

Part-C

Jamyang Shepa · Tsong Khapa

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Jam-yang-shay-ba's (1648-1721)

Great Exposition of Tenets

PART 6 of 6 parts

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[About: the five reasonings establishing the two selflessnesses in the context of the five stages of meditation leading to the union of calm abiding and insight; the inseparability of the two truths; and the refutation of all the various Buddhist and non-buddhist systems]

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[FIRST, A PRESENTATION OF THE FIVE REASONINGS ESTABLISHING THE TWO SELFLESSNESSES]

PART ONE – MEDITATION [Two selflessnesses, five reasonings, five stages, five paths]

1. Purpose and Motivation [We need to realize both selflessnesses: person and phenomena]

2. Self: The Opposite of Selflessness [The Middle Way between the two extremes: empty, but still not completely non-existent]

3. Meditation: Identifying Self [ex. Meditation of the selflessness of person]

[RÉSUMÉ OF THE FIVE REASONINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIVE STAGES OF MEDITATION:]

First stage of meditation on emptiness: How a beginner develops experience with respect to the view of emptiness

Identifying the object negated in the theory of selflessness

4. Meditative Investigation [ex. Using the sevenfold reasoning (#2) to establish the selflessness of person]

5. [ex. Using the reasoning of] Dependent-Arising [to establish the selflessness of person]

5b. [ex. Using the reasoning of Dependent-Arising (#3) to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

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6. [ex. Using the reasoning of the] diamond slivers (#1) [to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

7. Realization [of three more types of reasoning to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

7a. The refutation of the four extreme types of production (#4) [product is not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither]

7b. The refutation of the four alternative of production (#5) [one or many causes ? one or many effects]

7c. The reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many (the two first of reasoning #2) [Conclusion about the first stage of meditation: non-duality of subject vs. object / emptiness of emptiness]

8. Calm Abiding [Prerequisites, the object of calm abiding, faults & antidotes, nine states, five paths]

Second stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding

9. Special Insight [the path of preparation]

Third stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate actual special insight based on actual calm abiding

Fourth stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate direct cognition of emptiness [the paths of seeing & meditation, ten bhumis]

10. Tantra

Fifth stage of meditation on emptiness: How to meditate on emptiness during the second stage of Highest Yoga Tantra

11. Buddhahood [the resulting ground; the Buddha kayas]

[SECOND, A PRESENTATION OF THE TWO TRUTHS: EMPTINESS AND THE CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS]

PART TWO — REASONING INTO REALITY [Details about the Five Reasonings implying Emptiness]

0. Introduction [The two selflessnesses and the two sets of reasonings]

1. The Diamond Slivers (#1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity in change)

The ten samenesses (It is easy to realize the other nine samenesses after having realized the sameness of production)

Statement of the reasons

1. Non-production from self (cause&effect cannot be the same/one; the cause cannot be inside; Vaibhashika ?? & Samkhyas)

2. Non-production from other (cause&effect cannot be inherently different/two/unrelated otherwise anything would produce anything else; the cause cannot be outside; the junction is unexplainable: cause&effect cannot be simultaneous or separate in time; there is no

continuity, no discontinuity; but conventional production from other must be accepted as conventionally valid because the other three are much less logical/practical)

3. Non-production from both self and other (the causes cannot be both the same&different, inside&outside; Nirgranthas(Jainas) & theistic Samkhyas)

4. Non-production causelessly (the effect cannot be causeless; Charvakas / nihilists)

Conclusion

2. The Four Extremes (#4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // also: because cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)

3. The Four Alternatives (#5 : refuting that one or many causes can inherently produce one or many effects)

4. Dependent-Arising (#3 : the King of reasoning: refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)

5. Refuting a Self of Persons (#2 : the sevenfold reasoning: refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)

The mine (refuting the “mine”)

[Particularities of Prasangikas: the existent person is not any or all of the mental and physical aggregates]

PART THREE – THE BUDDHIST WORLD [Enumerating some useful conventional truths]

0. Introduction [all empty of inherent existence, but still dependently arisen, functional, and useful conventional truths]

The fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class

The fifty-five phenomena of the pure class

1. The Selfless

Classifications of phenomena (the selfless) in terms of non-existents and existents (permanent, things (forms, consciousness (mind, mental factors ...))

Classifications of phenomena (the selfless) in terms of the five aggregates

2. Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence

Details about the 12 members of the Wheel of Life, and their interpretation across three lives

3. The Four Noble Truths

Details about the Four Noble Truths

Details about the coarse and subtle selfless – that realizing only the selflessness of the person is not enough

PART FOUR – PRESENTATION AND REFUTATION OF SPECIFIC SYSTEMS / VIEWS (one at a time)

REFUTING NON-BUDDHISTS VIEWS:

1. Refutation of various views about the Self

? The assertion of self (various non-buddhist reasonings to be refuted: like inherent existence or complete non-existence of a self)

? Buddhist refutation of self (résumé of the refutations of those non-buddhist positions) : but “the fact that a substantially existent agent cannot be found does not mean that person or agent do not exist at all; they exist imputedly and effectively”.

2. Non-Buddhist Systems: (oscillating between the two extremes of permanence and annihilation)

Samkhyas / Enumerators / Proponent of the nature of the cause / Kapilas

? Samkhyas production from self, (the Samkhya’s permanent self, effect existing at the

time of the cause, production from itself (non-theistic) or from both self and others together (theistic), that the world was part of the creator's being -- to be refuted)

? Buddhist refutation of Samkhya (résumé of the refutations of the Samkhya's positions: permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, ...)

Charvakas / Hedonists / Nihilists

? Charvakas (Hedonists, Proponent of Annihilation, Nihilists) (the Charvaka's position on the production from no cause -- to be refuted)

? Buddhist refutation of nihilism (résumé of the refutations of the Nihilists's positions: production from no cause, a mind that is emerging from matter, annihilation at death, no rebirth, no karma ...)

REFUTING HINAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS:

3. Hinayana (the two schools of the Vehicle of the Hearers)

(1st school) Vaibhashika (18 subschools) [production from self, the Abhidharmists rejecting the authority of the sutras, asserting no self-consciousness but real dharmas (partless particles and partless moments of consciousness) and simultaneous cause & effect -- to be refuted] [résumé of the refutations of the Vaibhashika View]

(2nd school) Sautrantika [Followers of scripture or Reasoning, not accepting the Abhidharma, asserting a real self-consciousness and real dharmas, everything is momentary, accept absolute perception and inference -- to be refuted] [Refutation of the Sautantrika View]

REFUTING MAHAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS:

4. History of the Mahayana (a cosmology of many Buddhas, a 500 years old Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, ...)

5. (3rd school) Chittamatra [Mind-Only tradition, Followers of scripture or Reasoning, asserting true consciousness, that all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind, eight consciousnesses, ... -- to be refuted] [Refutation of the Chittamatra's positions]

6. (4th school) Madhyamika [Prasangika vs. Svatantrika, (to be refuted -- for this refutation see Part 5 below)]

? The Middle Way // The Two Truths // Definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation

PART FIVE – PRASANGIKA-MADHYAMIKA [Details about the refutation of the Svatantrika system]

1. The Prasangika School

2. Debate [Prasangika (Buddhapalita + Chandrakirti) vs. Svatantrika (Bhavaviveka)]

3. Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita

4. Chandrakirti's Defense of Buddhapalita 5. Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka

6. Prasangika in Tibet (mostly Prasangikas)

7. Validation of Phenomena (why talking about valid cognition?)

8. Meditative Reasoning (not accepting, not rejecting conceptualization)

PART SIX – The root text: "Emptiness in the prasangika system" by Jam-yang-shay-ba (1648-1721)

0. Introduction

? About the author // About the editions of the text used // Jam-yang-shay-ba's sources // Collaborators for the translation

1. Background

? Definition and etymology of 'Prasangika' // Synonyms of Prasangika // Divisions of Prasangika

? Literature on which the Prasangikas rely [Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, Buddhapalita, Atisha, Maitreya, Asanga, Tsong Khapa]

2. Interpretation of Scripture

3. The Object of Negation

THE FIVE REASONINGS REFUTING INHERENT EXISTENCE OF ALL DHARMA

4. Refuting Inherently Existent Production

REASONINGS REFUTING A SELF OF PHENOMENA

? Diamond Slivers (reasoning #1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity in change)

5. Other types of production

? Simultaneous refutation of production of the four extremes and of the existent, non-existent, both, and neither (reasoning #4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // also: because cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)

? Refutation of production of the four alternatives (reasoning #5 : refuting that one or many causes can inherently produce one or many effects)

6. Dependent-Arising

? Actual exposition of dependent-arising (reasoning #3 : the King of reasoning; refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)

? Elimination of error concerning dependent-arising

REASONINGS REFUTING A SELF OF PERSONS

7. Refuting A Self Of Persons

? Actual exposition of the reasoning refuting a self of persons (reasoning #2 : the sevenfold reasoning; refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)

? Elimination of error concerning the refutation of a self of persons

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-- Chapter 2. Self: The Opposite of Selflessness [The Middle Way between the two extremes: empty, but still not completely non-existent]

-- Chapter 3. Meditation: Identifying Self [ex. Meditation of the selflessness of person]

N4: [RÉSUMÉ OF THE FIVE REASONINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIVE STAGES OF MEDITATION:] :N4

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-- Identifying THE OBJECT NEGATED in the theory of selflessness

-- Chapter 4. Meditative Investigation [ex. Using the sevenfold reasoning (#2) to establish THE SELFLESSNESS OF PERSON]

-- Chapter 5. [ex. Using the reasoning of] Dependent-Arising [to establish the selflessness

of person]

-- 5b. [ex. Using the reasoning of Dependent-Arising (#3) to establish THE SELFLESSNESS OF PHENOMENA]

-- 5c. [ex. Using the sevenfold reasoning to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

-- Chapter 6. [ex. Using the reasoning of the] diamond slivers (#1) [to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

-- Chapter 7. Realization [of three more types of reasoning to establish the selflessness of phenomena]

-- 7a. The refutation of the four extreme types of production (#4) [product is not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither]

-- 7b. The refutation of the four alternative of production (#5) [one or many causes ? one or many effects]

-- 7c. The reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many (the two first of reasoning #2)

-- [Conclusion about the first stage of meditation: non-duality of subject vs. object / emptiness of emptiness]

-- Chapter 8. CALM ABIDING [Prerequisites, the object of calm abiding, faults & antidotes, nine states, five paths]

N5: [Second stage of meditation on emptiness: How to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding] :N5

-- Chapter 9. Special Insight [the path of preparation]

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(#1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity in change)

-- THE TEN SAMENESSES (It is easy to realize the other nine samenesses after having realized the sameness of production)

Statement of the reasons

-- 1. NON-PRODUCTION FROM SELF (cause&effect cannot be the same/one; the cause cannot be

inside; Vaibhashika ?? & Samkhyas)

-- 2. NON-PRODUCTION FROM OTHER (cause&effect cannot be inherently different/two/unrelated otherwise anything would produce anything else; the cause cannot be outside; the junction is unexplainable: cause&effect cannot be simultaneous or separate in time; there is no continuity, no discontinuity; but conventional production from other must be accepted as conventionally valid because the other three are much less logical/practical)

-- 3. NON-PRODUCTION FROM BOTH SELF AND OTHER (the causes cannot be both the same&different, inside&outside; Nirgranthas(Jainas) & theistic Samkhyas)

-- 4. NON-PRODUCTION CAUSELESSLY (the effect cannot be causeless; Charvakas / nihilists)

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(#2 : THE SEVENFOLD REASONING: refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)

-- The mine (refuting the “mine”)

-- [Particularities of Prasangikas: the existent person is not any or all of the mental and physical aggregates]

N3: [PART THREE – THE BUDDHIST WORLD [Enumerating some useful conventional truths] :N3

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[all empty of inherent existence, but still dependently arisen, functional, and useful conventional truths]

-- The fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class

-- The fifty-five phenomena of the pure class

N5: [Chapter 1. The Selfless] :N5

-- Classifications of phenomena (the selfless) in terms of non-existents and existents (permanent, things (forms, consciousness (mind, mental factors ...))

-- Classifications of phenomena (the selfless) in terms of the five aggregates

N5: [Chapter 2. Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence] :N5

-- Details about the 12 members of the Wheel of Life, and their interpretation across three

lives

N5: [Chapter 3. The Four Noble Truths] :N5

-- Details about the Four Noble Truths

-- Details about the coarse and subtle selfless – that realizing only the selflessness of the person is not enough

N3: [PART FOUR – PRESENTATION AND REFUTATION OF SPECIFIC SYSTEMS / VIEWS (one at a time)]

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N4: [REFUTING NON-BUDDHISTS VIEWS] :N4

N5: [Chapter 1. Refutation of various views about the Self] :N5

-- The assertion of self (various non-buddhist reasonings to be refuted: like inherent existence or complete non-existence of a self)

-- Buddhist refutation of self (résumé of the refutations of those non-buddhist positions) : but “the fact that a substantially existent agent cannot be found does not mean that person or agent do not exist at all; they exist imputedly and effectively”.

N5: [Chapter 2. Non-Buddhist Systems] :N5

(oscillating between the two extremes of permanence and annihilation)

N6: [Samkhyas / Enumerators / Proponent of the nature of the cause / Kapilas

-- Samkhyas production from self, (the Samkhya’s permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, production from itself (non-theistic) or from both self and others together (theistic), that the world was part of the creator’s being -- to be refuted)

-- Buddhist refutation of Samkhya (résumé of the refutations of the Samkhya’s positions: permanent self, effect existing at the time of the cause, ...)

N6: [Charvakas / Hedonists / Nihilists

-- Charvakas (Hedonists, Proponent of Annihilation, Nihilists) (the Charvaka’s position on the production from no cause -- to be refuted)

-- Buddhist refutation of nihilism (résumé of the refutations of the Nihilists’s positions: production from no cause, a mind that is emerging from matter, annihilation at death, no rebirth, no karma ...)

N4: [REFUTING HINAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS] :N4

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N6: [(1st school) Vaibhashika (18 subschools)

[production from self, the Abhidharmists rejecting the authority of the sutras, asserting no self-consciousness but real dharmas (partless particles and partless moments of consciousness) and simultaneous cause & effect -- to be refuted] [résumé of the refutations of the Vaibhashika View]

N6: [(2nd school) Sautrantika

[Followers of scripture or Reasoning, not accepting the Abhidharma, asserting a real self-consciousness and real dharmas, everything is momentary, accept absolute perception and inference -- to be refuted] [Refutation of the Sautantrika View]

N4: [REFUTING MAHAYANA BUDDHIST VIEWS] :N4

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(a cosmology of many Buddhas, a 500 years old Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, ...)

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[Mind-Only tradition, Followers of scripture or Reasoning, asserting true consciousness, that all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind, eight consciousnesses, ... -- to be refuted] [Refutation of the Chittamattra's positions]

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-- The Middle Way // The Two Truths // Definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation

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N3: [PART SIX – The root text: "Emptiness in the prasangika system" by Jam-yang-shay-ba (1648-1721)] :N3

N5: [Chapter 0. Introduction] :N5

-- About the author // About the editions of the text used // Jam-yang-shay-ba's sources // Collaborators for the translation

N5: [Chapter 1. Background] :N5

-- Definition and etymology of 'Prasangika' // Synonyms of Prasangika' // Divisions of Prasangika

-- Literature on which the Prasangikas rely [Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, Buddhapalita, Atisha, Maitreya, Asanga, Tsong Khapa]

N5: [Chapter 2. Interpretation of Scripture] :N5

N5: [Chapter 3. The Object of Negation] :N5

N4: [THE FIVE REASONINGS REFUTING INHERENT EXISTENCE OF ALL DHARMA] :N4

N5: [Chapter 4. Refuting Inherently Existent Production] :N5

N4: [REASONINGS REFUTING A SELF OF PHENOMENA] :N4

-- DIAMOND SLIVERS (reasoning #1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity in change)

N5: [Chapter 5. Other types of production] :N5

- Simultaneous refutation of production of THE FOUR EXTREMES and of the existent, non-existent, both, and neither (reasoning #4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // also: because cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)
- Refutation of production of THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES (reasoning #5 : refuting that one or many causes can inherently produce one or many effects)

N5: [Chapter 6. Dependent-Arising] :N5

- ACTUAL EXPOSITION OF DEPENDENT-ARISING (reasoning #3 : the King of reasoning; refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)
- Elimination of error concerning dependent-arising

N4: [REASONINGS REFUTING A SELF OF PERSONS] :N4

N5: [Chapter 7. Refuting A Self Of Persons] :N5

- ACTUAL EXPOSITION OF THE REASONING REFUTING A SELF OF PERSONS (reasoning #2 : the sevenfold reasoning; refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)
- Elimination of error concerning the refutation of a self of persons

L1: [Introduction] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Technical Note] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [List of Abbreviations] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Acknowledgements] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Part I – Meditation] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [PRESENTATION OF THE TWO TRUTHS: EMPTINESS (part 2) AND THE CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS (part 3)] :L1

L1: [PART II – REASONING INTO REALITY -- Details about the Five Reasonings proving the Emptiness of all dharmas] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Part Three – The Buddhist World [Details about the useful conventional truths] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Part Four – Presentation and refutation of various systems / views] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [Part Five – Prasangika-Madhyamika [Details about the refutation of the Svatantrika system] :L1

[see other files for this section]

L1: [PART SIX – Translation of “Emptiness in the prasangika system” by Jam-yang-shay-ba (P.561)] :L1

From the twelfth chapter of Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Explanation of 'Tenets', Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets And the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings

L2: [O. Introduction] :L2

JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA’S GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS, published in 1699, is one of only several books of its kind, two of the others being

-- Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets (Grub mtha'i rnam bzhag), which is based on

Jam-yang-shay-ba’s text,

-- and Daktsang's Understanding All Tenets (Grub mtha' kun shes) which Jam-yang-shay-ba takes as his main object of refutation.

There are many other short books which present the basic tenets of the various non-Buddhist and Buddhist systems; however, there is none of the length and breadth of the Great Exposition of Tenets. Replete with quotations from Indian sources, it presents the tenets of the philosophical culture of India in three hundred and ten folios (Dalama edition). A translation into English in the manner of the section done here, with all quotes restored to full length, would take 2500 pages.

According to Kensur Lekden, a master of the Great Exposition of Tenets would have the many sources for the work around his room and refer to them as quoted. Daily the students in Gomang (sGomang, meaning 'many doors' because Buddha's teaching has many doors or approaches and because those who have realized emptiness can walk through walls), the college of Drebung ('Bras-spung) monastery that uses Jam-yang-shay-ba’s textbooks, would have to present back to the teacher from memory the teacher's previous commentary on the Great Exposition of Tenets. The students would take sides and debate the many points, becoming clever at upholding and demolishing various positions and developing their intelligence and memory. The basic text would be memorized; the master would teach the whole work twice, and at the conclusion the students would have a map of the whole field of Buddhist philosophical literature. They would then be able to differentiate the systems and avoid confusing the works of authors of conflicting systems. They would be ready for the specialized texts on the path structure, Prasangika-Madhyamika, logic and epistemology, phenomenology, and discipline.

Jam-yang-shay-ba also wrote a textbook just on Prasangika-Madhyamika, a commentary to Chandrakirti's Supplement., which is in some ways far more extensive than his chapter on Prasangika in the Great Exposition of Tenets, such as in the discussion of autonomous syllogisms.

Still, in other respects, the Great Exposition of Tenets is more extensive than the former, as in presenting the Prasangika theory of interpretation and formation of the Sanskrit of 'dependent-arising', pratityasamutpada. Thus, each is studied for a fuller appreciation of the other. These two form the basis of the knowledge of Madhyamika in the Gomang College of Drebung which, within the sphere of the dominant Geluk order, was also influential—along with other colleges—in the Am-do province of Tibet as well as in Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, the Buryat area of Siberia, and the Kalmuk areas of Russia.

Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets has thirteen chapters:

- Discussion of tenets in general
- Refutation of the extreme of nihilism: Charvaka
- Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Samkhya and Kapila
- Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Brahmana, Vyakarana, Vedanta, and Guhyaka
- Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Vaishnava and Mimamsaka
- Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Shaiva, Naiyayika, and Vaisesika
- Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Nirgrantha (Jaina)
- Introduction to Buddhist tenets in general and presentation of Vaibhashika
- Sautrantika
- Introduction to the Mahayana and presentation of Chittamatra
- Introduction to Madhyamika, its history, refutation of wrong views about Madhyamika, and presentation of Svatantrika
- Prasangika
- Elimination of doubts about the Vajrayana.

JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA'S ROOT TEXT, written in verse mainly with nine syllables per line, consists of sixteen folios; his commentary is three hundred and ten folios (Dalama edition).

-- The basic text is called (see bibliography for Tibetan titles): Presentation of Tenets, Roar of the Five-Faced [Lion] Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Good Path to Omniscience.

-- His commentary is called: Explanation of 'Tenets', Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings.

The word 'tenets' in the title of the commentary refers to the root text; his commentary on it is like the light of the land of Samantabhadra, which is not lit by a sun that rises and sets but shines continuously through the power of meditative stabilization. This book of tenets fulfils the hopes of all beings seeking the ability to gain the wanted and avoid the unwanted since it explains what the wanted and unwanted are and how to achieve and avoid them. Through delineating the profound meaning of emptiness, it shows the path to liberation from cyclic existence and the eventual attainment of omniscience.

-- The great Outer Mongolian scholar, Nga-wang-bel-den (Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, born 1779), known more commonly as Bel-den-cho-jay (dPal-ldan-chos-rje), wrote an extensive commentary of annotations (four hundred and sixteen folios, Sarnath edition) on Jam-yang-shay-ba's autocommentary (three hundred and ten folios, Dalama edition). It is called: Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought. Nga-wang-bel-den's annotations do indeed untie the

knots of many difficult points in Jam-yang-shay-ba's text especially by elaborating the meaning of quotations, and thus it has been used extensively in the translation for both interpretation and addition of bracketed material.

Jam-yang-shay-ba is famous for his lengthy works replete with citations of Indian sources. Whereas his followers often point to his frequent citation of sources as a great advantage, the followers of the textbook literature by Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba (1478-1554), used in the Lo-sel-ling College of Drebung and the Shardzay College of Ganden, conversely point to their writer's ability to condense important topics into easily readable prose, highly accessible to beginners. In the middle is Jay-dzun Cho-gyi-gyel-tsen (1469-1546), whose textbooks, used by the Sera Jay and Ganden Jangdzay Colleges, tend to fall between those two in terms of length.

Here in the Great Exposition of Tenets Jam-yang-shay-ba's devotion to the source literature is particularly helpful as it makes his presentation of Prasangika an anthology of the basic literature in both sutra and the commentarial treatises. In order to reduce the bulk of the text, Jam-yang-shay-ba condensed many quotations. However, since, as Kensur Lekden reported, a master of the Great Exposition of Tenets would have the cited texts available and make use of them during instruction, this translator has sought out those texts and filled in the ellipses, with the result that thirty percent of the translation is comprised of these reconstructions.

The full, edited Tibetan text, with the reconstructions clearly marked, is given at the end of this book; the page numbers in brackets [###] throughout the translation refer to it. (note: le [1] seems missing, all the other ones up to [154] are there.)

L3: [About the author] :L3

According to Lokesh Chandra's account given in his Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature, 492 Jam-yang-shay-ba Nga-wang-dzon-dru was born in the Am-do province of Tibet in 1648. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk. He went to Hla-sa at age twenty-one to pursue his studies at the Gomang College of Drebung Monastic University; six years later he received full ordination and at age twenty-nine entered the Tantric College of Lower Hla-sa. He spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Drebung from age thirty-three. (Perhaps it was at this time that Manjushri, also called Manjughosha, appeared to him and smiled, due to which, according to Kensur Lekden, he came to be called 'One On Whom Manjughosha Smiled', Jam-yang-shay-ba.)

At age fifty-three he became abbot of Gomang and at sixty-two returned to Am-do province where he founded a monastery at Dra-shi-kyil (bKra-shis-'khyil), this being 1710. Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or four in 1721/2.

Partly because of the close connection between Gomang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Gelugpa by this time, Jam-yang-shay-ba's influence on the Gelugpa order has been considerable. Like the other textbook authors, he was seeking to explicate the thought of the founder of the

Gelugpa order, Tsong Khapa (1357-1419), and perhaps it was because he was the last of the great textbook authors and thus had the others' works before him and could speak from a fully developed tradition of such study that he could put such great emphasis on the Indian sources of Tsong Khapa's thought.

L3: [About the editions of the text used] :L3

FIVE EDITIONS OF JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA'S GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS were gathered over several

years. Four of them turned out to have the same basis:

-- the Dalama edition published in Musoorie in 1962

-- photographs (of the part translated here) of the text in the possession of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The photography was kindly done by Sherpa Tulku and Khamlung Tulku. Unfortunately, the final pages were not included, and thus publishing data is not available. The margin of every page reads 'grub 'grel', as do the other three in this class.

-- a hand-written copy (of the part translated here) of the edition held in the library of Gomang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State. This was graciously provided through the efforts of Kensur Lekden, by way of the then abbot of Gomang Den-ba-den-dzin. Again, the pages with publication data were not copied.

-- a hand-written copy (of the twelfth and thirteenth chapters) of an edition, surreptitiously procured—from a library in a country that shall remain unnamed—by Mr. Gyatso Tsering, Director of the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharmasala. The colophon states that it was commissioned by 'gam bear mkhan po chos 'byor rgya mtsho'.

The first, third, and fourth contain variations due to scribes' and print-setters' inaccuracies, but they share basic inaccuracies with the second; thus we can posit that they stem from a common edition. These basic inaccuracies do not appear in the other edition obtained:

-- a photographic reprint of the Dra-shi-kyil edition published in 1972 in New Delhi by Ngawang Gelek Demo in Volume 14 of the Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyahs-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje.

The last is by far the best edition due to not having some major errors, which all the other four have, and due to using the virama extensively in the section on forming the Sanskrit term pratyasamutpada under renderings of Sanskrit groups of letters in Tibetan. (A copy of this edition has recently been made by Gomang College; it contains no publication information above and beyond what is in the Dra-shi-kyil edition.) According to Kensur Lekden, Jam-yang-shay-ba's works have suffered from poor printing from the start due to the fact that the author wrote quickly in his old age, with little attention to the details of publication. The annotator, Nga-wang-bel-den, frequently points out printing errors, which appear in the edition represented by one through four in the list above. It can be deduced from his commentary (dbu 67b.8 note ca, for instance) that he did not have the Dra-shi-kyil edition at his disposal since he challenges readings that are clearly not in the Dra-shi-kyil edition but are in the other.

Both editions are replete with error; nevertheless, due to Jam-yang-shay-ba's proclivity for quotation, it was possible to compare a great portion of the text with the Peking edition as found in the Tibetan Tripitaka published under the auspices of the Tibetan Tripitaka Foundation (Tokyo-Kyoto, 1956). Thus, in counsel with the Gomang scholars mentioned below, it was possible to edit the text; a list of a hundred and ninety-one emendations of the Gomang hand-copy is given after the reconstructed text.

L3: [Jam-yang-shay-ba's sources] :L3

THE PORTION OF THE GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS TRANSLATED HERE has two hundred and nine quotations, counting a few quotes within quotes.

The sources in order of frequency of quotation are:

- 1 Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Madhyamakavatara) and his own commentary, thirty-eight quotations
- 2 Chandrakirti's Clear Words, a Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Madhyamakavrtti-prasannapada), twenty-eight quotations
- 3 Chandragomin's [Sanskrit] Grammar (Chandravydkarana), eleven quotations
- 4 Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakashastra), eight quotations
- 5 Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra (Sutrasamuchchaya), seven quotations
- 5 Nagarjuna's Precious Garland of Advice for the King (Ratnavali), seven quotations
- 5 Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Buddhapalitamulamadhyamakavrtti), seven quotations
- 6 Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (Prajnaparamita, in twenty-five thousand or eighteen thousand stanzas), five quotations
- 6 Descent into Lanka Sutra (Lankavatara), five quotations
- 6 Aryadeva's Four Hundred (Chatuhshataka), five quotations
- 6 Chandrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred' (Chatuhshatakanka), five quotations
- 6 Jnanagarbha's Discrimination of the Two Truths (Satyadvayavibhanga), five quotations
- 7 Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharydvatara), four quotations
- 7 Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad snying po), four quotations
- 7 Tsong Khapa's Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (rTsa shes tik chen), four quotations
- 7 Kalapa's Aphorisms (Kalapasutra), four quotations
- 8 Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Samdhinirmochana), three quotations
- 8 Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhumi), three quotations
- 8 Rice Seedling Sutra (Shalistamba), three quotations
- 8 Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktishashtika), three quotations
- 8 Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom' (Prajnapradipa), three quotations
- 9 Ashvaghosha's Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment (Paramarthabodhichittabhavandkramavarnasamgraha), two quotations
- 9 Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra (Akshayamatiniirdesha), two quotations
- 9 King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (Samadhiraja), two quotations
- 9 Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness (Shunyatasaptati) and his own commentary, two quotations
- 9 Mahamati's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter' (Suhrllekha), two quotations
- 9 Kamalashila's Illumination of the Middle Way (Madhyamakaloka), two quotations
- 9 Bhavaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvala), two quotations
- 9 Fifth Dalai Lama's Sacred Word of Manjushri, two quotations
- 9 Atisha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhipathapradipa), two quotations
- 9 Tsong Khapa's Praise of Dependent-Arising, two quotations

- 9 Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate, two quotations
- 10 one quotation each:
 - Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections (Vigrahavydvartani)
 - Nagarjuna's Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (Bodhichittavivarana)
 - Nagarjuna's Friendly Letter (Suhrllekha)
 - Chandrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning' (Yuktisastikdvrtti)
 - Avalokitavrata's Commentary on (Bhavaviveka's) 'Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) "Wisdom "' (Prajnapradipavrtti)
 - Dharmakirti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium of Valid Cognition'(Pramanavarttika)
 - Tsong Khapa's Explanation of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement'
 - Extensive Sport Sutra (Lalitavistara)
 - Heart of Wisdom Sutra (Prajnahrdaya)
 - White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine Sutra (Saddharmapundanka)
 - Chapter of the True One Sutra (Satyakaparivarta)
 - Questions of King Dharanishvara Sutra (Dharanishvararajaparipreccha)
 - Irreversible Wheel Sutra (Avaivartachakra)
 - Lion's Roar of Shrimaladevi Sutra (Shrimaladevisimhanada)
 - Sutra on the Heavily Adorned (Ghanavyuha)
 - Questions of the King of Nagas, Sagara, Sutra (Sagaranagarajapariprchha)
 - Kashyapa Chapter Sutra (Kasyapaparivana)
 - Meeting of Father and Son Sutra (Pitaputrasamagamana)
 - Compendium of Doctrine Sutra (Dharmasamgiti)
 - Six unidentified sutra quotations.

The authors in order of frequency of quotation are:

- 1 Chandrakirti, seventy-three quotations
- 2 Buddha (sutra), forty quotations
- 3 Nagarjuna, thirty quotations
- 4 Tsong Khapa, eleven quotations
- 4 Chandragomin, eleven quotations
- 5 Buddhapalita, seven quotations
- 6 Aryadeva, five quotations
- 6 Bhavaviveka, five quotations
- 6 Jnanagarbha, five quotations
- 7 Kalapa, four quotations
- 8 Ashvaghosha, Mahamati, Kamalashila, Atisha, Kaydrup, and the Fifth Dalai Lama, two quotations each
- 9 Avalokitavrata and Dharmakirti, one quotation each.

The above tally is JUST FOR THE PARTS OF JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA'S CHAPTER ON PRASANGIKA TRANSLATED

HERE on the definition, synonyms, divisions, literature, and emptiness of the Prasangika system. It is obvious from the two lists that at least for Jam-yang-shay-ba Chandrakirti is by far the principal source for the Prasangika position on emptiness and its relation to the other schools. (The last part of Jam-yang-shay-ba's presentation of the Prasangika system deals with the attributes of a Buddha and relies heavily on Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle [Uttaratantra]. Thus, the tally should be taken as applying not to Jam-yang-shay-ba's entire presentation of the Prasangika system but mainly to his

presentation of emptiness.)

L4: [The distinctions between Nagarjuna, Chandrakirti and Tsong Khapa's contributions] :L4

When Madhyamika is studied in the Gelugpa monastic colleges, it is Chandrakirti's Supplement that is memorized and that serves as the basis for the entire study of Madhyamika. Tsong Khapa's commentary and the individual monastic textbooks are used as aids for illuminating the meaning of Chandrakirti's text.

These books by Chandrakirti which are so often quoted are all explanations, directly or indirectly, of Nagarjuna's philosophy. Even the sutras quoted by Jam-yang-shay-ba are mostly those which Nagarjuna quoted in his Compendium of Sutra or made reference to in his Treatise or Chandrakirti quoted in his books. It is, of course, not surprising, since Nagarjuna was the founder of Madhyamika, to find that almost all of the philosophical quotes for Madhyamika derive from him either directly or through his chief commentator, Chandrakirti. WHAT IS NOTEWORTHY IS THAT CHANDRAKIRTI'S WORKS OF CLARIFICATION ARE HEAVILY RELIED UPON TO DETERMINE NAGARJUNA'S MEANING.

As Jam-yang-shay-ba says at the end of his section on Prasangika literature, the main source for the content of his presentation is Tsong Khapa. It seems that almost all of Jam-yang-shay-ba's quotes from Indian philosophical commentaries—Nagarjuna through Atisha—are cited by Tsong Khapa; JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA IS NOT GIVING A NEW PRESENTATION BUT ARRANGING TSONG KHAPA'S PRESENTATION IN A MORE CONVENIENT FORM FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY.

That most of the forty sutra quotations are also to be found in Tsong Khapa is not coincidence; JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA WAS SEEKING TO CLARIFY TSONG KHAPA'S TEACHING especially in contradistinction to Daktsang (born 1405), a scholar of the Sagya (Sa-skya) order who indicted Tsong Khapa for self-contradiction. Jam-yang-shay-ba defended the founder of his order and indicted Daktsang for self-contradiction in return. Jam-yang-shay-ba's genius and importance lies not in innovation in Madhyamika philosophy but in his defense of Tsong Khapa's interpretation and in his thorough presentation of the non-Buddhist and Buddhist philosophical systems. Jam-yang-shay-ba's work came almost three hundred years after both Tsong Khapa and Daktsang and at a time when Gelugpa influence was on the rise under the leadership of the Fifth Dalai Lama; thus, he by no means saved Tsong Khapa's teaching. It is more that his particular style of vast and thorough presentation, coupled with what at times is partisan fire, was suitable for developing the kind of sharp intellect that the monastic colleges of Tibet value.

- :: Nagarjuna was clarifying the thought of Buddha;
- :: Chandrakirti was clarifying the thought of Nagarjuna;
- :: Tsong Khapa was clarifying the thought of Chandrakirti; and
- :: Jam-yang-shay-ba was clarifying the thought of Tsong Khapa.

A measure of how important each clarification was is how often the clarifier is subsequently quoted as opposed to how often what is clarified is cited; still, though Chandrakirti is quoted most frequently and though his works finally drew more study and attention in Tibet than Nagarjuna's, Chandrakirti is definitely secondary to Nagarjuna. Nagarjuna was the master and Chandrakirti the commentator; Chandrakirti did not write a book like the Treatise

on the Middle Way which set a whole new trend in Buddhist philosophy and practice.

:: A study of Chandrakirti is viewed as a study of Nagarjuna.

Though it could also be said that a study of Nagarjuna is a study of Buddha, the sutras are far too vast and varied to lend the sense that a study of Nagarjuna is a study of Buddha in general. NAGARJUNA'S TREATISE IS AN EPITOME OF THE PERFECTION OF WISDOM SUTRAS, and without

the Treatise, as Chandrakirti says (commenting on VI.3 of his Supplement), it would be extremely difficult to understand what these sutras mean. The difference between Nagarjuna's and Chandrakirti's clarifications is that Nagarjuna's is far more basic. It sets an order where order seemed not to exist.

:: Chandrakirti shed additional light on the order revealed by Nagarjuna.

According to all the various Gelugpa interpretations, Chandrakirti showed that phenomena do not exist by way of their own character even conventionally whereas Bhavaviveka at least implies that phenomena conventionally exist by way of their own character. This means that for Chandrakirti even conventionally phenomena are not the composite of their parts or their bases of imputation. In relation to the other commentaries this was his 'innovation'.

TSONG KHAPA'S 'INNOVATION' was to present the conventional valid existence of all phenomena, detailing the acceptability of the certification of the conventional existence of all phenomena by valid cognizers. Tsong Khapa showed that Madhyamikas do have a system of their own and that it is supported by valid cognition despite the utter unfindability of phenomena among their bases of imputation. Tsong Khapa thus distinguished his teaching from most of the other Tibetan commentators, preserving in a very subtle way the validity of the classic Buddhist phenomenology through delimiting the scope of the Madhyamika reasoning.

According to Tsong Khapa, Nagarjuna's analysis refutes the inherent existence of conventionally existent phenomena; it does not refute their conventional existence which is validly established. Emptiness and dependent-arising are compatible within valid establishment.

Jam-yang-shay-ba had no such central 'innovation' for Prasangika philosophy. His commentary on Chandrakirti's Supplement provides a work in a different genre: scholastic debates which provide final conclusions about Prasangika. Despite Jam-yang-shay-ba's many differences with the other Gelugpa monastic textbook lineages, no difference was nearly as important as Tsong Khapa's astoundingly different and cogent definition of emptiness, delimiting the scope of what is negated in the theory of selflessness to inherent existence and preserving valid, conventional, effective existence.

Thus, JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA'S 'INNOVATION' was to give a presentation of Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems of tenets in far greater detail than any previous Tibetan scholar had given. He thereby furthered in Tibet and Mongolia the study of comparative philosophy. His principal sources are Bhavaviveka's presentation of the Indian systems in his Heart of the Middle Way (Madhyamakahrdaya) and commentary, the Blaze of Reasoning, Shantarakshita's Compendium on Reality (Tattvasamgraha) — though of course Bhavaviveka and Shantarakshita, being Svatantrikas, are not his source for the Prasangika system — and Chandrakirti's commentaries.

L4: [The usefulness of debates] :L4

In the Great Exposition of Tenets, the Buddhist systems are presented in ascending order of importance, but the presentations are remarkably unbiased. The cause for this is probably the TIBETAN INSISTENCE ON DEBATE AS A TEACHING METHOD. Since the aim of each debate is to

defend one's position, whatever position one is assigned is defended at all costs in the sense that unfair presumptions by any opponent are unhesitatingly refuted. Each monastic college has its favored and peculiar assertions which are indeed often defended with partisan vigor; however, this very partisan vigor is also invested in their opponents' positions within the debating courtyards of each college when their own members take the opposite viewpoint.

The philosophical disagreements are many, and it is therefore quite often impossible to speak of a Tibetan position on a subject. Often it is impossible to speak of a particular sect position because of differences within the sect. Sometimes, also, it is impossible to speak of a monastery position because of differences between the colleges which are the basic divisions of the monastery. There are even different lineages of assertions within monastic colleges; according to Geshe Gedun Lodro, Gomang, for instance, had four. However, the principal units are the monastic colleges, with far more happening between the various monastic colleges of the Gelugpa order than between Gelugpa and non-Gelugpa.

Not to discriminate differences in tenet as a pretension of non-bias is considered to be a sign of great ignorance and of dislike of religion, and indeed the devotion to debate cultivates both an excellent memory and a quick sense of discrimination, necessary for penetrating reality. Bias and partisanship are rejected, but discrimination is hallowed, though, of course, this is not easily accomplished. Jam-yang-shay-ba openly attacks the Sagyapa scholar Daktsang, often in an inflammatory way, in his Great Exposition of Tenets which was written for the dual purpose of refuting Daktsang and of establishing the 'correct' view of emptiness. Jam-yang-shay-ba cites scripture and reasoning in his unceasing indictment of Daktsang; he not only devotes forty folios solely to refuting Daktsang but also spices many sections with brief refutations and even name-calling. Daktsang is a 'spouter of disconnected discourse through possession by the madness causing one to mouth ignorance' (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 19a.5), 'one who wishes to do a dance having cut off the head of a crazy, dancing peacock and hung it on his behind' (see p.648), and so on endlessly.

The nasty comments provide occasional comic relief in this heavy book, but there is no denying that the insults are inflammatory and counter-productive. It often seems as if Jam-yang-shay-ba's head was about to be rent asunder in amazement at quite common positions. In the debating courtyards scholars sometimes resort to ridiculous laughter and absurd comparisons in order to heap upon the opponent the full devastating force of embarrassment and thereby cause him to lose footing even if he has not lost it logically. Still, each scholar must in turn take Daktsang's side in debate and win using his tenets. The aim in the debating courtyard is not to heap more abuse on Daktsang; rather, it is an enactment of a hypothetical encounter between Daktsang (born 1405) and Jam-yang-shay-ba (1648-1721/2) for the sake of exploring the principles of interpretive systems.

Most scholars in the Gomang College of Drebung College have won debates as a hypothetical Daktsang against a hypothetical Jam-yang-shay-ba. Indeed, even when teaching, they do not automatically leap into the stream of abuse but analyze to determine whether Daktsang's supposed contradictions are explicitly so or ones he would be 'forced' to accept from another viewpoint. The designations of insanity and so forth quickly lose their shock value

due to over-use and the shared knowledge that it is a game, but the technique also sometimes engages fierce aspects of the personality and lays at one's intellectual disposal energy that would otherwise be cut off. There is also, no doubt, a fascination with the tremendous importance that the utterly fabricated situation of re-enacting debates from the past assumes as a participant watches his attempts at waylaying the opponent and then revels in ridicule when the opponent is trapped or undergoes the opposite when he himself is trapped. Debate, above all, is used for group stimulated learning, the members increasing each other's knowledge through bringing special knowledge gained from their own research to the courtyard and then creatively exploring issues. The process of forcing each participant to identify with what are supposedly ridiculous positions causes one to become self-scrutinizing through seeing that other positions have their own logic, thereby challenging one's uncritical acquiescence to abusive caricature. The group dynamic (at least at the School of Dialectics in Dharmasala) is such that the participants keep a check on each other to prevent the type of over-kill that occasionally leaps into Jam-yang-shay-ba's style.

Kensur Lekden reported that Jam-yang-shay-ba's own devotion to citing sources came from embarrassment in debate when attempting to defend a Buddha's more fantastic qualities, such as the cognition of all phenomena by his hair. The requirement of accommodation to scripture balances the strong emphasis on reasoning. In even the most reasonable of books on Buddhist tenets, the fantastic is by no means obscured.

L3: [Collaborators for the translation] :L3

As mentioned at the beginning of this work, I studied almost all of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets and Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations under the guidance of Kensur Lekden (1900-71), a Gomang scholar and former abbot of the Tantric College of Lower Hla-sa while still in Tibet. Without his help— his openness, willingness, and skill in introducing and expanding on topics—the task would have been impossible. Also, the clarification of fine points gained from three months work with Professor Geshe Gedun Lodro (1924-79) at the University of Hamburg, a Gomang scholar who was a student of Kensur Lekden, was essential. They were both excellent scholars with hearts of compassion ever eager to help.

Translated in collaboration with Kensur Lekden and Geshe Gedun Lodro The text has been divided into seven chapters (+ introduction) to facilitate understanding

L2: [1. Background] :L2

:: Namas Svarasvatyai cha gurumanjughoshaya cha.493
:: Homage to both Svarasvati and Guru Manjughosha.

With respect to this Prasangika system the foremost lama, the great Tsong Khapa, says [at the end of his Essence of the Good Explanations]:494

:: One respects from the heart all the good explanations
:: Of those like adornments among the wise of the world.
:: Still, the eye of intelligence, a garden of jasmine, is opened fully

:: By the white rays of good explanations come from the moon [Chandrakirti],
 :: Overcoming all extreme conceptions through the reasoning that cyclic existence
 :: And nirvana are inevitable dependent-arising.
 :: Having seen the path revealed by Buddhapalita,
 :: Who would not take Nagarjuna's good system as chief?

Thus, THE PRASANGIKA-MADHYAMIKA SYSTEM is the very acme of the best among all systems and

schools of tenets. It is the great path of perfection travelled, being travelled, and to be" travelled by all the Conquerors of the three times [past, present, and future], the incomparable unparalleled mother that gives birth to the four types⁴⁹⁵ of Superiors, [2] and the sole, excellent path of passage. Without considering body, enjoyments, and so forth, all the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and Superiors made effort toward it, sought it, concentrated on it, and meditated on it. It is the unsurpassed ambrosia delighting others, the profound middle path clearing away all coarse and subtle extremes and extreme conceptions, the final thought of Nagarjuna which Buddhapalita established as the Prasangika system. For its chariot a great way was made by the honorable Chandrakirti.

The explanation of the Prasangika system (i.e. chapter 12 of 13) has six parts:

-- the definition [of a Prasangika] along with an etymological explanation
 -- synonyms
 -- divisions
 -- the texts on which they rely
 -- scriptural passages of definitive meaning and those requiring interpretation
 -- tenets.

L3: [Definition and etymology of 'Prasangika'] :L3

(See pp.441-530.)

The root text says:

:: Because they do not accept autonomous inferences
 :: But mainly state consequences
 :: That contradict the assertions of their opponents,
 :: They are called Prasangikas.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words [3] says,⁴⁹⁶

:: 'It is not admissible for one who is a Madhyamika to use an autonomous inference because another position [among the four extremes] is not asserted,'

'Existing under its own power' (rang dbang du grub pa),⁴⁹⁷

'existing inherently' (svabhavasiddha, rang bzhin gyis grub pa),

and 'autonomous' (svatantra, rang rgyud)

are synonyms.

Thus, the application of a reason [that is, a syllogism] the three aspects of which exist inherently is an autonomous inference (svatantraanumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag).

If such autonomous inferences are asserted, then [other phenomena such as] production would perforce [be asserted to exist inherently].⁴⁹⁸ Thus, when analyzing, there would necessarily

be a position which would be one of the four extremes [and which could withstand ultimate analysis]. In that case, a thesis which is a position of one of the four extremes⁴⁹⁹ would have to be asserted. However, the assertion of any of the four extremes is not suitable [for Madhyamikas] because they must uphold the meaning of the middle way which avoids those extremes.

Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:⁵⁰⁰

:: Even over a long period of time
:: Censure cannot be expressed
:: For one who has no position
:: Of [inherent] existence, non-existence,
:: Or existence and non-existence.

\ #####
\ 400.
\ Against one who holds no thesis that [things]
\ Exist, do not, or do and do not exit,
\ Counter-arguments cannot be raised
\ No matter how long [one tries].

Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections says:⁵⁰¹

:: If I had any [inherently existent] thesis, [4]
:: Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence].
:: Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis,
:: I am only faultless.

\ #####
\ 29.
\ If I would make any proposition whatever, then by that I would have a logical error;
\ But I do not make a proposition; therefore I am not in error.

Therefore, [a Prasangika] does not assert autonomous [inferences or any other autonomous phenomena even] conventionally. Even so, Prasangikas have a great many means of generating in opponents the view realizing that phenomena do not truly exist.

For THE DEFINITION OF A PRASANGIKA-MADHYAMIKA IS:

~ a Madhyamika who mainly states refutations of an opponent's assertion of any of the four extremes through the expression of a correct contradictory consequence—a consequence which either implies or does not imply the opposite meaning, and so forth, as will be explained below.

~ This is also an etymological explanation of Prasangika-Madhyamika' (Middle Way Consequentialist).

In this Prasangika system, the statements of consequences and other-approved syllogisms have respectively greater and lesser usage,⁵⁰² but they are not entirely mutually exclusive. For, the usage of an other-approved syllogism is mostly similar to that of a consequence. An example of an other-approved syllogism is:

:: There is no sense in the production again of a thing which [already] exists in its own entity, [5] as in the case of a manifest pot.

L3: [Synonyms of Prasangika] :L3

(See pp.432-9.)

The root text says:

:: They are known as Prasangikas,
:: Only-Appearance Madhyamikas,
:: And Non-Abiding Madhyamikas.

They mainly use contradictory consequences to generate in others the view [that no phenomenon inherently exists]; therefore they are called PRASANGIKAS (Consequentialists).

Chandrakirti's Clear Words says,503

:: 'The establishment of conventional phenomena is asserted by way of mere conditionality (idam pratyayatmatra, rkyen nyid 'dipa tsam), not by way of asserting [any of] the four positions ...'

Also,

:: 'When mere conditionality is asserted, both cause and effect are mutually dependent; hence, their establishment does not inherently exist...'

Therefore, Prasangikas are also called ONLY-APPEARANCE MADHYAMIKAS. They are Madhyamikas who assert the existence of just these appearances from the viewpoint of conditionally when there is no analysis and no investigation [to find an object designated].

Shura's [Ashvagosha's] Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment (Paramarthabodhichittabhavana) says:504

:: [Buddha], proclaimed selflessness with the great roar of
:: a lion.
:: Through synonyms such as emptiness, [suchness, final reality,] and so forth,
:: Limitless examples such as likeness with a magician's illusions, [dreams, mirages] and so forth [6]
:: And the skillful means of a variety of vehicles,
:: [Buddha] made known the meaning of the middle way not abiding [in any gross or subtle extremes].

Thus, because [Prasangikas] do not abide in even any of the extremes of permanence or annihilation, they are called NON-ABIDING MADHYAMIKAS and Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas.

L3: [Divisions of Prasangika] :L3

(See pp.431-2.)

The root text says:

:: Their divisions are Models,
:: Partisans, and Non-Partisans.

With respect to the divisions of Prasangika, earlier Tibetans rightly called THE 'FATHER' NAGARJUNA AND HIS 'SON' ARYADEVA THE MADHYAMIKAS OF THE MODEL TEXTS. This is because all—the two founders of the chariot-ways of Prasangika and Svatantrika [Buddhapalita or Chandrakirti, and Bhavaviveka] etc.—without difference treated Nagarjuna and Aryadeva as totally reliable sources.⁵⁰⁵

THE PARTISAN PRASANGIKAS are Buddhapalita, the honorable Chandrakirti, Shantideva [and so forth].

THOSE WHO ARE NON-PARTISAN BUT MAINTAIN THE PRASANGIKA VIEW are Shakyamitra, Nagabodhi, Rik-bay-ku-juk (Rigs-pa'i-khu-byug)⁵⁰⁶ and so on.

Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations says,⁵⁰⁷

~ 'Also, there are many eminent scholars, the masters Shura [Ashvaghosha], Nagabodhi, and so forth; however, [7] there are no translations of their treatises on Madhyamika [here in Tibet].'

The latter part of the second chapter of The Five Stages (Panchakrama) by Shakyamitra⁵⁰⁸ clearly manifests [the Prasangika view]. Also, upon consideration, Nagabodhi's Classification of the Ends of Actions (Karmantavibhahga) and so forth [clearly manifest the view of a non-partisan Prasangika].

Though Ashvaghosha's view is very clearly that [of a non-partisan Prasangika], Daktsang asserts that Ashvaghosha is a model [Madhyamika] and then that he explicitly refutes Svatantrika. However, Buddhapalita, Nagabodhi, and so forth are not seen to have quoted Ashvaghosha as a source [and they would have if he were a model]. Though the two, Bhavaviveka [and his chief student Jnanagarbha],⁵⁰⁹ as well as those coming after them quoted Ashvaghosha, this does not of itself make Ashvaghosha a model. Also, [Daktsang claims that] Shura's statement [in his Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment],⁵¹⁰ 'Also, illusions are not just illusions', refutes Svatantrika. If [Daktsang were right], then it is clear that Ashvaghosha would be a partisan Prasangika-Madhyamika [and not, as Daktsang claims, a model].⁵¹¹

Objection: Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations says,⁵¹² 'Also, there are many eminent scholars, the masters Shura [Ashvaghosha], Nagabodhi, and so forth; [8] however, there are no translations of their treatises on Madhyamika [here in Tibet].' Thus, if this Prasangika text [Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment] is Ashvaghosha's, then does it not contradict Tsong Khapa?

Answer: Ashvaghosha's Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment is a meditation manual; therefore, even though it does teach Madhyamika, Tsong Khapa's remark was made [with reference to treatises on the Madhyamika view and not its meditation], as in the case of the separate treatment of Nagarjuna's Collections of Praises and his Collections of Reasonings.⁵¹³

L3: [Literature on which the Prasangikas rely [Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Chandrakirti,

Shantideva, Buddhapalita, Atisha, Maitreya, Asanga, Tsong Khapa, Gyeltsap and Kaydrup ...] :L3

The root text says:

:: Their books are the profound sutras,
:: The Collections of Reasonings, the Four Hundred,
:: Engaging in the Deeds, the Compendium of Sutra, The Compendium of Learnings, the
Lamp for the Path, and so forth.

The sutras quoted by the Superior [Nagarjuna] and his spiritual son [Aryadeva] as sources
for the definitive meaning [emptiness] are taken as sutras teaching the profound meaning.

THESE ARE THE FOLLOWING SUTRAS FROM THE TURNING OF THE WHEEL OF THE
DOCTRINE OF
SIGNLESSNESS:

-- the seventeen mother and son sutras of the Perfection of Wisdom class⁵¹⁴
-- Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra (Akshayamatiridesha)
-- King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (Samadhiraja)
-- Compendium of Doctrine Sutra (Dharmasamgiti)
-- Questions of the King of Nagas, Anavatapta, Sutra (Anavataptandgarajapariprchhha)
-- Questions of the King of Nagas, Sagara, Sutra (Sagaranagarajapariprchhha)
-- Jewel Mine Sutra (Ratnakara)
-- Sport of Manjushri Sutra (Manjushrividita)
-- The first chapter of the Heap of Jewels Sutra (Ratnakuta), called Chapter Showing the
Three Vows Sutra (Trisambharanirdeshaparivarta)
-- And further from the Heap of Jewels Sutra: Kashyapa Chapter Sutra (Kashyapaparivarta
Bodhisattva Section Sutra (Bodhisattvapitaka) [9] Sutra Showing the Inconceivable Secrets of
the Tathagatas (Tathagatachintyaguhyanirdesha)
-- Etc.

The following are Sutras Teaching Both The Profound [Emptiness] And The Extensive [Deeds Of
Compassion]:

-- Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhumika)
-- Sutra Showing the Realm of the Inconceivable Qualities and Wisdom of the Tathagatas
(Tathagatagunajnanachintyavishaydvatdranirdesha)
-- Questions of Sagaramati Sutra (Sagaramatipariprchha)
-- The four sutras on the four meditative stabilizations⁵¹⁵
-- Buddhadvatamsaka Sutra (Buddhadvatamsakamamahavaipulya)
-- Questions of King Dhdran ishvara Sutra (Dhdran ishvararajapariprchhha)
-- Sutra on the Heavily Adorned (Ghanavyuha)
-- Etc.

THOUGH THE SUTRAS OF THE LAST WHEEL REQUIRE INTERPRETATION, [THE
PRASANGIKAS] RELY ON THE
SIX PERFECTIONS AND SO FORTH IN THEM. THEY ARE:

-- Great Drum Sutra (Mahadbherihdrakaparivarta)
-- Tathagata Essence Sutra (Tathagatagarbha)
-- Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Samdhinirmochana).

If one wonders on what commentarial treatises [the Prasangikas] rely, the texts considered
to be completely valid are those [Chandrakirti mentions] in his Clear Words,⁵¹⁶ 'Having seen
the Compendium of Sutra, the Precious Garland of Advice [for the King], the Praises, and...'

Thus, again and again [these works of Nagarjuna] are quoted in the Clear Words:

- Compendium of Sutra (Sutrasamuchchaya)
- Precious Garland of Advice for the King (rajaparikathdratnavali)[10]
- And among Nagarjuna's Praises of Reality directed toward the ultimate [emptiness]:
- Praise of the Element of Qualities (Dharmadhdtustotra)
Praise of the Supramundane (Lokditastava).
- Moreover, he speaks of:
- Praise of the Three Bodies (Kdyatrayastotra)
Peerless Praise (Nirupamastava)
Praise of What Surpasses Praise (Stutyatitastava)
Praise of the Inconceivable (Achintyastava)
Praise of the Mind Vajra (Chittavajrastava)
Etc.

Also, the Clear Words says,⁵¹⁷ '... with effort over a very long time the stanzas propounded in the Treatise, the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning, the Finely Woven, the Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness, and the Refutation of Objections,...' Thus, there are Nagarjuna's Five Collections of Reasonings" [that establish emptiness]:

- Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way Called 'Wisdom' (Prajnanamulamadhyamakakarika)
- Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktishashtikdkarika)
- Treatise Called 'The Finely Woven' (Vaidalyasutranama)
- Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness (Shunyatsaptatikarika) [11]
- Refutation of Objections (Vigrahavydvartanikarika).

Furthermore, the Clear Words ⁵¹⁸ says, 'And having seen the [Four] Hundred and so forth [by Aryadeva, etc.] and likewise many profound sutras ...' Thus, there are Aryadeva's texts: the Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas (Chatuhshatakashdstrakarika) as well as those included in 'and so forth', the Length of a Forearm ⁵¹⁹ (Hastavdlaprakaranakarika) and the Establishment of the Reasoning and Logic Refuting Error (Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi). Also, the several texts about the accumulations for enlightenment, etc., and the profound sutras are those quoted as sources in Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra and by this master [Chandrakirti] mentioned earlier.

Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Buddhapalitamulamadhyamakavrtti) and above [that is, the texts of the early Prasangikas such as Nagarjuna and Aryadeva] are taken as completely reliable [by Chandrakirti and later Prasangikas].

Also, the Clear Words says:⁵²⁰

~ ... as well as the commentary done by Buddhapalita, I have gathered together the good explanations of Bhavaviveka [and those of these masters] which were transmitted from one to another [and the texts of Shura, Jnanagarbha, etc.] as well as what I received from [Nagarjuna's own] analysis [of the meaning of his words] and have expounded this in order to please those of great intelligence. [12]

Thus, one must rely on the correct explanations by Bhavaviveka and so forth which were transmitted from one to another. One should not scar the teaching of the Conqueror with fabrications not in the sutras and commentaries. [For instance, Daktsang without foundation speaks] of the nine spheres of objects in the mental continuum of a Buddha Superior which are to be abandoned through meditation.⁵²¹ The precious Elder [Atisha] and the precious

Teacher [Drom-don ('Brom-ston)] said, 'It is not suitable for a follower of the Elder to be brash [and not cite scripture and reason]; be wary of the effects of actions.' Considering that statement as well as how the Teacher [Buddha] earnestly transmitted the teaching to Ananda, please press your palms together [in respect] toward all, not allowing yourself and others to be ruined.⁵²²

The Clear Words ⁵²³ also says:

:: Nagarjuna, with the honorable Rahulabhadra [Saraha], clearly taught the system of this [Treatise on the Middle Way] for a long time, [their] word being followed by [Arya]deva. His students, with decisive minds [gained] through analyzing the Treatise., defeated all the Forders and set forth the supreme Subduer's teaching for a long time. [13]

Thus, [Chandrakirti] speaks of the master, the Superior [Nagarjuna's], long period of teaching, also his students' composition of many commentaries on the master's texts, and their eradication of the Forders. Therefore, it is clear that this master [Chandrakirti] also relied on the oral transmission of their teachings, but [Chandrakirti goes on to] explain that most of those texts had already disappeared.⁵²⁴

The master Chandrakirti stated the names of Vasubandhu, Dignaga, and so forth [in commentary on his Supplement]⁵²⁵ and refuted them, but there is no one who stated Chandrakirti's name and refuted him.

THE FOUR GREAT COMMENTARIES AND SO FORTH OF THIS MASTER [CHANDRAKIRTI] WHO WAS RENOWNED AS A

TENTH GROUND BODHISATTVA [ARE:

- Clear Words, Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Mulamadhyamakavrttiprasannapada)
- Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning' (Yuktishashtikdvrtti)
- Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness' (Shunyatdsaptativrtti)
- Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas' (Bodhisattvayogacharyachatuhsatakatika) And so forth]. [14]

Also, in general, stabilizing and analytical meditation, the three vows of Bodhisattvas,⁵²⁶ the ways of meditating on the profound [emptiness], etc., as well as hearing and explaining, etc. —all beginning from reliance on a spiritual guide—are extensively set forth in the Bodhisattva Shantideva's texts:

- Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyavatara)
- Compendium of Learnings (Shikshdsamuchchayakarika).

Therefore, these two [Chandrakirti and Shantideva] are completely reliable.

One can take as reliable Atisha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhipathapradipa) and those works of Atisha included within the term 'and so forth' in the basic text, Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way (Madhyamakopadesha) and Introduction to the Two Truths (Satyadvaydvatara), as well as Prajnamoksha's Commentary on (Atisha's) 'Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way' (Madhyamakopadeshavrtti).

One should take the good parts of Atisha's⁵²⁷ Explanation of (Shantideva's) 'Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds' (Bodhisattvacharyavatahabhashya) and Commentary on the Difficult Points of 'Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment' (Bodhimargapradipapanjika).

One can rely on Maitreya's Treatise on the Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle

(Mahdyanottaratantrashastra) and Asanga's Explanation of (Maitreya's) 'Treatise on the Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle' (Mahdyanottaratantrashastravyakhya).

One should take whatever is common to Prasangika and Svatantrika in Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayalamkara) and in Aryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's discussions on the path, etc.

For an unconfused account with respect to what is uncommon [to Prasangika I, Jam-yang-shay-ba,] having taken as valid the good explanations of the three—the great being, the foremost [Tsong Khapa who is the] father and his two spiritual sons [Gyeltsap and Kaydrup], will explain the Prasangika system just according to them even though I might not cite them in quotation. For, free from error, they expounded clearly through millions of reasons.

L2: [2. Interpretation of Scripture] :L2

ABOUT DEFINITIVE SUTRAS AND THOSE REQUIRING INTERPRETATION (see pp. 422-8, 365-97) the root text says: [15]

- :: Sutras teaching the two truths
- :: Are respectively those to be interpreted,
- :: Because they must be interpreted otherwise,
- :: And the definitive, because the mode
- :: Of existence is definite there.

- :: There are two ways of interpretation:
- :: When even the literal meaning is not suitable
- :: And when the literal meaning, though established,
- :: Is not the final mode of existence.

- :: The first and last wheels require interpretation.
- :: The middle are definitive sutras.

- :: Five sutra sections of the Descent into Lanka,
- :: The Unravelling the Thought, and The Heavily Adorned,
- :: Thinking that there is no other creator
- :: And thinking of emptiness
- :: Teach mind-only [meaning] no external objects,
- :: A permanent essence, the existence of the basis-of-all,
- :: The true existence of other-powered phenomena
- :: And of thoroughly established phenomena,
- :: And three final vehicles. These five
- :: Teachings are proved to require interpretation.

There are many purposes for the master, the Superior [Nagarjuna's], composing the Treatise on the Middle Way and differentiating what requires interpretation and what is definitive. For, the Treatise was written for the sake of non-obscurity with regard to the two truths, for the sake of making known the purpose of the two truths, for the sake of eliminating

doubt in those who wonder just what requires interpretation and what is definitive, [16] and for the sake of dispelling the wrong understanding that conceives what requires interpretation to be definitive, that is, to be the way things are. Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:528

~ This Treatise on the Middle Way was composed by the master [Nagarjuna] for the sake of showing the difference between that requiring interpretation and the definitive. With respect to this, those scriptural passages speaking of production and so forth of dependent-arising were not spoken from the viewpoint of the nature of objects [as known by] the non-contaminated wisdom of those free from the dimness of ignorance. Rather, they were spoken from the viewpoint of the objects of mind of those whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the dimness of ignorance.

~ From the viewpoint of perceiving suchness, the Supramundane Victor529 said, 'O monks, this which is nirvana, having the attribute of non-deceptiveness, is the ultimate truth. All conditioned things are false, having the attribute of deceptiveness [appearing to exist in their own right when in fact they do not].' Etc.

~ Similarly, 'There is here no suchness and no non-erroneous suchness. [17] These have the attribute of deception. These also have the attribute of destructive allurements.530 These also are falsities; these are illusions, delusions of children.'

~ Similarly:

- :: Forms are like balls of foam.
- :: Feelings are like bubbles.
- :: Discriminations resemble mirages.
- :: Compositional factors are like banana tree trunks.531
- :: Consciousnesses resemble magical illusions. Thus the Sun Friend Buddha said.

~ Similarly, 'If a monk, mindful and attentive, exerting effort, analyzes phenomena day and night, he should realize peace, the auspicious abode of the extinction of conditioned things, the selflessness of phenomena.'532

~ Etc.

~ Due to not understanding the thought of [Buddha's] teaching set forth in this way, some would have doubt: 'Here, what is the teaching having the meaning of suchness? [18] What indeed is that having [some other] thought [as its basis]?' Also, due to having a weak intellect some think teachings which in fact require interpretation are definitive. In order to dispel with reasoning and scripture the doubt and wrong understanding of these two types of beings, the master [Nagarjuna] composed this Treatise.

There are differentiators of scriptures requiring interpretation and those of definitive meaning, because they are done so

-- (1) by THE FOUR RELIANCES [the third being, 'Rely on sutras of definitive meaning, not on those requiring interpretation'],

-- (2) by REASONING as in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way. 533

- :: Things are never produced
- :: At all anywhere
- :: From themselves, other,
- :: Both, or causelessly.

\ #####
 \ 1.
 \ Never are any existing things found to originate
 \ From themselves, from something else, from both, or from no cause.

etc., and

-- (3) also through many scriptural citations such as in Nagarjuna's Treatise: 534

:: [XIII. 1, XI. 1, and XV.7]
 :: The Supramundane Victor said that fraudulent
 :: Phenomena are falsities.
 :: All conditioned things have the attribute of deception, [19]
 :: Therefore, they are falsities.
 :: When asked 'Is a former limit [of cyclic existence]⁵³⁵ discerned?'
 :: The Great Subduer said, 'No.'
 :: Cyclic existence is without beginning or end.
 :: [Ultimately] it has no former and later parts [and thus does not inherently
 exist].

:: In the 'Advice to Katyayana'
 :: 'Exists', 'does not exist', and 'both'
 :: Are rejected by the Supramundane Victor, knower of
 :: [The nature of]⁵³⁶ things and non-things.

\ #####
 \ 13:1.
 \ A thing of which the basic elements are deception is vain, as the glorious one
 said.

\ All conditioned elements (samskara) are things that have basic elements (dharma)
 which are deception; therefore, they are vain. .

\ #####
 \ 1.
 \ The great ascetic [Buddha] said: "The extreme limit (koti) of the past cannot be
 discerned."

\ "Existence-in-flux" (samsara) is without bounds; indeed, there is no beginning
 nor ending of that [existence]. .

\ #####
 \ 7.
 \ In "The Instruction of Katyayana" both "it is" and "it is not" are opposed
 \ By the Glorious One, who has ascertained the meaning of "existent" and
 non-existent."

The differentiation of what requires interpretation and what is definitive is devised from
 the viewpoint of the subject matter [in the passage]. A sutra mainly teaching the ultimate
 [emptiness] is said to be definitive whereas one mainly teaching conventionalities
 [phenomena other than emptinesses] is said to require interpretation. The Teaching of
 Akshayamati Sutra says,⁵³⁷ 'What are definitive sutras? What require interpretation? Sutras
 setting forth the establishment of conventionalities [20] are called "requiring
 interpretation". Sutras setting forth the establishment of the ultimate are called
 "definitive".'

Question: How are conventionalities and the ultimate established?

Answer: There are ways of establishing them. Respectively, the setting forth of any of the varieties of actions and agents through various words and letters is the way that conventionalities are established. The setting forth of the doctrine of [emptiness which] is unapprehendable [as inherently existent], is beyond the [dual] intellect, difficult to view, and difficult to realize is the way that the ultimate is established.

The Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra says:⁵³⁸

~ Those sutras teaching [about various objects] by way of various words and letters are said to require interpretation.

~ Those teaching the profound, difficult to view, and difficult to realize are called definitive. Those teaching those objects indicated by various words [such as] self, sentient being, living being, nourisher, being, person, progeny of Manu, child of Manu, agent, and experiencer in the manner of there being, for instance, [an inherently existent] owner when there is no [inherently existent] owner are said to require interpretation. [21] Those sutras teaching the doors of liberation, the emptiness of phenomena, no [inherently existent] signs, no [inherently existent] wishes, no [inherently existent] products, no [inherently existent] production, no [inherently existent] sentient being, no [inherently existent] living being, no [inherently existent] person, and no [inherently existent] controller are called the definitive. This is called reliance on definitive sutras and non-reliance on those requiring interpretation.

The teachings of conventional phenomena in the first wheel of the teaching and in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought require interpretation. For it is necessary to search out the mode of existence [of the phenomena mentioned in these texts] apart from what was explicitly taught there. The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra, the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra, and so forth are definitive because the mode of existence of the phenomena [discussed in those texts] is definite as just the meaning of their explicit teaching.

With respect to interpreting the mode of existence [of the conventional phenomena mentioned in the first and third wheels] there are examples [such as a magician's illusions that contradict them] but the interpretation is from the viewpoint of [there being a pedagogic] need [which gave rise to the teaching]. Most passages requiring interpretation should have [both examples contradicting them and pedagogic need]. With respect to interpretation of the subject matter, reasonings such as not being able [in analysis] to find [the object designated] damage [the teaching of conventionalities if one takes merely that to be the final mode of subsistence]. [22] Also, scriptures saying in one voice that all products are false and so forth damage [such].⁵³⁹

Also, [with respect to definitive sutras] many examples such as illusions, many reasons such as, 'If [the object designated] is sought, it is not found,' and many scriptures teaching the profound non-production determine that the final mode of existence is just this [that is set forth explicitly in the text].

Here [in the Prasangika system] the way that texts requiring interpretation are to be interpreted [or literally, 'led'] does not refer to leading trainees—as by the indirect teachings [of a real self for the sake of] introducing them [to virtuous endeavor] but to interpreting the subject being discussed. In brief, there are two ways of interpretation:

one when the literal meaning of the passage is not even suitable to be what is expressed by the sutra as in, 'Father and mother are to be killed,' [which actually teaches that 'existence' and 'attachment' are to be abandoned 540 and the other when the literal meaning of the passage is suitable to be what the sutra expresses but interpretation is required to determine the mode of existence of the phenomena discussed in the text]. For instance, though the teaching that pleasures are produced from wholesome actions and sufferings from unwholesome actions is literal, it would not be suitable to assert these facts as the mode of existence of the two. One must interpret their mode of existence otherwise, as lacking self [objective existence]. Thus, there are, in brief, two modes of interpretation: of that which is not literally acceptable in order to discover the subject matter and of the literally acceptable to discover the nature of the phenomena discussed.

The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra [23] says:541

- :: One knows the features of definitive sutras
- :: In accordance with the Sugata's teaching of emptiness.
- :: All doctrines of a sentient being, a person, a being,
- :: Are to be known as requiring interpretation.

Therefore, [the Prasangikas'] differentiation of the three wheels of the teaching [as to whether they require interpretation] does not accord with the system set forth in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought.

The Extensive Sport Sutra says:542

- :: I have found a truth, profound, peaceful, lacking
- :: The elaborations [of thought], radiant, non-conditioned, the ambrosia.
- :: Though I taught it, no one would understand.
- :: I should stay without speaking in the forest.

[Hinayana passages] such as this and the Hinayana scriptures quoted in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way that explicitly teach the ultimate are sutras of the first wheel; yet, [the Prasangikas] say that these do not require interpretation. Therefore, there is no necessity that the individual three wheels [as taught by the Prasangikas] be the first, second, and third wheels as identified in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought [which states that every scripture of the first wheel requires interpretation].

Of the three wheels [identified] in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, the first wheel explains that the four truths and so forth exist by way of their own character (svalakshanasat, rang gi mtshan nyid kyis yod pa). 543 [24] The last wheel explains that imaginaries do not exist inherently and that other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena exist ultimately and inherently. [According to the Prasangika system] these two types of sutras require interpretation.

Also, the Heart of Wisdom Sutra 544 of the middle [wheel of the teaching], for instance, says, '[Avalokiteshvara] was viewing [the five aggregates] as empty of inherent existence.' Therefore, such [sutras] are definitive.

This way [that the Prasangikas divide scriptures into those requiring interpretation and the definitive] does not accord with the Sutra Unravelling the Thought [which states that the first and second wheels require interpretation and that the third wheel is definitive. However, the Prasangikas' disagreement with this sutra] does not mean that it contradicts the thought [of Buddha], for such [a system as is set forth in that sutra] is suitable for

certain types of trainees, and [no matter how much it differs from the final system] it does not contradict Buddha's thought. For example, Hearers are never permitted to kill, but certain Mahayanists are, according to the purpose. Though these two are systems of one speaker, they are not contradictory [in that the difference is explained through taking into account the level of the listener].

[All non-literal passages requiring interpretation such as, 'Father and mother should be killed,' or, 'A mind-basis-of-all exists,' must have another basis in Buddha's thought, a purpose, and refutations of their explicit meaning.]

Question: With respect to passages that are to be interpreted [and are non-literal], what are here [in the Prasangika system] the basis in Buddha's thought, the purpose, and the refutation of the explicit meaning?

Answer: [In general, there are numerous types of passages requiring interpretation. However, Chandrakirti cites the Descent into Lanka Sutra as proof that four types of teachings require interpretation.]

Some persons [cite Chandrakirti's Supplement]: 545

:: These passages [in the Descent into Lanka Sutra and so forth] show that other such sutras require interpretation.[25]

\ #####
\ 137.
\ In the [Lankavatara] Sutra that says
\ 'External objects do not exist, mind appears as various things',
\ Forms are denied for those with strong attachment to forms;
\ But that is also of interpretative meaning.

\ #####
\ 138.
\ The Blessed One says that it is of interpretative meaning;
\ And it is also established by reasoning to be of interpretative meaning.

These [interpreters wrongly] say that from among the Chittamatra teachings just four passages require interpretation [whereas they should say four types do]:

- the Sutra Unravelling the Thought where it teaches the three natures of Chittamatra [the sixth and seventh chapters]
- the two chapters of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought teaching a basis-of-all (dlaya, kun gzhi)⁵⁴⁶
- [the eighth chapter of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought called] 'Questions of Maitreya' where it teaches that there are no objects external [to a perceiving consciousness]
- [the seventh chapter of] the Sutra Unravelling the Thought where it teaches three final vehicles.

The third and fourth are indicated by the term 'and so forth' in Chandrakirti's own commentary to his Supplement.

[It is correct that these are four types of passages which Chandrakirti says require interpretation. However,] it is incorrect [that there are only four passages from Chittamatra teachings referred to here and requiring interpretation]. For Tsong Khapa's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement' says,⁵⁴⁷ 'This

[Prasangika] system considers all of the aforementioned four categories to require interpretation.' This statement explains that by way of topical abridgement and unification under subjects there are mainly four.

There are the three explicitly mentioned in Chandrakirti's own commentary on his Supplement and the teaching of three final vehicles discussed in Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra. However, if passages requiring interpretation are differentiated by way of various modes of expression and inner divisions, there are a great many. For example, there are the ways that three final vehicles are taught, such as in the Sutra on the Myrabolan Fruit (Myrabola) [which says that, if a person removed one by one myrabolan fruits from a pile as large as Mount Sumeru, he would finish quickly whereas, if he attempted to name individually all the types or lineages (gotra, rigs) of sentient beings, he would never finish].548

The Sutra Unravelling the Thought says:549

~ Thinking that [the purification and the path of purification of the three vehicles are the same in the sense that all three deliver beings from cyclic existence and are the same in the sense that the path is the meditation of selflessness] I teach one vehicle. However, it is not that there are no varieties of sentient beings—[26] the naturally dull, middling, and sharp—among the types of sentient beings.

Also, [there is the teaching that there are three final vehicles because three] truly existing lineages are apprehended individually.550 Furthermore, [there is the teaching that] Foe Destroyers are not reborn through transmigration as found, for instance, in the [Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza] Perfection of Wisdom Sutra [which is taken by the Chittamatrins who follow Asanga as indicating that some sentient beings never reach Buddhahood]:551

~ Those [Hearers] who have entered a state destined for the rightness [of nirvana] do not have the power to generate the aspiration to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment. Why? Because they have severed the continuum of cyclic existence [through not being born by the power of either afflictions or compassion].

Also, the Sutra Unravelling the Thought says:552

~ Though all the Buddhas exert themselves, those who have the lineage of a Hearer, proceeding solely to peacefulness, do not have the power to generate an intention toward the highest, complete, perfect enlightenment upon being set in the best of enlightenments.

Also, there is, for example, the explanation in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought] 553 that through fear [of the suffering of cyclic existence Foe Destroyers have forsaken helping others, and thus] their Buddha lineage has been severed. There are many passages and many ways of indicating that no matter how much Foe Destroyers meditate, [27] they cannot generate compassion and the unusual attitude [of taking upon oneself the burden of helping all sentient beings].

The individual scriptures showing that each of these [ways of teaching three final vehicles] requires interpretation were quoted in Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra and were just not quoted here [in Chandrakirti's commentary to his Supplement]. Thus, [it is wrong to say that Chandrakirti is referring to just four passages requiring interpretation]. Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes the explanations that all the Buddhas of the three times and all the present Buddhas of the ten directions teach one vehicle:554

~ It is extremely difficult to find sentient beings who have faith in one vehicle [due to the difficulties of the required accumulations of merit and wisdom in the Mahayana]. However, [all vehicles] are exhausted in one because such was taught in many sutras. The White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine Sutra says, 'Also, based on one vehicle, I teach doctrine to sentient beings in this way. Buddha's vehicles arrive at their conclusion in omniscience. There is no ascription of two or three vehicles. This is the nature [of the teaching] even in all the transient worlds of the ten directions.

~ 'Why? All those Tathagatas who appeared in the past in all the transient worlds of the ten directions [28] taught doctrine to sentient beings based on one vehicle. This is the vehicle to Buddhahood. Also, all those Tathagatas who will appear in the future will teach doctrine to sentient beings based on one vehicle. Also, all those Tathagatas who are presently appearing in all the transient worlds of the ten directions are teaching doctrine to sentient beings based on one vehicle.

~ 'Through that format this is to be understood: If there is even no ascribing of two vehicles in any of the transient worlds of the ten directions, what need is there to mention three?'

In this sutra⁵⁵⁵ [Hearers such as] Shariputra [29] are prophesied to attain the unsurpassed enlightenment; [this implies that there is only one final vehicle since even Hearers finally attain the highest enlightenment].

Also, Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes⁵⁵⁶ the explanation that, if different vehicles had been taught, Buddha would have had different discriminations [in the sense of desire for some students and hatred for others]. He would have had the fault of miserliness [because he would have withheld the best teaching from some. Thus, it is shown that all the vehicles] only flow into the Mahayana.

The Compendium of Sutra says:

~ The Chapter of the True One Sutra says, 'Manjushri, because [trainees] emerge [from all obstructions] through one vehicle, the field of Buddha has the essence of the Mahayana. I do not ascribe vehicles of Hearers and Solitary Realizers. Why? Because the Tathagata does not have various discriminations. Manjushri, if the Tathagata taught the Mahayana to some, the vehicle of the Solitary Realizers to some, and the vehicle of the Hearers to some, the Tathagata's mind would be very impure, would have the fault of attraction and also little compassion, and would be secretive with regard to the doctrine.

~ 'Manjushri, all the doctrines that I teach to sentient beings are for the sake of attaining omniscient wisdom. Flowing to enlightenment [30] and descending into the . Mahayana, they are the means of achieving omniscience; they lead completely to one place [omniscience]. Therefore, I have no establishment of vehicles.

~ 'Manjushri, an establishment of vehicles is done to set persons in Tathagatahood. It is done to set them in a small collection [of merit and wisdom] and in a limitless collection. However, because the element of qualities (dharmadhātu) ⁵³⁷ [emptiness] is not diverse, they do not have different vehicles. These teachings of conventionalities are uttered only as means of entering [the path to omniscience]. Ultimately there is one vehicle, not two.'

Also, [Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes] a Perfection of Wisdom Sutra [translated here in accordance with the Prasangika interpretation]:⁵⁵⁸

~ Those devaputras who have not generated the aspiration to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment [31] will generate that aspiration. Those [Hearers] who have entered a state destined for the tightness [of nirvana] do not have the power [that is, are far from having the power] to generate the aspiration to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment. Why? Because they have [temporarily] severed the continuum of cyclic existence [their Buddha lineage]. When they generate the aspiration to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment, even I will be pleased, and I will not upset their roots of virtue. They will take great cognizance of the doctrine that far exceeds even the superior.

This passage shows that if Foe Destroyers generate the attitude [of aspiration to enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings, Buddha] will be pleased and will not upset [their roots of virtue, that is, will not propound to them a teaching of five lineages or three vehicles].⁵⁵⁹ They will become cognizant of the very superior doctrine [that is, will generate the aspiration to enlightenment relying on extraordinary births].

Thus, it is explicitly taught that even Foe Destroyers generate the aspiration to perfect enlightenment for the sake of all beings. Therefore, the three scriptures [the Sutra on the Myrabolan Fruit, the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, and the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra mentioned above] are said to require interpretation.

Also, [Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes] the Questions of King Dharamshvara Sutra :560

~ The Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors, [32] do not appear for the sake of a variety of discourses [diverse vehicles]. They appear in order to cause sentient beings to be fully enlightened and realize the element of qualities, which is of one taste, without obstruction, the boon of all sentient beings. Thus, they turn the irreversible wheel [of doctrine causing continual progression toward Buddhahood].

~ O child of good lineage, a jeweler, for instance, takes an unpolished jewel from a jewel-mine. He washes it with a strong solution of soda and wipes it with a black haircloth. However, he does not cease his efforts with just this; he washes it with a strong solution of quicksilver and rubs it with wood and wool. However, he does not cease his efforts with just this; he washes it with the juice of a great herb and wipes it with a fine cloth. Having polished it, the jewel is free of the types of fetters and is called vaidurya (cat's-eye gem).

~ Just so, a Tathagata ascertains the impure [Buddha] nature of all sentient beings. [33] He causes sentient beings who greatly enjoy cyclic existence to be disquieted through disquieting discourse on impermanence, suffering, selflessness, and unpleasantness. He introduces them to the disciplinary practice of Superiors.

~ A Tathagata does not cease his efforts with just this; he causes them to understand the Tathagata's own mode of discourse through discourse on emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness. However, a Tathagata does not cease his efforts with just this; he leads those sentient beings to the Tathagata's land through discourse on the irreversible wheel [cultivation of the union of method and wisdom]⁵⁶¹ and discourse on the complete purification of the three spheres [of agent, action, and object].

Those sentient beings of various lineages and natures —having become equal—realize the nature of Tathagatahood, whereby they are called the highest [field of merit] worthy of giving. [34]

This passage explains through the example of the three stages of cleansing a gem that [a

Buddha] cleans away the stains of even Foe Destroyers' obstructions and establishes them in Buddhahood. Therefore, the teachings that Foe Destroyers do not have the capacity for Buddhahood are explained as requiring interpretation.

Also, [Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes] the Irreversible Wheel Sutra (Avaivartachakra):⁵⁶²

~ The youthful Manjushrf asked, 'What is the teaching of doctrine by the Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors, like?' Buddha said, 'The teaching of doctrine by the Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors, is like an irreversible wheel of doctrine.' Manjushrf asked, 'Supramundane Victor, how is it that the Supramundane Victor, based on three vehicles, teaches doctrine?'

~ Buddha said, 'Son of good lineage, those sentient beings [to whom I teach three vehicles] admire low [vehicles]; they do not understand the one vehicle. The skillful in means lead them thus. Son of good lineage, the Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors, possess great skill in means. [35] The Supramundane Victor has appeared at the time of the five ruinations;⁵⁶³ these are non-admirers of the one vehicle.'

This explains that the teaching of three vehicles is for the sake of leading those who do not understand the one vehicle.

Also, [Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra] quotes the Lion's Roar of Shrimaladevi Sutra :⁵⁶⁴

~ The so-called utter passing away (parinirvana, yongs su my a ngan las 'das pa) is a skillful means of the Tathagatas. All three vehicles are aspects of the one vehicle; he who understands the one vehicle understands the unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment.

The foregoing sutras were quoted together [in one section of Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra]. Also, here in the Lion's Roar of Shrimaladevi Sutra,⁵⁶⁵ as before, the non-birth of Foe Destroyers is shown to require interpretation. [The Compendium of Sutra quotes the Descent into Lanka Sutra :⁵⁶⁶

~ Their faults due to predispositions and their madness due to meditative stabilization having ceased, Hearers and Solitary Realizers [36] rise again from the uncontaminated realm. Through fulfilling the collections included within the worldly realm (the collection of merit) and the non-worldly uncontaminated realm (the superior collection of the wisdom of emptiness), they attain the capacity for the extraordinary body of wisdom and emptiness.]

The Descent into Lanka Sutra says:⁵⁶⁷

~ Even Hearers who have attained an abiding in the bliss of meditative stabilization will attain the body of bodies of the Conqueror.

And:

:: Having attained the body
:: Of meditative stabilization,
:: They do not rise for eons.
:: Just as drunken persons
:: Forsake beer and become sober,
:: So even they will attain
:: My body of wisdom and emptiness. [37]

Though there are many scriptural passages teaching the rebirth of Foe Destroyers and their attainment of the Mahayana path through the Buddhas' prodding, these were counted as one in Chandrakirti's Supplement: the teaching of one final vehicle.

Not only that, but also the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra shows that [the teaching of] a true existence of individual lineages requires interpretation. It says:⁵⁶⁸

:: The essence of the Tathagata exists in all migrators,
:: And thus there are no unfortunate sentient beings.

Also, there are the explanations in the Tathagata Essence Sutra and in Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle that the Buddha lineage exists in all sentient beings. Even these teachings are just included in [the one topic of] the teaching of one vehicle.

Thus, Chandrakirti's Supplement says:⁵⁶⁹

:: These passages [in the Descent into Lanka Sutra and so forth] show that other such sutras require interpretation.

\ #####
\ 137.
\ In the [Lankavatara] Sutra that says
\ 'External objects do not exist, mind appears as various things',
\ Forms are denied for those with strong attachment to forms;
\ But that is also of interpretative meaning.

\ #####
\ 138.
\ The Blessed One says that it is of interpretative meaning;
\ And it is also established by reasoning to be of interpretative meaning.

His own commentary on this [38] says:⁵⁷⁰

~ What are the 'other such passages [that require interpretation]? The teaching of] the non-existence of imaginaries and the [inherent] existence of other-powered phenomena that occurs in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought when explaining the three natures: imaginaries, other-powered phenomena, and thoroughly established phenomena.

~ Similarly, [the Sutra Unravelling the Thought teaches]:⁵⁷¹

:: There is a deep and subtle consciousness, the taker [of rebirth],
:: Having all the seeds and flowing like the continuum of a river.
:: If it were understood as a self, it would not be proper,
:: Thus I do not teach it to children.

~ And so forth. [The Descent into Lanka Sutra] says:⁵⁷²

:: Just as a doctor distributes
:: Medicines to the ill,
:: So Buddha teaches
:: Mind-only to sentient beings.

~ This passage [and others from the Descent into Lanka] show that these [types of passages] require interpretation.

Thus, it is said that just as a doctor distributes individual medicines in accordance with illnesses, so Buddha [39] teaches trainees mind-only and so forth.

Also, all passages taught merely in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings require interpretation. Since it is mistaken to take these teachings literally, like apprehending water in a mirage, it is said that one should not be enamoured of the words but seek the definitive meaning [emptiness].

The Descent into Lanka says:⁵⁷³

~ Sutras teaching in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings have meaning that is mistaken; they are not discourse on suchness. Just as a deer is deceived by a waterless mirage into apprehending water, so doctrine which is taught [in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings] also pleases children but is not discourse causing the wisdom of Superiors. Therefore, you should follow the meaning and not be enamoured of the expression.

This indeed describes all [non-literal passages requiring] interpretation. However, if they are described individually, on this occasion five types of sutras are mentioned:

- mind-only and no external objects
- the teaching in the Tathagata Essence Sutra of a permanent, stable essence in the continuums of all sentient beings which has the [major and minor] marks of a Buddha [40]
- the description of a basis-of-all
- the description of the true existence of other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena
- the teaching of three final vehicles.

[The first, third, fourth, and fifth are accepted by the Chittamatrins Following Scripture as definitive or literal; they assert the second, the teaching of a permanent Tathagata essence, to be non-literal and actually to be referring to the impermanent mind-basis-of-all.]

In the Descent into Lanka Sutra the teaching of mind-only is explained through the example of [the distribution of medicine to] the sick. This shows that the teaching of mind-only in the 'Questions of Maitreya' chapter of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought requires interpretation.

[Still, according to Prasangika 'mind-only' is not always a non-literal teaching requiring interpretation, since it is often taught for the sake of emphasizing that the principal creator of pleasure, pain, activities, and so on is the mind and not a deity or anything else. Thus, when the teaching of mind-only does not reject external objects, it is a valid literal teaching even for Prasangika. It requires interpretation only to determine the final mode of existence of the phenomena discussed.] The statement in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds, ⁵⁷⁴ 'These three realms are mind-only,' is said by Bhavaviveka to mean that the creator propounded by the Folders does not exist and that only the mind is the principal creator.

Chandrakirti's Supplement [similarly] explains [the meaning of 'mind-only' based] on the Sutra on the Ten Grounds itself:⁵⁷⁵

- :: The Bodhisattva of the Manifest [sixth ground],
- :: Who is nearing [the element of qualities]
- :: And understands that the three realms are only mind
- :: Realizes that the creator [of the world] is only mind,

:: Thus he knows there is no permanent self as the creator.

\ #####

\ [VI.84]

\ It says that a Bodhisattva on Approaching (6)

\ Realizes the three realms to be only consciousness

\ To realize the refutation of a permanent self as creator.

\ In fact, he realizes that only mind is creator.

Not only that, but also the Descent into Lanka Sutra says:⁵⁷⁶ [41]

:: I explain as mind-only

:: [What is said to be] the creator

:: Person, continuum, aggregates, causes,

:: Particles, principal, and Ishvara.

Thus, there are those who, though they are Buddhists, advocate as the creator a substantially existent person or a continuum or aggregates which are asserted to be the person. Also, some Buddhists advocate substantially existent causes as the creator.

The Vaisesikas advocate particles as the creator of the world; the Samkhyas, the principal; and the Aishvaras, Ishvara. Refuting them, Buddha said that only the mind is the creator.

[Some say that this passage from the Sutra on the Ten Grounds refutes forms which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness and that this is done through understanding that the three realms are only the truly existent mind. However, it would be inadmissible for Buddha to say in the same sutra that the mind exists inherently and that the mind is produced from causes. For inherent existence and dependent-arising are mutually exclusive.]⁵⁷⁷ If [this passage from the Sutra on the Ten Grounds means that] there are no forms separate from a [truly existent] mind, [why did Buddha in the same sutra] say,⁵⁷⁸ 'The mind [is produced] by the cause of actions'? Also, he would not have spoken [of the production] of name and form [by consciousness if there were no form]. Thus, because [the Sutra on the Ten Grounds] explains that the mind creates the varieties of the world, one should understand [that here the word 'only' of mind-only] refutes a creator which is not mainly the mind [and thus in this context does not refute external objects].

Question: The Descent into Lanka Sutra says:⁵⁷⁹

:: [Objects] do not exist as external objects as perceived. [42]

:: The mind appears as various [objects through the power of predispositions].

:: [Because the mind is generated] in the likeness of bodies [senses], enjoyments [objects of senses], and abodes [physical sense organs and environments],

:: I have explained [that all phenomena are] mind-only.

Is this to be explained [as referring to the mind as the main creator and not refuting external objects]?

Answer: No. Here a doctrine of mind-only which refers to the non-existence of external objects is presented, and it is said that what is perceived as bodies, enjoyments, and abodes is the entity of the mind [perceiving them]. The teaching of such in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought and so forth is for the sake of overcoming trainees' attachment to forms and so forth. With respect to the basis of Buddha's thought [when he taught this non-literal teaching of mind-only meaning no external objects], it is clear that he was

thinking that all phenomena are posited through their mental images as [is taught in] Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning. 580 In this context he set forth mind-only.

The refutation of this type of mind-only by both Bhavaviveka and this master [Chandrakirti] is the thought of the Superior [Nagarjuna] himself.

Nagarjuna's Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment says:581

:: The Subduer's teaching
:: That all these are mind-only
:: Was so that children would forsake [43]
:: Their fears. It is not suchness.

Also, Nagarjuna's Precious Garland says:582

:: Just as a grammarian [first] has [his students] read a model of the alphabet, so Buddha taught his trainees the doctrines they were able to bear.
:: To some he taught doctrines in order to turn them away from sins.
:: This was so that some [beings of small capacity] would achieve [the fruits of] merit [in rebirths as gods and humans].
:: He taught some [beings of middling capacity] doctrines based on the dualism [of object and subject as different entities].
:: To some he taught doctrines not based on dualism [that object and subject are empty of being separate entities and that consciousness ultimately exists].
:: He taught some [beings of heightened faculties] doctrines profound and frightening to the fearful, having an essence of emptiness and compassion, the means of achieving [highest] enlightenment. [44]

\ #####
\ 394. Just as a grammarian [first] has students
\ Read a model of the alphabet,
\ So Buddha taught trainees
\ The doctrines that they could bear.

\ #####
\ 395. To some he taught doctrines
\ To turn them away from ill-deeds;
\ To some, for the sake of achieving merit;
\ To some, doctrines based on duality;

\ #####
\ 396. To some, doctrines based on non-duality;
\ To some what is profound and frightening to the fearful—
\ Having an essence of emptiness and compassion—
\ The means of achieving [unsurpassed]86 enlightenment. a

Therefore, Chandrakirti's Supplement says:583

:: These sutras teaching no external objects of perception, Teaching that the mind appears as the varieties of objects, Turn away from forms those extremely attracted to forms. These also just require interpretation.

\ #####
\ 137.

\ In the [Lankavatara] Sutra that says
 \ 'External objects do not exist, mind appears as various things',
 \ Forms are denied for those with strong attachment to forms;
 \ But that is also of interpretative meaning.

\ ####
 \ 138.
 \ The Blessed One says that it is of interpretative meaning;
 \ And it is also established by reasoning to be of interpretative meaning.

[A teaching that requires interpretation according to both Chittamattra and Prasangika is that of a permanent, fully developed Tathagata essence.]

Similarly, the Descent into Lanka Sutra says:584

~ Mahamati said, 'The Tathagata essence taught in the Supramundane Victor's sutras is said by the Supramundane Victor to be naturally radiant [lacking the elaborations of thought], pure [free of adventitious contaminations], and thus from the beginning just pure. The Tathagata essence is said to possess the thirty-two characteristics [of a fully developed Buddha] and to exist in the bodies of all sentient beings.

~ 'The Supramundane Victor says that like a precious gem wrapped in a dirty cloth, the Tathagata essence is wrapped in the cloth of the aggregates, constituents, and sources, overwhelmed by the force of desire, hatred, and ignorance, [45] dirtied with the defilements of thought, and is permanent, stable, and everlasting.

~ 'If so, Supramundane Victor, how is this propounding of a Tathagata essence not like the Forders' propounding of a self? Supramundane Victor, the Forders teach and propound a self which is permanent, a non-agent, without the qualities [of form and pleasure, etc.], pervasive, and non-perishing.'

~ The Supramundane Victor said, 'Mahamati, this teaching of a Tathagata essence is not like the Forders' propounding of a self. O Mahamati, the completely perfect Buddhas, Tathagata Foe Destroyers, teach a Tathagata essence meaning emptiness, the final reality, nirvana, no [inherently existent] production, signlessness, wishlessness, and so forth. [46] So that children might avoid the fear of selflessness, they teach through the means of a Tathagata essence the state of no thought, the object [of the wisdom] free from appearances.

~ 'Mahamati, future and present Bodhisattvas— the great beings—should not adhere to this as a self. Mahamati, for example, a potter makes a variety of vessels out of one mass of clay particles with his hands, manual skill, a rod, water, thread, and mental dexterity. Mahamati, the Tathagatas teach the selflessness of phenomena which overcomes all imagined signs. Through [their techniques] having wisdom and skill in means— whether they teach it as the Tathagata essence or as selflessness—they, like a potter, teach with various formats of words and letters.' [47]

Thus, there is the teaching in the Tathagata Essence Sutra of a permanent body adorned with the major and minor marks of a Buddha, possessing the powers and so forth, and existing in the continuums of all sentient beings. This is explained, as before [in the case of the teaching of mind-only that means no external objects] to require interpretation from the viewpoint of another basis in [Buddha's] thought, his purpose, and the fact that there are refutations of the explicit teaching. Both this [teaching of a permanent Buddha Body in all sentient beings] and the teaching of the existence of a basis-of-all have emptiness as the

basis in his thought. The refutation of the explicit teaching is that if it were taken literally, such a teaching would be like that of the Forders [who absurdly ascribe change to the permanent]. Thus, the teaching of a permanent Buddha Body in all sentient beings is proved by reasoning to require interpretation.

Chandrakirti's Supplement says:585

:: The teachings that a basis-of-all exists, that the person [inherently] exists,
:: And that only the aggregates [inherently] exist
:: Should be taken as teachings for those who would not understand
:: The very profound meaning [of emptiness].

\ #####
\ 'Basis-of-all exists', 'Person exists',
\ 'These aggregates alone exist' -
\ These teachings are for those
\ Who cannot understand this very profound meaning.

[For the Prasangikas, the teaching of an impermanent mind-basis-of-all actually is based on a permanent Tathagata essence— the emptiness of the mind.]

The Sutra on the Heavily Adorned says:586

:: [Just as] lands [are the basis of] the varieties [of all things grown],
:: So the basis-of-all [is the basis for cyclic existence and nirvana].
:: The virtuous Tathagata essence is also this [basis-of-all], [48]
:: Tathagatas teach the essence with the term 'basis-of-all'.
:: Though the essence is proclaimed as the basis-of-all,
:: Those of weak intellect do not understand.

Thus, a natural lineage which is the emptiness of true existence of the mind in each sentient being—the Sugata essence or Buddha lineage—is called a basis-of-all. For it abides as the nature of all the phenomena [which make full enlightenment possible, these terms all referring to the emptiness of the mind].

[The natural lineage or Buddha lineage—the emptiness of inherent existence of the mind—is called alayavijnana which here means 'basis-of-all which is to be known well'.] Vijnana is so called because of being that which knows [that is, the knower] or because of being this which is to be known well or in detail [that is, the known]. Taking [the term vijnana of alayavijnana] according to the latter etymology [as 'that which is to be minded or known in detail'], the Tathagata essence is proclaimed as vijnana, that which is to be known in detail. Chandrakirti's Commentary on the 'Supplement' says,587

~ 'It should be known that because it abides as the nature of all the phenomena [which make full enlightenment possible], only emptiness is indicated by the term "mind-basis-of-all" (alayavijnana, kun gzhi rnam shes).'

[The three natures as taught by Chittamatra also require interpretation.]

Chandrakirti's Supplement says:588

:: Thus, one has understood the arrangement of scriptures [of definitive meaning and requiring interpretation].
:: Any sutra setting forth non-suchness, [49]

:: teaching that which requires interpretation, is to be interpreted.
:: Through realizing [this, these provisional teachings become a cause of entering into the realization that phenomena do not exist inherently].
:: Also, know that [any sutra] which bears the meaning of emptiness is definitive.

\ #####
\ 140.
\ Thus, having understood this explanation of the scriptures,
\ You should realize that any Sutra whose meaning does not explain thatness
\ Is taught as interpretative; and you should interpret it.
\ You should know that those whose meaning is emptiness are of definitive meaning.

Through such passages it is explained that the Sutra Unravelling the Thought requires interpretation where it shows the differentiation of the [true] existence and non [-true] existence of the first two of the three natures of the Chittamatra system [other-powered phenomena and imaginaries. The explanation in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought that impermanent phenomena truly exist needs to be interpreted as having as its basis in Buddha's thought their conventional existence.] For the Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra and so forth explain that the teachings of truly existent phenomena require interpretation.

Also, [another reason why the explanation that other-powered and thoroughly established phenomena truly exist requires interpretation is that Prasangikas] distinguish the existence and non-existence of the three natures [in another way]. According to the 'Questions of Maitreya' [chapter] of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra, all phenomena from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses do not ultimately exist but exist only in the terminology and conventions of the world. There it is said in answer to a question about the way that forms and so forth exist,⁵⁸⁹ 'They exist according to the terminology and conventions of the world but not ultimately.' Thus, it is said that all phenomena from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses [only nominally exist].

Therefore, Chandrakirti's commentary on his Supplement says:⁵⁹⁰

~ I will say a little bit [about our own system's presentation of the three natures].
For instance, a snake is [only] imagined in a coiled rope which is a dependent-arising, [50]
for there is no snake in the rope. However, a snake is thoroughly established in an actual
snake because it is not imagined. Similarly, that the final nature of things is in
other-powered phenomena which are products is imagined [because] the final nature is not a
product, for [Nagarjuna] said:⁵⁹¹

:: The nature is not fabricated
:: And is not dependent on another.

\ #####
\ 15:2.
\ How, indeed, will a self-existent thing become "something which is produced"?
\ Certainly, a self-existent thing [by definition] is "not-produced" and is
independent of anything else.

~ This final nature that is imagined in presently apprehended products which are
dependent-arising and like reflections [in that the way they appear and the way they exist
do not agree] is the actual final nature as the object of a Buddha. For [as the object of a
Buddha's cognition] it is not imagined. Not contacting [or being obstructed by] things that

are products, [his wisdom knowing the mode of existence] actualizes only the final nature. Thus, since he understands suchness, he is called 'Buddha'.

~ One has thus understood the presentation of the three natures: imaginaries, other-powered phenomena, and the thoroughly established. [51] [In this way] the thought of the Sutra [Unravelling the Thought] is to be explained [as requiring interpretation and the thought of the 'Questions of Maitreya' (see p.620) on the three natures is to be understood].

~ [The Chittamatrins treat the imputation of a difference of entity of] the two, apprehending subjects and apprehended objects [imputed in dependence on other-powered phenomena] as an imaginary. This should be considered [or analyzed], because apprehending subjects and apprehended objects [are other-powered phenomena and] other-powered phenomena [which are not subjects or objects] do not exist as things.

Let us illumine a little the meaning of his words. The way of [wrong] imagination is that whereas the final mode of existence does not exist as perceived in an other-powered phenomenon, it is perceived there through superimposition. For, the perception [that other-powered phenomena exist in their own right] despite their not actually so existing is an imaginary superimposition, like the superimposition by a consciousness apprehending a rope as a snake despite the snake's not existing in the rope. For, other-powered phenomena do not fulfill the sense of a non-fabricated nature, etc.

Other-powered phenomena presently being seen or apprehended are like mirror reflections in that there is no agreement between the way they appear and the way they are. Their nature or mode of being is an actual thoroughly established phenomenon [an emptiness] according to the sight of a Buddha [52] because he perceives without superimposing [true] existence when there is no [true] existence. It is like a snake's not being superimposed on an actual snake, and thus the object apprehended is thoroughly established. This sets out the definition and etymology of 'thoroughly established' (parinishpanna, yongs grub) and also explains that other-powered phenomena are the bases of the superimposition of imaginaries as well as the bases of emptinesses—thoroughly established phenomena.

Question: [It has been shown that the 'Questions of Maitreya' chapter of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra teaches that all phenomena do not exist ultimately but exist only nominally; however, the same chapter seems to show just the opposite.] The 'Questions of Maitreya' says,⁵⁹² 'Maitreya, these imagined forms [the ultimate existence imagined of forms] should be viewed as not existing substantially. These imputed forms [forms themselves] should be viewed as existing substantially because thought substantially exists and not because [the forms] exist under their own power.' [Here it says that thought 'substantially exists'; 'substantially existent' (aravyasat, rdzas yod) means 'ultimately existent' (Paramarthasat, don dam par yod pa) in the Prasangika system, and since the Prasangikas say nothing ultimately exists] how is [one to understand this quote]?

Answer: Here 'substantially existent' means just 'existent' (sat, yod pa) because one can understand from the context that [substantially existent] here does not refer to anything other than [just 'existent']. It does not refer to the 'substantiality' meaning 'inherently existent' or 'truly existent'. The Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra says:⁵⁹³ [53]

~ 'In dependence on the name, discrimination, and convention of the term "form" to these and those things which have the character of compositional phenomena, an intrinsic

existence of forms is imagined. These are imagined forms.

~ 'Maitreya, in dependence on the name, discrimination, designation, and convention of the terms "feelings", "discriminations", "compositional factors", "consciousnesses",—through to—"qualities of a Buddha" to these and those things which have the character of compositional phenomena, there is imagined an intrinsic existence of feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, consciousnesses—through to—the intrinsic existence of the qualities of a Buddha. These are imagined feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, consciousnesses—through to—imagined qualities of a Buddha. [54]

~ '[Then with respect to other-powered phenomena] there are the nominal, discriminated, imputed, and conventional "forms", "feelings", "discriminations", "compositional factors", "consciousnesses"—through to—"qualities of a Buddha" that are designated to these and those things which have the character of compositional phenomena, in dependence on thought abiding in just the nature of thought. These are imputed forms, imputed feelings, imputed discriminations, imputed compositional factors, imputed consciousnesses—through to imputed qualities of a Buddha.

~ 'Whether the Tathagatas appear or not, reality and the sphere of the actual status of phenomena just abide. Reality's forms are imputed forms' permanent, permanent, stable, stable non-intrinsic existence and non-self of phenomena as imagined forms—suchness, final reality. [55] These are reality's feelings, discriminations, consciousnesses—through to—reality's qualities of a Buddha.' Thus Buddha said.

~ The Bodhisattva Maitreya asked, 'From among these three types of forms [imagined forms, imputed forms, and reality's forms], which forms are to be viewed as not substantially existing? Which as substantially existing?

~ Which as neither not substantially existing nor substantially existing but as distinguished by being ultimate objects? From among the three types of feelings, the three types of compositional factors, the three types of consciousnesses—through to—the three types of qualities of a Buddha, which are to be viewed as not substantially existing? Which as substantially existing? [56] Which as neither not substantially existing nor substantially existing but distinguished by being ultimate objects?' Thus [Maitreya] asked.

~ The Supramundane Victor said to the Bodhisattva Maitreya, 'O Maitreya, these imagined forms [the ultimate existence imagined in forms] should be viewed as not substantially existing [because of not existing at all]. These imputed forms [forms themselves] should be viewed as substantially existing [that is, conventionally existing] because thought substantially exists and not because forms exist under their own power. Reality's forms [emptinesses] should be viewed as neither not substantially existing [because of existing as the nature of phenomena] nor as substantially existing [because of not existing by way of their own character] but as distinguished by being ultimate objects.'

Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations says:594

~ Therefore, the 'substantiality' of the 'substantially existing' and 'not substantially existing' mentioned in the 'Questions of Maitreya' is not the 'substantiality' set forth in other texts as the pair, 'substantiality and imputation' (dravya and prajñapti, rdzas btags). They also are not the 'establishment by way of [the object's] own character' (svalakshana-siddhi, rang gi mtshan nyidkyis grub pa) set forth by the Madhyamikas as 'substantiality' (dravya, rdzas).

[It has been shown that many teachings, accepted literally by the followers of Chittamatra, are interpreted otherwise by the Prasangikas. However] the Prasangika system does not assert that whatever the Chittamatrins accept as literal or as being definitive is necessarily actually non-literal [since both systems assert that the teachings of the six perfections and so forth are literal].⁵⁹⁵ Also, the Prasangikas do not assert that the opposite follows [either; they do not assert that whatever the Prasangika system says is literal the proponents of Chittamatra necessarily say is non-literal]. For the Sutra on the Ten Grounds says,⁵⁹⁶ [57] 'These three realms are mind-only,' and [the Mahayana Sutra of Knowledge (Mahayanabhidharma) says]:⁵⁹⁷

:: The beginningless realm
 :: Is the source of all phenomena.
 :: Because it exists, all migrations
 :: And even nirvanas are attained.

The Prasangikas accept these passages literally, [the first as negating a main agent other than the mind and the second as setting forth a Tathagata essence which is the emptiness of the mind].⁵⁹⁸ The Chittamatrins also accept these passages literally but with a different interpretation of their literal meaning; for them the first refutes forms which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness, and the second sets forth the mind-basis-of-all.]

L2: [3. The Object of Negation] :L2

The explanation of Prasangika tenets has three parts: their presentation of

- (1) the base,
- (2) paths, and
- (3) fruits of these paths.

[The first of these is translated here.]

The Prasangika presentation of the base has five parts:

- the object of negation in the view of selflessness,
- the reasonings refuting the object of negation,
- the basic objects of the two truths,
- the uncommon features [of the Prasangika system], and
- the valid cognizers certifying the above as well as an elimination of error. [The first two are translated here.]

L3: [The object of negation in the view of selflessness] :L3

This section has two parts:

- the measure of what is negated [58]
- and the correctness of this measure.

L4: [Measure of what is negated in the view of selflessness] :L4

(See pp.35-41.)

The root text says:

- :: All of cyclic existence and nirvana
- :: Appearing and renowned [to the mind]—
- :: The varieties [of phenomena] and their mode [emptiness]—
- :: Are posited by the inborn non-analytical [awareness]
- :: As existing according to the conventions of the world.

- :: Therefore, 'existing objectively [without just being an imputation] there by thought',
- :: 'Substantially existing', 'existing by way of its own character',
- :: 'Existing from its own [the object's] side',
- :: 'Truly existing', 'existing in its own right', and so forth
- :: Are synonymously what is negated.

Forms and so forth are the phenomena of cyclic existence—the afflicted class—and [the phenomena of nirvana]—the pure class (see pp.201-12). These phenomena are all included within 'the varieties and their mode which appear to and are renowned to the mind'. All these phenomena must be posited [as existing] for the inborn worldly [mind] which does not analyze [to try to find] the object designated and does not superimpose [falsity] through the conception [of phenomena] as truly existent.

Therefore, all the varieties and their mode [their emptiness] are only imputed [from the subject's side to] there [the object's side] by terms and thoughts. This is because these phenomena, except for being just nominally imputed [from the subject's side] to there, are not their individual parts, nor the mere composite of their parts, nor the continuum [of their moments], etc. [59] For example, in darkness a coiled speckled rope is imputed by thought to be a snake, and from a distance a cairn [a pile of stones] is merely imagined to be a human. Nagarjuna's Precious Garland says:599

- :: Because the phenomena of forms [which have the obstructiveness of which space is the absence] are only names, space also is just a name [and does not exist inherently.
- :: If someone said that forms exist inherently, then] when the elements do not exist [inherently], how could forms exist [inherently]?
- :: Therefore, even name-onlyness does not exist [inherently because that which possesses a name does not exist inherently].

\ #####
\ 99. Because the phenomena of forms
\ Are only names, a space too is only a name.
\ Without the elements how could forms exist?
\ Therefore even name-only does not exist.

Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:600

- :: Without [imputation by] thought [like the imputation of a snake to a rope] there is no [finding of] the existence of desire and so forth. If so, who with intelligence would maintain that a real object is [produced dependent on] thought? [For, being imputed by thought and existing as its own reality are contradictory.]

\ #####
\ 178.
\ Apart from conceptuality,

- \ Desire and so forth have no existence.
- \ Who with intelligence would hold [that there are]
- \ Real things [imputed by] conceptuality?

Chandrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred' says: 601

~ Undoubtedly, those which exist only through the existence of thought and those which do not exist when there is no thought are to be ascertained as not existing by way of their own entities, like a snake imputed to a coiled rope. [60]

Also, the Meeting of Father and Son Sutra says: 602

~ O Great King, a person, a being, has the six constituents, the six bases of contact, and the eighteen activities of mind.

~ Based on what is it said that the person has the six constituents? Great King, the six constituents are these: the constituent of earth, the constituent of water, the constituent of fire, the constituent of wind, the constituent of space, and the constituent of consciousness. Great King, these are the six constituents. My saying that a person has the six constituents is based on this.

~ Based on what is it said that a person has the six bases of contact? Great King, the six bases of contact are these: the base of contact which is the eye for seeing forms, the base of contact which is the ear for hearing sounds, [61] the base of contact which is the nose for smelling odors, the base of contact which is the tongue for sensing tastes, the base of contact which is the body for feeling the tangible, and the base of contact which is the mind for knowing phenomena. Great King, these are the six bases of contact. My saying that the person has the six bases of contact is based on this.

~ Great King, based on what is it said that the person has the eighteen activities of mind? Great King, the eighteen activities of mind are these. When a human sees a form with his eyes, he experiences the form as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When he hears a sound with his ears, he experiences the sound as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When he smells an odor with his nose, he experiences the odor as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. [62] When he senses a taste with his tongue, he experiences the taste as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When he feels the tangible with his body, he experiences the tangible as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When he realizes a phenomenon with his mind, he experiences it as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. Great King, these six experiences of pleasure, these six experiences of displeasure, and these six experiences of neutrality are in brief the eighteen activities of mind. Great King, these eighteen are activities of mind. Great King, my saying that these activities are the eighteen activities of mind is based on this.

~ Great King, [63] the constituent of earth is of two types: internal and external. Great King, what is the internal constituent? It is, inside the body, any of the hard and solid aspects, the close, conjoined with consciousness. Also, what are they? The internal earth constituent is to be known as hair, mustache, nails, 603 teeth, impurities, excrement, skin, flesh, veins, sinews, bones, marrow, heart, liver, lungs, kidneys, spleen, diaphragm, large intestine, small intestine, bladder, urinary canal, anal canal, anus, brain, veins of the brain—also, any type of hardness, solidity, and the close, conjoined with consciousness inside the body.

~ Great King, what is the external earth constituent? Any type of hardness, solidity,

the non-close, [64] not conjoined with consciousness is to be known as the external earth constituent.

~ Great King, when the internal earth constituent arises, it does not come from anywhere. When it ceases, it does not go anywhere.

~ Great King, a woman thinks of the internal, 'I am a woman.' Having imputed, 'I am a woman,' internally, she thinks of the external with respect to a man, 'A man.' Having imputed 'man' to the man externally, she becomes desirous and wishes to join with the external man.

~ The man also thinks of the internal, 'I am a man.' Having imputed, 'I am a man,' internally, he thinks of the external with respect to a woman, 'A woman.' Having imputed 'woman' to the woman externally, he becomes desirous and wishes to join with the external woman. Through desiring to join, they join together. Through the cause of joining there is the state of the fluid embryo.

~ Great King, both the imputed and the imputer do not [inherently] exist. [65] There is no woman in the woman [that is, in the basis of the imputation 'woman']. There is no man in the man [that is, in the basis of the imputation 'man']. Though they are thus non-existent, wrong thought is generated, but even this thought does not exist inherently.

~ Even the joining and the fluid embryo do not exist inherently as is imagined. How can that which does not exist inherently become hard?

~ Great King, having understood thought thus, you should understand hardness. It is to be understood that whenever hardness is produced, it does not come from anywhere. Great King, this body has a time in the end of going to the cemetery. When its hardness disintegrates and ceases, it does not go east, south, west, north, up, down, or to the intermediate directions. Great King, view thus the internal earth constituent.

~ Great King, there are occasions when the world abides in the sky as a heavenly mansion of Brahma, [66] consisting of the seven types of precious substances. O King, when its hardness arises, it does not come from anywhere. Though it abides as the massive [mountains], hard and firm, established through the cause of the diamonds of the Chakravada and Mahachakravada mountains, when its hardness arises, it does not come from anywhere. Though it abides as Meru—the King of Mountains—Yugamdhara, Nimimdhara, Ishadhara, Vajradhara, Khadiraka, Vinataka, Ashvakarna, Sudarshana, Mahasudarshana, Bare [Mountains], 604 Gandhamadana, or the Kitadri which are other than those, [67] or though it abide as the billion world systems including everything, or though it abide as an earth eighty thousand yojanas in height and sixty thousand yojanas in width, O King, when its hardness arises, it does not come from anywhere.

~ Great King, when this world is destroyed, there is a time when this great earth is burnt by fire, or destroyed by water, or wrecked by wind. When it is burned by fire, there will be no smoke, and there will be no remains of ashes. For instance, when the flame of a butter or oil lamp burns space, there is no smoke and no remains of ashes. Just so, when this world system of one billion worlds is burned by fire, there will be no smoke, and there will be no remains of ashes.

~ Also, when it is destroyed by water, there is no remainder. For instance, [68] when salt dissolves in water, there is no remainder. Just so, when this world system of one billion worlds is destroyed by water, there will be no remains.

~ When it is wrecked by wind, there will be no remainder. For instance, when a scattering wind drives about, no little birds are seen remaining. Just so, when this world system of one billion worlds is wrecked by wind, there will not be even a little remainder.

~ Great King, the arising of the earth constituent is thus empty. The destruction and arising of the earth constituent are also empty of inherent existence. Great King, the earth constituent, except for only being a designation, should not be viewed as an earth constituent. That which has the designation [the basis of the designations 'woman' or 'man'] is not the woman and is not the man. Thus, O King, with wisdom realize these as they are in reality. [69]

The meaning of this sutra is that [the constituents and so forth] do not exist, except as only nominal imputations. This is indicated by the quote from the beginning through to 'The earth constituent, except for only being a designation should not be viewed as an earth constituent.' Then the passage, 'That which has the designation is not the woman and is not the man,' explains that the basis of the imputation—that which has the name—is not the phenomenon which is imputed, a woman or a man.

Nagarjuna's Precious Garland, condensing the meaning of that, says:605

:: If a person is not earth, not water,
:: Not fire, not wind, not space,
:: Not consciousness, and not all of them,
:: What person is there other than these?

\ #####
\ 80. A person is not earth, not water,
\ Not fire, not wind, not space,
\ Not consciousness, and not all of them.
\ What person is there other than these?

The passage 'a person is not earth, not water, not fire, not wind, not space, not consciousness' explains that a person is not each of the bases of the imputation 'person'. The statement 'not all' explains that a person is not even the composite of the bases of imputation 'person' [that is, not even the composite of the six constituents]. The statement 'What person is there other than these?' explains that there is no person which does not depend on [the six constituents that are] the bases of the imputation 'person'.

Thus, [70] the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras say that even [the highest of phenomena,] nirvanas and emptinesses, are only established [from the subject's side to] there [the object's side] through names and thoughts. Similarly, [the Prasangika system,] unlike Svatantrika and so forth, asserts that the members of the following list, except for being different names, are [hypothetical]606 synonyms. [The Prasangika system] treats these terms as [hypothetical] synonyms in that they are what is negated by the reasonings [proving emptiness.

The terms that mean 'self' in the view of selflessness are:]

-- existing 'on' [that is, as a natural predicate of] the object [which gets] the imputation
-- substantially existing
-- existing able to establish itself—[this term and the preceding term] are opposites of dependent-arising [as are all the others in the list]
-- existing by way of its own character

-- existing from [the object's] own side [rather than being imputed from the subject's side]
-- existing through its own power
-- truly existing
-- existing inherently.

Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:607

:: All these [phenomena] are not self-powered;
:: Thus, there is no self [inherent existence].

\ #####
\ 348.
\ Anything that has dependent arising
\ Is not independent.
\ All these are not independent,
\ Therefore there is no self.

Chandrakirti's commentary says,608

'Here, that which has its own intrinsic existence, has inherent existence, has its own power, or has no dependence on another would exist by itself; therefore, it would not be a dependent-arising.'

L4: [Correctness of the measure of what is negated] :L4

(See pp.539-47.)

The root text says: [71]

:: The Madhyamikas, those free from the extremes,
:: Posit all actions and agents
:: In this [system] of no 'existence from [the object's] own side'
:: And of 'imputation by name and thought there [to the object]'.
:: Anything coarser or finer than this
:: Is an extreme of permanence or annihilation.

Thus, that which is to be refuted [by reasoning] must be identified from its subtlest level.
For, if it is not, one cannot ascertain the actual non-existent which is the negative [of self].

For, Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says:609

:: Without contacting the superimposed existent
:: One cannot apprehend its non-existence.

\ #####
\ [9:138]
\ [Samkhya:] If verifying cognition is not verifying cognition, then is that not verified falsely? In reality, the emptiness of phenomena is not ascertained through that verifying cognition.

\ #####
\ [Madhyamika:] Without detecting an imagined thing, its non-existence is not apprehended. Therefore, if a thing is false, its non-existence is clearly false.

\ #####

\ Thus, when in a dream a son has died, the thought "He does not exist" prevents the arising of the thought of his existence; and that too is false.

Also, one cannot ascertain the emptiness of former and later births, for example, without ascertaining that aspect which is their non-existence by way of their own being. Thus, the emptiness of births is not ascertained through only perceiving an utter vacuity that is merely the non-perception of former and later births. Buddhapalita, the honorable Chandrakirti, and many others assert this;

Buddhapalita says [in his commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way\].610

~ [The Nihilists say,] 'This world [or life] does not exist [as an effect of past lives]. A future world does not exist. [Also] spontaneously born sentient beings [such as hell-beings] do not exist,' and so forth. [72] What is the difference between their view and the [Madhyamikas'] view that all things are not produced and do not cease?

~ [Answer:] There is a great difference between these two. Not knowing the meaning of emptiness, you think that these two are similar. Acting with equanimity [that is, indifference] when one has not analyzed [to find that all sentient beings should be valued equally] and acting with equanimity when one has so analyzed are similar only in that both can be characterized as acting with equanimity. However, acting with equanimity but without analysis is involved in the entwinements of ignorance. Acting with equanimity when one has analyzed [is the result of knowledge and] is used by the Supramundane Victors.

~ Just as these two differ very greatly, so here also the perceptions [found in the texts of the Nihilists] such as, 'This world does not exist,' [meaning that this life is not the effect of other lives] are thoughts beclouded with ignorance. However, the other one [the Madhyamika] who sees that all phenomena are not [inherently] produced and do not [inherently] cease because they are empty of existing by way of their own being has preceded his conclusion with the mind of analysis. [73] Therefore, these two [Nihilist and Madhyamika] are very different.

Also, [Chandrakirti's] Clear Words says:611

~ Here some say, 'The Madhyamikas are indistinguishable from Nihilists because they propound that virtuous and non-virtuous actions, agents, fruits, and all worlds [lives] are empty of inherent existence. Also, the Nihilists say that these are non-existent. Therefore, Madhyamikas are indistinguishable from Nihilists.'

~ It is not so.

~ How?

~ Madhyamikas are proponents of dependent-arising; they say that due to arising dependent on, or reliant on, causes and conditions612 all—this world, the next, and so forth—lack inherent existence. The Nihilists do not ascertain that future worlds [future lives] and so forth do not truly exist (abhava, dngos po med pa) because of being empty of inherent existence due to being dependent-arisings.

Therefore, [the Prasangikas] refute the subtle object of negation —that is, refute that even particles exist from their own side— [74] but know how to posit all actions and agents of cyclic existence and nirvana within [asserting] that all phenomena are only nominalities and only imputations by thought. [A person who maintains such a system] is a Madhyamika—one who

does not abide in the extreme of existence or permanence [such as asserting that phenomena] exist inherently, etc., and who, [through propounding] the suitability of the existence of all phenomena conventionally as only nominalities, does not abide in the extreme of non-existence or annihilation.

As [Buddha] says in the Kashyapa Chapter: 613

~ [Inherent] existence is the one extreme. No [conventional] existence is the second extreme. That which is the center between these two is unanalyzable [because it cannot be analyzed just as it is by thinking about it], is undemonstrable [because it cannot be explained to another just as it is], is not a support [because it is not an object of the senses], is unperceivable [because from the viewpoint of the mind directly realizing it duality has disappeared], is unknowable [because it cannot be ascertained just as it is by a dualistic mind], and is placeless [because it is not a place or source of the afflictions]. Kashyapa, this is called the middle path, individual analysis of phenomena.

Also, such is said in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way :614

:: '[Inherent] existence' is a holding to permanence.
:: 'No [conventional] existence' is a view of nihilism.
:: Therefore, the wise do not abide in either
:: [Inherent] existence or no [conventional] existence.

\ #####
\ 10.
\ "It is" is a notion of eternity. "It is not" is a nihilistic view.
\ Therefore, one who is wise does not have recourse to "being" or "non-being."

Also, through affixing 'inherent existence' (svabhava, rang bzhin) [to the refutation of existence] the extreme of non-existence is avoided. [75] [This is because that which is negated as a predicate of phenomena is only inherent existence and not existence in general; a negation of existence in general would be an extreme of non-existence because phenomena do exist conventionally.] The extreme of [inherent] existence is avoided by [affirming that phenomena are] only imputations [and thus not inherently existent]. Therefore, the Svatantrikas' estimation of what is to be negated [merely true existence and not inherent existence] is coarser than that [of the Prasangikas who refute that phenomena inherently exist even conventionally].

Also, with respect to this assertion of phenomena as only imputations, some Tibetans [wrongly] do not accept even worldly trueness and falseness. [It is true that there is no difference between] an illusory horse created by a magician and an actual horse with respect to their existing or not in accordance with how they appear. [Both an illusory horse and an actual horse appear as if they inherently exist, but in fact do not; therefore, they equally do not exist even conventionally in accordance with how they appear.] However, if one does not accept a [worldly] 615 trueness and falseness with respect to whether something does or does not exist, then one contradicts Chandrakirti:616

:: If the world does not harm you, based on the world itself
:: Refute these [conventionalities].
:: You and the world debate about these,
:: And afterwards I will rely on the stronger.

And,

:: 'Do not lose the conventionalities renowned in the world.'

And,

:: 'Perceivers of falsities are asserted as two types [those perceiving the real and unreal relative to a worldly consciousness].'

One should understand that [not accepting any worldly trueness and falseness] does not pass beyond adhering to extremes. [Asserting a coarser object of negation] also does not pass beyond adhering to extremes. Thus, one should cast aside [such assertions].

L3: [Reasonings refuting inherent existence] :L3

This section has two parts [76]: brief indication and extensive explanation.

L4: [Brief indication of the reasonings refuting inherent existence] :L4

(See pp.127-9.)

Question: [The two selflessnesses, i.e., the lack of inherent existence in persons and in other phenomena] are realized by way of separate reasonings. Is this similar to the opinion of Svatantrikas and below [i.e., Chittamatrins] and some Tibetan 'Prasangikas' that the objects negated in the two selflessnesses differ in that the selflessness of persons is coarser and the selflessness of other phenomena is subtler?

Answer: [No, the two selflessnesses are realized by way of separate reasonings, but the object of negation, inherent existence, is the same in each case; thus, one is not coarser or subtler than the other.] Though the two selflessnesses do not differ in subtlety, the reasonings used for their realization are separate.

In order to indicate this the root text says:

:: There are the two selves
:: Of persons and [other] phenomena.
:: The non-existence of these there
:: Is asserted as the two selflessnesses.
:: A self of [other] phenomena
:: Is refuted by the four:
:: The diamond slivers and so forth.
:: A self of persons is refuted
:: By the fivefold and sevenfold [reasons].
:: Both also [are refuted] by dependent-arising.

Chandrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred' says,617

~ Here 'self is an inherent existence (svabhava) of phenomena, that is, non-dependence on another. The non-existence of this is selflessness. This [selflessness] is realized as twofold through a division into persons and [other] phenomena—a selflessness of persons and a selflessness of [other] phenomena. [77]

Thus, the self to be negated is non-dependence or non-reliance on another, the 'other' being terms, thoughts, and so forth. Absences of this self on its bases—persons and [other] phenomena—are respectively posited as the selflessness of persons and of phenomena. This is

the thought of the master Buddhapalita.

Four types of reasonings refute a self of phenomena [other than persons], whereas a self of persons is refuted by the reasoning in sutra and in Nagarjuna's Treatise 618 that is a searching for it in five ways. A self of persons is also refuted in Chandrakirti's Supplement by the reasoning that is a searching for [but not finding the self] in seven ways. [Chandrakirti added to the fivefold reasoning] two more refutations based on the teaching that the mere composite of the five aggregates is the basis of the imputation [and not the I]; these refute the assertions that the mere composite of the aggregates is the self and that the shape [of the body] is the self.

Both selves [of persons and of phenomena] are refuted by the reasoning that they lack being one and many and by the reasoning that they are dependent-arising. These will now be explained.

L2: [4. Refuting Inherently Existent Production] :L2

The extensive explanation of the reasonings refuting inherent existence has two parts:

- reasoning refuting a SELF OF PHENOMENA [other than persons] and
- reasoning refuting a SELF OF PERSONS together with an elimination of error.

L3: [REFUTING A SELF OF PHENOMENA] :L3

The reasoning refuting a SELF OF PHENOMENA [other than persons] has four parts:

- the diamond slivers, [78]
- the [simultaneous] refutation of production of the four extremes and production of the existent, the non-existent, [both, and neither],
- the refutation of production of the four alternative types, and
- along with an elimination of error, the reasoning of dependent-arising making known [the absence of true existence in] all phenomena.

L3: [DIAMOND SLIVERS (#1 : refuting production from self, other, both, neither – cause & effect cannot be the same, different, both, or neither – they cannot be simultaneous, separate in time, both, neither – no 100% sure cause inside, outside, both, neither – no continuity, no discontinuity – nothing exist and change)] :L3

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

(See pp.57-9, 131-50.)

This section has two parts:

- statement of the reasons
- and of the proofs for the modes of the reasons.

L4: [Statement of the reasons] :L4

(See pp. 137-42.) Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Madhyamikas agree that when stating

reasons to prove a thesis there should be no statement of proof without first overcoming the pointedness of the wrong view adhered to by the opponent with a demonstration of a [contradictory] consequence. However, here for the sake of easy exposition [a syllogism is put forth] in the root text:

- :: Because production from self,
- :: Other, both, or causelessly
- :: Does not exist, inherently
- :: Existent production does not exist.

The subjects, things which have production, have no inherently existent production because there is no production of them from themselves, from [inherently existent] others, from both, or causelessly—as in the case of a mirror image.

Chandrakirti's Supplement says:619 [79]

- :: Because there is no production from self, or other, or both,
- :: Or without relying on causes, things lack inherent existence.

\ #####
\ [VI.104]
\ 147ab.
\ Since production from self, other, both, or without depending upon a cause do not exist,
\ Things are free from inherent existence.

Atisha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment says:620

- :: Things are not produced from
- :: Themselves, others, both, or
- :: Causelessly; thus there is no
- :: Inherent existence.

\ #####
\ [49]
\ Since an entity does not arise from itself,
\ And is not from another, or even from both,
\ Nor is it yet without cause; therefore it has
\ No intrinsic nature by way of own-existence.

Truly established production would have to accord with one of these four extremes. Furthermore, if something is not produced from any of these four, it follows that it is not truly produced. Not only is this proved by reasoning, but also those who assert truly established production assert such. Therefore, it is not necessary to state a proof here [that not being produced from any of the four extremes entails an absence of truly existent production].

L4: [Proofs for the modes of the reasons] :L4

L5: [Non-production FROM SELF] :L5

(See pp. 136-40.)

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

The root text says:

- :: If [things] were produced from themselves,
- :: [Their re-production] would be senseless and endless.
- :: That which [already exists in something] is not [produced from] it,
- :: Causes and effects would always be seen,
- :: It would contradict worldly perception,
- :: All objects and agents [of production] would be one. [80]

Some Samkhyas say, 'A sprout exists at the time of its seed or of its [causal] entity. Since the natures of both the seed and the sprout are a partless unit—being mutually each other—there is no confusion of effects with wrong causes, and production is possible. However, if at the time of the cause [the effect] were totally non-existent, a non-existent [effect] could not be produced. If [that which is non-existent at the time of its causes] were produced, then even the horns of a rabbit could be produced.'

The Sautrantikas and above [Chittamatrins and Madhyamikas] agree that in general a non-existent is not produced, and, therefore, an existent is produced. Furthermore, they agree that 'production' is so called because it is the attainment of an existent entity by what is non-existent previous to its production. No one [among the Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Madhyamikas] asserts, like the Samkhyas, that [a thing] is produced from its own entity or that it is produced again.

Hence, it follows about the subjects, things which have production, that their production again would be senseless because they would have previously attained their entity.

Objection: There is no necessity [that if things had previously attained their entity, their production again would be senseless].

Answer: It follows about the subjects, these [things], that their production would be endless because [for you] production again of what is already existent is meaningful.

Here also, the Samkhya might say, 'There is no necessity [that, if production again of what is already existent is purposeful,⁶²¹ the production of things would be endless. For we Samkhyas say that what already exists in a non-manifest state must be produced or made manifest.]'

However, his answer does not hit the mark because he does not assert that what was previously non-existent [a non-existent manifestation] is newly produced. [Thus, he cannot say that a manifestation of the sprout which was previously non-existent is produced since he would fall away from his own theory of the production of the existent.]

Also, [81] it follows that there would be no point in production of something from itself because it would have already achieved its own entity.

Moreover, it follows either that a white seed only continues endlessly or that the production of only a green sprout continues endlessly because that which has already been produced would be produced again.

Furthermore, though a cause such as a white seed has disintegrated and is non-existent, its effect—a sprout—is seen. Thus, even the world does not accept the simultaneity of seed and sprout. [Therefore, the Samkhya's view] also contradicts what is seen.

It follows that the agent and the object of cause and effect [producer and produced] would

be one because a thing would produce itself.

Buddhapalita [says in his commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise]: 622

Things are not produced from their own entities because [if they were] their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless. The production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. If though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced.

Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' says: 623

~ There is no point in the production of something from itself [that is, from a cause that is the same entity as itself because it would have already attained existence]. [82]

~ Also, it is just not reasonable that what already has been produced be produced again.

~ If it is thought that the already produced is produced again, the growing of a sprout, etc., would not be found here [in the world]; the seed would be produced endlessly.

~ How could that [seed] be destroyed by that [sprout?

~ For, according to you, seed and sprout are not other.]

~ For you, the sprout's shape, color, taste, capacity, and maturation would not be different from those of its creator cause, the seed.

~ If, having forsaken the entity [of the state] of the seed, it becomes an entity [of a state] different from it, then how could it have the nature of that [seed]?

~ If for you the seed is not other than the sprout here [in the world], just as the seed [is unapprehensible at the time of the sprout], the sprout would not be apprehensible. Or, because they are one, just as the sprout [is apprehensible], so the seed would be apprehensible [at the time of the sprout]. Therefore, this [non-otherness of seed and sprout] is not to be asserted.

~ Though the cause is destroyed, the effect is seen; [83] thus, even the world does not assert that they are one.

~ Therefore, this ascription of things arising from self is not admissible in reality or even in the world.

~ If production from self were asserted, the produced and the producer—object and agent—would be one.

~ Since they are not one, production from self is not to be asserted because of the fallacies extensively explained [here and in Nagarjuna's Treatise].

L5: [Non-production FROM OTHER] :L5

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

This section has two parts: the actual exposition of the proofs of non-production from other and an elimination of error.

L6: [Actual exposition of non-production from other.] :L6

(See pp.140-44.)

The root text says:

:: If things were produced from [what is inherently] other,
:: Then darkness would arise from a flame,
:: And all would arise from all,
:: Both causes and non-causes.
:: Because [cause and effect would be] other,
:: They could not be one continuum, like wheat and barks.
:: Cause and effect would have to be simultaneous,
:: But because it is not so, what production
:: Is there of another from another?

If [it is claimed that there is inherently existent and thus analytically findable]
production from what is other, then it contradicts many scriptures and reasons.

The reasons are as follows.

:: It [absurdly] follows that thick darkness arises from a flame [84] because
another arises from what is other by way of its own character.

Also, the Superior [Nagarjuna] says:624

:: A [naturally existent] otherness
:: Of cause and effect is never admissible.
:: If there were an otherness of cause and effect,
:: A cause would be the same as a non-cause.

\ #####
\ 19.
\ Certainly a oneness of cause and product is not possible at all.
\ Nor is a difference of cause and product possible at all. .
\ #####
\ 20.
\ If there were a oneness of the cause and product, then there would be an identity
of the originator and what is originated.
\ If there were a difference of product and cause, then a cause would be the same
as that which is not a cause.

Thus, it [absurdly] follows that all would arise from what are its causes and from what are
not its causes because cause and effect would be naturally existent others.

Chandrakirti's Supplement says:625

:: If depending on others another arises, then even from a tongue of fire thick
darkness would arise. All would also be produced from all because even non-producers
[non-causes] would have otherness the same [as producers or causes].

\ #####
\ [VI.14]
\ 57.
\ If other arises in dependence upon other,
\ Then thick darkness arises even from flames.
\ Indeed everything arises from everything
\ Because all non-producers are similar in also being other.

Objection: The fallacies of these consequences do not apply. [Though a cause and its effect are naturally existent others]⁶²⁶ an effect which is helped [by a cause] is the effect of that [cause]. [85] A substantial cause and its effect are included in the one continuum of [for instance] a seed; they must be one continuum. That which is of a continuum different [from the effect] is not suitable to be [its] substantial cause, etc. For example, a barley seed is the cause of a barley sprout which is in its same continuum but is not a cause of a kimshuka flower.⁶²⁷

[In answer to this, there are these contradictory consequences:]

It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, a barley seed—a substantial cause—and a barley sprout—its effect—are not one continuum because [according to you] they mutually are naturally existent others, as in the case of Maitreya and Upagupta or as in the case of wheat and barley.

It follows that a seed and its sprout are not naturally existent others because they do not exist simultaneously and also because, when cause and effect are naturally existent others, the actions of production and cessation, etc., are impossible.

The Superior [Nagarjuna says in his Treatise on the Middle Way]:⁶²⁸

:: The entities of the things [which are effects such as sprouts] do not exist in their causes [either collectively or individually or in something other than their causes].

:: If [the effect's] own entity does not exist [at the time of its causes], then how could there be an entity of otherness [in the causes without the existence of the effect in relation to which they are called other]? [86]

\ #####

\ 1:5 ?

\ Certainly those things are called "conditioning causes" whereby something originates after having come upon them;

\ As long as something has not originated, why are they not so long (i.e. during that time) "non-conditioning-causes" ?

Chandrakirti's Supplement says:⁶²⁹

:: Objection: Just this is called something's effect because that something is able to create it. That which is able to produce it, even though [a naturally existent] other, is the cause. [Therefore, because of being special others, two things are cause and effect but not because of just being others in general.] Because there is production from what is included in the same continuum and from what is a producer, a sprout of rice is not [produced] from a barley [seed], etc.

:: Answer: Barley, the kesara lotus,⁶³⁰ the kimshuka flower, and so forth [because of being other than a rice shoot] are not asserted to be producers of a rice shoot, do not have the capacity [of producing a rice shoot], are not included in the same continuum [as a rice shoot], and are not [what precedes a rice shoot and is]⁶³¹ homogeneous [with a rice shoot]. Just so, a rice seed also does not have these [four qualities] because it is just [a naturally existent] other.

:: Sprout and seed do not exist simultaneously. [The sprout in relation to which a seed is called 'other' does not exist at the same time as the seed, and thus there is no otherness.] Without otherness how could the seed be other [than the sprout]? Thus, it is not

established that a sprout is produced from a seed. Cast aside this position that there is production from the [naturally existent] other.

:: Objection: Just as the ascending and descending of the two ends of a scale are not seen to be non-simultaneous, [87] so the production of what is to be produced and the cessation of the producer are [simultaneous. Therefore, cause and effect exist simultaneously and thus can be other in relation to each other.]

:: Answer: [Even] if [the two activities of the ascending and descending of the two ends of a scale] are simultaneous, here [in what is exemplified] there is no [simultaneity]; it is non-existent. Because that which is presently being produced [for example, a sprout] is approaching production, it is non-existent. That which is presently ceasing [for example, a seed], though existent, is asserted to be approaching disintegration. Thus, how is this similar to a scale [the activities of the two ends of which exist simultaneously]? When [the sprout which acts as the base of the action of growing and thus is] the agent is non-existent, [the existence of the activity of the sprout's] growing is also not an admissible entity.

\ #####
\ 'Something that can be produced is definitely called an effect;
\ And that which has the ability to produce it, though other, is a cause.
\ Thus, because it is produced from a producer of the same continuum,
\ A rice sprout is not from barley, or any other, as they are.'

\ #####
\ If you say this, then just as barley, corollas, kengshuka, and so forth
\ Are not called producers of a rice sprout, do not possess the ability,
\ Are not of the same continuum, and are not similar,
\ So too the rice seed is not any of these because it is other.

\ #####
\ A sprout does not exist at the time of its seed,
\ So without otherness how can the seed be other?
\ Therefore, since production of a sprout from a seed is not established,
\ Give up this position of so-called 'production from other'.

\ #####
\ 'Just as the highness and lowness of the two arms of a balance
\ Are seen to be simultaneous,
\ So too are the producing of what is to be produced and the ceasing of the producer.'

\ #####
\ If you say this, even though they are simultaneous, there is no simultaneity here; it does not exist.

\ #####
\ Since that being produced is approaching production, it does not exist,
\ And that ceasing, though existent, is said to be approaching cessation;

\ #####
\ So how are they similar to a balance?
\ This production [of the sprout] without an agent [the sprout itself] is also an

unacceptable entity.

Here, some Svatantrika-Madhyamikas say:

~ It is true that there is no truly existent otherness and no simultaneity of [truly existent] actions of production and cessation. However, is it not the thought of the Rice Seedling Sutra [when it gives the example of the two ends of a scale] 632 that without analysis the actions of the seed's cessation and of the sprout's production simultaneously exist from their own side?

However, damage accrues to this view the same as before. The thought of the sutra is that these activities exist conventionally, not from their own side.

Objection: [According to you Prasangikas, production is not admissible because of the non-existence of otherness which in turn is due to the non-simultaneity of seed and sprout. If so, then production would exist because of the existence of otherness in whatever exists simultaneously. For example]633 an eye consciousness is produced through depending on an eye sense, a visible form, and feeling which just are simultaneous [with the eye consciousness]. Therefore, production from other is just established.

Answer: It follows that the subject, an eye consciousness, [88] is not produced from others which exist simultaneously with it and which are its producers—that is, a visible form, an eye sense, feeling, and so forth—because of already existing simultaneously with these as another.

Chandrakirti's Supplement says:634

~ Objection: An eye consciousness has otherness in relation to its producers, an eye sense and so forth which exist simultaneously [with the eye consciousness] and the discrimination and so forth which arise together [with an eye consciousness].

~ Answer: Of what use is production [to what already exists]?

~ Objection: [An eye consciousness] does not exist [at the time of its causes].

~ Answer: For this the fallacy [that the eye sense etc. would not be other than a not yet existent eye consciousness] has already been explained.

\ #####
\ 'An eye consciousness is other than its simultaneous producers,
\ The eyes and so forth, and the discrimination and so forth that arise with it.'
\ If this is so, what need is there for an existent to arise?
\ If you say it does not exist, the faults in that have already been explained.

L6: [Elimination of error concerning the refutation of production from other] :L6

(See pp. 144-8.)

The root text says:

:: That others temporally different are refuted is mistaken.
:: [Using] a mass exactly the same and so forth are also mistaken.
:: Because the four extremes are not asserted
:: And because production from other is said
:: To be non-existent even in the world,

:: Its assertion here is a dance of the insane.

As Tsong Khapa's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement' says,⁶³⁵ some Tibetans assert that this refutation of production from other is a refutation of others that are temporally different [without the qualification of being naturally existent]. Also, some Tibetans use 'logical' coercives which are exactly the same [instead of good logic. These assertions] etc. are easily understood to be erroneous.

Daktsang, as was explained before [in chapter eleven which is not translated here]⁶³⁶ here again [89] asserts production from other. This assertion shows the nature of one who wishes to do a dance having cut off the head of a crazy, dancing peacock and hung it on his behind. For, you [Daktsang] quoted the Rice Seedling Sutra :⁶³⁷

~ Also, when a sprout is produced, arising from its cause— a seed—it is not created by itself, not created by [naturally existent] others, not created by both, not created by Ishvara, and not metamorphosed by time. It does not arise from particles, does not arise from its own nature, and is not produced causelessly.

Also, you are seeking to explicate the system of this passage from Chandrakirti's Clear Words :⁶³⁸

~ The world does not employ analysis such as 'from self or 'from [naturally existent] others' and so forth. The world understands only this, 'An effect arises from a cause.' The master [Nagarjuna] presented [cause and effect] this way too.

Also, Chandrakirti's Supplement says,⁶³⁹

:: 'Production from other is non-existent even in the world.' [90]

\ #####
\ From having only sown the seeds
\ The worldly claim 'I produced this child',
\ Or think 'I planted this tree';
\ Therefore there is no production from other, even for the worldly.

L5: [Non-production FROM BOTH SELF AND OTHER] :L5

(See p. 148-9.)

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

The root text says:

:: Because there is no [production]
:: From self and other separately,
:: Production from both is refuted.

Both the [theistic] Samkhyas who propound Ishvara as the cause [of all phenomena together with the nature] and the Nirgranthas [Jainas] assert, as was explained before [in chapters three and seven which are not translated here], that pots and so on are produced both from themselves and from others.

These assertions are inadmissible because that part of the assertion which is the production of something from self is damaged by the earlier refutations of production from self and that part which is production from other is damaged by the earlier reasonings refuting

production from other.

Chandrakirti's Supplement says:640

:: Also, production from both is not an admissible entity because those fallacies already set forth accrue [to the assertion of production of something from both self and others].

\ #####
\ [VI.98]
\ 141.
\ Production from both is also not a suitable entity.
\ Why? Because all the faults already explained apply.
\ It does not exist for the worldly, nor is it asserted in thatness,
\ Because production from either is not established.

L5: [Non-production WITHOUT CAUSES] :L5

(See p. 149-50.)

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

The root text says:

:: If things were produced causelessly,
:: Exertion would be senseless.
:: It would contradict perception.
:: All would be produced from all.

It [absurdly] follows that planting seeds, cooking food, and engaging in commerce for the sake of the arising of temporary and final effects are senseless [91] because, though there are no causes, effects arise. Also, it [absurdly] follows that crows would have the decorations of peacock feathers and that horses would have horns. Also, it [absurdly] follows that, just as a bread-fruit tree would not be a cause of that tree's fruit, so trees bearing nimba [a bitter fruit], mango, and so forth also would not be the causes of their own fruit.⁶⁴¹ Also, it [absurdly] follows that the ripening of mangos, lakucha [a type of bread fruit],⁶⁴² and so forth would not depend on the seasons because they would be produced causelessly.

Even if these consequences are accepted, it is not admissible because there is much damage [to asserting such]. For instance, not only does causeless production contradict what is seen by the world, it strongly contradicts what is seen by the world.

Chandrakirti's Supplement says:642a

:: If it is viewed that [things] are produced only causelessly, then everything would always be produced from even everything, and for the sake of the arising of certain effects the world also would not gather seeds and so forth, doing many hundreds of things [for the sake of those effects].

\ #####
\ [VI.99]
\ 142.
\ If there is production entirely without causes,

\ Then everything is produced from everything all the time;
 \ And so to obtain fruit, the people of this world
 \ Do not have to gather seeds and so forth in a hundred ways.

\ ####
 \ 143.
 \ If living beings are empty of causes they are unapprehendable,
 \ Like the fragrance and colour of an upala flower in the sky;
 \ But a very colourful world is apprehended.
 \ Therefore you should know that, like your mind, the world comes from causes.

\ ####
 \ 144.
 \ The nature of those elements that are the objects of your mind
 \ Is not the nature of this.
 \ How could one who has such thick mental darkness here
 \ Correctly realize the world beyond?

\ ####
 \ 145.
 \ You should realize that when you deny the world beyond
 \ You are conceptualizing the nature of objects of knowledge with a wrong view
 \ Because you have a body that is a basis for developing such a view.
 \ It is the same when you assert the nature of the elements to be existent.

\ ####
 \ 146.
 \ How these elements do not exist has already been explained.
 \ How? Because production from self, other, both, and no cause
 \ Have already been refuted in general above.
 \ Therefore these unmentioned elements also do not exist.

These positions were refuted formerly [in chapter two on the Nihilists which is not translated here]. [92]

L2: [5. Other Types of Production] :L2

L3: [Simultaneous refutation of production of the four extremes and OF THE EXISTENT, NON-EXISTENT, BOTH, AND NEITHER (reasoning #4 : Analysing the nature of the effect; refuting an effect/product that is existent, non-existent, both, neither // cause & effect cannot be simultaneous, nor separate in time)] :L3

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

[See also “Emptiness Yoga”, Chapter 13 – Other reasonings]

(See pp.61-3, 151-4.) The root text says:

:: If [things] are produced from others,
 :: Consider [whether the effects are]
 :: Existent, non-existent, both, or neither.

- :: Of what use [are causes] for the existent?
- :: The non-existent lacks object and agent.
- :: These [reasonings] refute their being both.
- :: What would causes do for what lacks both?

No things have any of the three—inherently existent production, abiding, or ceasing (i.e. the usual three stages of becoming as taught in the Hinayana: origination, duration, and cessation)—or production from [inherently existent] others. For the existent, non-existent, both, and neither are not produced. As before, [reasoning and others' systems establish that if things have inherently existent production, abiding, and ceasing or production from inherently existent others], it is necessary [that the effect must be either existent, non-existent, both, or neither]. Furthermore, among the four modes of the reason, [first] that which has already attained an existent entity is not produced again because the damages to production from self are incurred. The totally non-existent is not produced because of having no activity. That which is both existent and non-existent is not produced because, since the two—existence and non-existence—are mutually exclusive, they do not subsist in one entity. That which is neither existent nor non-existent is not produced because such does not exist.

Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness says:643

- :: Because the existent exists, it is not produced. [93]
- :: Because the non-existent does not exist, it is not [produced].
- :: Because the qualities are incompatible,
- :: The existent and non-existent is not [produced].
- :: Because there is no production,
- :: There is no abiding and no ceasing.

Nagarjuna's own commentary on this says:644

~ Because a thing (bhdva, dngos po) exists, it could not be produced from causes. For the existent is explained as 'the presently existent'. Because the non-existent does not exist, it could not be produced from causes. Because the existent and non-existent are not concordant, such is not produced, for they are mutually exclusive. The existent and the non-existent possess mutually exclusive qualities; hence, due to their incompatibility how could that which is both existent and non-existent be produced? Because there is no [inherently existent] production, there also is no [inherently existent] abiding and no [inherently existent] ceasing.

Chandrakirti's Supplement says:645

:: If producers are causes producing products that are other [than themselves], it is to be considered whether they produce an existent, non-existent, that which is both, or that which lacks both. If it exists, of what use are producers? What could these producers do for the non-existent? What could they do for that which is both? What could they do for that which lacks both? [94]

\ #####
 \ If a producer producing a product that is other is a cause,
 \ Then what is produced, an existent, a non-existent, both, or neither?
 \ If it is an existent, what need is there for a producer, and what need is there if it is a non-existent?

\ What need is there for both, and what need is there for neither?

In Chandrakirti's own commentary the reasons are individually established.⁶⁴⁶

Atisha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment says:⁶⁴⁷

:: The production of the existent is not admissible.
:: The non-existent also is like a flower of the sky.
:: Because both fallacies are entailed,
:: That which is both is not produced.

\ #####

\ [48]

\ An existent's arising is impossible; (It is not existence, it is not non-existence, it is not both or neither.)

\ A non-existent's is like flowers in the sky;

\ For a thing to be both is absurd fallacy;

\ So neither do they originate together.

Chandrakirti's Supplement applies [this refutation of production of the four extremes] to production from other, whereas the Superior [Nagarjuna] and the Elder Atisha give general explanations [of it without specifying production from other]. They refute not only production but also abiding and ceasing.⁶⁴⁸

Moreover, because there are four alternatives to be considered —only existent, only non-existent, both, and neither—this reasoning can be called a refutation of four alternatives [and not just four extremes]. Therefore, do not think that a refutation of the four alternatives (mu bzhi) precludes a refutation of the four extremes (mtha' bzhi).

L3: [Refutation of production OF THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES (reasoning #5 : refuting that one or many causes can inherently produce one or many effects)] :L3

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

[See also "Emptiness Yoga", Chapter 13 – Other reasonings]

This section has two parts: the actual exposition of the reasoning and an elimination of error.

L4: [Actual exposition of the reasoning refuting production of the four alternatives] :L4

(See pp.63-4, 155-9.)

As is stated in Kamalashila's Illumination of the Middle Way,⁶⁴⁹ our own Buddhist schools which propound [truly existent] things say:

~ It is not admissible that there is no true production, for it is said and seen that there is production of many effects and of one effect from one cause—[for example] a seed—and that many causes and conditions also [95] produce many effects and one effect.

In order to refute the systems that assert such, the root text says:

:: Things are not truly produced by causes.
:: One does not produce one, nor many one,
:: Nor one many, nor many many.

The subjects, things, are not ultimately produced by causes because ultimately one cause does not produce one effect, ultimately many causes do not produce many effects, ultimately one cause does not produce many effects, and ultimately many causes do not produce one effect. For there are reasons captivating to the intelligent.

For example, if one eye consciousness has the imprints of many causes, then it would not ultimately be produced by one cause. Also, it would [absurdly] follow that just as the causes are many, the effect which is their imprint would be many consciousnesses. [96]

Jnanagarbha's Discrimination of the Two Truths says: 650

- :: Many do not create one thing,
- :: Many do not create many,
- :: One does not create many,
- :: One does not create many things,
- :: One also does not create one.

Also:

~ You [Proponents of Truly Existent Things] assert that [an eye consciousness which is] the effect [of three causes —object, eye sense, and former moment of consciousness—] is not plural but that its qualities [that is, the qualities of its being produced in the image of the object, of its ability to apprehend a particular type of object such as visible forms rather than sounds, and of its being an experiencer], are different. Thus, alas, why not [assert] that Ishvara creates [everything]?

Also:

~ Just as [it would be contradictory for an eye consciousness to be] simultaneously produced [from a form] and not produced [from a form], so say why it would not be contradictory [for the form to be] ultimately (yang dag par) a producer [of the eye consciousness] and not a producer [of the eye consciousness]? [97]

Also:

~ If it is asserted that the [three imprints or] qualities are produced from [the composite of the three] causes, the individual [causes] would not be the producers. Also, if [the three causes] are [individually the producers, the eye consciousness which is] the effect would be causeless.

Also:

~ If you assert that [the eye consciousness which is] the effect is produced from [the three] causes, then it [absurdly] follows that the [three imprints or qualities which are] plural and the [eye consciousness which is] non-plural would, as before, be causeless.

L4: [Elimination of error concerning the refutation of the four alternatives] :L4

(See pp.159-60.) The root text says:

- :: Because one produces one and
- :: Because the others are suitable,
- :: Not affixing here a qualification
- :: Of what is negated is mistaken.

Here also Daktsang says that because the four alternatives—one cause producing one effect, etc.—are non-existent, [98] a qualification such as 'ultimately' or 'naturally' should not be affixed to what is negated [in the four reasons].⁶⁵¹ This is not correct because it is asserted that [conventionally] a cause, such as one instant of the eye sense, produces one effect, one instant of an eye consciousness.

Also, Chandrakirti's Clear Words, when [giving an etymology of] dependent-arising (pratityasamutpada), says:⁶⁵²

~ In a passage such as, 'Dependent on an eye sense and forms an eye consciousness arises,' a particular object [of dependence] has been openly accepted [—'dependent on an eye sense']. When the production of one consciousness, which has as its cause one eye sense, has been asserted, how could the term pratitya have the meaning of multiplicity?

Also, the same text at the point of giving the meaning of the term 'direct perceiver' (pratyaksha) ⁶⁵³ says:

~ Because there is no sense of [an eye consciousness's depending on] a multiplicity [of sense powers], one eye consciousness which has as its base one moment of an [eye] sense could not be a pratyaksha [according to the wrong etymology as 'depending on a multiplicity of sense powers'].

Also, Chandrakirti's commentary on Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:⁶⁵⁴

~ How could one moment of a consciousness be a pratyaksha [i.e., that which depends on a multiplicity of sense powers, according to the wrong etymology]? For [one moment of consciousness] does not engage [its object] through depending on a multiplicity of sense powers. [One moment of an eye consciousness does not depend on a multiplicity of sense powers of dissimilar type, such as also depending on an ear sense] because they are non-compatible. [Also, one moment of an eye consciousness does not directly depend on a multiplicity of former and later moments of a sense power of similar type, i.e., eye senses] because the moments of the sense power and of the consciousness [99] disintegrate right after they are produced.

Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge, for instance, contains collections of individual sutra teachings explaining that one action [in one lifetime] empowers many bodies [in other lifetimes], that many actions empower one body, that many actions empower many bodies, and that one action empowers one body. Such is asserted also here in Prasangika texts.

Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says:⁶⁵⁵

:: The effects [produced] by one clear consciousness [which is enthusiastic in cultivating the first concentration, etc.] are [births in the rank of] a Brahma, etc.

:: [However, if the mind is not powerful] the effect [of the consciousness] as well as of body and speech is not such because the activity is weak.

\ #####

\ [5:15]

\ Even when accompanied by body and speech, feeble mental activity does not have results such as Brahmahood and alike, which the mind alone has when it is clear.

Also, as quoted earlier, the fruits of one moment of faith in Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are immeasurable. Also, there is the explanation that if one even makes a ritual object called sachcha ⁶⁵⁶ the essence of which is a relic, one will be born as a universal emperor as many

times as there are particles in it.

However, if one's base or mind is weak, though one performs virtues and so on for a long time, [100] the effects are small.

Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says:657

:: [Buddha] the Knower of Suchness said
:: That though one performs for a long time
:: All the repetitions and asceticisms,
:: Doing them with a mind distracted is useless.

\ #####

\ [5:16]

\ The Omniscient One stated that all recitations and austerities, even though performed for a long time, are actually useless if the mind is on something else or is dull.

Also, sutra says, 'O monks, asceticisms, recitations, and so forth when the mind is distracted to desire are fruitless.'

Also, Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says:658

:: Due to a sin done even for a single moment
:: One dwells in the Most Tortuous Hell for an eon.

\ #####

\ [4:21]

\ One dwells in the Avici hell for an eon as a consequence of a vice committed in a single moment. What then can be said of a favorable state of existence, since sin has been accumulated since beginningless time?

Similarly, one should realize [that production of one effect from one cause, and so forth, exist conventionally] through many biographies and [Buddha's] life stories. One should look in Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra, Shantideva's Compendium of Learnings, and so forth [for further confirmation].

In brief, Kamalashila's Illumination of the Middle Way says:659

~ Question: Is it not seen that many are produced from one and that one is produced from many? [101] Therefore, how can these [views] be forsaken?

~ Answer: These are not [ultimately] admissible, but even we are not proving that these are not seen.

Thus, he explains that [the four alternative types of production] are not admissible ultimately but are not not manifestly perceived.

Also, Kamalashila's Illumination of the Middle Way says:660

~ The master [Nagarjuna] also saw that cause and effect exist conventionally and that conventionally there is, as reputed, production of many from one and of one from many. Also, he realized that the attributes of an eye consciousness and so forth exist through the operation or non-operation of an eye sense and so forth. Thus, in order to take care of childish beings, when demonstrating the usage of effect-signs (phalalinga, 'bras rtags)661 he said that if the causes were plural, [the effects] would be plural. However, it is to be

known that it is not so ultimately.

L2: [6. Dependent-Arising] :L2

The presentation of the reasoning of dependent-arising, making known the absence of true existence in all phenomena, has two parts: the actual exposition of dependent-arising and a refutation of errors.

L3: [Actual exposition of dependent-arising (reasoning #3 : THE KING OF REASONING; refuting that anything dependently arisen can be inherently existing)] :L3

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

(See pp.53-5, 161-71.) The root text says:

:: Because here there are no phenomena
:: That are not dependent-arising [102]
:: And because dependent-arising [means]
:: Only 'existing upon meeting',
:: 'Existing in reliance', and 'existing dependency',
:: All phenomena are not able to set themselves up
:: And do not exist from their own side.
:: Profound and extensive, eradicating the two extremes,
:: This is the king of reasonings.

Unlike the Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things, here [in the Prasangika system] phenomena which are not dependent-arising are not asserted. For whatever exists must both be relatively existent and lack inherent existence.

Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way says:662

:: Because there are no phenomena
:: That are not dependent-arising,
:: There are no phenomena that are not
:: Empty [of inherent existence].

\ ###
\ 24:19.
\ Since there is no dharma whatever originating independently,
\ No dharma whatever exists which is not empty.

Also, Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:663

:: There is not ever anywhere
:: Anything's existence without dependence.
:: Thus there is also not ever anywhere
:: Any permanent [self]. [103]
:: Common beings think

:: Space and so forth are permanent [realities].
:: The wise do not see these as realities
:: Even with worldly [understanding].

\ #####
\ 202.
\ There is not anywhere anything
\ That ever exists without depending.
\ Thus never is there anywhere
\ Anything that is permanent.

\ #####
\ 205.
\ That space and so forth are permanent
\ Is a conception of common beings.
\ For the wise they are not objects perceived
\ Even by conventional [valid cognition].

Also, [the Questions of the King of Nagas, Sagara,] Sutra says:664

:: The wise realize phenomena as dependent-arising, they also rely not on extreme views.
:: They know phenomena as having causes and conditions.
:: There are no phenomena without causes and conditions.

Also, Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:665

:: Thus, There are no phenomena that are not dependent-arising, and dependent-arising are also empty. Hence,
:: 'There are no phenomena that are not empty.'

Also, Nagarjuna's Treatise says:666

:: We explain 'arising dependent [on causes and conditions]' [104]
:: As [the meaning of] the emptiness [of inherently existent production].
:: That [emptiness of inherently existent production] is dependent imputation.
:: Just this [emptiness of inherently existent production] is the middle path.

\ #####
\ 18.
\ The "originating dependently" we call "emptiness";
\ This apprehension, i.e., taking into account [all other things], is the understanding of the middle way.

Also, Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:667

~ Due to lacking the two extremes of [inherent] existence and non-existence, just this emptiness which is characterized as no inherently existent production is called the middle path, the middle passage. Therefore, emptiness, dependent imputation, and middle path are synonyms of dependent-arising [for one who has generated the Madhyamika view in his continuum].

With respect to the term 'dependent-arising' (pratityasamutpada) and its meaning, the Grammarians say that if what depend and meet are cause and effect, then because effect would

exist at the time of cause, 'arising' would be impossible. Also, it would contradict the non-assertion of the existence of the effect at the time of its causes. Thus, they do not accept either the term *pratityasamutpada* or its meaning.

Also, the [Buddhist]⁶⁶⁸ Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things assert that all dependent-arisings are truly existent and are products. [105] Therefore, the attempt to prove a selflessness [which means no true existence] through the reason of dependent-arising proves just the opposite for them. [In syllogistic form, this is: the subject, a sprout, is not inherently produced because of being a dependent-arising. About this]⁶⁶⁹

Tsong Khapa's Praise of Dependent-Arising says:⁶⁷⁰

:: How can those who see the opposite [proved] and those who see [the reason] as non-established understand your [i.e., Buddha's] system [of emptiness as no inherent existence]?'

\ #####
\ How can such a one who sees
\ The process of relativity
\ As contradictory, or unestablished,
\ Even understand Your method?

In [Chandrakirti's commentary on] Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning [a qualm is raised by an objector about whether dependent-arising can serve as a sign of no inherently existent production]:⁶⁷¹

~ Here some say, 'Your way of speaking is one that never existed before. It is not reasonable that the term "dependent-arising" indicates no production and no cessation.

Just as your saying, "A child was born," would not mean you were saying, "A child was not born," this [usage of dependent-arising to prove no production and no cessation] is just inadmissible.'

For extensive [discussion on the Grammarians' non-acceptance and others' misinterpretations of dependent-arising] see Vasubandhu's own explanation of his Treasury of Knowledge (*Abhidharmakosha*) and its Commentary (*Abhidharmakoshatika*) by Rajaputra Yashomitra⁶⁷²

and also Vasubandhu's Commentary on the 'Sutra on Dependent-Arising' (*Pratityasamutpaddivibhaganirdesha*) and its Explanation by Gunamati.

Because there are also different ways of forming the term *pratityasamutpada*, I have arranged the interpretations of the former great translators and [grammatical references] to Kalapa's Aphorisms (*Kalapasutra*) and Chandragomin's Grammar (*Chandravydkaranasutra*) [106] and will explain a little the thought of Chandrakirti's Clear Words on the topic.

L4: [Correct way of interpreting dependent-arising] :L4

This section has two parts: formation of the term *pratityasamutpada* and explanation [of its meaning].

L5: [Formation of *pratityasamutpada*] :L5

(See pp.163.)

To form *pratityasamutpada* put down the root for going, in. Erase the n since it is an

indicatory letter. Put down i; before it put prati. [The nominative ending] su is added to this. Due to its being an indeclinable,⁶⁷³ su disappears.

Chandragomin's Grammar (I.iii.129) says,⁶⁷⁴ 'Ktva is suitable when alam and khalu have a prohibitive [sense]. After men. [Affix it] to the former in time of two [actions with] the same agent.' Also, in Kalapa's Aphorisms the sixth section on verbal affixes says,⁶⁷⁵ 'Also, ktva [is affixed] when alam and khalu have a prohibitive sense. After men. [Affix it] to the anterior of [actions with] the same agent.' Therefore, [the continuative] ktva is added.

Chandragomin's Grammar (V.iv.6) says,⁶⁷⁶ 'In a compound which does not have the negative particle, lyap [is substituted] for ktva.' Therefore, ktva changes to lyap. According to the sixth section on verbal affixes in Kalapa's Aphorisms,⁶⁷⁷ ktva becomes yap, but Chandrakirti's Clear Words accords with Chandragomin's Grammar. [107]

Because the l of lyap is for the sake of accent and the letter p is indicative of the addition of the augment tuk, they are erased. Put down ya.

Chandragomin's Grammar (V.i.69) says,⁶⁷⁸ '[Affix] tuk to a [root ending in] a short [vowel] which has no personal ending when [a verbal affix] having an indicatory p follows.' Therefore, tuk is added between i and ya.

Because the k is indicatory and the u is for the sake of pronunciation, the two are erased. Put down t.

In Kalapa's Aphorisms the first section on verbal affixes says,⁶⁷⁹ '[Affix] t to the end of a root which has an indicatory p.' [Because] the consonant has no vowel, it is drawn to the latter letter. Thus, tya is achieved.

Chandragomin's Grammar (V.i.106) says,⁶⁸⁰ 'When a simple vowel [is followed by] a simple vowel, the long [corresponding vowel is the single substitute for both vowels].' Thus, joining prati and /, make [the vowel long]. Pratitya is achieved; it is a stem.

Chandragomin's Grammar (II.i.93) says,⁶⁸¹ 'When the meaning only [of the noun is denoted], the first [case is employed].' Thus, the singular of the first case, su is added. According to Kalapa's Aphorisms it is si.

Chandragomin's Grammar (II.i.38) says,⁶⁸² 'The case affix is erased after an indeclinable.' Kalapa's Aphorisms says, 'After an indeclinable also [the case affix is erased].' Thus, the si [or su] is erased; thereby, pratitya is achieved. It is used for three [meanings]: 'having met', 'having relied', and 'having depended'. [108] Here in the Prasangika system, it is explained [that pratitya refers to any of these three meanings] according to the context and that it does not necessarily mean just one of them.

Also, pad has the sense of 'going'. Put down pad. Before it, put down the prefix ut, and before it put down sam. Su is added to these two and is erased as before [due to their being indeclinables].

Chandragomin's Grammar (I.iii.7) says,⁶⁸³ 'Ghan, [the verbal affix a causing the substitution of vrddhi for the preceding vowel, comes] also when an action [is denoted].' [In Kalapa's Aphorisms] the fifth section on verbal affixes says,⁶⁸⁴ '[The affix] ghan [comes] after [the roots] pad, ruj, vish, sprsh, and uch.' Therefore, at the end of the root pad, ghan is added. The significatory gh and the n which signifies vrddhi are erased. Put down the a which is the life of gha. The initial of the root is augmented. Putting [these parts] together in stages, one achieves samutpada.

Chandragomin's Grammar (II.i.93) says, 685 'When the meaning only [of the noun is denoted] the first [case is employed].' Thus, to this add su; erase u. Also, (VI.iii.98), 686 'For the [final] s and the sh of sajush, ru [is substituted at the end of a word].' 5 becomes ru.

Chandragomin's Grammar (V.i.19) says, 687 '[The u is the substitute] of ru when [it is followed by] a soft consonant and [preceded] by a non-protracted a.' Thus, the u, being indicatory, is erased.

Chandragomin's Grammar (VI.iv.20?) says, 688 'When there is a pause, visarga [is substituted for r].' Thus, r is made into visarga; samutpadah is achieved. It is explained at this point as meaning 'arising', 'established', and 'existing'. [109]

L5: [Explanation of the meaning of dependent-arising] :L5

(see pp.164.)

Thus, the meaning of pratityasamutpada is the arising of things dependent on causes. For prati is a prefix meaning 'meeting', and i is the root for going, in, but—with the continuative ending and modified by the prefix prati—pratitya is used for 'meeting' and 'relying'. Also, pada with samut before it is used for 'arising' and at other times is also explained as 'existing' (sat) and 'established' (siddha). Chandrakirti's Clear Words says: 689

~ Prati has the meaning of meeting (pradpti, phrad pa). [The verbal root] i has the meaning of going. Here the term pratitya, a continuative, is used for 'meeting' or 'relying' because of the modification of the meaning of the verbal root by the modifier [prefix]. It is explained, 'The meaning of the verbal root is led forcefully elsewhere by a modifier [prefix], like the sweetness of the waters of the Ganges [110] [being changed] by ocean water.' [The root] pad preceded by samut means 'arise' (prddurbhdva, 'byung ba); therefore, the term samutpada is used for 'arising'. Hence, the meaning of pratityasamutpada is 'the arising of things in reliance on causes and conditions'.

Many commentators who have written about this explanation think that lyap is the [Sanskrit] equivalent of [the genitive particle] kyi [in Tibetan]. They are also seen to make coarse errors about prati and iti. Also, though the great translator Sthiramati forms the term pratityasamutpada, it is not clear. 690 Having seen that without understanding these [explanations of the formation of pratityasamutpada] one does not understand the early part of Chandrakirti's Clear Words, I have clearly expounded a little, free from error.

L4: [Refutation of error concerning the etymology of pratityasamutpada] :L4

This section has two parts: refutation of other commentators' formation and of Bhavaviveka's.

L5: [Refutation of the formation of pratityasamutpada by other commentators] :L5

This section has two parts: statement of their assertion and refutation of it.

L6: [Statement of other commentators' assertion on the formation of pratityasamutpada] :L6

(See p. 163-4.)

Some former commentators on Nagarjuna's Treatise, other than Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka, say:

~ The term prati has a distributive meaning like 'diversely' or 'this and that'. [111]
[The verbal root] i or in has the meaning of 'going', or 'departing and disintegrating'.
Itya, which is the affix ya added to the verbal root, means 'that which goes'. Taking itya
as a secondary derivative noun, [pratityasamutpada means] the arising of what possesses
departing or disintegrating diversely, diversely.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:691

~ Others say that [the noun] iti means going, disintegrating. Itya means that which is
conducive to going.692 Prati has the sense of multiplicity. Having explained that the term
itya has an ending for a secondary derivative noun, they say [pratityasamutpada means] the
arising of those which go or disintegrate, diversely, diversely (pratiprati ityanam
vinashinam samutpada).

Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) Wisdom' says,693 'Some others say that the arising of
those which disintegrate diversely is pratityasamutpada.' Avalokitavrata's Commentary
(Prajnapradipatika) on this says:694

~ The 'some others' are some other proponents of Madhyamika tenets.695 [112] 'The
arising of those which disintegrate diversely' means the composition and arising of effects
that disintegrate in each diverse moment and have definite, diverse causes and conditions;
it is synonymous with 'arising upon meeting'.

~ [In Bhavaviveka's text] 'is pratityasamutpada' indicates the conclusion of the
meaning of the preceding words. It indicates that the composition and arising of effects
that disintegrate in each diverse moment and have definite, diverse causes and conditions is
pratityasamutpada. Proponents of Madhyamika tenets other than the commentator [Bhavaviveka]
himself say this.

When they form the term pratityasamutpada, the n of the verbal root for going, in, is
erased. [The zero affix] kvip is added and entirely erased.' T is suitable [to be affixed]
at the end of a root which has an indicative p.'696 Because of the sense of 'going' [an
action noun], t is added. Since it was said, 'Ya [is affixed] also as an affix for
derivative nouns [meaning] "good in that", 'ya which is an affix for derivative nouns is
added. [The case ending] si is added. [113] When this is joined with prati, there is [the
noun] pratityah. The rest [of their formation of pratityasamutpadah] is similar to that
given above. Chandrakirti, Bhavaviveka, and Avalokitavrata refute this assertion that there
is a case ending [that is, a genitive ending making pratityanam] which has been deleted [in
the compound].

L6: [Refutation of these other commentators' way of forming pratityasamutpada] :L6

(see pp. 163-4.)

Their explanation of prati as meaning multiplicity and itya as being a derivative noun is
not correct. For, the explanation of prati as meaning multiplicity, though suitable for just
general [applications of the term], does not cover specific applications. A term for 'many'
or multiplicity is [hypothetically]697 suitable when a general [reference for the term is
given as in], 'He who sees pratityasamutpada, that is, the arising of those which depart or
disintegrate diversely, [sees suchness].'698 In yah pratityasamutpadam pashyati the term
pratityasamutpadam is a compound; therefore, it is [hypothetically] correct that a
case-ending inside the compound could have been deleted. However, when a particular referent
is given as in, 'An eye consciousness is produced depending on an eye sense and a form'

chakshuh pratitya rupam cha utpadyate chakshurvijñanam, 699 multiplicity is not suitable in one particular. Here pratitya is not compounded with anything. It is not suitable [to say that] there is a compound here because the Sanskrit original for 'and' (cha) in 'an eye sense and a form' was not deleted and [the accusative ending] am of 'on a form' (rupam) was not deleted. Also, there is no case ending to be seen from the end of pratitya until chakshuh. This is because [pratitya is here just] fit to be an indeclinable, a continuative.

Chandrakīrti's Clear Words says: 700 [114]

~ Their etymology would be excellent in a passage such as, 'O monks, I will teach you pratityasamutpada,' or 'He who sees pratityasamutpada sees suchness.' For the meaning of multiplicity occurs, and there is a compound [thus allowing for the possibility that pratitya means pratityanam].

~ However, here in a passage such as, 'Dependent on an eye sense and forms an eye consciousness is produced,' a particular object [of dependence] has been openly accepted—'dependent on an eye sense'. When the production of one consciousness, which has as its cause one eye sense, has been asserted, how could the term pratitya have the meaning of multiplicity?

~ However, the meaning of 'meeting' occurs in the term pratitya even when a specific object is not asserted; arising having met [causes and conditions] is dependent-arising. Also, [the meaning of 'meeting'] occurs when a specific object is asserted, [115] for it is said that dependent on an eye and forms—that is, meeting an eye and forms or in reliance on an eye and forms—[an eye consciousness arises]. 701

~ If the term itya were a derivative noun, then here in 'Dependent on an eye sense and forms an eye consciousness is produced' (chakshuh pratitya rupani cha utpadyate chakshurvijñanam) the term pratitya would [absurdly] not be an indeclinable. Also, since there would not be a compound, a case termination would be present [at the end of pratitya]. The reading would [absurdly] be: chakshuh pratityam vijñanam rupani cha, 'That which departs to an eye sense and to forms, a consciousness, [arises].' And [since such is total nonsense] it is not so. Therefore, its etymology as just an indeclinable, a continuative, is to be accepted.

The meaning [is that pratitya must be accepted as a continuative] because chakshuhcha 702 rupam pratitya chakshu [vijñanam] appears [in the sūtra and no case-ending is given for pratitya].

L5: [Refutation of Bhavaviveka's way of interpreting pratityasamutpada] :L5

(see pp.165-6.)

L6: [Incorrectness of Bhavaviveka's refutation of another] :L6

Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom' states Buddhapaṇita's way [of interpreting pratityasamutpada]: 703

~ With respect to pratityasamutpada, [116] one [Buddhapaṇita] says that due to the sense of multiplicity in the prefix prati (rten cing), due to the sense of 'meeting' ('brel ba) in i, and due to the sense of 'arising' ('byung ba) in the term samutpada, pratityasamutpada means 'arising dependent on these and those [causes and conditions]' or 'arising upon meeting these and those [causes and conditions]'.

Bhavaviveka also states [the other way of interpreting the term cited] previously [on p.666].

Chandrakirti, thinking that such an explanation shows Bhavaviveka's lack of skill in stating an opponent's position, asserts that Buddhapalita's thought is not as Bhavaviveka stated it. For Buddhapalita says that pratitya means 'meeting' (pradpti, phrad pa); and thus prati (rten cing) does not have a sense of multiplicity, and itya ('brel ba) does not mean 'meeting'.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:704

~ Thus, he [Bhavaviveka] states others' positions and refutes them. It is regarded that there is a lack of skill in his stating of others' positions. [117] Why? He [Buddhapalita] who explains the term pratitya705 as meaning 'meeting' does not explain prati as having a sense of multiplicity or that i means 'meeting'.

Then, what [does Buddhapalita say]? Buddhapalita says that prati (rten cing) means 'meeting' and itya ('brel bar) means 'going'. Though individually they have different meanings, when these two are combined, the prefix [prati] changes the meaning of the latter word [itya]. It is like the sweet water of the Ganges becoming salty when it meets the salt water [of the ocean]. Thus, the two words indicate just one meaning, 'meeting'. Hence, the meaning of pratityasamutpada is 'arising upon meeting [causes and conditions]'.

When the term pratityasamutpada is applied to all things in the sense of 'arising upon meeting this and that collection of causes and conditions' and one says, "Hetupratityasamutpada," it is taken as being related with multiplicity. However, [118] Buddhapalita did not assert [that there is any sense of] multiplicity in a specific [application of the term] as in 'Dependent on an eye sense and a form [an eye consciousness is produced].'

Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:706

~ Then what [does Buddhapalita say]? He says that prati (rten cing) means 'meeting'. I ('brel bar) means 'going'. The combinationpratitya means just 'meeting'.707

~ Now when a consideration of all possible entities is asserted as being expressed by the term pratityasamutpada—etymologized as 'arising upon meeting' or dependent-arising—then a relation with multiplicity is being stated: 'Arising upon meeting this and that collection of causes and conditions' is [the meaning of] dependent-arising. [However,] when a consideration of a particular instance is asserted, there is no relation with multiplicity, [as in] 'Having met an eye sense and forms [an eye consciousness arises].'

~ Such is the unskillfulness of the master [Bhavaviveka] in citing [another's position].

Not only that, but also [Bhavaviveka's] way of refuting the others' system is not correct [119] because [his statement] is reduced to being just the thesis, '[Buddhapalita's explanation] is not correct,' without any reason.

However, Bhavaviveka's thought may have been that because a consciousness has no form, it could not meet an eye sense and a form because meeting exists only between the physical. However, even if that were his thought, it would be incorrect because it is asserted that monks meet [that is, attain] the four fruits [Stream Enterer, Once Returner, Never Returner, and Foe Destroyer, which are not physical]. Sutra says, 'This monk is one who has met [attained] the fruit.'

Also, prapya ('having met' or 'upon meeting', phrad nas) is a synonym of apekshya ('having relied' or 'in reliance upon', has nas). Also, the Superior Nagarjuna [in his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning] asserts that the term pratitya (rten cing 'brel ba) means prapya ('having met', phrad pa):708

:: That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions]

:: Is not inherently produced.

:: (Tat tat prdpya yad utpannam notpannam tatsvabhdvatah.)

\ #####

\ 19.

\ Whatever arises depending on this and that has not arisen substantially. That which has not arisen substantially: How can it literally be called 'arisen'?

Chandrakmi's Clear Words says:709

~ [Bhavaviveka says,] 'That is not admissible because of the non-existence of the meaning of these two [wrong interpretations of pratityasamutpada] 710 in 'An eye consciousness is produced depending on an eye and forms.'

~ This refutation is not correct. [120] Why? He does not state a reason why there is no occurrence [of a meeting], and, therefore, he has only a thesis.

~ Then, this might be [Bhavaviveka's] thought: 'A consciousness has no form; therefore, it has no meeting with an eye sense. For it is seen that there is a meeting just of those which have form.'

~ This is also not admissible because of the assertion of 'meeting' here in, 'This monk is one who has met the fruit.' Also, the term 'having met' (prdpya, phrad nas) is a synonym of the term 'having relied' (apekshya, bltos nas). Also, the master Nagarjuna accepts the term pratitya as meaning just prapti 'meeting', [or 'having met' when used as a continuative.

Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says:]711

:: That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions]

:: Is not inherently produced.

:: (Tat tat prdpya yad utpannam notpannam tat svabhdvatah.)

\ #####

\ 19.

\ Whatever arises depending on this and that has not arisen substantially. That which has not arisen substantially: How can it literally be called 'arisen'?

Therefore, others [Chandrakirti himself] say that even [Bhavaviveka's] refutation is not admissible.

L6: [Incompleteness of Bhavaviveka's own etymology and meaning of pratityasamutpada] :L6

(See pp. 165-6.)

Even Bhavaviveka's own way of explanation is incorrect [121] because though he asserts that he will [etymologize pratityasamutpada] explaining [the parts] individually, he does not

state individual meanings for pratitya and samutpada. Also, [in his Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom'] Bhavaviveka says no more than,⁷¹² 'the meaning of "conditionality" is the meaning of pratityasamutpada—"When this is, that arises; due to the production of this, that is produced"'.⁷¹³

Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:⁷¹⁴

~ What then is [the meaning of pratityasamutpada according to Bhavaviveka? He] presents his own system as, 'The meaning of conditionality is the meaning of pratityasamutpada—when this is, that arises; due to the production of this, that is produced.' This also is incorrect because he did not state a particular meaning for each of the two terms, pratitya and samutpada, and because he asserted that he would give an etymology.

Objection: Bhavaviveka says such asserting that pratityasamutpada is a term the meaning of which is determined by conventional usage and does not have the character set forth in its etymological explanation. It is like aranyetilaka [which literally means 'sesame in the forest'⁷¹⁵ but is conventionally used to mean anything not answering to one's expectations]. The word 'et cetera' [in Chandrakirti's text, which is soon to be quoted, refers to other such non-literal terms derived] from the transmission of earlier forms of speech, such as 'lakeborn' (saraja) for a lotus grown on dry earth [122] and 'lying on the earth' (mahisha) for a buffalo that is standing.

Answer: This also is not correct because the master, the Superior Nagarjuna, individually differentiated pratitya and samutpada as components of the term: tat tat prdpya 'having met this and that' [collection of causes and conditions] and utpannam 'arisen'. [Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says,]⁷¹⁶ 'Tat tat prdpya yad utpannam notpannam tat svabhavatah : That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions] is not inherently produced.'

Also, you [Bhavaviveka] wish, for instance, to explain [the term] in accordance with Nagarjuna's Precious Garland:⁷¹⁷

:: When this is, that arises,
:: Like long when there is short.

\ #####
\ 48. When this is, that arises,
\ Like short when there is long.
\ Due to the production of this, that is produced,
\ Like light from the production of a flame.

However, even you must explain this as [having the meaning of 'depending' or 'relying' or] ⁷¹⁸ 'meeting'. Therefore, that which you have refuted becomes [that which you yourself must assert]. [123]

Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:⁷¹⁹

~ Objection: Such is said [by Bhavaviveka] having asserted pratityasamutpada to be a conventional term [not necessarily following its etymological meaning] like aranyetilaka [meaning anything which does not answer to one's expectations], etc.

~ Answer: This also is not correct because the master [Nagarjuna] asserts pratityasamutpada just in relation to its members: 'Tat tat prdpya yad utpannam notpannam tat svabhdvatah. That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and

conditions] is not inherently produced.'

[Bhavaviveka] explains pratityasamutpada with:

:: When this is, that arises,
:: Like long when there is short.

~ Then, does he not assert just that depending (pratitya, rten te) on short, meeting (prdpya, phrad cing) to short, relying (apekshya, bltos nas) on short, long comes to be? Therefore, it is not fitting that he assert just what he refutes.

Thus, pratityasamutpada means the dependent-arising of products—their arising in reliance on their own causes and conditions. [124] It also means the dependent-arising [of all phenomena, products and non-products]—their existence meeting to or in reliance on their own parts, their own bases of imputation, or their own members. For with regard to the Sanskrit original of 'arising' (samutpada), Vasubandhu's Commentary on the 'Sutra on Dependent-Arising' explains sam as 'coming together', 'aggregating', etc. Also, Rajaputra Yashomitra⁷²⁰ explains pada as 'existing' etc.

Because all phenomena are just existent in dependence upon, in reliance upon, or meeting to [causes and conditions, their parts, and their basis of imputation], they are not able to set themselves up and do not exist through their own power.

Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:⁷²¹

:: That which has a dependent arising
:: Cannot be self-powered; since all these
:: Lack being under their own power,
:: There is no self [inherent existence].

\ ####
\ 348.
\ Anything that has dependent arising
\ Is not independent.
\ All these are not independent,
\ Therefore there is no self.

Also, the Superior Nagarjuna says [in his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning]:⁷²²

:: That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions]
:: Is not inherently produced. [125]

\ ####
\ 19.
\ Whatever arises depending on this and that has not arisen substantially. That which has not arisen substantially: How can it literally be called 'arisen'?

Also, it is as Chandrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred' says:⁷²³

~ I am not a proponent of no phenomena (*abhavavddin, dngos po medpar smra ba) because I propound dependent-arising.

~ Question: Are you a proponent of [inherently existent] phenomena (*bhavavadin, dngos par smra ha)?

~ Answer: No, [I am not a proponent of inherently existing phenomena] because I am a proponent of dependent-arising.

~ Question: What do you propound?

~ Answer: I propound dependent-arising.

~ Question: Then, what is the meaning of dependent-arising?

~ Answer: It means no inherent existence. It means no inherently existent production. It means the arising of effects which have a nature like that of magical illusions, mirages, reflections, magical cities of Smell-Eaters, emanations, and dreams. It means emptiness and selflessness.

Also, here [in the syllogism, 'The subject, such and such, does not inherently exist because of being a dependent-arising'] the profound is the predicate—'does not inherently exist'—and the vast is the reason—'being a dependent-arising'. The way that the profound is fully present in the predicate and the vast is fully present in the reason should be sought in detail in Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning, Chandrakirti's commentary on it, Nagarjuna's own commentary on his Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness, and his Precious Garland as well as in Gyel-tsap's commentary, etc. Nagarjuna's Friendly Letter (Suhrllekha) says:724 [126]

:: This dependent-arising is the profound preciousness
:: Of the treasury of the Conqueror's speech.
:: Who sees this correctly sees the highest aspect
:: [Of the teaching] of Buddha, the Knower of Suchness.

\ #####
\ Stance 112
\ Cette profonde doctrine de l'origine interdépendante
\ Est le précieux trésor de la Parole du Vainqueur.
\ Quiconque la comprend correctement
\ Perçoit le Bouddha, le suprême connaisseur de la réalité.

Also, Mahamati's commentary on this says:725

~ This dependent-arising is the preciousness of the Tathagata's speech because one who knows this well realizes correctly the teaching of the Tathagata. 'Profound' means 'solely profound'.

Also:

~ Or, 'He who sees this correctly ...' means seeing just the preciousness of the treasury which is the Conqueror's speech. The profundity is non-creation by self, non-creation by other...

Thus, this dependent-arising overcoming all conceptions of both extremes is the king of reasonings.

The foremost lama [Tsong Khapa in his Praise of Dependent-Arising] says:726 [127]

:: Among teachers the teacher of dependent-arising
:: And among types of knowledge the knowledge of dependent-arising
:: Are like the Conqueror King [Buddha] among worldly beings.

\ ####
 \ Among teachers, the Teacher of relativity,
 \ Among wisdoms, the wisdom of relativity;
 \ There are like Imperial Victors in the world,
 \ Making Your World Champion of Wisdom, over all.

L3: [Elimination of error concerning dependent-arising] :L3

(See pp. 171-3.) The root text says:

:: Therefore, [asserting] that the ultimate
 :: Is able to set itself up is [like wanting]
 :: To eat space; no one takes 'validly established'
 :: And 'able to set itself up' as synonyms.

Daktsang, as was explained before [in the eleventh chapter which is not translated here],⁷²⁷ asserts that 'ultimate object' (Paramartha, don dam), 'able to set itself up' (tshugs thub), and 'validly established' (pramanasiddha, tshadgrub) are synonyms. However, the three—the father, the Superior [Nagarjuna], and his spiritual sons [Aryadeva and Buddhapalita]—explain that dependent-arisings are not autonomous. Therefore, this assertion that an ultimate [an emptiness] is able to set itself up is like asserting that space can be eaten.

Also, Dharmakirti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium of Valid Cognition' (pramanavarttika) says,⁷²⁸ 'Because there are two types of objects of comprehension, there are two types of valid cognizers.' Thus, Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, and so forth assert that even generally characterized phenomena (samanyalakshana, spyi mtshan) [permanent phenomena] are validly established [but, of course, do not accept that they are able to set themselves up]. Thus, there is not even one [school of tenets] asserting that 'able to set itself up' is necessarily present in the meaning of 'validly established'. Therefore, do not scar Buddha's teaching [with such absurdity]! [128]

L2: [7. Refuting a Self of Persons] :L2

The presentation of the reasoning refuting a self of persons has two parts: actual exposition and elimination of error.

L3: [Actual exposition of the reasoning refuting a self of persons (reasoning #2 : THE SEVENFOLD REASONING; refuting that a self can be the same (one) or different (many) than the aggregates, or that one depends on the other, or that the self possess the aggregates, or is the mere aggregation, or the mere shape)] :L3

[See also Part I, Part II & Part IV on this reasoning]

(See pp.31-51, 175-95.)

The root text says:⁷²⁹

:: A self under its own power is non-existent
 :: Because the aggregates are not the person,
 :: The person is not [an entity] other [than the aggregates],
 :: The person is not the base of the aggregates,
 :: The person also does not [ultimately] depend on the aggregates,
 :: The person does not [ultimately] possess the aggregates,
 :: The shape [of the aggregates] is not the person,
 :: Like a chariot. Apply [this analysis] to all phenomena.

With respect to this, I have extensively refuted elsewhere⁷³⁰ many wrong notions about these sets of twos:

-- I and my
 -- the view of the transitory collection as a real I and the view of the transitory collection as real my
 -- the conventional, mental valid cognizer apprehending I and the conventional, mental valid cognizer apprehending my
 -- basis of imputation and phenomenon imputed, etc.

Therefore, here I will just illustrate the difficult points.

Sutra says,⁷³¹

~ 'O monks, any devotee or Brahmin who views a self is viewing only these five appropriated aggregates.'

Also, the root text [Chandrakirti's Supplement] says,⁷³² [129]

:: 'There is no [innate] apprehension [of a self] separate from the aggregates.'

\ #####
 \ 165.
 \ Since such a self is not born, it does not exist,
 \ Just like a child of a barren woman;
 \ And since it is not even the basis of grasping at I,
 \ It cannot be asserted even conventionally.

\ #####
 \ 166.
 \ All the characteristics attributed to it by the Tirthikas
 \ In this treatise and that treatise
 \ Are damaged by the reason of its not being born, with which they are familiar;
 \ Therefore none of these characteristics exists.

\ #####
 \ 167.
 \ Thus there is no self that is other than the aggregates
 \ Because it is not apprehended separate from the aggregates.
 \ It cannot even be asserted as the basis of worldly I-grasping minds,
 \ Because though they do not cognize it, they have a view of self.

\ #####
 \ 168.
 \ Even those who have spent many aeons as animals

\ Do not see this unborn permanent;
\ And yet they too are seen to grasp at I.
\ Therefore there is no self that is other than the aggregates.

Also,

:: '[The teaching by Buddha that the self is the aggregates] is [just] a refutation of a self different from the aggregates because other sutras say that forms and so forth are not the self.'

\ ####
\ 175.
\ If you assert that the aggregates are the self
\ Because the Blessed One says that the aggregates are the self,
\ This is to refute a self other than the aggregates,
\ Because in other Sutas it says that forms are not the self and so forth.

\ ####
\ 176.
\ Since other Sutas say that
\ Forms, feelings, and discriminations are not the self,
\ Nor are compositional factors or consciousness,
\ The teaching in the Sutra does not say that the aggregates are the self.

Chandrakirti's own Commentary on the 'Supplement' says:733

~ The object of observation of [a consciousness viewing the transitory collection as an inherently existent self] is the [nominally existent] self. For, that which conceives an [inherently existent] I has its object [an inherently existent] self.

Thus, the appearance of a [nominally existent] I, or self, sentient being, god, etc., in dependence on the transitory aggregates which are composites of plural [factors] is the [nominally existent] I, or self, sentient being, god, etc.

Furthermore, Buddhapalita says [in his commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise, 734 'That which the self possesses is called mine.' Thus, the maker into own of eyes and so forth—which are the things owned and are qualified as being 'own'—is assigned as own, mine, a sentient being's mine, a god's mine, etc.

A viewing consciousness which, having apprehended a [nominally existent] I, conceives that I to exist truly [130] is both a consciousness viewing the transitory collection as a real I and an ignorance. A viewing consciousness which, having apprehended [nominally existent] mine, conceives that mine to exist truly is both a consciousness viewing the transitory collection as real mine and an ignorance. These are explicitly said to be consciousnesses viewing the transitory collection [as real I and mine] in Chandrakirti's own Commentary on the 'Supplement': 735

~ There [in VI. 120] a 'consciousness viewing the transitory collection' is an afflicted knowledge dwelling in thoughts of such [inherently existent] I and mine.

Also, Chandrakirti's Supplement says:736

:: Initially adhering to a self, I,
:: And then generating attachment for things, 'This is mine.' :

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 \ I.3
 \ 3.
 \ I bow down to that compassion for living beings
 \ Who from first conceiving 'I' with respect to the self,
 \ Then thinking 'This is mine' and generating attachment for things,
 \ Are without self-control like the spinning of a well.

His Commentary on the 'Supplement' says: 737

~ These worldly beings, before adhering to mine, imagine through the conception of an [inherently existent] I that a non-[inherently] existent self does exist [inherently], and they adhere to just this as true. Then thinking 'mine', they adhere also to all things other than the object of the conception of I [as truly established].

Also, Tsong Khapa's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' says in detail: 738

~ The [conventionally existent] I is the base generating the thought 'I'. There is a consciousness observing it which as its mode conceives [the I] to exist by way of its own character. [131] This is both an innate consciousness viewing the transitory collection which [falsely] conceives I and an obscuration with respect to a self of persons. There is a consciousness observing the [conventionally existent] mine which as its mode conceives [the mine] to exist by way of its own character. This is both an innate consciousness viewing the transitory collection which [falsely] conceives mine and an obscuration with respect to the mine of a person.

[Thus, 'mine' refers not to things which are considered as belongings but to the maker of things into one's belongings; hence, mine is a type of person.] 739 Nevertheless, the person does not become many continuums [I being one and mine being another] due to the fact that I and mine are one entity, differentiated only in thought through their isolates. For example, in the Superior Ananda's continuum the I, monk, human, Stream Enterer, Shakya clan member, and royal caste member have different meanings but are one continuum. Therefore, it should be understood that the types of consciousnesses conceiving I in his continuum are manifold.

The appearance as I with respect to the aggregates and the appearance as I in dependence on the aggregates are I. However, not only are the aggregates not I, but also the aggregates appearing as I are not I. For, the appearance as an I established from its own side is not the object I.

Also, eyes, ears, and so forth are bases of the imputation 'mine' (ngayi ba) and [132] illustrations [not of the mine but] of what is owned (ngayiyin rgyu), but they are not mine. For they are not that which possesses mine (nga yi can) nor the maker of mine (nga yir byed pa po). Also, the conception of eyes, ears, and so forth as existing by way of their own character is a conception of a self of phenomena; what conceives the mine which appears in dependence on them to be inherently existent is the [false] conception of mine.

Tsong Khapa's Ocean of Reasoning says: 740

~ A consciousness observing a base [such as an eye generating the thought] 'mine' and conceiving it to exist in that way [by way of its own character] is a conceiver of a self of phenomena. Therefore, 'observing the mine' does not refer to observing those [eyes, ears, and so forth which are the bases giving rise to the thought 'mine'].

Also, Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate [seems to speak of eyes and so forth as illustrations of mine but actually] is explaining that they are illustrations of things owned (bdag gi yin rgyu):741

~ The eyes, ears, and so forth included within one's own continuum are illustrations of both mine and phenomena in the division [of all phenomena] into persons and phenomena.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:742

:: That which pertains to the self is the mine; it means one's own five aggregates.

:: Still, he is referring to the base, [generating the thought] 'mine' (bdaggi ba'igzhi) [and not mine itself].

Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says:743 [133]

~ The eyes, ears, and so forth included within one's own continuum are illustrations of both mine and phenomena in the division [of all phenomena] into persons and phenomena. They appear to innate [non-analytical] awarenesses as mine which is established from the object's own side or they appear to innate awarenesses as mine, and then observing such mine, one conceives that it exists by way of its own character. This is the innate [misconception of mine.

Therefore, on the basis that [the eyes, ears, and so forth in one's own continuum] are the objects generating the view of the transitory collection that [falsely] conceives of mine, you should know that when mine appears to a Buddha, he perceives it as only imputed to its basis of imputation and does not perceive the basis of the imputation as the phenomenon imputed. Also, you should know that a composite of the two [mistaken appearance of the mine as inherently existent and the emptiness of such] appears to lesser Superiors.

Furthermore, Daktsang and so forth say:744

~ It is wrong that when the conception of self is analyzed, one refutes the identification of a self separate from the aggregates and afterwards refutes the true existence of the aggregates. This is because the self and the aggregates appear as one to the innate [non-analytical intellect], for the root text [Chandrakirti's Supplement] says,745 [134]

:: 'There is no [innate] conception [of a self] separate from the aggregates.'

\ #####

\ 167.

\ Thus there is no self that is other than the aggregates

\ Because it is not apprehended separate from the aggregates.

\ It cannot even be asserted as the basis of worldly I-grasping minds,

\ Because though they do not cognize it, they have a view of self.

Ridiculing the instruction manuals on the view [of emptiness], even one of our own logicians propounds [that there is no innate conception of the self and aggregates as different].746 These assertions are the bad talk of those with partial vision much like the way a one-eyed yak eats grass.

[Contradictory consequences are now stated to refute the view that innate, non-analytical awarenesses perceive the self as one with the aggregates and that, therefore, analysis of the self means analysis of the aggregates.] It [absurdly] follows that an innate

[non-analytical] awareness would not conceive [the self and the aggregates] as different as in 'my body' and 'my mind'.

It [absurdly] follows that there would be no innate [non-analytical awareness mis] conceiving the self and the aggregates as like a master and his subjects.

If it is accepted [that there is no innate non-analytical awareness misconceiving the self and the aggregates as like a master and his subjects], then it [absurdly] follows that Chandrakirti would be wrong to say,⁷⁴⁷ 'What is related to [or preceded by] the view of self [that is, of inherent existence] is extinguished.'

It [absurdly] follows that the Sutra on the Ten Grounds concerning the fourth ground [and quoted by Chandrakirti]⁷⁴⁸ at this point [in the fourth chapter of his Commentary on the 'Supplement'] would be wrong. There are many [such contradictory consequences].

You seem to be basing your opinion on [Chandrakirti's statement in his Supplement],⁷⁴⁹ 'There is no [innate] conception [of a self] separate from the aggregates.' [However,] this refutes [the theory that there is an innate conception of] ⁷⁵⁰ a self that has a character discordant with the aggregates and that there is an innate conception of a permanent self independent of the aggregates; it does not refute that the self and the aggregates are just different. [For you] it [absurdly] follows that this distinction would be incorrect because of your thesis [that the self and the aggregates appear as one to an innate non-analytical awareness]. The three circles of self-contradiction! [You have accepted (1) the reason, (2) that the predicate of the consequence is entailed by the reason, and (3) the opposite of the consequence.]

If it is accepted [that the self and the aggregates are not merely different], then since the self and the aggregates exist and a difference between them has been rejected, it [absurdly] follows that the self and the aggregates would be one.

Also, [if it is accepted that the self and the aggregates are not merely different], then it [absurdly] follows that Chandrakirti would be wrong when he clearly states in his root text [that the self and the aggregates are not different entities but are just different]:⁷⁵¹ [135]

:: Those who have fallen down senseless into [lives as] animals for many eons also do not perceive this unborn permanent [self]. Having seen that the conception of [an inherently existent] I operates even in them, [what intelligent being would think that such an unborn permanent self is the base of the innate conception of an inherently existent self?] Thus, there is no self other than the aggregates.

\ #####
\ 168.
\ Even those who have spent many aeons as animals
\ Do not see this unborn permanent;
\ And yet they too are seen to grasp at I.
\ Therefore there is no self that is other than the aggregates.

Furthermore, while saying such, [we]⁷⁵² say that the way that the I in a human continuum appears is that it appears undifferentiable from the aggregates and as if standing on its own (hrang hrang ba) and concrete (phob phob pa). About this also, some [Daktsang and so forth]⁷⁵³ say, 'Such an appearance of the I is totally incorrect because the I is a non-associated compositional factor [that is, a product which is neither form nor

consciousness] and because non-associated compositional factors do not appear this way.'

[Contradictory consequences are stated in response.] It [absurdly] follows that there would be no appearance of I [to the mind] because [according to you] the appearance of the aggregates which are the bases of the imputation 'I' is not the appearance of the I.⁷⁵⁴ The three circles of self-contradiction!

It [absurdly] follows that when the I appears, an independent I would appear because the I would have to appear without depending on the appearance of the aggregates. The three circles of self-contradiction!

It [absurdly] follows that when the I appears to an innate [non-analytical awareness], without the appearance of the aggregates —the basis of the imputation—the appearance of an I, the phenomenon imputed which is merely neither form nor consciousness, would occur. For, your thesis is correct [according to you]! [136]

If that were accepted, it would contradict Chandrakirti's statement,⁷⁵⁵

:: 'There is no [innate] conception [of a self] separate from the aggregates.'

\ #####
\ 167.
\ Thus there is no self that is other than the aggregates
\ Because it is not apprehended separate from the aggregates.
\ It cannot even be asserted as the basis of worldly I-grasping minds,
\ Because though they do not cognize it, they have a view of self.

Not only that but also the way that the I appears to an innate [non-analytical awareness] is that it seems to exist from the side of the aggregates [and not just as an imputation from the subject's side] within the context that the basis of the imputation 'I' and the phenomenon imputed are inseparably mixed like milk and water. For at that time, it must appear by way of a mixture of the appearance of the aggregates, which are the basis of the imputation, and the appearance of the I, which is the phenomenon imputed [in dependence upon them]. If the I appeared separately from the aggregates, then the self would not appear to have the character of the aggregates—production, disintegration, shape, etc., being the feeler, discriminator, accumulator of actions, actor, knower, and so forth.

Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way says:⁷⁵⁶

:: If [the self] were other than the aggregates,
:: It would not have the character of the aggregates.

\ #####
\ 1.
\ If the individual self (atma) were [identical to] the "groups" (skandha), then it would partake of origination and destruction.
\ If [the individual self] were different from the "groups," then it would be without the characteristics of the "groups."

Also, Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:⁷⁵⁷

~ If the self were separate from the aggregates, it would have the character of non-aggregates. [137] The five aggregates have the character of suitability as form,⁷⁵⁸ experiencing, apprehending signs, composition, and realizing objects individually. Also,

just as consciousness [is different] from form, so the self which is being asserted to be different from the aggregates would be established as having a character different [from the aggregates]. Also, its different character would be apprehended just as [the character of] mind [is apprehended separate] from form, but it is not apprehended so. Therefore, the self is not separate from the aggregates.

Buddhapalita also says such. [If the person and the aggregates appeared totally separately] then a white horse, a speckled bull, and so forth would be impossible.

Also, the Sacred Word of Manjushri by [the fifth Dalai Lama,] the great master and foremost of Conquerors, says:759

~ Sometimes the I will seem to exist in the context of the body. Sometimes it will seem to exist in the context of the mind. Sometimes it will seem to exist in the context of the other individual aggregates [feelings, discriminations, and compositional factors]. At the end of the arising of such a variety of modes of appearance, [138] you will come to identify an I that exists in its own right, that exists inherently, that from the start is self-established, existing undifferentiatedly with the mind and body which are [also] mixed like milk and water.

This is the first essential [in meditation on the selflessness of I], the ascertainment of the object to be negated [in the view of selflessness]. You should analyze until deep experience of it arises. Having generated such in your mental continuum, you thereby crystallize an identification of the I conceived by the innate consciousness conceiving I as able to set itself up within the context that it and your own five aggregates are like water put in water. [139]

This appears to be an unprecedented good explanation, based on experiencing the meaning of the texts by the father Nagarjuna and his spiritual sons.

The objects generating the thought 'I' in the mind of a person such as Devadatta are not of different continuums, but there is a plurality of gods, humans, animals, and so forth [because he was, is, and will be these at various times over his continuum of lives]. The finer points should be known, such as that the I and the mind of his continuum have operated beginninglessly and that though [the I and the mind] have been produced and have ceased [moment by moment], they have never been destroyed. However, the states of being a god or animal, etc., are established through assuming such a body, and the states are destroyed through casting off such a body.

Also, since gods, humans, and so forth are differentiated by way of their physical supports [that is to say, their bodies], the I sometimes seems to exist in the context of the body. On the other hand, since the passage of the mere I through to Buddhahood depends on the mind [which leaves one body and assumes another], the I sometimes seems to exist in the context of the mind. If one [wishes to] penetrate the depths of the view, one should analyze these points well in accordance with Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way and Tsong Khapa's Great Commentary on it.

Tsong Khapa's Ocean of Reasoning says:760

~ Therefore, do not hold that the two, the human who is the imputer of the designation 'I' and the [conventionally existent] self which is the basis that is being imputed with the designation, are co-extensive. Know that the human is one part of the self. [140]

Also:

~ When Devadatta's selves of former and later lives are not individually differentiated, the self that serves as the basis of the [valid] conception of I is the mere I which has existed beginninglessly. Therefore, the selves of the individual migrators when they appropriate the bodies of gods and so forth are instances of the formerly mentioned mere I].

Also, it is said in the word of the foremost Conqueror [the Fifth Dalai Lama's Sacred Word of Manjushri],⁷⁶¹

~ 'Sometimes the I will seem to exist in the context of the body. Sometimes it will seem to exist in the context of the mind.'

Also, Chandrakirti's own Commentary on the 'Supplement' says:⁷⁶²

~ There is no [innate] adherence to a self anywhere except with respect to the aggregates. Hence, there is no fifth form of the [false] view of the transitory collection [as real I and mine].

Thus, there are twenty artificial views of the transitory collection, like twenty mountain peaks,⁷⁶³ and as antidotes to destroy them Chandrakirti states as signs or reasons the meaning of a statement in sutra that he quotes:⁷⁶⁴

~ Form is not the self; also the self does not possess form. The self is not in form; form is not in the self.... Just so, the self is not consciousness; [141] the self does not possess consciousness. The self is not in consciousness; consciousness is not in the self.

[Chandrakirti] establishes [through those reasons] the subtle selflessness, that is, the lack of inherent existence in all phenomena, mentioned in a sutra which says,⁷⁶⁵ 'All phenomena are selfless.' Therefore, it is with such in mind that the foremost precious [Tsong Khapa] says⁷⁶⁶ that the refutation of artificial [misconceptions] is a branch of refuting innate [misconceptions of persons and phenomena]. Also, refutations of extremes with respect to the selflessness of phenomena [other than persons] are used as reasons [in the sevenfold reasoning refuting a self of persons].⁷⁶⁷ Let us summarize the meaning of these sutras. The subjects, a Tathagata or a person,⁷⁶⁸ do not exist autonomously or inherently because:

- they are not the mental and physical aggregates which are the basis of their imputation, that is, they are not one with the aggregates which are the basis of their imputation
- they are not others separate from the aggregates which are the basis of their imputation, that is, they do not exist as entities separate from these aggregates which are the basis of their imputation
- inherently they are not like a tub, the support of the mental and physical aggregates which would then be like a juniper⁷⁶⁹ [142]
- they do not inherently depend on the mental and physical aggregates
- they do not inherently possess the mental and physical aggregates in the manner of a sameness of entity, as in the case of Devadatta's possessing an ear, and they do not possess the aggregates in the manner of a difference of entity, as in the case of Devadatta's possessing wealth.

In Nagarjuna's Treatise the reason is given with:⁷⁷⁰

:: [The Tathagata] is not [inherently one with his own five] aggregates; [the

Tathagata] is not [inherently] other than [his own five] aggregates; the aggregates are not [inherently dependent] on him; he is not [inherently dependent] on those [aggregates]; the Tathagata does not [inherently] possess the aggregates.

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\ 22:1.
\ That one [who is "fully-completed"] is not the "groups of universal elements" (skandha),
\ nor something other than the "groups";
\ the "groups" are not in him, nor is he in them;
\ The "fully completed" does not possess the "groups."
\ What, then, is the "fully completed"?

Then, the thesis is given as:

:: What [inherently existent] Tathagata is there?
:: [That is, there is no inherently existent Tathagata.]

\ #####
\ 22:2.
\ If the Buddha exists dependent on the "groups," then he is not "that which exists by itself" (svabbava)
\ And how can he exist as something else (parabhava) ("other-existence") if he is not "that which exists by itself" (svabbava)?

Also, Nagarjuna's Precious Garland gives the reason with:771

:: The aggregates are not [inherently one with] the self; those [aggregates] are not [inherently dependent] on that [self]; that [self] is not [inherently dependent] on those [aggregates]; without those [aggregates] that [self] is not [apprehendable separately; the self] is not mingled with the aggregates like fire and fuel.772

\ #####
\ 82. The aggregates are not the self, they are not in it,
\ It is not in them, without them it is not,
\ It is not mixed with the aggregates like fire and fuel. a
\ Therefore how could the self exist?

The 'mingling' [of the self and the aggregates] refers to possession [in which possessor and possessed] are one entity as explained previously [on page 687] when indicating what is negated [in the view of selflessness]. [143]

The thesis is given with:

:: Therefore, how could a self exist?

Furthermore, the reasons are to be established individually:

~ If those two [a Tathagata or a person] are one with [their respective] mental and physical aggregates, it [absurdly] follows that they are impermanent. It [absurdly] follows that they are [each] multiple. It [absurdly] follows that a self is not asserted. It [absurdly] follows that remembering other births is impossible.

Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) Treatise says:773

~ Respectively, the aggregates are not the Tathagata. Why? The aggregates possess the qualities of arising and disintegration; therefore, it would follow that the Tathagata was just impermanent. Also, the appropriator [the self] is not suitable to be just one with the appropriated [aggregates].

Also, Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:774

~ With respect to this [first stanza of the eighteenth chapter in Nagarjuna's Treatise], if the self were thought to be the aggregates, then the self would have production and disintegration because of depending on the production and disintegration of the aggregates. Also, the self is not asserted thus [144] because of the consequence of many faults.775

~ As [Nagarjuna] will explain (XXVII.12):

:: Also it does not arise [newly]
:: Not having existed [in a former life]
:: For fallacy follows there,
:: The self would be a product
:: And its arising would be causeless.

\ #####

\ 27:12.

\ There is no existing thing which is "that which has not existed prior."

Therefore, the error logically follows that

\ Either the individual self is "what is produced" or it originates without a cause.

~ And similarly (XXVII.6):

:: The appropriated [aggregates] are not the self,
:: [For] the aggregates arise and disintegrate.
:: How indeed could the appropriated
:: Be the appropriator?

\ #####

\ 27:6.

\ The individual self is not the acquisition, since that [acquisition] appears and disappears.

\ Now really, how will "he who acquires" become "that which is acquired?"

~ Furthermore, this position is to be understood from the extensive analysis in the Supplement :776

:: If the aggregates were the self,
:: Then because of the plurality of those aggregates,
:: the selves would also just be many.
:: Also the self would be a substantiality and viewing it as such
:: Would not be erroneous if it is acting on a substantiality. [145]

:: In nirvana annihilation of the self would definitely occur.

:: There would be destruction and production of the self in the moments prior to nirvana.

:: Due to the destruction of the agent, effects of those [actions] would be

non-existent.

:: Also another would experience [the effects of actions] accumulated by another—

\ #####

\ 170.

\ If the aggregates are [the same as] the self, then since they are many,

\ The self is also many.

\ The self is a substance,

\ And the view of it is not wrong because it apprehends a substance.

\ #####

\ 171.

\ The self definitely ceases at the time of a nirvana;

\ And in the lives prior to a nirvana,

\ Since an agent who is born and perishes does not exist,

\ There are no results [i.e. karmic consequences], and one experiences what another has accumulated.

~ Here I will not extensively elaborate on it. Thus, respectively the aggregates are not the self.

If these two [a Tathagata or a person] were entities different from their mental and physical aggregates [which are their bases of imputation], then it would [absurdly] follow that they are not aggregates. It would [absurdly] follow that they would not be feelers and so forth. It would [absurdly] follow that they would be permanent. It would [absurdly] follow that they would be apprehended apart from the mental and physical aggregates. It would [absurdly] follow that they would not be existent selves. It would [absurdly] follow that they would be without activity and would not be agents.

Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) Treatise says: 777

~ A Tathagata also is not other than his aggregates; he does not exist as a separate phenomenon which is not the aggregates. Why? He would not accord with the impermanent aggregates; therefore, he would just be permanent. If [a Tathagata and his aggregates] were other, it would follow that he would be apprehended [separate from the aggregates which are his basis of imputation]. Because he is not apprehended [separate from his aggregates], [146] a Tathagata is not other than his aggregates.

Also, Chandrakirti's Clear Words says: 778

~ If the self were separate from the aggregates, it would have the character of non-aggregates. The five aggregates have the character of suitability as form, experiencing, apprehending signs, composition, and realizing objects individually. Also, if the self is asserted to be different from the aggregates, just as consciousness is different from form, the self would be established as having a character different from the aggregates. Also, its different character would be apprehended just as [the character of] mind [is apprehended separate] from form, but such is not apprehended. Therefore, the self also is not separate from the aggregates.

Even if a self or a Tathagata inherently acted as the base of the mental and physical aggregates [which are in their continuum] or even if these two inherently depended over there on the aggregates, the fallacies of a self different from the aggregates would ensue.

Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) Treatise says:779 [147]

~ Aggregates do not exist in a Tathagata like a forest of trees in snow. Why? Those which are supported [aggregates] and their base [a Tathagata] would be other; therefore, it would follow that a Tathagata was permanent. Also, a Tathagata does not exist in aggregates like a lion in a forest of trees. Why? There would be the fallacy just indicated.

Also, Chandrakirti's own Commentary on the 'Supplement' says:780

~ If [the self and the aggregates] were [inherently] other, they would be fit to be the [intrinsically existent] entities of that which is supported and its support like yogurt in a metal bowl, for example. Since the two, yogurt and bowl, are just other in worldly conventions, they are seen to be the entities of that which is supported and its support. However, the aggregates are not thus different [entities] from the self, and the self also is not a different [entity] from the aggregates. Therefore, these two are not the entities of support and supported.

A Tathagata and a person do not possess the mental and physical aggregates in the mode of being inherently different or non-different entities. [148] If they possessed the mental and physical aggregates in the mode of inherent non-difference as if mingled or like a core, the fallacies of their being one with the aggregates would ensue. It would [absurdly] follow that a Tathagata and a person were impermanent, etc. If they possessed the mental and physical aggregates in the mode of inherent difference, the fallacies resulting from a difference of the self and the aggregates would ensue.

Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) Treatise says:781

~ A Tathagata does not possess [his] aggregates in the way that a tree possesses [its] core. Why? He would not be other than the aggregates; therefore, there would be the fallacy of his being impermanent.

Also, Chandrakirti's Supplement says:782

:: It is not accepted that the self [inherently] possesses the body. For the self [has already been refuted as inherently one with or different from the aggregates and thus] is not [inherently existent]. Therefore, the relationship of the self possessing the aggregates does not exist [inherently]. If it is said that they are other [entities, like Devadatta's] possessing a cow or that they are not other [entities like Devadatta's] possessing his body, [the answer is that] the self is not one with or other than the body. [Therefore, the self possessing form does not inherently exist.]

\ #####
\ [VI.142]
\ 185.
\ The self is not within the aggregates,
\ And the aggregates are not within the self.
\ Why not? If they were other, then there would be these conceptualizations;
\ But since they are not other, these are just conceptions.

\ #####
\ 186.
\ The self is not said to possess form because the self does not exist;
\ Therefore there is no relationship with the meaning of possession.

\ Whether other, possessing cows, or not other, possessing form,
\ The self is neither one with nor other than form.

Furthermore, Chandrakirti's own Commentary on the 'Supplement' says:783

~ Also, the suffix indicating possession [mat- or vat-pratyaya] is employed for the non-different in rupavan devadattah, 'Devadatta is a possessor of a form [a body].' It is employed for the different in goman, 'Devadatta is a possessor of a cow.' [149] Since form and the self do not have [naturally existent] sameness or otherness, there is no saying that the self [inherently] possesses form.

Hence, when these are condensed, they are included within [the reasoning that the self and the aggregates] lack [true] oneness and difference. However, Chandrakirti's Clear Words 784 explains that [five positions instead of just two] are refuted in relation to the modes of operation of the consciousnesses viewing the transitory collection [as real I and mine].

This reasoning is able to prove selflessness with respect to all phenomena since when any of the aggregates, constituents, or sources are analyzed into their basis of imputation and phenomenon imputed, they do not exist in any of those five ways. Therefore, one takes as one's reason that which refutes the object adhered to by artificial conceptions and refutes the innate conception that the phenomenon imputed exists from the side of its basis of imputation.

Nagarjuna's Precious Garland says:785

:: Just as the person is not [established as its own] reality
:: Because of being [only designated in dependence upon] a composite of the six constituents,
:: So each of the constituents also
:: Is not [established as its own] reality because of being [designated in dependence upon] a composite.

\ #####
\ 80. A person is not earth, not water,
\ Not fire, not wind, not space,
\ Not consciousness, and not all of them.
\ What person is there other than these?

\ #####
\ 81. Just as a person is not real
\ Due to being a composite of six constituents,
\ So each of the constituents also
\ Is not real due to being a composite.

Also: [150]

:: The three elements are not [one with] earth.
:: The three elements are not [dependent] on this [earth].
:: This [earth] is not [dependent] on those [three elements].
:: Without those [three elements] there is no earth.
:: Like [earth] each [of the other three elements]
:: Is not [findable when analyzed in those four ways],
:: Therefore the elements also are false like the self.

Also, some Svatantrikas and some of our own schools which propound [inherently existent] things explicitly posit the mind as the self that takes rebirth.⁷⁸⁶ Some propound as the self the special configuration [or shape] of the aggregates because gods and humans are posited by way of special configurations of the aggregates due to former actions (karma, las). In order to refute these [Chandrakirti] adds two facets of reasons:

:: The mere composite [of the five aggregates or of the consciousness aggregate] is not the self, and the physical shape is not the self.

Chandrakirti's Supplement says:⁷⁸⁷

:: A chariot is not accepted as other than its members [or parts]. That it is not other [but is one with its members] is not [established. Inherently] it does not possess its members. It is not [inherently dependent] on its members. Its members are not [inherently dependent] on it. It is not the composite [of its members]. It is not the shape [of its members. The self and the aggregates] are similar. [151]

\ #####
\ 194.
\ It is like a cart, which is not other than its parts,
\ Not non-other, and does not possess them.
\ It is not within its parts, and its parts are not within it.
\ It is not the mere collection, and it is not the shape.

This sevenfold analysis is also a supreme of reasonings for settling everything—forms and so forth—as selfless.

Chandrakirti's Supplement says:⁷⁸⁸

:: All things whatsoever—pots, cloths, tents, armies, forests, rosaries, trees, houses, carts, hotels, etc., and likewise [other things] designated by beings from whatsoever point of view—are to be known [as existing only according to unanalytical renown]. For the King of Subduers did not dispute with the world. Quality, part, passion, definition, fuel, and so forth as well as qualificand, whole, the impassioned,⁷⁸⁹ illustration,⁷⁹⁰ fire, and so forth—these [objects] do not exist in the seven ways when subjected to the analysis of the chariot. They exist through [non-analytical] worldly renown which is other than that.

\ #####
\ [VI.166]
\ 209.
\ Such things as pots, woolen cloth, canvas, armies, forests, rosaries, trees,
\ Houses, small carts, guest houses, and so forth
\ Should be realized in just the same way as they are spoken of;
\ Because the Able One would never argue with the worldly.

\ #####
\ 210.
\ Parts and part-possessors, qualities and quality-possessors, attachment and the attached,
\ Characteristics and bases of characteristics, firewood and fire, and so forth-
\ Objects such as these do not exist in seven ways when analyzed like a cart;
\ But otherwise do exist by way of worldly renown.

Also, about this, Daktsang says [in paraphrase]

~ The Sammitiyas and so forth assert that the five aggregates are the basis of the imputation 'self. Also, Bhavaviveka and so forth assert that only the mind is the basis of the imputation 'self. However, none of our own schools asserts that the mind is the self. [152]:791

Without even reading any of Bhavaviveka's and Chandrakirti's books, Daktsang has the courage to make distinctions, thereby making an external display of his own ignorant innards. [Contradictory consequences are offered in response.] Then it [absurdly] follows that when another [non-Buddhist] school proves that the mental consciousness is the self, it would not [for Bhavaviveka] prove what is already established [for him]. Also, it [absurdly] follows that Bhavaviveka would not assert that the collection of the body and the senses are a basis of the imputation 'self. For [according to you] (1) Bhavaviveka does not assert that the mental consciousness is the self and (2) from among the five aggregates, he takes only the mental consciousness as the basis of the imputation 'self. The three circles of self-contradiction!

If both consequences are accepted, then it [absurdly] follows that it is wrong for [Bhavaviveka] to explain in his Blaze of Reasoning [when another school tries to prove that the mental consciousness is the self] that they are proving what is already established [for him]:792

~ This is a proof of what is already established [for me] since we also actually impute the term 'self to [the mental] consciousness conventionally. Because [the mental] consciousness takes rebirth, it is called the self.

It [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for him] to say, '[we also] actually impute the term "self to [the mental] consciousness', that is, that the term 'self is used as an actual name for [the mental] consciousness [because, according to you, he does not assert such]. [153] Also, it [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for Bhavaviveka] to prove that [the mental] consciousness is the self through the reason of its being the taker of rebirth [because, according to you, he does not assert such].

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for Bhavaviveka] in his Blaze of Reasoning to explain that the collection of the body and the senses is a basis of the designation 'self [and thus is the self]:793

~ Because [the mental] consciousness takes rebirth, it is called the self. It is imputed to the collection of the body and the senses.

Also, it [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for Bhavaviveka] to cite as a source for this [a sutra] teaching that the collection of the aggregates is the basis of designation [of the self and thus is the self]:794

~ It is said, 'Just as one thinks "chariot", for example, with respect to a collection of parts, so in dependence on the aggregates "sentient being" is designated conventionally.'

Also, it [absurdly] follows that, when Chandrakirti quotes this sutra, he would be refuting that the aggregates are the basis of the imputation 'self [instead of that the collection of the aggregates is the self since it is clear that he is refuting Bhavaviveka's interpretation and you claim that Bhavaviveka interprets the passage as showing that the collection of the aggregates is not the person but is the basis of imputation of the person

in which case Chandrakirti must be refuting this]. Also, [for the same reason] it [absurdly] follows that Chandrakirti would not assert that the mind and the aggregates are bases of the imputation 'self [whereas he obviously does]. Also, it [absurdly] follows that the two—Bhavaviveka and Chandrakirti—do not differ with respect to asserting or not asserting establishment by way of [the object's] own character (svalakshanasiddhi, rang gi mtshan nyidkyis grub pa) [154] because [according to you] they are the same in not positing the phenomenon imputed as its basis of imputation. Etc. You have a mass of the three circles of self-contradiction!

L3: [Elimination of error concerning the refutation of a self of persons] :L3

(See pp.449-51, 505-30.)

The root text says:795

- :: They assert that on some occasions there is valid establishment
- :: With the three modes appearing similarly
- :: And that there are just [similarly appearing] reasons.
- :: However, they do not assert self-powered valid establishment,
- :: Therefore, they do not assert autonomous [syllogisms].
- :: That autonomous [syllogisms are asserted] in this system is mistaken.

Daktsang's saying that the Prasangikas assert autonomous syllogisms conventionally is, as was explained before [in chapter eleven which is not translated here],⁷⁹⁶ the tremendous mistake of confusing an other-renowned reason and an autonomous reason as the same.⁷⁹⁷ For on some occasions when Prasangikas critically investigate the meaning of the profound [emptiness] among themselves, there is valid establishment, like a magical illusion, with the three modes [of the reason] appearing similarly to both parties in the debate.⁷⁹⁸ Also, though the three modes, subject, and reason are established as like illusions and as appearing similarly to both parties in the debate, there is no valid establishment in which the three modes [of the reason] exist under their own power. Also, [Prasangikas] do not assert that [autonomous syllogisms] exist even conventionally because they assert that inherent establishment does not exist even conventionally.

Lhundup Sopa; the chapter attempts to put the Gelugpa teachings on valid establishment in context. The next sentence was repeatedly emphasized by Kensur Lekden.

L1: [Appendices] :L1

L2: [1. Types of Awareness] :L2

[not copied yet]

L2: [2. Other Interpretations of Dependent Arising] :L2

[not copied yet]

L2: [3. Modes of Division of the Vaibhashika Schools] :L2

[not copied yet]

L2: [4. Negatives] :L2

[not copied yet]

L2: [5. Proof Statements] :L2

Chandrakirti gives an example of A FIVE-MEMBERED PROOF which Jam-yang-shay-ba says can be interpreted correctly in two ways:⁸¹¹

- Thesis: A sound is an impermanent thing.
- Pervasion: Being an impermanent thing pervades being a product.
- Example: Being an impermanent thing pervades being a product, as in the case, for example, of a pot.
- Exemplification: Just as a pot is a product, so a sound is a product.
- Summary: Therefore, because a sound is a product, it is an impermanent thing.

Or,

- Thesis: A sound is an impermanent thing.
- Sign: Because products are impermanent things.
- Demonstration of the pervasion in an example: It is seen that being an impermanent thing pervades being a product as in the case, for example, of a pot.
- Applying the example to the meaning: Like a pot, a sound is also a product.
- Summary: Therefore, because of being a product, a sound is an impermanent thing.

The Buddhist logicians of the Dignaga-Dharmakirti school consider such a five-membered statement of proof to be redundant. In their school A CORRECT STATEMENT OF PROOF HAS TWO MEMBERS:

- Expression of pervasion: Being an impermanent thing pervades whatever is a product, as in the case, for example, of a pot.
- Expression of the presence of the sign in the subject: A sound is also a product.

The example has been affixed to the expression of pervasion; the thesis, exemplification, and summary are not stated because they are considered to be implicit. The five-membered statement is, therefore, redundant.

However, in the Dignaga-Dharmakirti school the actual, full process of debate is as follows for proving that a sound is impermanent to an opponent who asserts that a sound is permanent.

--Statement of a consequence implying a proof of the opposite,

It follows that the subject, a sound, is not a product because of being a permanent thing.

The consequence is stated for the sake of 'breaking down the pointedness or vibrance' of the opponent's adherence to the wrong view. Through the demonstration of inner contradictions in his own system (that a sound is permanent, that a sound is a product, and that whatever is a product is impermanent) he becomes doubtful about his own view. This prepares him for the statement of the reasoning which proves that sounds are impermanent; he becomes a suitable vessel for the second step.

--Statement of the reasonings that establish the presence of the sign in the subject, the

pervasion, and the counter-pervasion

-- a. Statement of the reasoning that establishes the presence of the sign in the subject

The subject, a sound, is a product because of being produced from causes and conditions.

The reason of this syllogism need not be established because it is obvious from, for instance, a snapping of the fingers that sounds are produced from causes and conditions. If it were necessary to establish every reason—if there were not an appeal to obvious experience—the number of reasons required to establish the presence of the original sign in the subject would be limitless, and there would be no opportunity to realize the basic thesis. Still, if the opponent is not yet satisfied, it is not the proper occasion for establishing the three modes of the sign, i.e., for proving to him that sounds are impermanent. Other indirect means are required to bring him to the point of recognizing the obvious dependence of sounds on causes and conditions.

-- b. Statement of the reasoning that establishes the pervasion

The subject, a product, is an impermanent thing because of being a momentary thing.

The mind that explicitly realizes the pervasion also implicitly realizes the counter-pervasion and vice versa; therefore, only either the pervasion or the counter-pervasion needs to be established. This is because explicitly realizing that the sign exists in only similar cases implies cognition that the sign is only nonexistent in dissimilar cases. Just so, if the sign is explicitly cognized as only non-existent in dissimilar cases, it is implicitly cognized as existent only in similar cases.

If it is necessary to establish that products are momentary things, one can state:

The subject, a product, is a momentary thing because without its disintegration depending on any other cause, it—from its inception—has a nature of disintegration, just as in the case of lightning.

If this is not obvious, further proof is not warranted, and it will be necessary to approach the opponent in a roundabout manner to prepare him for another try at the basic thesis.

-- c. Statement of the reasoning that establishes the counter-pervasion

The subject, space, is not a product because of being a permanent phenomenon.

This reason could, in turn be established with:

The subject, space, is a permanent phenomenon because of being existent and not being produced from causes and conditions.

No further proof is warranted.

-- 1. Correct statement of proof for similar instances

Whatever is a product is pervaded by being an impermanent thing, as in the case, for example, of a pot; a sound is also a product.

(This is exactly the same as the two-membered statement of proof.) A person of very sharp intellect would also grasp the opposite, and, therefore, for him the next step would not have to be stated. Or, the fourth step might be stated and not the third. The choice of whether to state a proof for similar or dissimilar instances is determined by the type of

opponent. If he is dominated by indecision, not being able to decide whether products are permanent or impermanent, a proof for similar instances is stated. If the opponent is dominated by the opposite view that products are permanent, a proof for dissimilar instances is stated. However, to all except the very sharp, both must be proved. The stater bases his decision of what is necessary on the opponent's responses during step two and to questions asked him.

-- 2. Correct statement of proof for dissimilar instances

Whatever is a permanent thing is pervaded by being a non-product, as in the case, for example, of space; a sound, however, is a product.

-- 3. Restatement of the correct statement of proof for either similar or dissimilar instances

This is done for the sake of generating in the opponent a simultaneous awareness of the three modes of the reason, i.e., its presence in the subject, the pervasion, and the counter-pervasion. This awareness is also called 'a mind apprehending the sign (or reason)' and is the direct cause of the inferring consciousness realizing that a sound is impermanent. At this moment the opponent becomes a correct, or full-fledged, second party of a debate in that he is prepared for the basic reasoning that a sound is an impermanent thing because of being a product. (The first party is the stater.)

-- 4. The statement of the basic syllogism

The subject, a sound, is an impermanent thing because of being a product.

The then full-fledged second party realizes that a sound is impermanent, after which he ceases to be a second party because he has finished realizing the thesis.

Thus, though a statement of proof in the Dignaga-Dharmakirti school has only two members, the actual prescribed mode of debate entails many more. What a Prasangika is saying is that all these steps are not necessary for sharp opponents. The mere statement of a consequence, 'It follows that the subject, a sound, is not a product because of being a permanent phenomenon, 'can generate in a proper second party a consciousness inferring the thesis that a sound is an impermanent thing. It is not the usage of consequences that singles out the Prasangika but his assertion that the statement of a consequence alone is sufficient to generate in another a consciousness realizing a thesis.

L1: [Notes] :L1

Since this book is for the most part interwoven with paraphrase of the texts mentioned in the introduction and paraphrase of explanation gleaned from the oral tradition, the main function of the notes, except in the translation sections, is to provide the reader with a key to this weaving through identifying the particular sources. The most commonly cited texts are abbreviated, a list of which is given on pp. 23-4 Entries in the Tibetan Tripitaka Research Foundation publication of the Tibetan Tripitaka (Tokyo-Kyoto, 1956) are indicated by the letter 'P', standing for 'Peking edition', followed by the entry number. See the

Bibliography for the full Sanskrit and Tibetan titles.

- 1 Part One, chapter one is mainly a paraphrase of Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 416.20421.17.
- 2 Quoted by Chandrakirti in his Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 54.4.7.
- 3 Brackets are from Tsong Khapa's Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement to the Middle Way', P6143, Vol. 154 81.1.5-7.
- 4 The source for this and the next paragraph is Kensur Lekden, whose teaching is based on Atisha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment and Tsong Khapa's elaboration of it in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path.
- 5 The brackets and the succeeding two sentences are taken from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 104a.5ff.
- 6 The remainder of the chapter is based on Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha 32a.4-32b.7.
- 7 Part One, chapter two is mainly taken from Kensur Lekden's teachings, which are based on common Gelugpa literature.
- 8 The Sanskrit is, for the most part, felicitously reconstructed from the Tibetan. For svain, see Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 61a.l.
- 9 Source for this and the next three paragraphs is Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 68a. 1 ff and 67a.lff.
- 10 Oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Geshe Lhundup Sopa.
- 11 Source for this paragraph and the last three sentences of the next is Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 68b.2ff, following Buddhapalita (see p.633-4).
- 12 Part One, chapter three follows the pattern set by Jam-yang-shay-ba in Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha 32b.7ff, with other writings as cited below.
- 13 Until the next note, the source is Kensur Lekden.
- 14 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 416.5.
- 15 Source until the next note is the Fifth Dalai Lama's Sacred Word of Manjushri (blockprint in the possession of Trijang Labrang, Dharmasala; no other information), 89a. ff. See also pp.685 of this text.
- 16 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 83b.5.
- 17 Part One, chapters four through seven are condensations of Part Two, chapters one through five for the sake of meditation; therefore, see the corresponding chapters in Part Two for the specific sources.
- 18 Geshe Rapden.
- 19 Geshe Rapden.
- 20 Geshe Gedun Lodro.
- 21 See Tenzin Gyatso's The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p.56.
- 22 Geshe Gedun Lodro.
- 23 His Holiness the Dalai Lama, when bestowing the oral transmission and explanation of Nagarjuna's Six Collections of Reasonings in Dharmasala, 1972.
- 24 Sources until the next note are Kensur Lekden and Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, 33a.2ff.
- 25 Tenzin Gyatso, The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way, p.77.
- 26 Part One, chapter eight is mainly drawn from Pabongka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path, compiled by Trijang Rinbochay (Sarnath: Pleasure of the Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1965), 302b.3-315b.6, and Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations

and Formlessnesses (modern folio printing in India, no place or date of publication), 22b.3-81b.1. The next two sentences are from the latter, 55b.5-56a.4.

27 The section on prerequisites is taken from Pabongka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path, 312b.3314a.7.

28 Pabongka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path, 315b.4, and Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 45a.4. The remainder of the paragraph is from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 47a.2-47b.1.

29 This sentence is from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 45a.6. The rest of the paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Lati Rinbochay.

30 This paragraph paraphrases Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 57a.5-58a.2.

31 This and the last sentence of this paragraph are drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 68a.2-4. The middle two sentences are from the same, 48b.5-6.

32 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 45b.3. The next two sentences are from the same, 68a.4-69b.3.

33 This and the next sentence are drawn from Pabongka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path, 306a.8306b.2.

34 The section on faults and antidotes is drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 69b.4-75b.5, and Pabongka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path, 304a.7-31 la.2. The Sanskrit for Chart 2 is taken from Maitreya's *Madhyanta-Vibhaga-Sastra*, ed. Ramchandra Pandeya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), pp. 130-1.

35 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 59b.2.

36 Pabongka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path, 31 la.3-31 lb.1. The brackets are from Lati Rinbochay's teachings.

37 The section on the nine states is drawn from Pabongka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path, 31 lb.5313b.3, and Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 76b.3-77b.3. The Sanskrit for Chart 3 is taken from Asanga's *Sravakabhumi*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Volume XIV, ed. Dr. Karunesha Shukla (Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1973), pp.363-6; and Asanga's *Abhidharma Samuccaya*, ed. Pralhad Pradhan (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950), p.75. This sentence is taken from the oral teachings of Lati Rinbochay.

38 Geshe Gedun Lodro.

39 This and the next sentence are drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, 33a.3.

40 These last two sentences are from Tsong Khapa, *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* (Dharmasala: Shes rig par khang, 1964), 347b.1-4.

41 The section on actual calm abiding is drawn from Pabongka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path, 314a.5-315a.5; and Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 78a.2-81b.1.

42 Lati Rinbochay.

43 This final section of the chapter is based on Geshe Gedun Lodro's commentary on Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha 33a.3-7, and Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 105a.4ff.

44 Part One chapter nine is drawn from many sources as cited in the following notes. The next sentence is from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 49b.3.

- 45 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 84a.5.
- 46 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 39a.6.
- 47 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 81b.3.
- 48 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 83b.2.
- 49 This sentence and the remainder of the paragraph are taken from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 83b.7-84a.2.
- 50 This paragraph is drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 86b.4-7 and 54b.1-55b.4.
- 51 Until n.52 the text follows Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha 33a.7ff.
- 52 Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo, Presentation of the Grounds and Paths, Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles (Buxadur: Gomang College, 1965), 13b.5-14a.6.
- 53 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 500.9-501.1. The Hinayana presentation substitutes the Desire Realm and the upper two realms for 'object' and 'subject', according to Geshe Lhundup Sopa.
- 54 See n.52 for source.
- 55 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 498.17-506.7.
- 56 Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo, Presentation of the Grounds and Paths, Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles, Collected Works, Vol. 7 (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1971), 458ff.
- 57 Nagarjuna and the Seventh Dalai Lama, The Precious Garland and The Song of the Four Mindfulnesses (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975), pp.84-7, stanzas 440-60.
- 58 Source for this paragraph is the oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
- 59 The rest of the chapter is based on Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 500.9-501.1, as well as the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden, recounting standard abhidharma teachings as modified by the Mahayana tenet systems.
- 60 Part One, chapter ten is based for the most part on the oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama which this author translated and edited as the first part of Tantra in Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977). The other sources are Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 525.15-531.3, and Nga-wang-bel-den, Illumination of the Texts of Tantra, Presentation of the Grounds and Paths of the Four Great Secret Tantra Sets (rGyud smad par khang, no date), entire.
- 61 Source for this and the next sentence is Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 529.18.
- 62 This sentence is from the oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The next is from Nga-wang-bel-den's Illumination of the Texts of Tantra, 12a.2.
- 63 Kensur Lekden.
- 64 This and the next sentence are taken from the oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
- 65 For amplification on this and the next paragraph see Tantra in Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977). Also see Nga-wang-bel-den's Illumination of the Texts of Tantra, 13b.2-14b.2.
- 66 The remainder of this paragraph is taken from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses, 53b.3, and Nga-wang-bel-den's Illumination of the Texts of Tantra, 13b.1-4.
- 67 General source for the rest of the chapter is Nga-wang-bel-den's Illumination of the Texts of Tantra, 14b.7ff (see 31b.7 and 33a.6 for the reference to abandoning the innate afflictions).
- 68 This and the next sentence are taken from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 105b.6106a. 1, and Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings.
- 69 Ling Rinbochay.

- 70 His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
- 71 Geshe Gedun Lodro.
- 72 Special Instructions on the View of the Middle Way, the Sacred Word of Lo-sang, 13b.4-5. This is number 48 in Herbert V. Guenther's *Tibetan Buddhism Without Mystification* (Leiden: Brill, 1966).
- 73 Part One, chapter eleven mainly paraphrases Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 506.7525.15, with amplification from Kensur Lekden.
- 74 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha49a.8-51a.5.
- 75 His Holiness the Dalai Lama gave this as an etymology that was meaningful to him though not based on any text.
- 76 Part Two, introduction is drawn mainly from Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, the first two paragraphs being from 421.20 and 410.3. The last sentence of the first paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, lecturing in 1972 on Tsong Khapa's Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path.
- 77 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 106b.3ff.
- 78 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 142b.5.
- 79 The main source for this paragraph is Geshe Gedun Lodro. Also see Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 183.7-14.
- 80 This paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.
- 81 Part Two, chapter one mainly follows Jam-yang-shay-ba's presentation of the diamond slivers, which is translated in Part Six, relying heavily on Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', as cited below. The first two paragraphs are drawn from Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 422.7, and Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 223b.1 and 197a.3ff.
- 82 See pp.639ff. The commentary relies heavily on the oral teachings of Geshe Gedun Lodro and Kensur Lekden.
- 83 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 70 gong a.2ff. See p.640.
- 84 Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Dharmasala: Shes rig par khang, no date), 387a.6ff.
- 85 In Sanskrit, *evam vichdryamana*. See, for instance, *Clear Words*, (Poussin, 107.13; P5260, Vol. 98 19.1.8: *yatashchaivam gantrgantavya gamandni vichdryamdndni na santi*).
- 86 Quoted by Gen-diin-cho-pel in his *Ornament to Nagarjuna's Thought* (Kalimpong: Mani Printing Works, no date), 13a.2. See also Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 139b.6 and 256a.4.
- 87 The section on non-production from self paraphrases Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 70 'og a.6ff.
- 88 This paragraph is drawn from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 70a.3ff.
- 89 This paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Geshe Gedun Lodro.
- 90 Kensur Lekden reported that this animal has a split lip, and thus is actually a hare. In this case, 'rabbit' would actually be *g.yos* in Tibetan.
- 91 The section on non-production from other, until the refutation of error, paraphrases Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 71a.5ff.
- 92 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 427.10.
- 93 Sources for the discussion of error, until the next note, are Tsong Khapa's *Essence of the Good Explanations*, *Treatise Discriminating What is to be Interpreted and the Definitive*, P6142, Vol. 153 197.5.5-198.2.2, and Tsong Khapa's *Illumination*, P6143, Vol.

15437.4.2-37.5.3.

94 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu52a.1.

95 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 281b.3ff; Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 37b.4.

96 This and the next paragraph are taken from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

97 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 52a.1.

98 This paragraph paraphrases Chandrakirti's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 136.8.7.

99 Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets, 13.7. See Sopa's and Hopkins' Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (New York: Grove, 1976), p.64.

100 Source for this and the next sentence is Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ka 27a.6.

101 This sentence paraphrases Chandrakirti's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 137.3.6. This is more cogent than Jam-yang-shay-ba's corresponding passage (p.649-50); perhaps the latter version is corrupt.

102 This paragraph is taken, with amplification from Geshe Gedun Lodro, from Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 424.1 Iff.

103 See Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 419.16-421.2 and 411.6.

104 Part Two, chapter two is drawn from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets' and Chandrakirti as cited in n.106 and n.107.

105 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 424.6 and 429.7.

106 Source until the quote from Chandrakirti is Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 52a.2ff.

107 P5263, Vol. 98 122.5.2ff.

108 Supplement, P5262, Vol. 98 101.3.4, Chap. VI.8c-13. See pp.642-3.

109 Bskyed par byed pa should read bskyed par bya ba.

110 Part Two, chapter three is mainly a paraphrase of Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets'; see n.l 12.

111 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 429A.

112 The remainder of this section until the last paragraph paraphrases Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 52b.2ff and 73a.2ff.

113 Geshe Gedun Lodro.

114 Lati Rinbochay.

115 Part Two, chapter four, until the elimination of error, is mainly drawn from Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 443.5-458.9.

116 This paragraph is based on the common usage of 'dependent-arising' among Tibetan scholars.

117 The significance of Nagarjuna's use of prapya is lost in the Tibetan translation which substitutes brten, i.e., pratitya, for prapya. This and the next two paragraphs leave off paraphrasing Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, offering other opinions and the author's reflections.

118 Avalokitavrata, Commentary on (bhavaviveka's) 'Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) "Wisdom"', P5259, Vol. 96 170.2.1.

119 The text returns to paraphrasing Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets', see n.l 15.

120 See his Length of a Forearm, P5248 (which some Western scholars attribute to Dignaga).

121 Ren-da-wa, Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter', 5 lb.6: sangs rgyas ni chos

kyi skus rab tu phyed has rten 'brelgyi gnas lugs las tha mi dadpa'iphyir ro.

122 Dak, 71b.5.

123 This paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Geshe Gedun Lodro.

124 This paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

125 Part Two, chapter five is drawn from many sources, but primarily from Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets as indicated below. The first sentence is from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 485b.1, with commentary by Kensur Lekden.

126 Tsong Khapa, Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154, chap. VI, beginning.

127 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 435.15.

128 Source for this and the next two paragraphs is Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 84a.2ff.

129 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 129a.2ff.

130 Except where noted, the commentary paraphrases Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 431.18ff.

131 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 27a.5.

132 This and the next paragraph are drawn from the oral teachings of Geshe Gedun Lodro.

133 The commentary returns to paraphrasing Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 437.7ff, and Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 85a.5ff.

134 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 81b.8. Source for the remainder of the paragraph is Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 82a.8ff.

135 Commentary returns to paraphrasing Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 437.7ff, and Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 86a.8ff.

136 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 86b.6.

137 Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 53.3.7. The paraphrase of Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets and Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets' leaves off; the commentary is now basically the author's.

138 This and the next sentence come from the oral teachings of Geshe Gedun Lodro.

139 Kensur Lekden emphasized this point many times. The next paragraph is also taken from his teaching.

140 The commentary returns to paraphrasing Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 438.1ff, and Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 87a.1ff. For the examples, see p.691.

141 See p.681.

142 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 438.10.

143 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 27a.5.

144 Source for the rest of the paragraph is Kensur Lekden.

145 This and the next paragraph are from Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 439.8ff.

146 This paragraph paraphrases Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 441.20ff.

147 The remainder of the chapter is mainly based on the teaching of Kensur Lekden.

148 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 443.2.

149 See Gen-dun-cho-pel's Ornament to Nagarjuna's Thought.

150 See Tantra in Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977) for Tsong Khapa's

presentation of Hinayanists' cognition of emptiness, pp.93-9. Also, see Compassion, pp.150-71.

151 Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 11 l.l.Sff.

152 Part Three in general is a reflection of Kensur Lekden's embodiment of an approach to Madhyamika that does not eliminate the rich Buddhist presentations of phenomena but incorporates them under the umbrella of dependent-arising and emptiness of inherent existence. The beginning of the Introduction, until the next note, is drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 12a.6ff.

153 Geshe Gedun Lodro. The 'midnight sky' reference is from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 12b.6.

154 The remainder of the Introduction is mainly taken from Tibetan Buddhist Studies of Kloh-drol bla-ma Nag-dbah-blo-bzah (Mussoorie: Lokesh Chandra, 1963), Vol. I, 247-8.

155 Source for the interpretations is Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 93a.8ff. The Sanskrit is from T.R.V. Murti's The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), pp.351-2.

156 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dngos 55a.8ff. Source for the point of attainment is Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 121a.4 and dngos 23b.4.

157 Geshe Gedun Lodro.

158 Gyel-tsap, Commentary on (Maitreya's) 'Treatise on the Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle, 182a.6-183a.6, chap. III.

159 IBID, 183a.6-183b.6.

160 IBID, 184b.1-184b.5.

161 Part Three, chapter one is based in general on the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden; using 'the selfless' as the source of the chart, rather than 'existent', is his own uncommon quintessential instruction. For the general list see Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 87.16-92.7. For discussion of many of the terms see Sopa's and Hopkins' Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider and Co., 1976). The material, for the most part, is usually taught with the Collected Topics of Valid Cognition (bsDus grva), the process of which relies to a great degree on the oral tradition, which Lati Rinbochay imparted at the University of Virginia in the spring and summer of 1976. Geshe Gedun Lodro's and Geshe Lhundup Sopa's elaborations on specific terms were particularly illuminating.

162 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, nga 43b.1. For a fuller discussion see the second part of the Supplement in Tantra in Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), pp. 193-4.

163 The main source for the section on forms is Cha-har Geshay's Identification of Elements, Elemental Evolutes, And So Forth, The Collected Works of Cha-har dge-bshes blo-bzang-tshulkrims (New Delhi: Chairing Jansar Tenzin, 1973), Vol. 10, 389-427. This section deviates at several points from Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge as found in Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga, ed. by Pralhad Pradhan (Santiniketan: VisvaBharati, 1950), pp.3-4. The Sanskrit terms were mainly taken from Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge. The etymology of 'form' is from Geshe Gedun Lodro.

164 This paragraph is based on teachings from Geshe Gedun Lodro.

165 This section on forms for the mental consciousness also relies on Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 352a.3ff.

166 The main source for the section on consciousness is Ye-shaygyel-tsen's Clear Exposition of the Modes of Minds and Mental Factors, Necklace for Those of Clear Mind, The Collected Works of Tshe-mchog-glin yons-'dzin ye-ses-rgyal-mtshan (New Delhi: Tibet House, 1974), Vol. 16,1-101. See H.V.Guenther's and L.S. Kawamura's translation of this in Mind in Buddhist

Psychology (Emeryville: Dharma, 1975). Ye-shay-gyel-tsen's Indian source is Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge; see pp.4-10 of the edition given in n.163.

167 Geshe Gedun Lodro.

168 With the exception of the last sentence, which is drawn from the oral teachings of Lati Rinbochay, the paragraph paraphrases Tsong Khapa's Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Dharmasala: Shes rig par khang, 1968), 87a.2-5.

169 The main source for the section on non-associated compositional factors is Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may's Beginnings of Annotations on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Essence of the Good Explanations' on the Topic of Mind-Only, Illumination of a Hundred Mind-Only Texts (blockprint in the possession of HH the Dalai Lama, place and date of publication unknown), 60a.2-61a.6. His Indian Source is Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge; see pp. 10-11 of the edition given in n.163. The etymology given in this paragraph is from the oral teachings of Geshe Gedun Lodro.

170 This section is drawn, for the most part, from Kensur Lekden's teachings. This first sentence, however, is from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, kha 10b.6.

171 Geshe Lhundup Sopa.

172 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, kha 10b.6.

173 IBID.

174 Part Three, chapter two is largely based on Tsong Khapa's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, P6001, Vol. 152 54.2.5ff. Geshe Lhundup Sopa's explanation of this text was invaluable. The section is also supplemented with points from monastic texts, namely, Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba's General Meaning of (Maitreya's) 'Ornament for Clear Realization' (Buxadur: Nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, 1963), 314b.3-332a.1, and Den-ba-dar-gyay's Analysis of Dependent-Arising (Mey College of Sera Monastery, 1969), entire.

175 Geshe Lhundup Sopa.

176 Pabongka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path, compiled by Trijang Rinbochay (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1965), 279a.

177 Part Three, chapter three is drawn from Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 126.JO-128.4, Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings, Gon-chok-den-bay-dronmay's Presentation of the Four Truths, Port of Those Wishing Liberation, Festival for the Wise, Collected Works, Vol. 2 (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972), 877-914, and Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba's General Meaning of (Maitreya's) 'Ornament for Clear Realization' (Buxadur: Nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, 1963), 69a.6-74a.1.

178 Presentation of the Four Truths, 887.3.

179 The descriptions are condensed from explanations by Geshe Gedun Lodro.

180 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 184b.3-4. The source for the next sentence is Geshe Gedun Lodro.

181 Presentation of the Four Truths, 885.3.

182 Presentation of the Four Truths, 908.3, and Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 55a.7.

183 Charts 36-9 are tabular forms of teachings emphasized by Kensur Lekden and common to Gelugpa teaching.

184 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 179.18ff.

185 This paragraph follows Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 179b.5ff. The last paragraph is a summation by the author.

186 Part Four, chapter one is drawn from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', stod 20b.3-23b.7.

187 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets',

dngos 25b.6.

188 Part Four, chapter two is taken mainly from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets and Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets'. The first section until the separate discussion of Samkhya is drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ka 9b.8-15b.1, and Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', stod 19b.7-20a.6.

189 Source for this and the next paragraph is Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', 33a.6-33b.2.

190 Dak, 4b.4.

191 With respect to the term 'individual analytical cessation', Geshe Gedun Lodro reported that the word 'individual' is usually treated as referring to the individual four truths and their sixteen attributes.

192 The text until the next note is drawn from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', stod 32b.5fF.

193 Kensur Lekden.

194 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 18.13ff.

195 Source for this and the next paragraph is Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', stod 33a.2-5.

196 The section on Samkhya is drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ka 29a.2-35b.8, Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', stod 63b.3-65b.7, and Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 29.8-37 A.

197 The rest of the paragraph and the next are drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

198 The section on Charvaka is drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ka 21a.6-28a.2, Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', stod 43b.7-44b.7, and Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 29.8-37 A.

199 Dak, 9a.5.

200 Dak, 9a.5.

201 Part Four, chapter three is drawn from several sources, as listed below. For the topic of refuge see Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 13.2fF. The next two paragraphs are taken from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

202 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ka 9a.8ff. The source for the next sentence is Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets, 4.1-4.

203 Though this teaching is common to Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets, Dak, and so forth, this explanation mainly follows the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden. See Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ka 13b.6ff.

204 The sources for the section on Vaibhashika are Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, kha 1-18, Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', _dngos 34b.3-36a.2, Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 84.13-97.7, Tu-gen, 25.3-27.1, and Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets, 17.12-30.3.

205 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', stod 1 lb.8. The source for the next sentence is Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', stod 106b.4.

206 Kensur Lekden.

207 Geshe Gedun Lodro.

208 Blaze of Reasoning, P5256, Vol. 96 67.2.6ff.

209 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, kha 17a.5.

210 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, kha7b.2.

- 211 Kensur Lekden. The counter-evidence is from John Buescher.
- 212 Kensur Lekden.
- 213 Kensur Lekden.
- 214 Dak, 28a.5.
- 215 The sources for the section on Sautrantika are Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ga 1-18, Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dngos 55a.3-56a.6, and Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 97.8-131.4.
- 216 Dak, 28a.4.
- 217 Kensur Lekden.
- 218 Jam-yang-shay-ba emphasizes that such does occur whereas Daktsang emphasizes the extreme difficulty of it.
- 219 The source for the contradictions is Dak, 28b.4-29a.2. The Mahayana answer to the first qualm is from Kensur Lekden.
- 220 This section on generic images or, more literally, meaninggeneralities (arthasamanya, don spyi) is drawn from conversations with Tibetan scholars over a long period of time—Geshe Sopa, Geshe Gedun Lodro, Kensur Lekden, Geshe Rapden, Ling Rinbochay, and Lati Rinbochay.
- 221 This section on impermanence is drawn from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dngos 27b.6-31a.7.
- 222 The source for this and the next definition is Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets, 17.16 and 30.10.
- 223 Part Four, chapter four is mostly drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden. The first part until the discussion of Nagarjuna's history reflects a story that he particularly liked to tell. The intention of the chapter is to give an example of a brief traditional history, not a definitive history, in order to give a broader picture of the culture. For a history of Madhyamika, see D.S. Ruegg's *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy In India* (Wiesbaden; Harrassowitz, 1981).
- 224 The source here is Lati Rinbochay, citing the eighth chapter of Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*.
- 225 The colors and shapes are taken from Cha-har Geshay, *Identification of Elements, Elemental Evolutes, And So Forth, The Collected Works of Cha-har dge-bshes blo-bzang-tshulkrims*, Vol. 10 (New Delhi: Chairing Jansar Tenzin, 1973), 414.
- 226 See E. Obermiller's *History of Buddhism* by Bu-ston (Heidelberg: Heft, 1932), Part One, p.98.
- 227 Geshe Gedun Lodro said that these stories, which were related by Kensur Lekden, can be found in *Lho brag chung chung*.
- 228 The general source for Nagarjuna's history is Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 4a.2ff.
- 229 See Taranatha's *History of Buddhism*, translated by Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya (Varanasi, 1964), p.67.
- 230 The source for this and the next sentence is Geshe Gedun Lodro; then the text returns to a paraphrase of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, as cited in n.228.
- 231 The source for this and the next sentence is Geshe Gedun Lodro; then the text returns to paraphrasing Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, as cited in n.228.
- 232 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets (ca 3b.4) cites Maitreya, 'Not formerly prophesied [as arising later], they arose simultaneously.'
- 233 Alaya, 6a.
- 234 The source for the remainder of this paragraph and the first sentence of the next is Tu-gen, 13.15ff; then the text returns to paraphrasing Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets.

235 The text paraphrases Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets(ca 6b.7ff), except where noted, until the last sentence of this chapter.

236 Tu-gen, 18.15ff.

237 Kensur Lekden.

238 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 282.9.

239 Avalokitavrata (see p.462) accepts the book as Nagarjuna's own work (P5259, Vol. 96 190.2.8).

240 Kaydrup, 88.6. Also, see n.414.

241 The text returns to paraphrasing Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 9a.6ff.

242 V.V. Gokhale, 'The Vedanta-Philosophy Described by Bhavya in his Madhyamakahrdaya', Indo-Iranian Journal, 2, (1958), no. 3, p.166, n.l.

243 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 288.13ff.

244 Chandrakirti openly refutes Bhavaviveka in the first, ninth, and eighteenth chapters of his Clear Words and criticizes Vasubandhu, Dharmapala, and Dignaga in his commentary to the third stanza of the colophon to his Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'.

245 Kaydrup, 90.1.

246 Kensur Lekden.

247 The remainder of this paragraph is drawn from the teachings of Kensur Lekden, who was relating a commonly held Gelugpa interpretation.

248 See Part Five, chapter one.

249 The Southern Buddhist tradition and Western scholarship generally put Buddha's death date at 483B.C. The contemporary Nyingma scholar Khetsun Sangpo, in accordance with an interpretation of the Kalachakra Tantra by Puk-ba Hlun-drupgya-tso (Phug-pa Lhun-grub-rgya-mtsho), ;places it at 881 B.C.

250 The source here is the oral teaching of Khetsun Sangpo.

251 Part Four, chapter five is mostly drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, nga 1-66, Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dngos 112b.7-116a.6, Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 157.4-275.10, and Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets, 40.755.3.

252 This and the next sentence are from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

253 Kensur Lekden.

254 Kensur Lekden.

255 The rest of this paragraph and the next two are elaborations from Kensur Lekden.

256 The source for the rest of this section through to the Prasangikas' refutation is Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 234.18ff.

257 Kensur Lekden.

258 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 251.12ff. The section begins at 250.1.

259 This and the next two sentences are drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

260 This critique mainly follows the corresponding section in Part Six, chapter two, with considerable commentary from Kensur Lekden.

261 Den-dar, 3b.4. For the rest of the paragraph see Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 374.6ff.

262 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 398b.l.

263 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 63a.3ff.

264 See Tantra in Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), Part Two, chapter two. Tsong Khapa's most extensive exposition of this point is found in his commentary to the first chapter of Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way',

translated by J. Hopkins in *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*, (London: Rider and Company, 1980), pp.150-81.

265 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha 37b.2.

266 Jnanavajra (P5520, Vol. 107 246.4.4) identifies these as the sutras teaching a Tathagata essence. This section on the Buddha nature is mainly explication of the corresponding section in Part Six, chapter two, drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

267 HH the Dalai Lama gave this etymology, relating that though he has not seen it in the literature, he has found it helpful.

268 Alaya, 17a.1.

269 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 8b.6.

270 The presentation of the Chittamatra assertion on the mindbasis-of-all is taken from Tsong Khapa's Alaya, as well as from Geshe Lhundup Sopa's oral teachings.

271 This and the next two paragraphs are drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden, as well as from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 25b.6ff, and Tu-gen, 20.3ff.

272 Tu-gen, 22.20.

273 The discussion returns to being based on Alaya, 30a.9ff.

274 Kensur Lekden.

275 Kensur Lekden.

276 Geshe Gedun Lodro.

277 Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may, Explanation of the Difficult Points of (Tsong Khapa's) 'Afflicted Mind and Basis of All', Entrance for the Wise (Musoorie: [Gomang College], no date), 5b.7.

278 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 48b.3 and 48b.6.

279 P2665, Vol. 61 286.1.6; see Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 48b.5.

280 See n.277.

281 The main sources for this section are Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, nga 25b.7-27b.1, and Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 175.8-178.14. The oral teachings of Kensur Lekden are particularly important throughout this section.

282 Kensur Lekden identified this as the position of the Lo-sel-fing College of Drebung Monastery.

283 The over-riding source for this section on the three vehicles is Kensur Lekden. Individual texts are cited in further notes.

284 Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets, 26-7.

285 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 95.2.

286 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, kha 12b.4.

287 The source for this paragraph is Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 269.7ff.

288 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, nga 14b.6ff.

289 The two etymologies are from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 16a.3ff. See n.495.

290 Geshe Gedun Lodro.

291 Kensur Lekden mentioned this teaching several times.

292 This paragraph is drawn from Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 270.8ff.

293 The remainder of the paragraph is taken from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', stod 89a.4ff.

294 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 66a.5ff.

295 The background section of Part Four, chapter six is drawn, except for the first sentence

and last paragraph, from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 3b.3-13a.2.

296 Jam-yang-shay-ba is drawing here from Tsong Khapa's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973), 401.15-426.7. The commentary on the stanzas is taken from Tsong Khapa's explanation.

297 Kensur Lekden.

298 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 8a.4. When Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 8a.6) says that conventional phenomena which are the bases of emptiness are 'suitable to be explicitly indicated [by Nagarjuna's Treatise] in a secondary manner' (stong gzhi phal pa'i tshul du dngos bstan la rung ba), he seems to suggest that a Perfection of Wisdom Sutra would also explicitly indicate conventional phenomena such as the paths when it indicates these as bases of emptiness. However, it is said that the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras indicate the path structure and so forth neither explicitly nor implicitly but in a hidden way. The reason for this is that the reasonings proving emptiness only establish a non-affirming negation, not something positive, with the result that a consciousness realizing emptiness realizes only emptiness. Jam-yang-shay-ba would not go against this point; thus, there is a question how he could uphold it. Still, his other point—namely, that the Treatise extensively indicates the suitability of conventional phenomena within the rubric of an emptiness of inherent existence—is very well taken, even though whether this shows that it explicitly indicates the path structure and so forth is questionable. Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba and Jay-dzun-ba hold that the Treatise does not explicitly indicate the path structure, etc.

299 See n.295. For more discussion of the title, see n.545.

300 This section on the two truths is taken mainly from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha 19b.2-36a.2, Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 89a.3-108a.4, and Kensur Lekden's oral commentary.

301 Kensur Lekden.

302 Trijang Rinbochay.

303 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha2_lb.1.

304 Tsong Khapa, Stages of Instruction From the Approach of the Profound Path of Naropa's Six Practices, P6201, Vol. 160 211.4.2.

305 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha 32b.5.

306 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca42b.1.

307 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 32b.2.

308 G7, cha 20a.5.

309 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha 20a.8.

310 The following reasonings are based on the Sutra Unravelling the Thought; see Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha 21b.4 and 21b.8.

311 This and the next three paragraphs are drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

312 P2665 (also P2666), Vol. 61 286.4.1, and Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, 22a.3.

313 Kensur Lekden.

314 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha21b.4.

315 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 98a.7.

316 The main source for the discussion surrounding the Jo-nangbas is Kensur Lekden.

317 Set Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 356.9, for a listing of these three.

318 Oral teachings of HH the Dalai Lama.

319 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha 23b.5. The surrounding commentary is

drawn from Kensur Lekden's answers to questions.

320 P5260, Vol. 98 76.2.5. This is in commentary on XXIV.8.

321 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 92b.4.

322 Geshe Gedun Lodro.

323 See Tenzin Gyatso's *The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way*, trans, by Hopkins and Lati Rimpoche (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p.74.

324 See Tsong Khapa's *Ocean of Reasoning* (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973), 406.17.

325 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, cha 25a.6.

326 See Sopa's and Hopkins' *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider and Co., 1976), p.135-6.

327 This section on the two types of scriptures mainly follows the corresponding section of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets in Part Six, chapter two, embellished with the oral teachings of Geshe Gedun Lodro.

328 This paragraph is taken from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 91a.8ff.

329 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 90b.5.

330 This and the next four paragraphs are taken from Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings.

331 See Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 144.16ff. The commentary is a paraphrase of Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 162.6.

332 Geshe Gedun Lodro.

333 Paragraph paraphrases Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 313.9ff.

334 The parenthetical addition is taken from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

335 This and the next paragraph are mainly taken from Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 162-6163.11.

336 See Tsong Khapa's *Tantra in Tibet*, ed. and trans, by Hopkins (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), Part Two, chapter two, for an extensive discussion of this. Tsong Khapa's commentary on the first chapter of Chandrakirti's Supplement is even more extensive; see J. Hopkins' *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*, pp. 150-81.

337 Part Five, chapter one mainly follows the corresponding section in the translation pp. 586-8, with commentary from Kensur Lekden's oral teachings.

338 Tu-gen, 15.20.

339 Tsong Khapa, Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, P6001. Vol. 152 151.513.

340 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 59b.3. The commentary is from Kensur Lekden.

341 This and the next sentence come from a conversation with the junior tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Trijang Rinbochay.

342 Obermiller, *History of Buddhism by Bu-ston*, Vol. II, p. 135.

343 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ka 16a.2 and Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', stod 25a.4ff.

344 This sentence and the rest of the paragraph are drawn from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 69a.8-70b.2.

345 This sentence and the next are taken from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 67a.367b.1. The rest of the section is drawn from the teachings of Kensur Lekden.

346 Part Five, chapters two through five are drawn almost entirely from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 224b.5-83a.l. This is Jam-yang-shay-ba's explanation of

the controversy between Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, and Chandrakirti in their respective commentaries on Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way and especially as recounted by Chandrakirti in his Clear Words. Throughout this explanation, my work at the Buddhist School of Dialectics in Dharmasala during April, May, and June of 1982 figures prominently. During that period I attended daily lectures by the Principal, Lobsang Gyatso of Lo-sel-ling-College, and debated with the class on an almost daily basis. The experience lifted this important topic out of the textbooks into a living dilemma of interpretation, requiring a far greater grasp of the movement of the controversy than I had previously. Throughout the explanation, the teachings of Kentsur Lekden from Gomang College who first introduced me to the topic are important. I have also made extensive use of a textbook on the topic from the Jay College of Sera Monastery by Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen: his Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, Key to (Chandrakirti's) 'Clear Words', Written by Jam-bay-yang Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen (Thai bzlog gi dka' ba 'i gnas gtan la 'bebs pa 'jam pa 'i dbyang sgom sde nam mkha' rgyalmtshangyis mdzadpa'i tshiggsalgyiIde mig)\n The Obligatory Texts (Yig-cha) for the Study of Madhyamika of Byes Grwa-tshah of Sera Monastery, Madhyamika Text Series, Vol. 4 (New Delhi: Lha-mkhar yons-'dzin bstan-pa-rgyal-mtshan, 1973), entire.

In the syllabus of the Gel-luk-ba monastic universities, this topic surfaces in the Middle Way class during discussion of the refutation of production from self in Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way', Tsong Khapa's Illumination of the Thought which is his commentary on the former text, and the respective monastic textbook such as Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (referred to here as Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way). Since Chandrakirti treats the topic in his Clear Words, the material from that text is brought over to this class which revolves around his Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'.

The first phase is called Opposite of the Consequences (thai bzlog); this leads into the second phase called Commonly Appearing Subjects (chos can mthun snang ba). Then, the texts return to the refutation of production from other which leads to a third phase called Two Truths (bden pa gnyis). Pertinent here are the first two phases—centrally important in the Gelugpa educational system for Prasangika-Madhyamika as they are used for acquiring a working knowledge of the differences between Svatantrika and Prasangika. This is our great fortune, for their training program provides highly developed commentaries on this very difficult controversy.

Jam-yang-shay-ba, Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen, and so forth base their expositions on those of Tsong Khapa in three of his works on Madhyamika which in chronological order are as follows.

1 Tsong Khapa's fullest treatment of Commonly Appearing Subjects is in the 'Great Exposition of Special Insight' in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path. This is pages 525.193.2 in the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path' (The Lam rim chen mo of the incomparable Tsong-kha-pa, with the interlineal notes of Ba-so Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, Sde-drug Mkhan-chen Ngagdbang-rab-rtan, 'Jam-dbyangs-bshad-pa'i-rdo-rje, and Bra-sti Dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub, New Delhi: Chos-'phel-legs-ldan, 1972). Tsong Khapa's text is translated by Alex Wayman in Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (New York: Columbia, 1978), pp. 309-36.

2 Not as full a treatment of Commonly Appearing Subjects as the former but presenting a slightly different interpretation later in his life is found in Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations (189.10-201.10 of the Varanasi 1973 edition).

3 Opposite of the Consequences is treated at some length in Tsong Khapa's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (52.2-7.13) after which he refers his readers to the discussion in his 'Essence of the Good Explanations and so

forth' for the topic of Commonly Appearing Subjects, suggesting perhaps a preference for the interpretation there over that in the 'Great Exposition of Special Insight' (see n.424).

As both aspects of the controversy had been explained in these works, the topics are mentioned only in passing in Tsong Khapa's *Illumination of the Thought* (80.16-1.1 in the Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition, no date) and are not mentioned at all in his 'Middling Exposition of Special Insight'.

Here I am mainly using Jam-yang-shay-ba's exposition because (1) it synthesizes Tsong Khapa's various presentations, while using the Essence of the Good Explanations when the interpretation differs (see n.424), (2) it treats the topics at great length and detail, and (3) it is fairly late, being around 1700, and thus has the advantage of having earlier presentations at hand.

Part Five, chapter two is mainly drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 224b.5- 6a.4 and a section just preceding it on consequences as noted below. Buddhapalita's commentary on I.I of Nagarjuna's Treatise is P5242, Vol. 9575.1.3-2.2, the entire text of which is translated on pp.460-1.

347 In explaining Chandrakirti's interpretation of Buddhapalita, Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 225b.2) gives as the reason of the first consequence, 'because of already existing from the time of its causes' but later (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 257b.5) declares, in self-contradiction, that such an interpretation is unacceptable. He says that Buddhapalita's phrase 'things which already exist in their own entities' (svatmana vidyamananam padarthanam [Poussin, 14.2], dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid du yodpa rnam la) cannot be explained as 'things which exist at the time of their causes' because the passage must indicate a correct other-approved syllogism proving that it is senseless for a sprout, for instance, to be produced again through the reason that it [already] exists in its own entity. This is based on Chandrakirti's statement that the phrase 'existing in their own entities' holds the reason.

The principle at work is that even though an other-approved syllogism uses tenets asserted by the other party, its members also must be established in general, whereby it is unsuitable to have as the reason of such an other-approved syllogism 'because [things] exist at the time of their causes' since things simply do not exist at the time of their causes.

Thus, for the sake of consistency I have used 'because of already existing in its own entity' or 'because of already existing in their own entities' throughout in accordance with Jam-yang-shay-ba's own later interpretation.

348 This section on consequences and syllogisms is mainly drawn from Kensur Lekden's contextualization of the controversy between the three Madhyamika masters.

349 Geshe Gedun Lodro.

350 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 222b.1-3a.1. The explanations are taken from Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings.

351 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 232b.4. See pp.474-5.

352 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 1a.2.

353 This and the next sentence are drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 62a.5.

354 For the definitions of Svatantrika and Prasangika and so forth, see Sopa's and Hopkins' *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider and Co., 1976), Part Two, chapters seven and eight.

355 Part Five, chapter three is drawn (except as cited in n.372) from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 226a.4-31a.6 (see n.346).

356 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 261b.2.

357 P5242, Vol. 95 75.1.3.

358 P5242, Vol. 95 75.2.2.

359 P5242, Vol. 95 75.1.3-2.2.

360 See n.374.

361 Bhavaviveka's text is P5253, Vol. 95 155.4.7-7.5.2. In Bhavaviveka's text, 155.4.7, read 'di la for 'di las in accordance with Avalokitavrata (Vol. 96 190.2.5) and Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 262a.6.

362 For discussion of the translation of the third fault see n.375.

363 The Tibetan (Vol. 95 155.5.1) lists three points—'things are produced from other, production is fruitful, and production has an end' (dngos po rnam gzhan las skye ba 'gyur ba dang skye ba 'bras bu dang bcaspa nyid du 'gyur ba dang skye ba thugpayod par 'gyur ba'iphyir)—rather than tying them together, as the Sanskrit does, into the opposite of the original full statement (paramddutpannd bhdvd janmasdphalydt janmanirodhchcheti [Poussin, 15.1-2]). The Tibetan seems to accord more with Avalokitavrata's serial lay-out of the three (see pp.465-6), but the mere re-framing of the syllogism in its opposite form leaves more room for the interpretation that Bhavaviveka's complaint is not with Buddhapalita's asserting that production is fruitful but with his holding that the reasoning refuting ultimately existent production implies something in its place, thus making it an affirming negation rather than a non-affirming negation as it should be. For, as Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 262a.6-b.4) says, the three points show that a Madhyamika tenet, according to Bhavaviveka, has been contradicted; the three points themselves are not the tenet that is contradicted.

'... because production has an end (janmanirodhdt, skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir)' more literally would be 'because of the cessation of production'. The rendering into Tibetan bothers Poussin (p. 15 n.4), but it seems that the translators wanted to avoid skye ba dgagpa which might be misinterpreted as 'production is refuted' and thus used thug pa, since thug med means 'endless' as in an infinite regress and hence thug pa means that it has an end, is finite, or is not repetitive.

364 Avalokitavrata's commentary is P5259 Vol. 96 190.2.5-1.2.4.

365 Seen.361.

366 Avalokitavrata is referring to the Akutobhaya which he clearly accepts as authored by Nagarjuna. Tsong Khapa and his followers disagree; see p.360 and n.414.

367 The Sanskrit is taken from Chandrakirti's Clear Words (see n.374).

368 The text (Vol. 96 190.5.3) mistakenly repeats the last two sentences.

369 Vol. 96 191.2.1: read skye ba for skye has.

370 53.9 (Varanasi edition, 1973).

371 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 262a.6-b.4.

372 This and the next paragraph are drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 27 lb.4-273a.3.

373 Kensur Lekden.

374 Part Five, chapter four is drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 231a.6-43a.2 (see n.346). The entire text of Chandrakirti's defense of Buddhapalita's refutation of production from self and criticism of Bhavaviveka's system, as found in his Clear Words, is cited in sections throughout this and the next chapter (P5260, Vol. 98 4.4.2-7.3.2; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 10 5.14-21.23; Poussin, 14.1-36.2). J.W. De Jong's splendid 'Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapada', Indo-Iranian Journal 20 (1978), pp.25-59, has been used throughout. With each citation, the references to Poussin's edition of the Clear Words in Bibliotheca Buddhica IV and the Tibetan translation in the Tibetan Publishing House gSung rab gees btus dpar khang edition of 1968 (10.11-25.16) are given in the text in

parentheses. Stcherbatsky's very free translation is in his *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, pp.98-125.

Here in Chandrakirti's citation of Buddhapalita the second fallacy reads atiprAsangadoshachcha, 'and because of the fault of great absurdity' which is rendered in Tibetan (Vol. 98 4.4.3) as dang shin tu thai bar 'gyur ba'iphyir, 'and because it would be very absurd'. The Tibetan of Buddhapalita's text (P5242, Vol. 95 75.1.6), however, is slightly different due, most likely, to a looser translation spelling out the actual absurdity, dang skye ba thug pa medpar 'gyur ba'i phyir, 'and because production would be endless'. Since the latter is more to the point and is also the reading in Bhavaviveka's text (P5253, Vol. 95 155.4.7) and Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhavaviveka (P5259, Vol. 96 190.3.1) as well as Tsong Khapa's commentary on the Treatise (Varanasi 1973 edition, 52.4) I have used it throughout.

375 With respect to the third fault prAsangavakyatvachcha, this is translated in the Peking edition of Bhavaviveka's text (Vol. 95 155.5.1, translation by Jnanagarbha and Lui-gyel-tsen [gLu'i-rgyal-mtshan]) as: glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa 'i phyir te but in the Peking edition of the Clear Words (Vol. 98 4.4.4, and in the Shes rig par khang edition, 10.17, these being the same translation by Mahasumati and Ba-tsap-nyi-ma drak [Pa-tshabnyi-ma-grags]) as: thai bar 'gyur ba 'i tshig yin pa 'i phyir and in Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhavaviveka (P5259, Vol. 96 190.3.8) as: glags yod pa 'i tshig yin pa 'i yang phyir te Only in the last one is the final cha of the Sanskrit represented by yang, allowing it to be interpreted as a third reason for the unsuitability of Buddhapalita's refutation. In his commentary on the Treatise Tsong Khapa (Varanasi 1973 edition, 52.12) points out the discrepancy in translation, indicating that he favors glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i yang phyir teas it is in the edition of Bhavaviveka he had before him and in Avalokitavrata in the sense of meaning, '[Buddhapalita's interpretation] is also unsuitable because of having words that afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system]'. Tsong Khapa identifies that this is the interpretation of Avalokitavrata, and it indeed is as can be seen in translation in the next citation. (The Tibetan of that, in Vol. 96 190.4.7 is: gnas nan buddha pa li tas bskad pa de ni rgol ba gzhan gyi klan ka 'i glags yod pa 'i tshig yin pa 'i phyir yang rigs pa ma yin noil yang zhes bya ba'i sgra ni gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa'i phyir dang gzhan gyis smras pa 'i nyes pa ma bsal ba 'i phyir rigs pa ma yin par 'ba' zhig tu ma zad gyi/de ni glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir yang rigs pa ma yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro).

In this interpretation prAsangavakyatvachcha has the sense of 'because of being a statement that is susceptible to [absurd] consequences' in the sense of affording an opportunity to an opponent to find holes in one's argument, rather than just meaning 'because of being a statement of [absurd] consequences'. Thus, this is not a description of Buddhapalita's commentary as containing consequences but an indication that it is susceptible to the absurd consequence of contradicting a basic Madhyamika tenet. The remainder of the passage then spells out what that inner contradiction is. In this interpretation the phrase is taken as a third reason, not as a reason beginning the next sentence. This is also Jam-yang-shay-ba's opinion (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 264b.2-6), based on Avalokitavrata (see p464-5).

376 See n.347.

377 P5229, Vol. 95 15.1.1.

378 Until the next note, the material is drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 273b.l-2.

379 This quote, as well as the next four, and the general argument are taken from Tsong Khapa's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, P6001, Vol. 152 156.2.2ff.

380 The source here is the author's own reading in these texts.

381 This and the next paragraph are drawn from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 59a.7fF.

382 This is found in Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations, cited here from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 233b.4.

383 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 233b.2, citing Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations.

384 The Sanskrit is Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 10 5.16-6.5 and Poussin 15.3-16.10.

385 Poussin's Sanskrit (15.4) reads '... is enquiring in the following way about the purpose in production of the existent...', but Dr. Vaidya (5.17) drops vidyamdnasya punarutpattau prayojanam in accordance with the Tibetan.

386 In accordance with J.W. De Jong's 'Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapada' (p.29, n.\5.5)svata itihetutvena tadevachotpadyata iti should read svata hi vidyamdnam hetutvena bravishi tad eva chotpadyata iti, which, as he says, is confirmed by the Tibetan.

About this, Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 265a.4-6) says, 'Yod pa rgyu nyid indicates that with respect to all that involve production their existence acts as a cause, and de nyid skye'o indicates that all that involve production are produced from their respective existence.' In that, read ranggiyodpas for ranggiyod pa'i andyodpa de las for yodpa de in accordance with the Ngawang Gelek edition, 480.5 and 480.6. He cites this passage to show that the Samkhyas '... assert that a sprout exists from the time of its causes and that it is produced from that existence.'

I have translated the first part of this sentence in accordance with his interpretation, but not the second part since the Sanskrit tad eva chotpadyata iti does not seem to warrant 'from that', instead meaning 'and just that is produced'.

387 See notes 500 and 501 with respect to the quotations from Aryadeva and Nagarjuna.

388 The brackets in the second stanza of the Refutation of Objections are from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Par/!' (New Delhi: Chos'phel-legs-ldan, 1972)477.5-8.2.

389 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 234a.1.

390 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 229a.6.

391 This sentence is from a work on the Opposite of the Consequences (thai bzlog) by Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen (sGom-sde Nam-mkha'-rgyal-mtshan, 1532-92), Madhyamika Text Series, Vol. 4 (New Delhi: Lha-mkhar Yons-'dzin Bstan-pa-rgyalmtshan, 1973), 602.5. The two previous sentences are deductions from his commentary. He lists five reasons that the Samkhyas use for proving production from self, all of which lack their intended force according to the Buddhist.

392 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 59b.2.

393 Chandrakirti also sees another correct other-approved syllogism in Buddhapalita's statements: The subjects, objects other than the person, are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, as in the case of the person. See Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 240b.6.

394 Or, according to the Sanskrit, 'and [thus] due to being established [for the Samkhyas] here it is held as the example'; the Tibetan does not translate upaddnam (Poussin, 21.10).

395 De Jong (n.21.13) corrects the Sanskrit to 'numdnabadhcodandydm, which would be 'damage', not 'contradiction', but I have stayed with 'contradiction' 'gal ba simply because it is easier to follow in translation.

396 With respect to why cloth, or woolen cloth as the word means in Tibetan, is frequently used as the second example after a pot, it strikes me that it is merely because of the

similarity in sound between the two words in Sanskrit, ghata and pata.

397 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 240a.1 and 240b.5-la.3.

398 Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 240b.6) seems to take 'example' as referring to an example of another syllogism, whereas it might refer (see Poussin, p.22, n.3) to the example in this syllogism (the person) which does not have the fault of indefiniteness in the sense of being overly vast by including everything and thus incurring the fault that when the example is realized, the main thesis would also be realized. However, the latter interpretation does not appear to fit Chandrakirti's context. Chandrakirti seems to be concerned that the subject of the main syllogism, not the subject of the example, include all phenomena that are produced. This is probably why Jam-yang-shay-ba, for the most part, interprets the subject as 'things such as a non-manifest pot and so forth' instead of just as 'things'. In the second syllogism, Chandrakirti is providing another all inclusive subject; thus it seems that the matter does not revolve around the example (which in the first syllogism is a pot already in its manifest form).

399 Dr. Vaidya (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 10 p.7, n.4) objects to Poussin's (see p.23, n.1) editing the text from atha vakyani to arthavakhyani in accordance with the Tibetan don gyi ngag 'di dag, but the usage of this same term on 7.22 suggests that Poussin could be right.

400 This and the next paragraph are my summary.

401 The remainder of the chapter is drawn from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 241b.2-3a.2.

402 The Sanskrit (Poussin, 23.4) reads, 'And, due to that, there is no contradiction with a tenet.'

403 From Gom-day, 617.6.

404 Gom-day, 61&A.

405 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 242a.5.

406 The bracketed additions in this and the next two sentences are from Gom-day, 619.2ff.

407 Tsong Khapa's Ocean of Reasoning, 55.17.

408 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 242b.4.

409 The identification of what is being refuted in these three cases is from Gom-day, 621.1ff. The bracketed additions in the first citation are from Tsong Khapa's commentary, 136.7, Varanasi 1973 edition.

410 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (242b .5) reads gzugs nizugs ni rgyu medpar/thai bar 'gyur but should read gzugs na gzugs ni, which then would accord more with the Sanskrit (Poussin, 24.10) rupam prasajyate/ ahetukam and with Tsong Khapa's commentary (129.1, Varanasi 1973 edition) than the Peking (Vol. 98 5.5.3)gzugs na gzugs kyi rgyu med par/thai bar 'gyur. The bracketed additions in the first citation are from Tsong Khapa's commentary, 128.19, Varanasi 1973 edition. Tsong Khapa (129.8) says that this implies its opposite meaning. That the other two do so is my speculation.

411 The glosses are from Tsong Khapa's commentary, 443.8, Varanasi 1973 edition.

412 The source for the material up to the citation from Chandrakirti is Tsong Khapa's Ocean of Reasoning, 56.8-16 (Varanasi 1973 edition).

413 De Jong ('Textcritical Notes' p.30, n.25.3), following Yamaguchi, says that both the first question and the response are spoken by Bhavaviveka; however, Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen (621.3-3.2) divides it as I have, though he does not specify the disputants. It fits the pattern of the section better to have a question being put to the hypothetical Bhavaviveka, his responding, and then being cut off based on his response.

414 As Gom-day, (623.1) points out, it is significant that Chandrakirti does not mention the

Akutobhaya as an auto-commentary of Nagarjuna, adding credence to the argument that it is not his.

415 Part Five, chapter five is drawn mainly from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 243a.257b.4.

416 The Tibetan reads 'are definite as not being produced from self (bdag las skye ba med par nges te), but this is not represented in the Sanskrit (see next note). The reason could also be translated as 'because of presently existing' since vidyamdna is the present middle participle; however, later (Poussin, 33.4) Chandrakirti cites the reason as sottvdd, suggesting that the particular form makes little difference, this perhaps being why it was translated into Tibetan merely as yod pa 'i phyir instead of da Ita bar yod pa 'i phyir.

417 The Tibetan of the example shespayodpa nyidbzhin must be a mere translation of the Sanskrit chaitanya and not an extension of it to include the reason ('existing'). In any case, the reference is to thzpurusha, the person, or pure spirit, pure consciousness.

Bhavaviveka's syllogism in full is: na paramanhata ddhyatmikanydyatanndni svata utpanndni vidyamdnatvdt chaitanyavaditi, don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa 'i phyir na shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no zhes.

418 Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations, 117.4 in the Varanasi 1973 edition.

419 For a slightly different citation of this, see p.648; also see n.637. The Tibetan has 'is not produced causelessly' at the end. Poussin (p.26, n.3) draws our attention to Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, IX. 142, and his Compendium of Learnings 219.10.

[9:142]

Nothing comes from something else, nothing remains, and nothing departs. What is the difference between an illusion and that which is considered by fools as real?

420 Poussin identifies this as 210.3-5. Chandrakirti cites it again in commentary at the end of chapters two and twenty-one. Poussin calls our attention to Shantideva's Compendium of Learnings, 238.10, 239.4.

421 Since in Gelugpa the nature of phenomena is permanent, here 'permanent' is interpreted, as usual, as the extreme of inherent existence.

421a Stcherbatsky (p. 113) translates this clause extremely freely, adding in considerable commentary as if Chandrakirti says such in his text: 'Indeed (Bhavaviveka) himself being a Madhyamika does not admit the transcendental reality of separate mental phenomena and at the same time he composes a syllogism about this very non-existing thing.' The last clause is total speculation stemming from Stcherbatsky's assumption that Chandrakirti does not accept the existence of anything.

422 Following De Jong's correction ('Textcritical Notes' p.31, n.28.1) ofvastusatdm to dravyasatdm.

423 Most of Chandrakirti's refutation of Bhavaviveka with respect to Commonly Appearing Subjects is included in Tsong Khapa's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path and has been translated by Alex Wayman in Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (New York: Columbia, 1978), pp.309-35. About the first example, a Buddhist's proof for a Vaisheshika that sound is impermanent, Wayman (p.309) says, '... in regard to (the proposition) "Sound is not eternal" (maintained by the Buddhist on the side of the Vaisesika)...', thereby suggesting that the Buddhist is proving that sound is impermanent on behalf of a Vaisheshika to someone else. Wayman is clearly drawing from a mis-reading of bye bragpa'i ngor in the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 525.5. Though ngo means 'side' or 'face', here with the ra ending it means, not 'on the side' but 'to the side' and thus, in English, 'to a Vaisheshika'.

That the conventions (vyavahdra, tha snyad) of inference and object inferred would be

non-existent if the subject, predicate, and so forth were qualified with the particular assertions of one school simply means that we could not speak of inferring anything if the terms were so qualified since the process of inference would get bogged down in merely considering the subject, etc., for the two parties could not come to agreement.

With respect to the second example, a Vaisheshika's proving to someone else that sound is impermanent, Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 346a.5) identifies the other party as a Nirgrantha (gCer bu pa), accepted as another name for Jaina. Stcherbatsky (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, p. 115) identifies the opponent here as a Mimamsaka; he inserts the identification into the text as if Chandrakirti so specified it, but he did not do so. Gomday, 633.2, identifies the other party as a DTpaka (gSal byedpa) as does the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 526.4, which says that Drpakais a sub-division of Samkhya. Wayman (p.310) goes along with Stcherbatsky. In any case, the assertion of the Vaisheshika's opponent is that sound is pre-existent in a non-manifest state and is made manifest by conditions, something which the Vaisheshika himself cannot accept.

424 Gom-day, 634.4.1, and Four Interwoven Commentaries, 530.1. The predicate of what Bhavaviveka is proving is an absence or negation of production (ultimately) with respect to the subject, eyes and so forth; in this sense, Chandrakirti says, '... when it is just the case that a negation of production (utpadapratishedha, skye ba bkagpa) is asserted (abhipreta, 'dodpa) as the predicate of the probandum (sddhyadharma, bsgrub bya'i chos)...' Wayman (pp.311-12) misconstrues the sentence to read, 'At the very time that he denies in this phase (of proof) an arising (in the absolute sense) and believes in a feature to be proved (the sddhya-dharma)...' The Sanskrit double nominative utpadapratishedho and sadhyadharma is rendered into Tibetan in a very clear way as an objective nominative skye ba bkag pa and an adverbial accusative bsgrub bya'i chos su; the particle su means 'as' and can in no way be construed as 'and'. Thus, Chandrakirti is giving the context of his following remarks— that of ultimate analysis, such as in this case when a negation of production is being asserted as, or taken as, the predicate of what one is proving. Many Tibetan scholars take this as showing that Chandrakirti is speaking only about occasions of debating about the final mode of subsistence of phenomena and that his remarks about no commonly appearing subjects should not be extended to times when debating about conventional phenomena such as impermanence, since the question of whether the consciousness certifying the subject and so forth is valid with respect to the mode of subsistence is relevant only when one is debating about that mode of subsistence.

Jam-yang-shay-ba's text (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 247b.1) mis-reads de'i tshe de kho nar (tada tad eva) instead of de'i tshe kho nar (tadaira) as the Peking edition (Vol. 98 6.3.3) does and which is confirmed by the Sanskrit (Poussin, 30.1). He strains to include de kho nar somewhere in the meaning of the sentence; disregarding syntax, he puts it with the first clause, reading it as referring to a reasoning consciousness in the face of which production is refuted. Following this reading, the passage would be:

... at this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production] when it is just the case that a negation of production in suchness [that is to say, in the perspective of a reasoning consciousness] is asserted as the predicate of the probandum ...

Tsong Khapa's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Lam rim chen mo) has the same mis-reading (Dharmasala: Shes rig par khang, 448b.3, and the Four Interwoven Commentaries, 530.3) but with a different interpretation. There, de kho nar is taken in a more syntactically appropriate way as going not with the 'when' clause but with what follows.

With this placement the passage reads:

That is not so, because at this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production] when it is just the case that a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the probandum, this one [Bhavaviveka] himself just asserts that the entity of the subject [an eye]— the basis of that [predicate, non-production from self]— which is found by a mere erroneous [consciousness] has degenerated from [being established] in suchness [that is to say, is not established ultimately since it is found by a mistaken consciousness]. Erroneous and non-erroneous [consciousnesses] are different.

In this interpretation, (according to the Four Interwoven Commentaries., 530.5-31.2) once Bhavaviveka asserts that eyes and so forth are not ultimately established and are not ultimates, it is established that they are falsities. Also, since it would be very contradictory for a consciousness of reality which is devoid of dualistic appearance to take such falsities as its objects in the perspective of its perceiving suchness, they must be objects found by erroneous consciousnesses and objects in relation to which a consciousness comes to be considered a mistaken consciousness. However, the Madhyamika is debating with a Proponent of True Existence who asserts that valid sense consciousnesses are non-mistaken with respect to visible forms and so forth. Therefore, it would be very contradictory for that one object to be that in relation to which a sense consciousness becomes mistaken as in the Madhyamika system and that in relation to which it becomes non-mistaken [read tshadma ma 'khrul ba'iyul for tshadma 'khrul pa'i yul, 531.2] as in the system of a Proponent of True Existence. Due to this, there is no subject commonly established for both the Madhyamika and the Proponent of True Existence. For, an erroneous, mistaken consciousness which is polluted by ignorance and a non-erroneous, non-mistaken consciousness of a Superior's meditative equipoise perceiving suchness are different, that is, are mutually exclusive in terms of how they engage their objects, the one dualistically and the other non-dualistically (according to Kentsur Yeshe Thupten).

In this interpretation the last sentence—'Erroneous and non-erroneous [consciousnesses] are different'—refers to the possible consciousnesses that could certify the existence of objects that are established by way of their own character, both being rejected. That which is erroneous—a consciousness to which a non-inherently existent object appears to be inherently existent —cannot certify an inherently existent object because that is the very thing with respect to which it is mistaken. That which is non-erroneous, a consciousness of meditative equipoise that does not involve such mistaken appearance, also cannot certify the existence of a conventionality such as eyes and so forth (the subject of our syllogism about non-ultimate production) because conventionalities do not appear to it, even in the case of a Buddha, in terms of its mode of perceiving emptiness non-dualistically since conventionalities can only be perceived in a dualistic mode. Also, in this interpretation the 'degeneration' or non-establishment is taken as referring to Bhavaviveka's having to assert that eyes and so forth are not established ultimately, that is to say, not established by way of their own character because of being found or certified as existing by erroneous consciousnesses, this in turn being because even he holds that they are not found by a consciousness of meditative equipoise.

Tsong Khapa's *Essence of the Good Explanations*, written later in his life than the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*, offers another interpretation of this passage. That text says at the point of explaining Chandrakirti's response to 'Bhavaviveka's' proposal that the subject and so forth are established because only generalities are used (191.8-192.10, Varanasi edition).

Bhavaviveka himself asserts that the entities of the subjects—eyes and so forth—are not found by mere erroneous [consciousnesses], and [Chandrakirti] refutes him through

demonstrating the reasoning that the erroneous and the non-erroneous are different, a dichotomy, etc. The meaning of [Chandrakirti's] statements is this: Mere eyes and so forth devoid of qualification of the two truths are not positable as the subjects in the proof that eyes and so forth are not produced from self because [according to Bhavaviveka] the valid cognizers comprehending those subjects are consciousnesses that are non-mistaken with respect to the nature [inherent existence] of eyes and so forth but false appearances—in which erroneous objects of knowledge appear to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not—do not exist among objects found by non-erroneous consciousnesses that are not mistaken with respect to the nature.

With respect to [Bhavaviveka] asserting the earlier reason [—that according to Bhavaviveka the valid cognizers comprehending those subjects are consciousnesses that are non-mistaken with respect to the nature or inherent existence of eyes and so forth—] in a system [such as that of Bhavaviveka] which asserts that whatever exists exists by way of its own entity, if [a consciousness] is mistaken relative to the appearance of the object's being established by way of its own character, it cannot be posited as finding [that is, realizing] its object of comprehension. Therefore, whether a valid cognizer is conceptual or non-conceptual, it must be non-mistaken about that with respect to which it is valid, its referent object or appearing object [respectively]. In that case, it must be valid about an entity or nature which is the object's own mode of subsistence and which is not just nominally designated conventionally, and he also asserts this. It is contradictory for whatever is an object found by such a valid cognizer to be an erroneous object of knowledge; thereby, the latter reason [—that false appearances, in which erroneous objects of knowledge appear to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not, do not exist among objects found by non-erroneous consciousnesses that are not mistaken with respect to the nature—] is established. Likewise, it is also contradictory for whatever is an object found by a mistaken consciousness to be a non-erroneous object of knowledge. Therefore, [Bhavaviveka] cannot dispel the fallacy of the non-establishment of the subject.

In this interpretation, Bhavaviveka is said to assert, not that eyes and so forth are not established in suchness because of being found by mistaken consciousnesses, but that these are not found by mistaken consciousnesses because they must be certified by consciousnesses that are not mistaken with respect to the inherent existence of those objects. However, the former is seen as being forced on him because of his assertions whereas the latter is presented as his actual assertion; thus, the change in Tsong Khapa's interpretation does not represent an about-face in terms of delineating Bhavaviveka's tenets and instead is a different reading of the text. (Also, in this interpretation the last sentence—'Erroneous and non-erroneous are different'—refers not to consciousnesses but to objects of knowledge.) About the change in interpretation, Tsong Khapa himself says in his *Essence of the Good Explanations* (195.20-196.2):

Although the two—[my] explanation [of this passage] elsewhere [in the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path] in terms of [Bhavaviveka's] having asserted that the basal subjects degenerate from [or are not] established as [their own] suchness and this mode [of interpretation]—do not agree, it is not that [my two interpretations] disagree with respect to [the passage's setting forth] the tenet of refuting autonomy.

It is my guess that since in his *Essence of the Good Explanations* Tsong Khapa does not use 'in suchness' (de kho nai, the misreading in de'i ishe kho nar) in any way at all, he came to understand it as a mis-reading and, due to this, changed his reading of the text, ingeniously making it mean the same thing, albeit by a very different route. It seems to me that Jam-yang-shay-ba makes the mistake of trying to keep 'in suchness' (de kho nar) when explaining Tsong Khapa's new interpretation in . his *Essence of the Good Explanations* and

thus goes through the verbal gymnastics of moving it, against all sense of syntax, into the previous clause.

In Tsong Khapa's *Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of* (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (52.2-7.13), Varanasi 1973 edition), written after his *Essence of the Good Explanations* he refers his readers to the discussion in his 'Essence of the Good Explanations and so forth' for the topic of Commonly Appearing Subjects, suggesting a preference for the interpretation there over that in the 'Great Exposition of Special Insight'; thus, it may be that in the end he did not hold that these two radically different interpretations are both correct. In any case, Jam-yang-shay-ba uses the interpretation in Tsong Khapa's *Essence of the Good Explanations* for this passage, and hence the interpretation used here in my translation and commentary is the same.

425 Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of the Middle Way*, 249b.2. —

426 For this, see Tsong Khapa's *Essence of the Good Explanations*, 193.13 (Varanasi: *Pleasure of Elegant Sayings* edition, 1973).

427 This was cited earlier, p.475. See n.388.

428 For this, see the *Four Interwoven Commentaries on* (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 578.5. The summations following are the author's.

428a Wayman (p.312) translates the last line of this citation as, 'You have no answer to this.' However, the *Four Interwoven Commentaries* (533.4) make it clear that the reference is to 'Bhavaviveka's' earlier answer: khyed kyis Ian btappa 'di ni don dang mthun pa 'i Ian ma yin pa nyid do 'The answer which you have given is just not an answer concordant with the fact.' Bhavaviveka's earlier answer (see p.507) was that just generalities are to be used as subject, predicate, and so forth without being qualified by the particular assertions of the two schools. Chandrakirti's refutation of this is built around his perception that a tenet unacceptable to a Madhyamika is automatically attached to the subject and so forth—inherent existence—because schools that propound inherent existence hold that the consciousness certifying the subject perforce must certify the subject's inherent existence.

429 Jam-yang-shay-ba (*Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way*, 250a.2) seems to make this conclusion since he does not specify 'Buddhists' here as referring to non-Prasangikas.

430 Gom-day, 633.1, sangs rgyas pa 'og mas. A note by Dra-di-gezhay Rin-chen-don-drup (Bra-sti-dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub) in the *Four Interwoven Commentaries on* (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path' (546.6) identifies the Buddhists here as Svatantrikas and below.

431 Geshe Gedun Lodro and Kensur Yeshe Thupten reported this. Wayman (p.316) translates the first clause of the second sentence in the following citation as, 'For in that instance (of example) there is no intention to state a difference between the sound universal and the impermanence universal.' However, the reference here is not to a difference between two things but to mere sound and mere impermanence which are not asserted as qualified (avivakshitavishesha, khyadpar brjodpar mi 'dodpa) with the particular tenets of the two schools. The *Four Interwoven Commentaries* (545.6-6.3) says: dpe'i skabs der ni sangs rgyas pas bye brag pa la sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa dang bye brag pas gsal byed pa la de Itar sgrub pa'i skabs su rim pa Itar 'byung 'gyur dangnam mkha'iyon tangnyisdang byaspa dang sngaryod rkyen gyis gsal bar byas pa gnyis te so so 'i 'dod pas khyad par ma byas par rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa tsam gyi sgra'i spyi tsam zhig dang phyis 'byung gi rgyu la has pa dang ma Itos pa gang gis kyang khyad par du ma byas pa 'i sgrub bya 'i chos rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa'i mi rtag pa'am 'jig pa nyid kyi spyi tsam zhig la tshad mar song ba de bkod nas so so 'i 'dodpa 'i khyad par de dag sbyar nas brjodpar mi 'dodpargnyis ka 'i lugs la mthun snang du grub pa zhig brjod par 'dodna nirgol bade gnyis ka'i lugs la yang yod pa

yin... 'On that occasion of the example when the Buddhist is proving to a Vaisheshika that sound is impermanent and a Vaisheshika is proving the same to a Drpaka, a mere generality of sound which is just established by way of its own character but is not qualified by their individual assertions —respectively, being a derivative of the elements and being a quality of space or being a product and being something previously existent which is manifested by conditions—and a mere generality of impermanence or disintegratedness (the predicate of the probandum) which is established by way of its own character but which is not qualified by either depending or not depending on later causes are stated within the context that these have been certified by valid cognition. If, not wishing to express [a subject and predicate] within affixing those qualifications of their individual assertions, they wish to express [a subject and predicate that are] established as commonly appearing in both of their systems, there is such in the systems of both disputants.' As Tsong Khapa (Four Interwoven Commentaries, 546.6ff) makes clear, 'sound not qualified by being a derivative of the elements or a quality of space' refers to sound's not being so qualified for the minds of the two disputants. In other words, the two disputants can speak of sound without putting in the qualifications of their systems even though the Buddhist holds that there is no sound that is not a derivative of the elements and the Vaisheshika holds that there is no sound which is not a quality of space. Though the Buddhist holds that sound is necessarily a derivative of the elements and the Vaisheshika holds that sound necessarily possesses those attributes (khyad par dang Idan pa), it is not necessary that sound be qualified for their minds (bio la khyad par du byaspa) by being a derivative of the elements or a quality of space. Conceptuality is able to isolate such generalities. Chandrakirti is saying that even if in Bhavaviveka's example such generalities are possible, there is no possibility of such when proving emptiness since the subject must be certified by valid cognition and a non-Madhyamika feels that this certification also certifies the inherent existence of the subject. The commentary, as given above, tacks 'established by way of its own character' onto the generalities, restricting the range of the example to non-Prasangikas; however, not all scholars hold that this restriction should be made, for even in the Prasangika system generalities of sound and impermanence are possible even when debating with non-Prasangikas since the issue of their being established by way of their own character is not pertinent.

432 This and the next paragraph supply background drawn from Kensur Lekden's oral teachings.

433 The Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 566.2-7.1.

434 Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen ends his commentary at this point.

435 The bracketed material in this sentence is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 561.4ff.

436 The bracketed material in 1.7 is from Tsong Khapa's Ocean of Reasoning, 77.3fF (Varanasi 1973 edition).

437 The bracketed material in this sentence is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 562.5.

438 This and the next sentence are teachings frequently emphasized by Kensur Lekden.

439 The Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 569.5, identifies this term as meaning 'something substantially established which is established by way of its own character' (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa 'i rdzas grub).

440 Reading ghatasya in accordance with De Jong ('Textcritical Notes' p.31, n.31.14).

441 Following the Tibetan gzhan gyis; the Sanskrit is pare which Stcherbatsky (p. 119, n.7) prefers as paraih but De Jong (p.31, n.31.14) decides should be left as it is.

442 The meaning of this is conjectured from discussion with Kensur Yeshe Thupten, who

pointed to a statement in Dignaga's Compendium of Valid Cognition (P5700, Vol. 130 3.1.3,1.4ab): 'Because [the sense powers] are the uncommon cause [of their respective consciousness], that [consciousness] is designated [with the term 'sense direct perceiver' (pratyaksha, dbangpo'i mngon sum)] by way of the sense powers.' (asadharana-hetutvad akshais tad.vyapadishyate, thun mong ma yin rgyu yi phyir/de'i tha snyad dbangpos byed [the Peking mis-reads deys tha snyad; de yi would also be suitable; this reading follows Hattori cited below]. For the Sanskrit and M. Hattori's translation and analysis see his Dignaga, On Perception [Cambridge: Harvard, 1968], p.26 and pp.86-7 n.1.30 and n.1.32). Kensur Yeshe Thupten and Hattori also point out that there is a similar statement in Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge, 1.45: 'Since due to their changing [that is, becoming duller or clearer, the respective consciousnesses] change [becoming duller or clearer], the bases are the eye [sense power] and so forth. Therefore, because of being the uncommon [cause], the consciousnesses are called by way of them [that is, a consciousness of visible forms is called an eye consciousness, not a form consciousness].' (tad-vikdravikdrivdd dshraydsh chakshur-ddayah/ato 'sdDharanatvach cha vijñanam tair niruchyate, [Hattori, p.76 n. 1.11]; de daggyurpas 'gyur nyidphyir/rten ni mig la sogspayin/dephyir thun mong ma yin phyir/de dag gis ni rnam shes bstan [148.16, Varanasi 1978 edition].) Thus, a non-Madhyamika is arguing that since the sense powers are themselves causes, they must be ultimately produced.

Stcherbatsky (p. 120) translates the passage as:

Thesis: Internal facts, i.e., mental phenomena really arise, i.e., they have a real existence.

Reason: Because they produce purposive actions directed towards the same objects as our thoughts have been directed to. Major premise: Whatsoever is efficient is real.

His translation, though a bit strained, is getting at the same point.

443 In the Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition (22.19), read shes rab kyi mig for shes rab kyis mig in accordance with the Peking (Vol. 98 6.5.5). It seems to me that the Tibetan would be better rendered as: dngos po rnam shes kyi yang dag pa ji ha ba bzhin nyid mthong ba 'i rnal 'byor pa mnyam par bzhag pa 'i shes rab kyi mig gis sgye ba dang 'gro ba la sags pa dag don dam paryod par bsgrub na ni.

444 In the Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition (23.4) read sgrub par byed pa la yang for sgrub par byed pa layodpa in accordance with the Peking (Vol. 98 6.5.7). Stcherbatsky (p.121) takes Bhavaviveka's refutation of going as a refutation of time; though there is a similarity between space and time, this refutation at least explicitly is concerned with motion, being concerned with the second chapter of Nagarjuna's Treatise, the 'Analysis of Going and Coming'.

445 De Jong (p.31, n.33.1) corrects the Sanskrit rupavatto svarupavat in accordance with Bhavaviveka's Heart of the Middle Way, III.39ab; thus, the Tibetan would be better translated as rang gzugs bzhin, 'like its form', meaning the form that the eye sees.

446 Bhavaviveka's Heart of the Middle Way, III.27ab; see De Jong, p.32, n.33.2.

447 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 253.5: read 'diyang for 'di la yang in accordance with Vol. 98 7.1.2. Here, Chandrakirti (Poussin, 33.4) gives the reason of Bhavaviveka's syllogism as sattvdt, not vidyamdnatvdt as he did earlier (26.1); the Tibetan is yod pa 'i phyir throughout.

Stcherbatsky's interpretation (p. 123) of the objection is quite fanciful. As this passage is not cited in the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', or in Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, or in Gom-day whose commentary has ended, the interpretation of the objection as coming from Bhavaviveka is mine. It makes sense since Chandrakirti argued earlier for the all-inclusiveness of Buddhapalita's syllogism (see n.398).

448 Tsong Khapa's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, P6001, Vol. 152 160.4.3.

449 Missing in the Tibetan. The Sanskrit (Poussin, 34.5) has *asmadanumananam*. The Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 572.4, by glossing this as referring to the inferences appearing in Chandrakirti's Clear Words and so forth, interprets the statement as referring not to all syllogistic reasoning in general but to those refuting production from self such as those drawn from Buddhapalita's text. This preserves other-renowned inferences or syllogisms as a means also for positively communicating one's own tenets. The interpretation seems forced; one is drawn into wondering why, if Chandrakirti meant to be so specific, he did not bother to be this specific.

Later in the same text (573.4), the same passage is glossed this way: '... but we [Prasangikas] do not use autonomous inferences because inferences [used by us Prasangikas] have the fruit [or purpose] of only refuting the [wrong] theses of other [parties].' In this version, the added commentary is not aimed at preserving the positive use of syllogisms; however, one could merely say that 'inferences' means not all but some inferences stated by Prasangikas. In any case, the Gel-luk-ba position is clear: other-renowned inferences are used for both positive and negative purposes.

450 Poussin (34.6) changes *parash chakshuh* to *param chakshuh* recognizing (see n.5) that the Tibetan (*gzhan*) does not confirm the change, preferring that it read *gzhan la*; however, Dr. Vaidya leaves the manuscript as is, and the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 573.5, follows the same reading, identifying the term as referring to other parties who assert that the eye sees.

451 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 255b.1, read *nyidduyangkhas* for *nyiddu khas* in accordance with the Peking, Vol. 98 7.1.7. The bracketed material in this and the next section is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 573.6-4.2.

452 The bracketed material is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 574.4.

453 Missing in the Tibetan. The Sanskrit (Poussin, 34.11) has *asmadanum anair*.

454 In Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 254a.6, *rtadgang las* for *gang la* in accordance with Vol. 98 7.2.2.

455 The Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 578.5.

456 The bracketed material is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 591.Iff.

457 The Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 592.2. With respect to 'who do not know suchness' the Sanskrit (Poussin, 36.1) is merely *tadanabhijria* 'who do not know that [or those, which could refer to "the definitions"]' whereas the Tibetan reads *de kho na mi shes pa'i* 'who do not know suchness'. The Four Interwoven Commentaries (592.3) takes it even further: *chos kyi de kho na nyid ma shes pa'i* 'who do not know the suchness of phenomena'. I have followed the Tibetan as it presumably reflects the reading of *tad* as meaning *tattva* (see Poussin, p.36, n.3) by the translators.

458 The rest of the chapter presents the author's reflections on these topics. This first sentence refers to Aryadeva's famous statement in his Four Hundred (the Four Interwoven Commentaries, 590.2):

Just as a barbarian cannot be
Approached with another language,
So the world cannot be approached

Except with the worldly.

194.

Just as a barbarian cannot be
Guided in a foreign language,
Ordinary people cannot be guided
Except by way of the ordinary.

(The need for adapted teachings: not only do we need to adapt the teaching to the major problem of the patient, but also to his level of understanding, using his own conceptual context, and accepted habits. We have to start from his own basis, otherwise everything will be globally rejected, including the teacher with the best intentions.)

459 Tsong Khapa, Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, P6001, Vol. 152 142.3.6.

460 Kensur Lekden frequently mentioned this as an apparent contradiction; it is from Chandrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred'.

461 Kensur Lekden.

462 Part Five, chapter six is mainly a paraphrase of Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 291.9-299.8, supplemented with information from the Nyingma Lama Khetsun Sangpo, who in 1972 was working on his own compilation of biographies of Tibetan yogis at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharmasala. The identification of the orders of particular scholars and yogis is his, as are the dates with an asterisk. The chapter is not intended as a definitive history of the spread of Buddhism to and development in Tibet, but as a presentation illustrating both the dominance of Prasangika and the active inter-play between the orders.

463 This paragraph is mostly drawn from the oral teachings of Khetsun Sangpo.

464 Snellgrove and Richardson give the date as 779 in A Cultural History of Tibet (New York: Praeger, 1968), p.277.

465 This was reported by Khetsun Sangpo.

466 Tsong Khapa, Middling Exposition, P6002, Vol. 152 184.2.5.

467 Khetsun Sangpo.

468 Khetsun Sangpo.

469 Khetsun Sangpo.

470 Tibetan Buddhism is usually viewed as having four principal orders, but Khetsun Sangpo follows a system of eight.

471 Part Five, chapter seven is mainly drawn from extended conversations with Kensur Lekden, Geshe Gedun Lodro, and Geshe Geshe Lhundrup Sopa; the chapter attempts to put the Gelugpa teachings on valid establishment in context. The next sentence was repeatedly emphasized by Kensur Lekden.

472 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 9b.5ff.

473 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 9a.7ff.

474 This and the next paragraph are mainly drawn from the oral teachings of Geshe Gedun Lodro.

475 Tsong Khapa, Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"', P6143, Vol. 154 67.5.2ff. The next paragraph is from Geshe Gedun Lodro.

476 Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 53.3.7ff.

477 This and the next paragraph are mainly drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

478 See Tenzin Gyatso's The Buddhism of Tibet and the Key to the Middle Way (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p.74.

479 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 106a.3ff.

480 Geshe Lhundup Sopa.

481 This paragraph is mostly from Kensur Lekden.

482 Ornament to Nagarjuna's Thought, Eloquence Containing the Essence of the Profundities of the Middle Way (Kalimpong: Mani Printing Works), 14a.6ff. The biographical material comes from his contemporaries, Geshe Wangyal, Kensur Lekden, and Geshe Gelden.

483 This was reported by the inner Mongolian scholar Geshe Gelden.

484 Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many, Collected Works, Vol. 1 (New Delhi: Lama Guru Deva, 1971), 425.Iff.

485 Part Five, chapter eight is drawn from the sources indicated in the subsequent notes in an attempt to contrast the Gelugpa interpretation with other prevalent views on the import of Prasangika-Madhyamika. The quote here is taken from the Shes rig par khang edition, 435b.3-5, with the answer being from 440a.3-b.1.

486 (New Delhi: Lama Guru Deva, 1972), 18b.3-4.

487 Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider and Co., 1976), p. 137.

488 IBID, p.134-5.

489 See Tenzin Gyatso's The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp.55-6.

490 336.4-35b.2.

491 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 419.17-420.9.

492 Sata-Pitaka Series, Volume 28 pp.45-6.

493 Svarasvati has not been edited to Sarasvati because the sva spelling occurs consistently in many Tibetan texts and accords more with the Tibetan translation of the name as dbyangs, 'melody' or 'intonation'. Kensur Lekden mentioned that Svarasvati and Manjughosha are special deities for authors, the former assisting with perfect speech and the latter with discriminative wisdom.

494 P6142, Vol. 153 208.5.5 The Peking Edition reads mtshan 'dzin instead of mthar 'dzin. Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad snying po) is the ultimate of his works dealing with comparative schools of tenets. Structured around the topic of the interpretable and the definitive in the Mahayana schools, the text is primarily concerned with delineating what the final mode of being of phenomena is according to those schools, on the basis of which the division into what requires interpretation and what does not is made. Thus, the hermeneutical theory of the Chittamatra, Yogachara-Svatantrika, Sautrantika-Svatantrika, and Prasangika schools is ontologically based, that is, their theories of interpretation of both scripture and objects revolve around what ultimate reality is in contrast to how Buddha spoke to certain trainees in accordance with their interests, dispositions, and capabilities.

As Jam-yang-shay-ba says at the beginning of his commentary on the Essence of the Good Explanations (Buxa edition, 3a.2), Tsong Khapa is presenting the essence of all the good explanations (legs bshad thams cad kyi snying po), and thus the title, at least according to him, does not indicate that Tsong Khapa is saying that his own text has an essence of good explanation or eloquence but that he is presenting the essence of the marvelous explanations on the subject of the interpretable and the definitive from Indian treatises. The title could be translated as Essence of Eloquence or Essence of the Eloquent as long as eloquence was understood as referring to the Indian scholars' discriminative presentation of the subject matter and not to euphony of expression as in beautiful poetic composition or to Tsong Khapa's own presentation. Undoubtedly, Tsong Khapa's composition comes to be eloquent by way of containing the eloquence of the Indian scholars, but this does not appear to be the intention of his title.

Jam-yang-shay-ba would find support in the last two lines of this quote for his position that Buddhapalita is the founder of the Prasangika system, but those who say that Chandrakirti is the founder would also find support from the statement just above it that Chandrakirti 'opened the chariot way' for Prasangika through clearly differentiating this system from others. I find Jam-yang-shay-ba's position to be insupportable in the face of (1) his own statement that even though Saraha preceded Nagarjuna in holding the Madhyamika view and even though Vimuktisena preceded Shantarakshita in holding the Yogachara-Svatantrika view (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 10a.5-1 la.4), those two are not posited as the founders of, respectively, the Madhyamika system and the Yogachara-Madhyamika system because they did not clearly set off those schools in contradistinction to other systems and (2) his admission that Buddhapalita did not do that for Prasangika (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 9a.5-10a.1) whereas Chandrakirti did (see p.584). Jang-gya (288.last line) goes so far as to say that Jam-yang-shay-ba actually did not hold that Buddhapalita founded Prasangika for the above reasons. However, the monastic college that uses Jam-yang-shay-ba's texts, Gomang, currently holds that Buddhapalita was the founder and that this is Jam-yang-shay-ba's view.

495 The four types of Superiors (Aryan) are Hearer, Solitary Realizer, Bodhisattva, and Buddha Superiors. Aryan ('Phags pa) is translated as 'Superiors' because, according to Kensur Lekden, these are beings who have risen above the level of common beings (prthagjana, so sor skye bo) through cognizing emptiness directly on the path of seeing.

Shravaka (Nyan thos) is translated as 'Hearers' because (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 16a.3-5) they hear (nyan) the doctrine, practice it, and then cause others to hear (thos par byed pa) that they have actualized their goal (see Hopkins' Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism [London: Hutchinson, 1980], pp. 102-3). This etymology is built around active and causative uses of the verbal root for hearing, shru; one hears and then causes others to hear, in this case not what one has heard but what one has achieved after putting into practice the doctrines one has heard by announcing that 'I have done what was to be done; I will not know another life,' etc. The translation of the term as 'disciples' loses this etymological meaning which appears to be important in the tradition as is evidenced by Chandrakirti's citing it in his Supplement (Tibetan Publishing House edition, 3.11) and Tsong Khapa's including and expanding on Chandrakirti in his commentary (Compassion, P. 102).

Chandrakirti (Comm, 3.14, cited by Tsong Khapa in Compassion, p. 103) gives a second etymology of Shravaka as Hearer-Proclaimer (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 16a.5ff) based on the White Lotus of Excellent Doctrine Sutra (Saddharmapundarika, IV.53 [P781, Vol. 30 23.3.2; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 6, p.82] which says:

O Protector, today we have become hearer-proclaimers (shravakabhuta).

We will thoroughly proclaim the excellent enlightenment

And will set forth the terms of enlightenment.

Thus we [will be] like formidable Hearer-Proclaimers (Shravaka).

Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 16a.6), expanding on Tsong Khapa's explanation (Compassion, p. 103), interprets this as meaning that Shravakas are so called because upon hearing (thos nas) about the supreme fruit of Buddhahood or about its path from a Buddha they proclaim (sgrogs pa) it to others without practicing it themselves. He says (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 17b.4) that at this point in the Lotus Sutra Bodhisattvas are saying that they are fit to be derided because, like Hearers, they are proclaiming the fruit of the Mahayana or the profound path proceeding to that state without practicing it themselves. The context of the sutra, however, appears to be slightly different as can be seen in Leon Hurvitz's very readable

translation in the Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma (New York: Columbia, 1976, p.98). The Buddha has told the story of the 'prodigal son' (see Whalen Lai's fine article 'The Buddhist "Prodigal Son": A Story of Misperceptions', Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp.91-8), and the former Hearer, Mahakashyapa, is re-telling the story, relating it to how he and other Hearers formerly proclaimed the Bodhisattva path but did not practice it:

The Buddha's sons,
Hearing the Dharma from us
And day and night taking thought,
Engaged in cultivated practice, (p.95)

Also:

So we, though we preached
The jewel cache of the Buddhadharma,
Had no hope for it
In the same way. (p.96)

Also:

Although we, for the sake of
The Buddha's sons,
Preached the Bodhisattvadharmas,
Wherewith the Buddha Path was to be sought,
Yet, with respect to this Dharma,
We never had any hopes, (p.97)

Mahakashyapa then explains that due to having heard that they have the lot of the Mahayana and thereupon attained the Mahayana path they, like the son in the parable who was gradually led to recognize that he is the son of a wealthy king, have gained something extraordinary which they always had in the sense that they had been preaching it but had no hope to practice it. As Hurvitz translates the stanza in question:

We now
Are truly voice-hearers,
Taking the voice of the Buddha Path
And causing all to hear it.

Thus, Jam-yang-shay-ba is certainly right in saying that the Lotus Sutra is indicating a dual etymology of Shravaka as those who hear about the highest enlightenment of the Mahayana and then cause others to hear about it (causative in Sanskrit, sgrogs in Tibetan) without practicing it themselves. However, it seems that the specific context here in this stanza is that the now Bodhisattva Mahakashyapa is saying that he and others are now formidable hearer-proclaimers in that unlike their earlier state as Hearer-Proclaimers who heard and proclaimed the Mahayana teaching without practicing it, they have put it to practice, have attained its fruit, and will proclaim it to others. Thus, at this particular point Mahakashyapa does not seem to be saying that 'we Bodhisattvas are fit to be derided' as Jam-yang-shay-ba says. This is confirmed in the commentary on the Lotus Sutra by Prthivibandhu (Sa'i rtsa lags), in which in reference to this stanza he says (The Nyingma Edition of the sDe-dge bKa'-gyur and bsTan-'gyur, Dharma Publishing, 1981, Text 4017, Vol. 76 663.6), 'This indicates that, having attained the great fruit, they are fit to help others who are set as Hearer Superiors.' Mahakashyapa is rejoicing in their new situation. How the context is interpreted affects the translation of the last line of IV.53, steno vayam shravaka bhishmakalpdh, de has bdag cag nyan thos mi zad 'dra (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 16b.2) or de has bdag cag sgogspa mibzad 'dra (P781, Vol. 30 23.3.2), 'Thus we [will be] like formidable Hearer-Proclaimers.' The term

'formidable' (bhishma, mi zad or mi bzad) is missing in Hurvitz's translation from the Chinese. Louis de la Vallee Poussin (Museon, ns V.I 1, 1910 [Vol. 29], p.253) renders the line, 'aussi serons-nous comme d'irrestibles Cravakas.' In *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (p. 103), I translated it as, 'Thus we are like intractable Hearers,' assuming that Jam-yang-shay-ba was taking the term in a negative way. 'Irresistible', like 'formidable', suggests the might and power (bhishma) of their proclamation now that they are proclaiming the Mahayana doctrine on the basis of actual attainment, whereas 'intractable' is a reference to the awful or frightful (bhishma) state that they were in when they just caused others to hear about the Mahayana but did not practice it themselves. In either case, there is a play on the contrast with their former state. The translation as 'formidable', however, seems to fit the context better.

Based on this etymology of shravaka as hearing of the highest enlightenment and proclaiming it without practicing it, Hurvitz (p. 116) explains that '*..by auditor is meant (italics his) one who lacks knowledge of Emptiness.*' However, as Tsong Khapa (*Compassion*, pp. 150-60) shows, this is not the position of Chandrakirti and other Prasangikas; according to him, in Prasangika the subtlest emptiness must be cognized even to be liberated from cyclic existence and thus Hearers and Solitary Realizers do so. In Tsong Khapa's interpretation of Prasangika, the path that Hearers hear about and proclaim without practicing would be great compassion, the altruistic intention to become enlightened, and meditation on emptiness using a myriad of reasonings rather than just a few. However, with regard to Chittamatra, Tsong Khapa and his followers hold that Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not cognize the subtlest emptiness (see Sopa and Hopkins' *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*, pp. 117-18), in which case what Hearers hear about and proclaim without practicing is the emptiness of a difference of entity between subject and object, as well as the paths of great compassion and so forth. The Chittamatrin interpretation, therefore, accords with Hurvitz's presentation.

Though this second etymology of hearing and proclaiming without practicing is pejorative, the former is not, as it is frequently reported in sutra itself that upon achieving their goal Hearers report to others the fact that they have completed their path with statements such as, 'I have done what was to be done; I will not know another birth' (*Compassion*, p. 102). Thus, given the importance that Chandrakirti, Tsong Khapa, and so forth give to the term itself, this non-pejorative etymology can serve as a basis for a literal translation as 'Hearers'.

Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 16b.2) views the two etymologies as built from different roots, but in both cases the Sanskrit seems merely to be a play between the active and the causative uses of shru. In the case of the Lotus Sutra the causative samshrdvayishyamatha (future causative first person plural) was translated into Tibetan as sgrogs rather than as thos par byedpa leading to the tradition that there are two etymologies of shravaka, one as nyan thos and another as thos sgrogs, whereas it seems that the two are variations of the one play on the active and the causative. In the first etymology the Hearers proclaim or cause others to hear that they have actualized their goal whereas in the second they proclaim or cause others to hear the doctrine that they have heard. Jam-yangshay- ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 16b.2) says that the Lotus Sutra etymology is built from the verbal root for 'proclaiming the heard' (thos pa sgrogs pa'ihying), but he does not cite the actual Sanskrit. However, in accordance with his etymology of the ka of madhyamaka as from the verbal root for proclaiming, kai (meaning 'to sound' according to Apte) following an explanation by Bhavaviveka (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 4b.3), we can surmise that he is taking the ka of shravaka as built from the verbal root for

proclaiming and 'the heard' as shruta from shru. However, though there are two etymologies of shravaka, they are built not around different verbal roots but around the single root shru treated in active and passive modes with different interpretations both of what is heard (the Hinayana or

Mahayana doctrine) and what is proclaimed (one's own attainment of the Hinayana enlightenment or the Mahayana doctrine one has heard but not practiced).

Pratyekabuddha is translated as 'Solitary Realizer' because of the explanation (Compassion, pp. 103-4) that pratyekabuddhas are not Buddhas but are called buddha because of having realization of suchness. 'Solitary' indicates that in their last lifetime they practice alone without depending on a teacher in that lifetime.

The terms Bodhisattva and Buddha are left untranslated as they are sufficiently familiar in English.

496 P5260, Vol. 98 4.5.3, commenting on I.I. The Sanskrit is Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Vol. 10, 5.24; Poussin, 16.2. The brackets are from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 232b.6.

Prasannapada is translated as Clear Words though it would be just as suitable as The Lucidly Worded, or The Clear Worded as Stcherbatsky does in his The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (rpt Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), or Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way as Mervyn Sprung does in his condensation of the text (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). It strikes me that Chandrakirti gave his commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakashastra) this title in contrast to Bhavaviveka's commentary, Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom' (Prajnapradipa) which, due to its brevity and lack of elaboration, is often difficult to fathom and thus unclear. As an example of such difficulty, see Bhavaviveka's refutation of Buddhapalita's interpretation of the refutation of production from self on p.461. Also, in the Clear Words Chandrakirti gives a very clear picture of the movement of the refutations by citing the qualm that each step answers, such as in his brilliant commentary on chapter two.

Stcherbatsky, in his The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, however, indicates that at least for him Chandrakirti's text is not clear and that the title seems ironic (p.75 n.l):

'Chandrakirti has given to his commentary the title of 'The Clearworded' (prasanna-pada) probably not without some dose of irony, since, as Prof. Wassilieff attests, its extreme dialectical subtlety, especially in the first chapter, is equalled by no other work in the whole domain of Northern Buddhist literature.' In the same vein, Mervyn Sprung (p.xii) says about the first chapter, in defense of his abridgements of the text, '... [the abridgements] are, without exception I believe, concerned with Chandrakirti's controversy with Bhavaviveka, his rival commentator within the Madhyamika school, or with his support of Buddhapalita, a commentator he attempts to follow, or else with traditional arguments of the Samkhya school having to do with causation. These controversies are important, obviously. Yet to place them with all their meticulous, Indian love of syllogistic detail, in what is otherwise a finely targeted introduction to the entire Prasannapadd, however natural they were to Chandrakirti's contemporaries, is to make access to the work for contemporary readers difficult and discouraging.' It is interesting to note that in the Gelugpa scholastic centers of learning this very controversy between the three Madhyamika masters is used as the means for gaining access to Madhyamika, as it is the first major topic of debate in the Middle Way class of geshay studies at the point of the sixth chapter of Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'. Chandrakirti's Clear Words forms the basis of the study with commentaries such as that by Jam-yang-shay-ba used to unravel its meaning; it is because of the clarity which I found in using Jam-yang-shay-ba's commentary that this controversy could be included in Part Five. Thus, I

am not making any claims that Chandrakirti's words in that section were clear to me on their own; still, I think that from his own point of view that section, like the rest of his text, was a good deal clearer than Bhavaviveka's.

With respect to this citation, the Buddhist Sanskrit Texts edition by Dr. P.L. Vaidya reads *midhyamikasya satah* which, despite his saying (p.5 n.5) that it is not rendered in the Tibetan, is rendered in the Tibetan by *dbu mapayin na ni* (Vol. 98 4.5.3). Poussin's edition (*Bibliotheca Buddhica* IV, 16.2) reads *mddhyamikasya svatah* which he finds to be missing in the Tibetan (see n.3); however, the Tibetan suggests that *satah* is correct.

Stcherbatsky (p. 100) seems to follow the Tibetan, loosely translating the passage as, 'But according to the Madhyamika method of dialectics an independent argument is never needed. This method consists in producing a contrathesis and then balancing two conflicting views without admitting either of them.' Sprung (p.37) follows Poussin's mis-reading, 'It is meaningless for a Madhyamika, because he cannot accept his opponent's premises, to propound a self-contained argument (*svatantraanumana*) from his own point of view (*svatah*).'

Nga-wang-bel-den (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', *dbu* 58a.7) interprets the passage differently, 'Here "autonomous inference" is a syllogism [literally, application of a sign] which is established from its own side.

"Position" is a word for probandum or thesis. "Another" means [a thesis which is] other than not established from its own side. Therefore, the meaning of this passage is: It is not admissible [for one who is a Madhyamika] to assert the statement of syllogisms which are established from their own side because [Madhyamikas] do not assert probanda or theses which are established from their own side.' Thus, for Nga-wang-bel-den the question is not about asserting something from one's own point of view or merely playing off others' assertions but about asserting syllogisms and theses that inherently exist.

Jam-yang-shay-ba's interpretation (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 232b.5-33a.3) is slightly more detailed, 'It follows that it is unsuitable for anyone who is a Madhyamika refuting all extremes as in the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra to use autonomous inferences, that is to say, syllogisms in which the three modes [of the presence of the reason in the subject, the pervasion, and counterpervasion] are established from their own side because [Madhyamikas] do not have assertions of other positions from among the four extremes and so forth. That [Madhyamikas] do not have assertions of other positions from among the four extremes and so forth follows because (1) [Madhyamikas] do not have positions asserting any extremes—the extreme of existence which is inherent existence, the extreme of non-existence which is utter non-existence, the extreme of both existence and non-existence which is inherent existence and inherent disintegration, or the extreme of a truly established emptiness or middle that abandons the two extremes of existence and non-existence and (2) the honorable Superior [Nagarjuna] says that he has no thesis contradicting the Madhyamika system.' The format of such interpretation is clear: every instance where Prasangikas seem to say that they have no theses is shown, by context, to mean that they do not have certain theses, not theses in general.

As is evidenced by Stcherbatsky's and Sprung's translations, they are inserting a good deal of interpretation into the text in an admitted attempt to make it clearer. I prefer more literal translation, resorting frequently to bracketed additions, to accomplish similar goals but to try to keep the original text more available. All translation is interpretation, but it seems appropriate, in the face of radically different interpretations, to make the original text as identifiable as possible.

497 According to Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 61a.3), the Sanskrit original is *svain*. As mentioned earlier, *siddha* (*grub pa*) and *sat* (*yod pa*) are often used interchangeably, and thus *svabhavasiddha* is translated here as 'existing

inherently' rather than as 'established inherently' merely because it is a little easier to understand in English.

It needs to be borne in mind that Bhavaviveka did not call himself a Svatantrika. The term appears to have been coined in Tibet, perhaps by visiting Indian scholars or Tibetans themselves, based on Chandrakirti's saying that it is not suitable for Madhyamikas to use svatantra-anumana, autonomous inferences (with the word 'inference' here not referring to a consciousness realizing a hidden or obscure object of knowledge in dependence on a correct reason but to the syllogistic statement itself). Jam-yang-shay-ba here equates svatantra with terms meaning existing under the object's own power, and thus the term has been translated as 'autonomous'. However, most Western scholars and many non-Gelugpa Tibetan scholars have taken the term just to mean a syllogistic statement that the stater himself supports and thus is in his own continuum (rang rgyud). This interpretation is rejected by Gelugpa writers because then Prasangikas would absurdly be Svatantrikas since, at least in the Gelugpa interpretation, Prasangikas themselves do use syllogistic reasoning.

Still, it seems to me that the term svatantra (-prayoga) might refer to the type of syllogism that must on all occasions be stated in order to generate in another party a consciousness realizing a thesis. In other words, the very insistence on the statement on all occasions of a syllogism that oneself supports indicates that one believes in commonly appearing subjects, predicates, reasons, examples, and so forth and thus implies that these inherently exist since the basic appearance to sense perception, for instance, is not being challenged. This meets back to the assertion that the object of negation in the view of selflessness, according to Bhavaviveka, does not appear to sense consciousnesses but according to Chandrakirti does. Through interpreting the term svatantra in this way, it is not necessary immediately to equate it with 'existing under the object's own power' or 'inherently existent'; rather, one should see inherent existence as an implication of the insistence that a syllogism that oneself supports in one's own continuum be stated. To me, it seems that Chandrakirti, in his long critique of Bhavaviveka, is surmising that Bhavaviveka's insistence on finding a syllogism in Buddhapalita's refutation of production from self stems from the latter's feeling that there are commonly appearing subjects and so forth, and thus his syllogisms are bound by the context of such insistence and all that it implies—commonly appearing subjects and, thus, inherent existence.

In this way, the equation of 'autonomy' with 'inherent existence' is not just on the basis of a flimsy reference to Amarasinha's lexicon (Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 325.10; Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 229a.6; Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 61a.3, rang rgyud rang dbang bdag dbang 'Autonomy, own-power, [and] selfpower [have the same meaning].'), nor does one have to squeeze Bhavaviveka's calling for a rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa (a selfpowered or autonomous inference) in his commentary on the beginning of chapter thirteen of the Treatise as if this directly indicates that Bhavaviveka himself asserts that 'autonomous' means 'inherently existent'

(Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 61a.7 and Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 325.12: da ni sun 'byin pa 'i Ian btab pa dang rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa 'i mthus 'du byed rnams rnam pa las ngo bo nyid medpa nyid bstan pa 'i don gyi dbang gis rah tu byed pa bcu gsum pa btsams so '[Nagarjuna] composed the thirteenth chapter in order to teach the non-entityness of compositional phenomena through the force of giving answers to [others'] refutations and self-powered [or autonomous] inferences.')

In short, Bhavaviveka never openly said that svatantra, autonomy, equals svabhava-siddhi, inherent existence. Rather, it seems that in such a context he is saying that it is not sufficient merely to refute another's position negatively—one must positively set forth one's own position. The implications of this, as explained above, are that Bhavaviveka

accepts a quality of objects that appears in direct perception which Chandrakirti refutes. The significance of Chandrakirti's identifying a subtler object of negation and Bhavaviveka's confusing the existence of an object with its inherent existence is perhaps more accessible when the route of the immediate equation of svatantra and svabhava-siddhi is not taken.

498 Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 58b.1.

499 To speak of a 'thesis which is a position' might seem redundant since position (paksha, phyogs) and thesis (pratijna, dam bca') are often synonymous. However, according to Kensur Lekden, a position of one of the extremes is non-existent because it is an extreme, whereas an assertion or thesis of an extreme position does exist.

500 P5246, Vol. 95 140.2.4, XVI.25. For Chandrakirti's commentary see P5266, Vol. 98, 279.2ff. This is quoted by Chandrakirti in his Clear Words following the last quote, P5260, Vol. 98 4.5.4 (the Buddhist Text Series Sanskrit is No. 10, 5.25; Poussin, 16.4).

According to Tsong Khapa (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 58b.2-59b.6), Chandrakirti cites this passage in his Clear Words as a source showing that it is unsuitable for a Madhyamika to assert autonomous theses because existence in the four alternatives is refuted in Madhyamika texts. Also, Tsong Khapa points out that in his commentary on the Four Hundred Chandrakirti says that this passage indicates that censure cannot be expressed, even over a long period of time, to a proponent of emptiness; thus, this passage certainly does not indicate that Madhyamikas have no assertions at all by way of suggesting that they do not even assert emptiness. Also, Chandrakirti cites the same passage in his own Commentary on the 'Supplement' upon saying, 'This propounding of dualism is just unreasonable for proponents of imputed existence (*prajnapativadin, btags par smra ba); therefore, Madhyamikas cannot be defeated in any way through refutations and answers dependent on duality.' As Tsong Khapa says, '[This passage] is cited [by Chandrakirti] as a source showing that those who assert imputed existence which negates substantial existence in the sense of [the object's] being established by way of its own entity cannot be refuted by Proponents of True Existence (*bhavavadin, dngos po yod par smra ba) who assert that [phenomena] are established by way of their own entities and by the Proponents of No Things (*abhavavadin, dngos po med par smra ba) who assert a negation of all capacity to perform functions in things such as forms. Therefore, it is not suitable as a source [showing that Madhyamikas] have no system.'

Based on Tsong Khapa, Nga-wang-bel-den goes on to identify the four alternatives here as inherent existence, utter non-existence, both, and a truly established category that is neither. The fourth alternative is specified as 'truly established' since a category that is composed of neither of the positions, that is, that objects are neither inherently established nor utterly non-existent is affirmed since objects do indeed exist conventionally.

Nga-wang-bel-den cites a passage from Tsong Khapa's 'Great Exposition of Special Insight' in the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path that gives a slightly different version of the four and sets forth the basic Gelugpa perspective on the four alternatives. With respect to the first alternative, he indicates that things which are established by way of their own entities are refuted whether these are asserted to be conventional or ultimate truths, whereas things that are able to perform functions are not refuted conventionally (though indeed ultimately). With respect to the second alternative, he says that non-things (abhava, dngos med), that is to say, uncaused phenomena, are refuted if they are asserted to be established by way of their own entities (and not if they are only asserted to exist conventionally). Likewise, a combination of the two and a truly established position that is

neither are refuted. Tsong Khapa concludes, 'All refutations of the four alternatives should be understood in this way. If the four alternatives were refuted without affixing such qualification, when [the first two alternatives, that is, that something is] an existent thing (dngos po yod pa) and a non-thing (dngos po med pa) are refuted and then both are refuted saying "not both", it would directly contradict one's own assertion to make the refutation, "not not both". If you [stupidly] insist that despite this there is no fault, [I can only say,] "We do not debate with the insane."'

In the earlier version, the four alternatives were:

- 1 inherent existence
- 2 utter non-existence
- 3 both
- 4 a truly established category that is neither.

Here the four are:

- 1 inherently existent thing
- 2 inherently existent non-thing (that is, inherently existent uncaused phenomenon)
- 3 both
- 4 a truly established category that is neither an inherently existent thing nor an inherently existent non-thing.

In the first way, one would be considering whether something like a chair is inherently existent, utterly non-existent, both, or some inherently truly established possibility that is neither inherently existent nor utterly non-existent, such' as that the chair is inherently established as conventionally existent. In the second way, one considers whether the chair is an inherently existent thing, an inherently existent non-thing, both an inherently existent thing and an inherently existent non-thing, or neither an inherently existent thing nor an inherently existent non-thing within being inherently existent. In both cases, the alternatives must be carefully qualified so that conventional existence is not ruled out. The four alternatives, therefore, are all-inclusive only in the sense of including all possibilities of inherently existent phenomena—when these are refuted, it can be decided that phenomena do not inherently exist. They do not include all possibilities whatsoever. If one does not agree that such qualification is needed upon being shown the selfcontradictions that are entailed without it, one is considered to be beyond the pale of sensible discourse; as Tsong Khapa says, 'We do not debate with the insane.'

Nga-wang-bel-den identifies another interpretation of the four alternatives by Tsong Khapa's student Kaydrup in his *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate*; there it is considered whether a chair, for instance, is a truly established existent, a truly established non-existent, a truly established category that is both of those, or a truly established category that is neither. This version is the most symmetrical in that all four alternatives are considered as being qualified by true establishment or inherent existence.

In this tradition of interpretation it is necessary to qualify the first position as 'inherent existence' or 'true existence' because it would be absurd to deny first that something exists and then that the same thing does not exist, for the two are a dichotomy, excluding any third possibility. (The reason why a third possibility of being both existent and non-existent is included is to take account of philosophical systems that posit such and probably also to create a sense of the fullness of the refutation in the meditator no matter how absurd the positions are.) Thus, although it is denied that phenomena are inherently existent, utterly non-existent, both existent and non-existent, or some fourth possibility that is neither existent nor non-existent, phenomena are existent, that is to say, conventionally existent. All possibilities of existence are not denied, only existence that would be able to bear analysis by a reasoning consciousness, and a reasoning consciousness

analyzing the ultimate cannot refute conventional existence as that is beyond its province. A result of this qualification is that there seems to be a lack of symmetry in the four positions; the fourth position, as given above in the first two interpretations, is not simply a denial of a combination of the first two. Although a third position which is a combination of inherent existence and utter non-existence (or inherently existent thing and inherently existent non-thing) is suitable to be refuted, a fourth position which is a mere denial of them is not, for phenomena are neither inherently existent nor utterly non-existent since they are conventionally existent. (Phenomena also are neither inherently existent things nor inherently existent non-things because they are conventionally existent things or non-things.) Once the fourth position is qualified as something inherently existent that is neither of those, it is not a mere denial of a combination of the first two positions.

Through qualifying what is negated, the Gelugpa interpreters maintain the commonsense notion that one cannot say that something does not exist and then claim that it also is not non-existent. In this system of interpretation the refutation of four alternatives is not used to lift the mind to a different, non-conceptual level through shock (or perhaps confusion) but to penetrate the nature of phenomena through a reasoned, conceptual process of refutation. When the negation of inherent existence is understood, one's understanding is non-conceptual in the sense of not wandering among many conceptions but remaining on one. Then, through combining that realization with the force of calm abiding, the ability to remain onepointedly on emptiness is greatly enhanced, but still one needs to alternate stabilizing and analytical meditation on emptiness in order to induce special insight, which in turn is deepened over the path of preparation, resulting in a totally non-conceptual realization of emptiness on the path of seeing.

Thus, even though it is sometimes disappointing to encounter the Gelugpas' conceptual qualifications of scriptural passages that seem to lift one beyond conceptuality, it should not be thought that somehow their systemization is intended to intellectualize the profound to a stultifying degree. Rather, they are seeking to put the intellect in its place, using it in a very profound way in a process leading to direct perception.

In this endeavor, Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations are invaluable, as they reveal the systematic background of Jam-yang-shay-ba's citations which, without this contextualization, sometimes even seem to be proving the opposite of what he intends. Until one understands that he intends his text as lecture notes for a teacher competent in Tsong Khapa's system, many of his citations are baffling. Undoubtedly, Nga-wang-bel-den saw this need and provided the contextualization.

501 P5228, Vol. 95 15.1.1, stanza 29. This is quoted in the Clear Words immediately following the last quote, P5260, Vol. 98 4.5.4; Buddhist Text Series No. 10, 6.1; Poussin, 5.7. See K. Bhattacharya's *The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna* (Delhi: Motilal, 1978), p.23. The brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 59a.6. For contextualization of this quote see pp.471-3.

With respect to the definition of a Prasangika given just below, it might be helpful to identify possible English translations for names of the schools of tenets:

Vaibhashika: Great Exposition School (so called because they follow the text called *The Great Exposition* [Mahavibhasha])

Sautrantika: Sutra School (so called perhaps because of their emphasis on sutra rather than on *The Great Exposition*)

Chittamatra: Mind Only School (so called because they propound that all phenomena are of the nature of the mind)

Madhyamika: Middle Way School (so called because of propounding a middle that is devoid of

the extremes of true existence and utter non-existence).

With respect to the major sub-divisions, there are:

the Sutra School Following Scripture (identified mainly as followers of Vasubandhu),
the Sutra School Following Reasoning (identified as followers of Dignaga and Dharmakirti),
the Mind Only School Following Scripture (these being the followers of Asariga),
the Mind Only School Following Reasoning (these being
the Mind Only followers of Dignaga and Dharmakirti),
the Autonomous Middle Way School (Svatantrika-Madhyamika),
the Consequential Middle Way School (Prasangika-Madhyamika).

As school names, the English is quite palatable, but to refer to persons it is a bit more cumbersome though still manageable:

Vaibhashika: Proponent of the Great Exposition

Sautrantika: Proponent of Sutra

Proponent of Sutra Following Scripture

Proponent of Sutra Following Reasoning

Chittamatrin: Proponent of Mind-Only

Proponent of Mind-Only Following Scripture

Proponent of Mind-Only Following Reasoning

Madhyamika: Proponent of the Middle Way

Autonomist, Middle Way Autonomist

Consequentialist, Middle Way Consequentialist.

I feel that it is important gradually to get beyond the use of Sanskrit terms whenever possible in order to lift Buddhist studies out of the arcane. There is no need to translate persons' names, except perhaps in texts such as certain sutras where, some names have great meaning, but the translation of technical terminology can be very helpful. With respect to this, I stand directly opposed to the style of the great French Buddhologist, Louis de La Vallee Poussin, though I do not criticize him for not trying to do what I am. Scholars have different tastes and perceive different needs, and the field is wide enough to accommodate many different approaches. In other words, I disagree entirely with those who call for only one style of translation.

502 As Nga-wang-bel-den says (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 59b.2), 'Since consequences must be stated on all [occasions of] generating inferences in others, they are of greater extent [or usage], but since other-approved syllogisms do not have to be stated for certain disputants of sharp faculties, they are described as being of less extent.'

The translation of the rest of this sentence and the next is doubtful, for, more literally, Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be saying, '... but they are not at all mutually exclusive. For, most statements of other-approved [syllogisms] also appear to be consequences.' The reason for preferring the other, more loose translation is that consequences and other-approved syllogisms are indeed mutually exclusive, that is, whatever is the one is not the other. His point, rather, seems to be that an other-approved syllogism can be seen as a consequence merely by switching the format. Or he may be saying that both other-approved syllogisms and consequences are capable of generating an inferential consciousness and thus in this sense are not mutually exclusive.

His example is a reference to Buddhapalita's refutation of the Samkhya view of production from causes that are of the same entity as the effect (see Part Five, chapters 2-5).

503 P5260, Vol. 98 10.3.1; Buddhist Text Series No. 10, 18.24; Poussin, 54.11. This is quoted in Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 282a.2 and in Tsong Khapa's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 37.5.3 and 38.3.2. The second quote almost immediately follows

the first one.

Since causes are not produced in dependence upon their own effects, the meaning of 'mere conditionality' is not limited to just the usual sense of *pratyaya*, condition assisting in production of an object, but refers to the condition or situation that allows the positing of an object, whether that be its own basis of designation or that in relation to which it is posited. A seed is designated in dependence upon its basis of designation, the two halves of the seed, as well as in dependence upon its presumed effect, a sprout. That appearances are posited from the viewpoint of such conditionality 'when there is no analysis and no investigation' does not mean that conventionalities are beyond the sphere of analysis in the sense of the usual worldly investigation of an object to make sure it is there. In other words, conventional phenomena are not just figments of the imagination or even beyond the sphere of logical reasoning in the sense of undergoing investigation by reasoned analysis, for this is how a permanent self and so forth are refuted. Rather, conventionalities cannot withstand ultimate analysis, analysis into their mode of being, such as investigation into whether the object is one with its basis of designation or a different entity from its basis of designation.

504 P5431, Vol. 103 246.5.2. The Peking edition wrongly reads *stong pa gnyis* instead of *stong pa nyid*. The brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 59b.4-7, which confirms the latter reading as does Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 409.10. Nga-wang-bel-den says that since Buddha's teaching that all phenomena are selfless cannot be defeated by any opponent, his teaching was proclaimed like the great roar of a lion (whose roar no other animal dares to answer). The Tibetan scholars with whom I have worked have identified Shura (dPa' bo) as Ashvaghosha. For references to controversy about this, see D.S. Ruegg's *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 119-21.

Jam-yang-shay-ba uses this passage from Shura's Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment to show that it is admissible to call Prasangikas Non-Abiding Madhyamikas and Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas. Since Shura's mere mention that the middle way does not abide in any of the extremes does not establish that he used these terms as names for the school, Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be saying that these are suitable names for Prasangika just because Prasangikas set forth a middle way that does not abide in any of the extremes. However, in that case it would be suitable to call Chittamatrins Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas as they also claim to propound a middle way that does not abide in the extremes. In other words, Jam-yang-shay-ba's evidence is scant.

His position is an attempt to clarify a point made in passing by Tsong Khapa in the latter's Great and Middling Expositions of the Stages of the Path. Tsong Khapa says that earlier Tibetans mistakenly used the term 'Those Who Hold That Illusion is Established by a Reasoning Consciousness' (*sgyu ma rigs grub*) for Svatantrikas and the term 'Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas' (*rab tu mignaspa'i dbu ma pa*) for Prasangikas' (Middling, 144a.2 in an unmarked edition of 263 folios). Here, Jam-yang-shay-ba is trying to show that Tsong Khapa's objection was not to the terms themselves but to the meaning assigned these by earlier Tibetans. Jang-gya (290.6-12) agrees, citing this as the opinion of the great scholar and adept Nor-sang-gya-tso (Nor-bzang-rgya-mtsho) and identifying him as using this quote from Ashvaghosha for his source. However, other scholars such as Nga-wang-bel-den hold that Tsong Khapa was refuting both the meaning and the usage of the terms themselves. Nga-wang-bel-den (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 59b.7-62a.1) gives a fascinating rendition of the controversy and Sha-mar Gen-dun-den-dzingya-tso (Zhwa-dmar dGe-bdun-bstan-'dzin-rgya-mtsho, 1852-1910) an even better one in his Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought, Set Forth to Purify Forgetfulness of the

Difficult Points of (Tsong Khapa's) 'Great Exposition of Special Insight' (IHag mthong chen mo'i dka'gnad rnam brjed byang du bkodpa dgongs zab snang ba'i sgron me, [Delhi: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1972], 19.4-27.5). The extended attention that they give to the topic is typical of the frequent emphasis on points made only in passing in Tsong Khapa's writing. These become fascinating areas in which scholars try to apply the founder's principles of interpretation to specific problems, thereby coming to know those principles better through putting them to creative use. A result is that in literature purporting to be presenting Tsong Khapa's established views, scholars such as Jam-yang-shay-ba slip in what is clearly their own opinion on difficult issues as if it were not a matter of controversy. This tradition is maintained even in oral teaching nowadays by some Gelugpa scholars, who will sometimes present a controversial position as if it is the only position on a topic. I have learned over the years to presume controversy based on the fervor and amount of repetition of such topics. I do not mean this as a general indictment, as these same scholars have displayed a remarkable ability on other occasions to present many views on an issue. Rather, the tendency to stone-wall probably comes from their long training in debate, and the resorting to such on certain occasions may simply depend on their mood. I try to get around the situation by presenting positions and asking questions in a way that does not polarize the issue.

505 In this paragraph Jam-yang-shay-ba paraphrases Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations, P6142, Vol. 153 185.4.4.

The word *phyi mo* (matrka) has the sense of a root text or model. Nagarjuna, in his Precious Garland (stanza 394), uses the term to refer to the model of an alphabet that a teacher would first use in instructing his students. Although the term also means 'grandmother', the translation of it as 'grandmother' in this context seems a bit inappropriate.

394. Just as a grammarian [first] has students

Read a model of the alphabet,

So Buddha taught trainees

The doctrines that they could bear.

506 A student of Chandrakirti, as identified in prayers of supplications.

507 P6142, Vol. 153 185.4.6ff. The quotation was lengthened by including the second clause.

508 Nga-wang-bel-den (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 59.6) points out that Tsong Khapa's Quintessential Instructions on the King of Tantras, the Glorious Guhyasamdja, Lamp Thoroughly Illuminating the Five Stages (P6167, Vol. 158 179.3.7) says that it appears that Nagarjuna, having completed the beginning of the second chapter of The Five Stages (Panchakrama, P2667), had Shakyamitra complete the chapter.

As above, it is my practice to translate the titles of texts in order to indicate the contents of the text; this, of course, does not imply that the text has been translated.

Major translations are indicated in the Bibliography.

509 A commentarial tradition, reported by Geshe Gedun Lodro, says that the second is Jnanagarbha although it also could be the second Bhavaviveka, known as the lesser (*chung ba*) who is the author of the Madhyamakaratnapradipa (P5254) which is not to be confused with the Prajnapradipa (P5253) by the greater Bhavaviveka, the founder of the Svatantrika system (see Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 283.11). Jnanagarbha is the more likely referent here because his works are widely cited whereas the lesser Bhavaviveka's are not.

510 P5431, Vol. 103 246.4.8. Kensur Lekden pointed out that the general teaching is that phenomena are like illusions in that just as the latter appear to be real but are not, so phenomena appear to exist objectively but do not and that phenomena are like illusions and not just illusions because they can perform functions whereas illusions cannot.

With respect to this particular quote, Daktsang himself (204.1, Thimphu edition) says that this passage '.. indicates that due to [holding that] illusions and so forth are established [Svatantrikas] do not perceive the inexpressible Manjushri.' Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be saying that for him this passage does not refute Svatantrika at all. He also (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 77a.l-4) argues against Daktsang for holding that in Haribhadra's system '... an ultimate reasoning consciousness of meditative equipoise establishes [that phenomena are] like illusions and goes on to say that all real conventionalities are established by reasoning (rigs grub), meaning reasoning in general and not a consciousness of meditative equipoise. Jam-yang-shay-ba thereby suggests that it is suitable to call Svatantrikas sgyu ma rigs grub, 'Those Holding That Illusory[-Like Phenomena] Are Established By Reasoning' as long as one understands that it is not a consciousness of meditative equipoise that establishes phenomena as like illusions; however, since Prasangikas also hold that conventionalities are established by valid cognition, it is unclear why this is a particularly good name for Svatantrikas, except perhaps that such is emphasized in their literature.

511 Nga-wang-bel-den (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 59b.7ff) seems to make the absurd conclusion that Jam-yang-shay-ba agrees with Daktsang that this passage does directly refute the Svatantrikas. In that case, Jam-yang-shay-ba would be contradicting his own pronouncement that Ashvaghosha is a non-partisan Prasangika. The annotator may have missed the meaning of the hypothetical 'if in Jam-yang-shay-ba's refutation of Daktsang.

Showing great independence and intellectual honesty, Nga-wang-bel-den often disagrees with Jam-yang-shay-ba, presenting a carefully framed argument in great detail. In the Gomang College which uses Jam-yang-shay-ba's works as their basic textbooks, Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations are sometimes described as 'not their own system' (rang lugs mayin) and denigrated as 'annotations [that point out only] mis-printings' (yig nor mchan 'grel). For me, they are a necessary key to Jam-yang-shay-ba's work through providing contextualization and giving an example of rigorous, nonpartisan application of scholarly principles. On this point, however, I do not think that the evidence merits his criticism of Jam-yang-shay-ba. In any case, it is abundantly clear that in Gelugpa works (except for Tsong Khapa's Golden Rosary, an early work which presents the view that even in meditative equipoise phenomena which are qualified by emptiness appear, this being dismissed as not Tsong Khapa's final position) a reasoning consciousness does not establish conventionalities as like illusions but only establishes emptiness and that this holds true for both Madhyamika systems. When one rises from meditative equipoise on emptiness, a wisdom consciousness subsequent to meditative equipoise realizes illusory-like phenomena through the continued force of the earlier realization of emptiness and the appearance of conventional phenomena.

512 P6142, Vol. 153 185.4.6ff; the quote has been lengthened by including the first clause. Shakyamitra, Nagabodhi, and Ashvaghosha were students of Nagarjuna according respectively to Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 59b.6, Obermiller's History of Buddhism by Bu-ston, Vol. 2, p. 132, and Tu-gen, 15.16.

Tsong Khapa's statement that their books on Madhyamika were not translated into Tibetan is challenged by a hypothetical objector. Jam-yang-shay-ba somewhat apologetically explains that Tsong Khapa means that their philosophical treatises on the Madhyamika view were not translated into Tibetan, and Nga-wang-bel-den (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 62a.l-3) explains that although the text'... is a Madhyamika treatise, it is not a text on the view from among the division into view, meditation, and behavior.' We are to understand that Ashvaghosha's Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment is a short meditation manual on emptiness according to the

Madhyamika system but not a philosophical treatise. Geshe Gedun Lodro explained that this is similar to Nagarjuna's Collections of Praises (sTod tshogs), his many praises of the mind vajra and so forth, not being included among his Collections of Reasonings (Rigs tshogs) even though they present emptiness by way of limitless forms of reasoning. The premise is that Tsong Khapa's reading was so vast and his writing so free of internal contradictions that he neither could have missed nor could have forgotten about Ashvagosha's text.

513 Kensur Lekden reported that there were still more of Ashvagosha's books in Tibetan than Tsong Khapa knew because the Sagyapas kept some translations of Ashvaghosha secret. Nga-wang-bel-den (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu, 62a.1ff) points out that some scholars say that the author of this book had the same name as Shura but was not the Shura, i.e., Ashvaghosha, who was contemporaneous with Nagarjuna. However, Jang-gya (409.13) dismisses the idea as a proofless thesis and says that the great scholars all consider the book to be reliably his.

For a discussion of works on practice ascribed to Ashvaghosha, Shura, and so forth see D.S. Ruegg's *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), pp.119-21.

514 The seventeen are six mother and eleven son sutras. According to Kensur Lekden, mother sutras are so called because they contain discussion of all eight 'clear realizations' (abhisamaya, mngon nogs) which are the subject matter of Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization. According to Tsong Khapa's Golden Rosary (P6150, Vol. 154 200.3.6ff) the six are the One Hundred Thousand, Twenty-Five Thousand, Eighteen Thousand, Ten Thousand, Eight Thousand, and Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, and the eleven are the Seven Hundred, Five Hundred, Three Hundred, Fifty Stanza, One Hundred and Fifty Means, Twenty-Five Doors, Questions of Suvikrdntavikrami, Kaushika, One Letter, Several Words, and Heart of Wisdom Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. Tsong Khapa's opinion is stated by Kaydrup who says (p.46), 'Our own system says that the mother and son sutras are not limited to seventeen because there are many more than that.' Thus, Jam-yang-shay-ba's usage of the formula of seventeen shows that in his opinion Tsong Khapa still approved of the designation, though not of a strict determination, as seventeen.

515 No one who can identify these has been found to date.

516 P5260, Vol. 98 92.2.1, Colophon, stanza 10a. For the Sanskrit see J.W. de Jong's very helpful article on this Colophon, missing in Poussin's edition of Chandrakirti's Clear Words, 'La Madhyamakasastrastuti de CandrakTrti' in *Oriens Extremus*, Jahrg. 9, 1962, pp.47-56 (reprinted in J. W. De Jong *Buddhist Studies*, pp.541-50 [Rep. of China: Asian Humanities Press, 1979]). This and the next stanza are cited, in pieces, over the next few pages; together, they read:

10 Having seen the Compendium of Sutra, the Precious Garland of Advice [for the King], the Praises, and with hard work over a very long time the stanzas propounded in the Treatise, the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning, the Finely Woven, the Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness, and the Refutation of Objections,

11 And having seen the [Four] Hundred and so forth [by Aryadeva, etc.] and likewise many profound sutras as well as the commentary done by Buddhapalita, I have gathered together the good explanations of Bhavaviveka [and those of these masters] which were transmitted from one to another [and the texts of Shura, Jnanagarbha, etc.] as well as what I received from [Nagarjuna's own] analysis [of the meaning of his words] and have expounded this in order to please those of great intelligence.

The bracketed material in stanza 11 is from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 42a.3. Those who do not say that Chandrakirti was an actual student of Nagarjuna would not accept Jam-yang-shay-ba's interpretation that Chandrakirti is speaking of analysis

gained from Nagarjuna himself. Instead, they would say that it refers to Chandrakirti's own analysis. If Chandrakirti is an actual student of Nagarjuna, it seems strange that he speaks of Nagarjuna's teaching for a long time, his students' teaching for a long time, and then (in stanza 7) Nagarjuna's teaching degenerating over a long time to the point where Chandrakirti needed to compose his texts.

De Jong (p.549 of Buddhist Studies) takes s'ataka as being a sutra ('Et apres avoir lu egalement ces nombreux sutra profonds tels que le Sataka ...'), but Jam-yang-shay-ba's reading (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 42a.2) as Aryadeva's Four Hundred is more plausible especially considering the dang in the Tibetan: rgya pa la sags de dag dang ni de bzhin

517 P5260, Vol. 98 92.2.2.

518 P5260, Vol. 98 92.2.3.

519 This Tibetan translation of the title as dbU ma lag pa'i tshad refers to a unit of measure from the elbow to the finger-tips, a cubit, because, as was pointed out by Lati Rinbochay, the text has twenty-four 'feet' (pada) and a cubit has twenty-four fingerwidths. Another Tibetan version of the title (Cha shas kyiyan lag) means 'members which are parts', this tying in with the presentation of the non-ultimate nature of phenomena through analyzing their parts. The first version (P5248) has twenty-four 'feet', whereas the second (P5244) has twenty-eight.

520 P5260, Vol. 98 92.2.3. Brackets are from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 42a.3. See n.516.

521 Daktsang asserts that one could first attain Buddhahood through the Perfection Vehicle and then enter the Tantra Vehicle, finally to become an unsurpassed Buddha of the Tantra Vehicle. Though the Gelugpas agree that in order to attain the final achievement one must enter the Tantra Vehicle, they say that the Buddhahood explained in sutra is that explained in tantra (see Tsong Khapa's explanation in Tantra in Tibet, pp. 139-42). They add that practice only of the Sutra Vehicle yields only the tenth Bodhisattva ground, not Buddhahood, for which one must practice tantra, specifically Highest Yoga Tantra. The point of difference between Daktsang and Jam-yang-shay-ba is whether the Buddhahoods described in both vehicles are the same. As a proof that they are, Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 58a.lff) points to the fact that the sutras themselves speak of a Buddha as having no inhalation and exhalation and that the winds (prana, rlung) which are overcome through the Tantra Vehicle cannot exist without breath.

522 Tsong Khapa quotes this in his Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path (73b.4 in the 1968 Shes rig par khang edition).

523 Colophon, stanza 6. P5260, Vol. 98 92.1.3. For Obermiller's translation of this passage, see his History of Buddhism by Buston, II, p.135. Saraha is identified as Rahulabhadra in Taranatha's History of Buddhism in India (Varanasi: 1964), p.67. For the Sanskrit, see n.516.

524 P5260, Vol. 98 92.1.6; Colophon, 7.

525 See n.244.

526 According to Geshe Lhundup Sopa, the three vows of Bodhisattvas are not actually separate vows but modes of the Bodhisattva vow. They are the ethics of restraining bad deeds, the ethics which are the composite of virtuous practices, and the ethics of aiding the aims of sentient beings.

527 According to Kensur Lekden, this does not mean that there are bad parts in AtTsha's works; rather, Atisha tends to follow the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas with respect to the path, their description being renowned as the general Mahayana explanation.

528 P5260, Vol. 98 7.5._7ff; Poussin, 40.7-2.8. This is partially quoted by Tsong Khapa in

his Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (P6153, Vol. 156 64.2.3).

Interpretation is not limited to scripture as it also applies to objects. The interpretation or hermeneutic of scripture is called *rjod byed drang nges*, literally, 'the interpretable and the definitive with respect to means of expression', and the hermeneutic of objects is called *brjod bya 'i drang nges*, literally, 'the interpretable and the definitive with respect to objects of expression'. 'Objects of expression' means objects such as tables, chairs, bodies, emptinesses, and so forth which are the objects or referents of words (means of expression) such as 'table', 'chair', 'body', 'emptiness', and so forth. (From this it is clear that referential language is not the object of negation by Madhyamika reasoning.) In Madhyamika the division of scriptures into the two categories of the interpretable and definitive is made based on the school's estimation of what final reality is, what the school's interpretation of emptiness is. It is a task of interpretation to determine why Buddha taught the non-definitive in terms of the need, or existential situation, of the listener. Thus, the hermeneutic is ontologically based within being inextricably involved with consideration of the levels of trainees.

With respect to the two classes of objects, emptinesses are definitive in that they are the final mode of subsistence of objects whereas conventional phenomena are in need of interpretation to determine their final mode of subsistence. Thus, a basic task of all beings is to interpret appearances—to recognize that what is appearing is not the final mode of being of those objects and to seek that final nature, not to obliterate the appearance of the object but to know its inner nature and thereby be better able to respond with respect to it.

529 The term *bhagavan* was translated into Tibetan most frequently as *boom Idan 'das*, the first two syllables meaning 'possessing conquest' and the last syllable meaning 'supramundane' (*'jig rten las 'daspa*), having been added (according to Kensur Lekden and so forth) to distinguish the Buddhist *bhagavan* from the non-Buddhist. The term is also recognized as meaning *skal Idan*, Fortunate One (or Blessed One as it is usually translated) because of possessing six fortunes. However, since the dominant translation into Tibetan is *beam Idan 'das*, I am translating it into English with 'Supramundane Victor'.

530 Missing in the Tibetan.

531 The plaintain tree. I assume this to be referring to the trunk of the tree which, much like an onion, has no core. However, Kensur Yeshe Thupten of Lo-sel-ling College takes it as referring to the fact that such trees bear fruit only once and are useless thereafter.

Poussin (p.41, n.8) says that these lines are cited in the *Samyuttanikaya* III. 142.

532 Translation follows the Tibetan.

533 P5224, Vol. 95 3.1.3, I.I. This is quoted in brief by Chandrakirti (P5260, Vol. 98 8.1.7; Poussin, 42.9).

534 The following three quotes are from the *Treatise on the Middle Way* (XIII. 1, XI. 1, and XV.7). They are cited by Chandrakirti in his *Clear Words* (P5260, Vol. 98 8.1.8ff; Poussin, 42.10).

535 The bracketed additions in this stanza are from Tsong Khapa's *Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'*, 232.2ff, Varanasi 1973 edition.

536 P5263, Vol. 98 43.5.7; Poussin, 270.3.

537 P842, Vol. 34 64.3.6ff. This citation and that in Jang-gya's *Presentation of Tenets* (313.17ff) agree, but they differ from that in the *Clear Words* (P5260, Vol. 98 8.2.2; Poussin, 43.4). The Peking edition of it is a combination of both.

538 P842, Vol. 34 64.4.2; see previous note. Brackets are from Jang-gya's *Presentation of Tenets*, 315.17. Jang-gya (316.1) points out that the long list of synonyms of self refers

also to the instruments and objects related to the agent, the person. Geshe Gedun Lodro said that though the addition of 'inherently existent' in brackets to 'owner' is appropriate, it is not necessary because the word 'self' carries with it the force of inherent existence. He added that this still does not mean that all instances, of the word 'self' mean either 'inherent existence' or 'inherently existent person', since it often refers to a nominally existent person. Even a Buddha is a person, self, and I, but he speaks of his 'self' based on a valid consciousness which perceives a nominally existent self. His words are not based on a false view of a self as existing inherently in its basis of imputation.

539 Nga-wang-bel-den (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 62a.3) finds this paragraph inexplicable; however, Geshe Gedun Lodro explained it as if without problem. His commentary with the original underlined is: dgongs gzhi gnas lugs kyi don ni bstan tshul de lasgzhan du 'dren pa la dpe yod kyang (cing) de dag dgos pa 'i sgo nas drang don du 'grel tshul te drang don gyi mdo sde phal cher la de Itar dgos shing brjod bya'i sgo nas drang don du 'grel tshul ni btags don btsal na mi rnyed pa sags kyi rigs pas gnod ...

In any case, a passage is said to require interpretation due to having three factors: a basis in Buddha's thought (dgongs gzhi): this is not Buddha's intention or purpose in teaching, for example, a mind-basis-of-all but the ontological basis in his own thought, which in this case is emptiness a purpose (dgos pa): the pedagogical intention, such as providing a means for the connection of actions and effects for those who temporarily are unable to understand such within the context of mere nominal existence damage to the literal teaching (dngos la gnod byed): contradiction of that teaching by reasoning and scripture. Even in the case of literally acceptable teachings such as those of the five aggregates, if one took such to be the final mode of subsistence of the phenomena discussed, this would be contradicted by the reasonings proving emptiness and scriptures on emptiness. Jam-yang-shay-ba is working around this format with the addition of examples that contradict the explicit teaching.

540 Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 317.4.

541 P795, Vol. 31 281.1.5, VII.5. This is quoted in the Clear Words (P5260, Vol. 98 8.2.8; Poussin, 44.1).

542 P763, Vol. 27 238.5.6, chapter 25; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 1, 286.10. Translation follows the Tibetan. The Peking edition reads rdul bral.

543 Here svabhava-asiddha is interpreted as meaning svalakshanaasiddha because the Chittamatrins assert that imaginary phenomena are svabhavasiddha but not svalakshanasiddha according to Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets, 46.7 and 48.8. Thus, 'inherently' in the next sentence means 'by way of the object's own character'.

544 P160, Vol. 6 166.2.2.

545 P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.3, VI.95cd; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.250. See Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 459a.6ff, and Jay-dzun Cho-gyi-gyel-tsen's Par-chin, 149.6 (Indian edition, no pub. data). The penetrating debates of the monastic courtyards are a cause of critical scholarship and a key to Jam-yang-shay-ba's style. As is the case here, he often introduces a topic, such as the four or five sutras requiring interpretation, not with a general presentation but with a rejection of an 'incorrect' interpretation of a minor point. He reports that some say that the number of passages which Chandrakirti said were to be interpreted are just four. Jam-yang-shay-ba corrects this, pointing out that Chandrakirti is referring to four types of passages because these four teachings were framed in many, many different ways. As sources for these four Chandrakirti refers only to the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, but Jam-yang-shay-ba includes other sutras of similar type, the Descent into Lanka Sutra, the

Sutra on the Heavily Adorned, etc., without specifying that these are included by implication.

Without a word of explanation, Jam-yang-shay-ba includes a fifth type of passage among those which require interpretation, the teaching of a Tathagata essence (Tathagatagarbha) as in the Tathagata Essence Sutra. In Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (459a.6ff), however, he defends the number five, saying that Chandrakirti was not necessarily referring only to sutras accepted as literal by the Chittamatrins. Still, Nga-wang-bel-den (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 63a.5ff) disagrees, citing Tsong Khapa who indicates that the passages referred to by Chandrakirti are all taken literally by the Chittamatrins, and thus there are only four since they do not take the teaching of a permanent Tathagata essence literally.

About the translation of Madhyamakavatara as Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way', see pp.399-405. Kensur Lekden was adamant about taking avatara ('jugpa) as 'add on' (snon pa) rather than 'introduce'. He based this on statements by Tsong Khapa and Jam-yang-shay-ba that Chandrakirti was 'filling in gaps' (kha skong ba); however, the matter is not easily settled since the evidence seems to go both ways. Let us first cite Tsong Khapa's explanation in my Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism (pp.97-9), removing the bias of the translation by adding in 'introduce' at every occurrence of 'supplement':

Question: How does Chandrakirti's text supplement/ introduce Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way ? Answer: One person [Jaya-ananda] says that in Nagarjuna's Treatise conventional and ultimate natures are not taught extensively, but that Chandrakirti teaches these two extensively here and in this way supplements/introduces Nagarjuna's Treatise.

This is not a good explanation because the forms of reasoning ascertaining suchness are far more extensive in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way than in Chandrakirti's Supplement/Introduction. Our own system on this is that Chandrakirti supplements/introduces Nagarjuna's Treatise in two ways, from the viewpoints of the profound and of the vast---Therefore, one way in which this book supplements/introduces the Treatise is through good determination of the meaning of the Treatise from the viewpoint of these two purposes [distinguishing the suchness of the Treatise from the interpretations by Svatantrikas and by Chittamatrins].

It also supplements/introduces the Treatise from the viewpoint of the vast.... Thus, [Chandrakirti thought that] it would be very good to fill in the gaps in the paths explained in the Treatise on the Middle Way.... the second way that this text supplements/introduces Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way is in supplementing/ introducing the paths of the Treatise from the viewpoint of the vast.

There is no question that Chandrakirti's text serves to introduce Nagarjuna's Treatise; the question is whether this is the meaning of his title. Jaya-ananda, author of the only extant Indian commentary on this text, sees the mode of its being an avatara as more extensive teaching. At first impression it might seem unsuitable for an introduction to be longer than what it introduces, but given the complexity of Nagarjuna's text, it makes sense that the introduction be longer than the text. What 'extensive' means, however, becomes an issue; Tsong Khapa refutes Jaya-ananda on the grounds that the Treatise, though shorter, is more extensive than Chandrakirti's text in terms of presenting emptiness from many, many viewpoints. It would seem however, that Jaya-ananda was thinking of 'extensive' as meaning 'longer' and that he needed correction on just that point. Given that either an introduction or a supplement could be more extensive than the actual text—either in the sense of length or complexity—we need another avenue of examination. Tibetan scholars who hold that 'jug pa means 'introduction' assert that the agent, the 'jug pa po, is the trainee and the means,

Chandrakirti's text. They mean not that the introducer is the student reading the text but that the enterer is the student, this being by means of Chandrakirti's text, and that the entered ('jug bya) is Nagarjuna's Treatise. Within the Gelugpa tradition of the large monastic colleges, there is no question that what is entered or added onto is Nagarjuna's Treatise, but the question of the agent is by no means easy. On one side are these points:
1 Despite much discussion about the 'special trainees of the Madhyamakavatara' ('jug pa'i died du bya ba'i gdul bya) there is no mention of this topic in connection with the title.

One would think that if the agent, the enterer, were the student reading the text, a discussion of who this student is would ensue here, but it does not.

2 There are several statements by both Jaya-ananda and Jam-yang-shay-ba in which the enterer/supplementer can only be interpreted as Chandrakirti or his text. Jaya-ananda says: bstan bcos 'di de la 'jugpar 'gyur ba'o (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 6a.3) and bstan bcos 'di de la 'jugpa'o' (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 6b.3), 'This treatise [by Chandrakirti] supplements/introduces that [one by Nagarjuna].'

Since bstan bcos 'di is in the nominative and not the instrumental case, there is no way to read the sentence as meaning 'a trainee enters that [text by Nagarjuna] through this treatise [by Chandrakirti].'

3 Tsong Khapa does not refute Jaya-ananda on this point, and he would if he disagreed, given his frequent refutations of him and the importance of the point.

On the other side is a remark by Tsong Khapa: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 1 la.2, de'i phyir gzhung 'di la rten nas dgos pa de gnyis kyi sgo nas rtsa she 'i don legs par ngespa nighzung 'dis dbu ma la 'jugpa 'i tshulgciggo. This was given above as: 'Therefore, one way in which this book supplements/introduces the Treatise is through good determination of the meaning of the Treatise from the viewpoint of these two purposes [distinguishing the suchness of the Treatise from the interpretations by Svatantrikas and by Chittamatrins].' However, it could also be translated as: 'Therefore, one way in which [a trainee] enters the Treatise through this book is to determine the meaning ...' Furthermore, Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 10b.5) calls such ascertainment the 'measure of having entered [or having been introduced to] Nagarjuna's Treatise by way of this [book by Chandrakirti]' (nges pa de 'di'i sgo nas rtsa shes la zhugs pa'i tshad yin). There is no way that this last statement can be construed as not referring to a person, a trainee, and thus the enterer here is clearly the trainee.

As there is undeniable evidence on both sides, we can conclude that the term avatara in this title has both meanings—as a supplement filling in holes and as a means of entry. I find the former to be predominant in the scholastic literature and thus have chosen 'Supplement', within admitting that the text certainly serves to introduce Nagarjuna's text and that even the title is sometimes taken as referring to a trainee's being introduced to the Treatise.

546 The fifth chapter is one, but the other was not located.

547 P6143, Vol. 15474.5.2.

548 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 62a.4ff. This differs some from the citation by Ratnakarashanti in his Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Compendium of Sutra', P5331, Vol. 102 151.4.8ff.

549 P774, Vol. 29 10.4.5, chap. 7. Brackets are from the sutra itself, just preceding the quote.

550 Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 62a.6.

551 P731, Vol. 18 198.1.8, chapter 14. The same passage also occurs in the Eighteen Thousand Stanza (P732, Vol. 19 297.1.6, chapter 22) and is quoted in Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra

(P5330, Vol. 102 101.4.2). Brackets accord with the Chittamatra interpretation. For the fuller quote see p. 606.

552 P744, Vol. 29 10.4.7, chapter 7.

553 P744, Vol. 29 10.4.8, chapter 7. The bracketed material is from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 62a.8. With respect to the translation of arhat or arhan (dgra boom pa) as 'Toe Destroyer', I do this to accord with the usual Tibetan translation of the term and to assist in capturing the flavor of an oral tradition that frequently refers to this etymology. Arhats have overcome the foe which is the afflictions (klesha, nyon mongs), the chief of which is ignorance, the conception (according to the Prasargika system) that persons and phenomena are established by way of their own character.

The Tibetan translators were also aware of the etymology of arhat as 'worthy one' as they translated the name of the 'founder' of the Jaina system, Arhat, as mchod 'od 'Worthy of Worship' (see Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ka 62a.3). Also, they were aware of Chandrakirti's gloss of the term as 'Worthy One' in his Clear Words: sadevamdnushdsurd lokdt pundrhatvdd arhannityuchyate (Poussin, 486.5), lha dang mi dang lha ma yin du bcas pa'i 'jig rten gyis mchod par 'os pas dgra bcom pa zhes brjod la (409.20, Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition; also, P5260, Vol. 98 75.2.2), 'Because of being worthy of worship by the world of gods, humans, and demi-gods, they are called Arhats.' Thus, we are not dealing with an ignorant misconception of a term, but a considered preference in the face of alternative etymologies—'Foe Destroyer' requiring a not unusual infix to make ari-han. Unfortunately, one word in English cannot convey both meanings; thus, I have gone with what clearly has become the predominant meaning in Tibet. (For an excellent discussion of the two etymologies of Arhat in Buddhism and Jainism, see L.M. Joshi's 'Facets of Jaina Religiousness in a Comparative Light', L.D. Series 85, [Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, May 1981], pp.53-8.)

It has been objected that 'Foe Destroyer' is offensively militaristic and that in communicating Buddhism to the West we need to choose terms more suited to our culture. However, we speak of the 'war on poverty', the 'war on smallpox', and so forth. Also, as a translator, one's job is to communicate another culture on its own terms as well as one can, after which readers can pick and choose what is appropriate in their situation.

A more serious objection is to the basic concept of treating one's own afflictive attitudes and emotions in an anthropomorphic way as if they were other people. (Shantideva prescribes such in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds when he addresses his own afflictions as if they were someone else.) The objection is that using such a bifurcating technique rules out watching the luminous and knowing nature (gsal rig gi rang bzhin) of a diseased state of mind as a means of causing it to disappear, this requiring intimate closeness with one's own afflictions. However, treating one's own afflictions as foes seems concordant even with this technique in that it introduces the possibility of not identifying with those afflictions and thus the possibility of their disappearance.

A suggested substitute translation is 'saint'; however, one would not want to limit the main use of the word 'saint' to Hinayana. 'Saint' seems more appropriate for arya 'Superior'. Translation equivalents are by no means easy to come by; accessibility is very important, but rich meaning after becoming accustomed to terms is also important. Still, I do not deny that 'Foe Destroyer' is, at first, awkward.

554 P5330, Vol. 102 101.2.3ff. White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine Sutra, P781, Vol. 30 10.1.5, chapter 2. Nagarjuna has abridged it considerably but fairly. Bracketed material is from Ratnakarashanti (P5331, Vol. 102 150.2.8ff). See Hurvitz's translation in the Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma, pp.30-1.

555 Chapters 2, 3, etc. according to E. Obermiller's 'The Doctrine of the Prajna-paramita as exposed in the Abhisamayalamkara of Maitreya', *Acta Orientalia* (Lugduni Batavorum: E.J. Brill, 1932), p.30.

556 P5330, Vol. 102 101.3.8ff. The sutra is the SatyakasatyakTparivarta which is not listed in the Peking catalogue but which is mentioned in Haribhadra's Abhisamaya-dlokd according to Obermiller, *IBID*, note on p.30. The next two bracketed additions are from Ratnakarashanti (P5331, Vol. 102 151.2.7ff).

557 The translation of dharmadhatu as 'element of qualities' is based on a note by Nga-wang-bel-den (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 8b.8): khyod la dmigs nas sgompas 'phags chos kyi rgyu byedpas chos dbyingszhes bya la 'It is called the element of qualities (dharmadhatu, chos dbyings) because meditation within observing it acts as a cause of the qualities (dharma, chos) of Superiors (Arya, 'Phags pa).' Emptiness, being uncaused, is not itself a cause (element), but meditation on it causes the development of marvelous qualities; thus, emptiness comes to be called a cause, an element producing those qualities.

558 P5330, Vol. 102 101.3.8ff. The original is P731, Vol. 18 198.1.7ff, chapter 14, and P732, Vol. 19 297.1.6. For Conze's translation, see p.205 of *The Large Sutra, Part II* (College Printing and Typing Co., 1964). Brackets accord with the Prasargika interpretation. For Gyel-tsap's commentary, see 145a.l of the Indian folio edition of his *Ornament for the Essence*.

559 Source for this and the next set of brackets is Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 62a.5.

560 P5330, Vol. 102 101.4.4ff. Questions of King Dharanishvara Sutra, P814, Vol. 32 300.5.4ff. Nagarjuna's version is considerably abridged. First brackets are from Ratnakarashanti (P5331, Vol. 102 151.3.1).

561 Ratnakarashanti, P5331, Vol. 102 151.4.6.

562 P5330, Vol. 102 101.5.6. Irreversible Wheel Sutra, P906, Vol. 36 105.3.2ff. Nagarjuna's abridgement is very slight.

563 The five ruinations are decrease of lifespan, degeneration of views, degeneration of the afflictions, degeneration of beings (for example, more difficult to tame), and degenerate era, according to Das's *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, p.501.

564 P5330, Vol. 102 102.1.2. For the first part of the original see P760.48, Vol. 24 255.5.3 or 255.5.6 or 255.5.8 or 256.1.3. The second part is 258.1.4. The abridgement is considerable. See the translation by A. Wayman and H. Wayman, *The Lion's Roar of Queen Srimala* (New York: Columbia, 1974), pp.81-92.

565 P760.48, Vol. 24 255.5.1ff. See *The Lion's Roar* (op. cit.), pp.80ff.

566 P5330, Vol. 102 102.\.3ff. Descent into Lanka Sutra, P775, Vol. 29 50.2.4ff. Brackets are from Jnanashnbhadra's Commentary on the 'Descent into Lanka', P5519, Vol. 107 130.3.2, and Ratnakarashanti, P5331, Vol. 102 152.1.6. Suzuki's translation is p.l 16.

567 P775, Vol. 29 37.3.8 and 50.3.2. Suzuki's translation is p.58 and p. 116 (210). For commentary on the second citation, see Jnanashnbhadra, P5519, Vol. 107 130.5.8ff.

568 This quote was not found in the sutra.

569 P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.3, VI.95cd.

570 P5263, Vol. 98 136.1.Iff, commenting on VI.95cd; Poussin's translation is *Museon*, n.s. v.12, p.250.

571 P774, Vol. 29 8.2.2, chapter 5.

572 P775, Vol. 29 34.3.5, chapter 2. Suzuki's translation is p.44 (123).

573 P775, Vol. 29 39.5.2, chapter 2. See Jnanashnbhadra, P5519, Vol. 107 112.3.7. Suzuki's translation is p.68.

574 P761.31, Vol. 25 263.3.8, chapter 6. This is quoted in the Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 134.1.5, and in Tsong Khapa's Essence, P6142, Vol. 153 196.2.6 as well as in his Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 71.5.8.

575 P5262, Vol. 98 103.1.8, VI.84; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.239.

Brackets are from his own commentary (P5263, Vol. 98 134.1.2).

576 P775, Vol. 29 40.2.6, chapter 2; Suzuki's translation is p.70 (139). See Jnanashnbhadra (P5519, Vol. 107 114.1.6) and Jnanavajra (P5520, Vol. 107 247.2.4). This is quoted in Commentary on the 'Supplement' (P5263, Vol. 98 134.2.3).

577 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 65a.8, which is based on Commentary on the 'Supplement' (P5263, Vol. 98 134.3.8).

578 P761.31, Vol. 25 263.5.6.

579 P775, Vol. 29 53.4.2, chapter 3; Suzuki's translation is p. 133 (33). See Jnanashnbhadra, P5519, Vol. 107 138.1.8. The bracketed material is from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dngos 104a.8ff.

580 P5225, Vol. 95 11.5.3. The 'basis in Buddha's thought' (dgongs gzhi) is not Buddha's intention or purpose in teaching mind-only but the basis in fact that he was working from.

According to the Prasārigika system, external objects exist; therefore, the teaching of mind-only meaning no external objects is not founded itself in fact. But on what fact is it founded—what was the basis in Buddha's thought? According to Nga-wang-bel-den (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 65b.6-6a.2), it was founded on the fact that phenomena are designated by way of their aspect or image (rnam pa) being posited in the consciousness observing them, and in this sense the elements and so forth are said in Nāgārjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning to be included in consciousness, for they are only posited by consciousness. With this as the ontological basis in his own thought, Buddha taught that all phenomena are mind-only, intending to communicate that there are no external objects to those temporarily unable to realize this deeper fact. Hence, the thought of the speaker (gsung bapo 'i dgongs pa) and the thought of what he said (gsungrabkyi dgongs pa) differ, as he was not, at that time, communicating his own deeper understanding.

A point to be gleaned from this type of explanation (as found in Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations') is that according to this school of thought Buddha spoke from a basis of specific understanding; his skill in means wrought changes in what he said according to his audience, but it is not that there was no basis in his own thought. Thus, his word needs to be interpreted in terms of both the needs of the listener and his own grounding in actual fact. When the existential need of the trainee was at odds with the ontological fact, his teaching is subject to refutation by scripture and reasoning. Thus, the interpretation of scripture revolves around the triad mentioned above—the basis in Buddha's thought (or the ontological fact), the purpose (or existential need of the trainee), and damage to the explicit teaching (or refutation by valid sources of knowledge).

581 P2665, Vol. 61 285.5.6. Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may (Explanation, 6a.5) says, 'This book is called Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment because it explains the meaning of a stanza on the mind of enlightenment spoken by Vairocana in the second chapter of the Guhyasamdja.'

582 P5658, Vol. 129 181.2.2, stanzas 394-6. Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', stod 26a.5ff. This is quoted in Chandrakīrti's Clear Words in commentary on XVIII.6; Poussin, p.359.

583 P5262, Vol. 19 103.3.2, VI.94; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.249.

584 P775, Vol. 29 39.5.5ff, chapter 2. Suzuki's translation is p.68. This is quoted in Commentary on the 'Supplement' (P5263, Vol. 98 136.1.4ff). Brackets are from Jnanavajra (P5520, Vol. 107 246.4.4).

585 P5262, Vol. 98 102.2.6, VI.43; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.l 1, p.322. Commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 127.2.4ff. See Tsong Khapa, P6143, Vol. 154 55.5.8. This quote has its own history of disputation because in the Gelugpa interpretation of the Prasangika system the self and the aggregates are asserted to exist conventionally whereas the basis-of-all does not exist in any way whatsoever and yet the three are treated similarly here without seeming to give the self and the aggregates any status which the basis-of-all does not have.

586 P778, Vol. 29 152.2.1.

587 P5263, Vol. 98 127.1.8ff, commenting on VI.42; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.ll, p.321. See Tsong Khapa, P6143, Vol. 154 55.5.Iff.

588 P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.4ff, VI.97; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.253.

Brackets are from Commentary on the

'Supplement' (P.5263, Vol. 98 136.3.8ff, and Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets' (dbu 66b.4ff).

589 P731, Vol. 19 189.2.1. This is quoted in Tsong Khapa's Essence (P6142, Vol. 153 203.5.8).

590 P5263, Vol. 98 136.4.7ff, commenting on VI.97; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.255. This is quoted in Tsong Khapa's Illumination (P6143, Vol. 154 76.3.6ff) and Essence (P6142, Vol. 153 204.5.3ff). See Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 66b.6ff, and Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 464a.2ff. Brackets are from Tsong Khapa's Illumination.

591 Treatise, XV.2cd.

592 P731, Vol. 19 190.2.8ff. Brackets are mostly from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 462a.4ff. This is discussed in Tsong Khapa's Essence of the Good Explanations, P6142, Vol. 153 203.4.6. In Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (_461b.5-2b_.3), Jam-yang-shay-ba identifies the qualm behind Tsong Khapa's consideration of this quote as someone's thinking that it is unsuitable to identify the three natures taught in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought as requiring interpretation because (1) this chapter of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra presents the three natures and (2) these are asserted by Ratnakarashanti in accordance with the Chittamatrin presentation. In response, Jam-yang-shay-ba explains that this chapter presents the three natures in a different way from the Sutra Unravelling the Thought and that Ratnakarashanti is not to be followed here. This is because the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra speaks of all phenomena as not existing ultimately and only existing conventionally whereas the Chittamatrins say that other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena ultimately exist whereas imaginary or imputational phenomena do not.

Though it might seem that the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra makes a differentiation of status among phenomena like that of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought when it says that imagined forms (imaginaries) do not substantially exist whereas imputed forms (other-powered phenomena) do, 'imagined forms' here refer to the ultimate existence imagined of forms which does not exist at all and 'imputed forms' refer to forms themselves which exist conventionally and thus it can be understood that 'substantial existence' here just means existence, not ultimate existence. Ratnakarashanti is faulted for not having taken the context of the sutra into proper account.

Therefore, since the necessarily correct presentation of the three natures in the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra is different from that in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, the latter is suitable to require interpretation.

593 P731, Vol. 19 190.1.2ff. This is quoted in Tsong Khapa's Essence, P6142, Vol. 153 204.3.8, from which the bracketed material is taken.

594 P6142, Vol. 153205.1.7.

595 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 461b.1.

596 See n.574._

597 Tsong Khapa (Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 56.2.7) identifies the quote as the Mahayana-abhidharmasutra which is cited in Asanga's Compendium of the Mahayana as a source for the mind-basis-of-all and in Asanga's commentary on Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle as a source for the Buddha nature. See E. Lamotte, *Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, troisieme volume (1934-5), p.171 n.3.

598 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 461b.4.

599 P5658, Vol. 129 175.2.6, stanza 99. Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 67a.1. Tsong Khapa quotes this in his Illumination, (P6143, Vol. 154 33.1.7).

600 P5246, Vol. 95 136.2.1, VIII.3. Brackets are from Chandrakirti's commentary (P5266, Vol. 98 229.5.3). Tsong Khapa quotes this in his Illumination (P6143, Vol. 154 32.4.2). Gyeltsap quotes this and the next citation in his commentary on the Precious Garland (edition of 78 folios in library of H.H. Dalai Lama), 20b.6-21a.2.

601 P5266, Vol. 98 229.5.3, commenting on VIII.3.

602 P760.16, Vol. 23 198.3.8ff, chapter 26. Chandrakmi briefly cites it in his Commentary on the 'Supplement' (P5263, Vol. 98 145.2.4fl), commenting on VI.138-9. Shantideva cites it in his Compendium of Learnings, chapter 14, as does Prajnakaramati in his Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Shdntideva's) 'Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds', IX.88.

603 According to Geshe Gedun Lodro, nails actually are not considered to be conjoined with consciousness.

604 The term 'Bare Mountains' has been untraceable to date. See Kosha iii.141 for the mountains. For kitadri, see Kosha iii.147.

605 P5658, Vol. 129 175.2.6, stanza 80. Tsong Khapa quotes it in his Illumination (P6143, Vol. 154 32.5.1). Jam-yang-shay-ba's commentary is based on Gyel-tsap's (21b.1-3).

606 As Kensur Lekden emphasized, the terms are only hypothetical synonyms because synonyms are existent by definition, and no member of this list exists.

607 P5246, Vol. 95 139.2.7, XIV.23. Brackets are from ChandrakTrti's commentary (P5266, Vol. 98 270.3.6).

608 P5266, Vol. 98 270.3.6, commenting on XIV.23.

609 P5272, Vol. 99 260.4.5, IX.140. See Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 200a.5ff.

610 P5242, Vol. 95 112.1.7ff.; chap. 18.

611 P5260, Vol. 98 56.1.6, commenting on XVIII.7; Poussin, 368.4.

612 '... or reliant on causes and conditions' (hetupratyayan prapya, more literally, 'meeting to causes and conditions') is missing in the Tibetan. The translation of the last sentence follows the Tibetan.

613 P760.43, Vol. 24 194.1.2ff. Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dngos 77a.7ff and dbu 68b.5ff. There is a similar quote in the Clear Words (Poussin, 358.10).

614 P5224, Vol. 95 6.3.7, XV.10.

615 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu69a.1.

616 P5262, Vol.98 103.1.8, VI. 83; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.238.

Chandrakirti's own commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 133.5.2. Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 69a.4ff. The second quote is P5262, Vol. 98 104.5.6, VI. 159d; Poussin's translation is

Museon, n.s. v.12, p.321. Chandrakirti's commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 147.3.8. The third quote is P5262, Vol. 98 101.5.5, VI.24a; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.11, p.300. Chandrakirti's commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 123.3.4.

617 P5266, Vol. 98 103.4.4, chapter 12. This is quoted in Tsong Khapa's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way', P6153, Vol. 156 66.1.4.

618 Chapters 10 and 22.

619 P5262, Vol. 98 103.4.4, VI.104ab; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.267. Chandrakirti's commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 138.5.4. Kensur Lekden said that this reasoning is called the 'diamond slivers' (rdo rje gzegs ma) because each of the four reasons is capable of overcoming a conception of inherent existence just as a piece of diamond has the hardness and so forth of a diamond. Thus, gzegs ma (kana) means 'piece'; hence 'sliver' should not be thought of as a weak, thin piece but a fragment. According to Apte, the Sanskrit term also means 'facet'; this would seem to be most appropriate when speaking of diamonds (and more appropriate to the meaning since each of the four reasons alone actually is not capable of refuting inherent existence); however, none of my Tibetan sources, oral or written, has explained it this way. The oral traditions that I have contacted are by no means always accurate; nevertheless, when put together, the various oral strains are quite full and no Tibetan scholar to date has given this interpretation (one said that gzegs ma refers to the points of a vajra).

620 P5343, Vol. 103 21.3.6.

621 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 225b.3.

622 P5242, Vol. 95 75.1.6ff, commenting on I.I. Brackets are from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 225a.6ff.

623 P5262, Vol. 98 101.3.4, VI.8c-13; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.11, pp.280-4. Brackets are mostly from Chandrakirti's own commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 120.3.4ff.

624 Treatise, P5224, Vol. 95 8.1.1, XX.19cd and XX.20cd. These are quoted in Chandrakirti's Commentary on the 'Supplement' commenting on VI.14ab.

625 P5262, Vol.98 101.4.2, VI.14; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.11, pp.286-7.

626 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu71a.8.

627 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 71b.2.

628 P5224, Vol. 95 3.1.5, 1.5. Brackets are from Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 14.1.6, commenting on 1.5. Chandrakirti's other interpretation takes parabhava as meaning production from other, but the meaning is roughly the same.

629 P5262, Vol. 98 101.4.3ff, VI.15-19; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.11, pp.288-93. Brackets are mostly from Chandrakirti's commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 121.4.3ff, and Tsong Khapa's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 38.3.7ff.

630 This might also be kesara; 'Rottieria intcotira; Mimusops Elengi, Mesua Ferrara' according to Poussin (Museon, v.11, 289 n.4). He (IBID, n.5) identifies kimshuka as 'Butea Frondosa'.

631 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 71b.2.

632 P876, Vol. 34 304.3.5. This is cited in Chandrakirti's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 122.3.7.

633 Source for the brackets is Chandrakirti's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 122.4.2.

634 P5262, Vol. 98 101.5.1, VI.20; Poussin's translation is n.s. v.11, p.295. Brackets are mostly from his own commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 122.4.5.

635 P6143, Vol. 154 37.4. Iff. I have disregarded snga phyi in the second sentence.

636 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 37b.4ff.

637 P876, Vol. 34 304.2.8 and 305.4.6, with some variation in the reading. See p. 502 for a citation of this by Chandrakirti with a slightly different reading.

638 P5260, Vol. 98 6.1.8, commenting on I.I; Poussin, 27.4. For the context of the quote, see p.503.

639 P5262, Vol. 98 102.1.5, VI.32d. His commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 24.5.8.

640 P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.5, VI.98ab; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.256 (misnumbered as 95ab). His commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 136.5.5.

641 See p. 150 for a different rendition of this.

642 Artocarpus Lacucha.

642a P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.6, VI.99; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.239. His own commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 137.2.8.

643 P5227, Vol. 95 13.1.7.

644 P5231, Vol. 95 52.5.6ff.

645 P5262, Vol. 98 101.5.2, VI.21; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.11, p.296.

646 P5263, Vol. 98 122.5.2ff. See pp. 152-4 for Chandrakirti's commentary.

647 P5343, Vol. 10321.3.5.

648 The instrumental bshad pas is not an actual one according to Geshe Gedun Lodro.

649 This is a paraphrase of Kamalashila's Illumination of the Middle Way, P5287, Vol. 101 76.4.2.

650 The Satyadvayavibhanga is not included in the Peking Tripitaka. Brackets, except where noted, are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 73b.3ff.

651 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 128b.7.

652 P5260, Vol. 98 3.3.7, commenting on the salutation; Poussin, 6.3-.5. See p.668.

653 P5260, Vol. 98 13.3.7, commenting on 1.3; Poussin, 74.3. For Dignaga's presentation of this, see M. Hattori's Dignaga, On Perception (Cambridge: Harvard, 1968), p.76 n.1.11 and p.87 n.1.33.

654 P5266, Vol. 98 259.1.5ff, chapter 13. Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 74b.4. See n.653.

655 P5272, Vol. 99 248.5.3ff, V.15. Brackets are from Gyel-tsap's commentary, 43b. of a Ganden edition.

656 Relics such as teeth and bone are made into powder, molded, and stamped with a holy image. These are called sachchha, or sachchha, perhaps from sack meaning 'to be devoted'.

657 P5272, Vol. 99 248.5.4, V.16. This is quoted in Tsong Khapa's Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path, 79b.5 (Dharmasala: Shes rig par khang, 1968).

658 P5272, Vol. 99 248.1.2, IV.21ab.

659 P5287, Vol. 101 76.4.2.

660 P5287, Vol. 101 76.5.2.

661 'The effects are plural because the causes are plural.' Actually, the inference is based on the cause and not the effect; however, according to Geshe Gedun Lodro it is the Buddhist logician's custom to refer even to these as effect-signs.

662 P5224, Vol. 95 9.3.5, XXIV. 19. Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 74a.8.

663 P5246, Vol. 95 136.4.3, IX.2 and IX.5. Brackets are from Chandrakirti's commentary, P5266, Vol. 98 236.3.3. This is quoted in Chandrakirti's Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 78.2.6; Poussin, 505.

664 This is quoted in Chandrakirti's Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 78.2.7; Poussin, 505. He also quotes it in his commentary to the Four Hundred, P5266, Vol. 98 236.5.2.

665 P5260, Vol. 98 78.2.8, commenting on XXIV. 19; Poussin, 505.14.

666 P5224, Vol. 95 9.3.4, XXIV. 18. Brackets are from Tsong Khapa's commentary, P6153, Vol. 156 148.3.2ff and 148.5.Iff.

667 P5260, Vol. 98 78.2.3, commenting on XXIV. 18; Poussin, 504.13.

668 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 75a.8. ,

669 Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 75a.7.

670 P6016, Vol. 15337.3.5.

671 P5265, Vol. 98 171.5.Iff.

672 See P5591, Vol. 115 176.2.3ff, and P5593, Vol. 116 175.2.3ff.

673 This is often called a gerund, not like the English declinable noun but the Sanskritic indeclinable continuative indicating often the anterior of two actions.

674 P5767, Vol. 140 5.1.3 Alamkhalvoh pratishedhe ktva va. See Pa, III.iv. 18-20. Hereon, the Sanskrit is taken from the Cdndravdydkaranam (Jodhapura, 1967). Usually the continuative affix is affixed to the former of verbs in a temporal series; 'After men' indicates an exception.

675 P5775, Vol. 140 45.3.8.

676 P5767, Vol. 140 13.4.7. Anansamdse ktvah lyap. See Pa, VII.i.37.

677 P5775, Vol. 14045.5.4.

678 P5767, Vol. 140 11.5.7. Hrasvasya atihi phi tuk. See Pa, VI.i.71.

679 P5775, Vol. 140 43.3.8.

680 P5767, Vol. 140 \2.\A.AkahakidTrghah. See Pa, VI.i.101.

681 P5767, Vol. 140 6.2.5. Arthamatreprathama. See Pa, II.iii.46.

682 P5767, Vol. 140 6.1.2. Supah asamkhyad luk. See Pa, II.iv.82.

683 P5767, Vol. 1404.3.6. Ghan kdrakecha. See Pa, III.iii.16, 18, 19.

684 P5775, Vol. 140 45.1.3.

685 P5767, Vol. 140 6.2.5. Arthamatreprathama. See Pa, II.iii.46.

686 P5767, Vol. 140 15.5.6. Sasajushah rah. See Pa, VIII.ii.66.

687 P5767, Vol. 140 12.1.6. Hashi cha atah roh. See Pa, VI.i.113, 114.

688 P5767, Vol. 140 16.1.7. Virdme visarjaniyah. See Pa, VIII.iii.15. The citing here is doubtful because the Tibetan quoted and the Peking translation do not, for the first time, agree.

689 P5260, Vol. 98 3.2.8ff; Poussin, 5.1-4. See the notes in Poussin (p.5ff) throughout.

690 In the Peking catalogue five books are listed as being translated by Sthiramati (bLo-rtan).

691 P5260, Vol. 98 3.3.3ff; Poussin, 5.7-8.

692 See Pa, IV.iv.98.

693 P5253, Vol. 95 154.1.8.

694 Avalokitavrata, Commentary on (bhavaviveka's) 'Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) "Wisdom"', P5259, Vol. 96 169.5.8ff.

695 Stcherbatsky (p.90) identifies these others as Hinayanists.

696 This is a paraphrase of Kalapa's Aphorisms; see n.679.

697 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 75b.8.

698 Rice Seedling Sutra, P876, Vol. 34 303.3.4. Here the word dharma (Tib. chos) equals tathatd (Tib, de kho na nyid) according to Tsong Khapa's Illumination (P6143, Vol. 154

147.1.3).

699 The Sanskrit has rupani, whereas the version given here follows Jam-yang-shay-ba's transliteration into Tibetan letters (see p.668).

700 P5260, Vol. 98 3.3.5ff; Poussin, 6.1-7.5.

701 The Sanskrit has only 'eye', not 'eye and forms' in this sentence.

702 Putting cha between the two words rather than after the second is irregular but still barely possible; thus, I have left it there. The original reads chakshurcha.

703 P5253, Vol.95 154.1.6ff. There are minor differences between the Tibetan translations of Bhavaviveka's own passage and Chandrakirti's citation of it but none of substance.

The Tibetan translators adopted a code for handling this three-part discussion of the formation of pratityasamutpada:

prati = rten cing

i or itya = 'brel bar

samutpada = 'byung ba

Their over-riding concern was with having a three-part translation equivalent that, when together, makes sense in Tibetan. As a result, the individual equivalents often make no sense when associated with these various interpretations.

Some Tibetan scholars claim that rten cing and 'brel bar have different meanings; however, since Chandrakirti says that prati (rten cing), which itself means prapti (phrad pa), modifies the meaning of itya ('brel ba) into meaning prapti (phrad pa), the two words come to have just one meaning, and thus it seems that the two were separated out in Tibetan merely in order to convey, albeit not very well, this discussion of the meaning of the individual parts. Perhaps a better alternative would have been to transliterate the individual parts into Tibetan rather than attempt a translation.

In Chandrakirti's interpretation, pratitya has just one meaning as a continuative meaning 'having depended' which in Tibetan is rten nas as in the commonly used rten nas 'byung ba or rten 'byung. Strictly speaking, therefore, in Prasangika rten nas 'byung ba or rten 'byung is the most appropriate general term, with rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba suitable only as a code equivalent for the three-part discussion, rten 'brel is a common usage that is neither.

704 P5260, Vol. 98 3.4.6ff; Poussin, 8.1-3.

705 The Tibetan mis-reads rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba where it should read rten cing 'brel bar in accordance with the Sanskrit pratitya.

706 P5260, Vol. 98 3.4.7ff; Poussin, 8.3-9.

707 For Chandrakirti prati alone means prapti (meeting, phrad pa) as does pratitya. In its continuative form prapti (phrad pa) is prapya (phrad nas).

708 Though the Tibetan here is phrad pa, 'meeting', I have rendered it to accord with Nagarjuna's prapya, 'having met'. The alternation in the use of forms is due to Chandrakirti's and Jam-yang-shay-ba's using the general term outside of this particular usage for the more specific term within this usage as a continuative.

The significance of Chandrakirti's citation is lost in the Tibetan translation de dang de brten gang 'byung ba/ rang gi ngo bor de ma skyes which, nevertheless, is an excellent translation in general in that it conveys the meaning. However, to convey the point here it should read de dang de phrad gang 'byung ba/ rang gi ngo bor de ma skyes. (The second line could have been rendered as de ni rang bzhin gyis ma skyes.) By using brten for prapya instead of phrad the purpose of Chandrakirti's stunning citation is lost in the Tibetan.

The text is P5225, Vol. 95 11.4.1.

709 P5260, Vol. 98 3.5.2ff; Poussin, 8.10-9.6. The Tibetan reading is followed in the first two paragraphs of the translation.

710 Brackets are from Avalokitavratā (P5259, Vol. 96 170.1.6). He identifies the two

interpretations as 'arising upon depending on and meeting these and those [causes and conditions]' and 'the arising of those which possess individual disintegration' (de dang de la brten cing phrad nas 'byung ba'izhes bya ba dang/so so'i 'jigpa dang Idan pa rnams kyi [text has kyi] 'byung ba zhes bya ba 'i don de gnyi ga med pa 'i phyr te).

711 P5225, Vol. 95 11.4.1.

712 P5253, Vol. 95 154.2.1.

713 Rice Seedling Sutra, P876, Vol. 34 303.3.8.

714 P5260, Vol. 98 3.5.7ff; Poussin, 9.7-10.2. Literally: 'That system which is presented as "What then? The meaning..." is also incorrect.'

715 Poussin calls attention to Pa, II.i.44.

716 P5225, Vol. 95 11.4.1.

717 P5658, Vol. 129 174.4.7, stanza 48ab. The Peking edition has: 'di yod pas na 'di byung dper/ ring po yod pas thung ngu bzhin.

718 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 77b.3 (which is actually 76b.3 due to misplacement in printing).

719 P5260, Vol. 98 4.1.Iff; Poussin, 10.3-9.

720 P5593, Vol. 116 175.2.3.

721 P5246, Vol. 95 139.2.7, XIV.23. Brackets are from Chandrakmi's commentary (P5266, Vol. 98 270.3.6).

722 P5225, Vol. 95 11.4.1. Chandrakirti's commentary is P5265, Vol. 98 177.1.3.

723 P5266, Vol. 98 270.3.3, which is commentary preceding XIV.23. Here in the terms dngospo medpar smra ba and dngos por smra ba (in Sanskrit most likely abhavavddin and bhavavddin) the term dngos po (bhava) has two different meanings in Tsong Khapa's mode of interpretation. In the first it means 'things', i.e., those which are able to perform a function, or even more widely 'phenomena', whereas in the latter it means 'inherent existence'. Thus, conceptual sense is made out of Chandrakirti's saying that he is neither a proponent of abhava or of bhava. Instead of such statements being taken as a direct call away from conceptuality to another level of consciousness beyond the opposites of abhava and bhava, their different sense is explicated such that we are left not with paradox but with a tidy explanation of two extremes and a middle free from them.

In Gelugpa, there is a decided movement away from only smashing two conceptual poles against each other and thereby forcing movement to another level of consciousness in the resulting conceptual hiatus. Rather, a complete conceptual map is laid out with the moves neatly delineated. Still, in order to follow the map, one must undergo the battering and smashing of misbegotten conceptuality, gain the appropriate conceptual realization and then, through becoming accustomed to it, eventually arrive at non-conceptual realization. It would be a mistake to assume that Gelugpas are somehow satisfied with a mere verbal lay-out of intricate philosophy. There is a basic recognition that we are controlled by our ideas, and thus re-formation of ideas in a harrowing process of analytical meditation—involving one's feelings in the most intimate sense—is of central importance.

724 P5682, Vol. 129 237.5.7.

725 Mahamati, Clear Words, Extensive Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter', P5690, Vol. 129 270.4.3 and 270.4.8.

726 P6016, Vol. 153 38.1.1.

727 G7 ca 26b.lff and 43a.2ff. For a discussion of 'able to set itself up' see

Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 10a.5ff. Also see Dak, 71b.5ff (215.5 in the Thim-phu edition). In chapter eleven of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets Jam-yang-shay-ba cites many scriptures that refer to valid cognition, correct perception, truths, and so forth and concludes that to be

validly certified does not necessarily mean to be able to set itself up or to be inherently existent. In Daktsang's system just the opposite holds: If something is validly certified, it must be selfinstituting. Thus, since nothing is able to set itself up in the Prasangika system, there can be no valid certification of the existence of objects for Daktsang. Valid certification for Daktsang and for Tsong Khapa are different; the former sees it as implying self-institution, whereas the latter views it, in Prasangika, as implying non-self-institution. For Tsong Khapa the valid certification of an object is itself a sign that the object does not inherently exist. The process of certification itself cannot bear analysis such as whether, when a consciousness certifies the existence of an object, the object is already certified, is being certified, or is yet to be certified. If the object is already certified, then it perforce is not what is undergoing present certification. If it is yet to be certified, how can it be said that it is being certified? If a certifier certifies what is presently being certified, then two activities are required, one for the designation of the consciousness as the certifier and another for the designation of the object as what is being certified. Also, when a certifier begins to certify an object, what is it acting on? Something already certified? Something being certified? Something yet to be certified? Valid certification of objects cannot bear such analysis; thus, valid certification even conventionally does not inherently exist.

Daktsang approaches the problem from a different angle; he probably thought that if it were affirmed that objects are validly certified, then students would think that objects as they appear to them would be true, and the knot of cyclic existence would be tied even tighter. Both Tsong Khapa and Daktsang agree that objects do not exist the way they appear, that our assent to these appearances binds us in cyclic existence, and that to free ourselves from cyclic existence we must discover the true nature of these objects. Their means are different.

728 P5709, Vol. 130 88.3.4, chapter 3.

729 Brackets in the root text are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 129a.2.

730 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 464b.2ff.

731 This is quoted in Chandrakirti's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 142.4.8, commenting on VI. 126. It is also quoted in Tsong Khapa's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 84.3.7.

732 P5262, Vol. 98 104.1.7, VI.124b; Poussin's translation is *Muse'on*, n.s. v.12, p.289. The second quote is P5262, Vol. 98 104.2.6, VI.132cd; *Muse'on*, n.s. v.12, p.301.

733 P5263, Vol. 98 141.2.7, commenting on VI. 120; v.12, p.283. Brackets are from Tsong Khapa's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 82.2.8.

734 P5242, Vol. 95 111.1.2, commenting on XVIII.2ab.

735 P5263, Vol. 98 141.2.3, commenting on VI. 120; v.12, p.282.

736 P5262, Vol. 98 100.2.5, I.3ab; v.8, p.258.

737 P5263, Vol. 98 109.3.5, commenting on 1.3; v.8, p.258. Brackets are from Tsong Khapa's Illumination, Vol. 154 6.5.1.

738 P6153, Vol. 15665.5.8ff.

739 A point of controversy among the Gelugpas is just what is an illustration (*mtshan gzhi*) of the 'mine'. Jam-yang-shay-ba says that it does not refer to the things which are considered to be mine, such as eyes and ears, but to the person who considers things to be possessions. 'Mine' is a person, but not a second person separate from I because the two are the same entity and different conceptual isolates or opposites of the negatives. 'Mine' cannot be the eyes, ears, tongue, and so forth, because these are the bases of the designation 'mine', and in the Prasangika system the basis of a designation is not the

phenomenon designated. As Kensur Lekden said, if one watches carefully when the thought 'my' or 'mine' appears, this 'my' often appears more on the subject's side than on the object's. He said that as a form of I it is more extensive and active than I.

Still, Jam-yang-shay-ba's annotator, Nga-wang-bel-den, disagrees (Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 78b.3-80b.5) saying that the eyes, ears, and so forth which are included within one's own continuum are illustrations of mine but not the objects observed by the false view of mine. For Jam-yang-shay-ba also, the objects of observation of the false view of mine are not the eyes, ears, and so forth but mine itself, which for him is a person, and that person is wrongly conceived to exist inherently.

The problem is largely one of terminology. Since the view of the transitory collection (satkayadrshiti, 'jig tshogs la ha ba) as inherently existent I and mine refers only to a conception of a self of persons, then even 'mine' would seem to refer only to the person involved in ownership, the 'my'. It makes some sense in English to say that my own ear is not an illustration of 'my', as 'my' is that which makes things into mine, but it is difficult to say that my own ear is not an illustration of 'mine', is not mine, just because it is not what makes such things into mine. Jam-yang-shay-ba tries to make this distinction in Tibetan by saying that an ear included in one's own continuum is not an illustration of mine (bdag gi ba'i mtshan gzhi), is not mine (bdag gi ba), but is an illustration of something that is owned (bdag gi yin rgyu'i mtshan gzhi) and thus something that is owned (bdag gi yin rgyu). According to Nga-wang-bel-den, however, 'mine' can refer to phenomena considered to be possessions and included within the continuum of a person, but those phenomena do not have to be the object of observation of a false view of mine—the object of observation perhaps being the I that owns them.

According to Geshe Lhundup Sopa, Jay-dzun Cho-gyi-gyeltsen, the textbook author of the Jay (Byes) College of Sera Monastery, avoids the problem by dividing phenomena into not just two categories, persons and other phenomena, but also a third, mine. Here in the false view of mine, 'mine' is not the person and not the eyes, etc., but just the mine itself, technically called the isolate of mine (ngayi ba'i rang Idog), or opposite from non-one-with-mine, which means just mine and not its illustrations, not the things that are mine. The object of observation of the false view of mine is this mine, but the false view of mine is nevertheless a conception of a self of persons since it is conceiving the I involved in mine to be inherently existent. In this way, my own ear is an illustration of mine, and thus is mine, but is not an object of observation of the false view of mine as this is only the isolate of mine.

In any case, the Gelugpa scholars agree that the conception of eyes, ears, and so forth included in one's own continuum as inherently existent is a conception of the inherent existence of phenomena, not of persons, and that in the false view of mine the mine is something different from the person that is conceived to exist inherently in the false view of I. The controversy over what this is draws one into noticing the I as owner.

740 P6153, Vol. 15666.1.2.

741 Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate (blockprint in the possession of Geshe Wangyal), 105a.6ff.

742 P5260, Vol. 98 53.5.8, commenting on XVIII.2cd; Poussin, 347.13.

743 Seen.741.

744 See Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 471a.3ff, for almost the same presentation. Jam-yang-shay-ba attributes this position to Daktsang in both Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets and Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, but in neither does he give a source to show that Daktsang actually asserts this

position. The absence of citation often means that Daktsang does not explicitly assert such but that he is 'forced' to do so as a consequence of other assertions. As Geshe Gedun Lodro said, it is necessary to determine, when Jam-yang-shay-ba cites a 'contradiction' in Daktsang's writings, whether it is an explicit contradiction or whether Daktsang is being forced into a particular assertion by logical pressure (*rigs pas phul ba*). As the ascription of fantastic positions explicitly unfounded in Daktsang's writings is a conscious literary device, it does not constitute inaccurate reporting of Daktsang's positions but does indeed make reading Jam-yang-shay-ba's text difficult.

My guess on this one is that it stems from a criticism by Daktsang (see Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 47a.8-8b.2) of Tsong Khapa for claiming that reasoning refuting artificial misconceptions does not refute the innate. In reply Jam-yang-shay-ba first explains that Tsong Khapa should be understood as saying that 'although one refuted objects imputed by systems of tenets that do not involve the mode of apprehension by innate [misconceptions], this would not damage innate [misconceptions] and although one refuted objects imputed merely and only by systems of tenets, this would not harm innate [misconceptions]'. This means that refuting that the I, for instance, does not depend on causes and does not change does not refute the innate misconception of the inherent existence of the I, as the conception that the I is independent and immutable does not constitute the innate conception that the I inherently exists or exists in its own right. Rather, refuting such can be a branch of refuting the innate conception of inherent existence when it is understood that if things did inherently exist, they could not depend on causes and could not change.

Having clarified Tsong Khapa's meaning, Jam-yang-shay-ba proceeds to accuse Daktsang of therefore holding that all forms of artificial misconceptions (such as that the person is permanent, unitary, and under its own power) and all forms of innate misconceptions are exactly the same and that, thereby, refuting the grossest of the gross would mean one had refuted them all—a position Daktsang obviously does not assert. Perhaps, it is within this absurd 'extension' of Daktsang's views that Jam-yang-shay-ba here claims that Daktsang holds that the person and the aggregates always appear as one.

Through studying the points Jam-yang-shay-ba displays in framing his refutation, one learns, not so much about Daktsang's views, but a great deal about Jam-yang-shay-ba's own views. This type of polemic is a frequently used technique for conveying information basic to one's own system and needs to be milked for that. If one thinks that it is merely polemic to put down an opponent, a great source of subtle distinctions will be lost. After holding one's nose for a while, the points—devoid of the polemic—become fascinating.

The opinion being forced on Daktsang here is that it is wrong to refute the existence of a person different from the aggregates first and then refute a self of phenomena, the reason behind this patently absurd view being that a consciousness innately misconceiving the person always views the person as one with the aggregates. Thus, for 'Daktsang' the very refutation of the inherent existence of the I constitutes a refutation of the inherent existence of mind, body, and so forth which are phenomena other than the person.

The refutation of this position provides an opportunity to discuss the extremely subtle and intricate topic of the appearance of an inherently existent I and its relation to the appearance of mind and body. Jam-yang-shay-ba's response revolves around considering an innate consciousness apprehending I (*ngar 'dzin lhan skyes*) in two ways: valid and invalid. He first points out that there are valid conceptions of 'my mind', 'my body', and so forth in which I and mind or body are different and then points out there is a coarse innate misconception of I in which the I and the aggregates are viewed as like a master and subjects, the assumption being that if the I and the aggregates did not appear to be

different such could not be misconceived.

745 P5262, Vol. 98 104.1.7, VI.124b. Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 83a.6.

746 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 471b.4. Although when the stomach is sick, persons say, 'I am sick,' they do not innately say, 'I am my stomach.'

Jam-yang-shay-ba is making the point that even though the appearance of the I is inseparably mixed with that of the mental and physical aggregates like water in milk, when we conceive the I to exist inherently, we do not conceive it to be either one with or different from the aggregates.

747 P5262, Vol.98 101.2.3, IV. 2d; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.8, p.311. Brackets are from Tsong Khapa's Illumination of the Thought, P6143, Vol. 154 27.1.1. Rangdu ha badang 'brel is taken as meaning that what is destroyed is that which is related to the view of self, not relation with the view of self as Poussin takes it ('est détruite toute relation avec l'idée de soi'). The view of self is the subtle misconception of the person as being inherently existent; that which is related with it or is produced in dependence upon it is the coarse view of the person as being self-sufficient. Thus, Chandrakirti is interpreted as saying that on the fourth ground the Bodhisattva overcomes the corresponding level of the innate coarse misconception of the self in which the I and the aggregates are conceived to be like master and subjects. If the I and the aggregates did not appear differently, such a conception could not take place, in which case Chandrakirti would absurdly be wrong to say that on the fourth ground the respective level of that affliction is overcome. See Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, p.226.

748 P5263, Vol. 98 118.3.2, end of chapter 4. The sutra is P761.31, Vol. 25 258.2.4. The sutra speaks of the fourth ground Bodhisattva's overcoming what is interpreted as this coarser view of self described in n.747.

749 P5262, Vol. 98 104.1.7, VI.124b; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.289. His commentary is Vol. 98 142.3.4. Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 83a.6.

750 Brackets are from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 471b.2.

751 P5262, Vol. 98 104.1.8, VI.125; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.290. Brackets in the citation are from Tsong Khapa's Illumination of the Thought, P6143, Vol. 154 84.2.5.

752 Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 481a.1) identifies this as Tsong Khapa and his spiritual sons (Gyel-tsap and Kaydrup). In colloquial Tibetan hrang hrang is used to depict someone who is alone, someone standing on his own. Phob phob seems to mean forthright or concrete, the very sound suggesting the seemingly hard surface of a bubble.

753 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 481a.2ff. For this same refutation, see Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 481a.1-b.5.

754 Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be saying that the appearance of the aggregates is the appearance of the I; however, his Great Exposition of the Middle Way (481b.2) words the same point differently: 'It [absurdly] follows that when an embodied self appears to an innate [consciousness] it does not have to appear by way of the appearance of the aggregates' (lhan skyes la lus can gyi bdag snang ba na phung po 'i snang ba 'i sgo nas snang mi dgos par thai). He is clearly holding the opposite of this absurd consequence, i.e., that when the I appears, it appears by way of the appearance of the aggregates; this does not mean that the appearance of the aggregates is the appearance of the I. Thus, in this reading he is saying only that the I appears together with the aggregates and dependent upon the appearance of the aggregates. This seems the more credible reading since it is clear that he is holding

that they appear together but that the I, within that context, appears to be standing by itself and concrete.

When he says that the I and the aggregates appear inseparably, it does not mean that one could not identify the appearance of the I within this conglomerate appearance; it merely means that they appear together and that the I appears by way of the aggregates' appearing. In accordance with the passage cited above, the passage here might read better as nga 'igdags gzhi phung po 'i rnam pa shar ba 'i sgo nas nga'i rnam pa shar ba ma yin pa'i phyir ('because [according to you] the appearance of the aspect of I is not by way of the appearance of the aspect of the aggregates which are the basis of imputation of "I"').

755 See n.749.

756 P5224, Vol. 95 7.2.8, XVIII.lcd.

757 P5260, Vol. 98 53.3.1ff, commenting on XVIII.lcd; Poussin, 343.8; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 10 146.20ff.

758 'Suitability as form' (rupana, gzugs su rung ba) is rendered by J.W. De Jong in his Cinq Chapitres De La Prasannapada (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1949, 4) as 'le pouvoir d'être brisé', 'capable of being broken'. The latter is how Ajitamitra interprets the term in his commentary on the Precious Garland (P5659, Vol. 129 notation lost).

Therefore, it appears that the translators into Tibetan were aware of both meanings and chose 'suitability as form' here. Lati Rinbochay said that 'capable of being broken' is not appropriate as a definition of form at least in those schools which assert partless particles as these cannot be broken down either physically or mentally. Perhaps this is the reason why the translation as 'that which is suitable as form', meaning whatever one points to when asked what form is, was preferred. Still, Geshe Gedun Lodro said that partless particles could not be further reduced without disappearing; thus, if we take their physical disappearance as their susceptibility to being broken, this interpretation of rupana as that which is susceptible to being broken would be an appropriate definition of form.

'That which is suitable as form' (gzugs su rung ba) appears to be almost a non-definition since it repeats the very term being defined, form; however, it does illustrate the notion that reasoning meets back to common experience in that with form we are at a level of common experience with little else to come up with as a definition other than saying that it is what we point to when we identify form.

759 Blockprint in the possession of Trijang Labrang, 88a.2ff.

760 P6153, Vol. 156 110.3.3, commenting on XI.3.

761 Blockprint in the possession of Trijang Labrang, 89a.6.

762 P5263, Vol. 98 146.1.1, commenting on VI.144; Poussin's translation is Muse'on, n.s. v.12, p.312.

763 See Chandrakirti's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 146.1.3fF, commenting on VI.144; v.12, p.312.

764 Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 54.5.6ff, commenting on XVIII.5; Poussin 355.5.

765 This is quoted in Chandrakirti's Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 54.5.7, commenting on XVIII.5 immediately after the last quote; Poussin, 355.7.

766 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 84b.6.

767 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 84b.5.

768 Jam-yang-shay-ba now states the syllogisms establishing the emptiness of a person, citing the two subjects which Nagarjuna used, the self (translated here as 'person') and the Tathagata, as in chapters eighteen and twenty-two of the Treatise. In this context 'self is the nominally existent person and not 'self in the sense of inherent existence, and the

Tathagata is merely an example of a person, albeit the most exalted person. The implicit point is that if even the most exalted person lacks inherent existence, then, of course, ordinary persons lack it.

In this context the term 'Tathagata' refers to a fully developed Buddha, not to the 'potentiality' for Buddhahood which exists in all sentient beings. The emptiness of the mind is the Tathagata nature or Buddha lineage, which itself is empty of inherent existence and applies to all persons; however, here the referent of Tathagata' is just the person of a Buddha. Thus, 'Tathagata and self, the dual subjects in Jam-yang-shay-ba's syllogisms refuting a self of persons, are not synonyms because there are many selves that are not Tathagatas. Jam-yang-shay-ba is merely using the dual subject as a convenient means to establish that not only are persons empty of inherent existence but also, among persons, even a Tathagata lacks it.

769 Chandrakirti uses this metaphor in his Clear Words P5260, Vol. 98 35.4.3, commenting on X.14; Poussin, 212-13.

770 P5224, Vol. 95 8.3.3, XXII. 1. Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 85a.1ff.

771 P5658, Vol. 129 175.2.8, stanza 82. Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 85a.2ff.

772 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets' (dbu 85a.3) says, 'The self is not inexpressible as either one with or other than the aggregates.' This is the assertion that the self and the aggregates are not mingled like fire and fuel.

773 P5242, Vol. 95 120.4.1, commenting on XXII.1.

774 P5260, Vol. 98 53.1.8, commenting on XVIII.1; Poussin, 341.8.

775 The Buddhist Sanskrit Texts edition of the Sanskrit (145.22) emends the text to read, 'due to the consequence of the fault of manyness'. However, the Tibetan accords with Poussin's Bibliotheca Buddhica edition (p.341) and allows for fallacies other than manyness.

776 Supplement, P5262, Vol. 98 104.2.Iff, VI.127-8; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v. 12, pp.292-4. Brackets are from his own commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 142.5.5ff, and Tsong Khapa's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 84.5.4ff.

777 P5242, Vol. 95 120.4.2, commenting on XXII. 1. Brackets are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 86b.8.

778 P5260, Vol. 98 55.3.Iff, commenting on XVIII. 1; Poussin, 343.8.

779 P5242, Vol. 95 120.4.4ff, commenting on XXII. 1.

780 P5263, Vol. 98 145.4.6ff, commenting on VI. 142; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.310. Brackets are from Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 89.1.3ff.

781 P5242, Vol. 95 120.4.5, commenting on XXII. 1.

782 P5262, Vol. 98 104.3.7ff, VI.143; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, pp.310-11. Brackets are from Tsong Khapa's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 89.1.7ff.

783 P5263, Vol. 98 145.5.2ff, commenting on VI. 143; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.311.

784 P5260, Vol. 98 66.5.4, commenting on XXII. 1; Poussin, 435.3. In the eighteenth chapter of the Treatise Nagarjuna presents the reasoning which refutes an inherent existence of persons in abbreviated form. There just two positions are refuted: a self is shown to be inherently neither the same as nor different from the aggregates. In the twenty-second chapter on the Tathagata, the five-cornered reasoning is presented.

785 P5658, Vol. 129 175.2.7, stanza 81 (for stanza 80 see p.631), and 175.2.8, stanza 83. Brackets in the first quote are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 67b.4-8; in the second, from Nga-wang-bel-den's

Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 87a.5ff. (In my translation of the Precious Garland, published as Volume 2 of the Wisdom of Tibet Series, I used the Sanskrit edition as well as Ajitamitra's commentary though I cited neither—*mea culpa*.)

The four elements conventionally exist in mutual dependence; the one cannot exist without the others. However, one of them is not the others because then it would have the character of the others whereby the character of the elements would become confused. They also do not inherently depend on each other, because then they would be inherently existent others, capable of standing alone whereas they are not. They also cannot subsist without the others. This is the fourfold analysis (dependence being considered two ways) which establishes that the elements do not inherently exist, that is, are not established as their own reality.

786 The term *dnegos smra ba* (bhavavadin) usually refers to those schools which assert true existence (*bden grub*), these being Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, and Chittamatra, and thus has been translated as 'Proponents of True Existence' or 'Proponents of Truly Existent Things'. However, here the term includes the Svatantrikas, who although they do not propound true existence do assert inherent existence (*svabhavasiddhi, rang bzhin gyis grub pa*). That they propound inherent existence is indicated by the fact that they assert the self to be a consciousness, for instance. In other words, when the object designated as 'person' is sought, something is found—a consciousness. (See also n.723.)

787 P5262, Vol. 98 104.4.6, VI.151; Poussin's translation is *Museon*, n.s. v.12, p.316.

Brackets are from Tsong Khapa's *Illumination*, P6143, Vol. 154 90.2.4ff. Chandrakirti's own commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 146.4.Iff.

788 P5262, Vol. 98 105.1.3ff, VI. 166-7; Poussin's translation ends with VI.165. Brackets are from his own commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 148.5. Iff, and Tsong Khapa's *Illumination*, P6143, Vol. 154 93.1.4ff.

789 Tsong Khapa (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 477a.l) identifies *chags pa* (*rakta*) in this context as referring to the mind or person that is desirous of an object—that which is made impassioned by passion, i.e., the impassioned.

790 'Illustration' (*mtshan gzhi*) most likely is *lakshya* in Sanskrit, which is translated into Tibetan both as *mtshon bya* 'definiendum' and *mtshan gzhi* 'illustration', the latter being a basis in which the definition illustrates the definiendum. It seems to make no difference here whether the term is translated as 'illustration' or 'definiendum'. I prefer the latter for broader symmetry but have deferred to the Tibetan translation and used 'illustration'.

791 Dak, 80b.1-4 (239.5-40.3 in the Thim-phu edition): '[Tsong Khapa's] explanation that among our own schools only the Vatsrputriyas propound a substantially existent self and [his] assertion that there are Madhyamikas and Chittamatrins such as Bhavaviveka and so forth who propound the mental consciousness as an illustration of the self are contradictory. Therefore, our own schools, except for the Vatsiputriyas, disagree about the basis of the designation which is imputed as the self or person—all five aggregates, the mental consciousness, the basis-of-all, its continuum, and so forth—but they all only assert the object designated, the actual person, as either a substantially existent or imputedly existent non-associated compositional factor. There is no one who asserts that there is a common locus of form or consciousness and person ...'

According to Jam-yang-shay-ba (for the corresponding presentation in Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way see 474a.2-6a.4), Daktsang is saying that the Vatsrputnyas assert that the five aggregates are the basis of the designation 'person' whereas Bhavaviveka only asserts that the mental consciousness is such. Jam-yang-shay-ba refutes the suggestion that for Bhavaviveka the collection of the body and the senses are

not the basis of designating 'I' with a quote from the Blaze of Reasoning (P5256, Vol. 96 36.4.5) which says the opposite, 'Thus, [the self] is imputed to the collection of the body and the senses.'

Jam-yang-shay-ba's basic point is that if for Bhavaviveka the mental consciousness is just the basis of the designation T and not the I, then there would be no difference between Bhavaviveka and Chandrakirti with respect to the nature of the conventionally existent I. He is showing that Bhavaviveka asserts that the mental consciousness is the I and, thereby, that he asserts that persons (and other phenomena) exist from their own side or are established by way of their own character since when they are sought, something that is them is found. Jam-yang-shay-ba (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 475b.5-6) clearly makes this point: 'It [absurdly] follows that those [scholars, Bhavaviveka and so forth,] do not assert that the self is established from its own side because [according to you] they do not assert that, when sought, it is found.' In other words, whoever asserts that when an object is sought analytically it is found thereby asserts inherent existence. It is central to the Gelugpa presentation of the four schools of tenets that only Prasangika asserts an emptiness of inherent existence and thus that all other schools assert that when an object is sought one can come up with something that is it. This is based on comments by Chandrakirti such as that analyzing the object designated is not suitable in the context of positing conventionally existent phenomena (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 275b.6) in which he is seen to be refuting the other schools. It becomes incumbent then to discover what each school asserts the self and so forth to be, and thereby what may have been at most a minor topic in those schools becomes major in the Gelugpa presentation of tenets. Whereas it would have been unthinkable in Indian Buddhism to compile and correlate (at least in print) the assertions of the various Buddhist schools on the identification of the person, in the Gelugpa texts this is found in books of tenets under the topic of 'object-possessors' (yul can) which is sub-divided into the three topics of expressional terms (rjod byed kyi sgra), consciousness (shes pa), and persons (gang zag). In the latter section (see Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, pp.78, 101, 115, 125, and 136) we learn that:

1 in Vaibhashika, all five aggregates are the person for some Sammitiyas and the mind alone for the Avantakas,

2 in Sautrantika, the continuum of the mental and physical aggregates is the person for the Sautrantikas Following Scripture and the mental consciousness, for the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning,

3 in Chittamatra, the mind-basis-of-all is the person for the Chittamatrins Following Scripture and the mental consciousness, for the Chittamatrins Following Reasoning,

4 in Madhyamika, a subtle neutral form of the mental consciousness is the person for the Svatantrikas whereas the mere I that is imputed in dependence upon its basis of imputation, the aggregates, is the person for the Prasangikas.

In the lower schools, the person is designated to the mental consciousness and so forth, meaning that the mental consciousness, for instance, is the person, whereas in Prasangika the person is designated in dependence upon the mental consciousness and so forth and thus is not those phenomena.

Just this point is the pivot of Gelugpa commentary, the brilliant discovery of Tsong Khapa's analysis, the over-riding organizing principle of their philosophical presentations, their dazzling insight into the Indian Buddhist schools, the core of their practice of emptiness, the grindstone for reducing other interpretations to unintelligible powder, the insight that makes the presentation of moral behavior in the four systems feasible, the foundation for making sense out of the controversies between the Indian schools, the cause impelling the

drawing of nearly incredible distinctions about the person, the magnifying glass for discovering hidden assertions of what the person is, and the foundation for recognition that even in Buddhism with selflessness as the core doctrine there are selves, there are persons, there are agents, there is a basis for moral retribution, there is someone to achieve nirvana, there are other sentient beings not just on a baseless level of pre-wisdom ignorance but validly established. It is a magnificent stroke.

It is necessary to search thoroughly among the teachings of each school in order to find its views on the existent self because most of their attention is paid to the non-existent self, be it selfsufficiency, true establishment, inherent existence, etc. In his *Blaze of Reasoning* Bhavaviveka says that to prove to him that the mental consciousness is the self would be a case of proving what he already accepted. Bhavaviveka also says that since the mental consciousness takes rebirth, it is called the self. Jam-yang-shay-ba takes the latter to mean that for Bhavaviveka the mental consciousness is the self, not just its basis of designation, since Bhavaviveka says that it is unnecessary to prove to him that the mental consciousness is the person. Also, Bhavaviveka says that the senses and the body are the basis of the designation 'self. Thus, (Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of the Middle Way*, 475a.4) for him there are two types of selves, a temporary one such as a human merely designated to the aggregates and a continual one which is a subtle type of mental consciousness that has travelled ceaselessly in all types of lives and therefore (according to Kensur Lekden) exists even during deep sleep, fainting, and meditative absorption in cessation. Still, Bhavaviveka is not teaching that yogis should engage in a particular type of practice in order to identify this everpresent consciousness as the self; the mental consciousness which he considers to be the person is subtle, and neither he nor anyone else puts forth practices aimed centrally at realizing or making manifest this subtle form of consciousness.

According to Kensur Lekden, Jam-yang-shay-ba told his own students that if a hypothetical Bhavaviveka asked a Prasangika why the mental consciousness could not be the self, the Prasangika would have difficulty replying. For the mental consciousness travels from life to life right through to the attainment of Buddhahood, and even the Prasangikas say that 'mind-only' sometimes literally means that the mind is the main creator.

However, the Prasangikas say that the reasoning that the selves would be as many as the many moments of the mental consciousness opposes asserting that the mental consciousness is the person. The person and the mental consciousness are related as object imputed and basis of imputation; therefore, the I is not the mental consciousness.

In a similar vein, Tsong Khapa and Jam-yang-shay-ba say that the Chittamatrins following Asanga assert the mind-basis-of-all (a subtle consciousness much like Bhavaviveka's subtle type of mental consciousness), which is substantially existent, as the person and thus as the substantially existent person (*dravyasatpudgala*, *rdzas yod kyi gang zag*). Like Bhavaviveka, Asanga says that the person itself imputedly exists, but, in this interpretation, that which is the person substantially exists. (The main difference between Asanga's mind-basis-of-all and Bhavaviveka's subtle mental consciousness is that the former is the repository of the seeds which produce the appearance of external objects whereas the latter does not have this function because for Bhavaviveka there are external objects.) Still, it is difficult to find any passage in Chittamatrin literature which proclaims that the mind-basis-of-all is a substantially existent self. Also, the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* (Jang-gya's *Presentation of Tenets*, 206.10) is often quoted to show that the mind-basis-of-all should not be conceived as a self: 'I do not teach this [mind-basis-of-all] to children because they would take it as a self.' Jam-yang-shay-ba's commentary is that Buddha is referring to conception of the mindbasis-of-all as a

self-sufficient substantially existent person (rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod kyi gang zag). Although the mind-basis-of-all is substantially existent and thus capable of being apprehended self-sufficiently (rang rkya 'dzin thub pa'i rdzas yod), it is not a self-sufficient person like a controller.

Daktsang, however, argues that there is no Buddhist school which says that a mind is the person. Daktsang accuses Tsong Khapa of committing the absurdity of saying on the one hand that the Chittamatrins do not accept that the self is substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient and saying on the other hand that they accept that the mind-basis-of-all is substantially existent and is the self. The Gelugpa answer is that for the Chittamatrins the person itself is not substantially existent, but the consciousness which is the illustration of the person is substantially existent. Technically (Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way, 476.2), the illustrationisolate of the person (gang zag gi gzhi Idog) substantially exists, but the self-isolate of the person (gang zag gi rang Idog) does not. As Jang-gya (Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 190.7) says, '... the Proponents of True Existence and below [that is, non-Buddhists] assert that there must be something self-sufficiently substantially existent as the basis of designation of imputedly existent things ...' It is only the Prasangikas who do not require this.

The gist is that the Chittamatrins do not accept the existence of the self as it is usually conceived, but do accept the substantial existence of a consciousness which performs all the functions of rebirth and thus is a self. In practice, the Chittamatrins present a Hinayana path which concentrates on the non-existence of a substantially existent self and a Mahayana one which centers around the non-difference of entity between subject and object; there are no special reasonings aimed at discovering the mind-basis-of-all as the actual self.

Have these distinctions between self-isolate, illustrationisolate, and so forth made it impossible to reflect on the insubstantiality of the person according to the lower systems? How could one meditate on the self-isolate of the person and not the illustration-isolate (the thing that is the person)? Is it possible to zero in on the person devoid of everything that is it, recognize that we have been conceiving it to exist substantially, and realize that it does not? Is the 'self-isolate of the person' so abstract that it reduces a most profound and emotionally trying meditation to mere superficial intellectual verbiage? Or is there something inside us, quite familiar, that corresponds to this term and the identification of which is aided by such hairsplitting distinctions?

The pressing question is: Why not say that the lower schools present a path to realization of the non-inherent existence of the person but are not able to extend this realization to other phenomena? One would have to say that they are blocked from making the extension that everything lacks inherent existence by views that it would be an extreme of nihilism to go so far and thus hold that the person does not inherently exist but its basis of designation must. After all, realizing that the Atlantic Ocean is deep does not mean that you realize that the Pacific Ocean is deep!

I believe that the answer to this revolves around what realization of emptiness means. As Aryadeva says, the viewer (or person realizing the emptiness) of one thing is capable of realizing the emptiness of all things. As the Dalai Lama said in lectures on Tsong Khapa's Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path in 1972, if you want to test your supposed realization of the emptiness of the person, switch to another object such as your head and see if the same realization of emptiness applies to it. He said that if it does not, you have realized something more coarse. Thus, even though, when a yogi realizes that whatever is not findable in the seven ways is not inherently existent, he does not at that time realize the absence of inherent existence of all phenomena, superimpositions contrary to such realization are removed. Therefore, a person capable of realizing the emptiness of

inherent existence of the person is capable of realizing the absence of inherent existence of any phenomenon as long as the functioning of that first consciousness has not diminished. Also, because the person is imputed in dependence upon the aggregates, there would be no way to realize the emptiness of inherent existence of the object imputed (the person) without removing the superimposition that the bases of its designation (the mental and physical aggregates) inherently exist. Hence, there is no way to say that the lower schools realize the emptiness of inherent existence with respect to the person but not with respect to other phenomena, in which case what they realize must be coarser. Since the meaning of inherent existence implies that the object can be found under analysis, those schools must be holding that objects, even the self, can be found under analysis. Even though they make a distinction between imputed and substantially existent objects, the former must, in the end, have the latter as their basis of designation. Hence, even the self or person has a substantially existent phenomenon as its basis of designation, and since the person is findable under analysis, that substantially existent phenomenon must be the person. What they refute is that the person, in isolation, substantially exists.

792 P5256, Vol. 96 36.4.5. Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, 431.1, has brjodpa for dran pa.

793 See previous note. In Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (475b.1-3) Jam-yang-shay-ba says that this passage posits consciousness as the self that continuously takes rebirth and indicates (1) that the mere collection of the body and senses is the self and (2) that the five aggregates— the body and so forth—are the basis of designation of the self, just as, for example, (1) the mere collection of the parts of a chariot is the chariot and (2) its parts are the basis of designation. Here, he words it slightly differently, indicating that the collection is the basis of designation and thus is the phenomenon designated.

794 P5256, Vol. 96 36.4.6. Throughout this series of consequences Jam-yang-shay-ba is operating based on Daktsang's actual assertions, drawing them out so as to contrast their full import with Tsong Khapa's teachings. This is not a case of pinning a fancied extension of an assertion on Daktsang and then drawing absurd contradictions, as sometimes is the case.

795 Brackets in the root text are from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dbu 129a.6.

796 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, ca 40a.5_fF.

797 It is not that Daktsang manifestly asserts that in the Prasangika system there are autonomous syllogisms. Quite the contrary, he asserts (Dak, 76a.4, Thim-phu edition 227.4) that it is contradictory to say that there are no autonomous proof statements and still hold that there is inference. Jam-yang-shay-ba feels that Daktsang must hold that there are proofs, whereby, due to his own assertion, he is forced to assert that there are even autonomous syllogisms in Prasangika. It is over-play that, for me, falls flat.

798 Prasangikas do not accept that the subject, reason, example, and so forth, of a syllogism appear similarly to a Madhyamika and a non-Madhyamika. For the Prasangikas, a valid cognizer which seems to an opponent to establish the subject, etc., is non-existent in the way that the opponent asserts it because a non-Madhyamika views a valid cognizer as certifying that the object is inherently existent, but for a Prasangika nothing inherently exists. In this way, there can be no common establishment.

However, when Prasangikas debate among themselves, the subject, etc., are accepted as appearing similarly to both parties in the sense that both assert that the subject and so forth are certified by valid cognizers that are not valid with respect to the inherent existence of the object. As mentioned earlier (p.51112), there is no way to have commonly

appearing subjects with respect to proving emptiness even when Prasangikas debate among themselves, because if they can understand that the subject and so forth are established by a valid cognizer that is not valid with respect to the inherent existence of the object, they have come to be able to distinguish between existence and inherent existence and this can only be done upon having realized emptiness. In that case, there is no need to prove emptiness to such a person. As Tsong Khapa's *Essence of the Good Explanations* (194.17 Varanasi 1973 edition) says:

If the subject is posited as established by a conceptual or non-conceptual mistaken consciousness which is such that [the object] does not exist in accordance with how it appears to be established by way of its own character, then the meaning of the absence of inherent existence— the probandum—has already been established. Therefore, how could [such a person] be suitable as another party for whom that would have to be proved?

Thus, Jam-yang-shay-ba appears to contradict Tsong Khapa here when he speaks of commonly appearing subjects within the context of two Prasangikas' examining emptiness. However, in the *Four Interwoven Commentaries* (536.5-7.2) he indicates that a Proponent of True Existence who has discarded his assertion of inherent existence and become a full-fledged second party about to realize the absence of inherent existence simultaneously has become someone for whom dependent-arising is a reason having the three modes of presence in the subject, pervasion, and counter-pervasion. Thus, that person has ascertained with valid cognition that whatever is a dependent-arising is necessarily without inherent existence and is about to realize the particular subject, such as I, as not existing inherently. Jam-yang-shay-ba is saying that at that point the other party has become a Prasangika due to realizing that whatever is a dependent-arising is without inherent existence but has not realized emptiness, though just about to. It is only in such a hair-splitting situation, however, that he can speak of commonly appearing subjects within the context of two Prasangikas' examining emptiness.

799 The source for this appendix is mainly the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden. The teaching is standard to that part of the study of the *Collected Topics of Valid Cognition* (bsDus grva) called 'Awareness and Knowledge' (bLo rig). See Lati Rinbochay's and Elizabeth Napper's *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*, (London: Rider and Co., 1980), for a full discussion.

800 See n.174 for the sources for this appendix.

801 Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', dngos 16b.

802 Paul Demieville, 'L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'apres Paramartha', *Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, premier volume (1931-2), p.19.

803 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, kha 6b.

804 Anton Schiefner, *Geschichte Des Buddhismus in Indien* (St. Petersburg, 1869), p.206 of text and p.270 of translation.

805 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, kha 7a.

806 Schiefner (see n.804), p.271 of translation.

807 *Blaze of Reasoning*, P5256, Vol. 96 68.4.3.

808 Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, kha 6b.5.

809 Bimala C. Law, trans., 'The Chronicle of the Island of Ceylon, or the DTPavamsa', *The Ceylon Historical Journal*, Vol. VII (1957-8), pp. 162-4. Wilhelm Geiger, trans., *The Mahavamsa, or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon* (London: Pali Text Society, 1934), pp.26-7. For an excellent discussion of the eighteen schools and the different interpretations of their origins see Andre Bareau's *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Vehicule* (Saigon: Ecole Fran?aise D'extreme-Orient, 1955).

810 The main source for this appendix is Pur-bu-|ok's (Phur-bu-lcog Byams-pa-rgya-mtsho,

1825-1901) Presentation of Collected Topics of Prime Cognition, Revealing the Meaning of the Texts on Prime Cognition, Magical Key to the Path of Reasoning (Tshad ma'i gzhung don 'byed pa'i bsdus grva'i rnam bzhag rigs lam 'phrulgyi Ide mig), specifically the section on The Greater Path of Reasoning (Rigs lam che ba) [modern blockprint, no publication data], 23a.6-36a.4. Only material concordant with Prasariḡika has been used. Tsong Khapa makes a similar presentation in his Essence of the Good Explanations, 239.1-41.17, Varanasi 1973 edition.

811 Jam-yanḡ-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way 238b.6ff. The material in this appendix is taken from the oral teachings of Geshe Gedun Lodro.

[End]