

Part-B

Jamyang Shepa · Tsong Khapa

source: https://web.archive.org/web/20060308195802/http://gileht.tripod.com/Jam-yang-shay-ba_Tenets_2.txt

TO READ THIS FILE SAVE IT TO DISK FIRST;
AND READ IT USING NOTEPAD OR ANY OTHER TEXT EDITOR.

Jam-yang-shay-ba's (1648-1721)

Great Exposition of Tenets

PART 4 & 5 of 6 parts

[see other files for the other sections]

[About: the five reasonings establishing the two selflessnesses in the context of the five stages of meditation leading to the union of calm abiding and insight; the inseparability of the two truths; and the refutation of all the various Buddhist and non-buddhist systems]

Sub-section titles are in the form: L#: [...].

These can be used to regenerate the structure using a Word Processor.

Paragraph starting with '¢(i.e. ...' are usually added comments by me.

L1: [CONTENTS] :L1

L1: [CONTENTS] :L1

L1: [Short Table of Contents / Résumé]

L1: [Short Table of Contents / Résumé] :L1

L1: [Introduction] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Technical Note] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [List of Abbreviations] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Acknowledgements] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Part I – Meditation] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [PRESENTATION OF THE TWO TRUTHS: EMPTINESS (part 2) AND THE CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS (part

3)] :L1

L1: [PART II — REASONING INTO REALITY -- Details about the Five Reasonings proving the Emptiness of all dharmas] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Part Three – The Buddhist World [Details about the useful conventional truths] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Part Four – Presentation and refutation of various systems / views] :L1

L2: [REFUTING NON-BUDDHISTS VIEWS:] :L2

L2: [1. Refutation of various views about the Self] :L2

L4: [THE ASSERTION OF SELF (various non-buddhist reasonings to be refuted)] :L4

L4: [BUDDHIST REFUTATION OF SELF (refuting those non-buddhist reasonings)] :L4

L5: [0. First clarifying the object of negation] :L5

L5: [1. Refuting the reasoning that the person substantially exists because it is observed that when phenomena such as the shape of a face are seen, the thought of the presence of a person is generated without prior consideration] :L5

L5: [2. Refuting that the person substantially exists just because it is observed that one engages in activities having first thought, 'I will murder,' or 'I will forsake murder'] :L5

L5: [3. Imputation of the self to the aggregates] :L5

L5: [4. Positing the character of the person] :L5

L5: [5. Positing the self as afflicted and purified] :L5

L5: [6. Positing the self as engaging and disengaging] :L5

L5: [7. Positing the self as the experiencer, agent, and liberator] :L5

L5: [8. Positing the self as the instrument] :L5

L5: [9. Positing the self as what is expressed by 'person'] :L5

L5: [10. Positing the view of self] :L5

L5: [Conclusion: empty of inherent existence, but still not completely non-existent – the Middle Way between the two extremes of existence and non-existence.] :L5

L2: [2. Non-Buddhist Systems] :L2

L5: [The various non-buddhist schools] :L5

L5: [The differences between Buddhists and non-buddhists] :L5

L5: [The origins of those non-buddhist schools] :L5

L4: [SAMKHYAS [the Samkhya's permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, production from itself (non-theistic) or from both self and others together (theistic), to be refuted]] :L4

L5: [The twenty-five categories of realities that both Samkhya schools accept] :L5

L5: [More on the Samkhyas from other texts] :L5

L6: [MIND AT THE ROOT OF CONFUSION] :L6

L7: [Non-Buddhist Thinking] :L7

L7: [The Non-Theistic Approach] :L7

L7: [Theistic Beliefs] :L7

L7: [The Nihilistic Viewpoint] :L7

L4: [BUDDHIST REFUTATION OF SAMKHYA (refuting the Samkhya's permanent self and effect existing at the time of the cause)] :L4

L4: [CHARVAKAS (Hedonists, Proponent of Annihilation, Nihilists) (the Charvaka's position on the production from no cause, to be refuted)] :L4

L5: [More on the Charvakas from other texts] :L5

L4: [BUDDHIST REFUTATION OF NIHILISM (refuting the production from no cause, a mind that is emerging from matter, an annihilation at death, no rebirth)] :L4

L2: [REFUTING HINAYANA BUDDHISTS VIEWS:] :L2

L2: [3. Hinayana [the two schools of the Vehicle of the Hearers]] :L2

L4: [(1st school of tenets) VAIBHASHIKA [the Abhidharmists, to be refuted]] :L4

L5: [More on the Vaibhashikas from other texts] :L5

L4: [(2nd school of tenets) SAUTRANTIKA [rely on the sutras, to be refuted]] :L4
 L5: [More on the Sautrantikas from other texts] :L5
 L2: [REFUTING OTHER MAHAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS:] :L2
 L2: [4. History of the Mahayana] :L2
 L2: [5. (3rd school) Chittamatra (or Mind-Only tradition)] :L2
 L6: [About the number of vehicles] :L6
 L6: [About the number of consciousnesses] :L6
 L6: [Definition of Chittamatra] :L6
 L4: [MIND-ONLY] :L4
 L4: [PRASANGIKA CRITIQUE OF MIND-ONLY [dependent on the mind, but not from the mind-only]
 :L4
 L4: [BUDDHA NATURE [an adapted skillful means for those who cannot face emptiness without fears or without falling into nihilism] :L4
 L4: [MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL [is the actual 'I' as explained by Asanga] :L4
 L4: [PRASANGIKA POSITION ON THE MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL] :L4
 L4: [THREE NATURES] :L4
 L4: [PRASANGIKA VIEW ON THE THREE NATURES [the duality of the two truths: another adapted skillful means] :L4
 L4: [THREE FINAL VEHICLES [another adapted skillful means] :L4
 L4: [ONE FINAL VEHICLE IN PRASANGIKA [emptiness as the basis of all] :L4
 L2: [6. (4th school) Madhyamika [and the divisions of Prasangika and Svatantrika] :L2
 L4: [BACKGROUND [we need to combine both truths: conventional truths and emptiness; they are inseparable; the Middle Way: not accepting, not rejecting]] :L4
 L5: [The Middle Way] :L5
 L5: [Nagarjuna's contribution] :L5
 L5: [Chandrakirti's Supplement] :L5
 L5: [Tsong Khapa's Illumination] :L5
 L5: [and everybody's debate about those] :L5
 L4: [TWO TRUTHS] :L4
 L5: [Definition of the Two Truths: deceitful or not] :L5
 L5: [The basis of division into the two truths] :L5
 L5: [*** The Two Truths are not different, not the same ***] :L5
 L5: [Emptiness of other vs. emptiness of self] :L5
 L5: [Before realizing the Perfect Union of the Two truths (Buddhahood) they are seen as opposites – but they are inseparable, non-dual: not two, not one] :L5
 L5: [The emptiness of the Two Truths; but still very useful concepts] :L5
 L5: [Emptiness doesn't deny valid conventional truths] :L5
 L4: [INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE AND PHENOMENA] :L4
 L5: [Definitive sutras, and those requiring interpretation – but, still, the real absolute truth is beyond all conceptualization and has to be directly realized] :L5
 L5: [The difference between Chittamatrins and Prasangikas about which sutras are definitive]
 :L5
 L5: [The Four Reliances – going beyond sectarianism, dogmatism and conceptualization] :L5
 L5: [The Three Turnings of the Wheel] :L5
 L5: [*** The Middle Way: Dependent Origination and emptiness are not different, not the same; they are inseparable, non-dual: not two, not one ***] :L5
 L1: [Part Five – Prasangika-Madhyamika [Details about the refutation of the Svatantrika system] :L1

L2: [1. The Prasangika School] :L2

L4: [Who were the first Prasangikas? Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, and Atisha] :L4

L4: [SYNONYMS [of Prasangikas] :L4

L5: [For them ‘conditionality’ means “merely imputed by the mind”, “conceptual interdependence”] :L5

L5: [Emptiness doesn’t mean complete non-existence] :L5

L5: [The Prasangikas do not reject the World conventions] :L5

L5: [How they avoid the two extremes] :L5

L2: [2. Debate [Prasangika (Buddhapalita + Chandrakirti) vs. Svatantrika (Bhavaviveka)]] :L2

L5: [The Samkhya position, to be refuted by Buddhapalita] :L5

L5: [Buddhapalita’s refutation of the Samkhya’s position] :L5

L4: [CONSEQUENCES AND SYLLOGISMS] :L4

L5: [Definition of Consequences / Prasanga] :L5

L6: [Five types of consequences] :L6

L7: [1. Consequence generating an other-approved inference, i.e., generating an inference in another using a subject, reason, and pervasion approved in the opponent’s system] :L7

L7: [2. Consequence through similarity of reason] :L7

L7: [3. Contradictory consequence] :L7

L7: [4. Consequence expressing contradiction and proving one’s own assertion] :L7

L7: [5. Consequence established through similarity of reason and thesis] :L7

L5: [Definition of Syllogism] :L5

L5: [When to use consequence or syllogism: Prasangika (Buddhapalita) vs. Sautantrika (Bhavaviveka)] :L5

L2: [3. Bhavaviveka’s Criticism of Buddhapalita] :L2

L2: [4. Chandrakirti’s Defense of Buddhapalita] :L2

L4: [CHANDRAKIRTI’S DEFENSE AGAINST THE FIRST FALLACY] :L4

L4: [CHANDRAKIRTI’S DEFENSE AGAINST THE SECOND FALLACY] :L4

L5: [An hypothetical extension of Bhavaviveka’s argument] :L5

L5: [Buddhapalita’s indication of an other-approved inference] :L5

L5: [The unassailability of Buddhapalita’s other-approved inference] :L5

L5: [A second other-approved inference contained in Buddhapalita’s commentary] :L5

L5: [Refuting production from self also refutes manifestation from self] :L5

L5: [But did Buddhapalita really say all that?] :L5

L4: [CHANDRAKIRTI’S DEFENSE AGAINST THE THIRD FALLACY] :L4

L5: [Consequences do not have to imply their opposite meaning] :L5

L5: [This is frequently Nagarjuna’s procedure] :L5

L5: [Why does bhavaviveka not find Buddhapalita’s words to be rich with syllogisms like Nagarjuna’s?] :L5

L2: [5. Chandrakirti’s Refutation of Bhavaviveka] :L2

L4: [THE GENERAL INDICTMENT] :L4

L4: [DOES ‘ULTIMATELY’ GO WITH THE PREDICATE?] :L4

L4: [DOES ‘ULTIMATELY’ GO WITH THE SUBJECT?] :L4

L4: [COMMONLY APPEARING SUBJECTS] :L4

L5: [There are no commonly appearing subjects] :L5

L5: [Are there ever commonly appearing subjects?] :L5

L5: [Bhavaviveka has to admit his own reason is not established] :L5

L5: [Bhavaviveka’s other autonomous reasons are not established] :L5

L5: [Bhavaviveka’s reason is inconclusive] :L5

L5: [Our other-approved syllogisms do not incur those faults] :L5

L4: [REMARKS] :L4

L2: [6. Prasangika in Tibet] :L2

L2: [7. Validation of Phenomena [an adated skillful means in order to help student not to fall into nihilism; the message is that emptiness doesn't deny conventional truths; on the contrary one implies the other; but this skillful means could back-fire the other way and reinforce reification]] :L2

L2: [8. Meditative Reasoning [The Middle Way: not accepting, not rejecting conceptualization; no absolute truth, but valid useful adapted skillful means and progressively more and more subtle methods, reasonings, views] :L2

L1: [PART SIX – Translation of “Emptiness in the prasangika system” by Jam-yang-shay-ba (P.561)] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Short Table of Contents / Résumé]

o. Introduction / Technical Note / List of Abbreviations / Acknowledgements

[FIRST, A PRESENTATION OF THE FIVE REASONINGS ESTABLISHING THE TWO SELFLESSNESSES]

PART ONE – MEDITATION [Two selflessnesses, five reasonings, five stages, five paths]

1. Purpose and Motivation [We need to realize both selflessnesses: person and phenomena]

2. Self: The Opposite of Selfness [The Middle Way between the two extremes: empty, but still not completely non-existent]

3. Meditation: Identifying Self [ex. Meditation of the selflessness of person]

[RÉSUMÉ OF THE FIVE REASONINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIVE STAGES OF MEDITATION:]

First stage of meditation on emptiness: How a beginner develops experience with respect to the view of emptiness

Identifying the object negated in the theory of selflessness

4. Meditative Investigation [ex. Using the sevenfold reasoning (#2) to establish the selflessness of person]

5. [ex. Using the reasoning of] Dependent-Arising [to establish the selflessness of person]

5b. [ex. Using the reasoning of Dependent-Arising (#3) to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

5c. [ex. Using the sevenfold reasoning to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

6. [ex. Using the reasoning of the] diamond slivers (#1) [to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

7. Realization [of three more types of reasoning to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

7a. The refutation of the four extreme types of production (#4) [product is not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither]

7b. The refutation of the four alternative of production (#5) [one or many causes ? one or many effects]

7c. The reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many (the two first of reasoning #2)

[Conclusion about the first stage of meditation: non-duality of subject vs. object / emptiness of emptiness]

8. Calm Abiding [Prerequisites, the object of calm abiding, faults & antidotes, nine states, five paths]

Second stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding

9. Special Insight [the path of preparation]

Third stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate actual special insight based on actual calm abiding

Fourth stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate direct cognition of emptiness [the paths of seeing & meditation, ten bhumis]

10. Tantra

Fifth stage of meditation on emptiness: How to meditate on emptiness during the second stage of Highest Yoga Tantra

11. Buddhahood [the resulting ground; the Buddha kayas]

[SECOND, A PRESENTATION OF THE TWO TRUTHS: EMPTINESS AND THE CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS]

PART TWO — REASONING INTO REALITY [Details about the Five Reasonings implying Emptiness]

0. Introduction [The two selflessnesses and the two sets of reasonings]

1. The Diamond Slivers (#1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity in change)

The ten samenesses (It is easy to realize the other nine samenesses after having realized the sameness of production)

Statement of the reasons

1. Non-production from self (cause&effect cannot be the same/one; the cause cannot be inside; Vaibhashika ?? & Samkhyas)

2. Non-production from other (cause&effect cannot be inherently different/two/unrelated otherwise anything would produce anything else; the cause cannot be outside; the junction is unexplainable: cause&effect cannot be simultaneous or separate in time; there is no continuity, no discontinuity; but conventional production from other must be accepted as conventionally valid because the other three are much less logical/practical)

3. Non-production from both self and other (the causes cannot be both the same&different, inside&outside; Nirgranthas(Jainas) & theistic Samkhyas)

4. Non-production causelessly (the effect cannot be causeless; Charvakas / nihilists)

Conclusion

2. The Four Extremes (#4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // also: because cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)

3. The Four Alternatives (#5 : refuting that one or many causes can inherently produce one or many effects)

4. Dependent-Arising (#3 : the King of reasoning: refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)

5. Refuting a Self of Persons (#2 : the sevenfold reasoning: refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)

The mine (refuting the “mine”)

[Particularities of Prasangikas: the existent person is not any or all of the mental and physical aggregates]

PART THREE – THE BUDDHIST WORLD [Enumerating some useful conventional truths]

o. Introduction [all empty of inherent existence, but still dependently arisen, functional, and useful conventional truths]

The fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class

The fifty-five phenomena of the pure class

1. The Selfless

Classifications of phenomena (the selfless) in terms of non-existents and existents

(permanent, things (forms, consciousness (mind, mental factors ...))

Classifications of phenomena (the selfless) in terms of the five aggregates

2. Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence

Details about the 12 members of the Wheel of Life, and their interpretation across three lives

3. The Four Noble Truths

Details about the Four Noble Truths

Details about the coarse and subtle selfless – that realizing only the selflessness of the person is not enough

PART FOUR – PRESENTATION AND REFUTATION OF SPECIFIC SYSTEMS / VIEWS (one at a time)

REFUTING NON-BUDDHISTS VIEWS:

1. Refutation of various views about the Self

? The assertion of self (various non-buddhist reasonings to be refuted: like inherent existence or complete non-existence of a self)

? Buddhist refutation of self (résumé of the refutations of those non-buddhist positions) : but “the fact that a substantially existent agent cannot be found does not mean that person or agent do not exist at all; they exist imputedly and effectively”.

2. Non-Buddhist Systems: (oscillating between the two extremes of permanence and annihilation)

Samkhyas / Enumerators / Proponent of the nature of the cause / Kapilas

? Samkhyas production from self, (the Samkhya’s permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, production from itself (non-theistic) or from both self and others together (theistic), that the world was part of the creator's being -- to be refuted)

? Buddhist refutation of Samkhya (résumé of the refutations of the Samkhya’s positions: permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, ...)

Charvakas / Hedonists / Nihilists

? Charvakas (Hedonists, Proponent of Annihilation, Nihilists) (the Charvaka’s position on the production from no cause -- to be refuted)

? Buddhist refutation of nihilism (résumé of the refutations of the Nihilists’s positions: production from no cause, a mind that is emerging from matter, annihilation at death, no rebirth, no karma ...)

REFUTING HINAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS:

3. Hinayana (the two schools of the Vehicle of the Hearers)

(1st school) Vaibhashika (18 subschools) [production from self, the Abhidharmists rejecting the authority of the sutras, asserting no self-consciousness but real dharmas (partless particles and partless moments of consciousness) and simultaneous cause & effect -- to be refuted] [résumé of the refutations of the Vaibhashika View]

(2nd school) Sautrantika [Followers of scripture or Reasoning, not accepting the Abhidharma, asserting a real self-consciousness and real dharmas, everything is momentary, accept absolute perception and inference -- to be refuted] [Refutation of the Sautantrika View]

REFUTING MAHAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS:

4. History of the Mahayana (a cosmology of many Buddhas, a 500 years old Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, ...)
5. (3rd school) Chittamatra [Mind-Only tradition, Followers of scripture or Reasoning, asserting true consciousness, that all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind, eight consciousnesses, ... -- to be refuted] [Refutation of the Chittamatra's positions]
6. (4th school) Madhyamika [Prasangika vs. Svatantrika, (to be refuted – for this refutation see Part 5 below)]

? The Middle Way // The Two Truths // Definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation

PART FIVE – PRASANGIKA-MADHYAMIKA [Details about the refutation of the Svatantrika system]

1. The Prasangika School
2. Debate [Prasangika (Buddhapalita + Chandrakirti) vs. Svatantrika (Bhavaviveka)]
3. Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita
4. Chandrakirti's Defense of Buddhapalita 5. Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
6. Prasangika in Tibet (mostly Prasangikas)
7. Validation of Phenomena (why talking about valid cognition?)
8. Meditative Reasoning (not accepting, not rejecting conceptualization)

PART SIX – The root text: "Emptiness in the prasangika system" by Jam-yang-shay-ba (1648-1721)

0. Introduction

? About the author // About the editions of the text used // Jam-yang-shay-ba's sources // Collaborators for the translation

1. Background

? Definition and etymology of 'Prasangika' // Synonyms of Prasangika // Divisions of Prasangika

? Literature on which the Prasangikas rely [Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, Buddhapalita, Atisha, Maitreya, Asanga, Tsong Khapa]

2. Interpretation of Scripture

3. The Object of Negation

THE FIVE REASONINGS REFUTING INHERENT EXISTENCE OF ALL DHARMA

4. Refuting Inherently Existent Production

REASONINGS REFUTING A SELF OF PHENOMENA

? Diamond Slivers (reasoning #1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity in change)

5. Other types of production

? Simultaneous refutation of production of the four extremes and of the existent, non-existent, both, and neither (reasoning #4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // also: because cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)

? Refutation of production of the four alternatives (reasoning #5 : refuting that one or many causes can inherently produce one or many effects)

6. Dependent-Arising

? Actual exposition of dependent-arising (reasoning #3 : the King of reasoning; refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)

? Elimination of error concerning dependent-arising

REASONINGS REFUTING A SELF OF PERSONS

7. Refuting A Self Of Persons

? Actual exposition of the reasoning refuting a self of persons (reasoning #2 : the sevenfold reasoning; refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)

? Elimination of error concerning the refutation of a self of persons

L1: [Short Table of Contents / Résumé] :L1

[Ignore this section – it is the same as above]

N2: [FIRST, A PRESENTATION OF THE FIVE REASONINGS ESTABLISHING THE TWO SELFLESSNESSES] :N2

N3: [PART ONE – MEDITATION [Two selflessnesses, five reasonings, five stages, five paths] :N3

-- Chapter 1. Purpose and Motivation [We need to realize both selflessnesses: person and phenomena]

-- Chapter 2. Self: The Opposite of Selflessness [The Middle Way between the two extremes: empty, but still not completely non-existent]

-- Chapter 3. Meditation: Identifying Self [ex. Meditation of the selflessness of person]

N4: [RÉSUMÉ OF THE FIVE REASONINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIVE STAGES OF MEDITATION:] :N4

N5: [First stage of meditation on emptiness: How a beginner develops experience with respect to the view of emptiness] :N5

-- Identifying THE OBJECT NEGATED in the theory of selflessness

-- Chapter 4. Meditative Investigation [ex. Using the sevenfold reasoning (#2) to establish THE SELFLESSNESS OF PERSON]

-- Chapter 5. [ex. Using the reasoning of] Dependent-Arising [to establish the selflessness of person]

-- 5b. [ex. Using the reasoning of Dependent-Arising (#3) to establish THE SELFLESSNESS OF PHENOMENA]

-- 5c. [ex. Using the sevenfold reasoning to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

-- Chapter 6. [ex. Using the reasoning of the] diamond slivers (#1) [to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

-- Chapter 7. Realization [of three more types of reasoning to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

-- 7a. The refutation of the four extreme types of production (#4) [product is not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither]

-- 7b. The refutation of the four alternative of production (#5) [one or many causes ? one or many effects]

-- 7c. The reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many (the two first of reasoning #2)

-- [Conclusion about the first stage of meditation: non-duality of subject vs. object / emptiness of emptiness]

-- Chapter 8. CALM ABIDING [Prerequisites, the object of calm abiding, faults & antidotes, nine states, five paths]

N5: [Second stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding] :N5

-- Chapter 9. Special Insight [the path of preparation]

N5: [Third stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate actual special insight based on actual calm abiding] :N5

N5: [Fourth stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate direct cognition of emptiness [the paths of seeing & meditation, ten bhumis] :N5

-- Chapter 10. Tantra

N5: [Fifth stage of meditation on emptiness: How to meditate on emptiness during the second stage of Highest Yoga Tantra] :N5

-- Chapter 11. Buddhahood [the resulting ground; the Buddha kayas]

N2: [SECOND, A PRESENTATION OF THE TWO TRUTHS: EMPTINESS AND THE CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS] :N2

N3: [PART TWO — REASONING INTO REALITY [Details about the Five Reasonings implying Emptiness] :N3

N5: [Chapter 0. Introduction [The two selflessnesses and the two sets of reasonings]] :N5

N5: [Chapter 1. The Diamond Slivers] :N5

(#1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity in change)

-- THE TEN SAMENESSES (It is easy to realize the other nine samenesses after having realized the sameness of production)

Statement of the reasons

-- 1. NON-PRODUCTION FROM SELF (cause&effect cannot be the same/one; the cause cannot be inside; Vaibhashika ?? & Samkhyas)

-- 2. NON-PRODUCTION FROM OTHER (cause&effect cannot be inherently different/two/unrelated otherwise anything would produce anything else; the cause cannot be outside; the junction is unexplainable: cause&effect cannot be simultaneous or separate in time; there is no continuity, no discontinuity; but conventional production from other must be accepted as conventionally valid because the other three are much less logical/practical)

-- 3. NON-PRODUCTION FROM BOTH SELF AND OTHER (the causes cannot be both the same&different, inside&outside; Nirgranthas(Jainas) & theistic Samkhyas)

-- 4. NON-PRODUCTION CAUSELESSLY (the effect cannot be causeless; Charvakas / nihilists)

-- CONCLUSION

N5: [Chapter 2. The Four Extremes] :N5

(#4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // also: because cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)

N5: [Chapter 3. The Four Alternatives] :N5

(#5 : refuting that ONE OR MANY causes can inherently produce one or many effects)

N5: [Chapter 4. Dependent-Arising] :N5

(#3 : THE KING OF REASONING: refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)

N5: [Chapter 5. Refuting a Self of Persons] :N5

(#2 : THE SEVENFOLD REASONING: refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)

-- The mine (refuting the “mine”)

-- [Particularities of Prasangikas: the existent person is not any or all of the mental and physical aggregates]

N3: [PART THREE – THE BUDDHIST WORLD [Enumerating some useful conventional truths] :N3

N5: [Chapter 0. Introduction] :N5

[all empty of inherent existence, but still dependently arisen, functional, and useful conventional truths]

-- The fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class

-- The fifty-five phenomena of the pure class

N5: [Chapter 1. The Selfless] :N5

-- Classifications of phenomena (the selfless) in terms of non-existents and existents (permanent, things (forms, consciousness (mind, mental factors ...))

-- Classifications of phenomena (the selfless) in terms of the five aggregates

N5: [Chapter 2. Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence] :N5

-- Details about the 12 members of the Wheel of Life, and their interpretation across three lives

N5: [Chapter 3. The Four Noble Truths] :N5

-- Details about the Four Noble Truths

-- Details about the coarse and subtle selfless – that realizing only the selflessness of the person is not enough

N3: [PART FOUR – PRESENTATION AND REFUTATION OF SPECIFIC SYSTEMS / VIEWS (one at a time)]

:N3

N4: [REFUTING NON-BUDDHISTS VIEWS] :N4

N5: [Chapter 1. Refutation of various views about the Self] :N5

-- The assertion of self (various non-buddhist reasonings to be refuted: like inherent existence or complete non-existence of a self)

-- Buddhist refutation of self (résumé of the refutations of those non-buddhist positions) : but “the fact that a substantially existent agent cannot be found does not mean that person or agent do not exist at all; they exist imputedly and effectively”.

N5: [Chapter 2. Non-Buddhist Systems] :N5

(oscillating between the two extremes of permanence and annihilation)

N6: [Samkhyas / Enumerators / Proponent of the nature of the cause / Kapilas

-- Samkhyas production from self, (the Samkhya's permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, production from itself (non-theistic) or from both self and others together (theistic), that the world was part of the creator's being -- to be refuted)

-- Buddhist refutation of Samkhya (résumé of the refutations of the Samkhya's positions: permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, ...)

N6: [Charvakas / Hedonists / Nihilists

-- Charvakas (Hedonists, Proponent of Annihilation, Nihilists) (the Charvaka's position on the production from no cause -- to be refuted)

-- Buddhist refutation of nihilism (résumé of the refutations of the Nihilists's positions: production from no cause, a mind that is emerging from matter, annihilation at death, no rebirth, no karma ...)

N4: [REFUTING HINAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS] :N4

N5: [Chapter 3. Hinayana (the two schools of the Vehicle of the Hearers)] :N5

N6: [(1st school) Vaibhashika (18 subschools)

[production from self, the Abhidharmists rejecting the authority of the sutras, asserting no self-consciousness but real dharmas (partless particles and partless moments of consciousness) and simultaneous cause & effect -- to be refuted] [résumé of the refutations of the Vaibhashika View]

N6: [(2nd school) Sautrantika

[Followers of scripture or Reasoning, not accepting the Abhidharma, asserting a real self-consciousness and real dharmas, everything is momentary, accept absolute perception and inference -- to be refuted] [Refutation of the Sautantrika View]

N4: [REFUTING MAHAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS] :N4

N5: [Chapter 4. History of the Mahayana] :N5

(a cosmology of many Buddhas, a 500 years old Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, ...)

N5: [Chapter 5. (3rd school) Chittamatra] :N5

[Mind-Only tradition, Followers of scripture or Reasoning, asserting true consciousness, that all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind, eight consciousnesses, ... -- to be refuted] [Refutation of the Chittamatra's positions]

N5: [Chapter 6. (4th school) Madhyamika] :N5

[Prasangika vs. Svatantrika, (to be refuted – for this refutation see Part 5 below)]

-- The Middle Way // The Two Truths // Definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation

N3: [PART FIVE – PRASANGIKA-MADHYAMIKA [Details about the refutation of the Svatantrika system] :N3

N5: [Chapter 1. The Prasangika School] :N5

N5: [Chapter 2. Debate [Prasangika (Buddhapalita + Chandrakirti) vs. Svatantrika (Bhavaviveka)]] :N5

N5: [Chapter 3. Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita] :N5

N5: [Chapter 4. Chandrakirti 's Defense of Buddhapalita] :N5

N5: [Chapter 5. Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka] :N5

N5: [Chapter Chapter Chapter 6. Prasangika in Tibet (mostly Prasangikas)] :N5

N5: [Chapter 7. Validation of Phenomena (why talking about valid cognition?)] :N5

N5: [Chapter 8. Meditative Reasoning (not accepting, not rejecting conceptualization)] :N5

N3: [PART SIX – The root text: “Emptiness in the prasangika system” by Jam-yang-shay-ba (1648-1721)] :N3

N5: [Chapter 0. Introduction] :N5

-- About the author // About the editions of the text used // Jam-yang-shay-ba's sources // Collaborators for the translation

N5: [Chapter 1. Background] :N5

-- Definition and etymology of 'Prasangika' // Synonyms of Prasangika' // Divisions of Prasangika

-- Literature on which the Prasangikas rely [Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, Buddhapalita, Atisha, Maitreya, Asanga, Tsong Khapa]

N5: [Chapter 2. Interpretation of Scripture] :N5

N5: [Chapter 3. The Object of Negation] :N5

N4: [THE FIVE REASONINGS REFUTING INHERENT EXISTENCE OF ALL DHARMA] :N4

N5: [Chapter 4. Refuting Inherently Existent Production] :N5

N4: [REASONINGS REFUTING A SELF OF PHENOMENA] :N4

-- DIAMOND SLIVERS (reasoning #1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity in change)

N5: [Chapter 5. Other types of production] :N5

-- Simultaneous refutation of production of THE FOUR EXTREMES and of the existent, non-existent, both, and neither (reasoning #4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // also: because cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)

-- Refutation of production of THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES (reasoning #5 : refuting that one or many causes can inherently produce one or many effects)

N5: [Chapter 6. Dependent-Arising] :N5

-- ACTUAL EXPOSITION OF DEPENDENT-ARISING (reasoning #3 : the King of reasoning; refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)

-- Elimination of error concerning dependent-arising

N4: [REASONINGS REFUTING A SELF OF PERSONS] :N4

N5: [Chapter 7. Refuting A Self Of Persons] :N5

-- ACTUAL EXPOSITION OF THE REASONING REFUTING A SELF OF PERSONS (reasoning #2 : the

sevenfold reasoning; refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)

-- Elimination of error concerning the refutation of a self of persons

L1: [Introduction] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Technical Note] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [List of Abbreviations] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Acknowledgements] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Part I – Meditation] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [PRESENTATION OF THE TWO TRUTHS: EMPTINESS (part 2) AND THE CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS (part 3)] :L1

L1: [PART II – REASONING INTO REALITY -- Details about the Five Reasonings proving the Emptiness of all dharmas] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Part Three – The Buddhist World [Details about the useful conventional truths] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Part Four – Presentation and refutation of various systems / views] :L1

L2: [REFUTING NON-BUDDHISTS VIEWS:] :L2

L2: [1. Refutation of various views about the Self] :L2

Source:

- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations

L4: [THE ASSERTION OF SELF (various non-buddhist reasonings to be refuted)] :L4

THE NON-BUDDHIST SYSTEMS assert the existence of a substantially existent self based on scripture and counterfeit reasoning.¹⁸⁶ The scriptures are those transmitted from one to another, setting forth the existence of a personal self.

The reasonings are:

~ A self exists because without prior consideration, when phenomena such as the shape of a face are seen, the thought of the presence of a person is generated, not just the thought of the presence of a shape.

~ A self exists because without prior consideration, when enjoyment preponderantly of pleasurable feelings is perceived, the thought of the presence of a high person is generated, not just of feeling. When enjoyment preponderantly of painful feelings is

perceived, the thought of the presence of a low person is generated, not just of feeling.

~ When the name 'Devadatta' is designated, one thinks of a person, not just of a discrimination of the name.

~ When engagement in afflictions—such as desire—or virtues—such as faith—are perceived, the thought of the presence of a childish person or a wise person is generated, not just of engagement.

~ When the mind understands its objects through the eyes and so forth, one does not just think that the mind sees but that 'I see.' This shows that there is a sentient being, or I separate from the mind.

~ If there were no self separate from the mental and physical aggregates, one would not think, 'I have seen a form,' or 'I will see a form,' but would only think of the aggregates as engaging in activities. However, this is not the case; one must definitely think of the self prior to engagement in activities.

L4: [BUDDHIST REFUTATION OF SELF (refuting those non-buddhist reasonings)] :L4

L5: [0. First clarifying the object of negation] :L5

Since those seeking liberation must completely refute the referent object of the view of the transitory collection as a real I and must assert a mere I or mere person, they must become skilled in the ways of refutation and proof through reasoning. Otherwise, falling to the extreme either of asserting no I at all or of affirming a substantially existent I, all their efforts will be senseless.

Since the mere person is not to be refuted, a person as qualified by a certain attribute is. This is called A TRUE ULTIMATE OR SUBSTANTIALLY EXISTENT PERSON (THE OBJECT OF REFUTATION) (*satyaka, bden pa), (paramartha, don dam), (dravyasat, rdzas yod).

In short, the person is conceived to exist substantially whereas it only exists imputedly (prajñaptisat, btags yod). Here, an imputedly existent object is a phenomenon, such as a forest or army, which when it appears as an object of the mind must depend on the appearance of some other basis which has a character different from it, such as trees or soldiers.

However, the substantially existent appears under its own power without depending on such—for instance, a tree or soldier. This explanation of 'substantial existence' comes from the lower systems because IN THE PRASANGIKA SYSTEM NOTHING SUBSTANTIALLY EXISTS SINCE THE APPEARANCE OF ANY PHENOMENON MUST DEPEND ON THE APPEARANCE OF ITS BASIS OF IMPUTATION, WHICH IS NOT ITSELF.

L5: [1. Refuting the reasoning that the person substantially exists because it is observed that when phenomena such as the shape of a face are seen, the thought of the presence of a person is generated without prior consideration] :L5

Are phenomena, such as the shape of a face and so forth, perceived and the thought of a sentient being generated with respect to them, or is something else perceived and the thought of a sentient being generated with respect to it? If the former, then that thought is erroneous because it conceives such to be a sentient being whereas a sentient being is other than the shape of a face and so forth. If the latter, one has let fall the position

that the thought of a sentient being is generated only from perceiving such phenomena.

Does that base which, when perceived, generates the thought of a sentient being have the nature of a sentient being or not? If the former, then that thought is erroneous because the sentient being appears to be self-sufficient in the sense of having a character different from that of the mind and body. If the latter, then one would have to assert that even a pot could serve as a cause generating the thought of woolen cloth.

Do you accept that the thought of a sentient being can be generated with respect to what is not a sentient being or not? If not, it is manifestly contradicted by the experience of generating the thought of a human to a pile of stones seen in the distance. If, however, the thought of a sentient being can be generated with respect to what is not a sentient being, then the basic assertion that the thought of a sentient being understands its object just as it is is indefinite.

Do you accept that the thought of non-sentient being can be generated with respect to a sentient being? Do you accept that the thought of a certain sentient being can be generated with respect to another sentient being?

When the aggregates are perceived, is the base that generates the thought of a sentient being manifest or hidden? If manifest, then the aggregates would be the sentient being because another phenomenon not included among them is not manifestly perceived. If hidden or obscure, then a small untrained child would not generate a thought of a sentient being.

L5: [2. Refuting that the person substantially exists just because it is observed that one engages in activities having first thought, 'I will murder,' or 'I will forsake murder'] :L5

Do these activities arise from mental causes or from the cause of the self? If the former, then one has let fall the position that these are activities of a substantially existent person. If the latter, then it contradicts the position that these activities are preceded by thought.

Is the cause of the activities permanent or impermanent? If permanent, then it could not act. If impermanent, then these could not be the activities of a permanent self.

Does the sentient being who is the agent have a nature of exertion or non-exertion? If the former, then the self could not be permanent. If the latter, it would be contradictory to say that the non-exerting exerts.

Do the activities of a sentient being have causes or not? If not, then the activities would always be performed. If caused, then since they would be preceded by other causes, they would not be the independent activities of a self.

Are activities performed under one's own power or under the influence of the other? If the former, then the sufferings of birth, aging, sickness, death, and so forth would never be experienced because what one experienced would be in one's own power. If the latter, then it would not be suitable for these to be the activities of the self because the self is asserted to be under its own power.

L5: [3. Imputation of the self to the aggregates] :L5

If the person is imputed to the mental and physical aggregates, then it could not be a self-sufficient entity different from the aggregates.

If the person abides in the aggregates like a pile of grain in a mandala, is the person permanent or impermanent? If permanent, then it could not be helped or harmed by pleasure and pain; hence, it would not accumulate virtuous and non-virtuous actions (karma las) and thus would not assume a body, in which case there would be no sense in asserting it as a person. If impermanent, then something that is other than the aggregates and is produced and disintegrates would have to be observed, but it is not.

If the person is other than the aggregates (which include all products) like sticks set side by side, then since the person would be a non-product, it would be senseless to assert it.

If the aggregates do not exist at all, then since there could be no relation with fetters, one would be liberated effortlessly.

L5: [4. Positing the character of the person] :L5

If a person separate from the aggregates exists, does it have the nature of being the viewer of forms and so forth or not? If it does, is it imputed to the eye consciousness and so forth or is it another object altogether? If the former, then it could not be substantially existent.

If the self is the viewer of forms and so forth but is other than the eye consciousness, then it would be either the object or the instrument of viewing. If it is the object, then it would be the basis of the activity of viewing. This could be in the sense of, like a seed, newly producing its own similar type in the next moment, but then the viewer would be impermanent, not permanent as is asserted. Or, this could be in the sense of transformation, like a potter or a human with magical powers, but then it would be impermanent and conventional. If just as a magician emanates illusions under his own power, so the self is under its own power, then the viewer would not undergo any suffering. The self might be conceived as the basis of the activity of viewing in the same way as the earth serves as the basis of and destroys the moving (sentient beings) and non-moving (the environment), but this is not observed in the self. Or, the self could be the basis of activity, like space, in the sense that one can stretch out and contract one's limbs in space which is non-obstructive, but this also is not observed in the self. Furthermore, if just as space is posited to a mere elimination of obstructive contact, so the viewer is posited to a mere elimination of its object of negation, then the self could not appear to the mind under its own power because it would be a mere absence.

If the viewer is the instrument of viewing, then like a sickle, its engaging in activity would definitely depend on an agent in which case it would be dual-natured, being both that which engages the object (as the instrument) and that which is engaged in the object (as the object upon which the agent acts). If, like a fire, it sometimes engages its objects under its own power without an agent (as in spontaneous combustion), then it would be senseless to assert the existence of the person in fear of the lack of an agent.

If the person does not have the nature of being the viewer of forms and so forth, then it is senseless to assert a person that does not have any valid cognition.

L5: [5. Positing the self as afflicted and purified] :L5

Does the self have the character of being afflicted and purified, or is it other than these? If it does, then it would be unreasonable to assert a person separate from the aggregates because food, clothing, and so forth help the self, imbalance of the elements and so forth harm it, and afflictions are perceived only in the aggregates, not in anything else. If the

self does not have the character of the afflicted and the purified, then it could not be afflicted and purified.

L5: [6. Positing the self as engaging and disengaging] :L5

Does a person who has the character of engagement and disengagement engage and disengage or does a person who does not have the character of engagement and disengagement do such? If the former, then a person separate from the aggregates could not exist because the activity of engagement is observed only in the phenomena of the aggregates. There is (1) engagement by way of having causes, like the body from its causes of semen, blood, and so forth, (2) engagement by way of having a nature of production, like a sprout, (3) engagement by way of having a nature of disintegration, like the gradual descent of a waterfall, (4) engagement from the one to the other like the connection of a flame to its next moment of similar type, and (5) engagement of transformation—having done one activity, engaging in another—like mounting a mount and thereby changing one's situation. All of these are observed only in the aggregates.

If a person who does not have the character of engagement and disengagement engages and disengages, then the self would not become engaged, because of not having the character of engagement. Since disengagement depends on a previous engagement, it is impossible when engagement is impossible.

L5: [7. Positing the self as the experiencer, agent, and liberator] :L5

Is something that is affected by pleasure and pain which are generated by objects asserted as the experiencer or is one who is not? One who is not affected by pleasure and pain could not be the experiencer since something that is helped or harmed from enjoying objects of experience is the meaning of an experiencer. If something that is affected by pleasure and pain generated by objects is the experiencer, then it is senseless to say that the self substantially exists because the state of being affected is perceived only in impermanent products.

Is something that is affected by the mind asserted as the agent, or is something that is not? As above, being affected is perceived only in impermanent products. Something that is not affected by the mind is not an agent because 'agent' means something that is affected by the mind.

Is something that is affected by the root and secondary afflictions asserted as the self that is liberated or is something that is not? As above, being affected is observed only in impermanent products. Something that is not affected by the afflictions could not be liberated because of not having been formerly bound.

L5: [8. Positing the self as the instrument] :L5

Is agentship posited only to the self or can it also be posited to others? If only the self, then it would not be suitable to say 'The light of burning fire illuminates the area,' indicating an agent other than the self. If others can be posited as agents, then it would be allowable to designate the self as the agent in seeing, hearing, and so forth, but there would be no point in asserting a substantially existent self.

L5: [9. Positing the self as what is expressed by 'person'] :L5

Is the verbal convention 'person' used only for the self or also for others? If only the self, then it would be wrong for one, having observed only the body of a being, to use the

verbal convention of his name with respect to it. If 'person' can be used for other things than the self, it could also be used for the viewer of forms and so forth. Though such would be allowable, it would be pointless to assert a further self.

L5: [10. Positing the view of self] :L5

It is not feasible for the view of self to be virtuous because it is especially produced in the obscured, is generated without application of effort, generates fear with respect to liberation, and is seen to nourish faults such as desire. Being non-virtuous, the view of a self is erroneous and mistaken with respect to its referent object, in which case one cannot prove the existence of self through citing the existence of the view of self. Furthermore, it is not feasible for the view of selflessness to be non-virtuous because the Omniscient Buddha spoke highly of it and because it must be achieved with great effort, does not generate fear with respect to liberation, causes the speedy attainment of auspicious fruits, and acts as the antidote of faults.

Is it that a substantially existent self abides as an objective reality and thus through its power the view of self is generated, or is it that whereas the person lacks substantial existence, the existence of a substantially existent self is superimposed through the power of conditioning to improper thought? If the former, then it would follow that Buddhists could not generate ascertainment of selflessness because this view of self, which would be produced by the power of the thing itself, would prevent it. If the latter, then it cannot be proved that a substantially existent self exists by way of citing the existence of the view of self.

L5: [Conclusion: empty of inherent existence, but still not completely non-existent – the Middle Way between the two extremes of existence and non-existence.] :L5

IN BRIEF, a person which is not imputed in dependence upon the collection, continuum, and so forth of the mental and physical aggregates does not inherently exist because of not being established as one nature with or a different nature from the aggregates. However, the opposite, the substantial existence of the self, is believed due to the assumption that the self exists validly as it appears to the innate false view of the transitory collection as a real I. To such an innate false view the self only appears to be a different object from the aggregates, for one seeks to leave these aggregates and gain others that are better than these but does not wish to leave the self.

When the substantial existence of the person is refuted, one understands implicitly that the person only imputedly exists. A mere person must be asserted on the positive side, and mere imputation is to be realized through the implicit force of refuting substantial existence. Thus, although self (atman, bdag) and person (pudgala, gang zag) are in general synonyms, they are not synonyms in the expression 'selflessness of the person'; in this context, the term 'self' refers to substantial existence (dravyasat, rdzas yod), whereas the term 'person' refers to the nominally existent sentient being imputed to the mental and physical aggregates. Though some Buddhist Vaibhashika systems (exemplified by some modern-day Theravadins) assert that there is no agent, only action, Tsong Khapa says¹⁸⁷ that they are mistakenly opposing worldly conventionalities.

THE FACT THAT A SUBSTANTIALLY EXISTENT AGENT CANNOT BE FOUND DOES NOT MEAN THAT PERSON OR AGENT DO NOT EXIST AT ALL; THEY EXIST IMPUTEDLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

L2: [2. Non-Buddhist Systems] :L2

Sources:

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets

The Buddhist tenet systems are differentiated from the non-Buddhist in that their teacher—Buddha—has extinguished all faults, attained all auspicious attributes, and taught from his own insight the profound doctrine of dependent-arising.¹⁸⁸ Their teaching harms neither themselves nor others, and their view is the assertion of the non-existence of a permanent, single, independent self.

Non-Buddhist teachers, teachings, and views are just the opposite; their teachers have not extinguished all faults, their teachings harm some sentient beings, and their view is of a permanent, single, independent self. This is not to say that their teachers do not have some auspicious attributes, or that all of their teachings harm, or that all of their views are wrong. Rather, their teachers do not have the perfection of a Buddha; within their teachings there is at least one that harms a sentient being, and they have a wrong view on the status of the self. Even the

Jainas, who cultivate not harming others, harm themselves in extreme asceticism and thereby also harm the organisms that live in their bodies. Also, even the Nihilists claim that the self is permanent or unchanging during its existence, however short.

It is necessary to take into account the meaning and not just terminology in dividing the Indian systems into Buddhist and non-Buddhist, for Buddhists are not the only ones to use the terms 'emptiness' and 'selflessness'. The Vaishnavas and Aishvaras assert an emptiness which for them is merely the vacuity resulting from destruction at the end of a great eon. Also, the native Tibetan Bon religion asserts a selflessness which for them is a permanent truly existent essence.

L5: [The various non-buddhist schools] :L5

Non-Buddhist Indian systems of tenets are almost innumerable; however, twenty-five are mentioned by Avalokitavrata, Tsong Khapa, and Tsong Khapa's disciple Kaydrup as having SPLIT OFF FROM SAMKHYA.¹⁸⁹ Jam-yang-shay-ba selects twelve for his discussion of non-Buddhist systems due to their being explained clearly in texts surviving in Tibet.

-- From the Buddhist point of view, eleven of these are assertions of an extreme of permanence, that is, they assert as existent what is non-existent.

-- The remaining one is an assertion of an extreme of annihilation, that is, they assert as non-existent what is existent.

THE ELEVEN SCHOOLS ADHERING TO A VIEW OF PERMANENCE ARE:

- Samkhyas and Kapilas (Enumerators and Followers of Kapila)
- Brahmanas (Followers of Brahma)
- Vyakaranas (Grammarians)
- Vedantins (Adherents to the Finality of the Vedas)

- Guhyakas (Secretists)
- Vaishnavas (Followers of Vishnu)
- Mimamsakas (Performers, or Analyzers)
- Shaivas (Followers of Shiva)
- Vaisesikas (Differentiators)
- Naiyayikas (Logicians)
- Nirgranthas or Jainas (The Naked or Followers of the Jinas).

THE SCHOOL ADHERING TO A VIEW OF ANNIHILATION IS

- that of the Charvakas (Hedonists).

Unlike the Buddhist schools of tenets which are all included in four types (with tantrists included among the Chittamatrins and Madhyamikas), all the non-Buddhist schools cannot be included in these twelve, or even in the twenty-five alluded to above.

L5: [The differences between Buddhists and non-buddhists] :L5

The way to determine whether a system is inner—Buddhist— or outer—non-Buddhist—is to investigate whether or not the teacher has extinguished all faults and has attained all auspicious attributes, whether or not the teaching abandons harming sentient beings, and whether the view is of selflessness or self.

Or in another way, THE BUDDHIST TEACHING can also be established through four means: view, meditation, behavior, and fruit.

- The view, avoiding the extremes of asserting that a person is a separate substantial entity from the mental and physical aggregates or that a person designated in dependence upon these does not exist, is that of the four seals (see p.336).
- The meditation, avoiding the extremes of being too tight or too loose, eradicates all transmigration, including the Peak of Cyclic Existence which is the highest Formless Realm.
- The behavior avoids the extremes of both sensuous indulgence and fatiguing asceticism with regard to clothing, food, abode, and medicine.¹⁹⁰
- The fruit is the non-return of obstructions that have been abandoned through individual analytical cessation.¹⁹¹

THE NON-BUDDHIST

- view is of a permanent, partless, independent self.
- Their meditation leads only to rebirth in higher realms within cyclic existence.
- Their behavior has fallen to extremes of severe asceticism or indulgence.
- Their fruit is the return of obstructions which only seem to have been abandoned.

To distinguish an insider from an outsider without identifying him or her as a proponent of specific tenets is merely to EXAMINE WHERE REFUGE IS TAKEN.

- One who takes refuge in Buddha, his Doctrine, and the Supreme Community from the depths of his heart is a Buddhist. Therefore, it is said to be mistaken to assert that the teacher of non-Buddhists and of Buddhists is the same, for Buddha is the only perfect teacher, and his teaching is unique.

Proponents of outer tenets affirm that the self apprehended by a consciousness viewing a permanent, partless, independent self is real. Proponents of inner tenets refute such. Those outsiders who accept only objects of direct perception, refusing to accept inference as valid, are proponents of annihilation (uchchedavadin, chad smra). Outsiders who also accept hidden objects which are revealed by inference and/or scripture are proponents of permanence

(shashvatavadin, nag smra).

L5: [The origins of those non-buddhist schools] :L5

-- According to Prajnavarman's Commentary on (Udbhatasiddhasvamin's) 'Exalted Praise' (Visheshastavatika) and according to Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way', all non-Buddhist systems are traced to the founder of the Samkhya system, Kapila.¹⁹² The Brahmin Kapila appeared in the world during the first of the twenty intermediate eons of abiding of this world system, when a life-span was immeasurable, and in retreat attained a solitary liberation through asceticism. In order to teach his path to others, he composed the Samkhya texts that mainly set forth the twenty-five categories of realities. The many and various systems of Forders (Tirthika, Mu stegs pa) split off from the root Samkhya as a result of disagreement over minute differences of opinion concerning the self as it was explained by Kapila.

-- However, some scholars, in accordance with the thought of Bhavaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvala), say that all the Forder systems arose individually, having their own fundamental teachers and different books, without relying on the Samkhya treatises.

-- According to the Jainas, however, the fundamental teacher of all Forders is the sage Arhat, who gave all the many and various systems of tenets to his companions. Afterwards, when Brahma came, Arhat said, 'Great Brahma, you have come leisurely; you have come very late. Because I have given away all the treatises, use these Vedas.'

-- Jam-yang-shay-ba says that these various accounts show how very difficult it is to come to any conclusion about the origins of the Forders.¹⁹³

-- Jang-gya, who in his presentation of tenets relied heavily on Jam-yang-shay-ba, says that the story of the twenty-five Forder schools splitting off from the Samkhyas is meant to refer to their basic similarity of view of a permanent, partless, independent self, and not to an actual historical origin.¹⁹⁴

Bhavaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning¹⁹⁵ reports that the pure offerings set forth in the Vedas initially spread widely. However, at a time when the morality of beings had diminished, sages debated about the Vedic injunction, 'Various things are good [for offering].' Some said that the offering of animals was not suitable, whereas some said it was. Those who wished to eat meat performed impure offerings and even altered the Vedas. Thus, the two types of offerings arose in stages, the initial pure offerings without animal sacrifice and later impure offerings that include blood sacrifice.

In general, non-Buddhists are called 'other sectarians' because they are followers of sects other than those of the Buddhists. They are called 'outsiders' because they are outside of the correct view of emptiness. Their treatises teaching paths to high status within cyclic existence and to liberation from cyclic existence are called 'Fords to the End'. The authors of such treatises are called 'Makers of the Ford to the End' (Ttrthahkara, Mu stegs byed).

L4: [SAMKHYAS [the Samkhya's permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, production from itself (non-theistic) or from both self and others together (theistic), to be refuted]] :L4

According to Bodhibhadra, Samkhyas (Enumerators) are so called because they advocate a definite enumeration of the causes that produce existents.¹⁹⁶ Or, according to Bhavaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning, they are called Samkhyas because they assert that one is liberated through understanding the enumeration of the twenty-five categories of realities. They propound that all products are produced from their own nature and thus are called Proponents

of the Nature as Cause. Because they follow the sage Kapila, they are called Kapilas. Because they accept that the non-manifest principal (pradhana, gtso bo) is the cause of all products, they are called Proponents of the Principal.

The school is divided into the non-theistic and the theistic.

-- THE NON-THEISTIC SAMKHYAS are followers only of KAPILA (i.e. the materialist school, atheistic) and do not take the lord Ishvara to be the motivating cause of the manifestation of the world. They assert that all products exist at the time of their causes and are made manifest by conditions.

-- THE THEISTIC SAMKHYAS, following Patanjali (i.e. the school of Yoga, theistic), take the lord ISHVARA to be their teacher and assert that the transformations or manifestations of phenomena depend on his supervision. They say that though all causes and effects are the same in nature, they differ as transformations.

L5: [The twenty-five categories of realities that both Samkhya schools accept] :L5

-- person (purusha, skyes bu) [or self, consciousness, conscious self, mind, sentience, knower of the field]

-- fundamental nature (prakrti, rang bzhin) [or nature, principal, universality, general principal]

-- intellect (buddhi, bio), or great one (mahat, chen po)

-- I-principle (ahamkara, nga rgyal)

---- a. I-principle dominated by motility (rajas, rdul)

---- b. I-principle dominated by darkness (tamas, mun pa)

---- c. I-principle dominated by lightness (sattva, snying stobs)

Five subtle objects or potencies of objects which evolve from the I-principle dominated by darkness:

-- visible forms (rupa, gzugs)

-- sounds (shabda, sgra)

-- odors (gandha, dri)

-- tastes (rasa, ro)

-- tangible objects (sprashtavya, reg bya)

Eleven faculties which evolve from the I-principle dominated by lightness:

Five mental faculties:

-- eye (chakshus, mig)

-- ear (shrota, rna ba)

-- nose (ghrdna, sna)

-- tongue (rasana, Ice)

-- body or skin (sparshana, pags pa)

Five physical faculties or action faculties:

-- speech (vdch, ngag)

-- arms (pant, lag pa)

-- legs (pada, rkangpa)

-- anus (payu, rkub)

-- genitalia (upastha, 'doms)

-- Intellectual faculty (manas, yid) the nature of which is both mental and physical

Five elements:

- earth (prthivi, sa) which evolves from the odor potency
- water (dp, chu) which evolves from the taste potency
- fire (tejas, me) which evolves from the visible form potency
- wind (vdyu, rlung) which evolves from the tangible object potency
- space (akasha, nam mkha') which evolves from the sound potency.

The person lacks the qualities of motility, darkness, and lightness. Inactive because of pervading all migrators, it is neither an agent of virtue or non-virtue nor the creator of manifest phenomena. The person is a permanent existent because of not changing and is consciousness because of not being an aggregate of particles. It is the experiencer because of experiencing pleasure and pain. The person 'dwells beside' the nature until liberation in the sense that the manifestations which evolve from the nature are confused with the person until yogic discrimination separates the two and all manifestations disappear.

The other twenty-four categories—the nature and so forth— are aggregates of particles and, therefore, are matter. The nature is a permanent and partless entity that pervades all its transformations and is the agent of virtue and non-virtue, etc. The nature and its transformations are the objects enjoyed by the person, but it itself is always non-manifest; even the sage Kapila did not directly see it. The nature is the three qualities of motility, darkness, and lightness in equilibrium. These three qualities (guna, yon tan) are:

- lightness (both in light/heavy and light/dark), desire, and pleasure: saliva, snying stobs
- motility, hatred, and pain: rajas, rdul
- darkness, obscuration, and gloom: tamas, mun pa.

The nature is also called the final mode of existence of phenomena and the ultimate. However, the person also is an ultimate, and the intellect, I-principle, and the five subtle elements are also natures in that they are sources of transformations. The nature is the original source of all the transformations.

From the nature the great one or intellect is produced. It is like a two-sided mirror, in which the images of objects from the outside and of the person from the inside meet or mix. The intellect 'empowers' the senses and apprehends the objects that the senses apprehend which in turn are then known by the person. This is the way that the person knows objects.

From the intellect three I-principles are produced. From the dark I-principle the subtle elements of odors, tastes, visible forms, tangible objects, and sounds are produced. These five respectively produce the five elements: earth, water, fire, wind, and space. From the lightness I-principle the eleven faculties are produced. The motile I-principle is the motivator of the former two. This is how Avalokitavrata presents the functions of the three I-principles; however, Tsong Khapa, in his commentary on Chandrakirti's Supplement, and Gyel-tsap, in his commentary on Dharmakirti's Ascertainment of Valid Cognition (Pramanavinishchaya), say that the dark I-principle is the motivator and the motile I-principle is the source of the five subtle elements.

The twenty-five categories are divided into four types:

- natures (causes),
- transformations (effects),
- both natures and transformations,
- and neither natures nor transformations.

The nature is only a nature since it is the cause of all the transformations and is not

itself caused. The intellect, I-principle, and the five subtle elements are both natures and transformations in that they both cause transformations and are themselves caused by something else. The eleven faculties and the five elements are only transformations because, though they are caused, they do not produce anything else. The person is neither a nature nor a transformation because it neither creates nor is created.

The nature and the person are truly existent phenomena because they are non-manifest. The other twenty-three are manifest and are, therefore, only conventionally existent; they are falsities.

The Samkhyas explain production as the manifestation through minor causes of what is already existent. Disintegration is an effect's dissolution into its own nature. The theistic Samkhyas add that the varieties of environments and animate beings are not produced from just the nature because it is mindless. That which is mindless is not capable of being a supervisor, and without a supervisor the creation of effects is not possible. The person is not suitable to be the supervisor because when the person is alone, before the appearance of the transformations, there is no knowledge; the intellect has not yet been produced, and without ascertainment by the intellect there is no realization of objects. Therefore, the varieties of effects are produced through the mutual dependence of the great lord Ishvara and the nature. An increase in strength of motility— among the three qualities that abide in the entity of the nature —causes Ishvara to issue forth all beings. An increase of lightness causes duration. An increase of darkness causes disintegration.

Though Ishvara and the nature, which are the causes producing all environments and animate beings, always exist, the serial production, duration, and disintegration of effects is said to be admissible. For, the three qualities—motility, darkness, and lightness—increase and diminish serially.

When the person wishes to enjoy objects, the nature realizes its desires, unites with the person, and creates the varieties of transformations. Eventually, through a lessening of desire, the person comes to view objects as faulty and parts from desire. By cultivating the concentrations and formless absorptions the divine eye is obtained. When this eye looks at the nature, the latter is ashamed just as a mistress is when she is discovered by a wife. Having been discovered, the nature parts from the person, and, opposite to the stages of production, all the transformations dissolve into the nature. When these have become non-manifest and the person remains alone, liberation is attained.

Since discrimination is the means to liberation, a yogi meditates in general on the twenty-five categories and in particular on the person as empty of the nature and on the nature as empty of the person. THIS TYPE OF EMPTINESS IS CALLED 'EMPTINESS OF THE OTHER'—the

person is empty of being the nature, and the nature is empty of being the person. When the two are no longer confused, the root of cyclic existence is cut, and liberation is attained.

L5: [More on the Samkhyas from other texts] :L5

Samkhya (Tib. grongs can pa) A Buddhist school which holds the non-Buddhist view that all objects of knowledge can be enumerated into 25 categories of phenomena. They believe in the "fundamental principle" which is partless, permeant, and pervades all phenomena.

~ “the Enumerator's (Samkhya) view that the sprout is present at the time of its seed”
– HHDL

\ #####
\ [Chandrakirti VI.121.ab]
\ 164ab.
\ A self that is an experiencer, a permanent thing, a non-creator,
\ And without qualities or activity is fabricated by the Tirthikas.

~ “The Samkhya assertion that a permanent conscious person exists” – Aryadeva’ 400 commentary

~ “Samkhyas (grangs can pa), proponents of a non-Buddhist system of tenets, assert that the person is permanent because of not changing and is consciousness because of not being an aggregate of particles. It is the experiencer of pleasure and pain but is neither an agent of virtue or non-virtue. Nor is it the creator of manifest phenomena which evolve from the nature (rang bzhin) and are confused with the person until yogic perception differentiates the two and all manifestations disappear. The nature or principal (gtso bo) and person are truly existent because they are non-manifest. The other twenty-three of the twenty-five categories enumerated by the Samkhyas are manifest and therefore only exist conventionally, since they are falsities.” – Aryadeva’ 400 commentary

L6: [MIND AT THE ROOT OF CONFUSION] :L6

Shamar Rinpoche: Who created the world? Where did life come from? What is the cause of suffering, how can we overcome it and be happy? Intelligent people, as distinct from those content to remain ignorant, have been asking themselves such questions since the dawn of mankind. 2500 years ago, the Buddha Shakyamuni expounded the true nature of things. Great thinkers throughout the course of history have achieved some degree of understanding of the nature of reality, as perfectly taught by the Buddha. In this essay, we will examine these different schools of thought.

L7: [Non-Buddhist Thinking] :L7

L7: [The Non-Theistic Approach] :L7

In ancient India there were three hundred and sixty different non-Buddhist philosophical positions concerning the cause of the world. Among these was the Samkhya school of thought, which maintained that the world was part of the creator's being. In their view the world is the creation of a Principle, which is a balance of happiness, suffering and neutrality, and which has five characteristics proper to it. It is permanent, unique, it is not inanimate matter, it is invisible, and has an unhindered capacity to produce emanations of itself. The Principle is the cause of the world; the world itself is the behavior or functioning of the Principle. The world is therefore part of the Principle and not external to it, making the Samkhya school an example of the type of philosophy that believes the world to be part of, rather than different from its creator.

On the receiving end, as it were, is the self or entity which experiences the world and which is quite different from the Principle. There is only one self for all living beings. This self is like a two-sided mirror. One side faces outwards and receives the reflection of the forms emanated by the Principle. The self is distracted by these forms, takes them to be real and falls under their influence, becoming deluded as a result. The emanations sent out by the Principle trick the self into a state of confusion that leads to suffering. So, far from being compassionate, the Principle actually harms the self.

The Samkhya student is therefore advised to keep his attention focused inward and remain

undistracted by the manifestations of the deceitful Principle. To the extent that the Samkhya student does this, the Principle's tricks will be unsuccessful. Consequently, the main practice of this school is meditation that closely resembles Buddhist tranquillity meditation, with similar results. When the mind is withdrawn from involvement in the distractions of the outside world it becomes peaceful and settled. This happy state is described as being the result of the Principle's 'embarrassment.' Not only is the mind of the student calmed, but the Principle is induced to reabsorb the world it has emanated, whereupon the self is liberated from its deceit.

Similar to their meditation method, the Samkhya lifestyle is designed to reduce and finally eliminate the influence of the Principle. To allow attachment to continue is to fall under the power of the Principle's functioning, therefore stress is laid on non-attachment as the means to liberation. The Samkhya student will live on as little food and drink as possible, and always of the slightest quality, wear few or no clothes (they are often referred to as 'the naked ones'), and have no permanent home.

There are many weaknesses in the Samkhya philosophy, not the least of which is that it has to be accepted on blind faith alone. Many questions remain unanswered: "Where does the Principle come from? Why is there only one self or entity for all living beings? If that is the case, how is it that when one individual is liberated, the whole of the self, that is to say all living beings, is not also liberated at the same time?" and so on. But despite these objections, the Samkhya was the best of the non-Buddhist views existent at the time of the Buddha Shakyamuni. Why? Because it recognized that while the self is controlled by distraction, there is no liberation, and that the means to eliminate distraction is to meditate so that mind's involvement in the outer world lessens. On the subject of mind, the Samkhyas had more understanding than the other philosophical schools in India at that time.

L7: [Theistic Beliefs] :L7

Another type of philosophy is the kind of theistic belief that holds the world to be produced by a creator god. Many of the Indian beliefs of that time fell into this category. Let us examine in more detail the views and practices of the worshippers of Ishvara, and this will serve as a general model.

Ishvara is said to possess eight characteristics: he is single, constant, moving, divine, worthy of respect, pure, the creator, and free and independent. The possession of these eight characteristics is what qualifies him as a supreme being. The world that he creates is not part of his being or functioning, as in the case of the Samkhya system: his creation is and remains quite other than himself, although he does have influence over it. He has the power to send to heaven or paradise those who please him and do his will, and to send to hell all who disobey or displease him. The principle practices of the Ishvarites consist of making burnt sacrifices and other offerings to propitiate their god, meditating on the visualized form of Ishvara and performing various yogic practices.

Like the Samkhya view, the Ishvarite belief has to be accepted by blind faith alone, leaving many unanswered questions. The tragic flaw in this kind of philosophy is that it does not explain where the creator himself came from. One can also raise the following objections to the creator's supposed characteristics: he is said to be constant and at the same time moving, but these are two mutually exclusive characteristics, since movement implies change. Besides this, his purity is defined as being 'the quintessence of loving-kindness and compassion,' but since he has and exercises the power to send beings who displease him to

hell, this seems to be inconsistent with one of his eight characteristics, that of purity. These are only some of the objections that can be raised, and the same doubts apply to other views dependent on the idea of a creator god.

Both the Samkhya school and the schools that believe in a creator god fail to see that at the root of cyclic existence and its misery is the clinging to the notion of 'I' or ego. Misunderstanding the cause of suffering, they are unable to eliminate it. Even though some of their practices - for example, the tranquillity meditation of the Samkhyas and the visualization of the creator god traditions - are similar to methods used in Buddhism, because their initial viewpoint is mistaken, their methods cannot be successful. They have missed the point.

This can also happen to the tantric Buddhist. Someone who engages in the practice of visualization without recognizing that the visualized form is at the same time empty of any real being or existence, is making the same mistake as the theistic practitioner. In tantra, the creative phase of a visualization should always be associated with its completion phase, that is to say that a visualization should always be based on an understanding of emptiness, the Perfection of Wisdom. The meditator who has not grasped the central aspect of emptiness and who meditates on the creative phase, is practicing like an Ishvarite. In his work, the Bodhicaryavatara Shantideva says that if one does not recognize the Mother Prajnaparamita (emptiness or the Perfection of Wisdom), all tantric practices will produce the same result as these theistic views.

L7: [The Nihilistic Viewpoint] :L7

Another type of belief rejects all views concerning the cause of the world. Its adherents say, "The sun rises, rivers flow downhill, peas are round, thorns are sharp, the eye in the peacock's feather is beautiful. These and everything else in the world were not made by anyone, they occur naturally by themselves." Such an attitude rejects completely the notions of cause and effect and future lives, and is therefore completely amoral, since actions, good or bad, are not considered to have any consequences.

This view is the most unintelligent one of all, and can be refuted simply by looking at the workings of the law of cause and effect in the world around us. If there were no such law, everything would be completely arbitrary. One might plant wheat and get barley, humans might give birth to animals, and so on. Since this is obviously not the case, the standpoint of causelessness taken up by those who 'cast far away' all theories can be easily discounted.

All the views considered so far have been non-Buddhist. None of them enable their adherents to forsake the suffering of cyclic existence, for the simple reason that, despite their various theories, they remain ignorant of its fundamental cause.

L4: [BUDDHIST REFUTATION OF SAMKHYA (refuting the Samkhya's permanent self and effect existing at the time of the cause)] :L4

If, as the Samkhyas claim, that which existed at the time of its causes were nevertheless produced again, it would be a senseless production, and there would be no end to the re-production. For, the already existent would require production.

If their causes are permanent and thus do not diminish, the disappearance of the twenty-three effects is contradictory.

Because the intellect is matter, it cannot experience pleasure and pain.

Because the nature and the person pervade all, it is contradictory for them to be partless. Does all or only a part of the principal pervade every individual thing?" If the former, the principal would be separate from itself just as a bull and a pot, which the principal and the person pervade, are separate entities. If only a part of the principal pervades individual manifestations, then it is admitted to have parts.

Is Ishvara a person? If he were, he would not be suitable to be the supervisor because persons are not agents in the Samkhya system and persons alone, without the nature, have no knowledge. If Ishvara is not a person, then there is a twenty-sixth category. Also, if nothing appears to a liberated person due to the parting of the principal and all its transformations, is Ishvara, the supervisor of all appearances, non-liberated?

If the person is a partless entity, it cannot be consciousness. If the person is permanent, how could it be bound and freed?

It follows that one cannot be freed from cyclic existence merely through cognizing that the person and happiness, pain, and so forth are different. For, even untrained children realize a separation of themselves from their faculties and from happiness, pain, and so forth. Conceiving themselves as the seeker, they seek happiness and faculties which are superior to those of the present. Furthermore, they conceive of themselves in former and later moments as one but realize that happiness and pain arise and cease.

It is not possible to be liberated from cyclic existence through meditating on one's faculties as suffering and through seeking to become separate from them. For, such a mind of disgust for suffering is accompanied by hatred. Also, at that time one still has desire, even if suppressed. To achieve liberation from cyclic existence it is necessary to destroy the misconception of objective existence that gives rise to desire, hatred, and suffering.

L4: [CHARVAKAS (Hedonists, Proponent of Annihilation, Nihilists) (the Charvaka's position on the production from no cause, to be refuted)] :L4

The Charvakas (Hedonists) are so called because they advocate satisfaction with only what is pleasant (charu, mdzes pa) here in this life.¹⁹⁸ They are called Proponents of Annihilation because they propound that at death, or after a number of lives, the continuum of the self ceases. They are called Nihilists because they propound that rebirth does not exist and that moral cause and effect do not exist. They are called Barhaspatyas because they follow the god Brhaspati. They are called the Gone-Afar (Ayata, rgyang phan pa) because they have gone apart from the right view. They are called Daivagurus after their teacher Devaguru, that is, Brhaspati, and Juk-dop-Jen-bas (Juk-stobs-can-pa) after their teacher Juk-dop, a student of the renowned sage Lokachakshu and a contemporary of the logician Dharmakirti.¹⁹⁹ They are called Proponents of Inherence and Proponents of Nature because they consider that many things, such as the sharpness of thorns and the descent of a waterfall, appear naturally, without depending on causes.

They are nihilists not because of believing in nothing or that life is totally worthless, but because they believe only in what they can perceive directly, discarding inference as a means of valid knowledge. Seeing that charity does not necessarily bring wealth as the clergy claim, they propound that this life and its attributes of life-span, wealth, and so forth are not results of merits and demerits in former lives. They are moral nihilists. Since they rely on direct perception as their sole source of knowledge, they deny causation where it cannot be seen, such as even in the coloring of flowers and the roundness of peas. However, they affirm causation that can be seen, such as the molding of a vase from clay.

The Nihilists are divided into Meditators and Dialecticians.

-- The Meditators attain clairvoyance through which they perceive former and future births for thirty, sixty, or ninety eons according to their mental level.²⁰⁰ Unlike Buddhists, they assume that the cycle of rebirth has a beginning because their clairvoyance is limited and they do not perceive a beginningless cycle of births. With their clairvoyance they follow themselves and others from lifetime to lifetime noticing no immediate relationship of cause and effect with respect to the experience of pleasure and pain.

-- The Dialecticians see the same lack of causal relationship in the stages of a single human's life and thus deny moral law along with rebirth. Wishing to save the world from uselessly wasting its riches on clergy and uselessly participating in efforts aimed at improving a future life, they advocate no cause and effect in the moral sense. It is also said that the sage Lokachakshu desired to lie with his daughter and so explained to her the absence of moral law.

For a Nihilist, consciousness is a fermentation of the elements, much like inebriation produced from alcohol. Mind is not considered to be a phenomenon of a different nature from matter. Matter in all systems is composed of particles, but mind in most systems is not. The Buddhists, based on a view of an essential difference between mind and matter, expound a theory that mind and body have their own separate substantial causes—the mind's main cause being a former mind. Thereby, a beginningless cycle of existence is established because a mind must always have a mind preceding it as its substantial cause. The Nihilists reject this notion saying that mind has a physical nature just as the capacity to cause inebriation is of the same nature as beer. The mind is an effect of the body just as light is an effect of a lamp. The mind is a quality of the body just as a mural is a quality of a wall.

Nihilists say that the scope of the person is limited to the scope of the senses. This counters the Buddhist notion of a subtle type of impermanent self that transmigrates and the non-Buddhist notion of a permanent self beyond sense perception. Nirvana is then the annihilation of mind and body with the return of the body to the four elements and the dispersion of the senses into space. 'Live happily until death. After death you have no location or place. When the body has become ashes, how can it live again? Therefore, former and later [lives] do not exist.'

A Dialectician Nihilist asserts that a mind on the point of death has no conjunction with a later mind just because it is a mind on the point of death. Even though he does not believe that there are Foe Destroyers, he cites the example of the final moment of the mind of a Foe Destroyer which, according to the Buddhist Vaibhashikas, ceases upon death. For a Vaibhashika, the continuum of mind and body of a Foe Destroyer ceases when he dies whereas the Mahayana schools say that this is impossible, declaring that in this respect the Vaibhashikas are like Nihilists.

Nihilists assert that because the mind is produced from the elements, there are no Foe Destroyers who have eradicated the afflictions of desire, hatred, and ignorance. Therefore, they do not accept an omniscient Buddha or Supreme Community.

Similarly, there is no excellent Doctrine because there is no abandonment of afflictions and no path that abandons them.

The Dialecticians add that there are no Foe Destroyers because beings are permanent, stable, perpetual, and unchanging as long as they exist and thus do not become good or bad through the power of causes. The Meditators, when they attain any of the equipoises of the four

concentrations or of the four formless absorptions, think that they are Foe Destroyers. Near the time of their death, they fall from their meditative stabilization, see their rebirth in a lower condition, and conclude, 'There is no Foe Destroyer, and there is no path of a Foe Destroyer.'

L5: [More on the Charvakas from other texts] :L5

Charvakas A philosophical school in India which reject the sacred scriptures and vedas, the belief in reincarnation and karma, and therefore advocated hedonism and doing whatever one wants in self-interest.

\ #####
\ Karikas 12 :1. Certains affirment que la souffrance
\ Est créée par soi-même, par d'autres,
\ Des deux, ou apparaît sans cause;
\ Cela est absurde.

\ #####
\ Some say:
\ Sorrow (dukkha) is produced by oneself (i),
\ or by another (ii),
\ or by both [itself and another] (iii),
\ or from no cause at all (iv);
\ But [to consider] that [sorrow (dukkha)] as what is produced is not possible.

~ Objection: Le je existe en soi puisque la souffrance à laquelle il est relié existe.
Les Écritures assimilent les cinq agrégats appropriés à la souffrance, elle existe donc. Et elle n'existe pas sans avoir de base, laquelle est le je.

~ Réponse: Certains Samkhyas et Vaisesikas maintiennent que la souffrance est engendrée par elle-même, tandis que la majorité des écoles non bouddhistes et bouddhistes affirment qu'elle est produite par une chose autre, différente en soi d'elle. Selon les Jains, la souffrance est créée à la fois par elle-même et par autre chose: celle qui est due au corps, étant douleur physique, est produite par elle-même et celle qui est due à l'être vivant, étant autre qu'elle, est créée par autre chose. Enfin, les Charvakas professent une souffrance sans cause.

L4: [BUDDHIST REFUTATION OF NIHILISM (refuting the production from no cause, a mind that is emerging from matter, an annihilation at death, no rebirth)] :L4

The mind right after conception has a preceding mind just because it is a mind. For, cause and effect must be of a harmonious nature. Even one whose mental powers are not clear and whose senses are torpid immediately after birth searches to eat food and searches to drink the milk of the breast without being taught. This is by the force of previous conditioning in other lives.

Consciousness is not produced from inanimate causes because the substantial causes of the inanimate and of consciousness are definitely separate. The natures of the two are different; the one is an aggregation of particles and the other is not.

Nihilists say that the mind is produced from the mindless elements because the mind is a product, just as inebriation is produced from beer and fire is produced from a magnifying glass and those two are products. However, because inebriation is an attribute of a mind and

not a mind, the example is not proper. Because causes must accord in type with their effects, the reason cited is in fact contradictory; it proves that the mind is not produced from the mindless elements.

The Nihilists say that a mind at the point of death has no conjunction to another life because it is a mind at the point of death, like the final mind of a Foe Destroyer. The reason is inconclusive because there are cases of memory of former lives and because babies have different styles of behavior. Furthermore, that the Vaibhashikas claim that the mind of a Foe Destroyer ceases at death does not make it so. The continuum of the mind never ceases, and the Vaibhashikas merely fall to the depth of the Nihilists in claiming so, as do some wrong interpreters of Prasangika who say that in meditative equipoise on emptiness there is no mind (confusing the fusion of subject and object at the time of direct cognition of emptiness with disappearance of the mind).

Body is not the main cause of mind because if it were, a dead body would absurdly be conscious. Also, the mind does not depend on the body in the sense of being its substantial effect because the increase and diminishment of wisdom and so forth do not depend on the increase and diminishment of the body. This is not to deny that mind and body affect each other; rather, all states and changes of mind do not depend on the body. Also, mind does not depend on body in the sense of its having a physical nature because if it did, a person's mental qualities would be perceived by a sense consciousness that perceives the body. Because the Nihilists say that the body is permanent as long as it lasts, the mind also would always have to have the same disposition.

The Nihilists are wrong in claiming that there is no omniscient consciousness. The development of clear and direct perception by a conditioned mind is the proof through which omniscience is established. Much as an object of desire repeatedly taken to mind can appear vividly before a lustful person, emptiness can be seen directly and not just through the medium of images or concepts. Once this is shown, then the gradations of the path and final omniscience are easily established.

The limitless development of love and wisdom is established by proving the existence of former and future lives. For, since love and wisdom are qualities of mind, they develop naturally together with a consciousness that becomes conditioned to the ways of love and wisdom. A feature of consciousness is that the same effort required to begin a continuum of love or wisdom is not required for each of the successive moments, much like the natural continuance of fire once it has been started. Since there are future lives, there is sufficient time for the full development of wisdom and love.

Because thorns and so forth are produced from their own seeds and because the sharpness of thorns and so forth are produced from those same seeds, the sharpness of thorns is not a suitable example of the causeless production of suffering. The ascertainment that thorns arise sometimes in some places proves that they are produced in dependence on their own objects of dependence, and these objects of dependence are accepted as their causes. A cause is that which aids its own effect; that which does not aid is not an object depended upon for production. If things were causelessly produced without depending on others, things would either always exist, or never exist, or everything would be produced from everything.

The Nihilists say that there are no former and later births, no omniscience, and no effects of charity, etc., because they have not seen them directly. Does this mean that all persons have not seen them directly or that just the Nihilists have not seen them directly? Also, do

they directly see them to be non-existent or do they realize them to be non-existent through inference? That all persons have not seen them is doubtful; how, without omniscience, can anyone know what all have and have not seen? If only the Nihilists have not seen them, it is answered that it is mistaken that the non-existent is co-extensive with what the Nihilists have not seen.

If the Nihilists say that a direct perceiver sees former and later births, omniscience, and so forth as non-existent, the answer is that non-existence of other lives and so forth could not be an object of direct perception because, according to the Nihilists, other lives are non-existent entities. How can the non-existent be seen directly? If their non-existence is established by way of inference, then by accepting such an inference the fault is entailed of first denying the validity of inference and then of using inference to establish a point. For, the proponents of Nihilism say that only direct perception is valid. The non-existence of former and later births and so forth not only cannot be established by valid inference, but also an attempt to do such would demolish their own position that inference is not valid.

L2: [REFUTING HINAYANA BUDDHISTS VIEWS:] :L2

L2: [3. Hinayana [the two schools of the Vehicle of the Hearers]] :L2

Sources:

- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets

A Buddhist is one who accepts the Three Jewels—Buddha, his Doctrine, and the Supreme Community—as the final refuge, whereas a non-Buddhist is one who does not.²⁰¹ Buddha is the teacher of refuge; the Doctrine—especially the true cessation of obstructions—is the actual refuge, and the Supreme Community are the friends helping persons toward refuge.

Refuge may be taken with any of THREE MOTIVATIONS:

- Some persons have concern and fear for the sufferings of bad migrations as animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-beings. (Lives within cyclic existence are called 'migrations' [gati, 'gro ba] because beings move from one to another within the round.) Due to their belief that the Three Jewels have the power of protecting from bad migrations, they take refuge in them from the depths of their hearts.
- Others, realizing the impermanence and changeability of even happy migrations, have concern and fear for the sufferings of all cyclic existences including those of happy migrations as humans, demi-gods, and gods. Due to their belief that the Three Jewels have the power of protecting from all these sufferings, they take refuge in them from the depths of their hearts.
- Still others, having realized their own miserable condition, infer that all are suffering and generate fear for all sentient beings' cyclic existence. They fear that even if beings turn toward a religion, they will seek one that leads only to a solitary peace, thereby neither perfecting themselves nor devoting themselves to the welfare of others. They also

have concern and fear for others' afflictions preventing liberation from cyclic existence, and their obstructions preventing omniscience. Due to their belief that the Three Jewels have the power of protecting all beings from these four faults, they take refuge in them from the depths of their hearts.

This last is the motivation of a Mahayanist, a being of greatest capacity.

Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Madhyamikas are Buddhists and also proponents of particular systems of tenets. 'Tenet' is a translation of *siddhanta* or *siddhyanta* (*grub mtha*'), which literally means 'established conclusion' or 'that which is an establishment and a conclusion'.²⁰² An established conclusion is so called because a meaning has been established for the holder's mind through reasoning, scriptural citation, or both, and he will not pass beyond this conclusion. A Buddhist proponent of tenets is one who not only accepts the Three Jewels as the highest refuge but also propounds the tenets of the four seals which testify to the fact that a doctrine is Buddha's.

Thus, all Buddhist systems—Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Madhyamika—propound THE FOUR SEALS:²⁰³

- all products are impermanent
- all contaminated objects are miserable
- all phenomena are selfless
- nirvana is peace.

For the highest system, the Prasangika division of Madhyamika, products are conventionally but not inherently existent phenomena produced from the aggregation of causes and conditions. Products are impermanent even to the point that other than their own production they require no cause, major or minor, for their disintegration. Contaminated objects are mainly consciousnesses that conceive things to exist inherently but are also the environments and other phenomena that are created from the merit and demerit accumulated by sentient beings when they engage in actions motivated by the ignorant misconception of inherent existence. All phenomena are selfless in the sense that both persons and all other phenomena such as body, mind, house, and fence do not inherently exist. The passage beyond ignorance and its consequent miseries is nirvana, which is explained as meaning 'passed beyond sorrow'. 'Sorrow' is here identified as the afflictions, the principal of which is the conception that things inherently or naturally exist. Peace is not bestowed by a deity or obtained otherwise than through nirvana.

L4: [(1st school of tenets) VAIBHASHIKA [the Abhidharmists, to be refuted]] :L4

[THE DEFINITION OF A VAIBHASHIKA IS:

~ a Hinayana proponent of tenets who does not assert self-consciousness and who asserts the true existence of external objects—with qualification.]²²⁰

'Vaibhashika' means a follower mainly of the Great Detailed Exposition (*mahavibhasha*) which is a compendium on knowledge (*abhidharma*, *chos mngon pa*), a study of phenomena.²⁰⁴ This text distills the meaning of THE SEVEN TREATISES OF KNOWLEDGE WHICH ONLY THE VAIBHASHIKAS ACCEPT

AS SPOKEN BY BUDDHA. 'Vaibhashika' (*Bye brag smra ba*) also means one who asserts that past, present, and future objects are all instances (*visheshas*, *bye brag*) of 'substantial entities' (*dravya*, *rdzas*). It is further said that Vaibhashikas are so called because, like the non-Buddhist Vaisesikas, they propound many 'substantially established phenomena'

(dravyasiddhadharma, rdzas grub kyi chos) such as uncaused space which the other Buddhist systems say are existent but only designated by thought.

Vaibhashikas assert partless particles that aggregate into gross objects. According to the Kashmiri sub-school, the particles do not touch each other but are held together by space. Others say that the particles surround each other without interstice, while others say that they touch each other. In any case, gross objects are formed through the aggregation of partless particles, and thus external objects—objects which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness—are said to exist truly.

The Vaibhashikas also assert partless moments of consciousness. An aggregation of these is a continuum of consciousness that perceives its object ‘nakedly’, that is, without itself being generated in the image of its object.

For Vaibhashika, ultimate truths (paramarthasatya, don dam bden pa) are objects that can bear analysis. This means that even when reduced, either physically or through the process of analysis, they still generate in a perceiver an apprehension of themselves. For instance, a clay pot, if broken with a hammer or analyzed into its parts, no longer generates a consciousness that perceives a pot or thinks ‘pot.’ Therefore, a pot is not an ultimate truth. However, the matter of the pot is still matter even down to the finest unbreakable particle. Therefore, objects such as partless particles, partless moments of consciousness, and permanent phenomena are ultimate truths—true for the ultimate analytical supramundane consciousness. They are also called ultimate truths because they definitely have ultimate existence.

All objects that require an aggregation of particles or of moments are conventional truths (samvnisatya, kun rdzob bden pa)—conventional because they are designated in accordance with worldly conventions and truths because such designations are true.

Both ultimate and conventional truths are substantially established (dravyasiddha, rdzas grub), though only ultimate ones are substantially existent (dravyasat, rdzas yod). Vaibhashika is the only school to differentiate ‘substantially established’ and ‘substantially existent’, the intention being to provide a status of ‘substantiality’ for conventional truths. Though conventional truths are imputedly existent (prajnaptisat, btags yod) they are substantially established because in this system these imputations are true; when the objects designated are sought, an autonomous entity is found.

The non-Buddhist Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas carry the doctrine of substantially existent entities to the point where whole and part are separate entities, as are quality and qualificand, doer and doing, and definition and definiendum.²⁰⁵ For the Naiyayikas, within the realm of the existent, whatever appear to the mind to be different are different substantial entities.

The Vaibhashikas are said to have been highly influenced by non-Buddhist thought even to the point where they are a mixture of Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Their name is, therefore, sometimes traced to the name ‘Vaisesika’.²⁰⁶

Furthermore, like the Samkhyas, the Vaibhashikas accept that a sprout, for instance, exists as a sprout at the time of its future, that is, when the sprout is yet to be produced. They say that if a product did not exist before its actualized state in present time, its production would be adventitious. If non-existents were produced, even non-existent things like the horns of a rabbit could be produced. For the other Buddhist schools, however, a

sprout at the time of its future exists as the entity of its seed, but the sprout does not exist as a sprout and, therefore, does not exist.²⁰⁷

The Vaibhashikas are also the only Buddhist school to accept simultaneous cause and effect as, for example, in the case of a consciousness and its accompanying mental factors, such as intention and feeling, which support each other like the poles of a tripod. No other Buddhist school accepts simultaneous cause and effect, citing as their reason that one thing cannot affect another that already exists; it can only affect later moments of the other.

‘Vaibhashika’ is a general name referring to EIGHTEEN SUBSCHOOLS that, according to differing explanations, split off from one, two, three, or four basic orders after Buddha’s death. According to an explanation by Bhavaviveka of a division from two basic orders, they are as shown in Chart 40.208 (i.e. not copied here) Bhavaviveka says that there are six Mahasamghika, seven Sarvastivadin, and four Vatsiputriya sects and that this is a list of eighteen; thus the eighteenth would have to be the Haimavatas. (For other renditions of the split into eighteen sub-schools, see Appendix 3.) Not all eighteen sub-schools actually accept the ‘Vaibhashika’ notion that past, present, and future objects are substantial entities. The Mahasakas, for instance, say that past objects and future objects do not substantially exist; only present objects do.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, not all accept that there is no simultaneous cognition of all phenomena because the ‘one expression’ of the Ekavyavaharika (literally, those who have one expression) school is the assertion of a Buddha’s simultaneous cognition of all phenomena.²¹⁰

Some of the eighteen sub-schools arose from the simple fact that their teachers were different or that their monasteries were located in different areas. Difference of language also contributed to the divisions, but according to Kensur Lekden, the chief cause was the Hinayana notion that all Buddha’s sutras are literal. (The evidence does not show this to be the case as interpretation of scripture was important in many Hinayana schools.)²¹¹

The five Sammitiya sub-schools (see Padmasambhava’s rendition in Appendix 3) assert the existence of a person that is neither the same as nor different from the mental and physical aggregates. However, they and the other thirteen Vaibhashika schools all assert the non-existence of a permanent, partless, independent self. The thirteen non-Sammitiya schools also assert the non-existence of a substantially existent or self-sufficient person. Their assertion of selflessness does not mean that there is utterly no self or person but refutes the existence of a certain type of self. For these thirteen Vaibhashika schools, a person is not independent of the mind and body but is a phenomenon within the mind-body complex. Some say that a person is the continuum of the five aggregates of forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses. Others say that a person is the mental consciousness; still others say that a person is all five aggregates.

For these thirteen Vaibhashika schools, the non-existence of a self-sufficient person is known as the subtle selflessness of persons. The coarse selflessness is a person’s non-existence as a permanent, partless, independent entity. Through cognizing and becoming accustomed to the subtle personal selflessness, the knot of cyclic existence is cut, and the state of Foe Destroyer is attained. One has destroyed the foe which is the conception of the person as a substantial or self-sufficient entity.

Simultaneously with becoming a Foe Destroyer, one attains a nirvana with remainder—the state of having passed beyond the afflictions (the chief of which is the conception of a self-sufficient person) while still possessing a physical support that receives its impetus

from former contaminated actions and afflictions. Then, at death the continuum of mind and body is severed in a nirvana without remainder. The attainer of the nirvana without remainder is thus said to be the Foe Destroyer who is about to die because once dead, his continuum of mind and body has utterly ceased, and there is then no one who could possess a nirvana without remainder.²¹²

For the Vaibhashikas, five of the six types of Foe Destroyers can fall from their attainment even as far back as the path of seeing. According to the other schools, however, such degeneration makes a mockery of the conception of the total abandonments of afflictions which are called true cessations, the third of the four noble truths.²¹³

The Vaibhashikas, despite being Hinayana in terms of their tenets, accept a Bodhisattva path that is trod by very rare beings —the one in our age being Shakyamuni Buddha.²¹⁴ That they accept such is clear from their literal acceptance of Buddha's Life Stories (Jataka) which recount his generation of the aspiration to enlightenment and his practice of the six perfections. They also accept as literal the Discipline (Vinaya) which recounts Buddha's performance of the twelve deeds of a fully enlightened being.

The Bodhisattva path requires an accumulation of the collections of merit and wisdom for three periods of countless eons whereas the path of a Solitary Realizer requires only one hundred eons. A Buddha completely removes both the afflictive and non-afflictive obstructions whereas the Hearers and Solitary Realizers, though they utterly abandon the afflictive obstructions, only 'abandon' the non-afflictive obstructions through non-attachment. In the Vaibhashika system the afflictive obstructions are the conception of a self-sufficient person and the poisons of desire, hatred, and ignorance that result from it.

The non-afflictive obstructions are ignorance of the distant in time, the distant in place, the profound and subtle qualities of a Buddha, and subtle objects such as the subtle details of cause and effect relationships. These are eradicated through a Bodhisattva's great accumulation of merit.

With respect to how practitioners ascend the paths, the Vaibhashikas say that a rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizer and a Bodhisattva pass in one meditative sitting from the beginning of the path of preparation through the paths of seeing, meditation, and no more learning. Thus, a Buddha's body is an ordinary human body of matter and is a true suffering even though it no longer can generate suffering for him. It is a true suffering because his body receives its impetus from former contaminated actions and afflictions. Therefore, the Buddha Jewel that is the object of refuge only refers to the phenomena of no more learning in his continuum.

Famous Vaibhashika masters are Vasumitra, Dharmapala, Buddhadeva, Samghabhadra and so forth.

L5: [More on the Vaibhashikas from other texts] :L5

The vaibhashikas form one part of the sarvastivada or school of pluralistic realism in hinayana. They are so called because they attach themselves to the vibhasha, a commentary on katyayaniputra's jnanaprasthana, compiled by vasumitra, probably after the great council under Kanishka. They reject the authority of the sutrams and acknowledge only the Abhidharma. A systematic exposition of the school's doctrines is found in the abhidharmakosham of vasubandhu (4th century CE), a Kaushika brahmana convert from peshawar.

The Buddha had declared that all compounded things were transitory and so nirvana was

inferred to be that which wasn't transitory. The vaibhashikas central philosophy is that even if compounded things were transitory, that by which it was compounded - the parts which make up the whole - was non-transitory. And this is the paramaanu or the atom.

The substance of a thing has a permanent existence throughout the three time periods of the past, present and the future. The permanent substance is the elements (dharma), which underlie the thing and not the transitory phenomena. Cause and effect refer to two phases of one thing. Water is the common substance of ice and steam. The phases are momentary but the substance is permanent. "The cause never perishes, but only changes it's name when it becomes an effect having changed it's state."

Vasubandhu argues thus in abhidharmakoshabhashyam :

- ~ Are we to think that wood perishes by contact with flames?
- ~ If it's thought so because we no longer see the wood - then the end result would be pure nothingness - a non entity. And a non entity can neither be a cause nor an effect.
- ~ If it's thought that things perish without cause, from their very nature, then they should perish right at the time of their taking being. "For if destruction being without cause, does not take place at the very birth of the thing, it will not take place later, for the thing remains what it is."
- ~ If it's said that a thing ripens, ages - the notion of change is contradictory. "That the same thing should become other than it is, is absurd. That the thing should remain the same and its characters become different is absurd."
- ~ We cannot destroy what exists, nor can we destroy what does not exist.

There are only four elements : earth, water, fire and air. Objects are the result of the coming together of atoms and all objects are ultimately reducible to atoms. An atom according to vasubandhu is the smallest particle, which can neither be divided, nor analyzed, nor seen, nor heard or tasted. Perception occurs when the atoms combine to form an object.

The vaibhashikas appeal to experience which bears unimpeachable witness to the nature of things. By experience they mean knowledge obtained by direct contact with the object. They refute the sautrantikas who insist that the existence of the external world is only inferred and not perceived. Agreed that objects are of two kinds - the perceived and the inferred, but there can be no inference without perception.

They assert the independent existence of nature and mind. There is a difference in the way things exist in our mind and the way they exist in nature. The consciousness of external objects is no mental creation, but discovery.

Perception and conception are recognized as the true instruments of knowledge. Perception, since it gives unreliable presentations is not definite. Conception though definite, is ideal or imaginary. When the senses (indriyas) come into contact with external objects, they arouse the mind (citta) and excite consciousness (vijñana). Moving away from nagasena's phenomenalism which asserts only perception but no perceiver, the abhidharmakosham teaches that the citta (mind) is one with vijñana (consciousness), which is the perceiver and the permanent substratum of consciousness. It's called chitta because it observes, manas because it considers and vijñana because it discriminates.

But there's no Self separate from citta or vijñāna. The pudgala or the Self has no existence apart from the elements of personal life. The unity of the individual is a fiction for the continuous flow of mental states. Vasubandhu devotes an entire chapter in his *Abhidharmakośha* to refute the concept of a Self independent of the mind.

According to this school, the Buddha was but an ordinary man, who after attaining qualified nirvāṇa by his buddhahood and final nirvāṇa by his death, lost his being. The intuitive knowledge of truth, which he attained without the aid of others, is the only divine element in him.

Pratisamkhyānirodha is the positive fruition of transcendental knowledge, the highest ideal of the sarvāstivādin. Since the permanent existence of the atoms of the skandhas is recognized, nirvāṇa is neither the same as existence conditioned by the five skandhas nor different from it. It's a materialistic lifeless state without consciousness, but real by itself.

L4: [(2nd school of tenets) SAUTRANTIKA [rely on the sutras, to be refuted]] :L4

[THE DEFINITION OF A SAUTRANTIKA IS:

~ a Hinayana proponent of tenets who asserts the true existence of self-consciousness and of external objects— with qualification.]

The other Hinayana school of tenets is Sautrantika.²¹⁵ Jam-yang-shay-ba distinguishes it from the Sautrantika that is a sub-school of Vaibhashika, but the scholar Dakṣaṅg (b.l 405) of the Sagya (Sa-skyā) order, whom Jam-yang-shay-ba frequently refutes in his *Great Exposition of Tenets*, disagrees. He says that there are eighteen Hinayana sub-schools, seventeen Vaibhashika and one Sautrantika.²¹⁶

Etymologically, the Sautrantikas are so called because they rely mainly on sutras in propounding tenets. However, since all Buddhist systems cite scripture and reasoning to support their tenets, the name Sautrantika is not a definition but an indication of emphasis. Etymologies are traditionally examined to discover whether they apply to a wider or narrower range than the precise meaning of the word, or whether the etymology can also serve as a definition. Here, the etymology of Sautrantika covers a wider set than those actually indicated by the term.

The Sautrantikas are of two types:

-- FOLLOWERS OF SCRIPTURE— mainly of Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* —and
-- FOLLOWERS OF REASONING—mainly of Dignāga's *Compendium of Valid Cognition* (*Pramāṇasamuccaya*) and Dharmakīrti's *Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition* (see Bibliography).

The latter are considered to be the higher of the two because of their resemblance to Mahayana counterparts, the Chittamatrins Following Reasoning, and because their assertions on the processes of reasoning are more developed.

The Gelugpa order of Tibetan Buddhism, of which Jam-yang-shay-ba is a member, is fond of Dharmakīrti's logic, especially as described by his Sautrantika followers. They see the Sautrantika system of Dharmottara and so forth as a stepping-stone to an understanding of Mahayana tenets—their fondness refuting any suggestion that the Hinayana schools are despised in Tibet.

The Followers of Reasoning are more famous than the Followers of Scripture for their works

on logic, but it cannot be said that the Followers of Scripture are not advocates of reasoning. Dignaga himself was a student of Vasubandhu, who was a Sautrantika Following Scripture before becoming a Chittamatrin, though Dignaga is said to have surpassed his teacher in the field of logic.²¹⁷

The tenets of the Sautrantikas Following Scripture are similar to those of the Vaibhashikas; however, they, along with the Followers of Reasoning, do not accept that past and future objects are instances of substantial entities. They also do not accept that a Foe Destroyer can fall from his attainment. All Sautrantikas agree that the Seven Treatises of Higher Knowledge were not uttered by Buddha, and most add that they were not even uttered by Foe Destroyers because the latter would not set forth mistaken teachings, such as that of the substantial existence of space. Sautrantikas say that space, analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations are mere negatives or absences of tangibility, afflictions, and so forth and thus are only imputedly existent, though permanent in the sense of being non-disintegrating. All Sautrantikas also assert that cause and effect cannot be simultaneous and that a consciousness does not perceive its object nakedly but is generated in its image. On these points the Sautrantikas disagree with the Vaibhashikas and agree with the Mahayana schools of tenets.

The differentiation between Sautrantika and the Mahayana schools is the former's agreement with Vaibhashika that objects, which are entities external to the consciousness perceiving them, truly exist. The Hinayana schools also do not assert that phenomena other than persons are selfless except in the sense that they do not exist as objects of use of a self-sufficient person. They consequently do not assert that there are obstructions to omniscience—obstructions to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena (*jneyavarana*, *shes bya'i sgrib pa*). As a result, they also do not accept the ten Bodhisattva grounds.

The Hinayana schools do not accept the existence of a Buddha's Enjoyment Body (*Sambhogakaya*, *Longs sku*) which immortally preaches doctrine to Bodhisattva Superiors. Therefore, it is very difficult for one who is a Hinayanist by tenet to become a Mahayanist by path as defined by the Mahayana schools.²¹⁸ In order to do so, he would have to generate an altruistic aspiration to enlightenment, as a Mahayanist by path does when he takes upon himself the burden of freeing all sentient beings from cyclic existence and establishing them in the happiness of Buddhahood. Without the possibility of omniscience and an immortal Enjoyment Body, the generation of such an unusual compassionate attitude would be next to impossible.

Many of the Hinayana schools do not even accept the Mahayana sutras as being Buddha's word, thinking that many Mahayana teachings contradict the four seals.²¹⁹ For instance, the teaching that a Buddha's Enjoyment Body abides forever without disintegrating contradicts the first seal that all products are impermanent. (The Mahayanists answer that though an Enjoyment Body disintegrates moment by moment, its continuum remains of the same type, unlike an ordinary body which becomes sick, old, and so forth; thus, it is immortal but still impermanent.) The Hinayanists say that the Mahayana teaching that a Bodhisattva proceeds from joy to joy contradicts the second seal that all contaminated objects are miserable. They say that the Mahayana teaching that through cultivating the path one attains a superior self contradicts the third seal that all phenomena are selfless. Also, they say that the teaching that a Hearer or Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer, after attaining a nirvana without remainder, enters into cultivation of the Mahayana path contradicts the fourth seal that nirvana is peace.

With such an aversion to the special Mahayana teachings that make an aspiration to help all sentient beings realistic, it would be almost impossible for a practitioner's sense of compassion to counter the influence of such tenets. However, it is said that a few Hinayanists by tenet have generated the full aspiration to altruistic enlightenment as described in the Mahayana scriptures. They thus become Mahayanists in terms of their path and not just in the way that the Bodhisattva path is described by the Hinayana schools. For the Hinayana schools of tenets, the Bodhisattva path merely entails a much longer period of the collection of merit; it does not involve such unusual aspirations.

The most marked difference between the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning and those Following Scripture lies in their assertions on the two truths. The Followers of Scripture agree with the Vaibhashikas that ultimate truths are objects such as partless particles and partless moments of consciousness which can withstand breakage and analysis, still generating a consciousness that apprehends them. For the Followers of Reasoning, however, ultimate truths are objects ultimately able to perform a function, especially the function of creating an effect. For them, all impermanent objects are ultimate truths—truths for an ultimate consciousness which is not mistaken with respect to its appearing object .

Valid sense consciousnesses that correctly perceive visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects and mental consciousnesses that directly perceive such objects as the four noble truths are non-mistaken. However, an inferring consciousness, though non-mistaken with respect to its referent object, is mistaken with respect to its appearing object. The reason is that it perceives an image of an object, and the image appears to be that object.²²⁰ For instance, when an inferential consciousness realizes the impermanence of an ox based on the sign that an ox is born and the pervasion of whatever is born by impermanence, the impermanence of an ox is its referent object. Its appearing object is a generic image or concept of the impermanence of an ox that seems to be the real thing; thus, it is said that a correct inferential consciousness is mistaken in terms of its appearing object.

Images or concepts, not being objects of a totally non-mistaken consciousness, are not ultimate truths. They also are not impermanent but permanent, not in the Vaibhashika and non-Buddhist sense of the continual existence of a thing from one moment to the next, but in the sense of not undergoing momentary disintegration.

Each person's images or concepts do indeed come into existence in dependence on the person's having formed an image of such an object, but from the viewpoint of their representing the exclusion of everything which is not that object, they are said to be permanent. For the non-Buddhist Forder systems, a generality (*samanya*, *spyi*) is permanent and partless. Through identifying it in one object, a person thereafter notices it in its other instances and thereby knows its manifestations. Thus, for the non-Buddhist Forders, the naming and noticing of objects is positive; terms and thoughts are affixed to objects through the power of the objects themselves. In short, for the Forders, one initially learns of the presence of a universal in an instance, and through that process of naming, one is able to know all instances of the universal when they appear in one's ken.

For the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning and for the Mahayana schools of tenets, the process of naming and noticing is negative or exclusionary. Ox appears as an exclusion (*apoha*, *gzhan sel*) of non-ox to a consciousness that thinks, 'Ox.' In other words, the process of naming relies on the elimination of non-ox. Without the appearance to the mind of something as the negative of non-ox, thought cannot identify 'ox'. Non-non-ox does indeed mean ox, but it

must appear to the mind through the negative route of eliminating non-ox.

Though non-non-ox means ox, it is a negative implying a positive object whereas ox is just a positive phenomenon. It is not that ox does not exclude or negate non-ox, but ox is positive rather than negative because ox does not appear to thought through an explicit exclusion of non-ox. A further complexity is that though ox is impermanent, the isolate of ox, which means ox in isolation, is permanent because of appearing only to thought, for ox devoid of all of its instances is something that can appear only to thought. Thus, though ox is the isolate of ox, the isolate of ox is not ox.

Furthermore, an appearance as non-non-ox (which here means a conceptual appearance of ox to a mental consciousness) is permanent, that is, non-disintegrating. Some contemporary Tibetan scholars identify this appearance (or as it has been translated here, generic image or meaning-generality) as the thing that appears to the mind when we think about 'ox'. They agree that it seems to move and change, sometimes being one color, sometimes another, etc., but they still say it is permanent because it does not disintegrate moment by moment as do external objects such as stones. The appearance of change is due to the mind. Others say that the appearance of this white-haired thing that appears to the inner mind is not the meaning-generality (arthasamanya, don spyi) of ox, but they have no identification of 'appearance' in this context. One scholar says that the meaning-generality of ox is impermanent, an internally created picture, and added that when he says this in the debating courtyards, the heads of the other scholars split wide open.

In any case, the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning, as well as the Mahayanists, present an essentially negative or exclusionary process of naming. One takes as one's basis the white-haired thing and takes as one's reason the presence of certain characteristics such as a dew-lap and a hump and then applies the name 'ox' to a generic image or meaning-generality that is actually an appearance as non-non-ox. A consciousness which has such a generic image as its appearing object is mistaken in that it understands its referent objects, such as the actual many and various oxen, through the medium of an image which is not manifold and various—thereby confusing place, time, and nature. Thus, an inferring consciousness realizing the impermanence of an ox, though valid with respect to its main object, impermanence, is mistaken in terms of its appearing object, an image of the impermanence of an ox which appears to be actual impermanence. A definite preference for direct cognition is implied, with inferential realization valued as a means to it.

A generic image or meaning-generality appears to the mind through dependence on thought, not through its own entity; therefore, it is said to be permanent. Such phenomena are conventional or obscured truths (samvrtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa) because they are truths, or existents, for thought. Thought—the intellect—is obscured because it cannot act directly on impermanent objects; it must work through the medium of images and concepts. The intellect, as has been seen, is mistaken; however, the intellect, when correct, does not conceive or hold the internal appearance as non-non-ox to be non-non-ox, that is, ox; such only appears to it, much as a reflection of a face in a mirror appears to be a face but is not usually conceived to be so. Thus, a correct intellectual consciousness is mistaken with regard to its appearing object but not with regard to its referent object.

The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning hold that the explicit objects of direct perception are impermanent objects. The Mahayanists, on the other hand, assert that the permanent phenomenon, emptiness, can be directly perceived. The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning explain that a yogi, in direct perception, explicitly realizes the impermanent mental and

physical aggregates and implicitly realizes the permanent phenomenon of emptiness which in their system is the non-existence of the person as a self-sufficient entity. An emptiness is thus not an ultimate truth but an obscured truth because it is a truth for thought, appearing to the mind through the route of the negation of a self-sufficient person. A selflessness, or an emptiness, is a non-affirming negative (*prasajyapratishedha*, *med dgag*), not implying anything in its place, and thus is permanent and cannot be seen directly.

The Sautrantika emphasis on impermanent things is obvious: impermanent objects are called ultimate truths, and yogis, in the most exalted of cognitions, explicitly realize not emptiness but the impermanent aggregates. If an object can perform the function of creating an effect, it is determined as ultimately existing; a pot, which for Vaibhashikas and for Sautrantikas Following Scripture is a conventional truth, is an ultimate truth for the Sautrantikas following Dharmakirti.

On the subject of impermanence itself the Sautrantikas offer a presentation that differs significantly from Vaibhashika and agrees with Mahayana.²²¹ The Vaibhashikas say that production, abiding, aging, and disintegration are not four activities but four agents: (1) that which causes production, (2) that which causes aging, (3) that which causes abiding, and (4) that which causes disintegration. These four characteristics of impermanent phenomena are substantial entities separate from the phenomena themselves. They are said to exist simultaneously as characteristics of one phenomenon, but to perform their functions serially. According to the Vaibhashikas, the momentariness of impermanent things actually refers to the period of these four instants.

Both types of Sautrantikas, however, hold that (1) production is the new arising of what did not exist before, (2) abiding is the remaining of a type similar to what preceded it, (3) aging is the non-similarity in entity of a later moment and a former moment, and (4) disintegration is a product's not remaining a second moment after its present. All four characteristics exist simultaneously because what is newly produced is just what does not remain for a second moment. What is newly produced is also just what abides as a type similar to its preceding cause and is just what is a different entity from its former cause. Therefore, all products last only the instant of their production; they require no further cause for their disintegration than their own production. Products have a nature of momentary disintegration; it is not something else that makes them so.

The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning also differ from the Vaibhashikas in that they assert self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is here not introspection or self-awareness, but a consciousness's cognizance of itself non-dualistically much as the sun illumines itself while it illumines others. In this context, self-consciousness has little function in the spiritual path, and despite its somewhat impressive name does not occupy even a degree of importance that elicits a clear position from each school. Still, self-consciousness figures into the definitions of the proponents of Hinayana tenets.

THE DEFINITION OF A VAIBHASHIKA IS:

~ a Hinayana proponent of tenets who does not assert self-consciousness and who asserts the true existence of external objects—with qualification.²²²

(The qualification excludes the Sautrantikas Following Scripture who seem also not to accept self-consciousness, but this is a matter of controversy.)

THE DEFINITION OF A SAUTRANTIKA IS:

~ a Hinayana proponent of tenets who asserts the true existence of self-consciousness and of external objects— with qualification.

L5: [More on the Sautrantikas from other texts] :L5

The sautrantikas are the second speculative school of the hinayana. They are so called because they adhere to the Sutta Pitaka, which consists of the discourses of the Buddha to the rejection of the two other Pitakas. Kumaralabdha, a contemporary of Nagarjuna, is said to be the founder of the system. Yashomitra, the author of *Abhidharmakosha* (a commentary on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakosha*) is a notable exponent of the school.

The sautrantikas like the vaibhashikas accept the atomic theory, but insist that even the underlying elements (dharma) are momentary. Everything is momentary. Entities appear from non-existence, exist for a moment and cease to exist. Tackling the question of the perceived impression of the permanence in objects it is said : "The forms of the object penetrate one after another into the understanding; the illusion of simultaneity is caused by the swiftness of the proceeding. Just as a firebrand waved around, appears like a circle."

The existence of the phenomenal world is admitted, but not because we have a direct perception of it. It's only through mental presentation that the existence of the world is inferred. The world must exist because there cannot be a perception without an object of perception.

Arguing against the theory of an internal principle manifesting as if it were something external (vijñānavāda), it is said that if there were no external objects then there being no genesis of such, the comparison, "as if they were external", is illegitimate. Though consciousness by itself is everywhere alike, the varieties of the forms of consciousness indicate the existence of external objects. If the consciousness was all there is, the world would be one and not manifold as it really is.

The knowledge of the subject (ālayavijñāna) is distinguished from the knowledge of the object (pravṛttivijñāna). The world does not rise into being at our will. The involuntary nature of sense perceptions are the proof of the reality of the external world. The world is therefore external to consciousness. Our belief in it is based on inference. When there's perception, there's only a presentation or idea first. From this idea, we infer the object. Both perception and inference are valid means of knowledge, but while perception involves direct presentation, inference is mediated by the use of reason (linga).

Dharmakīrti in his *nyāyabindu* defines perception as a presentation determined exclusively by the object and free from all mental impositions (kalpana). While the senses reveal the objects accurately, names and relations are imposed by the mind. This pure perception free from all traces of conceptual activity gives us the object in its own nature (svlakṣaṇam).

The Self is nothing permanent but a combination of the five skandhas. Nor is there a permanent consciousness like the vaibhashikas believe. Thought can think itself and we can have self-consciousness. The sautrantikas move away from the materialistic nirvana of the vaibhashikas. They feel that only a subtle consciousness remains after nirvana.

Arguing against the concept of God, Yashomitra says that since there's no cause without an effect, if God was indeed the primordial cause of the universe, then the world would have been created in totality at once and at the same time. But in reality we see creatures coming into existence not simultaneously, but successively. So the conclusion is that there's a series of causes and God is not the sole cause. But if it be said that the

diversity of the causes is due to the volition of God, who is the cause of them all - "Let now such and such a creature be born, let another creature be born in such and such a way" - then to admit several acts of volition is to admit several causes, which in turn demolishes the first hypothesis of one primordial cause.

Dharmakirti thinks the an eternal God cannot be regarded as the cause of this world : "To Chaitra a weapon causes a wound and a medicine heals that up. Both the weapon and medicine are regarded as causes because they are momentary and capable of successful activity. God is neither momentary nor is He efficient. If the opponent is so fond of taking an inactive and inefficient entity like God to be the cause of the world, he should better hold a dry trunk of a tree as the cause of this universe. God is eternal and so He cannot change. And unless He changes, He cannot be a cause."

Yashomitra declares defiantly : "The sons of sakhya hold that the evolution of the world has no beginning."

L2: [REFUTING OTHER MAHAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS:] :L2

L2: [4. History of the Mahayana] :L2

Sources:

- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets

This great eon is called the Fortunate Eon because during it one thousand Buddhas will appear in this world.²²³ A great eon is composed of eighty intermediate eons, divided into four periods of twenty each for formation, abiding, destruction, and vacuity of the world system. The last great eon ended in a destruction by fire, in which the whole of the Desire Realm and the first of the four areas of the Form Realm, called the First Concentration, were destroyed.

The Four Concentrations are situated, one on top of the other, above the Desire Realm, which is our habitation. After seven great eons end with destructions by fire, the next one ends with destruction by water, during which the Second Concentration is also destroyed. After seven cycles ending in destruction by water, the Third Concentration is also destroyed by wind. The Fourth Concentration is never destroyed by fire, water, or wind because it is free from the eight faults of inhalation, exhalation, investigation, analysis, pleasure, pain, mental pleasure, and mental displeasure.²²⁴ The individual environments of the Fourth cease with the death of the being on which their existence depends.

When the twenty intermediate eons of formation in this eon began, the area of the First Concentration was formed, and sentient beings were born there once again. Thereafter, the four abodes of the Desire Realm gods who inhabit the sky were formed. Our own world, in a system of one billion worlds, was formed when a great and powerful blue wind began blowing and circulating in the shape of a half moon.²²⁵ Great rains of seven types of precious substances fell and formed a vast white round ocean, supported by the dense winds. From the turbulence of the ocean were formed a yellow square of gold and then earth. From the dependent-arising of the combination of these three, a red triangle of fire formed, at which time the basis of the great Mount Meru and its surrounding mountains, four continents, and

eight sub-continents was complete.

At first the land surface was a marvelous substance that someone, through previous conditioning, was led into eating. Until that time, their spontaneously produced bodies had no anus or genitals; for the sake of excretion these now appeared. Gradually, the marvelous radiance of the beings degenerated, and the earth became hard with a corn-like plant growing in abundance. Some, however, were not satisfied with merely taking their portion day by day and began hoarding. Some began stealing; some killed; houses were built to hide the sexual act. Gradually the sins were committed, and the causes of birth in the bad migrations were made. The twenty eons of formation were finished with the formation of the birth-places for animals, hungry ghosts and hell-beings.

The pattern was produced a billion times simultaneously, providing lands for gods, demi-gods, humans, animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-beings in accordance with their nature as determined by previous deeds. The life-span for humans, which at that time was extremely long, gradually began to shorten, and when it was forty thousand years, the first of the thousand Buddhas of this great eon, Krakuchchhanda, appeared.²²⁶ When the average life-span was thirty thousand years, the second Buddha, Kanakamuni, appeared. At twenty thousand years, the third, Kashyapa (who is to be distinguished from the Hearer Kashyapa who was Shakyamuni Buddha's senior disciple) appeared. When the average life-span was only one hundred years, the very length of which reflects the poor state of the world, the heroic Shakyamuni, already a Buddha, appeared simultaneously in all one billion worlds of this world system to show the way to enlightenment. His teaching will remain for five thousand years. Eventually, the human life-span will degenerate to an average of ten years, accompanied by a destruction of the beings—but not the environment—by either weapons, sickness, or starvation, the current intermediate eon ending with a destruction by weapons. The remaining beings will experience renunciation whereupon emanations of Buddhas will appear to lead them on the path of virtue due to which the life-span will again begin to lengthen. During the period of lengthening, no Buddhas will appear as such, with the next openly declared Buddha—Maitreya—appearing four billion nine hundred million human years from now after the next decrease has begun.

The current era is that of Shakyamuni Buddha, whose lineage is traced back to a child born from an egg.²²⁷ The egg formed from semen that dripped onto a sugar cane leaf from a man wrongly accused as a killer. He was strung up for punishment, and having proved his innocence through causing his teacher's very black face to turn golden, his semen dripped down onto a sugar cane leaf. It formed an egg which his teacher nurtured, and a child hatched. Thus, the child, the lineage, and eventually Shakyamuni himself came to be known as Sugar-Cane-One (Ikshvaku, Bu ram shing pa).

His clan was called Shakya or 'the able' because of the clanking's amazement at his banished sons' and daughters ability to inter-breed in exile. They had been banished to satisfy a second wife's wish for her son to become king, and later when the king's attitude changed, his family was sought in exile with resultant amazement at their prolific inter-breeding.

Shakyamuni Buddha lived for eighty-one years, during which the highest of his philosophical teachings were the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. They present the most profound of all views, the absence of inherent existence in all phenomena. Offering the essence of Buddha's thought, they contain not only the doctrine of emptiness but also in hidden form, the modes of the paths to supreme enlightenment.

Four hundred years after Buddha's death, Nagarjuna, the prophesied upholder of Buddha's deepest teaching, was born.²²⁸ He systematically explained the meaning of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras in his Treatise on the Middle Way which is called 'fundamental' (mula) because it is the basic text of the Madhyamika system he founded. Living for six hundred years, his teachings are divided into three proclamations of doctrine which he performed based on former prayer-aspirations made in the presence of the Tathagata Lu-rik-gyel-bo (kLu-rigs-rgyal-po). Nagarjuna's FIRST PROCLAMATION OF DOCTRINE began with his becoming a monk under the abbot of Nalanda, Rahulabhadra, that is, Saraha,²²⁹ at which time he was called Shriman (dPal-ldan). While prefect of Nalanda, Nagarjuna protected the monks from famine through alchemy, exhorted the indolent, and expelled the wayward.

HIS SECOND PROCLAMATION commenced before one hundred years had passed in his lifetime. He went to Naga-land, taught doctrine to the Nagas, and brought back to this 'continent' the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra, etc., along with a great quantity of clay from which he made almost ten million reliquaries (stupa) and many images. He composed the Five Collections of Reasonings that establish emptiness as the mode of existence of all phenomena and thus founded the Madhyamika system which avoids all extremes. At that time he was called Nagarjuna. Nagas, or dragons, have their abode in the ocean, have treasures such as wish-granting jewels, and spew forth fire from their mouths, burning fuel and overcoming others. Just so, Nagarjuna possessed the profound understanding that eradicates the two extremes, possessed the treasure of profound good doctrine, and burned the fuel of bad views, thus clearing away mental darkness. Also, just as Arjuna protected the kingdom and tamed his enemies, so Nagarjuna protected the kingdom of doctrine and conquered the foe, cyclic existence, itself. Therefore, he was called Naga-Arjuna, Nagarjuna.

HIS THIRD PROCLAMATION OF DOCTRINE commenced with a visit to the northern continent three hundred years into his lifetime. On the way he met the king Shatavahana, then in his youth, and prophesied his ascension to the throne.²³⁰ From the northern continent, where he stayed for two hundred years in altruistic activity, he wrote the king a letter called the Precious Garland of Advice for the King. When the average life-span was eighty years—nine hundred years after the death of Buddha and five hundred years into his lifetime—Nagarjuna came for the third time to South India, the first time being his birth and the second his return from Naga-land. He brought with him the Great Drum Sutra (mahabhenhadrakaparivarta), the Lion's Roar of ShrimaIadevi Sutra (Shrimaladevisimhanada), the Tathagata Essence Sutra (Tathagatagarbha), and the Ornament of the Wisdom Engaging the Sphere of All Buddhas Sutra (Sarvabuddhavisayavata rajnanalamkara).²³¹ These four sutras became the basis of extensive explanation in Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle (Uttaratantra) which clarifies the meaning of the Tathagata essence, or emptiness of the mind, that permits development into Buddhahood.

During the third proclamation, Nagarjuna wrote praises of the Tathagata essence and lectured on the Great Drum Sutra etc., living another one hundred years. Upon his death he himself went to the Blissful Pure Land (Sukhavati, bDe ba can) and sent a manifestation to the Joyous Pure Land (Tushita, dGa'ldan) to question Maitreya about the Great Drum Sutra. In the future he is to become a Buddha. After the passage of the thousand Buddhas of this eon, there will be sixty-two eons without the appearance of any; then, after one hundred thousand ten million Solitary Realizers have appeared, seven Buddhas will appear. Nagarjuna will appear as the eighth, living for fifteen intermediate eons in extremely favorable conditions, with his teaching remaining for ten billion years.

Since he was away from South India for such long periods, many have thought that there were

two or three Nagarjunas, but it is clearly indicated in the Great Cloud Sutra (mahamegha) and the Great Drum Sutra that there was only one. With respect to his level of attainment, Bhavaviveka's disciple Avalokitavrata wrote, in accordance with the way things seemed to the world, that Nagarjuna was a first ground Bodhisattva; however, he actually was a seventh grounder who attained the eighth in that lifetime. Thus, the prophecies of Nagarjuna in the Descent into Lanka Sutra and the Fundamental Tantra of Manjushri (Manjushrimulatantra) as a first ground Bodhisattva should be taken to mean that although he was a seventh ground Bodhisattva, he manifested the ways of a first grounder for the sake of leading sentient beings. Still, the tantra system—which is accepted as having the final say—views Nagarjuna as having attained Buddhahood during that lifetime.

He did not newly invent the teachings of the Madhyamika system; Hinayana and Mahayana arose simultaneously during Shakyamuni's lifetime.²³² After his death, the Mahayana sutras remained in the lands of humans for forty years, but then with tumultuous times they disappeared. This is why the Mahayana had to be brought back, making it necessary for many authors to prove that it was the word of the Buddha—Maitreya in his Ornament for the Mahayana Sutas (mahayanasutralamkara), Shantideva in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyavata), Bhavaviveka in his Heart of the Middle Way (Madhyamakahrdaya), etc.²³³ Though one hundred and twenty years after Buddha's death the great religious king Ashoka respected and spread the teaching, it is clear that the Mahayana was then practically non-existent among humans; however, it had spread widely in the lands of gods and dragons and even in other areas.²³⁴ On this 'continent' it was limited to Bodhisattvas abiding on the earth and to tantric yogis who were secretly practicing it themselves and teaching it to the fortunate.

Because of the wide dissemination of the Hinayana Hearer orders, the Mahayana scriptures were as if non-existent. Though the great Brahmin Saraha appeared and spread mainly the Mahayana tantric teaching, it was the prophesied Nagarjuna who restored the teaching of the Mahayana to the world and, through the help of his students, spread it widely. The chief of his students was Aryadeva who also attained the eighth Bodhisattva ground during that life. Nagarjuna and Aryadeva are called the Model Madhyamikas because the founders of the two branches of Madhyamika—Svatantrika and Prasangika—quote them as equally reliable sources.

Nine hundred years after Buddha's death and five hundred years into Nagarjuna's six hundred year life, the teacher Asanga was born.²³⁵ He attained the third Bodhisattva ground during that life and, roughly during the time of Nagarjuna's third proclamation of doctrine, founded the Chittamatra (Mind-Only) system. The timing had to have been like that, for Nagarjuna refuted mind-only in his Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (Bodhichittavivarana), and this shows that he was still alive when the Chittamatra system was formed. In accordance with the doctrine of mind-only, Asanga commented on the meaning of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Samahinirmochana) in his Five Treatises on the Levels and Two Compendiums, etc. (see Bibliography). However, in his commentary on Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle, Asanga explained the thought of the Questions of King dharamshvara Sutra (dharanishvararajapariprchcha) and the Tathagata Essence Sutra in accordance with Prasangika, which was actually his own final system.

He showed that the mind-basis-of-all (alayavijnana, kun gzhi rnam shes) is taught in Hinayana scriptures just as Nagarjuna had showed that the Madhyamika selflessness is taught in them and that the Hinayana teaching of complete forsaking of the mental and physical aggregates in the final nirvana refers to the mode of appearance in meditative equipoise on emptiness.

Living for one hundred and fifty years, Asanga was mainly intent on founding the Chittamatra system. It is said²³⁶ that he did so in order to convert to the Mahayana his brother Vasubandhu who first was a Vaibhashika, then a Sautrantika, and finally a Chittamatrin due to Asanga's persistent efforts.²³⁷

Just after Asanga's founding of the Chittamatra system, Buddhapalita laid the foundation for the Prasangika system with the writing of his commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way. Even though Chandrakirti, through his defense of Buddhapalita, opened the way for Prasangika, Jam-yang-shay-ba considers Buddhapalita to be the founder. For, Buddhapalita in his commentary on the Treatise on the Middle Way used many consequences (Prasanga, *thai gyur*) rather than syllogisms to establish emptiness. The commentaries by Devasharma, Gunashn, Gunamati, and Sthiramati were not translated into Tibetan,²³⁸ but those authors as well as Bhavaviveka and his commentator, Avalokitavrata, mainly used syllogisms (*prayoga*, *sbyor ba*). The other commentaries on the Treatise, the Akutobhaya— accepted as being falsely attributed to Nagarjuna²³⁹— and Chandrakirti's Clear Words do not mainly use syllogisms; however, Buddhapalita's commentary predates Chandrakirti's. Also, the authorship of the short Akutobhaya is doubtful, though it certainly is not by Nagarjuna because his chief disciples did not quote it whereas they did liberally quote Nagarjuna's commentary on his Refutation of Objections (*Vigrahavyayartam*). Also, chapter twenty-seven of the Akutobhaya quotes Aryadeva, and Nagarjuna would not have quoted his own student.²⁴⁰ Thus, because Buddhapalita was the first main commentator on the Treatise to use consequences instead of syllogisms, Jam-yang-shay-ba considers him to be the founder of the Prasangika system. Still, not even Jam-yang-shay-ba says that Buddhapalita specifically rejected the usage of syllogisms as the best means of generating in an opponent the view that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence.²⁴¹

Buddhapalita is said to have written many books, but only his commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise survives in Tibetan or any other language. He achieved a meeting with Manjushri and attained tantric realization.

The great teacher Bhavaviveka (or Bhavyakara, Bhavaviveka, Bhavya, Bhavyaka, Bhavyakara, Bhavyaviveka, Bhavivikta, Bhaviveka, or Bhagavadviveka)²⁴² author of many books and source for much of what is known about Buddhist and non-Buddhist tenets, objected to Buddhapalita's consequences used in refuting the four extreme types of production—from self, other, both, or neither. Bhavaviveka also heartily refuted the Chittamatra position of no external objects and its notion that imaginary phenomena (*parikalpitadharma*, *kun btags pa'i chos*), such as analytical cessations, do not inherently exist. He asserted that all phenomena do not exist ultimately but do conventionally exist inherently or naturally; he thereby founded the great system of Svatantrika-Madhyamika.

Bhavaviveka is considered to be the founder of Svatantrika even though his commentator, Avalokitavrata, says that Bhavaviveka was following Devasharma's commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise, for he was the first to set forth extensively the incorrectness of Chittamatra (which he considered to be just Asanga's fabrication and not taught by Buddha at all) and the correctness of Madhyamika within the context of asserting that conventionally all phenomena exist inherently. Similarly, Nagarjuna was preceded in his views by the king Indrabhuti and the great Brahmin Saraha, but they are not assigned as the founders of Madhyamika because they did not set off Madhyamika in contradistinction to the other Buddhist systems.²⁴³

Bhavaviveka founded the Svatantrika system when Asanga's Chittamatra system had been widely

disseminated. He vowed to attain Buddhahood during his life, but attained it in the next as Vajraghantapada. Both he and Chandrakirti were students of Nagarjuna toward the end of his six hundred year life.

After Bhavaviveka's founding of the Svatantrika system, Chandrakirti rejected the usage of autonomous syllogisms (svatantraprayoga, rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba) and established the Prasangika system as different from Svatantrika and the other Buddhist schools of tenets. He refuted inherent existence (svabhavasiddhi, rang bzhin gyis grub pa) both ultimately and conventionally, establishing that even conventionally phenomena are only designated by thought.

Manjushri told Tsong Khapa, founder of the Gelugpa order in Tibet, that the tenth ground Bodhisattva Chandrakirti had descended from a realm very high in the world system to spread Nagarjuna's system and that his explanations were in all ways reliable. Though Chandrakirti openly refuted Bhavaviveka, Vasubandhu, Dharmapala, Dignaga, and so forth,²⁴⁴ no one openly refuted him. To some this shows that Chandrakirti lived much later than them; however, Jam-yang-shay-ba is of the opinion that Chandrakirti was an actual student of Nagarjuna. Tsong Khapa's disciple Kaydrup says that this view is supported by the masters of the Guhyasamaja Tantra (Guhyasamaja), scriptural citation, and reasoning.²⁴⁵ Thus, through living for three hundred years, Chandrakirti was roughly contemporaneous with those scholars whom he refuted.

In order to overcome others' sense that things exist the way they appear, Chandrakirti once milked a picture of a cow. Living for three hundred years in the usual gross physical body, he is said still to be alive in a rainbow body. As evidence of this, he met with a Tibetan translator of his Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'; due to his speaking quickly some errors appeared in the translation.²⁴⁶

Just after Chandrakirti's three hundred years, Shantarakshita founded the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika system. He is similar to a Yogacharin, or Chittamatrin, in that he shows that external objects do not exist either conventionally or ultimately and that objects conventionally are of the same entity as the perceiving consciousness.²⁴⁷ He is a Svatantrika because he holds that phenomena only conventionally exist inherently and a Madhyamika because he accepts that all phenomena do not exist ultimately. Similarly, Bhavaviveka's Svatantrika-Madhyamika system is called Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika because, like a Sautrantika, he asserts the existence of objects external to a perceiving consciousness—that is, gross objects which are aggregates of particles. (Prasangikas assert conventionally existent objects that are external to a perceiving consciousness but are not aggregates of particles, only imputed to them.)

Just as Nagarjuna and Bhavaviveka were anticipated in their teachings by other scholars who, however, did not open a broad path for the chariots of their systems to travel, so Shantarakshita was anticipated by others. Vimuktisena's view is clearly that of a Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika, and Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayalamkara), which was brought to this world by Asanga on his return from the Joyous Pure Land, manifests the same view. Also, it is clear that the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika system was present during the time of Bhavaviveka who was a definite predecessor of Shantarakshita. For he refuted it, saying that to accept mind-only first and then to pass on to the view of no ultimate existence is like spreading mud on the body and then washing. Avalokitavrata interprets Bhavaviveka's referent as Chittamatra, but the only system that passes through the gradation of realizing first mind-only and then no

ultimate existence is Yogachara-Svatantrika. Also, Yogachara-Svatantrika was present later when Shantarakshita was examining to discover which type of Madhyamika was the best. He made this choice and through his extensive works founded the system that was the final major development in the Madhyamika system, the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika. Chandrakirti's Prasangika-Madhyamika, however, held sway, ultimately becoming the dominant system throughout Tibet and Mongolia.²⁴⁸

// CHART 41: Mahayana Chronology in India

o A.N. (After the Nirvana)	Buddha died, having lived eighty-one years and two months. ²⁴⁹
400 A.N.-1000 A.N.	Nagarjuna, the founder of the Mahayana system in general and the Madhyamika system in particular.
900 A.N.-1050 A.N.	Asanga, the founder of the Chittamattra system.
Approx. 975 A.N.-1275 A.N.	Chandrakirti, the disseminator of Prasangika.

Bhavaviveka, the founder of Svatantrika-Madhyamika in general and Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika in particular, preceded Chandrakirti by a little, and Buddhapalita, the founder of Prasangika-Madhyamika, preceded Bhavaviveka by a little. Shakyamitra, Nagabodhi, and Ashvaghosha were students of Nagarjuna near the end of his life.

Padmasambhava died in 864 A.D. after living one thousand seven hundred and seventy-three years, and Shantarakshita died in 845 A.D. after living nine hundred and ninety-nine years.²⁵⁰

L2: [5. (3rd school) Chittamattra (or Mind-Only tradition)] :L2

Sources:

- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.602-20

The Chittamatrins (Mind-Only-ists) are so called because THEY ASSERT THAT ALL PHENOMENA ARE

OF THE NATURE OR ENTITY OF THE MIND.²⁵¹ (They are also called Vijnanavadins and Vijnaptivadins for the same reason.) This is not the same as asserting that all phenomena are mind because minds are observers of objects, and if all phenomena were minds, stones and so forth would absurdly have objects of observation.²⁵² Rather, just as dream objects are not the mind that perceives them but also not separate entities from the mind, so the objects of the world are not the consciousnesses that perceive them but also not separate entities from those consciousnesses.

Another name for Chittamatrins is Yogacharins, (Practitioners of Yoga), because they arrange the practices of the path from the viewpoint of yoga. This, however, is just an etymology and not a definition because all Buddhist tenets are presented for the sake of yogic practice.²⁵³

The Chittamatrins are divided, like the Sautrantikas, into Followers of Scripture and Reasoning.

-- The former (FOLLOWERS OF SCRIPTURE) are followers mainly of Asanga's Five Treatises on the Levels,

-- and the latter (FOLLOWERS OF REASONING) of Dignaga's Compendium of Valid Cognition and Dharmakirti's Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition.

L6: [About the number of vehicles] :L6

Though, in general, the term 'Chittamatrin' refers to the Followers of Scripture, that is, of Asanga, the Followers of Reasoning are said to be the more advanced of the two groups.²⁵⁴ This is because

-- Asanga teaches that there are three final vehicles, meaning that some sentient beings never achieve Buddhahood because their vehicle is completed at a lower stage on which they remain forever. According to him, some Hearers only realize that a person is not a self-sufficient entity and never realize that objects and subjects are empty of being separate entities. These Hearers aim only toward a solitary peace.

-- The Chittamatrin followers of Dharmakirti, however, point to the impermanence of fetters and to the skill of the Buddha in teaching and thereby show that all eventually cognize both selflessnesses and attain the highest enlightenment. Thus for them there is only one final vehicle and all sentient beings eventually attain Buddhahood.

-- The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning interpret Dharmakirti's teachings otherwise and accept three final vehicles but with only one type of realization of selflessness. This selflessness is the emptiness, or absence, of a self-sufficient person.

-- In both Chittamatra schools, however, there are different types of selflessness which vary in difficulty of realization, it being more difficult to realize that objects and subjects are empty of being separate entities than to realize that a person is not a self-sufficient entity. Thus, there are two types of selflessness: one of phenomena in general and one only of persons.

L6: [About the number of consciousnesses] :L6

The Chittamatra Followers of Scripture are the only Buddhist school to accept eight consciousnesses: the five sense consciousnesses, a mental consciousness, a mind afflicted with egoism (klistamanas, nyon yid) and A MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL (ALAYAVIJNANA, kun gzhi rnam shes).

The Followers of Reasoning and all other Buddhist schools assert only six consciousnesses with some of the functions of the seventh and eighth being performed by the mental consciousness. There are sub-schools of Chittamatra which assert one, two, seven, and nine consciousnesses, but they are considered to have strayed from the positions of the four Buddhist schools of tenets.

L6: [Definition of Chittamatra] :L6

THE DEFINITION OF A CHITTAMATRIN IS:

~ a person propounding Buddhist tenets who uses reasoning to refute external objects

and who asserts that dependent phenomena, such as consciousnesses, truly exist.

L4: [MIND-ONLY] :L4

Mind-only is the very core of the Chittamatrin teachings; for them it means that there are no objects which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness. They and the Yogachara-Svatantrikas, who assert mind-only conventionally, are the only Buddhist schools which assert that THERE ARE NO EXTERNAL OBJECTS.

-- All the other schools—Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Sautrantika-Svatantrika, and Prasangika—assert that an object of a sense consciousness is an entity external to the perceiving consciousness. For them, objects are a cause of a consciousness in that they cause it to be produced in their image. Causes must exist before their effects, not simultaneously or afterward because nothing can affect an already existent entity in that very moment.²⁵⁵ Thus, because of the cause and effect relationship of object and sense consciousness, and because causally related things must be different entities, the non-mind-only oriented schools assert that object and subject are different entities.

-- The Chittamatrins disagree, saying that Buddha taught that a sense consciousness perceives a present object, whereas if object and subject were cause and effect, then, since a cause has ceased when its effect exists, a sense consciousness would be perceiving a past object. The non-mind-only schools must accept that an object of a sense consciousness exists one instant prior to its apprehender, but they say that the object is present in that there is no moment intervening between the object moment and the perceiver moment. The Chittamatrins, however, are able to uphold Buddha's teaching on this point without any qualifications; FOR THEM, OBJECT AND SUBJECT EXIST SIMULTANEOUSLY. A seed (bija, sa ban) or predisposition (vasana, bag chags) is activated and simultaneously produces both an object and a cognizing subject, much as in a dream. (A Buddha has no seeds or latencies but perceives objects through the complete awakening or actualization of his collections of merit and wisdom.)

For the Chittamatrins, an object is of the same nature or entity as its perceiving subject, although an object is not a mind, not a cognizing agent, illuminating and realizing objects. If an object were a mind, it would have to be shown that it apprehends objects, and such cannot be shown. In this way, with OBJECT AND SUBJECT THE SAME ENTITY AND DIFFERENT ISOLATES, NOT SYNONYMS BUT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE WITH ONE NEVER THE OTHER, (i.e. maybe this

means, like in the Madhyamika, that the mind perceiving and the object perceived are inseparable; one cannot exist without the other; one implies the other; they are non-dual: not two, not one. This would be true. But that is not enough. One also has to realize that everything is merely imputed by the mind.) the Chittamatrins are able to uphold mind-only and still present the five aggregates, including forms. There are no forms that are separate entities from a perceiving consciousness, but there are forms that are the same entity as a perceiving consciousness. Again, as with the Prasangikas' assertion of nominally existent objects, the view is extremely subtle, and it should not be thought that because the system says there are objects, it is referring to objects as one knows them. For, a sense consciousness of a sentient being perceives objects as if they were distant and cut off, whereas the objects declared to be existent in the Chittamatra system are not cut off from the subject.

ACCORDING TO THE CHITTAMATRINS, THE FINAL ROOT OF CYCLIC EXISTENCE IS THE CONCEPTION THAT

OBJECT AND SUBJECT ARE DIFFERENT ENTITIES; THIS IS THE SUBTLEST AND STRONGEST OF ALL

MISCONCEPTIONS, AND WHEN IT IS DESTROYED, ALL MISCONCEPTIONS ARE DESTROYED.

Thus, the subtle

selflessness of all phenomena is a non-difference in entity between subject and object.

Bodhisattvas mainly meditate on this and thereby overcome the obstructions to simultaneous and direct cognition of all phenomena.

Included in the obstructions to simultaneous and direct cognition of all objects of knowledge, together with the conception of object and subject as different entities, is the conception that phenomena naturally exist as the grounds or bases of engagement of names.²⁵⁶

The non-existence of objects as natural bases of engagement of names is a selflessness of phenomena that is as subtle as the non-existence of subject and object as different entities, but is easier to realize. An understanding of it serves as a means of entering into an understanding of non-duality.

¶(i.e. There are MANY LEVELS OF UNDERSTANDING EMPTINESS, many levels of interpretation, more

and more subtle. What change is the type of dependence being studied, or the object of refutation being considered: impermanence, dependence on parts, dependence on cause & conditions, dependence on the base of imputation and the continuation of that – the one mentioned here --, the dependence on the mind (Chittamatra), dependence on the labelling of an undefective mind (Madhyamika-Svatantrika), the realization that it is merely imputed by the mind (Prasangika). – See Lama Zopa Rinpoche's The Ultimate Nature of Phenomena)

In refuting that phenomena naturally exist as grounds or bases of names, the Chittamatrins are not merely saying that the appearing objects of thought, meaning-generalities, do not naturally exist because of depending on thought. For the Sautrantikas propound such, and here a subtle selflessness of phenomena must be more subtle than anything found in the lower systems of tenets. Nor are they saying that forms and so forth do not naturally exist because for them forms naturally exist as unpredicable phenomena. Forms do naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist because if they did not, they would not exist at all. For the Chittamatrins, the Prasangika view that objects do not naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist is a denial of phenomena; if impermanent things did not naturally exist, they would be totally non-existent.

When the Chittamatrins speak of objects as not being naturally bases of names, they base this on the adventitious relationship between objects and names and between names and objects. For instance, when an ordinary being's eye consciousness perceives a pot, the pot not only appears to be a bulbous thing able to hold fluid, but also the bulbous thing appears to be the basis of the designation 'pot'. The bulbous thing seems to be the basis of the designation 'pot' by way of its own being and not just established so by verbal convention. After an eye consciousness perceives the object, thought imputes, 'This is a pot,' without the intervention of any other thought. The sense consciousness alone is able to draw thought into imputing, 'This is a pot,' without the aid of intervening reflection. Therefore, when another asks what the expression 'pot' means, people do not say 'It is the "pot" that is only nominally imputed to a bulbous thing capable of holding water.' They say, 'It is a bulbous thing capable of holding water.'

Due to previous conditioning, objects falsely appear to sense consciousnesses as if naturally bases of names, and then thought, assenting to this appearance, falsely conceives

them likewise. This is the Chittamatrin assertion. The Sautrantikas say that both the appearance of objects as naturally bases of names and the conception of them as so are correct because sense objects are truly existent external objects, and when they appear to a faultless sense consciousness, their very mode of being must appear just as it is. Still, they say that mental images which appear to internal thought do not naturally exist and are only a reification of what depends on thought for its existence.

In the Chittamatra system, forms and so forth are not external objects; they appear to be external objects through the force of predispositions accumulated through beginningless conditioning to the naming of objects. Forms are only of the nature of inner consciousness, but appear to be natural bases of names through the force of predispositions for expression. Therefore, the appearance of forms as naturally existent bases of names is not suitable to arise from the way things are, without dependence on establishment by names and thoughts. Otherwise, the fact that forms are the bases of names would not depend on a consciousness, in which case forms would be different entities from a perceiving consciousness, and this is refuted by many reasonings. The assertion that things are not by way of their own character grounds of the designation of names meets back to the assertion that subject and object are not different entities.

-- If the opposite were true—if things were naturally bases of names—then the establishment of a bulbous thing as the basis of the name ‘pot’ would not depend on thought because it would exist as the basis of the name ‘pot’ through its own mode of being. If this were accepted, then the generation of a consciousness that thinks, ‘Pot,’ would not depend on thought. If this were accepted, then it would follow that before one learned the name ‘pot’ a consciousness thinking, ‘This is a pot,’ would be generated through only looking at a bulbous thing.

-- Furthermore, since one being who has many names would inherently be the bases of these names; this one being would have to be that many beings. Just as the names appear to be different to thought, their objects would have to be different in reality because objects would naturally generate a naming consciousness.

-- Also, two beings who have the same name would be one being, similar to their one name which appears the same to thought.

-- Therefore, phenomena do not naturally exist as bases of the affixing of names, and thought which apprehends them so is mistaken. It is undeniable that beings perceive objects as if they were of their own nature the bases of the affixing of names; this false perception must be destroyed.

One is exhorted to engage in THE FOUR INVESTIGATIONS and THE FOUR COGNITIONS:

- investigation into whether names are merely adventitious, mere imputation, or whether they are designated through the force of the object’s own mode of being
- investigation into whether objects naturally or adventitiously exist as bases of names
- investigation into whether in the designation of entities the relationship between the word and the object exists substantially
- investigation into whether objects exist naturally as bases of the designation of qualities, such as their production, destruction, color, impermanence, and use.

[AND THE FOUR COGNITIONS:]

- realization that names do not exist inherently in the objects they denote
- realization that objects do not exist inherently as the bases of the designation of names
- realization that the designation of entities based on the relationship of names and objects does not exist inherently

-- realization that the designation of qualities does not exist inherently.

The latter four are realized CONCEPTUALLY on a Bodhisattva's paths of accumulation and preparation and directly or non-conceptually on the paths of seeing, meditation, and no more learning. They act as a means of entering into a realization of mind-only.

Through establishing that a mental consciousness is mistaken when it apprehends objects as naturally existent bases of names, it is also established that such an appearance to a sense consciousness is mistaken. IT IS THEREBY NEGATED THAT OBJECTS ARE EXTERNAL ENTITIES, UNRELATED TO CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THUS IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT OBJECTS ARE ONLY APPEARANCES TO THE CONSCIOUSNESS THAT APPREHENDS THEM. Thereby, it is refuted that a spot of blue, for instance, is a different entity from its perceiving consciousness.

Asanga collected MANY EXAMPLES FROM SUTRAS TO SHOW THAT COGNITION IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT

EXTERNAL OBJECTS. For instance, no one considers it to be contradictory for a yogi who is meditating on ugliness to have a consciousness of an image of foulness without this foulness existing in reality. Just so, it is not contradictory to have a consciousness of external objects due to the predispositions of ignorance even though there are no external objects.

Similarly, hell-beings see a bowl of fluid as molten bronze. Hungry ghosts see it as pus and blood; animals such as fish, as an abode; humans, as water for drinking; gods, as ambrosia. If these existed as external objects, there would be the contradiction of one thing having many contrary natures. Therefore, everything is just consciousness, that is, of the nature of mind.

Furthermore, if there were external objects, the externality of objects would be their mode of being, and thus the uncontaminated wisdom that cognizes the mode of being would be conceptual. Ordinary beings would absurdly be directly perceiving the mode of being and so would lack ignorance. There also would be no liberation from ignorance and thus no means of developing an omniscient consciousness. Therefore, external objects are only fabrications of thought.

-- The example of a magician's illusions is given to overcome doubt that without external objects one could not apprehend objects.

-- The example of a mirage is given to overcome doubt about how minds and mental factors could be produced without external objects.

-- The example of a dream is given to overcome doubt about how one could find things attractive and unattractive without external objects.

-- The example of a hallucination is given to overcome doubt about how the varieties of consciousness could be produced without external objects.

-- The example of an echo is given to overcome doubt about how the various expressions could arise without external objects.

-- The example of a moon reflected in water is given to overcome doubt about how an image that is an object of meditative stabilization could arise without external objects.

-- The example of magical manifestation is given to overcome doubt about how Bodhisattvas are born in accordance with the thoughts of beings.

From these examples of the production of a consciousness without the presence of an external object one can realize that it is possible for external objects to be non-existent.

The Chittamatrins refute the view that material objects are constructed from the amassing of

partless particles through pointing out that if a partless particle is surrounded by other particles, the place where one of the surrounders touches the one in the center would not be the place where the others do and thus there would be touched and untouched parts. Or, if the supposed six particles surrounding the center one all touch the same place on the center particle, then nothing could be larger than the one partless particle. Some respond saying that the surrounding particles do not touch the center particles, but it is answered that nevertheless one of the surrounders would be closer to one side of the center particle than the others, and so the center particle would have to have sides and thus parts.

Furthermore, a spot of blue and an eye consciousness that apprehends it are not different entities because the observation of one by a valid cognizer is co-extensive with the observation of the other by a valid cognizer. In other words, whenever an eye consciousness observes an object, a self-consciousness observes the eye consciousness. (For Chittamatrins and some Sautrantikas every consciousness is self-conscious because later when an object seen is remembered, one also remembers the subject. This shows that the subject must have perceived itself at the same time as it was perceiving its object; otherwise, the subjective element would not be remembered.)²⁵⁷ Dharmakirti states the reasoning of necessary simultaneity of observation of the subject and the object to prove that a sense consciousness and its objects are not different entities. This is based on the concomitance of whatever are necessarily simultaneously observed with absence of difference of entity.

Jang-gya ²⁵⁸ explains that the above reasoning does not just prove a non-affirming negative which is a non-difference of entity of subject and object; it also implicitly proves that a sense object and a sense consciousness which apprehends this object are one entity. For if two things that exist are not different entities, they must be one entity. (i.e. That is the mistake they are making. They are stuck in the duality of difference vs. sameness without being able to transcend it. – So, of mind and matter, there are four possible positions: take one side and reduce the other to this one, take the other side and do the same, take both sides, take neither side. Chittamatra have chosen to reduce matter to mind after noticing that they cannot be different. But the right solution would be to transcend this duality, and take the Prasangika position.) Also, this reasoning is used as a means to realize mind-only; therefore, how could it merely be establishing a non-affirming negative—a non-difference of entity of subject and object? To cognize the thesis would imply a cognition of sameness of entity of subject and object. Thus, Jang-gya, unlike Jam-yang-shay-ba, finds it difficult to say that for Chittamatrins what is being proved here is just a non-affirming negative. However, on other occasions, he seems to agree with Jam-yang-shay-ba that a subtle selflessness of all phenomena is a non-affirming negative—a mere non-difference in entity between subject and object. This non-affirming negative is a quality of each and every phenomenon because an object is empty of, or lacks, a difference in entity from a subject, and a subject is empty of a difference in entity from its object.²⁵⁹ Each phenomenon from a form through to an omniscient consciousness possesses such a quality, which is an ultimate truth because of being a final object of observation of a path of purification. Blind to this excellent quality, sentient beings wander in cyclic existence, assenting habitually to the false appearance to their senses of a difference in entity between subject and object.

L4: [PRASANGIKA CRITIQUE OF MIND-ONLY [dependent on the mind, but not from the mind-only]

:L4

The Prasangikas say that Buddha set forth a non-literal teaching of mind-only in order to

overcome certain trainees' attachment to forms; the basis in his own thought was the fact that the mind is the principal creator of everything.²⁶⁰ The explicit teaching that objects are of the same entity as the mind is refuted by the reasoning that subject and (external) object are mutually existent; if one exists, the other must exist, and if one does not exist, the other must not exist. Therefore, mind-only in the sense of no external objects is not taken literally. Both object and subject are conventionally existent, and conventionally there are objects external to a perceiving consciousness. (i.e. It is not because they are not different, or inseparable, that they are the same. They are non-dual: not two, not one.)

According to Prasangika, the mind is the principal creator of everything because sentient beings accumulate predisposing potencies through their actions, and these actions are directed by mental motivation. These potencies are what create not only their own lives but also the physical world about them. All environments are formed by karma, that is, actions and the potencies they establish. The wind, sun, earth, trees, what is enjoyed, used, and suffered—all are produced from actions. Potencies on the mind of each person in combination with those of similar beings create the very substance of their world system. The Prasangika assertion is not like the Chittamatrin one that a potency or seed simultaneously creates a cognizing subject and a cognized object. Rather, the physical world is constructed through the former actions of beings of similar type, and that world is conventionally an entity external to a consciousness which perceives it. For, the world of objects acts as a cause of consciousness, affecting it in various ways. (i.e. The mind and world are interdependent. We cannot reduce one to the other. They are not different, not the same. They are non-dual: not two, not one.)

Still, the mind, the motivator of actions, is the principal creator. (i.e. "Principal" from our own point of view ... of course .. only from the point of view of a desirable Liberation.) The Prasangika view, like that of Chittamatra, is of a world inextricably involved with the person. Mahayanists practice the Bodhisattva deeds of compassion with a view toward the creation of pure lands for temporary Emanations (Nirmanakaya, sPrul sku), who are surrounded by both common beings and Superiors, and a Highest Pure Land (Akanishta, 'Og min) for their immortal Enjoyment Body (Sambhogakaya, Longs sku) which is surrounded only by Bodhisattva Superiors. In these lands one provides the conditions for others to advance on the path, including the land on which they stand. Perhaps it could be said that development of the ability to produce pure lands is a conscious sublimation of the uncontrolled process of the creation of less suitable worlds by contaminated actions.

Both Chittamatrins and Prasangikas accept roughly the same presentation of phenomena; they disagree on their nature. For instance, both schools accept that when different types of beings look at a bowl of fluid, the fluid actually becomes different things. (i.e. Again, this "becoming" is from somebody's point of view. It is never in absolute terms.) For a human it is cool water; for a god, ambrosia; for a hungry ghost, pus and blood etc. To a Chittamatrin this in itself proves that there are no external objects; the very world of objects is under the influence of the mind, changing in entity due to the presence of different types of beings. (i.e. It is not because it is dependent on the mind, on the accumulated conditioning (physical and mental), that it is from the mind only, or of the nature of the body only.) To a Prasangika, however, such changes in the external world show that objects do not inherently exist and show how powerful the mind and the potencies of actions are. Such changes are a sign of the lack of inherent existence in that objects depend on their perceivers and are not existent just in and of themselves under their own power.²⁶¹ Even when a human and a hungry ghost perceive a bowl full of fluid simultaneously,

a Prasangika is ready to say that there are two parts to the fluid, one water and one pus and blood, existing simultaneously as external objects. It is even said that a hungry ghost, who possesses a coarse body, can stand in the same spot as a human, who also possesses a coarse body.

For a prasangika, the examples of dreams and so forth show that objects can appear to be inherently existent but not be so; they can be unfindable among their bases of imputation and still be effective. That objects are not naturally bases of names proves, for a Prasangika, that phenomena do not inherently exist; the Chittamatrins misunderstand the import when they add that sense objects are inexpressible truly existent phenomena. From their examination of names and the naming process the Chittamatrins make the unwarranted conclusion that objects are of the nature of the mind. They mistakenly think that by knowing that a sense consciousness misperceives its objects as naturally bases of names one will somehow be caused to realize that the perception of objects as external entities is mistaken. FOR THE PRASANGIKAS THE REASONING WHICH PROVES THAT OBJECTS ARE NOT NATURALLY BASES OF THE DESIGNATION OF NAMES PROVES THAT ALL PHENOMENA DO NOT INHERENTLY EXIST. All phenomena depend on the mind which imputes them; this very dependence is a sign of their non-inherent existence. Still, the Chittamatrin analysis of names and objects is a stepping-stone to the Prasangikas' more subtle teaching.

According to Prasangika it is simply wrong to say that a spot of blue and an eye consciousness that apprehends it are necessarily simultaneously observed by valid cognizers and, therefore, are not different entities. For THERE IS NO SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. If there were self-consciousness, then agent and object would be one; a knife could cut itself; a finger could touch itself, with toucher and touched exactly identical. A lamp does not illumine both itself and the other because a flame itself has no darkness to clear away; it is bright by nature. If light illumined light, then darkness would obscure darkness in which case darkness would not be seen.

Here 'self-consciousness' (svasamvedana, rang rig) refers specifically to a consciousness's cognition of itself simultaneous with cognizing its object and does not refer to introspection or watching oneself. All systems advocate reliance on introspection and self-awareness which are essentials for effective meditation; in these cases the mind is perceiving a previous moment of the mind or a part of the mind is perceiving the general mind. Even in systems that assert self-consciousness, it is not an aid to self-awareness. 'Self in 'self-consciousness' means the consciousness itself and not the person. Self-consciousness is a consciousness's perceiving itself in a non-dualistic manner; it does not involve analysis such as whether the mind is wandering or remaining with its object.²⁶²

Without self-consciousness, it cannot be shown that an eye consciousness apprehending a spot of blue is observed by a self-consciousness at the same time that the spot of blue is observed by the eye consciousness. Thus, another supposed proof of the non-existence of external objects falls, THE CONCLUSION FOR PRASANGIKA BEING THAT A DIFFERENCE IN ENTITY BETWEEN SUBJECT AND OBJECT EXISTS CONVENTIONALLY THOUGH CERTAINLY NOT IN THE MANNER IN WHICH COMMON BEINGS PERCEIVE IT.

Still, for Chandrakirti not all teachings of mind-only even literally mean that there are no

external objects; sometimes this teaching literally and without interpretation indicates that the mind is the principal creator of all the varieties of objects. Thus, there are two types of mind-only doctrines: non-literal and literal. Both need finally to be interpreted to discover the final mode of existence of the mind and its objects as lacking inherent existence, but when the teaching of mind-only only indicates that the mind is the principal creator as in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds, it is validly established and literal. This is Chandrakirti's Prasangika interpretation of the literal and non-literal teachings of mind-only.

The Sautrantika-Svatantrika Bhavaviveka is far more severe.²⁶³ He says that Buddha never taught a mind-only which means no external objects; even the teachings that Chandrakirti accepts as superficially teaching no external objects Bhavaviveka says do not. They are all literal, teaching that the mind is the principal creator. Bhavaviveka accuses Asanga of fabricating a teaching of no external objects and polluting Buddha's teaching out of pride in his abilities as a scholar. Bhavaviveka takes the Yogachara-Svatantrika teaching that first one realizes mind-only and afterwards realizes the lack of true existence of the mind and compares it to first smearing mud on the body and then bathing. He questions why one should not from the beginning attempt the best teaching which is the lack of true existence of all objects. For him the Chittamatra emptiness is not a step on the ladder toward the Madhyamika emptiness whereas for the Gelugpas it is.

Still, according to the Gelugpa interpretation of Prasangika one cannot be liberated from cyclic existence through cognizing a lack of difference in entity between subject and object and cannot attain omniscience through the Chittamatra system. For the Prasangikas, to be a Superior (Aryan, 'Phags pa)—one who has attained a direct cognition of emptiness either as a Hearer, Solitary Realizer, or Bodhisattva and thereby risen above common beings—means that one has cognized the absence of inherent existence of all phenomena. Unlike the other Mahayana schools, the Prasangikas assert that all Superiors, whether Hinayana or Mahayana, cognize the same emptiness;²⁶⁴ Mahayanists are more intelligent and their mode of cognition is more forceful, but the emptiness cognized is the same for all. Without cognizing the lack of inherent existence of the person, one cannot be liberated from cyclic existence, and the very cognition of the absence of inherent existence in the person implies the ability to cognize its absence in other phenomena, such as mind, body, possessions, and so forth, because the mode of emptiness is similar. It is only the base of the predicate emptiness that is different. Despite the Prasangikas' view on the profound attainment of all Superiors, Hinayana and Mahayana, they do not accept that one can be liberated through cognizing emptiness as set forth by the other Buddhist tenet systems, Hinayana or Mahayana. One is thus to distinguish between Hinayana and Mahayana as modes of the practice of paths and as systems of tenets that describe the paths followed by Hinayanists and Mahayanists.

Consequently, there are Prasangikas who attempt to cognize the emptiness of inherent existence as Hinayanists, that is to say, with the motivation of liberating only themselves from cyclic existence. They are Mahayanists by tenet but Hinayanists by path. A Prasangika can be a Mahayanist by path only through generating in his or her mental continuum the non-artificial determination to attain Buddhahood in order to liberate all sentient beings from misery and join all with happiness. He must generate an attitude of compassion which exceeds the usual by taking upon himself alone the burden of liberating all beings from suffering. Through much artificial practice he must bring this wish to the point of spontaneity. Finally, whether walking, eating, standing, or lying down he is able to generate a sense of dedication toward altruistic enlightenment through just turning his mind

to the topic. When he is able to do this out of meditative session just as strongly as he can at the time of meditation, this is the sign that he has attained the spontaneous aspiration to enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings. Thereby, he becomes a Bodhisattva and attains the path of accumulation, which is this spontaneous wish itself as well as his other practices. He then becomes a Mahayanist by both path and tenet.

Buddha Superiors as well as Bodhisattva, Solitary Realizer, and Hearer Superiors are all Prasangikas by tenet because they have cognized emptiness directly. The attainment of special insight into emptiness is simultaneous with the attainment of the path of preparation, and thus even persons on any of the three paths of preparation (Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva) must also be Prasangikas.²⁶⁵

COGNITION OF A NON-DIFFERENCE IN ENTITY BETWEEN OBJECT AND SUBJECT IS MISTAKEN BECAUSE IT

CONTRADICTS WHAT EXISTS, SINCE A DIFFERENCE DOES EXIST CONVENTIONALLY. It must be remembered

that for something to be conventionally or nominally existent the object cannot be found separate from or among the bases of its designation. Also, it must be remembered that the mode of direct cognition of emptiness is such that subject and object are undifferentiated like fresh water poured into fresh water and that a Buddha continually abides in this state even when he is perceiving conventional objects. Perhaps, the Chittamatrins are attempting to describe this aspect of the final state and extend its significance to every mental state.

The Prasangikas are describing another aspect (i.e. The final truth is beyond all description, all conceptualization. The only thing we can do is to point at the moon, from our own point of view.), the continual perception of the unfindability of the imputed object in its bases of imputation, relegating the unusual mode of direct cognition of this unfindability to the analogy of water poured into water. Also, when Prasangikas practice the stage of generation in Highest Yoga Tantra, they visualize themselves as deities and their surroundings as the habitation of a deity, with the persons and objects forming their environment as the same entity as themselves. It is specifically said that one is not to view the surrounding sentient beings as having minds that are entities separate from one's own mind. The sameness of entity of subject and object is brought into practice as an aid to realizing the more subtle presentation of emptiness as the lack of inherent existence.

The Prasangikas do not say that the Chittamatrin teachings are not appropriate for certain trainees; at issue is which teaching is the higher, which can liberate sentient beings from cyclic existence, and which can establish sentient beings in omniscience. Their exclusivity comes in declaring their own teaching to be the only final teaching. For either school to declare that the other is its equal would be to deny their own emphasis on reasoning as a means of bridging the gap between misconception and insight. (i.e. No absolute, only adapted skillful means.)

L4: [BUDDHA NATURE [an adapted skillful means for those who cannot face emptiness without fears or without falling into nihilism] :L4

In the Tathagata Essence Sutra, the Nirvana Sutra, and so forth,²⁶⁶ Buddha speaks of a permanent, fully developed Buddha possessing the ten powers and existing in the continuum of each sentient being. The Prasangikas say that this teaching is an example of giving to the 'cause' the name of the effect, for the emptiness of the mind of each sentient being is what

allows for change of that person's mind, and this emptiness is being called a fully developed Buddha. The emptiness of the mind, its lack of existence by way of its own being or its dependence on causes and conditions, is that most marvelous quality of the mind allowing it to be transformed into the wisdom of a Buddha. This emptiness is not a fully developed Buddha but is like a 'cause' of Buddhahood in that if the mind did not lack inherent existence, it would be utterly static, unable to be affected by practice of the paths.

Buddha praised this essential and marvelous 'cause' calling it a fully developed Buddha. In order to lead beings who were incapable of understanding emptiness correctly, he taught a Tathagata essence which is a fully developed Buddha obscured in the sheaths of misconception. The basis in his thought was the existence of the Tathagata essence or Buddha nature which is the emptiness of the mind—not a fully developed Buddha, which could never be obscured, dulled, or hidden by anything. Buddhahood is not a temporary but an immortal state in which body and mind, though impermanent, are similarly and endlessly produced.

Buddha set forth THE NON-LITERAL TEACHING OF A TATHAGATA ESSENCE for Mahayana trainees who are not yet able to cognize the profound emptiness; he taught it in order to allay their fears of emptiness. The refutation of the explicit teaching is that all sentient beings would be Buddhas, and practice of the path would be senseless.

The Buddha nature, that is, emptiness of the mind, of each sentient being is his natural lineage, that quality which naturally abides in the mental continuums of all sentient beings allowing them to attain Buddhahood and thus giving them the Buddha lineage (gotra, rigs) or Buddha constituent (dhatu, khams). It is called a 'cause' of development into Buddhahood even though, being permanent, it is not actually so. The emptiness of the mind is permanent, or non-disintegrating, because although it is a predicate of the mind, it is not produced and destroyed each moment as the mind is. Emptiness is the mere negative or absence of objective existence. 'Permanent' for all Buddhist schools except Vaibhashika means 'non-disintegrating', without necessarily indicating perpetual existence. However, the emptiness of the mind is both non-disintegrating and always existent because from beginningless cyclic existence each sentient being's mind has existed and will continue to exist uninterruptedly right through Buddhahood when it is the Wisdom Body (jñanakaya, Ye shes kyi sku). The emptiness of the mind, because it is the precondition of change and transformation, is called a 'cause' of Buddhahood and according to a practitioner's position on the path is temporarily called a Hearer, Solitary Realizer, or Bodhisattva lineage. At Buddhahood, the Bodhisattva lineage becomes the Nature Body (Svabhavikakaya, Ngo bo nyid sku) of a Buddha. Though the emptiness of the mind is permanent and non-changing, it is said to improve when the mind of which it is a predicate improves. Finally, the mind itself reaches consummation as the Wisdom Body, and the emptiness of the mind becomes the Nature Body—these being the two aspects of a Buddha's Truth Body (Dharmakaya, Chos sku), so called because the Wisdom Body is the ultimate true path and the Nature Body is the ultimate true cessation.²⁶⁷

For the Chittamatrins also, the teaching of a Tathagata essence as a fully developed Buddha in the continuums of all sentient beings is non-literal. For them, the basis in Buddha's thought was THE MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL (ALAYAVIJNANA, kun gzhi rnam shes), the impermanent basis of all attainments. A seed naturally abiding in the mind-basis-of-all is the natural lineage, an impermanent phenomenon which is the potential for spiritual attainment.²⁶⁸ Here,

it is not emptiness that is called the Buddha nature but a potency predisposing the individual to certain paths and allowing the attainment of states that never existed before in the mental continuum. This seed, therefore, is not planted or established newly 'on' the mind-basis-of-all but abides there naturally, without beginning.

In sum, neither Chittamatrins nor Prasangikas accept as literal the teaching of a permanent body of Buddha obscured in the continuums of all sentient beings. According to the Gelugpas an assertion of this teaching as literal is beyond the pale of the four schools of tenets of this Buddha's teachings. The Prasangikas, taking the Descent into Lanka Sutra as their source, show that the teaching of a permanent essence points to the lack of independent existence of the mind, that quality which when cognized can lead to Buddhahood. Emptiness in general is the element of (superior) qualities (dharmadhatu, chos dbyings) because meditation on it acts as a cause generating the qualities of Superiors.²⁶⁹ The emptiness of the mind is singled out as the Buddha nature because it specifically allows for mental improvement- and the cognition of what previously was not cognized.

L4: [MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL [is the actual 'I' as explained by Asanga] :L4

According to the Chittamatra system as explained by Asanga, each sentient being has a MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL.²⁷⁰ It is a repository of SEEDS or predispositions, including those that simultaneously produce an apprehending subject and an apprehended object. It is a non-defiled, neutral consciousness and thus capable of being 'infused', or 'stained', or 'perfumed' with virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral potencies. It is a steady consciousness capable of existing through states which are otherwise mindless, such as deep sleep, the meditative equipoise of cessation, and fainting. It derives its potency from one complete action done in the past and lasts as long as the potency established by that action lasts.

It pervades the entire body, and when a person is about to die, his mind-basis-of-all withdraws from the limits of the body, slowly making those parts cold. Finally, it leaves the body and takes rebirth through the force of another of its seeds, carrying with it the seeds already accumulated but not yet activated. It is a continuum of seeds, similar to a stream, existing for Hearers and Solitary Realizers until they become Foe Destroyers and for Bodhisattvas until the eighth ground. Beyond these levels it is called a fruition consciousness (vipakavijnana, rnam smin rnam shes) until Buddhahood when it is transformed into a mirror-like wisdom.

The principal function of the mind-basis-of-all is contained in its seed aspect. However, the senses themselves and all the objects that appear to them also appear to the mind-basis-of-all, but it does not notice or identify them, nor is it capable of either remembering or inducing another consciousness to take notice of them. A sense consciousness directly perceives its objects and is capable of drawing the mental consciousness into noticing or identifying them; however, although objects appear to a mind-basis-of-all, it is incapable of drawing the mental consciousness into noticing those objects.

The Chittamatrins who follow Asanga are the only school to assert the existence of A MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL. Along with it, AN AFFLICTED MIND (klistamanas, nyon yid) is asserted, together with THE OTHER SIX CONSCIOUSNESSES that are commonly accepted: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses. A mental consciousness ascribes names to objects, perceives slightly hidden objects such as impermanence and emptiness, misconceives a difference of entity of subject and object, and so forth. A mind-basis-of-all does not cognize emptiness even though it has seeds with it that ripen and cause a mental

consciousness to do so.

The afflicted mind, or the seventh from among the eight consciousnesses, mistakenly conceives the mind-basis-of-all to be a self-sufficient person. Even though the mind-basis-of-all, because it is the transmigrating entity, is indeed found to be the actual person when one searches to find it, it is not a self-sufficient person. Thus, the seventh mind is described as afflicted by four mental factors: view of a self, obscuration with respect to a self, pride in a self, and attachment to a self. When these mental factors are overcome through their antidote—realization of selflessness—the untainted entity of the seventh mind remains. Then, when the conception of subject and object as different entities is destroyed totally and forever at Buddhahood, the seventh mind is transformed into the wisdom of sameness cognizing all phenomena as equally free from a difference in entity between subject and object.

All Buddhist schools refute a certain type of self and accept another.²⁷¹ All deny that there is a permanent, single, independent self.

-- All except the Pudgalavadins (Proponents of a Person) deny that there is a substantially existent or self-sufficient person; they present the person as something other than these two. The Pudgalavadins assert a self which is neither the same as nor different from the mental and physical aggregates.

-- The Kashmiri Vaibhashikas and the Sautrantikas Following Scripture assert that the continuum of the mental and physical aggregates is the self.

-- The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning, the Chittamatrins Following Reasoning, and the Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas assert that a subtle form of mental consciousness is the self.

-- The Chittamatrins Following Scripture assert that the mind-basis-of-all is the self.

-- The Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas assert that the continuum of the mental consciousness is the self.

-- For Prasangika, none of these is the self, which is the I imputed in dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates.

Those who accept a consciousness as the actual self are specifically referring to the transmigrator, a neutral, subtle entity. They also accept that there is a self imputed to the aggregates, but in all systems except Prasangika 'only imputed' (prajñaptimatra, btags pa tsam) eliminates only that something separate from its bases of imputation is the self, not that the composite of the bases of imputation or any one of them is it. (i.e. Again, they think that not different means the same.) Therefore, Tugen (Thu'u-bkvan, 1737-1802) says that only in the Prasangika system does the word 'only imputed' have its full meaning.²⁷² In all the other systems something must be the self; otherwise, for them there could be no transmigration, activity, and so forth. They identify the mental consciousness or the continuum of the aggregates as the self. Their meaning of 'only imputed' carries the sense of identification with one or more of the bases of imputation. In the Prasangika system 'only imputed' means that also not any of its bases of imputation is the self; nonetheless, the imputed self or person can function. The mere-I is the transmigrator and the carrier of the seeds or potencies from one life to another. It is the object that gives rise to the thought 'I' in lifetime after lifetime. It is the I that is imputed or designated in dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates in the Desire and Form Realms and upon only the mental aggregates in the Formless Realm. THE CHITTAMATRINS, HOWEVER, ASSERT THAT THE MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL IS THE ACTUAL I SINCE IT IS THE TRANSMIGRATOR AND

CARRIER OF SEEDS.

Thus, it should not be thought that because the Buddhist systems deny self, there is no transmigrator. The non-Buddhist systems could not posit transmigration without a permanent self; the Buddhist schools of tenets, on the other hand, posit many different modes of transmigration without a permanent self.

The Chittamatrins following Asanga feel that because Buddha said that the six consciousnesses of a person do not function in deep sleep and in the meditative equipoise of cessation, etc., there must be another very subtle consciousness, the continuity of which keeps the person alive.²⁷³ Also, since the six consciousnesses have periods of non-existence, the seeds or predispositions, if stored there, would be destroyed, and the continuity of lives would be severed. Therefore, they posit the existence of a mind-basis-of-all. The schools that accept the mental consciousness or its continuum as the self answer that Buddha was referring to the coarse states of the mental consciousness and that there is a subtle, neutral, stable mental consciousness that passes from one lifetime to another and exists through the equipoises of cessation, bearing the continuity of the seeds.²⁷⁴

The Chittamatrins following Asanga accept that a mind-basis-of-all is accompanied by the five mental factors that accompany any consciousness—feeling, discrimination, intention, contact, and mental engagement. The absorption of cessation is nevertheless without coarse feeling and discrimination even though the mind-basis-of-all and its five factors are present because the feeling and discrimination that accompany the mind-basis-of-all are subtle and non-manifest. This same reasoning allows the other schools to posit a subtle mental consciousness that is accompanied by such subtle, non-manifest factors and thus to say that there is no need to assert a separate mind-basis-of-all as an eighth consciousness.²⁷⁵

L4: [PRASANGIKA POSITION ON THE MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL] :L4

In the Prasangika system, external objects, and not seeds, are what provide sense objects although the overlay of false appearance is produced from seeds. A mental consciousness, and not an afflicted mind, misconceives the nature of the person. A subtle mental consciousness, and not a mind-basis-of-all, abides throughout the ‘mindless’ states. The mere-I, not a mind-basis-of-all, transmigrates. The six consciousnesses are temporary bases of seeds; the mere-I, not the mind-basis-of-all, is the constant basis of the seeds.

The basis in Buddha’s own thought when he taught a mind-basis-of-all was emptiness, the basis of all phenomena which is to be minded well (*alayavijnana*). Taking *vijnana* not as referring to the agent or action of knowing but as the object, the Prasangikas see the mind-basis-of-all as referring to the ‘basis of all to be known well or in detail’, emptiness. Emptiness is the basis of all in that it makes possible all the various types of beings, nirvana, cyclic existence, and so forth.

Buddha’s purpose in teaching a mind-basis-of-all was to provide a base for the transmission of cause and effect through a continuum of lives for those disciples who could not understand the mere-I as the bearer of predisposing tendencies. The refutation of the explicit teaching is that, although a mind-basis-of-all is said to be impermanent, it is like the Samkhyas’ nature (*prakṛti*, *raṅg bzhin*) which contains all causes.²⁷⁶ Because the causes already exist, everything would necessarily be produced all of the time, or once and never again.

The Yogachara-Svatantrikas, who do not assert an external world, do not even conventionally assert a mind-basis-of-all; for them, a mental consciousness bears the seeds that create the appearance of an external world. Thus, it is said that no Madhyamika school asserts the existence of a mind-basis-of-all even though one Indian Madhyamika, Abhayakara, early in his life is said to have asserted a mind-basis-of-all.²⁷⁷ There are also a few passages in Nagarjuna's writings that refer to a basis-of-all, but these are said to refer to the mental consciousness that takes rebirth.²⁷⁸

Although Nagarjuna does say once in his Precious Garland and once in his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning that everything is included in the mind, the Gelugpas point to his Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment for his position:²⁷⁹

- :: A knower realizes an object known.
- :: Without an object known, there is no knower.
- :: (i.e. Inseparability of mind and world; non-duality: not two, not one.)

Also, many yogic treatises make reference to a basis-of-all (alaya, kun gzhi), but there the term means the nature of phenomena (dharmata, chos nyid), or emptiness.²⁸⁰ **THUS, NOT EVEN CONVENTIONALLY DO THE PRASANGIKAS ACCEPT A MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL; THEY SAY THAT THIS TEACHING POINTS TO EMPTINESS, THE BASIS OF ALL CHANGE.**

L4: [THREE NATURES] :L4

Buddha said that every phenomenon has Three Natures (trisvabhava, rang bzhin gsum):

- imaginary or imputed (parikalpita, kun btags), (i.e. dependent on the mind)
- other-powered (paratantra, gzhan dbang), (i.e. dependent origination)
- and thoroughly established (parinishpanna, yongs grub).²⁸¹ (i.e. emptiness)

There are an endless number of non-existent imaginaries, such as the horns of a rabbit or the hairs of a turtle, but according to the Chittamatra system the most significant imaginary nature of every phenomenon is its being a different entity from an apprehending subject. Buddha called attention to an illusory element in ordinary perception, the bifurcation of object and subject into separate entities, calling it 'imaginary' to show that it is utterly unfounded and should be eradicated.

Subject and object as different entities are **NON-EXISTENT IMAGINARIES**, as are objects that are established by way of their own character as bases of names and self-sufficient persons. Ordinary beings experience objects in an unfounded way, as if they were entities separate from themselves and as if they were naturally bases of the affixing of names, and conceive themselves to be the lord or controller of mind and body. Buddha called these elements imaginaries because they are mere reifications through names and thoughts and do not actually exist.

The objects that serve as the bases for misconceiving imaginaries are **OTHER-POWERED NATURES**. These are impermanent phenomena produced not by their own power but in dependence on specific aggregations of causes and conditions which are other than themselves. These phenomena lack independence, unable to remain any longer than their own one moment. By calling impermanent products 'other-powered natures', Buddha draws attention to the dependent nature of products, countering the usual tendency to see objects as if they exist in themselves. These phenomena are falsities because they appear to be natural bases of names and to be entities separate from a perceiving subject but are not. They are said to

deceive because they appear one way and exist another. However, products, though falsities, do not falsely exist; rather, they truly exist since they are produced from causes and conditions.

The non-existence of such an imaginary nature in a dependent nature is a THOROUGHLY ESTABLISHED NATURE. This is immutable and the final object of observation by a path of purification. An object which is a different entity from a subject does not exist; a subject which is a different entity from its object does not exist; these non-existences are emptinesses in the Chittamatra system. The emptiness of subject and object as different entities is named 'thoroughly established' in direct contrast to 'imaginary' in order to show that this is the highest quality of an object and should be sought. The thoroughly established nature includes the emptiness not only of subject and object as different entities but also of objects which are naturally existent as bases of names and of a self-sufficient person. 'Emptiness' in the Chittamatra system refers to these three.

All phenomena, from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses, have the three natures—even permanent phenomena such as space and emptiness, though for these the term 'dependent nature' does not mean 'that which is dependent on causes and conditions for its production' but just identifies the entity of permanent phenomena as a base of an imaginary nature and a thoroughly established nature. Or, according to another interpretation, the dependent nature of a permanent phenomenon refers to a consciousness which cognizes it and is an impermanent phenomenon dependent on causes and conditions.²⁸²

Products, or impermanent phenomena, themselves are dependent natures, and thus it should not be thought that a product is one thing and its dependent nature another. Among permanent phenomena, emptinesses are thoroughly established natures, and space, analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations are a special category of existent imaginaries, being imaginary in the sense that they appear to exist by way of their own character but do not, since they are posited in dependence on terms and thoughts. Space, for instance, is the mere absence of obstructive contact and is cognized by non-Buddhas only through inference—appearing to the mind through the elimination of obstructive contact.

A phenomenon's thoroughly established nature (ultimate truth) is not a different entity from its dependent nature (conventional truth). The relationship of the two is a sameness of entity within a difference of isolates. An emptiness is a dependent nature's own non-difference in entity between subject and object.

Emptinesses—that is, thoroughly established natures—truly, ultimately and naturally exist as do dependent natures, because the Chittamatrins consider that for an emptiness or a product to exist at all, it must ultimately exist.

L4: [PRASANGIKA VIEW ON THE THREE NATURES [the duality of the two truths: another adapted skillful means] :L4

THE PRASANGIKAS SAY THAT BUDDHA TAUGHT THAT THOROUGHLY ESTABLISHED AND DEPENDENT NATURES

TRULY EXIST IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE FRIGHT OF THOSE WHO COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW AN

EMPTINESS OR AN IMPERMANENT PHENOMENON COULD NOT TRULY EXIST BUT STILL EXIST. According to

the Prasangikas, the basis in Buddha's thought was the conventional existence of all phenomena, since objects are imputed by terms and thoughts, unfindable among their bases of

imputation, but conventionally existent.

The Prasangikas also substitute inherent existence as the chief non-existent imaginary in place of non-difference in entity between subject and object. In their interpretation the non-existence of dependent phenomena as this imaginary is a thoroughly established nature because no phenomenon ultimately exists and all phenomena exist only conventionally. Beings are called to identify a mistaken aspect in all ordinary perceptions, the appearance of objects as if they exist right there in their bases of imputation; such objects are called 'imaginaries' in order to show their unfounded character and the necessity of ridding oneself of the misperceptions and misconceptions of inherent existence. In the Prasangika system, the absence of inherent existence as a predicate of dependent phenomena is their thoroughly established nature, appearing in direct perception to exist the way it actually does. Emptiness is not a realm separate from the world of objects but their highest quality. Buddha implicitly exhorts yogis to discover and cognize it through giving it the name 'thoroughly established nature'.

An emptiness no more truly exists than any other phenomenon, but just as products can be cognized directly despite their lack of true existence, so an emptiness can be cognized directly despite its lack of true existence. Through accustoming oneself to its import, the cyclic existence which is generated through the conception of imaginaries can be stopped, and dependent natures can be seen as they are.

Since in Prasangika emptiness—the absence of inherent existence (svabhavasiddhi, rang bzhin gyis grub pa)—is the nature (svabhava, rang bzhin) of all phenomena, it should not be thought that svabhava is refuted in all its meanings. Svabhava meaning svabhavasiddhi or 'inherent existence' is refuted, but svabhava as 'final nature' or just 'character' (such as heat and burning as the character of fire) is not refuted. (i.e. Emptiness doesn't mean complete non-existence, that would be nihilism.)

The final nature that ordinary beings imagine in dependent phenomena is an imaginary, but for a Buddha the actual final nature is a thoroughly established nature. However, this does not mean that there are two ways of looking at dependent phenomena, one in which a dependent phenomenon itself becomes an imaginary and another in which it becomes a thoroughly established nature. Rather, the 'final nature' in reference to an untutored being is an imaginary because he or she conceives the inherent existence of dependent phenomena to be real, and the final nature in reference to a Buddha is a thoroughly established nature BECAUSE A BUDDHA CONTINUALLY PERCEIVES THE ABSENCE OF INHERENT EXISTENCE AS THE REALITY OF OBJECTS. The attempt here is to avoid making products into emptinesses, to preserve thoroughly established natures as the nature of phenomena and not make them the phenomena themselves even in the eyes of a Buddha. Still, Buddhas simultaneously and directly cognize all phenomena and their emptiness with the same consciousness.

L4: [THREE FINAL VEHICLES [another adapted skilfull means] :L4

All Buddhist systems of tenets, Hinayana and Mahayana, accept three vehicles: Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Great Vehicles.²⁸³ These are three different modes of practice for three different types of individuals.

THE VAIBHASHIKAS, SAUTRANTIKAS, AND CHITTAMATRINS WHO FOLLOW ASANGA accept that there are three final vehicles or, in other words, that there are some beings who never attain the

highest achievement because, after completing their lower vehicle, they do not pass on to the higher. Specifically, it means that there are some sentient beings who never attain Buddhahood.

-- FOR THE VAIBHASHIKAS, Shakyamuni Buddha is the only being of this period to attain Buddhahood; a Buddha is a being who accumulated the collections of wisdom and merit for three countless eons whereas the most that any other being is capable of achieving is in the neighborhood of one hundred eons, as in the case of a rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizer.²⁸⁴ Also, Buddha eradicated both obscurations, the afflictions of desire, hatred, and ignorance and the non-afflictive ignorance. The first prevents the attainment of liberation from cyclic existence, and the second prevents the attainment of an all-knowingness which in their system is not the simultaneous cognition of all phenomena but the knowledge of everything one by one. Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers have eradicated the afflictions, but they have merely abandoned the non-afflictive ignorance through non-attachment.²⁸⁵ Thus, for the Vaibhashikas, Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers are inferior to a Buddha and never attain Buddhahood; they finish their paths, and upon death the continuum of mind and body ceases in a remainderless nirvana. 'Remainderless' means that there no longer is any mind-body complex that derives its impetus from contaminated actions and afflictions; a remainderless nirvana is a substantiality (dravya, rdzas) and a functioning thing (bhava, dngos po) which is the cessation of the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence, its function being the prevention. Of obstructions.²⁸⁶ Since Vaibhashikas do not accept that a Foe Destroyer after death forms a new physical support through pure wishes and meditative powers, the attainer of a remainderless nirvana is said to be a person about to pass into extinction but not one who has passed into extinction, for there is no mind, body, or person after a remainderless nirvana.

-- THE SAUTRANTIKAS' assertion of three final vehicles is roughly similar; however, they assert that a remainderless nirvana is a phenomenon (dharma, chos), not a functioning thing (bhava, dngos po) but rather a non-affirming negative which is a nothingness. For the Hinayana schools, manifestation after the death of an enlightened being is impossible, whereas the Mahayanists disagree, comparing Hinayanists to Nihilists on this point.

-- THE CHITTAMATRINS WHO FOLLOW ASANGA also propound three final vehicles, saying that because sentient beings have different types of minds and different styles of behavior, their vehicles must also be different.²⁸⁷ Some beings want only their own happiness; some want others to suffer; some want happiness for themselves and desist from harming others; some want only the happiness of cyclic existence; some want only to liberate themselves from cyclic existence; and some want only to free others from cyclic existence. These differences of attitude and style of behavior arise from differences in faith and interest which in turn are due to the presence of different lineages. Since it is thus unquestionable that the various lineages are different in the causal state, in the effect state they would not all pass into only one vehicle.

These Chittamatrins, therefore, assert three final vehicles as well as Five Lineages. The five are:²⁸⁸

- those who from the point of attaining the path of accumulation right through to attaining the path of no more learning are Hearers, not changing or abandoning paths in mid-stream
- those who from beginning to end are Solitary Realizers
- those who from beginning to end are Bodhisattvas
- those who are indefinite, first in one vehicle and then another, either advancing upward as from a Hearer path to a Bodhisattva one, or falling downward as from a Bodhisattva path to a Hearer one

-- those who have no lineage for liberation from cyclic existence, will never free themselves from misery, and will never attain omniscience.

Hearers are so called because they hear the doctrine from others and when they attain the fruit of practice, cause others to hear that they have attained the goal, 'I have done what was to be done; other than this I will not know another existence.'²⁸⁹ Or in another etymology, Hearers are so called because they hear about the superior fruit of Buddhahood or its path from a Buddha and, without practicing it, proclaim it to others. According to the Chittamatrins following Asanga, the Hearers 'who travel only to peace', upon attaining the state of Foe Destroyer, do not pass on to the Mahayana but at death enter into a remainderless nirvana.

However, those Hearers do not become extinct but possess a wisdom of perpetual meditative absorption in the sphere of peace. They have eradicated the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence and through their meditation do not possess the obstructions to omniscience, but the latter have not been abandoned through their antidote, and, therefore, they are not Buddhas.²⁹⁰ Thus, Chittamatra, unlike the Hinayana schools of tenets, does not propound that the continuum of mind and body ceases in a remainderless nirvana because a Hearer Foe Destroyer is reborn in a pure land in meditative absorption inside a great lotus.²⁹¹ A distinctive feature of the Mahayana teaching is the assertion that pure wishes and meditative powers can cause one to be reborn in a pure land, whereas for the Hinayanists it is as if cleansing the process of rebirth involves destroying the ability to manifest. For the Mahayanists, the process of purification reveals increasing control over mind and matter to the point where Buddhas and Bodhisattvas even after their 'deaths' can appear simultaneously in many places in order to aid beings. That each Buddha has an immortal Enjoyment Body abiding in his Highest Pure Land is a Mahayana tenet not shared with Hinayana.

The Chittamatrins following Asanga say that there are other Hearers who complete their vehicle, attain the state of Foe Destroyer, and through the urgings of a Buddha, pass on to the Mahayana, eventually attaining Buddhahood.²⁹² They enter the Mahayana after attaining a nirvana with remainder. They have been liberated from cyclic existence but still possess a bodyremainder—that derives its impetus from contaminated actions and afflictions. However, they have attained nirvana because they have passed beyond sorrow, which is identified as the afflictive obstructions, the chief of which in the Chittamatra system is the conception that a person is a self-sufficient entity separate from the mental and physical aggregates. They enter the Mahayana and are empowered by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas so that although they appear to pass into a remainderless nirvana, they do not, remaining alive in a magical manifestation which not even the gods can see. They complete the collections of wisdom and merit, meditating on the non-difference in entity between subject and object, thereby destroying the obstructions to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena. Becoming Buddhas, they complete the Mahayana path.

The Chittamatrins following Asanga say that Buddha sometimes taught one vehicle rather than three in order to draw those of indefinite lineage into the Mahayana and to keep those Bodhisattvas who might fall to a lower path within the Mahayana. However, the Chittamatrins Following Reasoning—the Mahayana followers of Dharmakirti—answer that there is only one final vehicle,²⁹³ for contaminations are caused and, therefore, impermanent. Also, it is not that there is no means of eradicating the afflictions because through cultivating the antidotes to their causes all contaminations are eradicated. Also, it is not that there is a means but no one knows it because one who knows the nature of the causes knows their

antidotes. Also, it is not that there are none who seek it because the compassionate seek to overcome suffering. Also, it is not that there is no teacher of the means because a protector Buddha teaches a path he manifestly sees, knowing the effects of his teaching and thereby not erring.

L4: [ONE FINAL VEHICLE IN PRASANGIKA [emptiness as the basis of all] :L4

THE PRASANGIKAS AGREE THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE FINAL VEHICLE, saying that when Buddha taught

three final vehicles the basis in his own thought was that temporarily there are three different vehicles. His purpose in teaching three final vehicles was to overcome the fright of those who could not imagine completing the immeasurable collections of merit and wisdom of the Mahayana. The explicit teaching of three final vehicles is contradicted by the presence of a Buddha nature in every sentient being.

Just as the proponents of mind-only assert that a basis-of-all acts as the basis of the phenomena of cyclic existence and of nirvana, so the Madhyamikas assert that a natural lineage, or the mind's lack of inherent existence, acts as the base and support of all phenomena of cyclic existence and of nirvana.²⁹⁴ Emptiness should not, however, be confused with a physically pervasive entity that produces all phenomena. Emptiness is the base of all phenomena because due to the lack of inherent existence all the actions and agents of cyclic existence and of nirvana are possible. For if phenomena existed inherently, they would be independent and thus incapable of change through being acted upon by causes. Emptiness does pervade all phenomena in the sense that wherever there is a phenomenon there is an emptiness, but it is not a material substance that produces phenomena. Still, without it change would be impossible, and in this light emptiness can be viewed even as the 'substance' of phenomena.

Emptiness is not only the object of the highest wisdom and of the path of deliverance; it is the very justification of change, allowing beings of different types to reach the same high achievement. The mind's character of dependence on causes— its non-inherent existence—is the Buddha nature that makes Buddhahood possible for all.

L2: [6. (4th school) Madhyamika [and the divisions of Prasangika and Svatantrika] :L2

L4: [BACKGROUND [we need to combine both truths: conventional truths and emptiness; they are inseparable; the Middle Way: not accepting, not rejecting]] :L4

Sources:

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
- Tsong Khapa's Ocean of Reasoning

L5: [The Middle Way] :L5

In the Gelugpa monasteries of Tibet the Madhyamika system was studied through textbooks written as commentaries on Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Madhyamakavatara).²⁹⁵ Madhyamaka, in the title, refers to Nagarjuna's Madhyamakashastra and not to his other works because when Chandrakirti quotes the Madhyamakashastra, he merely says, 'From Madhyamaka,' whereas when he quotes Nagarjuna's other works, he refers to them by their own names. THE WORD MADHYAMAKA itself is formed from

the stem madhya meaning 'middle', with the affix ma yielding a derivative noun that has the same meaning as its base. Madhyama means 'the very middle' or 'the middlemost'. Bhavaviveka derives the affix ka from the verbal root for 'proclaiming', kai, thus taking madhyamaka as meaning 'that which proclaims the middle', that is, either a person, a system of tenets, or treatise that propounds the middle. In the case of Nagarjuna's title, it refers to a treatise setting forth the middle, or middle way not in the sense of the middle path but the middle way things are; therefore, the word Madhyamaka when used in this sense is translated as Treatise on the Middle Way even when it is not accompanied by the explicit word for 'treatise', shastra.

L5: [Nagarjuna's contribution] :L5

Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way extensively teaches both the profound emptiness and the extensive varieties of spiritual paths, etc. His text delineates reasonings that establish an emptiness of inherent existence as the final mode of existence of all phenomena, not with one or a few but many examples and through many approaches in twenty-seven chapters. The four noble truths, the two truths, nirvana, production, perception, etc. are analyzed with respect to activity, agent, and object, appropriator and appropriated, substance and attribute, and so forth.

IN HIS TREATISE, NAGARJUNA TREATS THE TWO TRUTHS EVEN MORE EXTENSIVELY THAN CHANDRAKIRTI DOES IN HIS SUPPLEMENT.

The Treatise teaches:296

- the nature of the two truths
- that if one does not know the two truths, one does not know the essence of Buddha's scriptures
- the purpose of teaching the two truths
- the faults of misconceiving the two truths
- that because the two truths are difficult to realize, Buddha did not teach them in the beginning.

Nagarjuna says:

1 (XXIV. 8)

- :: Doctrines taught by the Buddhas
- :: Rely wholly on the two truths,
- :: Worldly conventional truths
- :: And ultimate truths.

Truths are objects that exist the way they appear. Thus, conventional objects are truths only in the sense that they seem to exist the way they appear for an ignorant consciousness, a concealer (samvrti) of suchness through conceiving phenomena to exist inherently. Hence, all objects except emptinesses are conventional truths or truths-for-a-concealer. An emptiness, however, is a truth because it exists the way it appears to direct perception, this is, as empty of inherent existence. It is an ultimate truth, because among phenomena it is supreme since through meditating on it obstructions are removed and since it is the object of the highest wisdom.

2 (XXIV. 9)

- :: Those who do not comprehend
- :: The difference between these two truths
- :: Do not know the nature
- :: Of the profound doctrine of Buddha.

Those who do not know the difference between conventional and ultimate truths do not know the essence of Buddha's teaching, the principle of the profound dependent-arising. Therefore, one who wants to know the actuality of the Conqueror's teaching should comprehend the suitability of all actions, objects, and agents in dependently produced and dependently designated conventionalities that appear like a moon in water. Also, one must comprehend by that very reason the mode of the ultimate that abandons the two extremes of inherent existence and total non-existence.

3 (XXIV. 10)

- :: Without relying on conventions
- :: The ultimate cannot be taught.
- :: Without realizing the ultimate
- :: Nirvana is not attained.

Someone says, 'If the ultimate is a nature free of [dualistic] elaborations, then it needs to be taught, but what is the point of teaching conventionalities such as the aggregates, constituents, and sources? If the unreal is to be abandoned, there is no point in teaching what is to be abandoned.'

Answer: Although it is true that the erroneous—conventionalities that appear to be real but are not—are to be abandoned, the ultimate cannot be taught without depending on worldly ultimates such as object of expression, expresser, knowing, object known, and so forth—the conventions related with Superiors that are asserted to be conventional truths. Also, without teaching the ultimate, it cannot be realized, and without that, nirvana cannot be attained. Therefore, because of being the means of attaining liberation, just as one who wants water has need of a vessel, so initially one definitely should assert conventionalities just as they are.

4 (XXIV. 11)

- :: If emptiness is viewed wrongly,
- :: Those of small intellect are hurt,
- :: Like wrongly holding a snake
- :: Or wrongly using a spell.

A yogi who realizes that conventional truths produced merely through ignorance do not inherently exist and realizes their ultimate emptiness will not fall to the two extremes. For he does not conceive that an objectively existent nature, which formerly existed, now does not exist. Also, because he has not damaged (or refuted) worldly conventionalities that are like reflections, he has not damaged actions and their fruits (and thus does not fall to an extreme of nihilism). Such a yogi also does not falsely superimpose ultimate existence on phenomena because he has seen that actions and their fruits can occur in only non-inherently existent things; he knows that things do not inherently exist, and that all actions, their fruits, and so forth would not be possible if they inherently existed. Those, however, who see that phenomena do not inherently exist without perceiving such a difference between the two truths either think that things do not exist or impute true existence to emptiness and

thereby think that things inherently exist as bases of emptiness. These are both wrong ways of viewing emptiness, and in this way those with little intellect are hurt.

When they see that things do not inherently exist, it seems to them that there is no way of positing actions, agents, and objects, whereby they conclude that all does not exist—falling to a view of deprecation. Or, if they do not deprecate everything, they question how these things, while they are being apprehended, could be empty of inherent existence—concluding that the meaning of non-inherent existence is not the meaning of emptiness and thereby abandoning emptiness. Through this they accumulate an action (karma, las) resulting in being bereft of the doctrine and are born in a bad migration.

5 (XXIV. 12)

:: Therefore, realizing that the dull-witted
:: Would have trouble understanding this doctrine,
:: The mind of the Subduer
:: Turned away from teaching doctrine.

Since one who views emptiness wrongly is harmed and since those of little intelligence cannot apprehend the meaning of suchness correctly, after enlightenment Shakyamuni—when he saw the dispositions of sentient beings and the great profundity of the doctrine—knew that those of little intellect could not realize the depths of the profound doctrine of dependent-arising. Therefore, his mind turned away from teaching. (This, however, is accepted as being his first teaching, for his pretended retreat from teaching indicated the profundity of his doctrine and thereby generated interest.)²⁹⁷

Chandrakīrti did not treat all these topics in his Supplement, which is, therefore, less extensive than the Treatise though of greater length. A work is extensive not because of a great number of words, but because of covering many topics; for instance, Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization is short but its meanings are indeed vast. Therefore, Nāgārjuna's Treatise is more extensive than Chandrakīrti's longer Supplement.

Furthermore, the Treatise is not limited to an extensive explanation of emptiness; it also extensively sets forth the suitability of conventional phenomena within an emptiness of inherent existence as well as the four truths, actions and their effects, the Three Jewels, the eight levels of approaching and abiding in the fruits of Stream Enterer, Once Returner, Never Returner, and Foe Destroyer, and so forth. Jam-yang-shay-ba ²⁹⁸ says that if, as some scholars say, Nāgārjuna's Treatise does not set forth the varieties of phenomena, paths, and so forth, then to do so, it would be necessary to give a tally of the bugs in the world. Still, Jam-yang-shay-ba agrees that these varieties are not the principal object of discourse in the Treatise; the profound emptiness is. When Nāgārjuna identifies particular phenomena which are the bases of their own emptiness, he explicitly but secondarily indicates the paths, grounds, fruits, and so forth.

As Nāgārjuna says (XXIV. 14ab):

:: For whom emptiness is possible
:: For him all is possible.

The establishment of the phenomena of cyclic existence and nirvana is possible when emptiness is possible. If things inherently or naturally existed, they would be independent and could not be affected by causes and conditions. Emptiness, or the lack of inherent existence, makes possible production, abiding, and disintegration.

L5: [Chandrakirti's Supplement] :L5

Chandrakirti's Supplement reveals emptiness through far less forms than the Treatise; it is a supplement in that it fills certain holes in the Treatise that became apparent with the founding of the Chittamattra and Svatantrika systems. Nagarjuna wrote the Treatise during his second proclamation of doctrine which preceded the founding of those two systems. Therefore, the Treatise required clarification to show that it was not suitable to interpret its meaning according to those systems.

Chandrakirti also provides an extensive discussion of the three types of compassion (compassion observing sentient beings, observing sentient beings as qualified by momentary impermanence, and observing sentient beings as qualified by non-inherent existence), the ten Bodhisattva grounds, Buddhahood, and the cultivation of calm abiding on the fifth ground and special insight on the sixth. Jam-yang-shay-ba explains that Chandrakirti was not filling holes in the Treatise in the sense of providing what was incomplete or making extensive what was not already extensive, but rather in the sense of making the extensive more so and of taking secondary subjects as principal. He explains that Chandrakirti makes clear that students of the Treatise should practice the Bodhisattva paths and ascend the grounds.²⁹⁹

Chandrakirti wrote a commentary to his own Supplement; the founder of the Gelugpa order,

L5: [Tsong Khapa's Illumination] :L5

Tsong Khapa (1357-1419) wrote a commentary called Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"',

L5: [and everybody's debate about those] :L5

and the major Gelugpa monastic colleges have their own commentaries on both Chandrakirti's and Tsong Khapa's works, usually in the form of general explanations accompanied by debates. These works are the basis for the study of Madhyamika and more particularly of Prasangika, centering on the topic of the two truths.

L4: [TWO TRUTHS] :L4

Sources:

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings

L5: [Definition of the Two Truths: deceitful or not] :L5

The two truths are objects, not vague concepts of truth, beauty, and so forth.³⁰⁰ They are phenomena (dharma, chos), objects (vishaya, yul\ existents (sat, yod pa), and objects of knowledge (jnaya, shes by a).

TRUTHS ARE THOSE THINGS THAT EXIST THE WAY THEY APPEAR, and thus only ultimate truths

(paramarthasatya, don dam bden pa) or emptinesses qualify as truths. The other various and sundry objects do not exist the way they appear, except to Buddhas. These objects are truths only for a concealer of suchness, an ignorant consciousness; therefore, they are called truths-for-a-concealer (samvrtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa).

TRUTHS-FOR-A-CONCEALER ARE FALSITIES, appearing one way and existing another. Thus, since

only an ultimate truth can actually sustain the meaning of truth, it is not truths that are divided into the two truths. Objects of knowledge, or phenomena, are the basis of division of the two truths.

The Meeting of Father and Son Sutra (Pitaputrasamagama) says,
~ 'Objects of knowledge are exhausted in the two truths.'

¢(The two truths are the conventional truth and the ultimate truth.

¢-- The conventional truth is the mode in which things appear,

¢-- and the ultimate truth is the mode of being, or the way things really are. -- Ven.

Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche)

¢--

¢-- [Chandrakirti VI.23]

¢-- 66.

¢-- All things hold two entities:

¢-- Those that are found by seeing correctly and by seeing falsely.

¢-- It is said that the object of seeing correctly is thatness;

¢-- And that of seeing falsely a conventional truth.

L5: [The basis of division into the two truths] :L5

Since those which are divided into THE TWO TRUTHS ARE PHENOMENA (and the synonyms of 'phenomena'), each member of either division is a phenomenon, an object, an existent, and an object of knowledge. This means that an emptiness is a phenomenon, object, existent, and object of knowledge as are all other various and sundry objects.

AMONG SIX POSITIONS ON THE TOPIC OF WHAT IS DIVIDED INTO THE TWO TRUTHS WHICH ARE REFUTED BY

JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA IS THAT OF THE TRANSLATOR NGOK, (NGOG-LO-TSTSHA-BA BLO-LDAN-SHES-RAB) AND

HIS FOLLOWERS, WHO DO NOT ACCEPT THAT AN EMPTINESS IS AN OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE because the

mere non-finding of an object under analysis is just called an emptiness, and, thus, there is no phenomenon 'emptiness' existent there. Ngok's idea is that if an analytical consciousness cognized an emptiness, then that emptiness would necessarily inherently exist. For, an analytical consciousness is searching to find whether an object inherently exists or not, and if it 'finds' or cognizes an emptiness of inherent existence of that object, then it would seem that the emptiness must inherently exist since, according to him, it would be able to bear ultimate analysis. Therefore, according to him mere appearances are the basis of the division into the two truths and not objects of knowledge because an ultimate truth, that is, an emptiness, is not an object of knowledge.

THE GELUGPA ANSWER³⁰¹ to this is: An analytical consciousness investigating whether a table, for instance, is separate from its basis of designation, or is the composite of its bases of designation, or is some one of its bases of designation does not find a table. This very non-finding is an emptiness, and this non-finding is 'found' or cognized by an analytical consciousness. However, because an analytical consciousness is not investigating whether the emptiness of the table can be found, its 'finding' or cognizing the emptiness of the table, i.e., its lack of inherent existence, does not necessitate that the emptiness be inherently existent. This is because the analytical consciousness was not searching for the emptiness of the table but for the table. When, in turn, an analytical consciousness searches for the

emptiness of the table, it also cannot be found; an emptiness of the emptiness of the table is 'found'. This type of finding does not mean that the object can bear ultimate analysis; nothing can bear ultimate analysis; even an emptiness cannot.

Every emptiness is, in turn, qualified by an emptiness, necessitating an infinite regress, but this does not entail a fallacy just as there is no fallacy in the fact that there are an infinite number of causes that eventually lead to the production of a sprout. Infinite regresses are damaging only when they necessitate an impossibility; since the causal sequence that leads to the production of a sprout can stretch back through measureless time, there is no fallacy such as the impossibility of millions of causes having to occur in a tiniest moment.

Still, the situation with an infinite number of emptinesses is different from that of an infinite chain of causes over time. Since each emptiness of the emptiness of the emptiness of the emptiness, etc., of a table is a phenomenon, they must all be cognized by a Buddha if he is to be omniscient. Also, if first one emptiness is understood and then the mind turns to the next, and the next, and the next, there would be no time in which all the emptinesses related with just one object could be known. However, this is true only for the mode of cognition of emptiness by inference. An inferring consciousness first realizes the emptiness of a thing through the medium of a concept; then, through merely turning the mind to another object, its emptiness is immediately known. However, when emptiness is directly cognized—that is to say, without the medium of concepts and images—all emptinesses throughout all world systems are simultaneously known. The mind and its objects—all emptinesses are totally undifferentiated like fresh water poured into fresh water; a transformation has been effected that allows simultaneous cognition of the emptiness of everything.

Direct cognition of all emptinesses does not mean that all phenomena are directly known; rather, the mode of existence of all phenomena is realized. When a yogi has become familiar with direct cognition of emptiness on the Bodhisattva's path of meditation and has completed the necessary stock of merit, he becomes a Buddha, able to know directly and simultaneously both the emptinesses of all phenomena and the phenomena themselves. An analytical consciousness does not create an emptiness; it discovers the nature of a phenomenon; thus, an emptiness of an emptiness does not come into being when the first emptiness is understood. An emptiness, like any other phenomenon, is itself empty of inherent existence, just as hotness is the nature of red pepper even when it is not being tasted.³⁰²

The emptiness of one thing, though no different in color, shape, and so forth from another emptiness, is not the emptiness of another thing. However, because of their similarity of type, meditation on the emptiness of one thing functions as meditation on the emptiness of all things. For, having inferentially realized the emptiness of one thing, merely turning the mind to another subject yields cognition of its emptiness without having to rely again on the process of reasoning.

If the emptiness of one thing were the emptiness of another, one would be forced to accept that the lack of inherent existence of a pot is the lack of inherent existence of a person and that the apprehension of the inherent existence of a pot is the apprehension of the inherent existence of a person, but this is clearly not the case. One must understand that emptinesses are divided by way of their bases, that is, the things that are empty. Therefore, ultimate truth is not partless; otherwise, it would contradict the various scriptures that speak of two, four, sixteen, eighteen, etc., divisions of emptinesses. The

King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra says, 'Just as you have understood the discrimination of a self, so apply [this understanding of the lack of inherent existence] to all.'³⁰³ Having learned about the emptiness of the person, a yogi is to apply this understanding to all phenomena; therefore, knowing one emptiness inferentially does not mean that all emptinesses are already known. Otherwise, why, after knowing the emptiness of the person, would one have to apply it to other phenomena?

The presentation of emptinesses as different emphasizes the stage of the path concerned with developing an inferential understanding of emptiness. However, there is the powerful experience of utter undifferentiability of subject and object in a direct cognition of emptiness in which it seems that subject and object become more 'one' than the word 'one' could ever convey. For 'one' is always a composite of different things; there is no 'one' that can appear to thought which is not a composite. The Gelugpas must resort to the realm of exceptions and analogies at the time of presenting the mode of direct cognition of emptiness; all emptinesses in all world systems are realized, subject and object are like water in water, but for an outside 'observer' subject and object are different and each emptiness is different from every other emptiness. Sometimes, it seems as if the Geluk-bas deliberately disregard the more fantastic, relegating it to the realm of exceptions rather than attempting to blend the outlooks of higher experiences with their presentation. It seems as if they occasionally lose sight of the goal during their highly intricate philosophical maneuverings whereas other interpreters seem more content to keep the goal in mind and risk some apparent difficulties in presenting conventional objects.

This indeed is the way the difference between the Gelugpas and the non-Gelugpas often appears, if only because the Geluk-bas, having accepted the task of laying out all phenomena under the umbrella of valid establishment, must spend so much time in formulating conventionalities. However, there is a deeper point; in his tantra teaching Tsong Khapa objects to those who do not thoroughly practice the stage of generation—roughly speaking, imagination of oneself as a deity and one's surroundings as the environment of a deity. He objects to those who immediately, without ripening their mental continuum, rush to clear away all forms and abide in some sort of vacuity, which is not the vacuity that is a negative of inherent existence but nothingness.³⁰⁴ Similarly, Jam-yang-shay-ba says that in Tibet few have wished to meditate on emptiness and have called meditation on a vacuity of nothingness meditation on emptiness.³⁰⁵ For him and for Tsong Khapa, analytical meditation on emptiness involves reflection on the reasons why things do not inherently exist. The meditator should state to himself a subject, such as 'I', a predicate, such as 'do not inherently exist', and a reason, such as 'because of not being the same as or different from the mental and physical aggregates, mind and body'. Then, he should continue to prove the reason, reflecting on the meaning until conviction and the resultant intuition are generated. This type of meditation acts as an antidote to the misconception of inherent existence whereas mere withdrawal of the mind from the object I, though often felicitous, will not counteract the misconception of an inherently existent I.

In Gelugpa teachings, analysis is stressed, and emptiness is presented as the highest predicate, quality, or nature of each object—its lack of inherent existence. Non-perception of it is like not perceiving the best quality of everything one sees—their thoroughly established nature. The attempt to keep emptinesses individual is in order to emphasize that each and every one of these various and sundry objects lacks inherent existence; emptiness is not a vague negative, but a specific negative of inherent existence in each and every object. The content of wisdom is the incontrovertible cognition of this.

Other than saying that the experience of a direct cognition of emptiness is like fresh water poured in fresh water, of what benefit are words like 'one' in leading a yogi to the experience? The experience is entered through analysis, through gaining an inferential intuition into emptiness and directly attacking the very cause of cyclic existence, not through superimposing a vague concept on experience. Though most Tibetan orders, after the defeat of the Chinese Hoshang Mahayana, accept analysis, its use is often more limited for non-Gelugpas than for Gelugpas.

For Tsong Khapa an emptiness is an imputedly existent phenomenon like any other object, but for Ngok it is only a designation pointing to this non-finding of objects by an analytical consciousness. Jam-yang-shay-ba says that in that case an emptiness would not exist, and there would be no ultimate truths. These differing systems serve to highlight the fact that nothing can bear analysis. That the Gelugpas are able to view this non-finding as an object, an ultimate object, and as validly established allows them to take literally passages in sutras that others find require interpretation, such as the presentation of suchness as a phenomenon in the Meeting of the Father and Son Sutra above when it presents objects of knowledge—existents—as the basis of the division into the two truths. Still, suchness is a mere non-affirming negative of inherent existence, not a positive phenomenon, and when it is realized, one is not thinking, 'This is emptiness.'

THE NEXT POSITION THAT JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA REFUTES IS THAT OF TANGSAK-BA (THANG-SAGS-PA) WHO

SAYS THAT THE ENTITIES OF ALL PHENOMENA beginning with forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses and extending through to and including omniscient consciousnesses ARE THE BASES OF DIVISION INTO THE TWO TRUTHS.

The problem with this position is that since, for instance, a form would be a basis of division into a truth-for-a-concealer and an ultimate truth, the ultimate truth which is a division of the form would have to be a form in which case it would be composed of material particles. This, of course, is not Tang-sak-ba's intention; he means that every phenomenon, from a form through to an omniscient consciousness, has two entities, one a truth-for-a-concealer and the other an ultimate truth. However, Jam-yang-shay-ba would perhaps say that when searching for proper terminology, even unintended absurdities must be considered.

SOME SAY THAT NON-REIFIED OBJECTS ARE THE BASIS OF THE DIVISION INTO THE TWO TRUTHS. Just

objects which exist, not those falsely reified into existence, are divided into the two truths. To this Jam-yang-shay-ba makes the trifling objection that then reified systems, such as Samkhya which falsely reifies many objects, would not be truths-for-a-concealer whereas they are. Wrong systems, even if they involve reifications, do exist as systems.

DAKTSANG, IN TURN, IS CRITICIZED FOR HIS ASSERTION THAT NON-INVESTIGATED AND NON-ANALYZED

OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE ARE THE BASIS OF THE DIVISION INTO TWO TRUTHS. Daktsang's reason is

that under investigation and analysis nothing is found; thus, the two truths are only non-analytical. Jam-yang-shay-ba rejects this view because the two truths themselves are objects of intensive analysis. One would have to contradict Chandrakirti's statement that Madhyamikas are skilled in presenting what conventionally exists.³⁰⁶ Also, since an emptiness is found by an analytical consciousness, how can it be said that ultimate truths

are non-analyzed objects of knowledge?³⁰⁷ Jam-yang-shay-ba thereby also rejects Daktsang's view that objects of knowledge are established as existing by an ignorant consciousness, refusing a role for valid establishment in a presentation of what exists.

A FIFTH POSITION THAT TRUTHS ARE THE BASIS OF DIVISION is refuted by the fact that then truths-for-a-concealer would exist the way they appear, since they would be truths.

THE SIXTH IS ACTUALLY NOT A POSITION BUT A LACK OF INTEREST IN WHAT IS DIVIDED INTO THE TWO

TRUTHS despite extensive discussion on the two divisions; Jam-yang-shay-ba refutes this by saying that then the truths would be attributes without a substratum.

THUS, THE BASIS OF DIVISION INTO THE TWO TRUTHS IS ONLY OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE, and since all

existents are divided without residue into the two truths, there is no third or fourth truth. The four noble truths are included in the two truths, with true sufferings, origins, and paths being truths-for-a-concealer and true cessations being ultimate truths, that is, emptinesses within the continuum of those who have abandoned totally and forever any portion of the obstructions.

ALSO, THE TWO TRUTHS ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE AND A DICHOTOMY; in other words, if something

exists, it must be either a truth-for-a-concealer, or an ultimate truth. Thus, if something is a truth-for-a-concealer, it is not an ultimate truth, and if something is an ultimate truth, it is not a truth-for-a-concealer.

Jam-yang-shay-ba quotes the Meeting of Father and Son Sutra to prove through scriptural citation that there is no third truth:³⁰⁸

:: Without depending on others the Knower
:: Of the World taught these two truths,
:: Conventional and likewise ultimate—
:: A third truth does not exist.

He quotes Kamalashila's Illumination of the Middle Way to show that the two truths are mutually exclusive contradictories:³⁰⁹

~ 'With respect to phenomena that have the character of mutual abandonment [i.e., a dichotomy], when having refuted [that something under consideration] is the one, if it is [also] not established as the other, then it does not exist. Therefore, a position that is neither is not feasible.'

L5: [*** The Two Truths are not different, not the same ***] :L5

*** THE TWO TRUTHS ARE NOT DIFFERENT ENTITIES BUT ONE ENTITY WITHIN NOMINAL DIFFERENCE

***.310

If conventional and ultimate truths were different entities, the lack of inherent existence of a form would not be the final mode of existence of the form because it would be completely separate from the form. Just so, realization of the non-inherent existence of a form would not overcome the conception of the form as inherently existent. Also, a yogi's cultivation of high paths would be senseless because understanding emptiness would not be related with destroying misconception of the objects themselves. Similarly, a Buddha would

not have forsaken the apprehension of inherent existence because he would have only a powerless apprehension of an emptiness which was entirely separate from objects.

¢(i.e. The Two Truths are not different, but still not the same: remember this passage above:

¢-- (Karikas XXIV. 9)

¢-- Those who do not comprehend

¢-- The difference between these two truths

¢-- Do not know the nature

¢-- Of the profound doctrine of Buddha.

¢-- “Those who do not know the difference between conventional and ultimate truths do not know the essence of Buddha’s teaching, the principle of the profound dependent-arising. Therefore, one who wants to know the actuality of the Conqueror’s teaching should comprehend the suitability of all actions, objects, and agents in dependently produced and dependently designated conventionalities that appear like a moon in water. Also, one must comprehend by that very reason the mode of the ultimate that abandons the two extremes of inherent existence and total non-existence.”

¢-- i.e. So the Two Truths are not different, not the same; one cannot exist without the other; they are conceptually interdependent; they are said to be inseparable, non-dual: not two, not one. That is the meaning of the Union of The Two Truths.)

*** ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE TWO TRUTHS WERE UTTERLY THE SAME, EVERYTHING TRUE OF THE ONE WOULD BE TRUE OF THE OTHER ***.

In that case, for every truth-for-a-concealer such as desire and hatred which was overcome on the path, an ultimate truth also would be overcome. Just as truths-for-a-concealer have many dissimilar and different aspects such as color, shape, odor, and taste, so ultimate truths would be dissimilar and different. Just as many truths-for-a-concealer are afflictions, so many ultimate truths would also be afflictions. Just as common individuals directly cognize truths-for-a-concealer such as forms, sounds, odors, and tastes, so they would absurdly directly cognize the emptiness of forms and so forth.

Therefore, the two truths are not different entities; they are the same entity. This is what the Heart of Wisdom (the Heart Sutra) means when it says that emptiness is form and form is emptiness.³¹¹ The two truths are not one, but are nominally different, for they appear differently to thought. The relationship is called a oneness of entity but a difference of isolates or opposites of the negatives. The negative of truth-for-a-concealer is non-truth-for-a-concealer, and its opposite is non-non-truth-for-a-concealer, which indeed is truth-for-a-concealer but as known through a negative route. Similarly, the negative of ultimate truth is non-ultimate truth, and its opposite is non-non-ultimate truth. Because non-truth-for-a-concealer is different from non-ultimate truth, the opposites of the negatives are also said to be different.

The meaning can be more easily seen with an example. Take table and product. If the mind turns to deciding whether the two are different, it determines whether there are any non-tables which are products and any non-products which are tables. When it is said, pointing at the basis of the imputation ‘table’, ‘This is a table,’ and ‘This is a product,’ it is not obvious just from the statement whether only tables are products. It then must be seen that there are non-tables, such as cups, which are products and that there are no non-products which are tables because non-products are either permanent phenomena or

non-existents. From this approach, non-table and non-product are different, and thus it is said that the opposites of those negatives, non-non-table and non-non-product, are different. However, table and product are the same entity just because a table is a product. Though there are products which are not tables, product is the same entity as table because there is no generality product which is a separate entity from its specific instances, such as tables, houses, fences, mountains, and so forth.

A truth-for-a-concealer and an ultimate truth are a case of two phenomena which are the same entity and different opposites of the negatives with the two terms being mutually exclusive; nothing can be both. Product and table are the same entity and different opposites of the negatives within the relationship of a generality and its particular instance. Impermanent thing and product are the same entity and different opposites of the negatives wherein the two terms are not mutually exclusive but synonymous because all instances of either are instances of the other. They are nevertheless one entity but different opposites of the negatives and not utterly one because the mention of the one does not necessarily entail the appearance to the mind of the other. Still, product and impermanent thing are synonyms, the first being a thing from the viewpoint of its being made by causes and conditions and the second from the viewpoint of its disintegrating moment by moment. In the same way, khyi (which means 'dog' in Tibetan) and dog are the same entity and different opposites of the negatives because when 'khyi' is said, 'dog' does not necessarily appear to the mind. Only khyi and khyi are the same entity and the same opposite of the negative, or more strictly, the same isolate.

These distinctions yield a sense of the impact for this writer when, after a discussion of the fresh water poured into fresh water metaphor for the direct cognition of emptiness, the late Gelugba scholar and tantric abbot, Kensur Lekden, leaned toward me and said that it almost seems as if the cognizer and cognitum are one opposite of the negative.

Nagarjuna says in his *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment*³¹² that the two truths are like product and impermanent thing; however, his example is said³¹³ not to show that the two are synonyms but that they are the same entity, with the existence of one being impossible without the existence of the other. That the two truths are not synonyms is determined through the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought*,³¹⁴ which nevertheless does not explicitly state that they are the same entity and different opposites of the negatives. In a similar vein, Tsong Khapa reports that some have said that the two truths, though not different entities, have a difference which is a mere negation of their being one.³¹⁵

L5: [Emptiness of other vs. emptiness of self] :L5

The Jo-nang-bas hold that the two truths are different entities.³¹⁶ Theirs is a view of 'EMPTINESS OF OTHER'—an ultimate truth is empty of being a truth-for-a-concealer and a truth-for-a-concealer is empty of being an ultimate truth. This is said to be similar to the Samkhya teaching that the root of cyclic existence is the confusion of the person and the nature and that liberation is gained by realizing that the person is not the manifesting nature and that the manifesting nature is not the person. Through differentiating the two, a yogi is released from cyclic existence.

For a Gelugpa, it is true that an ultimate truth is not a truth-for-a-concealer and vice versa, but this distinction does not constitute emptiness. An emptiness is a phenomenon's own lack of inherent existence; thus, this doctrine is called 'EMPTINESS OF SELF' which does not mean that a table is empty of being a table but that a table is empty of its own

inherent existence. Otherwise, if a table were empty of itself, there would be no tables and, by extension, no phenomena; an emptiness would also be impossible because an emptiness would be empty of being an emptiness.

The Jo-nang-ba assertion of a difference of entity between the two truths contradicts the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, but it does reflect the Gelugpa acceptance that at the time of direct cognition of emptiness (by anyone except a Buddha) none of the conventional phenomena which are the bases of the quality emptiness appear to the mind. A direct cognition of emptiness is non-dual in four ways:³¹⁷ (1) all appearances of inherent existence have ceased, (2) all appearances of conventionalities have ceased, (3) all appearances of subject and object have ceased, and (4) all appearances of generic images (or conceptual meaninggeneralities) have ceased.

L5: [Before realizing the Perfect Union of the Two truths (Buddhahood) they are seen as opposites – but they are inseparable, non-dual: not two, not one] :L5

The disappearance of conventional phenomena is said to be due to the mind's concentration solely on emptiness and due to the cessation of the five sense consciousnesses. Until Buddhahood a direct cognition of suchness precludes cognition of other phenomena just as cognition of other phenomena precludes direct cognition of emptiness; the stains of the mind are such that the one blocks the other.³¹⁸ When anyone except a Buddha directly realizes emptiness, merely the quality emptiness appears without the appearance of the qualificands—the phenomena which are empty.

Thus, though the two truths are inextricably related, it is possible to perceive one and not the other; common beings perceive truths-for-a-concealer without perceiving ultimate truths, and sentient beings in meditative equipoise on emptiness perceive ultimate truths without perceiving truths-for-a-concealer. However, if it is wrongly viewed that an ultimate truth is a different entity from a truth-for-a-concealer, an emptiness could not be the final mode of existence of phenomena and meditation on it would not serve to dissolve misconceptions about the nature of objects.

An ultimate truth, or more literally, a highest object truth (paramarthasatya, don dam bden pa) is so called because an emptiness is the most exalted of all phenomena and is the object of the wisdom that realizes suchness.³¹⁹ It is a truth because it exists the way it appears in direct cognition. Truths-for-a-concealer (samvrtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa) are so called because all other objects are assumed by ignorance to exist the way they appear. An ignorant consciousness is not just a consciousness which does not know suchness but a concealer of suchness through actively assenting to the false appearance of objective existence. Even in direct sense perception, forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects appear to exist inherently, as if they existed in their own right. All phenomena except emptinesses appear to the cognizers that certify them as existing as if they exist inherently. Since the ignorance that assents to this appearance is the root of cyclic existence, its role in everyday perceptions is emphasized through naming all phenomena except emptinesses 'truths-for-a-concealer', truths for ignorance.

Even for Foe Destroyers and eighth ground Bodhisattvas, who have totally and forever overcome the conception that phenomena inherently exist, phenomena still appear to exist inherently, to be their bases of imputation, but these liberated beings know that they are not. Like magicians who see their own creations but, unlike the deceived audience, know them to be illusions, Foe Destroyers and eighth ground Bodhisattvas have destroyed ignorance and

know that phenomena do not inherently exist. Therefore, it is only through their knowledge of how other beings conceive conventionalities that these conventionalities are still for them truths-for-a-concealer. Though they have destroyed the concealer of suchness in their own continuums, they realize how others misconceive phenomena.

To a Buddha, conventionalities appear the way they exist, for a Buddha has eradicated not only the afflictions, the chief of which is the ignorance that misconceives the nature of phenomena, but also the appearance of inherent existence caused by beginningless conditioning to ignorance. Therefore, the explanation that conventionalities do not exist the way they appear does not hold true for a Buddha. Still, even for a Buddha conventionalities—all phenomena except emptinesses—are truths-for-a-concealer because he knows how things are perceived and conceived by others.

L5: [The emptiness of the Two Truths; but still very useful concepts] :L5

Chandrakirti etymologizes the word *samvrti* of *samvrtisatya* as ‘concealer’ (*samantadvarana*, *sgrib byed*), ‘conventionality’ (*vyavahara*, *tha snyad*), and ‘interdependence’ (*parasparasambhavana*, *phan tshun rtenpa*).³²⁰ All existents except emptinesses are conventional truths and interdependent existents. They are conventional in the sense that they are conventions as consciousnesses or expressions or as objects of consciousness or expressions. They are interdependent in the sense that doer depends on doing and doing depends on doer, etc. However, the latter is only an etymology and not a definition, FOR AN EMPTINESS IS ALSO INTERDEPENDENT IN THAT IT DEPENDS ON THE PHENOMENON OF WHICH IT IS THE

FINAL MODE OF BEING.³²¹ Just as the nature of a phenomenon depends on that phenomenon, so the phenomenon also depends on its nature. Furthermore, an emptiness depends on the meditative equipoise that certifies it, and it also depends on its basis of imputation, the non-inherent existence of an object. Thus, though all phenomena are interdependent, conventionalities are called interdependent existents in order to stress their false appearance as if they exist in and of themselves.

Since neither ultimate truths nor truths for a concealer inherently exist, THE DIVISION OF THE TWO TRUTHS IS NOT AN ONTOLOGICAL DIVISION. BOTH EXIST ONLY CONVENTIONALLY (*samvrtisat*, *kun rdzob tu yod pa*) with *samvrti* here referring to a valid dualistic cognizer; both truths exist for valid dualistic cognizers and not in ultimate analysis. The division of the two truths emphasizes two types of objects of consciousness, truths and falsities. BOTH, HOWEVER, ARE FALSELY EXISTENT OR FALSELY ESTABLISHED BECAUSE NEITHER IS INDEPENDENT; EACH DEPENDS ON ITS IMPUTING CONSCIOUSNESS AND ON THE OTHER.

Whether understood by a particular being or not, emptiness is forever established as the nature of objects, which do not gain non-inherent existence through being cognized as lacking inherent existence. They never did, never do, and never will inherently exist. Emptiness is validated by a consciousness of meditative equipoise, and there has always been someone cognizing emptiness.³²² Though each person needs to validate it for himself, this does mean that because it is not validated for someone, it is not validated in general. If this were the case, it would be difficult to establish the existence of anything.

For Prasangika nothing exists objectively, that is to say, as if of its own will right with its basis of imputation. Prasangika philosophy, though emphasizing the subjective element,

is still not a turn to utter subjectivity in which what exists for the individual is what exists. There are standards and criteria for valid establishment, and in this sense both suchness and the phenomena qualified by it are objective.³²³ The division into two truths on epistemological grounds is a call to eradicate ignorance and to attain the highest wisdom. It is a call to recognition that a conventional cognizer, even if valid with respect to the existence or non-existence of objects, is not valid with respect to their suchness. It is a call to a new mode of perception, to a cognition of a reality that has been ever-present.

The two truths are not vague realms of misty truth as suggested by translations which use the singular, such as 'Absolute Truth' and 'Conventional Truth'. In Sanskrit and Tibetan the singular is used for a class name whereas in common English usage a general term is most often either in the plural, or in the singular with the indefinite article 'a'. It would be correct to refer to conventional truths as 'Conventional Truth' only if it were suitable to refer to tables as table, e.g., 'Table is object,' rather than 'Tables are objects.'

However, translating paramarthasatya in the singular as 'ultimate truth' even without an article can be considered a matter of choice depending on the context, because though there are many types of emptinesses, they are only enumerated as such in accordance with the various types of phenomena that are bases of the quality emptiness. Still, at least in the Gelugpa interpretation the emptiness of one thing is not the emptiness of another in the sense of exact identity, and from this viewpoint the term has often been translated here either in the singular with the article 'an' as 'an ultimate truth' or in the plural as 'ultimate truths'. Despite this, when referring to a direct cognition in which all emptinesses are simultaneously realized, it seems cumbersome to say, 'A yogi directly cognizes ultimate truths', because it seems to imply that only some ultimate truths are being cognized. Rather, usage of the singular as in, 'A yogi directly cognizes ultimate truth in a totally non-dualistic manner,' or 'A yogi directly cognizes emptiness after having become accustomed to an inferential realization,' at least suggests that there is no ultimate truth which at that point is not being cognized. The meaning, nevertheless, is not amorphous, but specific; an emptiness is a phenomenon's lack of inherent existence. Thus, one 'reflects on an emptiness' or 'generates an inferential cognition of an emptiness' because it is the emptiness of a specific phenomenon that is being reflected upon and realized.

Also, for paramartha, 'ultimate' is a better translation than 'Absolute' because 'Absolute' suggests something that exists in and of itself, independently, whereas nothing is independent in the Madhyamika system, even an emptiness.

L5: [Emptiness doesn't deny valid conventional truths] :L5

As was said earlier, a truth-for-a-concealer is not established as existing by a concealer—an ignorant consciousness. Its erroneous inherent existence is 'established' by ignorance. Since the mere existence of truths-for-a-concealer is not refuted by emptiness, the division into the two truths is not of mental objects into those of the stupid and those of the wise. THE CONVENTIONAL EXISTENCE OF OBJECTS IS CERTIFIED BY VALID COGNIZERS AND NEVER ERADICATED BY ULTIMATE ANALYSIS, WHICH REFUTES ONLY THE INHERENT EXISTENCE OF OBJECTS, BOTH CONVENTIONALLY AND ULTIMATELY. Once ultimate analysis establishes that the inherent existence of an object cannot be found, it cannot be found ultimately or conventionally; hence, the doctrine of the two truths is not a concession to the ways of ignorance.

Chandrakirti establishes that even conventionally objects are not their bases of imputation; even conventionally objects are merely interdependent.

This does not mean that when a truth-for-a-concealer, such as a chair, is perceived, a common being perceives it as a truth-for-a-concealer.³²⁴ Though one must depend on truths-for-a-concealer, such as words, definitions, examples, and so forth, in order to realize an ultimate truth, one must gain an understanding of an ultimate truth—an emptiness—in order to realize that a truth-for-a-concealer is just a truth-for-a-concealer. Beings whose minds have not turned toward emptiness do not actually know truths-for-a-concealer as such, though indeed they perceive and use them every day. Thus, the name ‘truth-for-a-concealer’, itself is a call toward an understanding of emptiness. The same impact is present when samvrtisatya is taken as ‘conventional truth’, for it implies that there is a non-conventional analytical consciousness for which these objects do not exist the way they appear. Also, samvrtisatya as ‘interdependent existent’ calls for a recognition of the lack of independent or inherent existence. However, the most forceful meaning of samvrtisatya is ‘truth-for-a-concealer’ which is used so predominantly that Jam-yang-shay-ba points out that it is not the only etymology of the term.³²⁵

In the Prasangika system there is no division of truths-for-a-concealer into the real and the unreal from the point of view of a reasoning consciousness because all are unreal in the sense of being falsities that do not exist the way they appear.³²⁶ However, based on the world’s discrimination of what is true or untrue, real or unreal, through determining whether, with respect to impermanent objects, they can perform functions in accordance with their appearance, the Prasangikas accept a division of truths-for-a-concealer into the real and unreal. The unreal are objects such as a mirror image which appears to be a face but cannot perform the functions of a face. A mirror image exists, however, and, therefore, can be classed among the two truths. An example of a real conventional truth is a face.

Even though an ignorant consciousness accepts an inherently existent person to be true, an inherently existent person is not a truth-for-a-concealer, real or unreal, because such does not exist. Therefore, the etymology of samvrtisatya as an object which the concealer, ignorance, takes to exist the way it appears is wider than the actual meaning of the term. Things that ignorance assumes to be true but do not at all exist cannot be classed among the two truths, which are only existents. Thus, the name ‘truth-for-a-concealer’ is not a definition. Just as Buddha said that all products are deceptive, so his choice of a name for conventional objects, ‘truths-for-a-concealer’, points to an error in the perception of them: they seem to exist in and of themselves, but do not.

L4: [INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE AND PHENOMENA] :L4

Sources:

- Geshe Gedun Lodro’s oral teachings
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.595-623

L5: [Definitive sutras, and those requiring interpretation – but, still, the real absolute truth is beyond all conceptualization and has to be directly realized] :L5

SUTRAS THAT MAINLY AND EXPLICITLY TEACH ULTIMATE TRUTHS ARE DEFINITIVE (nitārtha, nges don)

because the mode of existence of the phenomena discussed in such passages is definite as just what is said.³²⁷ No further interpretation is necessary to discover the way things are.

Though a direct cognition of ultimate truth cannot be described exactly as it is, the cognition and its object can be taught.³²⁸ For example, as Chandrakirti says, if one without cataracts tells another who has and sees hairs falling before him, 'There are no hairs here,' the person with cataracts will not realize the lack of hairs the way the person without the disease does; however, it cannot be said that he does not realize the non-existence of the hairs. In the same way, when someone who lacks the contaminations of the darkness of ignorance teaches about suchness, a listener cannot realize it the way the speaker does, but it is accepted that in general it is not that he does not realize suchness.

When Shantideva says that 'the ultimate is not an object of the mind', he means that it is not an object of direct perception by a dualistic mind.³²⁹ A non-dualistic wisdom consciousness, which in relation to its cognitum emptiness is like water poured into water, is needed in order to know an emptiness just as it is experienced by a Superior. Kensur Lekden said that after direct cognition a yogi intensely wishes to tell others how it is, but NO WORDS SUCCEED.

Sutras that mainly and explicitly teach truths-for-a-concealer require interpretation (neyartha, drangdon). Because the mode of being of the phenomena discussed in such passages is not explicitly presented, it is necessary to search out a mode of being other than what is explicitly said. In other words, sutras that do not explicitly teach emptiness must be interpreted in order to understand it. Their subjects may be validly established, but the final mode of being of these subjects is not explicitly mentioned.

Also, sutras that teach non-existent objects, such as a permanent self, must be interpreted to discover Buddha's intention in preaching such a doctrine to a particular type of trainee. The teaching of a permanent self has as its basis Buddha's thought that there is continuous rebirth. The purpose is to influence listeners, who for the time being cannot posit an impermanent self without becoming morally nihilistic, to accept cause and effect and thereby generate devotion to virtue which yields rebirths of high status. The teaching of a permanent self is refuted by the reasoning that a permanent self cannot be reborn since what is permanent cannot change.

Other sutras must be interpreted just to discover what is being said. For instance, a passage that says, 'Father and mother are to be killed,' does not even say that father and mother are to be killed. Rather, it says that 'existence'—the fully potentialized latency that in the next moment will become a new life—and 'attachment', which nourishes this latency (see pp.280-1), must be destroyed. Such passages must be interpreted first to determine what is being said and then to determine the mode of existence—emptiness—of the phenomena discussed.

In definitive sutras the mode of being is definite right there in the texts, but this does not mean that literal passages requiring interpretation are indefinite in the sense of not being validly established.³³⁰ 'Definitive' here connotes not only validity but also ultimacy.

'Sutras' are passages spoken by Buddha and not necessarily whole texts; even a few words or a phrase can be a sutra. Thus, because ALL ACTUAL PERFECTION OF WISDOM SUTRAS ARE DEFINITIVE, some phrases in books called Perfection of Wisdom Sutras which set forth conventionalities, such as the location of the discourse, are not actual Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. For they require interpretation to determine the final mode of being of the

phenomena discussed, such as the location's emptiness of objectively established existence. Also, because actual Perfection of Wisdom Sutras are literal, though the phrase, 'There are no forms', is accepted as spoken by Buddha, Buddha did not speak a phrase teaching that there are no forms. He taught that forms are not inherently existent as is clearly specified in various Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, such as the Heart of Wisdom; this qualification is extended to all similar instances in the text. Buddha never taught that there are no forms because teaching or not teaching a doctrine is determined on the basis of whether there is or is not a student for it. There must be a special or specific type of trainee for a teaching, and there are no special students for a teaching that there are no forms. Buddha taught that forms do not inherently exist, that forms are impermanent, that forms are not different entities from perceiving consciousnesses, and so forth.

L5: [The difference between Chittamatrins and Prasangikas about which sutras are definitive]
:L5

THE CHITTAMATRINS, unlike the Prasangikas, do not make a division of definitive and requiring interpretation on the basis of whether ultimate or conventional truths are taught but on the basis of whether the teaching in the sutra is literally acceptable. This means that for the Chittamatrins all sutras of which the teaching is validly established, such as of the five aggregates, are definitive; those which are not validly established, such as of a self-sufficient person, require interpretation.

For the Chittamatrins, the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras are nevertheless the supreme of all Buddha's sutras, but their speaking of an absence of natural existence is not said to be literal. For them, Perfection of Wisdom Sutras are not definitive and require interpretation, not because their subject matter is secondary but merely because they are not literal. The special students of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras must be of sharper faculties than those of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, a definitive sutra, because from the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras themselves they must be able to determine the Chittamatrin presentation of the three natures and so forth without relying on a text, such as the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, which clearly differentiates what does and does not truly exist.

THE SVATANTRIKAS agree with the Prasangikas that definitive sutras mainly and explicitly teach emptiness. However, the Svatantrikas hold that a definitive sutra must be literal. For instance, the Heart of Wisdom Sutra where it says that phenomena do not inherently exist is non-literal because it requires qualification to indicate that ultimately (paramarthatas, don dam par) phenomena do not exist inherently, since for Svatantrikas phenomena inherently exist conventionally. In the Svatantrika school, to be literal a sutra that teaches ultimate truths must specify 'ultimately' in its refutation of inherent existence, though it need not be specified explicitly in every instance.

L5: [The Four Reliances – going beyond sectarianism, dogmatism and conceptualization] :L5

That scriptural passages are to be divided into definitive and requiring interpretation is taught in sutra itself through THE FOUR RELIANCES:331

- rely on doctrine, not on persons;
- rely on meaning, not on words;
- rely on definitive sutras, not on those requiring interpretation; and
- rely on wisdom, not on knowledge.

Initially, at the time of hearing the teaching, one should not rely on the person of the teacher, looking to his fame, wealth, and so forth. Rather, one should listen to anyone's

teaching that explains the path out of suffering. One should not take the words as most important but mainly pay attention to the meaning. Again, when thinking about the teaching, one should take definitive sutras as most important and should recognize that those requiring interpretation are a means of realizing the definitive—emptiness. When practicing, one should not feel satisfied with just the knowledge arising from hearing and thinking but should devote oneself to generating the non-conceptual wisdom arising from meditation.

The two types of scriptures are also differentiated in sutras teaching that all products are falsities, thus establishing that passages propounding the non-true existence of products are definitive. (Sutras often take products as their examples of falsities, but this does not mean that non-products, such as space, are not falsities. Rather, products are the chief of objects encountered by common beings and, therefore, are singled out as falsities, appearing one way and existing another.)³³²

Nagarjuna's refutation of production, establishing that production does not inherently exist, indicates through reasoning that sutras which speak of inherently existent production or do not mention the actual empty status of production require interpretation. Consequently, sutras that specify production as lacking inherent existence are definitive.

Nagarjuna himself did not explicitly state in any of his works on which sutra he was relying for his differentiation of sutras into two types.³³³ However, one can infer from his mode of procedure that he was relying on the Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra which is quoted as a source for the differentiation by Chandrakirti in his Clear Words, by Avalokitavratā in his commentary on Bhāvaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom' (prajnapradīpa), and by Kamalashīla in his Illumination of the Middle Way.

It is said that the Prasāṅgika system presents Buddha's own final differentiation of the two types of scriptures even though it contradicts the thought of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, which the Chittamatrins use as their basis for the division. However, it does not contradict Buddha's thought when he taught the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, in that the latter merely accords with the mentality of certain Mahāyāna disciples who were incapable of comprehending the final teaching. It is similar to the non-contradiction in terms of Buddha's own thought when he taught Hīnayānists that killing was totally forbidden but taught Mahāyānists that killing is permitted in certain circumstances. (Bodhisattvas—some say eighth grounders and above and some say first grounders and above—may, in order to help others, commit seven of the ten non-virtues: killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, speaking harshly, speaking divisively, and chattering senselessly.³³⁴ However, they are never allowed to commit the three mental non-virtues—covetousness, harmfulness, and wrong views. In general, these seven non-virtues are permitted when they are the only possible way to stop someone from bringing great harm on himself or others; thus, they are performed altruistically, not with an intent to harm.)

L5: [The Three Turnings of the Wheel] :L5

The Sutra Unravelling the Thought sets forth THREE TURNINGS OF THE WHEEL of doctrine by Buddha. The division into three is made according to subject matter, specifically the manner in which selflessness is presented.³³⁵

-- The first turning is comprised of sutras that set forth the selflessness of persons but do not refute that phenomena are established by way of their own character as bases of names and conceptions.

-- The second is comprised of those that on the literal level set forth the non-true

existence of all phenomena, without distinguishing that some do and others do not truly exist.

-- The third is comprised of those that clearly discriminate the true existence of emptinesses and impermanent phenomena and the non-true existence of imaginary phenomena.

Since THE CHITTAMATRINS follow the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, they assert that all sutras of the first and second wheels require interpretation whereas all those of the third wheel are definitive.

THE PRASANGIKAS, on the other hand, assert that the first and third wheels as explained in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought require interpretation and that the middle wheel is definitive.

The three wheels of doctrine can also be arranged in a different manner.

-- In this system the first wheel is comprised of sutras mainly spoken for Hinayana disciples, teaching the four noble truths and concordant topics. 'Hinayana disciples' are Hearers and Solitary Realizers, who do not have separate wheels of the teaching because Solitary Realizers can attain their paths in reliance on the Hearers' division of the teaching.

-- The second wheel is comprised of sutras mainly spoken for Mahayanists, those of the wheel of signlessness, such as the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras and so forth, as well as those teaching concordant topics.

-- The third wheel is comprised of sutras mainly spoken for Mahayanists, those of the wheel of good discrimination, such as the Sutra Unravelling the Thought and so forth as well as those teaching concordant topics.

According to the Prasangikas, a sutra of the first wheel, which is meant for Hinayanists, is not necessarily a first wheel sutra as set forth in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, for according to the Prasangika system, Hinayanists cognize the same selflessness as Mahayanists, and therefore, many first wheel passages do not require interpretation. Without realizing the emptiness of inherent existence through understanding that analytically findable existence does not occur, liberation is impossible. Thus, a central Prasangika tenet is that some Hinayana scriptures also teach the final mode of being of objects.³³⁶

L5: [*** The Middle Way: Dependent Origination and emptiness are not different, not the same; they are inseparable, non-dual: not two, not one ***] :L5

Without understanding the mode of being of objects—without understanding that objects are not their own final mode of being —no one, Hinayanist or Mahayanist, can uproot the basis for the afflictions that bind beings in cyclic existence, the mistaken notion that objects exist from their own side right with their bases of designation.

THUS, BOTH HINAYANISTS AND MAHAYANISTS—those motivated primarily to get out of cyclic existence for themselves and those mainly seeking others' welfare—MUST COGNIZE THE MIDDLE WAY BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF OVER-CONCRETIZED EXISTENCE AND NO EXISTENCE AT ALL, SEEING THE COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN EMPTINESS AND DEPENDENT-ARISING.

To accomplish this, a practitioner must distinguish between what teachings are definitive in that they present the final mode of subsistence of objects and what teachings require

interpretation to arrive at that final mode of being. This differentiation, moreover, is not limited to scriptures, but must be carried over to objects as well—emptinesses being definitive and all other objects requiring interpretation to arrive at their final mode of subsistence. The basis of this is a division of hermeneutics in Madhyamika into two categories—of the objects of expressions (brjod bya ‘i drang nges) such as chairs, tables, bodies, and emptinesses; and of means of expression (rjod byed drang nges) such as sutras. A practitioner is called to interpret all ordinary objects of experience to discover their inner nature.

L1: [Part Five – Prasangika-Madhyamika [Details about the refutation of the Svatantrika system] :L1

L2: [1. The Prasangika School] :L2

Sources:

- Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.586-8

L4: [Who were the first Prasangikas? Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, and Atisha] :L4

The works of both Nagarjuna and Aryadeva are considered by both Svatantrikas and Prasangikas to be reliable sources.³³⁷ From the Prasangika point of view Nagarjuna and Aryadeva are Prasangikas though neither specified themselves as such nor openly presented the special features of that system. They are called Model Madhyamikas.³³⁸

Buddhapalita did not clearly specify that consequences are to be used in place of autonomous syllogisms;³³⁹ however, his extensive use of consequences qualifies him, according to Jam-yang-shay-ba, to be the founder of the Prasangika school.

It is with Bhavaviveka's refutation of Buddhapalita and insistence on autonomous syllogisms that the necessity for a clear statement of Prasangika method arose.

At that point, Chandrakirti defined the system in relation to the other schools, clearly explicating the incorrectness of using autonomous syllogisms and the correctness of consequences for generating in another the view of the middle way, and it is for this reason that most Tibetan monastic colleges consider Chandrakirti to be the founder of Prasangika.

Thus, THE PARTISAN PRASANGIKAS are those who explicitly differentiate themselves as Prasangikas through extensive use of consequences and/or through specific challenges of the Svatantrika viewpoint from a Prasangika standpoint.

Among them are

- Buddhapalita,
- Chandrakirti,
- Shantideva, and
- Atisha.

There are other Prasangikas who are neither Models because they were not used as valid

sources by all Prasangikas and Svatantrikas nor Partisans because they did not explicitly reject the Svatantrika viewpoint. However, it can be seen from their works that their view accords with Prasangika; they are THE NON-PARTISAN PRASANGIKAS:

- Shakyamitra,
- Nagabodhi,
- Rik-bay-ku-juk (Rigs-pa'i-khu-byug, a student of Chandrakirti),
- Shura (Ashvaghosha),
- etc.

L4: [SYNONYMS [of Prasangikas] :L4

Prasangikas are called Only Appearance Madhyamikas, for as Chandrakirti says (see p. 586), THEY ASSERT THE EXISTENCE OF CONVENTIONAL PHENOMENA—THOSE PHENOMENA WHICH APPEAR TO THE CONVENTIONAL MIND—BY WAY OF THEIR CONDITIONALITY, NOT THROUGH ASSERTING ANY OF THE FOUR EXTREMES: THAT PHENOMENA INHERENTLY EXIST, UTTERLY DO NOT EXIST, BOTH INHERENTLY EXIST AND UTTERLY DO NOT EXIST, OR ARE ANOTHER INHERENTLY EXISTENT ALTERNATIVE.

¢(i.e. Tetralemma: we cannot say what the real non-dual nature beyond conceptualization is, but we can say what it is not: it is not existence, not non-existence, not both, not neither.)

L5: [For them 'conditionality' means "merely imputed by the mind", "conceptual interdependence"] :L5

'CONDITIONALITY' (idampratrayata, rkyen nyid 'di pa tsam), or 'having this particular condition, is a synonym for the dependent-arising of compounded phenomena.³⁴⁰ Not covered by the term 'conditionality' is the dependent-arising of uncompounded phenomena, such as space, analytical cessations, non-analytical cessations, and emptinesses. Non-products—or permanent phenomena—are dependent-arisings in two ways: (1) they arise, or exist, in dependence on their parts or bases of imputation, and (2) they arise, or exist, in dependence on a conceptual consciousness that imputes them. For example, the space of a room is imputed or designated to an absence of obstructive contact and to the space of the various parts of the room; thus, it depends both on its bases of designation and on the mind that designates it.

¢(i.e. See the various level of understanding of emptiness / dependent origination at the end of this section: impermanence, dependence on parts, dependence on causes and conditions, dependence on the collections of the base and the continuation of that, independence of our mind, dependence of the labeling, merely imputed by the mind.)

Here, with regard to PERMANENT PHENOMENA, 'arising' in the term 'dependent-arising' does not mean 'being produced' but 'existing' (sat, yod pa) or 'established' (siddha, grubpa). Permanent phenomena are dependent-arisings in that they are 'dependency existent' or 'dependency established'.

¢(i.e. they are conceptually interdependent with their opposite. One cannot exist without the other. One implies the other. They are not different, not the same. They are inseparable, non-dual: not two, not one.)

The dependent-arising of IMPERMANENT PHENOMENA is itself a sign that products are not produced from themselves, naturally existent others, both, or causelessly. The first

alternative and the last two alternatives require no qualification; however, the second, PRODUCTION FROM OTHER, does require the qualification 'naturally existent'. For products are indeed conventionally produced from causes that are conventionally existent others. There is no production, even conventionally, which can bear analysis, but there is conventionally existent self and other and conventionally existent production from what is other. Self and other are mutually dependent as are cause and effect. Because of being interdependent, they cannot be naturally existent, that is to say, established by way of their own character.

It is by way of this CONDITIONALITY that a Prasangika accepts phenomena. The Sanskrit word translated by 'phenomena' is dharma. Because all dharma are objects of knowledge (jnaya, shes bya), they can appear to the mind, and thus the word 'phenomena' from the Greek phainomenon meaning 'appearance' is used as a translation equivalent. There are impermanent and permanent phenomena, and in this system of translation there is no noumenon which is not a phenomenon.

FOR EVEN EMPTINESS IS A PHENOMENON IN THAT IT APPEARS TO THE MIND AND IS AN OBJECT (VISHAYA, YUL); IN THE PRASANGIKA SYSTEM NOTHING EXISTS INDEPENDENTLY, IN AND OF ITSELF, AS 'NOUMENON' SUGGESTS. EVEN AN EMPTINESS IS A DEPENDENT-ARISING BECAUSE IT IS IMPUTED TO A LACK OF INHERENT EXISTENCE WHICH IS ITS BASIS OF IMPUTATION AND, LIKE ALL OTHER PHENOMENA, CANNOT BE FOUND WHEN SOUGHT AMONG ITS BASES OF IMPUTATION.³⁴¹ Just as much as a chair is not its legs, arms, back, or seat, or even their composite, so the emptiness of a chair is not the lack of inherent existence of the legs, arms, back, or seat, or even their composite.

'CONDITIONALITY' refers to the dependent-arising of products, and indeed all Buddhist schools of tenets accept that products are dependent-arisings inasmuch as all effects depend on causes. However, the Prasangika sense of 'conditionally' is brought into focus when it is seen that they accept the dependence not only of effects on causes but also of causes on effects. For a seed is a cause only in relation to its effect, a sprout. (For convenience, a sprout can be considered to be a shoot of some height when the two bulbous halves of the seed are no longer present and a root system has developed.) Its ability to produce an effect, given the proper conditions, makes it a cause. Except in relation to the sprout, how can it be said that a seed is a cause? This is obvious and requires no special analysis, for in the Prasangika system, if anything could bear ultimate analysis, it would inherently exist whereas nothing inherently exists. That a cause is dependent on an effect is obvious to the ordinary non-analytical intellect.

¢(i.e. Cause & effect are conceptually interdependent. One cannot exist without the other. One implies the other. They are not different, not the same. They are inseparable, non-dual: not two, not one.)

However, no other Buddhist system of tenets—Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, or even Svatantrika—accepts that causes are dependent on effects. They reason that causes do not rely on effects for their production whereas effects do rely on causes for their production. However, the Prasangikas' approach is from the viewpoint of the designation of the ultimately unfindable nominality 'cause' and not from the viewpoint of its production, for they agree that a cause does not depend on its effect for its production. THE PRASANGIKA

ASSERTION OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF CAUSE AND EFFECT HIGHLIGHTS THEIR EMPHASIS ON THE INTERRELATED NATURE OF NAMES AND THE NAMING PROCESS, THE DEPENDENCE OF ALL PHENOMENA ON THOUGHT. (i.e. Conceptual interdependence.)

All phenomena are interdependent though each and every phenomenon is not interdependent with each and every other phenomenon. A calf depends on its causes, cow and bull, etc., and the cow and bull as parents depend on their calf though they were not born from the calf. Still, a calf and a pony are not dependent on each other.

L5: [Emptiness doesn't mean complete non-existence] :L5

It is by way of this CONDITIONALITY that the one hundred and eight afflicted and purified phenomena are asserted to exist, but the name 'Only Appearance Madhyamika' does not imply that Prasangikas assert that phenomena merely appear to the mind whereas in fact they do not exist. (i.e. That would be the definition of the Mind-only school.)

Though analysis shows that phenomena ultimately do not exist, ULTIMATE ANALYSIS DOES NOT DENY THAT OBJECTS EXIST CONVENTIONALLY. Truly existent or inherently existent objects are rejected through Madhyamika analysis but not the mere objects themselves. However, it is to be remembered that the status of conventionalities is such that they are not separate from their parts; they are neither their parts individually nor the composite of their parts. They are not their bases of imputation even conventionally. A chair is only the 'chair' imputed in dependence on legs, arms, back, seat, and so forth arranged in a certain shape. The conventions of the world are exactly the opposite of the Prasangika view on this point; the world, through beginningless ignorance, confuses the object imputed with the basis of imputation. All of the conventions of the world are not, then, accepted in the Prasangika system. The Prasangikas mostly accept those phenomena which the world says exist, but not the way the world feels those phenomena exist. Phenomena appear to the world to exist naturally, and the world assents to this appearance; such appearances are false, and such assent is mistaken.

L5: [The Prasangikas do not reject the World conventions] :L5

In the same vein, Bu-don (Bu-ston)³⁴² says that Prasangikas are called 'Madhyamikas using what is renowned in the world' (Loka-prasiddha-varga-chdri-madhyamika). The name is perhaps a deliberate contrast with the Hindu emphasis on scriptural wisdom over ignorant worldly conventions. However, even in the Prasangika system the world's ignorance is still the first link of the dependent-arising of the misery of cyclic existence. Therefore, the Prasangikas, though mostly accepting the world's opinion on what exists, do not enshrine every aspect of the worldly non-analytical intellect. For it is analysis itself that will break the knot of cyclic existence through rescuing beings from the tangles of misconception.

L5: [How they avoid the two extremes] :L5

Prasangikas are also called Non-Abiding Madhyamikas, or Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas, because THROUGH REFUTING INHERENT EXISTENCE THEY AVOID THE EXTREME OF PERMANENCE AND THROUGH ASSERTING CONVENTIONAL EXISTENCE THEY AVOID THE EXTREME OF ANNIHILATION. They do not abide in any way, coarse or subtle, in either, but in the middle or center which denotes neither a

mixture of existence and non-existence nor a gray area of agnostic doubt. The middle way philosophically is the way things are—not mistaking what exists for what does not exist and not mistaking what does not exist for what exists.

All systems claim to occupy the center.³⁴³ For example, the Dialectician Nihilists say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through not asserting phenomena which are beyond sense perception and avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting those that are manifest to the senses. The Samkhyas say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting the transformation of states and avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting the unchangeability of the nature. The Vaibhashikas, the lowest Buddhist school of tenets, say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting that all products are impermanent and avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting that past and future objects are substantialities. The Sautrantikas say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through not asserting that permanent phenomena, such as space, are substantial entities and avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting that forms and so forth are naturally bases of names. The Chittamatrins say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting that forms and so forth are not naturally bases of the affixing of names and avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting that products and emptinesses truly exist.

The Svatantrika-Madhyamikas say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting that objects do not exist from the viewpoint of an objective mode of subsistence which is not established through the object's appearing to a non-defective consciousness. For all objects attain their inherent existence through appearing to a non-defective consciousness. The Svatantrikas do not find it contradictory to assert that objects have no objective, inherent existence which is not established by the mind and to assert that objects do exist inherently.³⁴⁴ A beautiful woman created by a magician has no mode of being that is not posited by the mistaken minds of the audience who have come under the spell of the magician. However, this does not mean that the beautiful woman has no mode of being; she has one posited by a mistaken consciousness. Just so, though phenomena seem to have their own mode of being or own mode of subsistence free from any positing consciousness, they do not; however, they do have their own mode of subsistence within the scope of its being posited to them through their appearing to consciousness. In the case of the illusory woman, the positing consciousness is mistaken whereas in the case of phenomena the positing consciousness is correct or non-defective— free from error due to spells, moving objects, disease, and so on. The Svatantrikas, therefore, say that they avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting that conventionally objects exist inherently or exist in their own right.

The Prasangikas find such to be contradictory, and thus they say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting that objects do not exist inherently. For them, existing ultimately (paramarthasiddha, don dam par grub pa) and existing inherently (svabhavasiddha, rang bzhin gyis grub pa) are synonymous whereas for the Svatantrikas they are not. The Prasangikas say that they avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting that conventionally all phenomena are only nominal and exist only imputedly. They do not find it contradictory for phenomena to exist only designatedly and yet be able to perform functions. They do not find it contradictory for things to be unfindable among their bases of designation either singly or as a composite and yet exist. In fact, the only way that things can perform functions is to exist merely imputedly, for if objects did inherently exist, they could not be affected by causes nor could they affect anything. Existence would be impossible in a world of frozen substantialities; things would be static, for they would not

depend on causes.

Objects are imputed in the way that a snake is imputed to a rope.³⁴⁵ Just as much as a snake cannot be found among the parts of the rope either individually or collectively, so phenomena, even when correctly imputed, cannot be found among their bases of imputation, individually or collectively, and, of course, not separately. Nevertheless, there is a difference between a snake wrongly imputed to a rope and a snake rightly imputed to a proper basis of designation because the latter can perform the functions of a snake. Therefore, when Prasangikas cite the example of a rope-snake, it illustrates only the mode of imputation; the purport of the example is not that the existence of phenomena is the same as the existence of a rope-snake. A rope-snake does not exist and cannot perform the functions of a snake whereas things do exist and create effects within the context of being ultimately unfindable nominalities.

THE MOST DIFFICULT POINT IN THE PRASANGIKA SYSTEM IS THIS: THE UTTER UNFINDABILITY OF PHENOMENA IN THEIR BASES OF DESIGNATION AND YET THEIR ABILITY TO PERFORM FUNCTIONS.

Prasangikas do not deny the bhava (dngos po) which is defined as ‘that which is able to perform a function’, particularly the function of creating an effect. They deny the bhava which means inherent existence (svabhava, rang bzhin in the sense of rang bzhin gyis grub pa), the non-dependence of things on their parts, their bases of designation, or the consciousness that designates them. **THUS, WHEN AN EMPTINESS OF INHERENT EXISTENCE IS RIGHTLY SEEN IN AN OBJECT, UNDERSTANDING OF IMPUTED EXISTENCE IS FURTHERED. WHEN IMPUTED EXISTENCE IS RIGHTLY SEEN, UNDERSTANDING OF THE EMPTINESS OF INHERENT EXISTENCE IS FURTHERED. AS LONG AS THESE TWO ARE SEEN TO BE CONTRADICTORY, THAT IS, AS LONG AS A REFUTATION OF INHERENT EXISTENCE SEEMS TO REFUTE THE EFFECTIVE EXISTENCE OF PHENOMENA, ONE HAS NOT PASSED BEYOND THE VIEWS OF NON-MADHYAMIKAS.**

¢(i.e. The Two Truths, dependent origination and emptiness, are not contradictory; they are not different, not the same; one cannot exist without the other; one implies the other; they are inseparable, non-dual: not two, not one. That is the Middle Way.)

Nagarjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way (XXIV. 14ab) says:

:: For whom emptiness is possible
:: For him all is possible.

This eliminates the view that Madhyamikas themselves accept emptiness but accept conventional phenomena only in dependence on others’ misconceptions. Nagarjuna said that ‘for him’, that is, for the Madhyamika who accepts emptiness, everything—all the objects, agents, and actions of cyclic existence and of nirvana—is suitable. The key to the Prasangika assertion of conventional phenomena is that though they assert the existence of what the world says exists, they do not assert that phenomena exist the way that the world sees them.

Not only are the world’s habitual conceptions wrong but also other philosophies, far from

actually abiding in the middle way, have fallen to extremes. They tie even tighter the knot of cyclic existence. All of these extremes are forsaken by the Prasangikas who detail with exactitude the way that phenomena exist. When EMPTINESS OF INHERENT EXISTENCE IS SEEN TO BE

HARMONIOUS WITH IMPUTED EXISTENCE, THEN THE MIDDLE WAY in which the Prasangikas abide can be cognized.

¢(i.e. There are many levels of understanding emptiness, many levels of interpretation, more and more subtle. What change is the type of dependence being studied, or the object of refutation being considered:

¢-- Rinpoche: And what doesn't exist - all the false views that we have on the merely labeled rope, which are explained as false by the philosophical schools - all these which do not exist at all, we think are one-hundred-percent true. So, for our minds, what exists appears like it doesn't exist, and that which doesn't exist we think exists. So it is completely opposite. Reality and the way things appear to us, in everyday life, is totally opposite.

¢---- While it is impermanent, a phenomenon appears as permanent;

¢---- while it depends on the parts, it appears existing alone;

¢---- while it is dependent on causes and conditions, it appears existing with its own freedom;

¢---- and while it depends on the collections of the base and the continuation of that, it appears as a self-entity.

¢---- The rope appears as a self-entity.

¢---- Then, it appears to our hallucinatory mind to be independent of our mind, even though it is a creation of one's own mind without an outside creator (coming from only the mind means there is no outside creator). According to the Mind-Only (Chittamatrin) school, it is the imprint left on the seventh consciousness, the base-of-all, being experienced out, manifesting into rope and into the consciousness which perceives that. But while the rope is existing like this, it appears back to one's own mind as though it is without dependence on the mind, without depending on the imprint that was left on the seventh consciousness and experienced out. Without depending on that, the rope appears to exist totally on its own side, which is a false view.

¢---- On top of that, there is the false view which is the object to be refuted according to the Madhyamika-Svatantrika school: while the rope is existing by way of an undefective mind, a valid mind, labeling that it exists, the rope appears as though it is without dependence on the labeling of an undefective mind. It appears totally existing from its own side.

¢---- Now we come to the very subtle hallucination, false view, and object to be refuted, according to the highest philosophical school, the Madhyamika-Prasangika school. The rope, even though it exists merely labeled by the mind, appears back to one's hallucinatory mind as though it is not just merely labeled by the mind, but something more than that, something beyond that. There appears something extra, slightly more than what is merely labeled by mind - something from there, something additional, something extra to what is merely labeled by the mind. (i.e. This last one is the ultimate understanding of emptiness.)

¢-- This very subtle thing is what doesn't exist, what is not there. (something extra to what is merely labeled by the mind)

¢---- It is something which doesn't exist on the rope, the merely labeled rope.

¢---- This is the object to be refuted

¢---- according to the Prasangika school

¢--- this very subtle hallucination, this slightly extra,
¢--- addition to what is merely labeled by the mind.

¢-- In reality there is only one emptiness, the emptiness we have to realize to cut the root of samsara, the ignorance. And the emptiness which we have to realize so that we can be liberated from the entire suffering and its causes is this emptiness, not those previous ones. It is this emptiness (as explained by the Prasangika school). We have to realize this very subtle hallucination, this false view, for what it is, and then see that it doesn't exist. It exists nowhere. It is empty. And we then have to realize this on the "I" and the aggregates.

¢-- So now, there's no rope on the base, the collection of hairs that, put together, can function to tie things. There's no rope there. But there is a rope on the road, on that spot, where there is this base, this collection of hairs put together. Where there is this, there is a rope, but there is no rope on this base, on this collection of hairs that is curled there. On that, there is no rope. You cannot find rope there.

¢-- But there is rope on the road. So, what is not there? It is the merely labeled rope appearing back as a real one from there. The very subtle false view of the object to be refuted, according to the Prasangika school, arises when the rope appears back as though it is not merely labeled by mind. If it appears back merely labeled by mind, that is OK, that is correct - that is the truth, and is according to reality. But it appears back as though it is not merely labeled by mind. It is good to use this phrase: "not merely labeled by mind." This will help you later to come to know the very subtle object to be refuted, the very subtle hallucination of the false view. That is what we have to realize is empty. Only then can we be liberated from samsara. However, to our hallucinatory mind, this rope appears not merely labeled by mind. But this is not there, this exists nowhere. Not only does this not exist on that base, the collection of hairs and how it's put together, it doesn't even exist on the road, on that spot. It exists nowhere in the world.

¢-- That rope, the merely labeled rope, appearing back as though it is not merely labeled by mind - this you can say is in your mind. It is not there, and it is not right.

¢-- But just like this, in exactly the same way, the "I" appears. The merely labeled "I" appears not merely labeled by the mind, as though it is something real from there. But this is totally non-existent - it exists nowhere. It is totally empty.

¢-- And, as stated in the Heart Sutra, the same applies to the aggregates, the body, the mind, everything that appears back not merely labeled by the mind, as well as form, sound, smell, taste, tangible objects, all the senses and all the sense objects, all the rest of the phenomena, the Four Noble Truths, the Twelve Links, all of which are merely labeled by the mind but appearing back not merely labeled by the mind. (i.e. In fact all the conventional truths, absolutely everything, all dharmas, are all empty of inherent existence.)

¢-- So all phenomena that are merely labeled by the mind, appearing back to our mind as though they are not merely labeled by the mind - all this is totally hallucinatory, totally non-existent, totally empty. All this part of appearance, we can say, is just in the mind. Which is another way of presenting what is hallucination - by saying it is just in the mind, in your mind. It is one way of getting the idea, of getting the feeling of what is hallucination.

¢-- -- From: Lama Zopa Rinpoche, The Ultimate Nature of Phenomena)

L2: [2. Debate [Prasangika (Buddhapalita + Chandrakirti) vs. Svatantrika (Bhavaviveka)]]
:L2

Sources:

- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings

Buddhapalita's refutation—in commentary on the first chapter of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way—of the Samkhya position that an effect is produced from a cause which is of the same nature as itself drew heavy criticism from Bhavaviveka.³⁴⁶

An examination of Buddhapalita's refutation, Bhavaviveka's criticism, and Chandrakirti's defense of Buddhapalita reveals central differences between the two divisions of Madhyamika: Prasangika, founded by Buddhapalita /Chandrakirti, and Svatantrika, founded by Bhavaviveka.

L5: [The Samkhya position, to be refuted by Buddhapalita] :L5

The Samkhya position is (i.e. the Samkhya's permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, production from itself (non-theistic) or from both self and others together (theistic), to be refuted) :

~ The cause of a barley shoot is a barley seed, and its minor causes are water, manure, and so forth. The nature of the cause and of the minor causes is partless, and thus the nature of the seed is the nature of the water and of the manure, and the nature of the water is the nature of the seed and of the manure, and so on. For these causes have a common effect.

~ The barley shoot exists at the time of the barley seed because the barley shoot abides in the nature of its causes at the time when they are still causes and when the effect or manifestation has not yet been produced. For example, a pot exists in the nature of the clay. Therefore, the nature of the causes and the nature of the effect are one and thus are each other.

Though some Samkhyas speak not of production but of manifestation, the relationship of oneness of the nature and the manifestation is the same as with producer and produced, or cause and effect.

L5: [Buddhapalita's refutation of the Samkhya's position] :L5

Buddhapalita flings consequences at the Samkhyas' assertion.

First he sets his thesis:

~ Things are not produced from their own entities.

Then in answer to anyone's wondering what fallacies there are in asserting production of something from that which is of the same nature, he gives a brief refutation in the form of two consequences:

~ There are the fallacies that their re-production would be senseless and, not only that, would also be endless.

Buddhapalita's actual words are:

~ "Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again]

would be just senseless and because production would be endless.'

The way he flings the consequence that re-production would be senseless is:

~ It follows with respect to the subject, a sprout, that its production again is senseless because of already existing in its own entity.³⁴⁷

The Samkhya, however, holds that what is existent but unmanifest must be made manifest. Therefore, he might answer that it is not entailed by something's already existing in its own entity that its production again is senseless. In that case, the second consequence of the endlessness of its production is flung:

~ It follows with respect to the subject, a sprout, that its production is endless because, though it already exists in its own entity, there is sense in (or a need for) its reproduction.

If the existent requires re-production, then even when the effect is manifest, it would still require re-production because it exists.

Buddhapalita says,

~ 'The production again of things already existent in their own entities is purposeless. If though existent they are produced, they would never not be produced.'

The Samkhya holds that what has already been manifested need not be produced; therefore, he might again answer that there is no entailment. However, his answer does not hit the mark, for by switching from the vocabulary of production to that of manifestation he cannot escape inquiry about whether the manifestation exists at the time of its unmanifest state. If he says that the manifestation does not exist at the time of its unmanifest state, he would fall from his view that all products, though formerly existent, are manifested by causes because the manifestation would not exist at the time of its unmanifest state. Therefore, he might accept that the manifestation existed from the time of its unmanifest state. He would be saying that it is not entailed by a manifestation's existing at the time of its unmanifest state that it would not be produced again.

Then the consequence of endlessness is flung:

~ It follows about the subject, a manifestation, that its production is endless because, though it exists from the time of its unmanifest state, it has a need for production again.

L4: [CONSEQUENCES AND SYLLOGISMS] :L4

L5: [Definition of Consequences / Prasanga] :L5

CONSEQUENCES (PRASANGA) are used to generate in an opponent a consciousness that infers a thesis.³⁴⁸ UNWANTED CONSEQUENCES THAT CONTRADICT AN OPPONENT'S POSITION AND ARISE FROM HIS POSITION ARE FREQUENTLY USED. EMPLOYING A REASON AND A PERVASION APPROVED BY THE OPPONENT, A CONSEQUENCE OF HIS VIEWS WHICH CONTRADICTS ANOTHER OF HIS VIEWS IS PRESENTED TO HIM.

[Example:] For instance, if among the various tenets of a school there were the assertions -- that a sound is permanent,

-- that a sound is a product,
-- and that all products are impermanent,

the following consequence would be stated:

~ It follows that the subject, a sound, is not a product because of being a permanent phenomenon.

The opponent himself has accepted the reason, that a sound is a permanent phenomenon. He has accepted the pervasion, that whatever is a permanent phenomenon is not a product. Thus, he is forced to accept the unwanted thesis that a sound is not a product, and this contradicts his own view that a sound is a product.

The stater of the consequence would say, 'The three spheres have been accepted!' This means that the reason, the pervasion of the reason by the predicate of the consequence, and the opposite of the consequence have been accepted.³⁴⁹

The sample consequence above also implies its opposite meaning:

~ The subject, a sound, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being a product.

The opposite of the original reason is put as the predicate of the implied thesis, that is, 'permanent phenomenon' becomes 'impermanent phenomenon'. The opposite of the predicate of the original thesis is put as the reason of the implied syllogism, that is, 'not a product' becomes 'a product'.

To repeat, the consequence,

~ It follows that the subject, a sound, is not a product because of being a permanent phenomenon,

implies the syllogism,

~ The subject, a sound, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being a product.

Through the statement of the consequence, a consciousness that infers the implied opposite meaning is generated in the opponent.

Non-Prasangikas also use consequences to break down the vibrance or pointedness of the opponent's adherence to his own view. However, they do not accept that a consequence alone can generate in the opponent a consciousness inferring the implied thesis. Prasangikas assert that the statement of a consequence alone is sufficient, provided the opponent is intelligent and ready. To such an opponent, a further explicit statement of a syllogism is purposeless.

The intent is to generate in the opponent an inferring consciousness, though not necessarily through the route of implying the opposite meaning as just explained. For instance, Buddhapalita's consequences above are intended to generate in the Samkhya a consciousness which infers that there is no production from self and not that there is production from other.

L6: [Five types of consequences] :L6

Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way ³⁵⁰ lists FIVE TYPES OF CONSEQUENCES.

-- [Consequence generating an other-approved inference, i.e., generating an inference in another using a subject, reason, and pervasion approved in the opponent's system

- Consequence through similarity of reason
- Contradictory consequence
- Consequence expressing contradiction and proving one's own assertion
- Consequence established through similarity of reason and thesis]

L7: [1. Consequence generating an other-approved inference, i.e., generating an inference in another using a subject, reason, and pervasion approved in the opponent's system] :L7

~ Example: It follows that the subject [of this consequence], a sprout, is not a dependent-arising because of being objectively existent.

This type is also called 'a consequence implying its opposite meaning'. It both contradicts the opponent's assertion that a sprout is a dependent-arising and implicitly establishes that a sprout does not objectively exist. The other-approved syllogism which is implied by the consequence is:

~ The subject [of this syllogism], a sprout, is not objectively existent because of being a dependent-arising.

The above consequence would be flung at a Buddhist proponent of objectively existent things. Svatantrika and the other lower Buddhist systems accept that all impermanent things are dependent-arising at least in the sense that they arise dependent on an aggregation of causes and conditions, and they also accept that the very sign of their dependent-arising proves their objective existence. For them, if things did not objectively exist, they would not exist at all.

If, after the statement of the consequence, the opponent were still recalcitrant, his answer would be, 'The opposite is entailed', meaning that whatever is a dependent-arising is objectively existent. However, his answer would not hit the mark because the meaning of 'objectively existent' is 'independently existent', thereby contradicting dependent-arising. The opponent might require more consequences to reveal to him his self-contradiction. However, for one who is ready to realize his self-contradiction, the above consequence is sufficient to generate in him a consciousness inferring that a sprout does not objectively exist and, by extension, that all phenomena do not objectively exist.

L7: [2. Consequence through similarity of reason] :L7

~ Example: It follows that a sound apprehending ear consciousness sees colors and shapes because a color and shape apprehending eye consciousness ultimately sees colors and shapes.

If an eye consciousness ultimately saw colors and shapes, then it would be independent, that is, would not depend on the eye sense that endows it with the ability to perceive colors and shapes but not sounds. Since consciousnesses would apprehend their objects without dependence on their respective senses, an ear consciousness would also absurdly apprehend colors and shapes. The thesis being implied is that an eye consciousness and, in general, sense consciousnesses do not ultimately perceive their objects. The implied thesis here, however, is not, as in the previous example, the subject plus the opposite of the reason.

L7: [3. Contradictory consequence] :L7

~ Example: It follows that the subject, the ox-generality which is a permanent thing, does not pervade its many particular instances because of being a partless unity.

This consequence merely demonstrates a contradiction in the opponent's view and neither implies the opposite meaning, like the first type of consequence, nor uses a similarity of reason, like the second. The opposite meaning would be:

~ The subject, the ox-generality which is a permanent thing, is not a partless unity because of its pervading its many instances.

It is true that the ox-generality is not a partless one because it has as many parts as the number of oxen it 'pervades' or encompasses. However, the ox-generality is impermanent because all instances of ox are impermanent. Thus, the subject of the thesis, the permanent ox-generality, does not exist and, therefore, could not be proved to possess the quality of the reason, that is, it could not be shown that the permanent ox-generality has as many parts as the number of oxen it pervades.

The implied thesis of this consequence is not its opposite meaning but that an ox-generality which is a permanent thing does not exist. Another implied is:

~ The ox-generality has parts because of pervading its many particular instances.

The opponent here is a non-Buddhist Vaishesika.

The other types of consequences are contradictory, but this type is merely contradictory in that it does not share the special qualities of the other four types.

L7: [4. Consequence expressing contradiction and proving one's own assertion] :L7

~ Example: It follows that the subject, a sprout, is senselessly re-produced because of already having attained its own entity.

A Samkhya accepts that re-production is sensible in the sense that what has already attained existence in its non-manifest state still requires production to become manifest. Therefore, the consequence of senseless re-production expresses an inner contradiction of this position. Furthermore, since the view being proved by this consequence is that there is no production from self, the Prasangika's own assertion is being proved. Again, the issue is not that only some consequences prove something, either positive or negative, for all correct consequences prove something. Rather, this type of consequence is distinguished by its particular force, as in the example where no production from self is proved but the opposite of the reason is not implied.

L7: [5. Consequence established through similarity of reason and thesis] :L7

If someone said that it followed that the form aggregate exists inherently because the feeling aggregate exists inherently, this consequence would be stated:

~ It follows that the reason 'the feeling aggregate inherently exists' cannot prove that the form aggregate inherently exists because the reason and thesis are equally difficult to prove.

Even if there were inherent existence, there is no difference in difficulty of realization in establishing that the feeling aggregate inherently exists and that the form aggregate inherently exists. To fulfill the purpose of generating the inference of a thesis in another, the establishment of the sign (reason) as present in the subject must be easier than the realization of the thesis. For instance, a sound is proven to be an impermanent thing through the sign of its being a product. Though 'impermanent thing' and 'product' are

synonyms because all instances of the one are instances of the other, being a product can serve as a correct sign of being an impermanent thing, for being a product is easier to understand than being an impermanent thing. To be a product means to be made, and a mere snapping of the fingers can demonstrate that a sound is made or created by causes and conditions. That products are impermanent, i.e., that they necessarily disintegrate moment by moment, is harder to realize. Therefore, when the reason is as hard to establish as the thesis, the reason is not suitable.

L5: [Definition of Syllogism] :L5

Much like a consequence, A SYLLOGISM (prayoga, sbyor ba) consists of a thesis and reason; however, in the logic school of Dignaga and Dharmakirti the stater of a syllogism must himself accept the reason's presence in the subject, the pervasion of the reason by the predicate of the thesis, and the pervasion of the negative of the predicate by the negative of the reason.

[Example:] For instance:

~ The subject, a pot, is an impermanent thing because of being arisen from exertion—just as, for example, speech [is arisen from exertion and is impermanent].

The stater of the syllogism must accept the reason's presence in the subject—that a pot is arisen from exertion. He must accept the pervasion—that all things arisen from exertion are impermanent—and the counter-pervasion—that all permanent things are not arisen from exertion.

However, in the case of a consequence neither subject, predicate, nor reason need be accepted by the stater. It is only necessary that the opponent accept, or be forced from his own position to accept, these three. Consequences are means of dealing with opponents on their own grounds, and Chandrakirti declares that, if the opponent will not accept consequences stemming from his own views, there is no point in proceeding to state syllogisms to him.³⁵¹

L5: [When to use consequence or syllogism: Prasangika (Buddhapalita) vs. Sautantrika (Bhavaviveka)] :L5

Thus, first of all, the difference between the Svatantrika Bhavaviveka on the one side and the Prasangika Buddhapalita on the other is Bhavaviveka's insistence on the eventual statement of syllogisms. It is not that Prasangikas do not use syllogisms amongst themselves when there is agreement on the status of the subject, etc.; rather, the point at issue is what constitutes the necessary and best means of generating in an opponent the view that phenomena do not truly exist.

This controversy stems from different opinions on whether phenomena appear correctly to a non-defective sense consciousness.

-- THE PRASANGIKA POSITION is that not only do ordinary beings misconceive the nature of phenomena but also phenomena appear to them in a mistaken aspect. In other words, an assenting to an incorrect appearance of phenomena as inherently existent is what constitutes the misconception that phenomena inherently exist. Even for eighth ground Bodhisattvas and Foe Destroyers (both of whom have totally overcome the conception that things inherently exist) phenomena still appear as if inherently existent. It is only for a Buddha that phenomena appear just as they are.

-- Thus the Prasangikas say that although a sense consciousness can be valid with respect to

the existence of its object, it is never, except in the case of a Buddha, correct about the mode of existence of the object. For, due to the force of previous conditioning, objects appear to a sense consciousness as if existing objectively whereas they do not. They cannot be found among their bases of designation when sought, but appear as if existent in their own right.

-- HOWEVER, BHAVAVIVEKA'S SCHOOL, SAUTRANTIKA-SVATANTRIKA, asserts that phenomena appear

correctly in terms of their inherent existence to a non-defective sense consciousness.

Bhavaviveka agrees that phenomena appear to sense consciousnesses to exist by way of their own character and asserts that they exist so. From this basis, he says that it is possible to state a syllogism in which subject and reason appear similarly to both parties in the debate. Bhavaviveka asserts that being arisen from exertion conventionally exists inherently in a pot, as do the natures of pervasion and counter-pervasion whereas a Prasangika sees the presence of the reason in the subject, the pervasion, and the counter-pervasion as existing imputedly or nominally, without inherent existence.

Both systems accept that an inferring consciousness is a valid cognizer (Pramana, tshad ma).

The statement of a valid reason that the subject possesses and which itself possesses the proper pervasion and counter-pervasion is not just verbal manipulation but a revelation of the nature of things which is hidden to the direct perception of ordinary beings.

Prasangika, as well as Svatantrika, relies on inference to gain an understanding of emptiness. A meditator's statement to himself and intense reflection on consequences and syllogisms in meditation are presented in both sutra and tantra systems as the means of gaining a familiarity with emptiness. Thus, in both sutra and tantra, cognition of emptiness through inference is a prerequisite for direct cognition.

According to Prasangika, once the view of emptiness is about to be entered, syllogisms about the final nature of phenomena are appropriate; however, when debating with those who are not yet about to generate the view in their continuum, consequences mainly are used. The case is the same in meditation; CONSEQUENCES ARE STATED IN ORDER TO BREAK DOWN ONE'S OWN ADHERENCE

TO THE WRONG VIEW; THEN, SYLLOGISMS MAY BE STATED, IF NECESSARY.

¢(i.e. I think the difference is between one who thinks there are elementary absolute basis on what we can base all proofs through syllogism, and the other who thinks that there is no such elementary absolute basis that can serve as a basis of any proofs, or any absolute logical system of proofs, and that the only thing left is to use the opponent's assumptions and logical system in order to show its absurd consequences from the inside. I think only the later one is right. So. Maybe, it means that we should use consequence when reasoning about the ultimate nature, and syllogism when reasoning about conventional truths.)

Without considering the difference between Prasangika and Svatantrika,
THE DEFINITION OF A MADHYAMIKA IN GENERAL IS:352

~ A proponent of Buddhist tenets who totally refutes all extremes of permanence, i.e., that any phenomenon ultimately exists, and refutes all extremes of annihilation, i.e., that phenomena do not exist conventionally.

Therefore, all Madhyamikas—Prasangikas and Svatantrikas— avoid the extreme of permanence or existence through refuting that phenomena ultimately exist, truly exist, or exist as their own reality. They avoid the extreme of annihilation or non-existence through asserting that

all phenomena exist conventionally, or nominally.

The word madhyama itself refers to the middle way that things are, the profound meaning of dependent-arising free from the two extremes, permanence and annihilation. The extremes here are misrepresentations of existence and non-existence. Because phenomena do not exist ultimately, the ultimate existence of phenomena is an extreme of existence. Because phenomena do exist conventionally, the non-existence of phenomena conventionally is an extreme of non-existence. Avoiding the extremes of existence and non-existence, however, does not mean that Madhyamikas refrain from making assertions about existence and non-existence because they do assert that phenomena exist conventionally but not ultimately, even if these assertions exist only nominally.

¢(i.e. I don't think so. Prasangikas are saying the everything is not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither. They are not saying that things are existent, non-existent, both, neither.)

A Svatantrika is a Madhyamika who asserts that a non-defective consciousness which perceives an object as existing inherently in its basis of imputation is valid and thus accepts that an object so cognized appears similarly to both parties in a debate.³⁵³ Based on the common appearance of a subject, the Svatantrika states a reason to prove a predicate about this subject. (i.e. They think there could be a basis acceptable by both because existing in absolute terms, and that could be directly seen by both. But there is no such thing. All perceptions are conditioned by accumulated karma. So, unless you are a Buddha, all of your perceptions are tainted. So there is no absolut valid basis.)

THUS, THE DEFINITION OF A SVATANTRIKA-MADHYAMIKA IS:

~ A proponent of no true existence who asserts that conventionally all phenomena exist by way of their own character.

Truly existent phenomena are refuted by Svatantrikas through relying on a logical mark, a reason, that has the inherently existent threefold aspects: presence in the subject, pervasion, and counter-pervasion. This usage of autonomous inferences (svatantra-anumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag) to generate in an opponent a cognition of emptiness is the source of their name.

THE DEFINITION OF A PRASANGIKA IS:

~ a Madhyamika who does not assert that phenomena exist by way of their own character even conventionally.

Etymologically, a Prasangika is so called because of asserting that an inferential consciousness realizing a thesis of no inherent existence can be generated in the mental continuum of a disputant through only the demonstration of consequences (prasanga, thal 'gyur).³⁵⁴

ACCORDING TO PRASANGIKA ALL SENSE INFORMATION IS CHARACTERIZED BY MISINFORMATION ABOUT THE STATUS OF OBJECTS, FOR THINGS UNDENIABLY APPEAR TO COMMON BEINGS TO EXIST INHERENTLY IN THEIR BASES OF DESIGNATION. THEREFORE, CONSEQUENCES THAT OPERATE WITHIN THE SPHERE OF A NON-MADHYAMIKA'S OWN VIEWS ARE RELIED UPON TO CONVINCE HIM THAT NOTHING

CAN BEAR ANALYSIS,
THEREBY CAUSING HIM TO REALIZE THE ABSENCE OF OBJECTIVELY ESTABLISHED
EXISTENCE.

¢(i.e. They know that everything is like an illusion, merely imputed by the mind, and that thus there cannot be two perceptions that are truly identical; there is no essence of things to be perceived by both and that can serve as an absolute basis for syllogistic proofs. Even logic itself is not an absolute truth, not an absolute system.)

Thus, Svatantrikas and Prasangikas are named on the basis of the means by which they generate in others the view that phenomena do not truly exist.

L2: [3. Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita] :L2

Sources:

- Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom'
- Avalokitavratā's Commentary on (bhavaviveka's) 'Lamp for (Nagarjuna 's) "Wisdom "'
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings

THE SPLIT BETWEEN SVATANTRIKA AND PRASANGIKA grew out of Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita's refutation of the Samkhya view that an effect is produced from a cause which is the same entity as the effect.³⁵⁵ Their commentaries on the first chapter of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way reveal their differences.

Buddhapalita said:

~ Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless. It is thus: the production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. If though existent they are produced, they would never not be produced.

Bhavaviveka took the first sentence not merely as a brief display of a thesis and consequences but as indicating an autonomous syllogism (svatantra-anumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag). (Svatantra is usually translated as 'independent' rather than 'autonomous'; however, the very motto of Buddha's teaching is dependent-arising, and thus 'independent' for svatantra seems a too obvious self-contradiction. Also, here 'inference' does not refer to a consciousness, but to a syllogistic statement. Therefore, svatantra-anumana is translated often as 'autonomous syllogism'.)

According to Bhavaviveka, Buddhapalita's autonomous syllogism, if taken at face value, is:

~ The subjects, things, are not produced from their own entities because production is senseless and endless.

Bhavaviveka thought that the reason as stated would obviously not be Buddhapalita's intended reason, for Buddhapalita himself would not assert that production is senseless and endless. He thought that Buddhapalita's intended meaning would have to be:

~ The subjects, things, are not produced from their own entities because production is

sensible and has an end.

According to Bhavaviveka, this autonomous syllogism sets forth a thesis of non-production from self but cannot prove it because it offers neither a reason nor an example which have the capacity of refuting production from self. This is Bhavaviveka's FIRST OBJECTION to Buddhapalita's mode of reasoning.

Bhavaviveka states his own syllogism refuting production from self as an example of a correct autonomous syllogism:

~ The subjects, the inner sources (see p.273) such as an eye sense, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing—like, for example, existent consciousness [which exists and is not produced from itself].

For a Samkhya, the person or consciousness is eternal and thus not a product; therefore, just as a person or consciousness requires no production, so an eye sense requires no production because it exists (even in its unmanifest state).

Bhavaviveka's SECOND OBJECTION to Buddhapalita's supposedly intended syllogism is this:

-- A Samkhya would question what 'production from self or 'production from their own entities' means. Does it mean production of effects from already manifest entities? If it does, Buddhapalita's syllogism is proving what is already established for Samkhyas since Samkhyas themselves accept that the manifest is produced from the non-manifest and, once manifest, requires no further manifestation. Because Samkhyas do not accept that effects are produced from entities which are already manifest, Buddhapalita would be laboring to prove what they already accept.

-- Or, the Samkhya's question would be: Does the reference to production from self apply to production of an effect from the entity of the non-manifest nature (prakṛti, rang bzhin)? If so, the syllogism would prove just the opposite of what Buddhapalita intended. It could not prove that there is no production from self because all products are produced from the nature.

-- The Samkhya would say:

~ The subjects, things, are produced from themselves, that is, from the nature which is the same entity as themselves, because production is sensible and has an end.

Therefore, Bhavaviveka concludes that Buddhapalita's intended syllogism does not avoid the fallacies that a Samkhya, having analyzed the thesis, would be expected to adduce.

Also, as a THIRD FAULT, because Buddhapalita stated something that is not established as his reason—that production would be senseless and endless—it must be reversed into: production is sensible and has an end. This being so, the predicate of the thesis also must be reversed; it must be changed from 'Things are not produced from themselves' to 'Things are produced from others'.

To restate this step, the reason as stated ('production is senseless and endless') is unacceptable because it must be a property of the subject ('things'), and it is not established that things have senseless and endless production. Therefore, the reason must be changed to 'production is sensible and has an end' in consideration of Buddhapalita's 'actual' meaning, for it is established that things have sensible and finite production.

Furthermore, Bhavaviveka would claim that Buddhapalita could not have intended his reason to mean:

~ If produced from themselves, it would be senseless and endless.

For syllogistically this would be: The subjects, things, are not produced from self because, if produced from self, their production would be senseless and endless.

The reason why Buddhapalita supposedly could not have meant this is that when the reason is established, the thesis would already be established. Contrary to this, it is always necessary to establish that the reason is a property of the subject, then establish that the predicate of the thesis follows from the reason, and then, for the first time, realize the predicate of the thesis as a quality of the subject. In other words, when it is established that if things are produced from self, their production is senseless and endless, it is already established that things are not produced from self. There would be no point in further establishing the concomitance of the predicate of the thesis, 'no production from self with the reason, 'if produced from self, their production would be senseless and endless'. Therefore, Bhavaviveka concludes that since it is 'clear' that Buddhapalita himself did not accept what he explicitly stated, he must have meant:

~ The subjects, things, are produced from others because production is sensible and has an end.

Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita thereby contradicts the Madhyamika tenet that the refutation of the four extreme types of production is a non-affirming negation (prasajya-pratishedha, med dgag). In other words, when production from self is refuted, production from other should not be implied in its place. Even though Buddhapalita did not state as an explicit thesis that things are produced from others, Bhavaviveka decided that this was his implicit thesis, and, therefore, his explicit thesis becomes an affirming negation (paryudasa-pratishedha, ma yin dgag)—an explicit negation of production from self which implies an affirmation of production from other in its place. According to Bhavaviveka, Buddhapalita's explicit thesis actually is:

~ About the subjects, things, their production from themselves is not just eliminated.

In the Madhyamika system a thesis of any of the four extreme types of production is just to be eliminated; nothing is to be implied in its place, not even conventionally existent production, even though such is validly established as existing. If an affirming negation were set forth, it would contradict the intention of Nagarjuna's Treatise to eliminate all elaborations (prapancha, spros pa) of true existence for which only non-affirming negations are appropriate. If an affirming negation were used, one would then be seeking to affirm that things are conventionally produced, rather than merely eliminating that phenomena are produced from self, other, both, and neither and seeking to take this mere absence as one's object in meditative equipoise. Thus, if Bhavaviveka's description of Buddhapalita's intention is correct, the latter would indeed have erred.

Bhavaviveka would add that although it is not the case in general that when a reason is reversed the thesis also has to be reversed, Buddhapalita's intention was clearly not just to prove no true existence but also to prove that production exists nominally or conventionally.³⁵⁶ For in his introductory remarks to his commentary on the first chapter of the Treatise, Buddhapalita indicates that the first chapter is in answer to an objector who says,³⁵⁷ 'Show how this which is called production is only a convention.' Also, concluding a brief refutation of production from self, other, both, and neither, Buddhapalita says, 'Since the production of things is thus in all ways inadmissible, there is no production; therefore, this called production is only a convention.'³⁵⁸

Let us cite the entire passage in question from Buddhapalita's commentary: 359

~ Here [an objector] says, 'Show how this which is called production is only a convention.'

~ Answer: That is shown first [in the first stanza of the first chapter of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way]:

:: There is never production
:: Anywhere, of any thing
:: From itself, from others,
:: From both, or without cause.

~ Concerning this, if some things are produced, consider whether the production of those things is from self, from other, from both self and other, or causelessly. Upon examination it is not feasible in all ways.

~ 'From self is synonymous with 'from [its own] entity'. About that, respectively, things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless.³⁶⁰ It is thus: the production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. [Also] if though existent they are produced, they would never not be produced. Hence, that also is not asserted. Therefore, respectively, things are not produced from self.

~ They also are not produced from other. Why? For it would [absurdly] follow that everything would be produced from everything.

~ They also are not produced from both self and other because [such] would [absurdly] entail the fallacies of both [production from self and from other].

~ They also are not produced causelessly because it would [absurdly] follow that everything always would be produced from everything and because there would be the fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless. Since the production of things is thus in all ways inadmissible, there is no [inherently existent] production; therefore, this called production is only a convention.

According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, these statements led Bhavaviveka to believe that Buddhapalita was taking it that since production is delimited to either production from self or production from other, the refutation of the former implies the affirmation of the latter. Thus, the root of Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita is the latter's own introductory remarks to the refutation of production which seem to indicate that his intention is to show through the refutation that production exists conventionally. Because of this, Bhavaviveka viewed Buddhapalita's consequences as implying a proof of a positive phenomenon, that is, conventionally existent production from other.

In a brilliant display of intellectual ingenuity that exists to this day among the Gelugpa colleges, Jam-yang-shay-ba traces Bhavaviveka's objection back to Buddhapalita's somewhat questionable introductory remarks.

Bhavaviveka himself only says:³⁶¹

~ About this, one [that is, Buddhapalita] who is other [than Bhavaviveka himself] makes the explanation, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.'

~ That is not suitable (1) because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example; (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Samkhya would be expected to adduce]; and (3) because [Buddhapalita's] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system.³⁶² His explanation affords such an opportunity] because since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from what is explicitly stated, what emerges is the opposite of the thesis and the reason—that things are produced from other because production is fruitful and because production has an end—due to which [he] would contradict [Madhyamika] tenets.³⁶³

Bhavaviveka's commentator, Avalokitavrata, elaborates on the criticism, clarifying points largely through making sure that the grammar is understood and the moves are properly identified. His commentary is painstakingly slow and repetitive but is worth citing because it clearly reveals the broad outlines of Bhavaviveka's argument:³⁶⁴

~ [Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom'] says:

:: About this,³⁶⁵ one [that is, Buddhapalita] who is other [than Bhavaviveka himself] makes the explanation, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.'

~ This indicates that also on this occasion of proving that things are not produced from self the commentator, the master Buddhapalita, makes such and such an explanation. In that, 'About this' means 'on this occasion of proving that things are not produced from self. 'Other' refers to the Elder (Sthavira, gNas rtan) Buddhapalita who is other than most of the many commentators on this Treatise [on the Middle Way]—ranging from the honorable master [Nagarjuna] himself,³⁶⁶ the Elder Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, Devasharma, Gunashri, Gunamati, and Sthiramati through to the master Bhavaviveka.

~ The master Buddhapalita makes this explanation: 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.' In that, 'Things' (bhavdh, dngospo rnam) ³⁶⁷ are the external and internal sources (ayatana, skye mched). 'From themselves' (svata, bdag gi bdag nyid las) [which is rendered into English above as 'from their own entities' following the Tibetan which is following this very gloss by Avalokitavrata] means 'from [their] entities' (bdag nyid las).

~ [Buddhapalita is referring to production] from that. 'Are not produced' means '[are not produced] ultimately'.

~ Why are things not produced from their own entities? 'Because their production would be just senseless' [or, more literally, 'because of the senselessness of their production']. Their production' (tadutpada, de dag gi skye ba) means the production of those things. 'Senseless' (vaiyarthya, don med pa) means 'devoid of sense', 'purposeless', 'fruitless'. 'Ness' (ya[?], nyid) is the fact of their production being without sense, the senselessness of their production.

~ By saying 'because their production would be just senseless' [Buddhapalita] is indicating: If things are produced from an existent [state], their production would be just senseless because there would be nothing different from what had already been produced, nothing which had not arisen earlier.

~ Also, 'because their production would be endless' [indicates]: If, though existent,

something were produced, then through being produced it would be produced in that aspect without cessation; therefore, [its repeated] production would just not finish. ‘Makes the explanation’ means that the Elder Buddhapalita makes that explanation on this occasion of proving that things are not produced from self.

~ [Bhavaviveka’s Lamp for (Nagarjuna’s) ‘Wisdom’] says:

:: That is not suitable (1) because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example; (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Samkhya would be expected to adduce]; and (3) because [Buddhapalita’s] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system. His explanation affords such an opportunity] because since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from what is explicitly stated, what emerges is the opposite of the thesis and the reason—that things are produced from other because production is fruitful and because production has an end—due to which [he] contradicts [Madhyamika] tenets.

~ In this passage the commentator [Bhavaviveka] himself proves that the explanation by the Elder Buddhapalita is not suitable. In that, ‘is not suitable’ is [Bhavaviveka’s] thesis that the explanation by the Elder Buddhapalita is not suitable. Why is it not suitable? ‘Because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example.’ This indicates that in his explanation he has only proclaimed a mere thesis, ‘Things are not produced from self,’ and has not expressed a reason why they are not produced from self such as [Bhavaviveka did in his syllogism when he gave as the reason] ‘because of existing’ and has not expressed an example of the non-production of the existent from self such as [Bhavaviveka did when he said] ‘like, for example, an existent consciousness,’ and therefore [his explanation] is not suitable.

~ Furthermore, [it is not suitable] ‘because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Samkhya would be expected to adduce]. This indicates that] even if he had fully expressed and established a reason and an example, it would, without question, have the fallacies adduced by another who propounds [ultimately existent] production, but you [Buddhapalita] did not avoid them; therefore, because of not avoiding the fallacies adduced by another, [the explanation] is not suitable.

~ For what further reason is it not suitable? ‘And because [Buddhapalita’s] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system].’ [This indicates that] the explanation by the Elder Buddhapalita is also unsuitable because of being a passage that affords an opportunity for censure by another party. ‘And’ (cha, yang)\s to be taken as [indicating] that not only is [his explanation] unsuitable because of not expressing a reason and an example and because of not avoiding the fallacies adduced by another but also it is unsuitable because of affording an opportunity [for censure].

~ To indicate just that [third fault, Bhavaviveka] says, ‘... [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from what is explicitly stated’. What is explicitly stated? It is just Buddhapalita’s explanation, ‘Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.’³⁶⁸ To be reversed from that is to be reversed from that which is explicitly stated. The opposite of ‘Things are not produced from their own entities’ is ‘things are produced from other’; the opposite of ‘because their production would be just senseless’ is ‘because their production

is fruitful', and the opposite of 'because production would be endless' is 'because production is finite'. Hence, because of affording an opportunity [for censure] it is also unsuitable.

~ How [does Buddhapalita's explanation] come to be a passage affording an opportunity [for censure] through reversing what is explicitly stated? Therefore, [Bhavaviveka] says, '... what emerges is the opposite of the thesis and the reason [or, more literally, the property of that].' The 'thesis' (sadhya, bsgrub par bya ba) is the thesis, 'Things are not produced from their own entities.' 'What emerges is opposite of that' means that what emerges is the opposite of 'Things are not produced from their own entities,' i.e., things are produced from other.

~ The 'property of that' (taddharma, de'i chos) is the property of that thesis, that is to say, [the reason which is] the property of the subject of that thesis: namely, 'because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.' 'What emerges is the opposite of those': what emerges is the opposite of 'because their production would be just senseless'— namely, because production is fruitful—and the opposite of 'because production would be endless'—namely, because production is finite.

~ How does [Buddhapalita's explanation] come to afford an opportunity [for censure] due to the emergence of the opposite of those? Therefore, [Bhavaviveka] says, 'things are produced from other because production is fruitful and because production has an end'. [This means that Buddhapalita gives someone an opportunity for censure through opening up] the opportunity of [someone's saying that he is holding] (1) that things are produced from other, which emerges as the opposite of the thesis 'Things are not produced from their own entities'; (2) production is fruitful, which emerges as the opposite of the property [proving the thesis] 'because their production would be just senseless'; and (3) production is finite, which emerges as the opposite of the property [proving the thesis] 'because production would be endless'.

~ What fault is there in such? As a possible response by his opponent, [it would show that Buddhapalita] 'contradicts [Madhyamika] tenets'. For it would contradict the tenets in the master [Nagarjuna's] scriptures that he does not assert that things are [ultimately] produced from other, that he does not assert that production³⁶⁹ is [ultimately] fruitful, and that he does not assert that production is [ultimately] finite.

~ Therefore, this explanation by the Elder Buddhapalita is not suitable since it contradicts reasoning and scripture.

Tsong Khapa, in commenting on these points in his Ocean of Reasoning,³⁷⁰ disagrees with Avalokitavrata about what tenet is contradicted. He says that it is the tenet that the statement in Nagarjuna's Treatise 'there is no production from self is a mere elimination of production from self. As Jam-yang-shay-ba³⁷¹ points out, the three points show that a tenet is contradicted— they are not the tenet that is contradicted.

There is no question that Bhavaviveka is indeed right in saying that the refutation of the four extreme types of production is just a non-affirming negation and that it would contradict Madhyamika tenets if Buddhapalita indulged in an affirming negation on this occasion of ultimate analysis. However, a defender of Buddhapalita would answer that his refutation of the four extreme types of production is indeed a non-affirming negation. For his emphasizing that production exists conventionally does not mean that he considers that the refutation of production establishes conventionally existent production. Buddhapalita is

briefly setting out the general thrust of Nagarjuna's Treatise that nothing exists ultimately and that everything is feasible within the context of mere nominalism; he means:

~ Though non-production from the four extremes is here a non-affirming negation, production does exist nominally.

Furthermore, even if Buddhapalita's words do seem to suggest an affirming negation, since he did not wish to suggest such, he cannot be called to task for it. Even sutra says, 'That which is produced from causes is not produced,' and Bhavaviveka himself says, 'The subject, a form, does not exist ultimately because of existing—like, for example, a magician's illusion [which exists and does not exist ultimately].' No one asserts that these statements imply conventional production or conventional existence even though they might seem to.

Based on Buddhapalita's somewhat misleading words, Bhavaviveka took his consequences as implying a proof of conventionally existent production from other. Then, he proceeded to extract Buddhapalita's supposed actual meaning according to this notion. He then showed that this would contradict the Madhyamika tenet that the refutation of production is a non-affirming negation.

This does not mean, however, that non-affirming negations have no implications.³⁷² A non-affirming negation cannot imply a positive phenomenon or even an affirming negation but can imply another non-affirming negation of the same type. For instance, the non-affirming negation (or negative phenomenon), the non-existence of a son of a barren woman, implies the non-affirming negation, the non-existence of the beauty or ugliness of the son of a barren woman. Also, meditation on emptiness, a non-affirming negation of inherent existence, with respect to one phenomenon functions as meditation on the emptiness of everything. In the same vein, it is said that until one has eradicated adherence to the inherent existence of the mental and physical aggregates, one has not cognized the absence of inherent existence of the person. Similarly, the thesis that things are not inherently produced from self, other, both, and neither implies that production does not exist inherently, thereby implying that things lack inherent existence.³⁷³ These are all non-affirming negations that imply other non-affirming negations.

Therefore, non-affirming negations (or negative phenomena) may have implications, but those implications are all other non-affirming negations of the same type. An affirming negation, on the other hand, implies something positive in its place. For instance, the fact Devadatta's not eating during the day implies his eating at night. (For a discussion of negatives see Appendix 4.)

IN CONCLUSION, Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita's consequences revolves around his interpretation of the latter's prefatory and concluding remarks to the refutation of production. He interpreted them as showing that Buddhapalita saw conventionally existent production as being proved by the refutation of true production, thereby contradicting the basic Madhyamika tenet that the object realized through a refutation by ultimate analysis is a mere negation or elimination of true existence.

L2: [4. Chandrakirti's Defense of Buddhapalita] :L2

Sources:

- Chandrakirti's Clear Words
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
- Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen's Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences
- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Corresponding section of the translation pp. 584-6

For Chandrakirti, all of the fallacies that Bhavaviveka found in Buddhapalita's refutation of production from self are INADMISSIBLE.³⁷⁴

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (14.1-15.3, 10.11-11.2) says:

~ The master Buddhapalita says, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless. There is no need for production again (punarutpada, yang skye ba) of things which already exist in their own entities. If though existent they are produced, they would never not be produced.' About this, some [namely, Bhavaviveka] express faults, 'That is not suitable (1) because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example; (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Samkhya would be expected to adduce]; and (3) because [Buddhapalita's] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system.³⁷⁵ His explanation affords such an opportunity] because since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from what is explicitly stated, what emerges is the opposite of the thesis and the reason—that things are produced from other because production is fruitful and because production has an end—due to which [he] would contradict [Madhyamika] tenets.'

~ We [that is, Chandrakirti] view all of these fallacies as not being reasonable.

L4: [CHANDRAKIRTI'S DEFENSE AGAINST THE FIRST FALLACY] :L4

The first fallacy was that Buddhapalita could not refute production from self because he did not state a reason and an example of an autonomous syllogism. Chandrakirti's answer is that through disputation with contradictory consequences an opponent can indeed come to accept that there is no production from self. Buddhapalita demonstrated the inner contradictions in production from self with two consequences:

~ It follows about the subject, a sprout, that its production again is senseless because of already existing in its own entity.³⁷⁶

If it is answered that the consequence is not entailed by the reason, the second consequence is:

~ It follows about the subject, a sprout, that its production is endless because though it already exists in its own entity, there is need for its re-production.

The opponent can perceive that these consequences contradict his tenets because a Samkhya asserts that production again (into a manifest state) is sensible (even though he does not assert that the production again of the already manifest is sensible) and does not assert that products are produced endlessly. Thereby, Buddhapalita shows that the proofs for the existence of production from self are unreasonable, for a Samkhya can find no example of re-production of that which has already been produced. Since senseless re-production and endless production of that which has already been produced contradict his own tenets about

production, the Samkhya is caused to fall away from his assertion of production from self.

Furthermore, if one is able to show such inner contradictions and the opponent perceives them yet persists in his error, there is no point in further stating reasons and examples of autonomous syllogisms. Bhavaviveka's rushing to state autonomous syllogisms just shows his liking for logic.

Also, if one is a Madhyamika who refutes all extremes as in the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra, one should not use autonomous syllogisms, in which the reason has inherently existent presence in the subject, pervasion, and counter-pervasion. This is because a Madhyamika has no assertion of other positions among the four extremes and so forth, such as that things inherently exist, utterly do not exist, both inherently exist and inherently disintegrate, or that there is an inherently existent middle way that forsakes the two extremes of existence and non-existence. A Madhyamika has no thesis which contradicts the Madhyamika system.

Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections says:³⁷⁷

- :: If I had any [inherently existent] thesis,
- :: Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence].
- :: Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis, I am only faultless.

It is not being said that a Madhyamika has no theses; he merely has no theses that inherently exist. He has no theses upholding the existence of phenomena which can be found under analysis. However, Madhyamikas do have both negative and positive theses.³⁷⁸ That they have negative theses is clear in the refutations of going and coming and of production, for instance.

Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way says (II.8):

- :: Respectively, a goer is not going,
- :: A non-goer also is not going,
- :: Indeed what third other than
- :: A goer and a non-goer is going?

Also, (I.1):

- :: There is never production
- :: Anywhere of any phenomenon
- :: From itself, from others,
- :: From both, or causelessly.

Madhyamikas also have positive theses as in Nagarjuna's Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment, 'I assert dependently arisen activities to be like dreams and magicians' illusions.' His Refutation of Objections³⁷⁹ says, 'We do not set forth a non-assertion of conventionalities.'

His Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says:

- :: Those who assert dependent phenomena
- :: As like moons in water,
- :: As not real and not unreal,
- :: Are not tricked by views.

His Praise of the Supramundane (Lokatitastava) says, 'You [Buddha] have taught agent and object as conventionalities. Your assertion is that they are established as mutually dependent.'

Also, Chandrakirti says in his own commentary on his Supplement, 'The wise should think that this position is faultless and beneficial and should definitely assert it.' Also, 'Therefore, because dependent imputation is asserted in the same way as the assertion of dependent-arising as just conditional, it does not follow for our position that all conventionalities are annihilated; it is suitable also for the opponent to assert just this.' Throughout his commentary to his own Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' and in his Clear Words Chandrakirti refers to theses stated in the basic text and the reasonings or consequences which prove these theses.³⁸⁰ Thus, Madhyamikas have both negative and positive theses.

Since Nagarjuna does seem to say in his Refutation of Objections that he does not have any theses, the background of that statement needs to be known.³⁸¹ A Madhyamika has said, 'Phenomena do not inherently exist,' to which a proponent of inherently existent phenomena has answered, 'If the words of this thesis inherently exist, then it would not be correct that all phenomena do not inherently exist. If the words of this thesis do not inherently exist, they are nothing and cannot refute the inherent existence of phenomena.' The idea of the opponent is that if things exist, they must exist by way of their own being. If things do not, then they do not exist at all and, like the hairs of a turtle, cannot effect anything.

Thus, the debate in the Refutation of Objections is not about having or not having a thesis in general. It is about whether the words of the thesis, 'Phenomena do not exist inherently,' exist inherently. The meaning of Nagarjuna's answer is:

~ If I asserted that the words of such a thesis existed inherently, I would have the fault of contradicting my own thesis that all phenomena do not exist inherently. However, because I do not assert that the words of my thesis exist inherently, I do not have this fault.

Thus, this passage which is often quoted to show that Madhyamikas have no theses does not do so. Madhyamikas have nominally existent positive and negative theses; they do not have any theses which are analytically findable or any theses which affirm the existence of analytically findable phenomena.

It is not fitting for a Madhyamika to assert the existence of autonomous syllogisms because, even conventionally, nothing exists autonomously or inherently. However, Tsong Khapa adds that it does not necessarily follow that if one accepts autonomous syllogisms, one is not a Madhyamika, for Svatantrikas do so but are still Madhyamikas.³⁸² Since they are higher than Chittamatrins because they prove with limitless forms of reasoning that all phenomena do not truly exist, they are not suitable to be other than Madhyamikas. The non-contradiction of being a Madhyamika and yet accepting what is not fit for a Madhyamika is similar to the non-contradiction of being a monk and yet having minor infractions of the monk's code.³⁸³

In defense of Buddhapalita against Bhavaviveka's attribution of the first 'fallacy', Chandrakirti's Clear Words (15.3-16.10, 11.1-12.4) says:³⁸⁴

~ I view all of these fallacies as not being reasonable. How? His saying 'because [Buddhapalita] did not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from

self] as well as an example' is not reasonable.

~ Why? [Buddhapalita] is inquiring in the following way of an opponent who asserts production from self:³⁸⁵

~ You [Samkhyas] propound that 'from self [means] that the existence [of things that involve production acts] as a cause and that just it [i.e., the existent] is produced.'³⁸⁶ However, we do not see that there is purpose in the production again of the existent, and we also see that [such production] would be endless. However, you [Samkhyas] do not assert that the already produced [that is, the already manifest] is produced again and also do not assert that [the production of a thing] is endless. Therefore, your debate [that is to say, your position of production from self] is devoid of correctness and contradicts your own assertion.

~ When [Buddhapalita] debates through just these [consequences] which have the effects [derived] from stating a reason and example, would the opponent not accept it? However, if the opponent is not overcome even through debate by way of contradicting his own assertions, then due to [his] shamelessness he also just would not be overcome by [stating] reasons and examples. We [Prasangikas] do not debate with the crazily stubborn. Therefore, when the master [Bhavaviveka] sets out inferences at inappropriate times, he is manifesting just his own liking for inference.

~ Also, it is not suitable for one who is a Madhyamika to make autonomous inferences because of not asserting other positions [among the four extremes]. Moreover, Aryadeva [XVI.25] explains:³⁸⁷

:: Even over a long period of time
:: Censure cannot be expressed
:: For one who has no position of [inherent] existence,
:: Non-existence, or existence and non-existence.

~ Also, [Nagarjuna's] Refutation of Objections [stanzas 29 and 30] says:

:: If I had any [inherently existent] thesis,
:: Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence].
:: Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis, I am only faultless.

:: If [in accordance with your thought] ³⁸⁸ the factualities
:: Of direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established objects of comprehension],
:: Then [it would be suitable] to prove those [in your own system] and refute [others], but since [valid cognizers observing
:: Such objects of comprehension] do not exist [even conventionally], there is no [chance for you] to censure me.

L4: [CHANDRAKIRTI'S DEFENSE AGAINST THE SECOND FALLACY] :L4

Chandrakirti next declares inadmissible the second fallacy adduced by Bhavaviveka in what the latter considered to be Buddhapalita's intended syllogism refuting the Samkhya position.³⁸⁹ Bhavaviveka's criticism was that Buddhapalita did not avoid the fallacies which a Samkhya would be expected to adduce upon analyzing his thesis and reason. Chandrakirti's answer is that Buddhapalita did not state an autonomous syllogism like Bhavaviveka's:

~ The subjects, the inner sources such as an eye sense, are not produced from self because of existing—like, for example, an existent consciousness.

Chandrakirti objects to Bhavaviveka's syllogism, saying that he has not avoided the fallacy of proving what is already established for Samkhyas if non-production from self refers to non-production from an entity of an effect. For, Samkhyas hold that manifestations are not produced from the manifest, that is, from effects, but from the non-manifest. On the other hand, if non-production from self refers to non-production from the entity of a cause, one would have the fallacy of the reason's proving exactly the opposite for a Samkhya.

Similarly, if the reason of Bhavaviveka's autonomous syllogism ('because of existing') is analyzed, the same faults need to be eradicated. If 'existing' means that an eye sense exists from the time of its causes, then the reason, for a Samkhya, only goes to prove that things are produced from self. If 'existing' means that an eye sense exists at the time of its manifestation, then one would be proving what is already established for the Samkhyas since they themselves assert that it has already been produced into its manifest or effect state and thus does not require production.

Chandrakirti says that though Bhavaviveka himself incurs these fallacies, Buddhapalita did not state such a thesis or reason. Rather, the thesis of Buddhapalita's consequence is:

~ It follows about the subjects, things, that their production again is senseless.

The reason is:

~ Because of already existing in their own entities.

(It should be remembered that Buddhapalita only said, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.')

According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, Chandrakirti saw in Buddhapalita's refutation the positing of a thesis:

~ Things are not produced from their own entities.

Then, he saw two consequences demonstrating damage to the view that things are produced from their own entities:

-- It follows about the subjects, things, that their production again is senseless because of already existing in their own entities.

-- It follows about the subjects, things, that their production is endless because, although already existent in their own entities, there is need for their production.

In other words, Chandrakirti is saying that Bhavaviveka misread Buddhapalita's text, for aside from positing a general thesis that things are not produced from self (that is, from their own entities), Buddhapalita did not express a syllogism (see p.456) such as 'The subjects, things, are not produced from their own entities because production is senseless and endless' (or in its altered form 'because production is sensible and has an end').

The fallacies which Bhavaviveka imputed to Buddhapalita are flung back at him by Chandrakirti. It is Bhavaviveka and not Buddhapalita who has the questionable autonomous syllogism with a vague predicate of the thesis ('are not produced from self or 'are not produced from their own entities') and a vague reason ('because of existing'). In this vein, Chandrakirti's Clear Words (16.11-18.4, 12.4-12.18) says:

~ When in that way a Madhyamika just does not express autonomous inferences, how could [Buddhapalita] have an autonomous thesis [such as Bhavaviveka stated]— ‘The inner sources are not produced from self—which the Samkhyas would cause to be overturned as follows:

~ What is the meaning of this thesis? Does ‘from self mean from the entity of the effect or from the entity of the cause? Which is it? If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you have the fault of] proving what is already established [for us]. If it is from the entity of the cause, then it has the sense of [proving] the opposite because [according to us Samkhyas] all that have production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] causes.

~ Also, how could we [Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti] have a reason [such as that stated by Bhavaviveka]— ‘because of existing’—which would be either [a case of] proving what is already established [for a Samkhya] or of having the opposite meaning [for a Samkhya] and with respect to which we would have to toil to get rid [of the fault that we would be] proving what is already established or [the fault of] having the opposite meaning!

~ Therefore, just due to not being susceptible to the consequence of those faults, answers to them did not [need] to be expressed by the master Buddhapalita.

L5: [An hypothetical extension of Bhavaviveka’s argument] :L5

Chandrakirti goes on to say that hypothetically Bhavaviveka might accept that the reasons, etc., which prove non-true existence do not appear similarly to Madhyamikas and non-Madhyamikas, making an autonomous syllogism impossible, in which case Buddhapalita should have stated a correct otherapproved inference (parasiddha-anumana, gzhan grags kyi rjes dpag). (Even though an actual anumana refers to an inferring consciousness, here in parasiddha-anumana, literally ‘otherapproved inference’, it refers to the application of a reason approved by the other party in the debate, an ‘other-approved syllogism’. Synonymous with parasiddha-anumana is parasiddhalinga (gzhan grags kyi nags), ‘other-approved reason’. Svasiddhaanumana (ranggrags kyi rjes dpag), ‘self-approved inference’, and svasiddha-linga (rang grags kyi rtags), ‘self-approved reason’, are also synonymous with parasiddha-anumana, ‘other-approved inference’, because ‘self and ‘other’ here both refer to the opponent from different points of view.)³⁹⁰ Thus, according to Chandrakirti, Bhavaviveka may mean that Buddhapalita did not state a correct other-approved inference because the latter did not give a proper reason and example.

In answer to this, Chandrakirti states that there is no need for an other-approved syllogism because the inner contradictions and unreasonableness of the opponent’s view can be shown by consequences and by showing him that his proofs of production from self are unreasonable, and thus there is no further purpose in stating an other-approved syllogism. That the Samkhya’s ‘proofs’ of production from self have no capacity to do so is the clearest sign of the eradication of the Samkhya’s own view. For, if upon statement of contradictory consequences, he wants to hold to his position, he must proceed to prove that there is production from self, for it is the way of logicians to state reasons in order to generate in another an ascertainment of a thesis just as one oneself has ascertained it. The Samkhya’s syllogism would, for instance, be:

~ The subject, a sprout unmanifest at the time of its causes, is produced from its own entity because the non-existent is not produced and because the causes of one thing are distinct from the causes of another.

The Samkhya's idea is that if the non-existent were produced or made manifest, then the horns of a rabbit could be produced. Also, things have their own distinct causes, and this indicates that they exist non-manifestly in their causes.

However, a Buddhist would not accept the reason as correct. For a Buddhist (that is to say, for a Sautrantika on up), even though what is non-existent at the time of its causes is produced, what is non-existent in general is not produced, and also the causes of one thing are indeed distinct from the causes of another thing, but these two facts do not entail that things are produced from their own entities. The reason, therefore, does nothing to advance why things are produced from their own entities; the syllogism is only a repetition of the basic thesis itself. Technically speaking, there is no concordant example to be found which can serve as a basis for ascertaining the entailment.³⁹¹ The Samkhya's proofs are no proofs at all in that they are just outflows of his own assertions, incapable of establishing them. In this vein, Chandrakirti's Clear Words (18.5-19.7, 12.18-13.18) says:

~ [Bhavaviveka] might think, '[I might allow that] since according to Madhyamikas the position [or thesis], reason, and example [of an autonomous syllogism] are not established, autonomous inferences are not to be expressed, and, therefore, one would not prove the meaning of a thesis refuting production from self and would not clear away the other's thesis through an inference established for both [parties]. Still, one must express contradiction of the other's thesis through one's own [other-approved] inference. Hence, one must have a position [that is, a thesis] and so forth that are devoid of the faults of position, reason, and example. Thus, since [Buddhapalita] did not express such and did not avoid the fallacies of those [which a Samkhya would be expected to draw, Buddhapalita] just has those faults [of not stating a reason and example capable of proving no production from self and of not avoiding the fallacies which a Samkhya would cite upon examining what no production from self means].'

~ Answer: That is not so. Why? One [such as a Samkhya] who [upon being pressed by the consequences set forth by Buddhapalita] wishes to generate ascertainment of something which he holds as a thesis in others in just the way that he has ascertained it, should demonstrate to others [that is, Madhyamikas] just that logical proof through which that meaning is understood. Therefore, it is respectively the custom for just the other party [here, the Samkhya] to state a proof of the meaning of a thesis which he himself asserts [in response to the contradictions shown by Buddhapalita's consequences rather than for Buddhapalita to proceed to set forth an otherapproved inference]. However, this [reasoning which a

~ Samkhya states to a Madhyamika to try to prove production from self] is not a [valid] reasoning for the other [party, the Madhyamika]. Because the reason and example [which a Samkhya cites] are not [valid], the proof of the meaning of his thesis is just a statement of outflows of [his own] assertions. Therefore, since he has asserted a position that is devoid of logical correctness, it deceives just himself, due to which it cannot generate ascertainment in another. In this way, just this inability of his attempt to prove the meaning of his thesis [due to being faulty] is the clearest eradication of his [position]. What need is there here to express damage [to his position] by way of inference! [For, the contradiction of his view that something exists and yet needs to be reproduced has been shown, and upon the Samkhya's presentation of his own view in syllogistic inference, the Madhyamika has given answers showing its illogicality.]

L5: [Buddhapalita's indication of an other-approved inference] :L5

Still, hypothetically, Bhavaviveka might insist on the statement of a self-approved or, as it is also called, an other-approved syllogism, because there are many other-approved syllogisms in Nagarjuna's writings and in many sutras. Chandrakirti answers that even if an other-approved syllogism needed to be stated, Buddhapalita did state one when he said, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless.' This indicates a correct other-approved syllogism:

~ With respect to the subjects, things such as a non-manifest pot and so forth abiding in the potential entities of their causes, their production again is senseless because of already existing in their own entities—like, for example, a manifest pot [which already exists in its own entity and the re-production of which would be senseless].

This other-approved syllogism is similar to the consequence which Jam-yang-shay-ba first interpreted in Buddhapalita's statement as:

It follows about the subject, a sprout, that its production again is senseless because of already existing in its own entity.

Except for slight differences in format, there is no substantial difference in this case between the consequence and otherapproved syllogism. In general, however, consequences have greater usage than other-approved syllogisms because they must be stated in all instances of generating an inference in another in order, at least, to break the pointedness or the vibrance of the other party's adherence to a wrong view.³⁹² An other-approved syllogism need not be stated for intelligent opponents, when a consequence alone is sufficient to generate a consciousness inferring the intended thesis.

The question between Chandrakirti and Bhavaviveka is whether Buddhapalita's statement indicates such a correct other-approved syllogism. To quote Buddhapalita again:

~ Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless.

Chandrakirti sees the word 'their' in the reason clause as indicating the subject and the example. His source is Buddhapalita's more extensive rendition:

~ The production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless.

This more extensive statement of 'their' as 'of things already existing in their own entities' implicitly contains within it an example—like a manifest pot—which possesses both the reason —already existing in its own entity—and the predicate—senseless production again. A valid example must possess both the reason and the predicate and be approved by the Samkhya, who agrees that a manifest pot already exists in its own entity and does not require further production. Since this more extensive statement is Buddhapalita's own commentary on the brief statement, it must be applied to the condensed version.

Similarly, the phrase, 'existing in their own entities', in the longer statement bears the reason of the syllogism. The predicate of the thesis is indicated in the shorter version itself, 'production would be senseless', though the word 'again' (punar, yang) does need to be added from the longer statement, making 'production again would be senseless'.

Therefore, even if Buddhapalita's words are taken from the viewpoint of presenting an other-approved inference, the faults imputed by Bhavaviveka do not apply.

This is because Buddhapalita's words contain a five-membered statement of proof:

-- Thesis: With regard to things such as a non-manifest pot and so forth, their production again is senseless.

-- Pervasion: That production again is senseless pervades, or applies to all cases of, things already existing in their own entities.

-- Example: Like an already manifest pot.

-- Exemplification: Just as an already manifest pot already exists in its own entity, so things such as a non-manifest pot already exist in their own entities.

-- Summary: Therefore, because things already exist in their own entities, the production again of things is senseless.³⁹³

(See Appendix 5 for a discussion of other proof statements.) About this, Chandrakirti's Clear Words (19.8-21.7, 13.18-15.4) says:

~ [Bhavaviveka] might say, 'Nevertheless, the fault of contradiction with one's own inference [that is to say, with an inference acceptable to a Samkhya] must, without question, be expressed.'

~ [Answer:] The master Buddhapalita also just expressed such. How? For he said, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless.' In that, the [word] 'their' (tad, de dag) [in the reason clause] holds [or indicates] 'those which already exist in their own entities'. Why? This is because [Buddhapalita's subsequent statement] 'The production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless,' is [his] commentary on that abbreviated statement [and we must, therefore, carry it over to the shorter statement]. Also, this [longer] statement ['those which already exist in their own entities'] bears a concordant example ['a manifest pot'] renowned to the other [party, the Samkhya] which possesses the qualities of [the predicate of] the probandum ['senseless production again'] and the proof ['already existing in its own entity'].

~ In [Buddhapalita's longer statement], 'already existing in their own entities' bears the reason. [In the shorter statement itself] 'because production would be just senseless' holds the predicate of the probandum [once it is changed to 'production again (punarutpada, yang skye ba) is senseless' in accordance with the longer statement].

~ In:

~ A sound is an impermanent thing because products are [necessarily] impermanent things. It is seen that products are impermanent things, as in the case, for example, of a pot. Likewise, a sound is also a product. Therefore, because of being a product, [a sound] is an impermanent thing.

~ Product which is manifested [or used] due to its connection [with the predicate of the probandum] is the reason. Just so, here also [the syllogism is]:

~ Things [such as a non-manifest pot and so forth] are not produced from self because the production again of what already exist in their own entities is just senseless. Just as it is seen that pots and so forth which already abide in front [of oneself] and which already exist in their own manifest entities do not rely on being produced again, so if you think that there are pots and so forth which already exist in their own entities at the time of the lump of clay and so forth, then production even at that time of what already exist in their own entities does not exist.

~ In that [syllogism], the reason—'already existing in their own entities'—which is

manifested [or used] due to its connection [with the predicate of the probandum, ‘senseless production again’] and which is unmistakable with respect to refuting re-production expresses contradiction through the Samkhya’s own inference [that is, an inference acceptable to a Samkhya].

~ Therefore, how is it that [Bhavaviveka] says, ‘That is not suitable because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason as well as an example’?

L5: [The unassailability of Buddhapalita’s other-approved inference] :L5

Chandrakirti found in Buddhapalita’s commentary a syllogism that is unassailable. For a Samkhya would have no qualms about the thesis since the subject is clearly stated as a non-manifest pot and so forth, and a non-manifest pot does not require production. Also, the thesis—that a non-manifest pot and so forth have no need of production again—is new to a Samkhya and cannot be said to be a case of trying to prove what is already established for him since he accepts that the first production of a thing is its attainment of an existent entity in its causes and that it requires further production into a manifest state. He would also have no qualms that the reason was proving exactly the opposite because the thesis is that the production again of a non-manifest pot is purposeless.

About this, the Clear Words (21.8-.14, 15.4-.15) says:

~ Not only is it just not that a reason and example were not expressed, but also it is not that the fallacies adduced by the other [party, the Samkhya] were not avoided. How? For, the Samkhyas do not assert that a pot dwelling in front [of oneself] which has a manifest form (abhivyaktarupa, mngon par gsal ba’i rang bzhin) manifests again, and [thus] here it is an entity established as an example [of something which already exists in its own entity and is not produced again].³⁹⁴

~ Since the probandum is:

~ those which are potential entities and do not have a manifested nature, predicated with a negation of production,

~ how could [the Samkhyas] have the qualm that [Buddhapalita’s syllogism has] the fault of a position [thesis] that is proving what is already established [for them] or has the sense of a contradictory reason [proving for them not that things are not produced from self but that they are].

~ Therefore, even if [Buddhapalita] did express contradiction³⁹⁵ [of the Samkhya view] through self[-renowned] inference [that is, a syllogistic statement approved by the Samkhyas], they would not set forth the fallacies which [Bhavaviveka] mentioned. Hence, it is just not that [Buddhapalita] did not avoid fallacies adduced by the other [party since they would not adduce them]. For these reasons, it should be known that these [two] objections [to Buddhapalita’s remarks by Bhavaviveka] are just senseless.

Chandrakirti says that, furthermore, Buddhapalita’s syllogistic statement does not have the fault of not applying to all products, since by using ‘a pot and so forth’ as the subject all things that have production are included in the subject and not just some specific products, such as pots. Thus, a Samkhya would not have any qualms that the reasoning did not apply to all products. The Clear Words (22.1-.2, 15.15-. 18) says:

Because the phrase ‘and so forth’ in ‘a pot (ghata, bum pa) and so forth’ was expressed with the intention of including all things asserted as being produced, [Buddhapalita’s

sylogistic statement] also does not become indefinite by way of [not including] cloth (pata, snam bu) and so forth.³⁹⁶

L5: [A second other-approved inference contained in Buddhapalita's commentary] :L5

In the above syllogism which Chandrakirti found in Buddhapalita's commentary, the thesis is that things such as non-manifest pots have no need of being produced again., not that they are not produced from self (or from their own entities), the latter being considered, in the context, to be vague and thus subject to questioning by a Samkhya. In this interpretation of Buddhapalita's remarks, his opening statement that things are not produced from their own entities is, according to Jam-yang-shay-ba, just a general thesis applying to the section, not the specific thesis of either the consequences or the other-approved syllogism just explained. Nevertheless, Chandrakirti finds a second otherapproved syllogism in the same passage that has the absence of production from self as the predicate of the thesis:

~ The subjects, objects other than the person which are asserted by the Samkhyas to be produced, are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, as is the case, for example, with the person (purusha, skyes bu).

According to Jam-yang-shay-ba,³⁹⁷ Chandrakirti's point is that even if Buddhapalita is proving for a Samkhya that objects other than the person are not produced from self, there is no fault of the Samkhya's having qualms that Buddhapalita is trying to prove what is already established for them, or that it proves just the opposite, or that it is indefinite due to not being all-inclusive. In other words, the argument is so well framed that none of these faults can be adduced.

Jam-yang-shay-ba does not explain how this syllogism is faultless; he merely says that it is easy to realize that it is. Clearly, it is all-inclusive in that 'objects other than the person which are asserted by the Samkhyas to be produced' includes all phenomena that are subject to production, since it excludes even the fundamental nature (prakṛti, rang bzhin), which is other than the person but is not produced, and yet includes all evolutes of the fundamental nature. Also, it is clear that the example is established for the Samkhya, who holds that the person exists in its own entity and is not produced from self since it is not produced at all. Perhaps, the specification of the subject as all phenomena that are subject to production rules out any question about the predicate of the thesis—'are not produced from self— such as whether it means that these are not produced from their manifest form since manifest objects are not subject to production, and thus 'are not produced from self must mean that 'not produced from their unmanifest causal form in which they preexist.'

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (22.3-.5, 15.18-16.1) only says:

~ Or, [the brief statement by Buddhapalita indicates] this other syllogism:

~ Objects other than the person which [the Samkhyas] propound as being produced from self are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, as is the case, for example, with the person.

~ [In that] this example [of the person] is expressed.³⁹⁸

L5: [Refuting production from self also refutes manifestation from self] :L5

Buddhapalita's refutation of production from self also applies to those Samkhyas who assert not production but manifestation. For production and manifestation are similar in the non-appearance first of what is later apparent. Thus, any objection by a Samkhya that

Buddhapalita's refutation does not hit its mark would be unfounded.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (22.6-.S, 16.1-.5) says:

~ Even if [a Samkhya objected that] a refutation of production does not harm a proponent of manifestation, manifestation is designated with the term 'production', and due to qualitative similarity [of production and manifestation] with respect to earlier non-apprehendability and later apprehendability, the term 'production' just expresses manifestation. Thereby, it is not that refuting it [i.e., production] does not damage [the assertion of the manifestation of what already exists in an unmanifest state].

L5: [But did Buddhapalita really say all that?] :L5

Chandrakirti, who has been conducting this debate based on what Bhavaviveka actually said and extending it into the hypothetical, now indicates that Bhavaviveka's only possible answer at this point would be that one cannot actually find these meanings in Buddhapalita's remarks. Chandrakirti's answer is that although Buddhapalita did not extensively state these exact words, his statements are laden with meaning and that he, Chandrakirti, has said nothing not indicated by Buddhapalita.

The Clear Words (22.9-23.2, 16.5-.9) says:

~ [Bhavaviveka might object:] Without [Buddhapalita's] having anything that expresses the meanings which you have set out, how was such analysis found?

~ Answer: These statements of meaning³⁹⁹ [by Buddhapalita], due to having great import, contain the abovementioned meanings. Being explained, they issue forth this having the nature of the meanings given. Hence, there is nothing [in what I have said] that is not indicated in them.

IN SUMMARY, the purpose of Chandrakirti's defense of Buddhapalita is to show:⁴⁰⁰ (1) that consequences are sufficient to generate in an opponent an inference of the desired thesis, (2) that autonomous syllogisms are utterly out of place in the Madhyamika system, and (3) that if it is insisted that other-approved syllogisms are required, Buddhapalita's more extensive statement together with the initial brief one contain a correct five-membered syllogism.

His defense is reminiscent of the style of Nagarjuna's Treatise in that he gives a complete presentation and then, taking another tack, sets forth a new one. In the same way, in the second chapter of the Treatise Nagarjuna refutes inherently existing going through analyzing the area gone over, then begins again and refutes it through analyzing the goer, then through analyzing the beginning of going, and finally through analyzing its opposite, rest. Each is sufficient to refute naturally existent going completely, and yet he resorts to other methods for the sake of attacking the diverse ways in which the misapprehension of one topic is supported. When many angles are analyzed, it is more likely that the proper inferring consciousness will be generated in the other party. Also, it is necessary to refute the different philosophical systems directly through their own approaches and tenets.

The root of Bhavaviveka's objection is that he did not think that Buddhapalita's brief demonstration meant what it is found to mean by the more sympathetic. As Jam-yang-shay-ba so clearly spells out, the reason behind Bhavaviveka's disagreement is found in Buddhapalita's prefatory remarks where he seems to indicate that something positive, the conventional existence of production, is being proved on this occasion of refuting the four extreme types

of production. Jam-yang-shay-ba agrees with Bhavaviveka that Buddhapalita's remark is questionable, but says that Buddhapalita was summarizing not what is specifically proven by the refutation of the four extreme types of production but the general meaning of the chapter taken in the light of the whole text: inherently existent production is refuted but production does exist nominally.

L4: [CHANDRAKIRTI'S DEFENSE AGAINST THE THIRD FALLACY] :L4

This brings us to the third and final fallacy adduced by Bhavaviveka—that since it is necessary for Buddhapalita to assert the opposite of his thesis and reason, he contradicts the Madhyamika tenet that the refutation of the four extreme types of production is a non-affirming negation.⁴⁰¹ According to Bhavaviveka, Buddhapalita's intended meaning is that production from self is not just eliminated but is replaced by production from other because production is purposeful and has an end.

To repeat, Buddhapalita said, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be senseless and because production would be endless.' Bhavaviveka saw the statement as indicating two consequences:

- It follows that the subjects, things, are produced senselessly because of being produced from self.
- It follows that the subjects, things, are produced endlessly because of being produced from self.

When a consequence implies its opposite meaning, the negative of the reason in the consequence is put as the predicate in a syllogism, and the negative of the predicate in the consequence is put as the reason in the syllogism. Bhavaviveka saw these consequences as implying their opposite meaning:

- The subjects, things, are not produced from self because their production is not senseless.
- The subjects, things, are not produced from self because their production is not endless.

Chandrakirti answers that Buddhapalita did not state such consequences at all, never mind intending to imply their opposite meaning. Instead, the two consequences should read:

- It follows the subjects, things, are produced again senselessly because of being produced from self (or because of already existing in their own entities).
- It follows that the subjects, things, are produced endlessly because of being produced from self (or because, although existing in their own entities, there is sense in their being produced again).

The idea is that for the Samkhyas the first production of things is their attainment of existence in the nature or entity of their causes; then, they are produced again when made manifest. The reason why the first consequence should read 'produced again', rather than 'produced', is that although Buddhapalita's brief statement says only 'produced' (utpada, skye ba), the more extensive statement following it (see p.460) says 'produced again' (punarutpada, yang skye ba).

Bhavaviveka thought that Buddhapalita was flinging the absurd consequence that, in general, production is senseless and endless, and thus he thought that the opposite—sensible and limited production—was being asserted. However, once it is understood that the consequences are that things are produced again senselessly and endlessly, it can be seen that the opposite meaning—that things are produced again sensibly and not endlessly—is accepted only by a Samkhya. For, a Prasangika has no such thesis of the sensible and limited re-production

of things. Understanding what Buddhapalita's consequences actually are and that their opposite meaning is asserted only by a Samkhya is so central to the controversy between Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka that the Gelugpa colleges call this phase of their Middle Way studies 'The Opposite of the Consequences' (thai bzlog).

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (23.3-24.2, 16.10-. 17) says:

~ The opposite meaning of the consequences [—that things are produced again sensibly and not endlessly—] is related only with the other [party, the Samkhya], not with us because we do not have [such] a thesis. Therefore, how could we be contradicting [the Madhyamika tenet that the refutation of production is a non-affirming negation]?⁴⁰² Through proving that the opposite of the consequences [is related with, or held by, the other party] we only wish to adduce as many fallacies as possible to the other party [so that he will give up his assertion of production from self].⁴⁰³ Therefore, how could the master Buddhapalita—following the unerring system of the master Nagarjuna [in which production from other, as well as sensible and finite re-production are not asserted]⁴⁰⁴—have said any words that would make him susceptible in the sense of affording an opportunity for another [to show contradiction with the Madhyamika system]!

Some Tibetans (and indeed many Western scholars) have explained that this passage indicates that Madhyamikas (or Prasangikas) do not have any theses in general. Jam-yang-shay-ba⁴⁰⁵ says that it is easy to realize that this is wrong. Since the referent of Chandrakirti's remark that Madhyamikas have no thesis is specific—meaning specifically that Madhyamikas do not hold the thesis that production again is sensible and limited—the passage cannot serve as a source showing that Madhyamikas have no theses in general.

L5: [Consequences do not have to imply their opposite meaning] :L5

The mere fact that these statements are properly constructed unwanted consequences does not mean that Buddhapalita must assert their opposite. As Chandrakirti has just indicated, through showing a Samkhya that he is logically subject to consequences that are opposite to his own views he can see the internal contradictions of asserting production from self and thereby will drop it, provided he does not shamelessly persist in his error.

Thus, on this occasion when a proponent of no inherent existence, a Prasangika, is adducing for a proponent of inherent existence, a Samkhya, the consequences that re-production is senseless and endless, these are not consequences implying their opposite meaning from among the five types of consequences (see pp.445-9), but merely unwanted consequences stated for the sake of refuting the opponent's thesis of production from self. For, Buddhapalita did not state them intending to imply their opposite, and words accord with the intention of the speaker—they do not coerce the speaker powerlessly but accord with the speaker's motivation. For instance, when a Buddhist says 'consciousness' and a Samkhya says 'consciousness', the two have radically different meanings.

In this vein Chandrakirti's Clear Words (24.2-.6, 16.17-17.3) says:

~ When a proponent of no inherent existence adduces a consequence for a proponent of inherent existence, how could it follow that he is subject to the opposite meaning of the consequence? Words do not make the speaker powerless like [an executioner]⁴⁰⁶ with a club or noose [forcing a victim to say all sorts of things]. Then, how [do words indicate what they express]? If they have the capacity [to indicate their respective meaning], they accord with the speaker's intention in speaking. Therefore, [Buddhapalita's] adducing consequences

[here] has the effect only of refuting the other party's thesis [that reproduction is sensible and finite];⁴⁰⁷ hence he does not come to have the opposite meaning of the consequences.

As Jam-yang-shay-ba notes,⁴⁰⁸ Chandrakirti is saying that Buddhapalita's consequences here at the point of refuting production from self do not imply their opposite meaning; he is not saying that no consequences imply their opposite meaning.

L5: [This is frequently Nagarjuna's procedure] :L5

IT IS CLEARLY NAGARJUNA'S METHOD IN THE TREATISE FREQUENTLY TO USE CONSEQUENCES, RATHER THAN SYLLOGISMS, TO REFUTE OTHERS' POSITIONS.

For example, in refuting through an absurd consequence that a definition inherently subsists in what is defined,⁴⁰⁹ he says (V.lcd):

:: If space existed before its definition,
:: It would follow that it was without definition [at that time, due to which it would not exist].

He states an unwanted consequence in order to refute another's position and to cause him to cognize that a definition does not inherently subsist in what is defined and, therefore, that the existence of a definition does not serve to show that the defined inherently exists. The consequence implies its opposite meaning: Space does not exist before its definition because of having a definition. However, it does not imply that space exists after its definition.

Also, in refuting through an absurd consequence that dependent establishment exists inherently in conventionalities, Nagarjuna says (IV.2abc):⁴¹⁰

:: If a form [such as a sense power] existed [inherently] ,
:: Separate from the form's cause [the elements],
:: It would follow that a form is causeless [because depending on causes would be contradictory with its inherent existence].

Nagarjuna here is implying the opposite meaning, i.e., that a form is not inherently separate from its causes because a form is caused. An unwanted consequence is being stated to refute a position, and the opposite is also being implied.

Similarly, in refuting that nirvana is a functioning thing (bhava, dngos po), Nagarjuna says (XXV.4ab):

:: Nirvana is not a [functioning] thing.
:: [For] it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death.

Since the consequence is:

~ It absurdly follows that nirvana has the characteristics of aging (changeability) and death (disintegration)⁴¹¹ because of being a functioning thing,

the opposite is something that a Prasangika in the Gelugpa school, which indeed asserts that nirvana is not a functioning thing since it is unchanging, could assert:

~ Nirvana is not a functioning thing because of not having the characteristics of aging

and disintegration.

Though consequences sometimes imply their opposite meaning as in these cases, Bhavaviveka cannot insist that Buddhapalita's consequences do so just because they are consequences, for there are many types, including those that do and do not imply their opposite. Tsong Khapa⁴¹² gives an illustration of one that implies its opposite: If it is asserted that a sprout exists by way of its own entity, then the consequence is flung:

~ It follows that a sprout would not arise in dependence upon a seed because of existing by way of its own entity.

This implies the opposite:

~ A sprout does not exist by way of its own entity because of arising in dependence upon a seed.

As Tsong Khapa says, there are a great many instances of consequences' proving a thesis which is the opposite of the reason in the consequence by way of a reason which is the opposite of the predicate of the consequence. However, even in these cases, all that is being established is a mere elimination of the inherent existence which is asserted by the other party. A positive phenomenon is not being implied, and thus the Madhyamika tenet that the reasonings proving emptiness establish only a non-affirming negation of inherent existence is not contravened even when the opposite is implied. Still, the question why Chandrakirti cites as his three examples consequences that do imply their opposite remains; one could only say that he is giving examples of Nagarjuna's procedure of using consequences, not of consequences that do not imply their opposite meaning.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (24.7-25.2, 17.3-10) says:

:: In this way, the master [Nagarjuna] mostly eradicates others' positions by way of merely adducing consequences as through (V.I):

:: Space does not at all exist Before its definition.

:: If space existed before its definition,

:: It would follow that it was without definition [at that time, due to which it would not exist].

And (IV.2):

:: If a form [such as a sense power] existed [inherently]

:: Separate from the form's cause [the elements],

:: It would follow that a form is causeless [because depending on causes would be contradictory with its inherent existence].

:: Nowhere is there any [functioning] object that is causeless.

Likewise (XXV.4):

:: Nirvana is not a [functioning] thing (bhava, dngos po).

:: [For] it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death.

:: There are no [functioning] things

:: Without aging and death.

Etc.

CHANDRAKIRTI'S POINTING OUT HERE THAT NAGARJUNA'S PROCEDURE FREQUENTLY IS

TO ADDUCE

CONSEQUENCES (PRASANGA, THAI 'GYUR) APPEARS TO BE A CENTRAL REASON WHY, IN TIBET, CHANDRAKIRTI'S SCHOOL CAME TO BE CALLED PRASANGIKA.

L5: [Why does bhavaviveka not find Buddhapalita's words to be rich with syllogisms like Nagarjuna's?] :L5

Bhavaviveka would find syllogisms implied in Nagarjuna's consequences; so, Chandrakirti asks him why he does not find them in Buddhapalita's statements. The hypothetical Bhavaviveka answers that it is the job of a commentator in the process of expanding on the meaning of a root text to present syllogisms with proper reasons and examples. To this, Chandrakirti cites the devastating fact that Nagarjuna, in commenting on his own Refutation of Objections, did not extensively use syllogisms.

The Clear Words (25.3-7, 17.11-16) says:⁴¹³

:: If the master [Nagarjuna's] statements are considered to be causes of many syllogisms due to being meaningful statements and thus of great import, why are the master Buddhapalita's statements also not considered that way?

:: Objection [by the hypothetical Bhavaviveka]: It is the custom of commentators to set forth syllogisms at length.

:: [Answer:] That also is not so because when even the master [Nagarjuna] commented on [his] Refutation of Objections, he did not set out syllogistic statements.⁴¹⁴

Thus, Madhyamika custom or tradition does not call for the usage of syllogisms. Bhavaviveka's insistence on syllogistic reasoning goes against Madhyamika procedure.

Chandrakirti next probes more deeply into the reasons behind Bhavaviveka's insistence on syllogistic statements, concluding that it stems from a basic misconception about the nature of reasoning, which in turn stems from a misapprehension of emptiness. In this way, in the next and final phase of this controversy Chandrakirti goes on the offensive—having defended Buddhapalita by (1) first showing that consequences are sufficient, (2) inbetween showing that even if one insists on a syllogistic statement, it is there in Buddhapalita's remarks, and (3) finally showing again that consequences are sufficient. By rimming his argument with demonstration of the sufficiency of consequences, Chandrakirti causes us to wonder what is behind Bhavaviveka's view. He is now ready to set out his view of emptiness, more profound than Bhavaviveka's. It is a dramatic moment.

L2: [5. Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka] :L2

Sources:

- Chandrakirti's Clear Words
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
- Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen's Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences
- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.696-7

L4: [THE GENERAL INDICTMENT] :L4

To start, Chandrakirti turns to analyzing Bhavaviveka's refutation of the Samkhya position of production from self.⁴¹⁵

The general indictment of Bhavaviveka is that even though he asserts the Madhyamika view, he states many faulty autonomous syllogisms—despite a wish to show great skill in logic. For instance, he states the following syllogism to refute production from self:

~ Ultimately the internal sources (eye sense, ear sense, etc.) are not produced from self because of existing, like, for example, an existent consciousness. (Hereafter, 'eye sense' will be substituted for 'inner sources' for the sake of brevity.)

Many fallacies, such as the non-establishment of the presence of the reason ('existing') in the subject ('the inner sources'), are seen.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (25.7-26.2, 17.16-18.2) says:

:: Furthermore, this logician [Bhavaviveka], while wishing merely to demonstrate that he has great skill in treatises of logic, expresses autonomous syllogisms which are realized to be the locus of collections of a great many fallacies, despite his asserting the Madhyamika view. How? Respectively, here he states this syllogism, 'Ultimately the internal sources are not produced from self⁴¹⁶ because of existing, like existent consciousness.⁴¹⁷

Since, in the Samkhya system the person, or consciousness, is permanent, it is not produced and thus obviously not produced from self; so, a Samkhya can easily agree with the suitability of the example, i.e., that consciousness is existent and not produced from self. In this type of reasoning, the reason is not a non-observation of a related object but an observation of something contradictory (existence) with the predicate of what is being negated (being produced from self). Bhavaviveka's penchant for this style of reasoning is said to be based on the easy availability of cogent examples⁴¹⁸ approved by the other party.

According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, Bhavaviveka's intention in this syllogism is to convey that just as the non-apprehension of production and cessation mentioned by Nagarjuna in the expression of worship at the beginning of his Treatise on the Middle Way is taken in reference to a mind of meditative equipoise on emptiness, so the four extreme types of production should be explained as not existing in the face of meditative equipoise on emptiness. Considering 'ultimate' as referring to a mind of meditative equipoise on emptiness, Bhavaviveka is actually wishing to say, 'For an ultimate consciousness, an eye sense is not produced from self because of existing, like, for example, an existent consciousness.'

L4: [DOES 'ULTIMATELY' GO WITH THE PREDICATE?] :L4

Chandrakirti says that Bhavaviveka's syllogism is not correct because—within its being unclear why the qualification 'ultimately' is affixed and to what it should be affixed—it is fallacious no matter how it is taken. He questions where 'ultimately' should be affixed in the syllogism. Does it go with the predicate? If so, it would mean:

~ An eye sense is not ultimately produced from self because of existing, as in the case of, for example, an existent consciousness.

Bhavaviveka might want to affix it to the predicate because to refute production conventionally would contradict the Madhyamika's own tenets; therefore, it should be refuted

only ultimately.

However, Chandrakirti answers:

~ 1 There is no need from the Madhyamika's point of view to affix 'ultimately' to the predicate because, though a Madhyamika asserts production conventionally, he does not assert production from self even conventionally. Therefore, production from self is to be refuted in general without affixing the qualification 'ultimately'. For this reason both Buddha in the Rice Seedling Sutra, etc., and Nagarjuna in his Treatise refute production from self in general and do not affix 'ultimately' to the refutation.

~ 2 There is no need from a Samkhya's point of view to affix 'ultimately' to the predicate because there is value in refuting the Samkhya, who has fallen from both ultimate truths and conventional truths, both ultimately and conventionally. Not recognizing emptiness, he falls from ultimate truths; falsely ascribing existence to a permanent person and so forth, he falls from conventional truths.

~ 3 There is no need from the ordinary worldly person's point of view to affix 'ultimately' to the predicate in order to preserve worldly production from self because the world also does not assert production from self. Without considering whether things are produced from any of the four alternatives—self, other, both, or neither—the world just accepts that a sprout, an effect, arises from a seed, a cause. Buddha said that he accepts what the world accepts, and this also is the way that Nagarjuna accepts production conventionally—without analysis, such as investigating whether an effect is produced from itself, others, both, or causelessly.

About this, Chandrakirti's Clear Words (26.2-27.6, 18.2-19.6) says:

~ Why is the qualification 'ultimately' put in this [syllogism]?

~ [Hypothetical answer by Bhavaviveka: It is affixed to the predicate] because production which is asserted in accordance with worldly conventions is not to be refuted and because if it were refuted [conventionally], it would follow that one would be damaged by [one's own] assertion [of conventionally existent production].

~ [Response:] This is not suitable because [a Madhyamika] does not assert production from self even conventionally. [The Rice Seedling] Sutra⁴¹⁹ says:

~ Also, when a sprout is produced, arising from its cause—a seed—it is not created by self, not created by [naturally existent others], not created by both, not produced causelessly, not created by Ishvara, and not metamorphosed by time. It does not arise from particles, does not arise from the nature (prakṛti, rang bzhin), and does not arise from its own entity.

~ Similarly [the Extensive Sport Sutra (Lalitavistara)] ⁴²⁰says:

:: If a seed exists, the sprout does also.

:: The sprout is not what the seed is.

:: It is not [inherently established as] other than it or just it.

:: Hence the nature of phenomena (dharmata, chos nyid) is not permanent and not annihilatory.⁴²¹

~ Also, this very [text, Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way, XVIII. 10] says:

:: Whatever arises dependently is respectively
 :: Not just that [i.e., its causes] and is not
 :: Also other than that.
 :: Hence [causes] Are not annihilatory nor permanent.

~ [Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka:] The qualification is made relative to the other's [that is, the Samkhya's] system.

~ [Answer:] That also is not suitable because their presentations are not asserted [by Madhyamikas] even conventionally. It is to be realized that it is advantageous to refute in both ways [that is, conventionally and ultimately] the Forders (Tirthika, Mu stegs pa) who have fallen from non-erroneous perception of the two truths. Thus, to express the qualification relative to the other's system (mata, gzhung) is also not suitable.

~ Furthermore, the world—in relation to which the qualification would be meaningful [if it asserted production from self]—does not construe production from self. The world does not employ analysis such as 'from self or 'from other' and so forth. The world understands only this, 'An effect arises from a cause.' The master [Nagarjuna] presented [cause and effect] this way too.

~ Therefore, the qualification ['ultimately'] is ascertained as meaningless in all respects.

L4: [DOES 'ULTIMATELY' GO WITH THE SUBJECT?] :L4

Bhavaviveka might, however, say that 'ultimate' should be affixed to the subject because the production of an eye sense, which Samkhyas accept as ultimate, is refuted even conventionally:

~ An ultimate eye sense is not produced from self because of existing, as in the case, for example, of an existent consciousness.

Chandrakirti answers that since Bhavaviveka himself does not accept an ultimate eye sense, the subject and thus the reason are not established for him. (In an autonomous syllogism the subject and reason must be mutually and similarly established for both parties in a debate; in addition, an ultimate eye sense is not a fit subject for any type of syllogism with a positive reason such as 'existing', since it simply is not established.)

The Clear Words (27.7-.9, 19.6-.9) says:

:: [Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka:] This qualification was made wishing to refute the conventional production [of subjects which are asserted to exist ultimately].

:: [Answer:] Then, you would have a fallacious position [thesis] in which the base [subject] is not established (asiddhadhara, gzhi ma grub pa) and a fallacious reason in which the base [subject] is not established (dshraydsiddha, gzh i ma grub pa) since you do not assert sourceseyes and so forth—ultimately.^{421a}

It might be said that there is no fault because Bhavaviveka accepts conventionally existent production, and a conventionally produced eye sense is taken as the subject of the syllogism. However, there then would be no place to which 'ultimately' could be affixed, for it would be affixed neither to the subject nor to the predicate.

Again, it might be said that 'a conventional eye sense' is the subject and 'is not

ultimately produced' is the predicate. However, this also is incorrect because Bhavaviveka did not say it, and even if he had, the subject would not exist for a Samkhya. The Samkhyas do not accept that an eye sense exists conventionally the way Madhyamikas use 'conventionally'. In Madhyamika terms, the Samkhyas accept an eye sense as substantially existent (dravyasat, rdzas yod) and not as imputedly existent (prajnaptisat, btags yod) or conventional as the Madhyamikas do. Though the Samkhyas assert that the principal (pradhana, gtso bo) and person (purusha, skyes bu) are ultimate truths and that the rest of the twenty-five categories are conventional truths, since they ascribe a different meaning to 'conventional', it would be necessary to explain which meaning of 'conventional' was being used. Using the Madhyamikas' meaning would be unacceptable to the Samkhyas; using the Samkhyas' meaning would make the subject non-existent for the Madhyamikas. Even on this level Bhavaviveka's argument is ill-framed.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (27.9-28.3, 19.9-17) says:

:: [Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka:] Since eyes and so forth exist conventionally, there is no fault.

:: [Answer:] Then what does 'ultimately' qualify?

:: ['Bhavaviveka:'] Since the ultimate production of conventionalities such as eyes is being refuted, 'ultimately' qualifies the refutation of production.

:: [Answer:] In that case, [you] should have said, 'Ultimately there is no production of conventionalities such as eyes,' but such was not said. Even if you had, because the other party [the Samkhya] asserts eyes and so forth just as substantially existent (dravyasat, rdzas su yod pa)⁴²² and does not assert them as imputedly existent (prajnaptisat, btags par yod pa), the position [thesis] would be fallacious in that the base [subject] would not be established. Hence, that is not suitable.

L4: [COMMONLY APPEARING SUBJECTS] :L4

Bhavaviveka might answer that one should not qualify either the subject or the predicate with 'ultimate' or 'conventional' but take as the subject just a general eye sense which is common to both disputants. He might assert that when various schools of tenets debate, it is necessary to take just general terms for the subject and the predicate, for if each school affixed its own particulars, there would be no such thing as inference. (I feel that with this final major move in the now entirely hypothetical argument Chandrakirti has gotten down to his basic point: Bhavaviveka's insistence on the statement of syllogisms indicates that for him the elements of a syllogistic argument—subject, predicate, reason, and example—appear commonly to both parties of a debate, Madhyamika and non-Madhyamika, that is to say, are asserted as certified by valid consciousnesses in a similar way in their respective systems, whereas if Bhavaviveka knew Madhyamika well, he would know that such is impossible. The defense of Buddhapalita has prepared the ground by revealing the intensity of Bhavaviveka's insistence on syllogistic reasoning, and the examination of the qualification 'ultimately' has removed a possible objection—Chandrakirti is suggesting that Bhavaviveka really did not mean anything by it anyway. In other words, we are not dealing in the merely hypothetical but in what Chandrakirti feels is actually at the core of Bhavaviveka's thought.)

Bhavaviveka might cite some examples. For instance, if, when a Buddhist proved to a Vaisheshika that a sound is an impermanent thing, he specified the subject as a sound which is

derived from the great elements, the subject would not exist for the Vaisesika. If, in accordance with Vaisesika tenets, 'a sound which is a quality of space' were specified, it would not exist for the Buddhist. Similarly, if, when a Vaisesika debated with a Jaina, he specified 'a sound which is a product' as the subject, it would not exist for the Jaina. If he specified in accordance with Jaina tenets 'a sound which existed formerly and is manifested by conditions', the subject would not exist for the Vaisesika himself.

Similarly, Bhavaviveka might add that the predicate of a thesis also cannot possibly be qualified with the particular tenets of each school but must be only the general term. For instance, if when proving that a sound is an impermanent thing, a Buddhist specified the predicate as 'an impermanent thing the disintegration of which is [externally] caused', the predicate would not exist for the Buddhist himself because things require no further cause for their disintegration other than their own production. Still, if he took as the predicate 'an impermanent thing the disintegration of which is uncaused', the predicate would not exist for the Vaisesika.

Bhavaviveka might add that the reason why even the predicate must be just the generality which appears similarly to both parties in the debate is that before proving a thesis, one must give a concordant example which possesses both the predicate (impermanent thing) and the sign (product). Since the predicate is, therefore, a quality of the example, it is clear that the predicate must appear similarly to both parties and, if so, must be just a generality not qualified by any school's particular tenets.

In this vein, Chandrakirti's Clear Words (28.4-29.7, 19.17-20.8) says:⁴²³

:: [Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka: For example,] in [the proof] that sound is an impermanent thing just generalities are to be taken as the subject and the predicate, not specified [with the particular tenets of the debaters]. If specifics were used, the conventions of inference [that is, inferring consciousness] and object inferred would be non-existent. For, if [as the subject] one used 'sound which is derived from the elements', it would not be established for the other party [the Vaisesika]. However, if one used 'sound which is a quality of space (akasha, nam mkha')', it would not be established for oneself, the Buddhist.

:: Similarly, even when a Vaisesika posits the thesis that sound is an impermanent thing, if [as the subject] he used 'sound which is a product', it would not be established for the other [party, the Jaina]. However, if [the subject were specified as 'sound] manifested [by conditions]', it would not be established for himself.

:: Similarly, [with respect to the predicate] if [impermanence were specified as] that of which the disintegration is caused, it would not be established for the Buddhist himself. However, if [it were specified as] causeless, it would not be established for the other party [a Vaisesika]. Therefore, just as here [in these examples] mere generalities are to be used as the subject and the predicate, so here also [in the refutation of production from self] a mere subject devoid of qualification is to be used.

L5: [There are no commonly appearing subjects] :L5

Chandrakirti's answer is that all of this is inadmissible. A valid cognizer must certify the subject of a syllogism as existing, and in systems such as Bhavaviveka's and a Samkhya's which assert (either explicitly or implicitly) that all objects exist by way of their own character this valid cognizer must be non-mistaken in terms of the object's establishment by

way of its own character. Thus, in Bhavaviveka's system, a mistaken sense consciousness is not accepted as finding or certifying its object of comprehension; rather, the subject about which the two parties are debating whether it is ultimately produced or not must be certified as existing by such a non-mistaken consciousness. Because of this, Bhavaviveka cannot assert that eyes and so forth are falsities, appearing one way and yet existing another—that is to say, appearing to be established by way of their own character but not—since he asserts that the consciousness certifying the subject is non-mistaken. However, eyes and so forth which are found by a non-mistaken valid cognizer just plain do not exist. Thus, although Bhavaviveka and a Samkhya agree on the status of the subject with respect to its being established by way of its own character, such a subject simply does not exist. In this way, the meaning of there being no commonly appearing subjects is that the subject in a syllogism such as Bhavaviveka's simply does not exist.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (29.7-30.3, 20.8-12) says:

:: That is not so, because at just that time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production] when it is the case that here a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the probandum, this one [Bhavaviveka] himself just asserts the degeneration for non-establishment⁴²⁵ of the entities of the subjects [eyes and so forth]—the basis of that [predicate, non-production from self]—which are found by a mere erroneous [consciousness. Bhavaviveka instead holds that the subjects of his syllogism, eyes and so forth, are found by a non-erroneous or non-mistaken consciousness in which case they would not be falsities; however, they are falsities since they appear to exist inherently but do not, and thus the subject is not established.] The erroneous and the non-erroneous are different [that is, a dichotomy].

To repeat, at this time when Bhavaviveka is attempting to prove that for an ultimate or reasoning consciousness an eye sense is not produced, he might not qualify the subject with tenets peculiar to any system, but the subject must still be validly cognized by both parties. However, in Bhavaviveka's system if a consciousness is mistaken with respect to the inherent existence of an object, it is not valid. For him, to be valid with respect to an object a consciousness must also be valid with respect to the object's being established by way of its own character. Thus, once a sense consciousness apprehending blue, for instance, is valid, it must be non-mistaken with respect to its appearing object (the blue), and once a conceptual consciousness, such as an inferential consciousness realizing the impermanence of the body, is valid, it must be non-mistaken with respect to its referent object (the impermanence of the body).⁴²⁶ Since the consciousnesses that realize these are non-mistaken, these objects cannot be falsities, appearing to exist one way but actually existing in another way; otherwise, the consciousnesses would be mistaken with respect to that seeming mode of being.

However, they are falsities, and falsities simply cannot be among objects found by a non-mistaken consciousness. The reason for this is that false objects and true objects—that is to say, erroneous objects found by a mistaken consciousness and non-erroneous objects found by a non-mistaken consciousness—are mutually exclusive, even a dichotomy; whatever exists must be either one or the other. In this context, a mistaken consciousness is one to which eyes and so forth, for instance, appear to be established by way of their own character because objects which are so established do not exist, just as the falling hairs which appear to someone with cataracts do not exist in the least.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (30.3-.4, 20.12-.15) says:

:: Therefore, like the falling hairs [seen by] one with cataracts and so forth, when what does not exist [by way of its own character] is apprehended by [i.e., appears to] an erroneous [consciousness] as just existing [that way], how could even a portion of an object existent [by way of its own character] be observed?

Similarly, in this context a non-mistaken consciousness is one which directly perceives only the nature of phenomena, emptiness, since it does not involve the appearance of false objects that even in direct perception seem to exist one way but do not. A consciousness in meditative equipoise perceives only emptiness in a totally non-dualistic way, without the slightest appearance of conventional objects which appear to sentient beings as if they are established by way of their own character but do not. To a consciousness of meditative equipoise on emptiness, there is not the slightest appearance of something that does not exist the way it appears; this is like the fact that the consciousness of one without cataracts does not see falling hairs and so forth and thus it does not certify those falling hairs as existing.

In this vein, Chandrakirti's Clear Words (30.5-.8, 20.15-.20)says:

:: Like the falling hairs and so forth of one without cataracts, when a non-erroneous [consciousness of meditative equipoise on emptiness] does not superimpose the unreal [i.e., objects established by way of their own character], how could it observe the merest portion of a conventionality that does not exist [by way of its own character]? Therefore, the honorable master [Nagarjuna] says [in his Refutation of Objections]:427

:: If [in accordance with your thought] the factualities
:: Of direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established objects of comprehension],
:: Then [it would be suitable] to prove those [in one's own system] and refute [others], but since [valid cognizers observing
:: Such objects of comprehension] do not exist [even conventionally], there is no [chance for you] to censure me.

According to Chandrakirti, all consciousnesses of sentient beings except a direct cognizer of emptiness are mistaken, and thus there can be no valid cognizer of the subject in a syllogism which is not mistaken with regard to the mode of being of that subject. However, a non-deceived consciousness, which nevertheless is mistaken about the inherent existence of its object in the sense not that it conceives the object to exist inherently but that the object merely appears to exist that way, can establish the existence of objects that are falsities—objects which appear to exist by way of their own character or inherently but do not. A distinction is made between the appearing object (snang yul) of a consciousness and its object of engagement ('jug yul); a valid cognizer (Pramana, tshad ma) can be mistaken with respect to its appearing object but not with respect to its object of engagement.

Thus, it is not that Prasangikas hold that the subject in a debate is not certified by the valid cognizers of both parties, for they hold that each party—whether they recognize it or not— has valid cognizers of mere objects, such as eyes, which are valid with respect to neither the inherent existence nor the non-inherent existence of the object.⁴²⁸ However, only a Prasangika recognizes valid cognizers to be such; a non-Prasangika holds that the very valid cognizer which certifies the existence of the subject of the syllogism certifies its being established by way of its own character. Thus, in one way it is said that there are no commonly appearing subjects in the sense that in the systems of the two, the

Prasangika and the non-Prasangika, the establishment of the subject by valid cognition is not asserted similarly.

¢(i.e. Rinpoche: “The explanations of valid cognition are mainly from the perspective of the sutra and the mind only schools, the Sautrantika and the Cittamatra. The middle way or the Madhyamaka schools say that since there is not a single phenomenon that truly exists, then THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS VALID COGNITION. They do not assert anything; they do not have any of their own assertions from their own perspective, because there is nothing to make any assertions about. There is no one to make any assertions, so how could there be any assertions? But they do explain things from the perspective of others. So they explain valid cognition from the perspective of how it is thought of in the world.”

¢-- From: Commentary on In Praise of the Dharmadhatu (Nagarjuna) by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, Shenpen Osel Web Site

¢ – See also: Hopkins Meditation on Emptiness, Part 5, section 7 Validation of Phenomena (why talking about valid cognition?))

In another way, even though the two parties, such as Bhavaviveka and a Samkhya, might agree that the subject of a syllogism is certified by a consciousness that is non-mistaken with respect to its being established by way of its own character, the subject, when qualified this way, does not exist, and thus from this point of view it can be said that a commonly appearing subject does not exist.

Again, in another way, if in a debate in which one was seeking to prove non-ultimate production, the other party understood the subject as being certified by a consciousness that is valid with respect to neither its inherent existence nor its non-inherent existence, that person would already have understood the Prasangika view of the emptiness of inherent existence. The person would have come to be able to differentiate between inherent existence and mere existence—making it possible to identify that there are consciousnesses which neither certify inherent existence nor realize non-inherent existence but only realize their object. Thus, there would be no need to establish non-ultimate production for such a person. In this case, there is also no commonly appearing subject—even though both parties recognize the ‘subject’ as being certified by a similar type of valid cognizer—simply because there is no subject which needs to be proven as lacking ultimately existent production.

Thus, when there is no non-erroneous consciousness to certify the existence of the subjects of syllogisms such as eyes (the subject of Bhavaviveka’s syllogism proving that eyes are not produced from self) which for Bhavaviveka are qualified by being found by a non-erroneous consciousness, the subjects just plain do not exist. Since such a subject cannot be established, the two parties—even if they, like Bhavaviveka and a Samkhya, both hold the view that the consciousness certifying the subject certifies its inherent existence—do not have a common mode of establishing the subject with valid cognition. For a non-erroneous consciousness in this context just perceives emptiness, resulting in there being no valid cognizer non-erroneously knowing subjects such as eyes.

In this way, the subject is shown not to be established in common for the two proponents. This makes the thesis, the combination of subject and predicate, non-established simply because the subject is not established. For the same reason, the sign’s being a property of the subject (pakshadharmata, phyogs chos) also is not established. Chandrakirti’s Clear Words (30.9- 11, 20.20-21.5) says:428a

:: Because in that way the erroneous and the non-erroneous are different, on an occasion when the non-erroneous [is realized by the wisdom of meditative equipoise] the erroneous does not exist [in its perspective]. Hence, how could a conventionality [that is to say, falsity such as] an eye which is the subject [in this syllogism] be [in its perspective]? Therefore, due to the irreversibility of having a fallacious position [thesis] in which the base [subject] is not established (asiddhadhara, gzhi ma grub pa) and a fallacious reason in which the base [subject] is not established (dshraydsiddha, gzhi ma grub pa), this [attempt at an answer—that commonly appearing generalities are to be used—] is just not an answer [since there is no valid cognizer, mistaken or non-mistaken, to certify the existence of such subjects].

L5: [Are there ever commonly appearing subjects?] :L5

Chandrakirti is saying that there is a difference between proving impermanence and proving emptiness with respect to whether or not there can be commonly appearing subjects. Thus, it might seem that we are to conclude that even in the Prasangika system there are occasions when commonly appearing subjects are possible.⁴²⁹ However, Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen⁴³⁰ specifies that the Buddhist here is of the lower schools, thereby suggesting that even when debating on impermanence there is no commonly appearing subject in the Prasangika system. This is cogent because the non-Prasangika would still hold that the valid cognizer which certifies the subject certifies its inherent existence, but no such subject exists.

However, if one held that even in the Prasangika system there are commonly appearing subjects on occasions such as in debating about impermanence, one could say that the question of inherent existence is here of no consequence and that this is why both Chandrakirti and Tsong Khapa center their discussion of no commonly appearing subjects around the proof of no ultimately existent production or no production from self, in which the question of inherent existence is intimately involved. In this way, some Tibetan scholars say that the Prasangika tenet that a subject does not appear similarly to both parties in a debate applies only to occasions when proving emptiness.⁴³¹

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (30.12-.14, 21.5-.9)says:

:: There also is no similarity with the example. Even if there [in the example] a generality of sound and a generality of impermanence which are not asserted as qualified [with particular tenets] do exist for both [the Buddhist and the Vaisheshika], nevertheless proponents of emptiness and proponents of non-emptiness do not [agree on] asserting a generality of eyes as conventionally [existent in the sense of not being established by way of its own character] or as ultimately [existent]. Hence, there also is no similarity with the example.

L5: [Bhavaviveka has to admit his own reason is not established] :L5

Chandrakirti indicts Bhavaviveka further, saying that he must accept the consequence that his reason refuting production from self is not established. For when another Buddhist school stated the syllogism:

~ The subjects, the inner sources, are only caused because the Tathagata said so,

Bhavaviveka said that the reason was not established. His thought was that if it were said that the Tathagata meant ultimately existent causation, the reason would be non-existent for a Madhyamika whereas if the Tathagata meant only conventionally existent causation, the reason would be non-existent for a Proponent of True Existence. Since besides these two

there is no third category, Bhavaviveka himself objected that the reason had the fallacy of not being established for both disputants.

Here in the case of Bhavaviveka's attempt to refute production from self, there is also no third category other than (1) objects found by mistaken consciousnesses and (2) objects found by non-mistaken consciousnesses. If the subject, the sign, and so forth are claimed to be cognized by a non-mistaken consciousness, then they would not be established for Madhyamikas. For Madhyamikas (actually Prasangikas) say that except for the wisdom of meditative equipoise on emptiness any consciousness of a sentient being is mistaken. If it is claimed that the subject, the sign, and so forth are cognized by a mistaken consciousness, then they

would not be established for non-Madhyamikas. For the Proponents of True Existence assert that a valid consciousness is non-mistaken with respect to the inherent nature of its object. It is self-contradictory for Bhavaviveka to assert something parallel to what he finds to be a fallacy in others.

This is a convincing argument, but the debate does stem from a difference of tenet in the Prasangika and Svatantrika systems.⁴³² Chandrakirti does not accept that consciousnesses of sentient beings are non-mistaken valid cognizers with respect to the inherent existence of their objects, whereas Bhavaviveka does. The latter finds that it is not contradictory for a consciousness to perceive things as inherently existent and to be non-mistaken because things do conventionally exist inherently. Chandrakirti finds the two to be contradictory because both true existence and inherent existence are equally to be refuted, both ultimately and conventionally.

This means that for Bhavaviveka when an object is sought among its bases of imputation, it can be found. For instance, a table is the composite of its parts, and the actual person is a subtle form of the mental consciousness. For Chandrakirti, an object cannot be found among its bases of imputation; a table is not the composite of its parts, and a person is not a consciousness. In the Prasangika system, even conventionally objects are only imputedly existent; they are designations. Furthermore, it is undeniable that sentient beings perceive objects just the opposite way; the basis of imputation appears to be the thing itself. Thus, a Prasangika asserts that all sentient beings' sense and mental consciousnesses, except direct cognizers of emptiness, are mistaken. Hence, it is not that Bhavaviveka has a manifest contradiction⁴³³ but that he does not assert something which a Madhyamika, as interpreted by Chandrakirti, should—that conventional objects are certified only by mistaken consciousnesses. If he did assert this, he would be subject to the same kind of analysis that he makes with respect to the Hearer school's syllogism. In other words, in proving to a Samkhya that eyes and so forth are not produced from self, he would be holding that such conventionalities are certified by mistaken consciousnesses, whereas for the Samkhya the consciousness certifying the subject—eyes—would also certify its inherent existence; in that case the subject would not be established in common for the two of them.

The claim of self-contradiction is Chandrakirti's way of highlighting the fact that Bhavaviveka, in asserting that a valid cognizer of a conventionality is unmistaken, is going against what should be a basic Madhyamika tenet—that except for a consciousness directly realizing emptiness all consciousnesses of sentient beings are mistaken in that their objects appear to exist inherently but do not.

Chandrakirti offers no explicit evidence that Bhavaviveka asserts that such consciousnesses

of conventionalities are non-mistaken; there is merely his earlier statement (p.508) that Bhavaviveka himself accepts that objects found by a mistaken consciousness are not established:

~ ... at this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production] when it is just the case that a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the probandum, this one [Bhavaviveka] himself just asserts the degeneration [or non-establishment] of the entity of subjects [eyes and so forth], the basis of that [predicate, non-production from self], which are found by a mere erroneous [consciousness].

If Bhavaviveka asserts that objects found by an erroneous or mistaken consciousness are not established, then since he obviously holds that the subjects of his syllogisms are established, he must hold that they are certified or realized by non-mistaken consciousnesses. From this, many Tibetan scholars have drawn the conclusion that for Bhavaviveka the object of negation in the view of emptiness does not appear to sense consciousnesses.

In Tibet, these points have been formalized into a Svatantrika system by scholars using as their basis brilliant exploration of the implications of brief statements such as this. By presenting a system in structured form, what is gained is clarity and sharpness in differentiating positions, resulting in ease in applying such tenets in meditation. Still, in the debating courtyards of the monastic universities, the sources for these now seemingly hardened positions are examined in detail with the result that those who pursue the topics in depth realize the almost fluid nature of the sources while reconstructing and examining the patterns of Tsong Khapa's thought as he formalized these systems. The challenge is first to come to know Tsong Khapa's interpretation so well that one can read it into his sources and then to examine the sources to determine if the interpretation is justified—both of these phases being required in the debating courtyard. A basic requirement is to go beyond the texts to construct what Bhavaviveka, for instance, was getting at. Thus, dynamic ingenuity is not limited to the past; it is ever-presently required. Our examination of the texts here is, therefore, only the tip of the iceberg. About Bhavaviveka's being forced to accept that his own reason is faulty, Chandrakirti's Clear Words (30.15-31.10, 21.92.6) says:

~ Just this mode of expressing the fallaciousness of the position [or thesis] which is that the basis [the subject] is not established is to be applied also in expressing the fault of non-establishment with respect to this reason— 'because of existing'.⁴³⁴ For, this logician [Bhavaviveka] himself [comes to] assert the points explained above. How? Another stated this proof:

:: Causes and so forth producing the internal sources just exist because the Tathagata said so.

:: Whatever the Tathagata said is that way, as, for example, is the case with [his] saying that nirvana is peace.

~ At that time [Bhavaviveka] expressed the following fault:

~ What are you asserting is the meaning of the reason? [Are you saying] 'because the Tathagata said such [in terms of] conventional [existence]'⁴³⁵ or 'because the Tathagata said such [in terms of] ultimate [existence]'? If conventionally, the meaning of the reason is not established for yourself, but if ultimately, [then as Nagarjuna, I.7ab, says,] 'When [one analyzes whether] ⁴³⁶ the phenomena [of effects] exist, do not exist, or [both] exist

and do not exist [at the time of their causes], they are [understood as] not established [by causes].’ At that time, conditions [producing] effects which have a nature of existence, non-existence, or both [at the time of their causes] are refuted. Therefore (I.7cd) ‘How could [an ultimately established definition, that is,] establisher (nirvartaka, sgrub byed) [or producer] be [the definition of] causal [condition (hetupratyaya, rgyu ‘i rkyen)]? In that case, it is not feasible [to say that because the definition of causal condition ultimately exists, causal conditions ultimately exist].’ The meaning of [Nagarjuna’s] statement is that those [ultimately existent things] are just not causes producing [effects]. Therefore, because [we Madhyamikas assert that]⁴³⁷ what is established [that is, effects] and establishers [that is, causes] do not exist ultimately, [for a Madhyamika] that reason is just non-established [if the referent is to ultimate existence]. Or it is just contradictory [if the referent is to ultimate existence due to being very contradictory with a predicate of the probandum which should be a conventionality].

L5: [Bhavaviveka’s other autonomous reasons are not established] :L5

Chandrakirti adds that Bhavaviveka’s other autonomous syllogisms similarly incur the fallacy of the non-establishment of the subject, reason, and example since in the latter’s system these must be certified by a valid cognizer which is non-mistaken with respect to the mode of being of the object. For a Prasangika a valid cognizer can be mistaken with regard to the object’s inherent existence but still be able to certify the existence of the object as a falsity; however, this does not mean that ignorance establishes the existence of objects.⁴³⁸ Ignorance wrongly imputes the inherent existence of objects; valid dualistic cognizers establish the existence of objects.

About these other autonomous syllogisms, Chandrakirti’s Clear Words (31.11-33.3, 22.6-3.12) says:

~ Because this one [Bhavaviveka] himself [comes] in this way to assert the non-establishment of reasons, in all inferences in which [he] states inherently existent phenomena (vastudharma, dngos po’i chos)⁴³⁹ as reasons, the reason and so forth are not established for him. Hence, all [his] proofs are destroyed. For, in:

~ Ultimately the internal sources are not produced from their conditions which are other [than them] because of being other, as, for example, is the case with a pot,⁴⁴⁰

~ or:

~ The producers of the internal sources such as eyes, which others⁴⁴¹ want to say [exist] ultimately, are not ascertained as conditions [producing the internal sources] because of being other, as, for example, is the case with threads and so forth,

~ ‘other’ and so forth are not established for oneself [i.e., Bhavaviveka].

~ On an occasion when another expressed the following reason:

~ The internal sources are only produced because of making the special designations of those which possess their objects [that is to say, because of being the reasons why their respective consciousnesses are called ‘eye consciousnesses’ and so forth],⁴⁴²

~ this one [Bhavaviveka], wanting to speak of the non-establishment of that reason, says that if production, going, and so forth were established as existing ultimately by the eye of⁴⁴³ wisdom of a yogi in meditative equipoise seeing the reality of things just as it is, then that reason—‘because of making the special designations of those which possess

their objects’—would just have the sense of being established [but it is not established] because [ultimately existent] going is also refuted just through the refutation of [ultimately existent] production.

~ This [sort of reasoning that Bhavaviveka used against his opponent] likewise is to be applied also⁴⁴⁴ to a reason which he formulates:

~ Ultimately the not-yet-gone-over is not being gone over because of being a path, like the path already gone over.

~ In that, the reason—path—is not established for him [due to not being established by the meditative equipoise of a yogi seeing suchness, this being the only unmistakable consciousness that a non-Buddha has].

~ Also, in:

~ An eye that serves as a basis [of an eye consciousness], does not ultimately see forms because of being an eye sense power, as, for example, is the case with [an eye sense power] that is similar [to one that serves as the basis of an eye consciousness but does not actually serve as a basis of an eye consciousness such as during sleep],

~ and likewise:

~ An eye does not [ultimately] see forms because of having arisen from the elements, as, for example, is the case with form,⁴⁴⁵

~ and:

~ Earth is not [ultimately] an entity of hardness because of being an element, as, for example, is the case with wind,⁴⁴⁶

~ and so forth it is to be applied that the reasons and so forth are not established for yourself [Bhavaviveka].

L5: [Bhavaviveka’s reason is inconclusive] :L5

Furthermore, the reason of Bhavaviveka’s autonomous syllogism would be inconclusive for a Samkhya:

~ The subject, an eye sense, is not ultimately produced from self because of existing, as, for example, is the case with an existent consciousness.

A Samkhya might think that an eye sense, because it exists, is not produced from self as in the case of consciousness but is produced from self as in the case of a pot. For him, a consciousness or person is not a product and thus, of course, is not produced from self; therefore, an eye sense is not produced from self in the sense that a consciousness is not produced from self, but it is produced from self in the way that a pot is. Bhavaviveka might object that pots are equally proven not to be produced from self, but that is not what he said since his subject was limited to the internal sources unlike Buddhapalita’s broad subject that includes allthings involving production.

Chandrakirti’s Clear Words (33.4-.6, 23.12-18) says:

:: Also,⁴⁴⁷ this reason—‘because of existing’—is indefinite in that the other party [would wonder], ‘Is it that the internal sources because of existing are not produced from self in accordance with how consciousness exists or is it that, like pots and so forth, they

are produced from self?’

:: [‘Bhavaviveka’ objects:] It is not indefinite because pots and so forth are equally proven [not to be produced from self because of existing].

:: [Answer:] That is not so because such was not expressed.

L5: [Our other-approved syllogisms do not incur those faults] :L5

Chandrakirti says that all of these fallacies accrue to Bhavaviveka because of his using autonomous syllogisms in which the subject and so forth must appear similarly to both parties in the sense that they must be established similarly in the systems of both. It is not sufficient in an autonomous syllogism that the subject be just validly established by one party and just validly established by the other party. Rather, the subject must be established or certified similarly in the systems of both disputants. Just so, the presence of the sign in the subject, the pervasion, counterpervasion, and example must be validly established in the systems of both parties in a similar manner. This is the meaning of there being no similarly appearing subject, etc.

These fallacies do not accrue when one uses other-approved syllogisms. For instance, Nagarjuna says (III.2cd):

:: How can that which does not

:: See itself see another?

This is an other-approved syllogism:

~ The subject, an eye, does not inherently see another, a form, because of not seeing itself, like, for example, a pot.

It is not necessary to establish the reason, the example, and the subject (even though they are established for a Madhyamika)⁴⁴⁸ because the opponent himself accepts them. In order to ascertain the pervasion, i.e., that non-inherently existent perception of others pervades that which does not perceive itself, first a general pervasion is to be ascertained. This is done through a general counter-pervasion:

~ If things have an inherently existent nature, first that nature is to be apprehended in a thing, and then this nature can be apprehended in another which possesses that thing. For instance, because water has moisture, moisture is apprehended in earth which possesses water. Also, because a pleasant odor is apprehended in a certain flower, the pleasant odor is apprehended in a cloth which possesses, or is infused with, the odor of this flower.

Then, a general pervasion is stated:

~ If there is non-apprehension of a nature in a thing, then it follows that there is non-possession of this nature in another phenomenon which possesses this thing. For example, since jasmine flowers do not possess a foul odor, a foul odor is not apprehended in clothing that possesses, or is infused with, them.

Having demonstrated the general pervasion, it is applied to the present context:

~ It is admissible that if an eye has perception of itself, then it inherently sees another form when together with it. However, since an eye does not see itself, it does not inherently see another form.

When the opponent ascertains such a refutation as a refutation through realizing that not seeing oneself and inherently seeing another are contradictory, he ascertains the Madhyamika view of no inherent existence. At this time, he forsakes the theses and tenets of a Proponent of True Existence and simultaneously realizes that though things do not have inherent existence, conventionally existent activity and agency are possible. He then comes to distinguish non-existence and non-inherent existence for the first time, understanding that non-inherent existence does not contradict functionality.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (34.1- 12, 23.18-4.16) says:

~ [Hypothetical objection by Bhavaviveka:] Is it not that just those faults which you ascribe to another's [that is, my, Bhavaviveka's, own] syllogisms accrue to your inferences, due to which they would just have the fallacies of non-establishment of the subject, reason, and so forth? Therefore, do not object to one [of us] with the faults that are incurred by both. Therefore, all these faults are not suitable.

~ Answer: Proponents of autonomous inferences (svatantra-anumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa) come to have these faults but we do not use autonomous inferences because our⁴⁴⁹ inferences have the fruit of only refuting others' theses.

~ It is as follows. [For example] another⁴⁵⁰ who thinks that the eye [inherently] sees is refuted by inference renowned to himself:

~ You assert that an eye [has] the attribute of not seeing its own entity and also⁴⁵¹ assert that if it does not have the attribute of [inherently] seeing other [forms such as blue, then that an eye sees] just does not occur. Therefore, whatever [substratum] does not possess [the attribute of] seeing its own entity also does not possess [the attribute of] seeing others [such as blue and so forth], as, for example, is the case with a pot [which does not inherently see others because of not seeing its own entity]. Also, an eye does not possess [the attribute of]⁴⁵² seeing its own entity; therefore, it also does not possess [the attribute of inherently] seeing others [such as forms]. Therefore, seeing others—blue and so forth—which is contradictory with not seeing its own entity is contradicted just by inference renowned to yourself.

~ Since only such is expressed by our⁴⁵³ inferences, how could our position be subject to those faults as mentioned and due to which⁴⁵⁴ fallacy would be equally incurred?

The syllogism is valid because the subject and so forth are validly established for the opponent. It is not necessary that the subject and so forth be validly established in the same manner for the stater of the refutation. However, this does not mean that they are not established for the Madhyamika; they are, and they must be. What is not required is that the subject and so forth be validly established in a similar manner in the systems of both disputants. Therefore, the term 'other-renowned syllogism' eliminates that the subject and so forth are established in a similar manner for the Madhyamika; it does not suggest either that these are not established for the Madhyamika or are a matter of doubt. Thus, something's being 'other-renowned' or 'other-approved' comes down to how it is renowned or established for the other party, not to whether it is accepted as validly existing.

As Dzongka-ba says:⁴⁵⁵

:: Therefore, the subject, predicate, and reason of an otherrenowned syllogism must exist conventionally; it is not sufficient that they merely be asserted as existing by him [the other party].

The conventions of the world alone are appropriate for logical treatises, and in the world disputes are settled either by a third party accepted by both disputants or by one's own word, but not by the opponent's word. Just so, people are convinced by reasons established for them and not merely by the fact that reasons are established for others.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (34.13-35.4, 24.16-5.5) says:

:: [Hypothetical rejoinder by Bhavaviveka:] Is there damage by inference even from an inference established for either [of the parties]?

:: Answer: There is. It is just by a reason established for oneself, not by one established for the other [disputant], since such is seen in the world. In the world, sometimes [one party] prevails and [the other] is defeated by the word of a judge which both take to be valid, and sometimes, by just one's own word, but victory or defeat is not by the other's word. Just as it is in the world, so it is also in logic because only the conventions of the world are appropriate in treatises of logic.

Vasubandhu and Dignaga assert that in both affirmations and negations the subject and so forth must be established for both parties, but according to Chandrakirti they actually should accept the usage of other-approved or other-renowned syllogisms. For in a refutation by scriptural citation the scripture need not be accepted as a valid teaching by both in the debate, just by the defending party. Also, in inferences for oneself (as in meditative reflection) it is sufficient that the subject and so forth be established for oneself and need not be established for both because in an inference for oneself there is no second party. Thus, it is senseless for them to insist on common establishment of the subject and to say that consequences alone cannot generate an inferring consciousness. Buddhas aid those worldly beings who do not know suchness with just what is renowned among them.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words (35.4-36.2, 25.5- 16) says:

~ Therefore, some say, 'There is no harm by inference that is through the force of being renowned to the other [party] because [we] wish to refute mere renown to others.' Also, there is someone who thinks, 'That [reason]⁴⁵⁶ which expresses ascertainment [established] for both is [capable of] proof and refutation; that which is either established for just one or about which there is doubt [by either party as to whether it is established] is not capable of such.' In dependence upon the world's presentation of conventions they also should assert just this mode, as described above, with respect to inference. For, damage through scripture is not only by way of scripture established for both [parties]. Then how? It is [also] by way of [scripture] established for [the other party] himself. [Furthermore] in inference for oneself just what is established for oneself is weightier at all [times], not what is established for both.

~ Therefore, expression of the definitions of logic [as they are renowned in the systems of the Svatantrikas and below]⁴⁵⁷ is not needed because the Buddhas help beings who are trainees and who do not know suchness with reasoning as it is renowned to them. Enough extensive elaboration.

L4: [REMARKS] :L4

There is great emphasis in the Prasangika system on the conventions of the world, which provide a common ground and insure that the Prasangika will not be trying to help the world with a language it does not understand.⁴⁵⁸ Yet, it should not be thought that a Prasangika seeks to defeat all logicians through contradictory consequences in order to return to the

vulgar views of the world. The refutations of other doctrinal systems are to be applied to the eradication of one's own innate ways of misconceiving the person and other phenomena. Though Prasangikas mostly assert the existence of the phenomena which the world says exist, they do not accept what the world conceives about how these phenomena exist. No phenomenon exists by way of its own character; all phenomena exist imputedly, including emptiness. No phenomenon is its basis of imputation; all phenomena lack inherent existence. It is undeniable that the opposite appears to worldly beings and that, in turn, the world adheres to this appearance.

The insistence on referring to what is renowned in the world is not anti-philosophical; it is a call to see what appears without philosophical fabrication to the ordinary mind. This ordinary mind is possessed by one and all, philosopher and non-philosopher. The innate intellect is of two kinds: one the referent objects of which are non-existent and the other the referent objects of which are existent. The first is the habitual untutored intellect which without analysis conceives phenomena to exist inherently. Because an inherently existent object is utterly non-existent, the referent object of a consciousness conceiving inherent existence is non-existent. However, the image or concept of inherent existence which it perceives does exist. This mind is to be extirpated through hearing, thinking, and meditating on the non-existence of that referent object.

The second type of habitual non-analytical intellect is just the usual mind of everyday affairs that enters into thoughts and activities without analyzing whether the object exists ultimately as it appears or not. The Prasangikas are emphasizing attention to this mind, for it is this in its conceptual and non-conceptual forms which certifies the existence of all phenomena, establishing even the existence of emptiness although it is a mind of meditative equipoise that certifies emptiness itself. Through attending to this mind one can determine what exists, and through determining what exists one learns what the bases of emptiness are. Since emptiness is a quality of objects—their lack of inherent existence—one must first identify what exists and then, using these existents as bases, meditate on their lack of inherent existence. Prasangikas assert what the world asserts not only because these phenomena do indeed exist but also because just these same phenomena are to be seen as lacking inherent existence. The concern is with the mind and its objects, as they are, without the fabrications of mistaken philosophical systems.

It is clear from Chandrakirti's lengthy defense of Buddhapalita and from his attack on Bhavaviveka that he was versed in both their systems. His refutations of Samkhya, Nihilism, and so forth indicate a thorough study of non-Buddhist and Buddhist schools of tenets, comparative logic, and so on. Chandrakirti's reliance on the world's renown or what is established in the world is not a turning away from philosophy, study, or analysis but a refined view of an analytical philosophy.

Though phenomena such as the ten Bodhisattva grounds which form the structural basis of Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' are also said to exist conventionally, it is undeniable that they are not well known to ordinary beings. However, Tsong Khapa says⁴⁵⁹ that when the ten grounds become objects of the mind through hearing and experience, they appear to a non-analytical ordinary awareness; therefore, they are said to exist conventionally. Through this maneuver he shows that there is no need to abandon the extraordinary features of the spiritual path for the sake of according with the world.

Similarly, Chandrakirti lays out in great detail and with abundant definitions the standard

phenomena of the world and those fabricated by other philosophical systems. He thereby stresses a study of definitions and an identification of the bases of emptiness before entering into the reasoning that refutes inherent existence.

Also, Chandrakirti accepts what the world accepts for the most part—‘that is, except in cases such as the world’s assumption that the body is clean (if it is washed), pleasant, unchanging, and under the control of a self.⁴⁶⁰ Furthermore, he refuses to allow that there can be a subject of a syllogism which is validly established in a similar manner for a Madhyamika and a non-Madhyamika; this is because all consciousnesses of a sentient being, except for a direct cognizer of emptiness, are mistaken with regard to the mode of existence of objects. Only a Buddha has both sense and mental consciousnesses which perceive objects exactly as they are, imputedly existent; only he does not, in sense perception, confuse the object imputed with its basis of imputation. (A Buddha is not a sentient being, *sattva* (sems can), because, though he is conscious and has mind—sense and mental consciousnesses—he does not have a consciousness which still has obstructions yet to be abandoned, and this is the definition of a sentient being.⁴⁶¹ All beings except for Buddhas have obstructions yet to be abandoned—even the highest of Bodhisattvas as well as Hearer and Solitary Realizer and Destroyers.)

Since beginningless cyclic existence all sentient beings have been chained to the false conception that phenomena exist inherently in their bases of imputation such that even a sense consciousness, though free from thought construction, perceives its objects as if they inherently exist. This appearance of inherent existence is assented to, and cyclic existence continues its unbroken round. All beings, non-Buddhist and Buddhist, Hinayanist and Mahayanist, must overcome the conception of inherent existence to break the round of powerless birth, aging, sickness, and death. AS A TECHNIQUE TO DO SO, A PRASANGIKA REMOVES

THE VERY BASIS OF USUAL SYLLOGISTIC DEBATE BY DENYING THE EXISTENCE OF UNMISTAKEN VALID

COGNIZERS OF CONVENTIONAL OBJECTS IN ALL WHO ARE NOT BUDDHAS. He uses consequences that call

for analysis of everyday objects to discover the nature of objects. Analysis, the very opposite of ordinary intellect, which is defined as unanalytical, is demanded. Even syllogistic statements about this final nature cannot be used until one is about to realize the view of non-inherent existence and of the conventional valid existence of nominalities.

Uneducated beings would have difficulty understanding the format of a consequence, never mind its import. Therefore, the Prasangika’s reliance on consequences and on what is renowned in the world does not reflect a vulgarization of Buddhism for the masses. Rather, it is an acknowledgement that PEOPLE ARE CONVINCED ON THEIR OWN GROUNDS—an emphasis on

watching one’s own mind to discover or reveal what exists for oneself so that these existents may serve as bases for meditation on emptiness. In paying such close attention to the ordinary workings of the mind, the other type of ordinary mind—the non-analytical consciousness which assents to the false appearance of things as truly existent—can be seen more easily.

Prasangikas and Svatantrikas were named in Tibet from the point of view of the way in which they seek to generate in others a consciousness that infers the non-true existence of things, but it does not follow that all Prasangikas and Svatantrikas are debaters. They are seeking to accustom themselves to the view of emptiness through the statement of

consequences and syllogisms to themselves in meditation and do not necessarily go about debating. Even a follower of Prasangika tenets may temporarily follow the Hinayana path, taking for the motivation of meditation on emptiness the wish to liberate himself or herself from cyclic existence and leaving for later the full development of the wish to free all beings from cyclic existence. Even those with the motivation of a Mahayanist would not necessarily debate or even teach during that particular lifetime, for it is necessary first to educate oneself before educating others.

Still, even a person who is a Mahayanist by tenet and Hinayanist by path or motivation reverts and will eventually generate the great compassion of the Mahayana which requires taking upon oneself the burden of liberating all sentient beings. Eventually he will teach to others the view of the middle way through consequences.

L2: [6. Prasangika in Tibet] :L2

Sources:

- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
- Khetsun Sangpo's oral teachings

Buddhism first came to Tibet when books rained from the sky on the palace of King Hla-to-to-ri-hyan-dzen (Lha-tho-tho-rignyan-btsan, 374-494*) in 433 A.D. 462 The King was sixty at the time, and through paying respect to the books he assumed the appearance of a twenty year old, living for sixty more years to the age of one hundred twenty. Five generations later, during the reign of King Song-dzen-gam-bo (Srong-btsan-sgam-po, 617-698*), Buddhism was established in the snowy land through the efforts of his minister Thu-mi-sam-bho-ta who travelled to India, learned Sanskrit, created a Tibetan alphabet, and translated many books including sutras brought from Naga-land by Nagarjuna.

THE FIRST OF THE TWO DISSEMINATIONS OF BUDDHISM INTO TIBET extends to the time of the translator Rin-chen-sang-bo (Rin-chen-bzang-po, 954-1055) whose translations form the boundary line beginning the new translations of tantra. The thorough transmission of the explanation and achievement in practice of the Buddha's complete system occurred in the first dissemination during the reign of Tri-song-day-dzen (Khri-srong-lde-btsdn, 790-848*) beginning in 803. During that period many Indian panditas visited Tibet; the Prasangika master Padmasambhava (877 B.C.-A.D. 864*) who was the founder of the Nyingma order, Dharmakirti (not the famous logician), Vimalamitra, and Buddhaghuhya who are all included within the Nyingma order, all came at this time. The Nyingmapas, or followers of the old translations, are so named because they use translations, especially of Highest Yoga Tantras, made prior to the time of Rinchen-sang-bo.

These panditas, along with the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika Shantarakshita (ca. 165 B.C.-A.D. 844*) bore the burden of explaining everything from the discipline (vinaya, 'dul ba) to Madhyamika philosophy as well as tantra. 463 Padmasambhava tamed the spirits of Tibet and initiated the king, princes, and others into tantra. Together with Shantarakshita and the king, Padmasambhava established doctrinal colleges at Sam-yay (bSam-yas), Hla-sa, and Yar-lung-drang-druk (Yar-klung-grang'brug) and established meditation centers at Sam-yay-chen-bo (bSam-yas-chen-po), Shel-drak (Shal-brag), Chu-wo-ri (Chu-bon), and

Drak-ye-r-ba (Brag-ye-r-pa). Students in turn founded many doctrinal colleges and meditation centers, and thus though Padmasambhava mainly taught tantra, he spread all forms of the teaching. Similarly, Dharmakirti performed the mandala initiations of the Yoga Tantras, and so forth, but his teaching was not confined to tantra. The rules of tantra at that time were very strict, and it was not until later when the Tibetans were more educated in Buddhism that these and other masters spread tantra widely.

The Svatantrika-Madhyamika master Shantarakshita bore the Hinayana Sarvastivada lineage of discipline which is traced back to Rahula, Buddha's own son. Thus, the Sarvastivada discipline was favored over the other lineages. Later the king decreed that all were to follow the Bodhisattva abbot Shantarakshita in behavior, with the result that the texts of the other lineages of discipline were not even translated into Tibetan.

Shantarakshita warned that though no non-Buddhist could harm the continuation and development of Buddhism in Tibet, a dangerous internal schism would arise. Leaving his advice in bronze in the king's treasury, he counselled the king to call his student Kamalashila when the prophecy came to pass. After Shantarakshita's departure from Tibet, the Chinese abbot Hoshang Mahayana (Hvashang) composed many texts primarily setting forth his view of non-application of the mind to anything. His system spread widely in Tibet, even being accepted by the queen. King Tri-song-dan-po saw that this system, which deprecated the many techniques of skillful means, did not accord with Nagarjuna's teaching. Being reminded of Shantarakshita's words, he invited Kamalashila to come to Tibet to debate with Hoshang Mahayana at Sam-yas (ca. A.D. 846*).⁴⁶⁴ Through citation of scripture and reasoning Kamalashila defeated the Chinese abbot, spread again the complete teaching, and praised analytical wisdom in his three books on the Stages of Meditation (bhavandkrama). The king decreed that all were to follow Nagarjuna's Madhyamika view, but unlike the translation into Tibetan of only the Sarvastivada discipline, this did not prevent the views of other schools of tenets from being translated—the reason being that the great Indian teachers considered a study of various views valuable in ascertaining the features of the final view. It is said that Kamalashila was killed by a Chinese spy shortly before the king's own death in A.D. 848.

Even though some Indian scholars who upheld Chittamatra did visit Tibet during the first dissemination, since Padmasambhava, Dharmakirti, and so forth were Prasangikas in view and Shantarakshita was a Svatantrika, THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE VIEW OF TIBET AT THAT TIME WAS MADHYAMIKA.

Jang-gya reports that Ye-shay-day (Ye-shes-sde), who was a student of both Padmasambhava and Shantarakshita, accorded with the latter's Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika, but some say that his view was mainly Prasangika in accordance with the view of Padmasambhava.⁴⁶⁵ Ye-shay-day was a great translator who used the name Vairochana for his tantra translations, Indrabodhi for his translations of medical treatises, Gen-jak-tang-da (Gan-jag-thang-ta) for his Bon translations from Shang-shung (Zhang-zhung) language into Tibetan, and Ye-shay-day for his sutra translations. Ye-shay-day's breadth is typical of many scholars of the period.

DURING THE SECOND DISSEMINATION, a while after the persecution of Buddhism during the last six years of the reign of King Lang-dar-ma (gLang-dar-ma, 877-906*), the great translator Rinchen-sang-bo (954-1055) relied on many Indian teachers, learned a great deal of philosophy and tantra, and translated many, many texts. His view was said to be that of a Thoroughly non-Abiding Madhyamika, that is, Prasangika; overcoming many mistaken tantric

practices, he spread the teaching widely throughout Tibet. THUS, WHEN BUDDHISM RETURNED TO PROMINENCE IN TIBET, IT WAS STILL THE MADHYAMIKA VIEW AND ESPECIALLY PRASANGIKA THAT DOMINATED PHILOSOPHY.

The principal agents of the second dissemination were Rinchen-sang-bo and his teacher Atisha (982-1054*).⁴⁶⁶ Atisha reestablished the system of studying all aspects of Buddhism—the various sutra and tantra systems in terms of the practice of one individual—and this method persists through to the present. His student Drom-don ('Brom-ston) was able to penetrate Chandrakirti's system, and Atisha declared with pleasure that only the Prasangika view was to be upheld in Tibet. Atisha wrote that one could cognize suchness through the precepts transmitted from Chandrakirti, and the Kadampa (bKa'-gdams-pa) lineage stemming from Atisha contains many texts that accord with the thought of Chandrakirti's Prasangika-Madhyamika.

Relying heavily on Atisha's works, the Gelugpa order, originally a branch of Kadampa, took Prasangika as their own final system. The famous Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path by Tsong Khapa (1357-1419), the founder of Gelugpa, is a commentary on Atisha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhipathapradipa); in it Tsong Khapa presents, among other things, the particular features of special insight (vipashyana, lhag mthong) in the Prasangika system. Not just the Gelugpas, but also the Nyingmapas, Gagyupas (bKa'-brgyud-pa), and Sakyapas pay great respect to Atisha and study his works thoroughly.⁴⁶⁷

The great Kadampa Ngok-lo-dza-wa Lo-den-sliay-rap (Ngoglo-tstsha-ba bLo-ldan-shes-rab), a student of Atisha, quotes Bhavaviveka and Chandrakirti as sources but, along with his students, appears to agree mainly with Shantirakshita's Yogachara-Svatantrika. Also, there were some Chittamatrin followers of the teacher Suvarnadvipa (gSer-gling-pa), who, though a Chittamatrin, was Atisha's principal guru for the generation of the altruistic aspiration to enlightenment.

The view of the Jo-nang-ba or Jo-mo-nang-ba school, a division of the Sakya order, is said by some to be a fabrication that is beyond the pale of the Indian schools of tenets. Their interpretation of the Madhyamika emptiness is that the permanent, unchanging realm or constituent (dhatu, khams) of the Tathagata which exists in all sentient beings is empty of all impermanent phenomena. Emptiness here is an emptiness of the other: the Tathagata realm, or Buddha nature, is empty of being impermanent phenomena and impermanent phenomena are empty of being the Tathagata realm. The other orders say that though emptiness is not impermanent phenomena and vice versa, this does not constitute emptiness; emptiness is a negation of self in the sense that phenomena are empty of, or lack, their own inherent existence. The Jo-nang-bas were refuted by many, but despite being considered as similar to the Vedantins in view, their founder Yu-mo-ba is renowned among scholars of all orders for his literature on the Kalachakra Tantra.

The great Sakyapa scholar, Bu-don (Bu-ston, 1290-1364), originally a Nyingmapa and later a scholar of literally all orders and systems of tenets, accords greatly with the Prasangika Kadampas in view. It is said that he held Chandrakirti's works to be the best of all.

The great Kadampa translator Ba-tsap-nyi-ma-drak-ba (Patshab-nyi-ma-grags-pa) spent twenty-three years in Kashmir, invited the pandita Kanakavarman (gSer-gyi-go-cha) to Tibet, and translated and taught many Madhyamika treatises. His four famous students, as well as many of his other students, spread Chandrakirti's system even more widely than he did.

There are some Madhyamika followers in Tibet about whom it is difficult to say whether they are Svatantrika or Prasangika. Go-rin-bo-chay Kuk-ba-hlay-dzay ('Gos-rin-po-che Khug-pa-lhasbtsas) travelled to India twelve times, met with seventy-two scholars, and made many explanations of tantras. He was most likely a member of both the Kadam and Sakya orders, and though he was a Madhyamika, it is not clear which branch he asserted as his final system. Similarly, the translators Bakay-gay (Ba-khe-gad, Khe-gad-'khor-lo-grags), Ra (Rva, Rva rDorje-grags), Dro ('Bro, 'Bro Shes-rab-grags), and Nyen (gNyan, gNyan Dar-ma-grags) and so forth either because of their teachers or because of their own assertions are seen to be Madhyamikas, but no clear delineation of Svatantrika or Prasangika can be made.

The Sakya order stems from Drok-mi Shakya-ye-shay ('Brokmi Shaky a-ye-shes, 933 to either 1047 or 1050*) who spent twelve years in India studying especially with tantric teachers, then returned to Tibet, and spread tantra. He became Marpa's first Sanskrit teacher when Marpa was still a child. Drok-mi practices the mother tantras under the Indian pandita Gayadhara whose coming to Tibet greatly furthered the Sakya order and who ultimately died there in order to be near his place of rebirth. Drok-mi is said to have been a Madhyamika; also, since he sought to explicate the thought of the great Indian yogi Virupa, his view is Prasangika. The final view of the Sakya order is that of the Great Madhyamika, that is, Prasangika, their identification of the view being mixed with tantric precepts and known as the union of manifestation and emptiness. The great Sakya pandita Jam-yang-gun-ga-gyel-tsen ('Jam-dbyangs-kundga'-rgyal-mtshan) was a Prasangika in view in both his tantra and sutra teachings. The later Sakya scholar Ren-da-wa (Redmda '-ba\ a teacher of Tsong Khapa, wrote a commentary on Chandrakirti's Supplement as well as instruction manuals for meditation on the Prasangika view. A Prasangika_ himself, his writings on the view agree greatly with Tsong Khapa's.

The founder of the Shi-jay (Zhi-byed) order was Pa-dam-ba-sang-gyay (Pha-dam-pa-sangs-rgyas), who many say was Bodhidharma, also known as Kamalashila (but not Shantarakshita's student Kamalashila). He was a student of eighty gurus, including Nagarjuna, Maitripada, and Naropa, lived for over five hundred years, visited Tibet five times, spread Buddhism widely in both China and Tibet, and is said to have visited Milarepa near the end of his life. Based on the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, he divided his teaching into three systems—sutra, tantra, and union of sutra and tantra—spreading a doctrine much like that of sudden enlightenment. It is said that he pretended to die a few times in China.⁴⁶⁸

The writings of the famous clairvoyant Ma-Ji-lap-dron (Macig-lab-sgron) who is the founder of the Jo (gCod) branch of the Shi-jay order accord significantly with the Prasangika system. After she defeated Indian yogis through debate and feats of yoga, her system of exorcism, or elimination of suffering (gCod), originally brought to Tibet by Bodhidharma who received it from Aryadeva, spread back to India where it remained for a short while.⁴⁶⁹

The renowned founder of the Gagyü order, Marpa (Lho-brag Mar-pa-chos-kyi-blo-gros, 1012-1096) visited India three times and Nepal four, meeting with one hundred and eight gurus, including Naropa, Maitripada, Jnanagarbha (not the Svatantrika Jnanagarbha), Shantibhadra, and so forth. He practiced in detail the yoga of the Guhyasamaja Tantra and most of the father and mother tantras. Returning to Tibet, Marpa had many students who upheld his lineage, and because his tantric activities were vast, his lineage spread widely. It is obvious that he relied on many teachers of both Chittamatra and Madhyamika views, but in his own words he relied mainly on Naropa and Maitripada in all aspects—whether view,

meditation, practice, or tantra. That both Naropa and Maitripada were Prasangikas can be seen from their own words; thus, it is clear that the instructions on the view in the Marpa lineage are the great Madhyamika-Prasangika. Still, it is not necessary that every instruction in his lineage be Prasangika, for it is a sign of a great master that he does not teach the same to everyone or immediately attempt to explain his own view. Thus, some precepts in his lineage accord with Chittamattra.

Many of the songs of Marpa's famous student Milarepa (Mi-la-ras-pa, 1040-1123) accord with Prasangika. Even those that speak of the four yogas, which is also a topic of the Chittamatrin Ratnakarashanti, can be explained as either Chittamatrin or Madhyamika. Since his teachings are not general presentations of tenets but answers to questions put by disciples, they accord with the disposition of the questioner. Milarepa's student Gampopa (sGam-po-pa, 1079-1153) made popular usage of the term 'mahamudra' as a name for Gagyupa instructions on suchness in both sutra and tantra teachings. Gampopa's student Pak-mo-drup-dor-jay-gyel-bo (Phag-mo-grub-rdo-rje-gyalpo) had many students who formed branches of the Gagyu order.

In sum, the eight principal Tibetan orders—Nyingma, Sagya, Kadam (which includes Gelug), Gagyu, Shang-ba Gagyu (Shang-pa bKa 'rgyud, which was founded earlier than Marpa's Gagyu), Shi-jay (which includes Jo-yul), Jor-druk (sByor-drug, a tantric order based on the Kalachakra Tantra), and Dor-jay-dayba (rDo-rje-bzlas-pa, a tantric order based on the tantras of the deity Bhairava)—mostly base their study of Madhyamika on Chandrakirti's Supplement.⁴⁷⁰ Students would memorize and debate Chandrakirti's Supplement, and only some would memorize Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way.

IN TERMS OF THE VIEW OF EMPTINESS, ALL THE MAJOR TIBETAN ORDERS ARE MADHYAMIKA, AND ALMOST ALL WHO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN PRASANGIKA AND SVATANTRIKA ARE PRASANGIKA. PRASANGIKA WAS AND STILL IS SEEN AS THE ACME OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS AND THE BASIS FOR THE SPECIAL TECHNIQUES OF DEITY YOGA IN TANTRA.

L2: [7. Validation of Phenomena [an adated skillful means in order to help student not to fall into nihilism; the message is that emptiness doesn't deny conventional truths; on the contrary one implies the other; but this skillful means could back-fire the other way and reinforce reification]] :L2

Sources:

- Den-dar-hla-ram-ba's Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many
- Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
- Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings
- Geshe Lhundup Sopa's oral teachings
- Corresponding section of the translation pp.632-6

Even from the Prasangika standpoint it is not sufficient merely to tear down other philosophies.⁴⁷¹ Not only must external debate be used as a branch of the attempt to overcome one's own misconceptions but also one must in one's own system of conventional

existence present with valid confirmation all the actions, objects, and agents of cyclic existence and nirvana.

This very assertion of the valid establishment of all phenomena is what the Sakyapa scholar Daktsang and others find so objectionable in Tsong Khapa. Daktsang cites as the cause for Tsong Khapa's 'error' the latter's ADDICTION TO LOGIC.⁴⁷²

~ The cause for such a burden of contradictions [in Tsong Khapa's writings] is that, despite [Chandrakirti's and others'] statements again and again [that phenomena exist] only for the world without analysis, [Tsong Khapa] applied reasoning and proved [their valid conventional existence] due to the force of his habituation to logic.

Daktsang found eighteen 'contradictions' in Tsong Khapa's writings, the foremost of which is his assertion that there is a valid establishment of all phenomena in the Prasangika system:⁴⁷³

~ Those [pretending] to follow Chandrakirti who assert through analysis with many reasons that impure mistaken appearances are validly established have a great burden of contradictions.

The basic problem is that in the Prasangika system when objects are sought among or separate from their bases of imputation, they cannot be found and, thus, how can it be said that phenomena are validly established?

HOW CAN VALID COGNITION, EITHER DIRECT PERCEPTION OR INFERENCE, AFFIRM AN UNFINDABLE PHENOMENON AS EXISTING?

ACCORDING TO TSONG KHAPA, every phenomena has its establisher, that is, a consciousness that certifies it as existing.⁴⁷⁴ A correct sense consciousness which directly perceives its object in other words apprehends its object without the medium of images and concepts—certifies the existence of visual objects, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. The mere realization of their objects by those consciousnesses in turn certifies their own existence.⁴⁷⁵ There is no further certifier of the certifier, and this is the reason why a valid cognizer exists in dependence on its own realization and does not inherently exist.

Similarly, an inferring consciousness which realizes uncaused space—a mere negative of obstructive contact—is the certifier of space. Just so, the wisdom of meditative equipoise certifies emptiness, although before directly cognizing emptiness, its existence can be certified by a valid dualistic mental consciousness that arises in dependence on reasoning and scripture. Emptiness is more difficult to realize than its existence, just as liberation from cyclic existence is more difficult to realize than the mere existence of liberation. However, sense consciousnesses certify both their objects and the existence of their objects because the one is no more difficult to realize than the other and because it is impossible to identify another consciousness which, after a sense consciousness has certified its object, certifies the existence of that object.

Since it is obvious that double moons, blue snow mountains, a permanent self, and so forth are seen but do not exist at all, it cannot be said that everything which is perceived by the six consciousnesses is certified as existing. Some distinction of error has to be made; otherwise, there would be no way to determine which conventional phenomena exist and which do not.

How else could Chandrakirti say:⁴⁷⁶

~ From fear, not realizing that the self is just nominal, not knowing dependent imputation as it is, fallen away even from conventional truths, fooled by sheer wrong imagination through counterfeit inferences, [the non-Buddhist Forders] imagine a self and propound its character due to ignorance. A refutation of them even conventionally was given [in chapter eight where] the mutual establishment of a self and its appropriation [the mental and physical aggregates] was set forth.

How could Chandrakirti say that the Forders fall away even from conventional truths if there were not a valid means to determine what does and does not exist conventionally? How could Chandrakirti assert that the self is just nominal, a dependent imputation? It could not be done merely through polling the populace because, though the populace might not say that the self is permanent, they certainly would not even get a hint of what dependent imputation means.

By what means is it that Shantideva determines what is and what is not the path in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds ?

By what means is it that Nagarjuna determines the modes of the ethics he advises for the king in his Precious Garland of Advice for the King? If it were said that these are determined by the valid establishment which is just popular in the world, then Chandrakirti's nominalism would also have to be an object of popular valid establishment.

TSONG KHAPA'S ANSWER is that these correct direct and indirect cognizers are valid within their sphere, in the sense that they determine whether, with respect to impermanent phenomena, the object imputed can perform the functions of the object or not.⁴⁷⁷ For instance, there is no difference with respect to the non-findability of a man imputed to a conscious human body and a man imputed to a pile of stones. However, the common intellect can determine without any special analysis which of the two is imputedly existent and which is just an imputation. The one can perform the functions of a man whereas the other cannot. Approaching and taking a good look is sufficient as a valid check of the coordination of basis of imputation and object imputed. Though an object imputed is not its basis of imputation and cannot be found among the bases of imputation or separately, it can be determined through simple checks whether the imputation is correct or not. To exist does not mean just to exist for thought; coordination of basis of imputation and object imputed is required.⁴⁷⁸

The difference between a picture of a cow and a cow is that the former cannot perform the functions of a cow but the latter can. However, Chandrakirti is renowned for having milked a picture of a cow in order to overcome others' sense of inherent existence. Might it not be that the ability to perform a function is linked inextricably with thought and thus the great yogis can do anything with anything? The Gelugpas answer that, of course, they too accept the special powers of yogis but add that the yogis' and the world's presentations of phenomena should not be mixed. For the yogis' presentation would utterly eradicate the world's conventions;⁴⁷⁹ some yogis' eye consciousness can cognize odors, and their ear consciousness can cognize colors and shapes. A Buddha's hair cognizes all phenomena simultaneously; moments are stretched to eons; eons are reduced to moments. A Buddha can fit the world into a hair pore without changing the size of the hair pore or of the world. Thus, the sphere of valid establishment is the coarse conventions of the world; within that context what is validly established holds true, and even Buddhas and yogis need not

contradict these truths just because their sphere is subtler.⁴⁸⁰

Still, does this mean that we poor worldlings are to have our dull presentation of phenomena and the yogis their subtle presentation? Even if it is granted that it is not ignorance that validly certifies these phenomena, but correct cognizers within a certain sphere, are we to hallow the admitted dullness of our sphere? What is the purpose of adhering to the world's limited knowledge? Why consecrate it with 'valid establishment' (pramanasiddhi, tshad mas grub pa)?

THE GELUGPAS ANSWER that it is necessary first to realize the existence of phenomena before meditating on their emptiness.⁴⁸¹ Otherwise, the Nihilists who cognize an absence of former and future lives and the Madhyamikas who cognize an absence of inherent existence of former and future lives would be the same (see p.632-3). Furthermore, the cause and effect of actions are very subtle, and beings are bound in cyclic existence by the laws of cause and effect until they cognize emptiness directly and then become familiar with it over a long time. If a practitioner does not correctly outline the laws of cause and effect, he will be caught by his mispractices, whereby his very opportunity to meditate on emptiness will be lost. Furthermore, Buddhahood is not a mere state of total non-duality; rather, it is the perfection of mind and body, and dualistic perception in the sense of subject, object, and so forth continue though without the dualism of misperceived or misconceived inherent existence. A Buddha's wisdom and body are continuing effects of profound and vast practice.

THE COGNITION OF EMPTINESS IS NOT THE ERADICATION OF PHENOMENA BUT A THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING

OF THEIR MODE OF EXISTENCE. One learns how to perceive phenomena without confusing the basis

of imputation with the object imputed.

Because ordinary beings cannot distinguish between inherent existence and conventional existence, as soon as it is said that objects are validly established, they tend to believe that objects as they perceive them are affirmed. Therefore, some non-Gelugpa masters have taught that nothing except emptiness validly exists; they feel that since a student is unable to distinguish between inherent existence and conventional existence, he can destroy his conception of inherent existence through destroying his sense of existence and then afterwards determine what remains.

Agreeing with them, the twentieth century renegade Gelugpa monk Gen-dun-cho-pel (dGe-'dun-chos-'phel) says that no teacher need fear that his students would fall to a view of utter annihilation or nihilism because no one can escape the data of his senses.⁴⁸² He agrees that there is something left over after the fabrications of inherent existence are destroyed, but in the meantime STUDENTS DO NOT REQUIRE FORTIFICATION FROM NIHILISM THROUGH A TEACHING OF VALID ESTABLISHMENT.

Gen-dun-cho-pel is said to have led an exciting life, and this may be the cause for his conviction that students would not fall into nihilistic views. He wrote a commentary on the Aphorisms on Desire (Kamasutra) from his own experience; he visited India and was arrested upon his return to Tibet as a Russian spy. He is said to have been quite a drunk, but also it is reported that upon retiring from the street with a friend in a drunken stupor he explained Nagarjuna's teaching with a very clear head.⁴⁸³ The vibrance of his life may have prevented him from falling into nihilism despite his obvious devotion to the doctrine of the unfindability of objects. However, that sense data are enough to keep all students from

nihilism does not stand in the face of some current 'Buddhist' literature; the shadow of nothingness is often dark; the lack of discrimination between non-inherent existence and non-existence is obvious.

Still, Gen-dun-cho-pel's point is significant; he often refers to scholars who pressed him with their debates, and it appears that HIS OBJECTIONS ARE NOT TO A PHILOSOPHICAL INCORRECTNESS IN DZONGKA-BA'S TEACHING BUT TO A PEDAGOGICAL FAULT. Since even Dzong-kaba says that no beginner can discriminate between existence and inherent existence, AN EMPHASIS ON THE VALID ESTABLISHMENT OF CONVENTIONALITIES MIGHT MERELY FORTIFY THE HABITUAL SENSE THAT THINGS EXIST THE WAY THEY APPEAR. Gen-dun-cho-pel essentially is accusing the Gelugpas of being too subtle for their own good.

The highly respected Mongolian scholar and Gelugpa geshay Den-dar-hla-ram-ba (bsTan-dar-lha-ram-pa) in his Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many says in the same vein:484

~ Except for refuting just these mountains, fences, houses, and so forth which so forcefully appear to exist concretely, we are very wrong if we search for some other horn-like thing to refute. ['Horn-like' means something sticking out above everything else, obvious or prominent, something separate from the object itself.] For Jang-gya-rol-way-dor-jay's (ICang-skya-rol-ba 'i-rdo-rje) Song on the Practice of the View says, 'It seems that having fully accepted these concrete appearances as givens, they are searching for some horn-like thing to refute.'

~ Still, some say [in answer] to this, 'This is wrong because the mountains, fences, houses, and so forth as they appear to common beings are the objects of direct apprehension by sense consciousnesses. Therefore, it is unsuitable to refute them in any way because [Dzongka-ba's] "Great Exposition of Special Insight" [in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path] says, "None of the objects of non-conceptual sense consciousnesses are ever refuted through reasoning."'

~ That indeed is true; however, an object which appears to a non-conceptual [sense] consciousness is the object which is conceived to exist inherently by a conceptual consciousness [in the sense that a conceptual consciousness assents to the object's appearance of inherent existence]. Therefore, related with this object are the appearance of objective existence which is to be refuted and the mere appearance [of the object] which is not to be refuted. [However] before attaining the view [of non-inherent existence but conventional, valid, effective existence] these two appear confused as one. When the view is found, these two [the appearance of objective existence and the mere appearance] are discriminated, and it is well renowned in the words of the wise that there is this essential that the mere appearance is not refuted. When mountains, fences, houses, and so forth appear to ordinary beings, they appear in all respects to exist objectively. Therefore, one should meditate until, destroying this mode of appearance, it is cancelled in all respects for one's mind, and the fear, 'Now there is nothing left over,' is generated.

~ The generation of such fear is extremely rare. Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says, 'If even arrival at the point of actual generation of fear and fright of the profound emptiness is extremely rare, what need is there to say that arrival at an actual ascertainment, which is an understanding of an emptiness through experience, is almost

non-existent.'

~ Therefore, greatly superior to the present-day philosophers to whom not even an image of the mode of objective existence has appeared are those in former times who overextended what is refuted [in the view of selflessness and held that the objects themselves are refuted].

~ There are reasons for not being frightened about emptiness. On the one hand, the stupid who do not know either the term or meaning of emptiness are not frightened because they do not know any of its disadvantages or advantages. For example, the stupid who do not know about how one can fall from a horse are brave to mount a wild horse. On the other hand, those who perceive emptiness directly do not fear it because they lack the cause of fear, that is, the conception of inherent existence which is abandoned through seeing [the truth], like a being who has learned well the ways of controlling a wild horse.

~ Then, who fears [emptiness]? It is suitable for fear to be generated in one who has understood emptiness a little and is investigating whether such and such a phenomenon exists or not. For suddenly the phenomenon appears to his mind to be totally non-existent. An example is a person who has understood a little but not completely how to mount a wild horse.

Even though the 'mere appearance' of an object is not negated in the view of selflessness, one has to bring oneself in analysis to the point where the object is utterly unfindable and totally disappears. One can at that time come up with nothing that is the object; this is a time of fright. It is said that eventually one will be able to comprehend what the 'mere appearance' that is not refuted is.

THE GELUGPA VIEW IS INDEED SUBTLE. It attempts to describe what nominal existence is: the non-identification of the imputed object as its basis of imputation and yet the coordination of these two as determined by whether the object so designated can perform its functions. Gelugpas do sometimes seem to proceed to disregard emptiness and enter into long discussions about this or that conventional phenomenon. However, it rests on the oral teaching to emphasize attention to what objective existence and nominal existence mean and not just to enumerate and justify what conventionally exists.

Gen-dun-cho-pel's revolt from Gelugpa teachings suggests that in the eyes of one intelligent being, not too many scholars and yogis were able to follow such a difficult middle path.

L2: [8. Meditative Reasoning [The Middle Way: not accepting, not rejecting conceptualization; no absolute truth, but valid useful adapted skillful means and progressively more and more subtle methods, reasonings, views] :L2

Sources:

- Tsong Khapa's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path
- Nga-wang-bel-den's Explanation of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions
- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets

Many, both in the East and in the West, have interpreted Prasangika-Madhyamika to be a systemless system that, based on the realization that words are incapable of generating an experience of objects like that of direct perception, uses reasoning merely to refute other views while propounding a meditation that is solely a withdrawal from conceptuality. This view contrasts sharply with the Gelugpa interpretation.

That Prasangikas have no system is refuted by Tsong Khapa in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path :485

~ Nowadays some who wish to be Prasangika-Madhyamikas [say]: 'Our own system even conventionally does not have any assertions based on the ultimate or the conventional. For, if we had such theses, then we would have to assert examples and reasons that prove them, in which case we would become Svatantrikas. Therefore, there is no such thing as an 'own system' for Prasangikas since [Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, and Chandrakirti] say that Madhyamikas have no position and no thesis.

~ As Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections says:

:: If I had any thesis,
:: Then I would have that fault.
:: Because I have no thesis,
:: I am only faultless ...'

~ Answer: If this which you propound is not the Madhyamika system, then it is contradictory to establish it through citing passages from the Superior [Nagarjuna] and his spiritual sons. Also, since [according to you] it cannot be posited as Chandrakirti's or any other Buddhist system, it would be outside this religion. [However] if you say that it is Madhyamika and, from within that, the system of Chandrakirti, then it would contradict [your assertion] that Madhyamikas [in general] and Chandrakirti [in particular] do not have their own system.

~ Likewise, it is not feasible to propound—in hopes of being freed from assertions—that all presentations are solely from others' point of view. For, in saying, 'The existence of forms and so forth should be asserted solely from the viewpoint of other,' though you do not assert the existence of forms and so forth, you certainly must assert a positing from others' viewpoint, in which case you are not freed from assertions. Since at that time you must assert the others from whose viewpoint [these presentations] are posited, as well as the positer, and so forth, to propound that assertions are made solely from the viewpoint of others not only does not help but harms your [position of] not having your own system.

Tsong Khapa rejects the interpretation that Prasangikas in particular or Madhyamikas in general have no system. Those who propound such have misunderstood the various passages in Madhyamika texts that seem to indicate this. (Tsong Khapa's interpretation of the passage from Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections is given on pp.471-3.)

Nor is it the uncommon Prasangika-Madhyamika view that words are inadequate to convey experience just as it is. For according to Nga-wang-bel-den, Jam-yang-shay-ba's annotator, this is the view of the Hinayana Sautrantikas. In his Explanation of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets⁴⁸⁶ he explains in detail that in the system of the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning—that is, those following Dignaga and Dharmakirti—impermanent phenomena such as pots, pillars, bodies, minds, and so forth are:

~ ... specifically characterized phenomena (svalakshana, rang mtshan) because of being

phenomena that must be realized by a mind that takes them as its appearing object through the appearance of their own uncommon characteristics [in direct perception]. Due to this, they are not objects of terms since their entities cannot fully appear to a terminologically arisen [conceptual] consciousness. Also, a mind realizing them is not generated through the mere existence of terminology, mental application, and so forth that are other than them.

Thus, to say that the uncommon Madhyamika view is that words cannot generate perception of an object as direct sense perception can is to say that there is no difference in view between Sautrantika and Madhyamika. It is not the latter but the former who explicitly point out that the appearing object of a thought or conceptual consciousness is a meaning-general (arthasāmanya, don spyi) which is necessarily simple, being merely an appearance as the opposite of everything that is not that particular object. Rather than trying to prove that reasoning and words are inadequate, the Prasāngika-Madhyamikas base themselves on the adequacy of these to show that the appearance of objects as if concretely or solidly existent is false. Far from deciding that reasoning is mistaken because it does not agree with appearance, reasoning is used to show that the appearance of objects is false—that their nature is other than what appears, that the sense consciousnesses of sentient beings are mistaken with respect to their appearing objects, that, as Khenpo Lekden so often said, there is a conflict between what appears and what is. The point at issue is not whether words can generate an experience like that of direct perception. That they cannot is accepted and held in common with lower systems of tenets. Investigation into emptiness means examining whether phenomena actually have the concrete existence that even in non-conceptual direct sense perception they appear to have. It is from this point of view that Gon-chok-jikmay-wang-bo says,⁴⁸⁷

~ 'All sense consciousnesses in the mental continuum of a sentient being [a non-Buddha] are necessarily mistaken.'

The process of reasoning itself, used by a competent yogi, is viewed as the means of gaining access to emptiness—a slightly hidden phenomenon that is not accessible to initial understanding through direct perception.⁴⁸⁸ Far from being counter-productive to realizing emptiness, reasonings such as dependent-arising, the lack of being one or many, and so forth reveal emptiness in an incontrovertible cognition of the nature of phenomena, albeit through the medium of an image. Inferential cognition is thus not a mulling over of concepts but a conclusion reached through perceiving a sign in a subject, realizing its concomitance with a predicate, and then realizing that the subject has that predicate. The conceptual or imagistic element of this realization is removed through repeated cultivation, resulting in direct cognition. Thus, conceptual and direct realization are in a harmonious relationship of cause and effect.⁴⁸⁹ To discard reason would be to forsake the sole access to this which is hidden to the direct perception of an ordinary being.

HENCE, MEDITATION ON EMPTINESS IS NOT THE SAME' AS WITHDRAWING FROM CONCEPTUALITY.

¢(i.e. It is not about rejecting conceptualization, as if it was inherently bad, nor about accepting it as is; it is about realizing the real nature of everything, including conceptualization; realizing their non-duality, their unborn purity.)

Jam-yang-shay-ba makes this point clearly and at length in his Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions :⁴⁹⁰

~ Someone says: 'Since the mode of subsistence, emptiness, is not anything, the mind of

its meditation should not apply itself to anything. [Such non-application] is how to meditate on emptiness—selflessness—and its achievement is the measure of having achieved special insight realizing selflessness.'

~ Answer: Then it would [absurdly] follow that the son of a barren woman and his mind would be meditating on emptiness—selflessness—because both do not apply the mind to anything. The three circles [of self-contradiction]! [You have accepted the reason, the predicate's following from the reason, and the opposite of the consequence.] The reason is so because [both the son of a barren woman and his mind] do not exist.

~ Someone [refining the above position] says: 'Within the scope of minds and persons, any conception such as, "It is this or that," is a case of conceiving true existence. Therefore, not conceiving such and not applying the mind to anything [constitute meditation on emptiness].'

~ Answer: It [absurdly] follows that, within the scope of minds, if one remains without conceiving, 'It is this or that,' one is meditating on emptiness because [for you] that is the meaning of meditation on emptiness. If you accept this, then it [absurdly] follows that the five sense consciousnesses of an ordinary fool individually realize emptiness and meditate on it because they remain without conceiving, 'It is this or that.' You have accepted the entailment. The reason is so because [those five] are sense consciousnesses. You cannot accept [that the sense consciousnesses of such a person realize emptiness and meditate on it] because these are of an ordinary being. [The reason] entails such because it is explained that the sense consciousnesses of a sentient being [that is, anyone but a Buddha] are not valid with respect to suchness. For, Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' says, 'It is not feasible that the dumb be valid,' and the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra says, 'Eye, ear, and nose are not valid'.

~ Even if [this position] is put in the framework of the mental consciousness, then it [absurdly] follows that every case of thick sleep would be a meditation on emptiness because even the stupid know that at that time the mind cannot be applied to anything. If you accept that such is meditation on emptiness, then it [absurdly] follows that even though one meditates on emptiness, it is not possible to be liberated because even though there has been limitless meditation on such emptiness since beginningless time, there are still a limitless number of animals and so forth who are not liberated. You accept the reason. If you accept [the consequence], then it [absurdly] follows that there does not at all exist a path that liberates from cyclic existence because through meditation on emptiness one cannot be liberated. You accept the reason. The three circles [of self-contradiction]!

~ Someone says: 'At that time [during thick sleep] one does indeed experience emptiness and the Truth Body, but since it is not with mindfulness, one is not liberated'.

~ Answer: Then, it follows from your assertion that there is something to be mindful about with respect to emptiness. If you accept this, then it follows that it is not correct that emptiness is not an object of any mind because it is an object of mindfulness. You have accepted the reason. The three circles [of self-contradiction]!

~ Furthermore, [one can through using this reasoning] examine fainting and so forth as well as the existence and non-existence of meditator and means of meditation and so forth and refute [wrong positions]. Such [positions] are opposed and extensively refuted in the Kalachakra Tantra. For an extensive [rendition] see Tsong Khapa's Great Exposition of the

Stages of the Path. Also, it follows that the views of your system and of [the Chinese Abbot] Hoshang (Hvashang) are similar because he asserted that not applying the mind to anything is meditation on emptiness and you also assert the same.

~ To this someone says: It follows that the views of Hoshang's and our systems are not the same because Hoshang refuted giving and so forth whereas we do not.

~ Answer: Then it follows that with respect to the view you two do not differ because you speak of a difference of deeds and implicitly accept that there is no difference in view.

~ Someone who follows such [a system] says: To refute the conception of self through analysis is to adjust conceptual elaborations like a dog chasing after a stone [that has been thrown at it. However] from the start to hold the mind without scattering to anything is like a dog's seizing the hand that threw the stone, and thus this alone is profound. When the view is settled through scripture and reasoning, one is sunk in verbal conventions.

~ Answer: It follows that this is not correct because without analyzing and refuting the referent object of the conception of self [that is, inherent existence] it cannot be abandoned. For, this is the thought of the Conqueror [Buddha] and the supreme ornaments of the world.

~ Sutra says:

:: 'How is it that a Bodhisattva conquers over strife?'

:: 'Manjushri, [by] analyzing and abiding in the unapprehendable nature of phenomena.'

~ The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra says:

:: If the selflessness of phenomena is analyzed

:: And if this analysis is cultivated,

:: It causes the effect of attaining nirvana.

:: Through no other cause does one come to peace.

~ Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:

:: When selflessness is seen in objects,

:: The seeds of cyclic existence are destroyed.

~ Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' says:

:: The wise say that the reversal of conceptions

:: Is the fruit of analysis.

~ Dharmakirti says:

:: Without disbelieving the object of this [misconception]

:: It is impossible to abandon [misconceiving it].

~ Furthermore, [one can through using this reasoning] examine whether the mind meditating [on emptiness] is [necessarily] conceptual or free from conceptually and refute [wrong positions that it is necessarily one or the other as it can be either].

~ Also, someone says: When one has not yet found the view of selflessness, mere setting [of the mind] without thinking of anything is not meditation on emptiness, but once the view

has been found, all such setting without thought is meditation on emptiness.

~ Answer: It [absurdly] follows that once the view has been found, even [thick] sleep would be meditation on emptiness because all settings [of the mind] without thought once the view has been found are meditation on emptiness. You accept the reason. If you accept the consequence, then it [absurdly] follows that such sleep is cultivation of the wisdom realizing emptiness because it is cultivation of the view realizing emptiness. You accept the reason. [The reason] entails such because the view is necessarily of the substantial entity (dravya, rdzas) of wisdom. The reason is easy to establish. If you accept the consequence, then it [absurdly] follows that such sleep is cultivation of the discrimination of phenomena which is an investigation of emptiness.

~ Someone says: Although all setting [of the mind] in non-conceptuality once the view has been found is not meditation on emptiness, prior to each [session of] sustaining non-conceptuality one should analyze with the wisdom of individual investigation and then, after that, all setting in non-conceptuality is meditation on emptiness.

~ Answer: It [absurdly] follows that once the view has been found and analysis is done for each [session], falling into [thick] sleep is meditation on emptiness because it is a setting in non-conceptuality by one who has found the view and performed a stint of analysis. You have accepted that such follows. The reason is established because the subject is what it is. You cannot accept the consequence.

~ Someone says: When meditating on emptiness, ascertainment of it is induced [by reasoning]. Then within non-degeneration of the mode of apprehension of emptiness, setting [the mind] in non-conceptuality is the mode of sustaining the full form of the view or special insight into emptiness.

~ Answer: Then it [absurdly] follows that such meditation is the mode of cultivating wisdom and special insight realizing emptiness because [according to you] it is the mode of cultivating the view and special insight realizing emptiness. You have accepted the reason. You cannot accept the consequence because that is the mode of cultivating the calm abiding and meditative stabilization realizing emptiness. For, that is stabilizing meditation realizing emptiness. That the reason is so follows because stabilizing meditation realizing emptiness is the cultivation of meditative stabilization and calm abiding realizing emptiness, whereas analytical meditation realizing emptiness is the cultivation of wisdom and special insight realizing emptiness. This is so because individual modes of cultivating calm abiding and special insight realizing emptiness exist and because in general analytical meditation is cultivation of special insight and stabilizing meditation is cultivation of calm abiding.

~ [See Part One, chapters eight and nine for a discussion of calm abiding and special insight.]

MEDITATION ON EMPTINESS IS NOT A MATTER OF WITHDRAWING FROM CONCEPTUALITY BUT OF CREATING

THROUGH REASONED ANALYSIS A MIND THAT IS CAPABLE OF ACTING AS AN ANTIDOTE OR COUNTER-AGENT

TO THE CONCEPTION OF INHERENT EXISTENCE. (i.e. By directly realizing the real non-dual nature of our own mind, we automatically become free from our own created illusions, obsessions and fears.) In dependence on this investigation the view is found, whereupon it is possible to use emptiness as the object in the process of developing calm abiding. Once

that is achieved, stabilizing and analytical meditation are alternated until analysis itself induces greater stabilization and special insight is attained. This special insight—WITH ANALYSIS AND STABILIZATION IN UNION—is cultivated through continued reliance on reasoning to

the point where it becomes direct perception, when emptiness is no longer known through the medium of a meaning-generalty but nakedly in non-dual cognition. (i.e. The perfection of meditation is meditating in accord with the real non-dual nature of everything, beyond existence and non-existence; not accepting, not rejecting. Only then is it efficient. That is the meaning of the union of calm abiding and insight, the Union of The Two Truths.)

As jang-gya says:491

~ In particular, the many forms of reasoning for ascertaining suchness that were set forth [by the Mahayanists] are only for the sake of clarifying the path of liberation for the fortunate, not for the sake of becoming intent on debate. Buddhapalita says, 'What is the purpose in teaching dependent-arising? The master [Nagarjuna] whose very nature is compassion saw that sentient beings are beset by various sufferings and assumed the task of teaching the reality of things just as it is so that they might be liberated. Therefore, he began teaching dependent-arising.' Also, Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' says, 'The analyses in the Treatise were not done for the sake of attachment to debate; suchness was taught for the sake of liberation.' Also, Tsong Khapa says, 'All the reasoned analyses set forth in the Treatise on the Middle Way are only so that sentient beings might attain liberation.'

Thus, the main purpose of the twenty-seven chapters of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way with its many forms of reasoning is taken to be the refutation not of other systems but of one's own innate conception of inherent existence. (i.e. so we would not fall into the traps of the other systems, and so we could directly realize the real non-dual nature of everything ourselves) Though beings do not innately conceive that products, for instance, are produced from themselves, others, both, or neither, refutation of these four refutes the innate conception of the inherent existence of products because if products did exist in accordance with their concrete mode of appearance, they would have to exist in one of these four ways. Also, since other systems variously hold these views, they are refuted secondarily in the process of developing a meditative consciousness that understands the impossibility of such concrete or inherent existence and becomes accustomed to that emptiness. The primary aim is to become a source of help and happiness through penetrating the empty nature of phenomena that serves as the foundation of transformation into Buddhahood.

L1: [PART SIX – Translation of “Emptiness in the prasangika system” by Jam-yang-shay-ba (P.561)] :L1
[see other files for this section]

[End]

Archived from gileht.tripod.com via the Wayback Machine · for the benefit of all beings