say that the innate sense of a self-sufficient person is the person's appearing to be like a head salesman and his aggregates appearing to be like salesmen. The head salesman, unlike the relationship between a shepherd and his flock, is not separate from the category 'salesman', but he is the boss of the other salesmen. Similarly, though a person is of the nature of the aggregates, he appears to be the controller of them; the aggregates, like salesmen, appear to depend on the person who, like a head salesman, appears not to depend on the aggregates. In fact, the person depends on the aggregates; however, when one thinks, 'My body', it seems that first there must be an I and then a body which is owned or controlled. This is the way that a self-sufficient person appears.

When the dependent nature of the person is reflected upon in meditation and when it is seen that the person is nothing separate from the aggregates, one can withdraw from desires and so forth that are entered into for the sake of such a person. One can then reflect on phenomena other than persons, such as mind and body or external possessions, as not being objects of use and enjoyment by a self-sufficient person. Such meditation is powerful and serves to advance one to the point of being a fit vessel for the doctrine that persons and other phenomena do not inherently exist. Through being taught non-self-sufficiency, a meditator is led into seeing the dependent nature of the person and is thereby drawn into probing the significance of dependence, the very sign of non-inherent existence.

L1: [Part Four – Presentation and refutation of various systems / views] :L1

[see other file for this section]

L1: [Part Five – Prasangika-Madhyamika [Details about the refutation of the Svatantrika system] :L1

[see other file for this section]

L1: [PART SIX – Translation of “Emptiness in the prasangika system” by Jam-yang-shay-ba (P.561)] :L1

From the twelfth chapter of Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Explanation of 'Tenets', Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets And the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings

[see other file for this section]

L1: [Appendices] :L1

[see other file for this section]

L1: [Notes] :L1

[see other file for this section]

[End]

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